# The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42077

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 3, 2013
- **Citation:** R42077

## Text

The Unified Command Plan and
Combatant Commands:
Background and Issues for Congress
(name redacted)
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
January 3, 2013

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R42077

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands

Summary
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and associated Combatant Commands (COCOMs) provide
operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant
impact on how they are organized, trained, and resourced—areas over which Congress has
constitutional authority. The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and reviewed and updated every two years that
assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of
responsibilities to COCOMs. Functional COCOMs operate worldwide across geographic
boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services
while Geographic COCOMs operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a
distinctive regional military focus. There are currently nine COCOMs:
•

USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

•

USSTRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE.

•

USTRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL.

•

USAFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.

•

USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

•

USEUCOM: U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.

•

USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

•

USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI.

•

USSOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL.

This report provides information on the history, mission, and operational considerations for each
of these organizations as well as a brief discussion of current issues associated with the UCP and
these commands.
The origins of the UCP and COCOMs are rooted in World War II. After the war, U.S. leaders,
taking advantage of the lessons learned in both theaters, initiated a series of legislative changes
that resulted in the current UCP process and COCOM construct.
The UCP and COCOMs are covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle A - General Military
Law; Part I–Organization and General Military Powers; Chapter 6–Combatant Commands. These
provisions detail the responsibilities and authorities of COCOMs as well as legal requirements
related to the UCP.
Potential issues for Congress include the implications of a strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific
region. Another issue is whether there is a need for greater interagency involvement in the UCP
development process. A possible area for congressional concern is if Geographical COCOMs
have made U.S. foreign policy “too militarized.” Some have also suggested there might be a need
for separate COCOMs apart from the current nine to better address emerging regional and ethnic
alignments as well as emerging threats such as cyber warfare. Finally, if Congress believes the
current COCOM construct does not meet contemporary or future security requirements, there are
proposals for alternative organizational structures that might prove more effective.

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Contents
What Are the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Combatant Commands (COCOMs)? ................ 1
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
Unified Command Plan (UCP) .................................................................................................. 1
Combatant Command (COCOM).............................................................................................. 2
Functional Combatant Commands ...................................................................................... 2
Geographic Combatant Commands .................................................................................... 3
Origins of the UCP .................................................................................................................... 3
Outline Command Plan 1946—The First UCP ................................................................... 3
National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) ....................................................................... 4
DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-599) ................................................................. 4
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) ................................. 5
What Laws Govern the UCP? .......................................................................................................... 5
UCP Update Cycle ........................................................................................................................... 6
Other Agency Involvement .............................................................................................................. 7
Congressional Involvement ............................................................................................................. 7
The Current UCP ............................................................................................................................. 8
Change One to the 2011 UCP .................................................................................................... 9
Origins of the COCOMs .................................................................................................................. 9
What Laws Govern COCOMs? ..................................................................................................... 10
General Discussion of Provisions ............................................................................................ 10
Command Authority .......................................................................................................... 11
COCOM Commander’s Responsibilities .......................................................................... 11
COCOM Funding .......................................................................................................................... 12
COCOM Budgetary Provisions ............................................................................................... 12
Functional and Geographic Combatant Commands ...................................................................... 13
Basic Organizational Principles............................................................................................... 13
Interagency Representation in COCOMs ................................................................................ 14
Functional Combatant Commands................................................................................................. 15
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) .................................................................. 15
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 15
History ..................................................................................................................................... 15
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 16
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) ..................................................... 16
Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) ...................................................................... 16
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) .......................................................... 17
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) .......................................................... 17
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) ..................................................................... 17
Other Components ................................................................................................................... 17
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) ..................................................................... 17
Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) ............................................ 18
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 18
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 18
SOF Support to Combatant Commanders ......................................................................... 18

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Efforts to Address “Fraying” of the Forces ....................................................................... 18
Continued Efforts to Expand USSOCOM Authorities and Control of Deployed
SOF ................................................................................................................................ 19
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) ........................................................................... 19
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 19
History ..................................................................................................................................... 20
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 21
Service Subcomponents .................................................................................................... 21
Functional Components..................................................................................................... 22
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 23
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 23
Nuclear Weapons Sustainment .......................................................................................... 23
Possible Shortfalls in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Analysts.......................................................................................................................... 23
USCYBERCOM Workforce ............................................................................................. 24
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) ................................................................. 24
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 24
History ..................................................................................................................................... 24
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 26
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) ............................................... 26
Military Sealift Command (MSC)..................................................................................... 26
Air Mobility Command (AMC) ........................................................................................ 26
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 26
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 27
Ground Supply to Afghanistan .......................................................................................... 27
Guam and Building Toward USTRANSCOM’s Future .................................................... 27
Geographic Combatant Commands ............................................................................................... 28
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) .................................................................................. 28
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 28
A Different Kind of Combatant Command ....................................................................... 28
History ..................................................................................................................................... 28
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 30
U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) ........................................................................................... 30
U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) ................................................................................. 30
U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA) ............................................................................... 30
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) ........................................................... 30
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) ................................................ 31
Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAFRICA) ..................................................... 31
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 31
U.S. Deployment to Central Africa ................................................................................... 31
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)..................................................... 32
Exercises ........................................................................................................................... 32
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 32
Regional Threats ............................................................................................................... 32
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Challenges .................................... 32
Additional Forces Allocated to USAFRICOM ................................................................. 33
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) ............................................................................... 33
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 33
History ..................................................................................................................................... 33
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 35

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U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) ......................................................................................... 35
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) ......................................................... 35
U.S. Air Forces Central (AFCENT) .................................................................................. 35
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT)............................................ 35
Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) ........................................................ 36
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 36
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 36
Middle East Unrest ............................................................................................................ 36
Iranian Interference ........................................................................................................... 37
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) ................................................................................. 37
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 37
USEUCOM Commander and NATO ................................................................................ 37
History ..................................................................................................................................... 38
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 39
U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR) ......................................................................................... 39
U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) ............................................................................. 39
U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) ................................................................................. 39
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) ........................................................ 40
Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) ........................................................... 40
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 40
Support to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan ................................................................................................................ 40
Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises ............................................................... 40
Exercises in the Baltics, Balkans, and Caucasus ............................................................... 40
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 41
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 41
The Balkans ....................................................................................................................... 41
Missile Defense ................................................................................................................. 41
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).......................................................................... 42
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 42
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) .............................................. 42
Missile Defense ................................................................................................................. 42
Unique Civil Support Mission........................................................................................... 42
History ..................................................................................................................................... 43
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 44
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) .................................... 44
Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK) .................................................................................... 44
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) .......................................................................... 44
Joint Task Force North (JTF North) .................................................................................. 45
Army North (ARNORTH) ................................................................................................ 45
Air Force North (AFNORTH) ........................................................................................... 45
U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) ................................................................................ 45
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 45
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 46
Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations............................................................ 46
The Arctic .......................................................................................................................... 46
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) ...................................................................................... 47
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 47
History ..................................................................................................................................... 47
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 48

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U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) ........................................................................................ 48
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) ............................................................................................... 48
U.S. Eighth Army .............................................................................................................. 48
U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) ............................................................................................. 49
U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF) ....................................................................................... 49
U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC).................................................................... 49
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) ............................................................ 49
Other Major USPACOM Organizations .................................................................................. 49
Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) ..................................................................... 49
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) ........................................................... 50
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) ............................................................... 50
Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West) ............................................................. 50
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 50
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 50
Regional Challenges.......................................................................................................... 50
U.S. Strategic Shift to the Pacific ...................................................................................... 51
Report to Congress on Resources Needed for U.S. Strategic Shift to the Pacific ............. 51
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) .......................................................................... 53
Mission .................................................................................................................................... 53
History ..................................................................................................................................... 53
Subcomponents........................................................................................................................ 54
U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH) ......................................................................................... 54
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet
(COMUSNAVSO/COMFOURTHFLT) ......................................................................... 54
Air Forces Southern/Twelfth Air Force (AFSOUTH) ....................................................... 55
U.S. Marine Forces South (USMARFORSOUTH) .......................................................... 55
Special Operations Command South (USSOCSOUTH) ................................................... 55
USSOUTHCOM Task Forces and Direct Reporting Units ..................................................... 55
Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-Bravo) ................................................................................. 55
Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF–Guantanamo) ........................................................... 55
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) .......................................................... 55
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) ............................................................ 56
Ongoing Operations................................................................................................................. 56
Exercises and Military-to-Military Activities.................................................................... 56
Task Force-Oriented Activities.......................................................................................... 56
Selected Current Issues............................................................................................................ 56
Counter-Trafficking ........................................................................................................... 56
Natural Disasters, Poverty, and Violence .......................................................................... 57
Extra-Regional Actors ....................................................................................................... 57
Potential Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................... 57
What Are the Implications of the Asia-Pacific Strategic Shift for the UCP and
COCOMs? ............................................................................................................................ 57
Is Greater Interagency Involvement in the UCP Process Needed?.......................................... 58
Has U.S. Foreign Policy Become “Too Militarized” as a Result of the Geographic
COCOMs? ............................................................................................................................ 59
Are There Other Regions or Functions That Merit a Separate COCOM? ............................... 61
Is There an Alternative to COCOMs? ..................................................................................... 63
Replacing Subcomponent Commands with Joint Task Forces (JTFs) .............................. 63
Replacing COCOMs with a Joint Interagency Organization ............................................ 63

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Figures
Figure 1. Combatant Command Chain of Command .................................................................... 11

Tables
Table 1. FY2011–FY2013 Operations & Management (O&M) Budget ....................................... 12

Appendixes
Appendix. 2011 UCP COCOM Areas of Responsibility ............................................................... 65

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 65

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What Are the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and
Combatant Commands (COCOMs)?
Introduction
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and associated Combatant Commands (COCOMs) provide
operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant
impact on how they are organized, trained, and resourced—areas over which Congress has
constitutional authority. In a grand strategic sense, the UCP and the COCOMs are the
embodiment of U.S. military policy both at home and abroad. The COCOMs not only execute
military policy but also play an important role in foreign policy, and Congress, in both oversight
and budgetary roles, has shown great concern in this regard. All Combatant Commanders testify
to the Armed Services Committees on an annual basis about their posture and budgetary
requirements and frequently host Members and staff during a variety of congressional delegation
visits.

Unified Command Plan (UCP)
The Department of Defense (DOD) defines the Unified Command Plan (UCP) as
The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified
combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure;
delineates the general geographical area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic combatant
commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant
commanders.1

The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS) and reviewed and updated at a minimum every two years. While the UCP is
normally on a two-year cycle, it can be updated anytime based on changing strategic, political,
and budgetary requirements. As noted, the UCP assigns missions; planning, training, and
operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of responsibilities to COCOMs. The UCP is
assessed and modified, taking into consideration the following strategic documents:2
•

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America;

•

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America;

•

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America; and

•

The current UCP.

The UCP process also takes into consideration the strategic context (such as the war in
Afghanistan, the global economic situation, relationships with allies, etc.) and command guidance
from the President and senior DOD civilian and military leadership. As part of the final review
1

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010 (as
amended through May 15, 2011), p. 385.
2
Information in this section is from a briefing provided to CRS by the Joint Staff Plans Division on October 7, 2010.

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process before the UCP is submitted to the President, the proposed UCP is reviewed by senior
service leaders, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC). Congress is
not included in this review process but does have visibility into issues affecting UCP
development.

Combatant Command (COCOM)
DOD defines Combatant Command (COCOM) as:
A unified3 or specified4 command with a broad continuing mission under a single
commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense
and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant
commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.5

Dr. Cynthia Watson, a professor at the National War College and author of “Combatant
Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagements” describes combatant commands as being:
Commands in charge of utilizing and integrating air, land, sea, and amphibious forces under
their commands to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national
interests. Four [now three] of the unified commands handle functional concerns while there
are six with geographic mandates. The specific configurations have shifted over the decades,
but the idea that geography provides an organizing principle remains the same, allowing each
combatant command to have its specific threats and opportunities. The combatant
commanders work with the military forces in their theaters, and report to the commander in
chief and secretary of defense. The combatant commanders do not serve on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff nor are they the senior U.S. representatives in the theater.6

The number of combatant commands is not regulated by law or policy and their numbers and
responsibilities have varied over the years. Today, there are nine active COCOMs, and one
COCOM–U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was disestablished in 2010 and all of its
remaining functions were transferred to other COCOMs or organizations.

Functional Combatant Commands
Functional combatant commands operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide
unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services:
•

USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL;

3
Joint Publication 1-02 defines a unified command as a “command with a broad continuing mission under a single
commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established
and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
4
Joint Publication 1-02 defines a specified command as “a command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally
functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military
Department.”
5
Ibid., p. 60.
6
Cynthia A. Watson, “Combatant Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagement,” Praeger Security International,
2011, p. 15 (hereinafter, Cynthia A. Watson).

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•

USSTRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE; and

•

USTRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL.

Geographic Combatant Commands
Geographic combatant commands operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a
distinctive regional military focus.
•

USAFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany;

•

USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL;

•

USEUCOM: U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany;

•

USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO;

•

USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI; and

•

USSOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL.

Origins of the UCP
The United States’ experience with global warfare in World War II provided countless lessons
attesting to the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of
U.S. forces.7 While the United States was able to achieve a degree of unified command in the
European theater under General Dwight Eisenhower—Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Force—attempts to establish unified command in the Pacific “proved impossible.”8
Differences between the Army and Navy precluded any sort of unified command arrangement and
General Douglas MacArthur commanded U.S. Army Forces, Pacific while Admiral Chester
Nimitz commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Although both commanders were able to work together
to defeat Japan, there was a considerable amount of friction between these two powerful,
independent commands. After the war, President Truman noted:
We must never fight another war the way that we fought the last two. I have the feeling that
if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war
would have ended much earlier.9

Outline Command Plan 1946—The First UCP10
In 1946, the Chief of Naval Operations characterized the Pacific command arrangement as
“ambiguous and unsatisfactory” and proposed a single command over the Pacific (not including
Japan, Korea, and China) to provide unity of command over all U.S. forces in the region. The
7

Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Joint History Office, “The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999,” Washington, DC, 2003.
8
Ibid., p. 11.
9
Charles A. Stevenson, “Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st
Quarter 2008.
10
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office, “The History of the Unified Command Plan
1946-1999,” Washington, DC, 2003, p 11.

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Army and the Army Air Forces rejected this proposal, favoring instead unified command based
on assignment of mission and forces as opposed to geographic areas. After a great deal of
discussion and compromise, a worldwide system of unified command was established. President
Truman approved the “Outline Command Plan” in December 1946, establishing seven commands
as an “interim measure for the immediate post war period.” The seven commands were:
•

Far East Command;

•

Pacific Command;

•

Alaskan Command;

•

Northeast Command;

•

Atlantic Fleet;

•

Caribbean Command; and

•

European Command.

Some of these seven commands contained more than one service and were, in a sense, unified,
while others, such as the Atlantic Fleet, were service-specific. Even though these commands were
established to achieve a degree of unity, the services continued in many instances to plan and act
independently. Since 1946, the UCP has continued to evolve—sometimes in a dramatic manner—
to reflect ever changing strategic, organizational, and political requirements. While Congress has
influenced the UCP over the years, three major legislative initiatives have had a lasting impact on
the UCP.

National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253)
While the National Security Act of 1947 is best known for the creation of the U.S. Air Force, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and establishing the office of the Secretary of Defense, it also
created the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system.11 The UCC system signified the
recognition by the United States that it would continue to have a worldwide, continuous global
military presence. The National Security Act of 1947 also gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the
responsibility to establish unified commands in “strategic areas” subject to the approval of the
President and Secretary of Defense.12

DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-599)13
In 1958, President Eisenhower—the former Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force—
decided a more unified and streamlined chain of command to employ combat forces was needed,
essentially putting an end to separate land, sea, and air combat. President Eisenhower sought “a
complete unification of all military planning and combat forces and commands” and proposed the
DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 to Congress to amend the National Security Act of 1947.

11

Cynthia A. Watson, p. 13.
“The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999,” p. 15.
13
Ibid., p. 26.
12

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The DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 authorized the President, acting through the Secretary of
Defense with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified or specified commands, assign missions,
and determine their force structure. This act did not alter any of the authorities established by the
National Security Act of 1947 but instead established a clear line of command from the President,
through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders. Combatant commanders were
delegated full operational control over forces assigned to them but once these forces were
assigned, they could only be transferred with presidential approval. Responsibility for the
administration of these assigned forces was to remain with their respective services.

Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433)14
In the aftermath of the failed 1980 multi-service mission to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran and the
1983 invasion of Grenada which featured numerous instances of poor inter-service planning and
cooperation, there was renewed emphasis on “jointness” both in Congress and at the Pentagon.
Goldwater-Nichols sought to “rebalance the relative power of the geographic commands versus
the services.”15 Goldwater-Nichols called for the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) to review the
missions, responsibilities, and force structure and geographic boundaries for each COCOM not
less than every two years and recommend changes to the Secretary of Defense and the President.
In addition, the act expanded the CJCS’s and combatant commander’s powers and gave
combatant commanders greater interaction with Congress and greater participation in the DOD
budget process.

What Laws Govern the UCP?
The UCP and COCOMs are covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle A - General Military
Law; Part I–Organization and General Military Powers; Chapter 6–Combatant Commands. As it
relates to the UCP, Section 161, inter alia, stipulates:

14
15

•

Unified COCOMs are established by the President, through the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF), with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.

•

The CJCS shall periodically review (at least every two years) missions,
responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each
combatant command.

•

Based on this review, the CJCS will recommend to the President, through the
SECDEF, changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structure deemed
necessary.

•

The President, except in times of hostilities or imminent danger, will notify
Congress not less than 60 days after establishing a new combatant command or
significantly revising the missions, responsibilities, or force structure of an
existing combatant command.

Cynthia A. Watson, pp. 14-15.
Ibid.

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Also under Section 161, the CJCS is required to consider during each periodic UCP review:
•

Whether there was an adequate distribution of responsibilities among the regional
unified combatant commands;

•

Whether fewer or differently configured commands would permit the United
States to better execute war fighting plans;

•

Whether any assets or activities were redundant;

•

Whether war fighting requirements were adequate to justify current commands;

•

Whether exclusion of certain nations from the Areas of Responsibility presented
difficulties with respect to national security objectives in those areas; and

•

Whether the boundary between the U.S. Central and European Commands could
create command conflicts in the context of a major regional conflict in the
Middle East.

UCP Update Cycle16
Generally, the UCP update cycle runs from 12 to 18 months. The current UCP process consists of
five iterative phases described below:
1. Guidance: DOD UCP planners review four central documents: The National
Security Strategy of the United States of America; The National Defense Strategy
of the United States of America; The National Military Strategy of the United
States of America; and the current UCP. UCP participants also receive command
guidance in various forms and in varying degrees, and are apprised of the
strategic context under which the UCP will be evaluated. During the final part of
this phase, stakeholders (Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and the Joint
Staff) identify issues they believe need to be addressed during the UCP update
cycle.
2. Slate: During this phase, issues are slated for discussion. At the beginning of the
phase an action officer planning conference is held to discuss UCP issues. After
the conference, stakeholders submit Issue Development Papers (IDPs) to the
Joint Staff where they are posted online on a secure operating system
(SIPRNET)17 where stakeholders can view and comment on them. After a period
of time, these IDPs and associated comments are sent to the Deputy Director for
Strategy and Policy and the Director J-5 for validation. Those IDPs that make it
through the validation process are then “slated” and placed online so stakeholders
can develop positions for the next phase of the UCP process.
3. Assessment: This phase begins with a Planner’s Assessment Conference where
courses of action (COA) are developed for each validated IDP. These COA
provide decision makers with a range of choices to address the IDPs. Once the
COA are agreed at the conference, they are again posted online for review and
comment. After a period of time, the COA are finalized and “closed out.”
16
17

Information in this section is from a briefing provided to CRS by the Joint Staff Plans Division on October 7, 2010.
SIPRNET stands for Secret Internet Protocol Router Network DOD’s classified computer network.

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4. Adjudication: The adjudication phase is a four part process whereby the issues
and COA are sent to various levels of the Joint Staff for approval. The first level
is the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy and after review and approval, a
draft UCP is published. Next comes the Director J-5 and another revised draft
UCP is published. This draft UCP is then taken to a Service Chiefs’ “Tank”18
meeting and after that meeting, another UCP draft is prepared. Finally a Joint
Chiefs of Staff Tank meeting is held and a final draft UCP is prepared, posted on
the SIPRNET, and is then ready for final review.
5. Review: During this phase the UCP is reviewed and revised for the final time.
The first review is held at the “four-star level” including Service Chiefs,
Combatant Commanders, and other 4-star level general officers and DOD
civilians. Next, the SECDEF reviews the draft UCP and suggests changes. The
next step is the National Security Council (NSC) review where the UCP is
commented on by other U.S. government agencies. Finally, after incorporating
the views of the NSC principals, the UCP is taken to the President for approval
and final publication.

Other Agency Involvement19
There are other executive branch agencies (State Department, Department of Justice, Department
of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to name a few) that are collectively
referred to as the Interagency and have a vested interest in the UCP because some of its
associated military tasks intersect with the responsibilities of these agencies. While none of these
agencies are formally part of the UCP development process, they do have access to it by means of
agency liaison officers stationed at the COCOMs and on the Joint Staff. These liaison officers
have visibility of the IDP and COA process as well as access to draft UCPs and are able to report
their observations and concerns to their principals (i.e., Secretary of State, Attorney General, etc.).
The NSC also receives periodic updates on UCP development or revisions during the UCP cycle.
The principals may then choose to address their UCP concerns with senior DOD leadership.
During the NSC UCP Review, other agencies can publicly voice concerns with the UCP but,
unless an agency has not been actively following the UCP development, there should be no
“surprises” when the UCP is reviewed by the NSC.

Congressional Involvement20
Congress currently has no statutory role in the UCP development, revision, or review process
other than those stipulated in Title 10, Chapter 6, Sections 161 and 166. Congress does, however,
make its concerns known during hearings, private conversations between Members and staff and
DOD leadership, and through lending support to UCP-related issues through legislation or by
resolution. For example, prior to the 2007 decision to stand up AFRICOM, a number of Members
called for the creation of a separate geographic combatant command for Africa. Congress also
18
Tank is the euphemism for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference Room in the Pentagon where sensitive important
senior-level meetings are held.
19
Information in this section is from a briefing provided to CRS by the Joint Staff Plans Division on October 7, 2010.
20
Ibid.

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periodically includes provisions in annual National Defense Authorization Acts calling for DOD
studies and reports on certain aspects of COCOM structure and operations. These requirements,
in addition to providing information to Congress, also serve the purpose of identifying areas of
congressional concern which can influence DOD COCOM-related resourcing and policy
decisions.

The Current UCP
The 2011 UCP is a classified document. On April 8, 2011, DOD released the 2011 UCP and the
unclassified highlights were included in the following news release:
DOD Releases Unified Command Plan 201121
The Department of Defense released today the updated Unified Command Plan (UCP), a key
strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of
responsibility for commanders of combatant commands. Unified Command Plan 2011,
signed by the President on April 6, assigns several new missions to the combatant
commanders.
Every two years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions,
responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command and recommend
to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary. As in
past years, the 2011 review process included the combatant commanders, service chiefs and
DOD leadership. Significant changes made by UCP 2011 include
- Shifting areas of responsibilities boundaries in the Arctic region to leverage longstanding relationships and improve unity of effort. As a result of this realignment,
responsibility for the Arctic region is now shared between USEUCOM and
USNORTHCOM rather than USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM and USPACOM as
directed in previous UCPs.
- Giving USNORTHCOM responsibility to advocate for Arctic capabilities.
- Codifying the President’s approval to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command.
- Expanding U.S. Strategic Command’s responsibility for combating weapons of
mass destruction and developing Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations.
- Giving U.S. Transportation Command responsibility for synchronizing planning of
global distribution operations.
UCP 2011 continues to support U.S. defense security commitments around the world while
improving military responsiveness to emerging crises.

A map with the UCP COCOM Areas of Responsibility is included in the Appendix.

21

U.S. Department of Defense News Release, DOD Releases Unified Command Plan 2011, N. 288-11, April 8, 2011.

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Change One to the 2011 UCP22
On September 12, 2011, President Obama signed Change One to the 2011 UCP, which primarily
captured the administrative changes reflecting the disestablishment of USJFCOM and a number
of SECDEF-directed Efficiency Initiatives. These changes include
•

Removing any language referring to USJFCOM which was disestablished on
August 31, 2011;

•

Removing language for geographic combatant command standing joint force
headquarters,23 which are approved for disestablishment by the end of FY2012;

•

Adding the responsibility of global standing joint headquarters to
USTRANSCOM;

•

Transferring the Joint Warfare Analysis Center missions from USJFCOM to
USSTRATCOM; and

•

Removing language and responsibilities for Information Operations, Military
Deception, and Operations Security from USSTRATCOM as these mission areas
are to be transferred to the Joint Staff.

Origins of the COCOMs
The non-statutory origins of COCOMs are rooted in the U.S. experience in World War II. Prior to
World War II, the services operated independently and, despite lessons learned from World War I
suggesting the Army and Navy needed to better communicate and plan, no real concerted effort
was made to coordinate the Armed Forces, largely attributed to “bureaucratic distrust and service
rivalry.”24 During this period, Marine Corps fears the Army would lobby to eliminate the Marines
on the grounds they were a “redundant service” as well as Army efforts to maintain control over
the country’s air arm typified the climate among the services that made any meaningful reform
virtually impossible.25
World War II presented unique challenges not faced during the 18-month U.S. involvement in the
First World War. While World War I was fought in a variety of theaters, such as Europe, Africa,
the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, U.S. involvement was primarily limited to Europe and
was predominately land-centric. In terms of strategic planning and command relationships, the
United States played a supporting role.
The United States’ experience in World War II bore little resemblance to that of the Great War.
The European and Pacific theaters of the Second World War varied significantly, with the
European Theater being a land-centric conflict supported by naval operations whereas the Pacific
22

Taken from information provided to CRS by the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 13, 2011.
From Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended
through September 15, 2011, a Standing Joint Force Headquarters or SJFHQ is a staff organization operating under a
flag or general officer providing a combatant commander with a full-time, trained joint command and control element
integrated into the combatant commander’s staff whose focus is on contingency and crisis action planning.
24
Cynthia A. Watson, p. 11.
25
Ibid.
23

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Theater was naval-centric and supported by Marine and Army ground forces. Both theaters also
featured extensive supporting air force operations, including long-range strategic bombing
campaigns unprecedented in both size and scope. In terms of relationships with allies, the United
States assumed the leadership role in both the Pacific and European theaters—largely due to its
unmatched military and industrial resources—despite insistence that the U.S. was “co-equal
partners” with Great Britain, France, and Russia. Unlike 1918, after the Japanese surrender in
1945, U.S. political and military leaders did not advocate a post war policy of isolationism,
because of fears of a communist Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. U.S. global military
presence was viewed as a guarantee against unfettered communist expansion, and this presence
necessitated an effective, geographically focused, long-term, joint command arrangement.

What Laws Govern COCOMs?
As previously noted, COCOMs are governed by the provisions contained in Sections 161 through
168 of Title X, Armed Forces, U.S. Code.26 These sections address the following provisions;
•

Section 161: The establishment of COCOMs;

•

Section 162: Chain of command and assignment of forces for COCOMs;

•

Section 163: Role of the CJCS;

•

Section 164: Assignment and powers and duties of commanders of COCOMs;

•

Section 165: Administration and support of COCOMs;

•

Section 166: COCOM budget proposals;

•

Section 166a: Funding COCOMs through the CJCS;

•

Section 166b: Funding for combating terrorism readiness initiatives;

•

Section 167: Unified COCOMs for special operations forces;

•

Section 167a: Unified COCOMs for joint warfighting experimentation:
acquisition authority; and

•

Section 168: Military-to-military and comparable activities.

General Discussion of Provisions27
These provisions assign a number of responsibilities to the CJCS including a regular (at least
every two years) review of the missions, responsibilities, areas of operation, and force structure of
each combatant command. Upon completion of this review, the Chairman provides suggestions to
the President—through the SECDEF—for changes in missions, force structure, and
responsibilities for the COCOMs. These provisions also tie the services to the COCOMs as the
Secretaries of the military departments are directed to assign their forces (unless assigned

26

Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Sections 161-168, Title 10–Armed Forces, pp. 144154, and Cynthia A. Watson, pp. 2-6.
27
Information in this section is taken from Cynthia A. Watson, pp. 2-6.

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elsewhere such as a multi-national peacekeeping operation) to COCOMs. These forces can only
be transferred from the commands by the SECDEF.

Command Authority
Forces assigned to COCOMs are under the command of that COCOM commander, with the chain
of command starting with the President and running through the SECDEF as indicated in Figure
1. The CJCS serves as a link between the President and the SECDEF and the COCOM
commanders. The President can send guidance to COCOM commanders through the CJCS, and
the chairman can relay combatant commander’s needs and concerns to the SECDEF and the
President. The CJCS may exercise oversight of the COCOMs, if desired by the SECDEF, but has
no command authority over the COCOMs. In this regard, the CJCS is described as taking part in
national security discussions but not in the formal decision-making process as it relates to
COCOMs.
Figure 1. Combatant Command Chain of Command

Source: This figure is taken from the author’s National Defense University academic notes, 2010.
Note: USJFCOM was disestablished in August 2011 and no longer functions as a COCOM.

COCOM Commander’s Responsibilities
COCOM commanders are responsible for the accomplishment of missions assigned to them as
well as all aspects of joint training, logistics, and military operations. COCOM commanders are
also responsible for establishing command relationships with subordinate commands as well as
organizing subordinate units as deemed necessary. While Combatant Commanders exercise
control over subordinate units from different services, the services retain administrative control of

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their personnel to include assignment, promotion, schooling, and retirement. To facilitate
administrative control, geographic combatant commands have service subcomponents for each
service.

COCOM Funding
On an annual basis, COCOMs request Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. Funding for
forces assigned to COCOMs are funded by the respective services and funding for operations are
funded separately, such as operations in Afghanistan and counterterror operations that have
primarily been funded through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account. Table 1
provides O&M funding figures for the COCOMs from FY2011 to FY2013. It should be noted
that some amounts include operational and OCO costs (see corresponding notes).
Table 1. FY2011–FY2013 Operations & Management (O&M) Budget
($ in thousands)
COCOM

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

USAFRICOM

259,368

282,152

285,022

USEUCOM

134,377

120,278

119,267

USSOUTHCOM

198,930

193,257

206,342

USPACOM

301,919

268,014

300,097

USNORTHCOM

274,572

203,803

200,114

USSTRATCOM

648,459

507,382

689,821

USCENTCOMa

106,631

137,167

179,266

USSOCOMb

7,269,710

3,890,115

5,096,226

13,588

13,368

13,003

USTRANSCOMc

Source: Information in this table was provided to CRS by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Comptrollers Office.
Note: COCOM amounts, unless noted, reflect headquarters and mission support O&M funding.
a.

Does not include figures for operations in Afghanistan.

b.

USSOCOM figures include both headquarters and operational funds.

c.

USTRANSCOM is funded predominately with customer orders.

COCOM Budgetary Provisions
The SECDEF is required to submit an annual budget proposal for the COCOMs and funding may
be requested for joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and selected operations. Proposed
funding for special operations forces (SOF) training with foreign forces may also be requested.
COCOMs can also receive funds through the CJCS as part of the “Combatant Commander
Initiative Fund.” Although not a COCOM, the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) is also eligible for this fund. Authorized activities include
•

Force training;

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•

Contingencies;

•

Selected operations;

•

Command and control;

•

Joint exercises to include activities of participating foreign nations;

•

Humanitarian and civic assistance;

•

Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of
foreign countries;

•

Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation
programs;

•

Force protection; and

•

Joint warfighting capabilities.

COCOMs also have access to a DOD budget account known as the “Combating Terrorism
Readiness Initiatives Fund.” Authorized activities under this fund include
•

Procurement and maintenance of physical security equipment;

•

Improvement of physical security sites;

•

Under extraordinary circumstances:
•

Physical security management planning;

•

Procurement and support of security forces and security technicians;

•

Security reviews, investigations, and vulnerability assessments; and

•

Any other activity relating to physical security.

Functional and Geographic Combatant Commands
Basic Organizational Principles28
COCOM commanders hold four-star flag rank and have risen through the ranks of their
respective services, commanding at the highest levels. COCOM commanders have also met Joint
Military Education Requirements as set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The President
nominates combatant commanders based on the recommendations of the SECDEF. The Senate
Armed Services Committee holds confirmation hearings for the nominees and the Senate then
votes to confirm the candidates. While four-star officers from any service may serve as combatant
commander for any given COCOM, some appointments (e.g., U.S. Pacific Command being
commanded by a Navy admiral) traditionally have gone to specific services.

28

Ibid., pp 19-21.

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The basic configurations of COCOM staffs are generally the same and mirrors the Joint Staff at
the Pentagon. COCOM staffs are organized as follows, although there are variations based on
unique COCOM mission areas:
•

J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel;

•

J-2 Directorate of Intelligence;

•

J-3 Directorate of Operations;

•

J-4 Directorate of Logistics;

•

J-5 Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy;

•

J-6 Directorate of Command, Control, Communication, and Computer;

•

J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force Development;

•

J-8 Directorate of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment; and

•

J-9 Directorate of Interagency Partnering.

Within the COCOM command and staff construct, Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are often created to
address a single policy concern and allocate resources, such as anti-drug efforts or humanitarian
assistance, on a short- to mid-term basis. JTFs can also be established in response to a crisis or for
a long-term commitment.
Some COCOMs also have a political advisor (POLAD) assigned to the commander to serve as an
interface with the civilian portion of the national security establishment as well as the
ambassadors and embassy staffs of countries that fall under the COCOM commander’s UCP
mandate.

Interagency Representation in COCOMs29
Both Functional and Geographic COCOMs have integrated assets and representatives of other
agencies and departments of the U.S. government into the COCOM’s structure to enhance
operations. Examples of this representation include
•

USAFRICOM: A State Department Deputy Commander for Civil-Military
Activities, a senior U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) advisor,
and two other senior U.S. diplomats who serve as a Foreign Policy Advisor and
as the J-9, Director of Outreach;

•

USCENTCOM: An Interagency Action Group (IAG) established in the J-3
Directorate of Operations to integrate USCENTCOM and Interagency activities;

•

USEUCOM: Established a J-9 Directorate for Interagency Partnering; and

29
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 944 of the
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 P.L. 111-383, Department of Defense Report on
Organizational Structures of the Headquarters of the Geographic Combatant Commands, June 2011, p. 3.

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•

USNORTHCOM: A Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) that
integrates and synchronizes the activities of numerous civilian, State, Federal,
and private sector organizations.

Functional Combatant Commands
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)30
Website: http://www.socom.mil

Mission31
USSOCOM’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip special operations forces (SOF) and
provides those forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders under whose operational
control they serve. USSOCOM also develops special operations strategy, doctrine, and
procedures for the use of SOF and also develops and procures specialized, SOF-unique
equipment for its assigned forces. USSOCOM is also the lead COCOM for synchronizing DOD
planning against terrorists and their networks on a global basis. USSOCOM also can execute
global operations against terrorist networks when directed to do so by the President or Secretary
of Defense. The diverse nature of USSOCOM’s counterterror mission requires working
extensively with other non-DOD U.S. Government Agencies, sometimes referred to as the
Interagency.

History32
The 1980 Desert One tragedy and the 1983 loss of 237 Marines in Beirut, combined with the
command and control problems experienced during Grenada in 1983 heightened apprehensions
about DOD’s ability to manage the services, including special operations forces who were
“owned” by their respective service.
By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in Congress of the need for military reforms. In
June, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under the chairmanship of Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ), began a two-year-long study of DOD which included an examination of SOF.
With concern mounting on Capitol Hill, DOD created the Joint Special Operations Agency on
January 1, 1984. This agency had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF units
and did little to address SOF issues.
Within Congress, there was a growing sense that a radical restructuring of SOF was needed.
Proponents included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME), both members of
30

For detailed information on USSOCOM, subcomponents, and assigned forces see CRS Report RS21048, U.S.
Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
31
Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander United States Special Operations Command
before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 7, 2012.
32
Information in this section is taken from author’s National War College course materials, USSOCOM History Book,
“Founding and Evolution of USSOCOM,” pp. 5-11.

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the SASC, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Congressman Daniel believed the U.S.
military establishment had little interest in special operations and that U.S. SOF was second-rate
when compared to countries such as Great Britain and Israel. Senators Nunn and Cohen also
believed that DOD was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Nunn expressed a
growing frustration with the Service’s practice of reallocating monies appropriated for SOF
modernization to non-SOF programs and suggested the U.S. needed a more efficient organization
and a more direct chain of command for special operations.
In early 1986, SOF advocates introduced reform bills in the House and Senate. The Senate bill,
co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, called for a joint military organization for SOF and the
establishment of an office in DOD to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for lowintensity conflict and special operations. Representative Daniel’s proposal went even further—he
wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint
Chiefs and report directly to the SECDEF, thereby keeping Joint Chiefs and services out of the
SOF budget process.
Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. CJCS Admiral William J. Crowe,
led the Pentagon’s opposition to the bills and proposed instead a new special operations forces
command led by a three-star general. This proposal was not well received by Congress, who
wanted a four-star officer in charge so that he could deal on an equal footing with the four-star
Service Chiefs.
President Reagan approved the establishment of USSOCOM on April 13, 1987. DOD activated
USSOCOM on April 16, 1987, and nominated Army General Lindsay to be USSOCOM’s first
commander.

Subcomponents33
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)
USASOC includes Army Special Forces, also known as Green Berets; Rangers; Civil Affairs, and
Military Information Support Operations (MISO)—formerly known as psychological operations
(PSYOPS)—units. In addition, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) provides
rotary wing support to all SOF units.

Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC)
NSWC consists of Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams that conduct operations in both maritime and
ground environments. NSWC also has SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams—specialized SEALs
that pilot small submersible vehicles that can deliver SEALs to their area of operations. NSWC
includes Special Boat Teams that can deliver SEALs from ship to shore as well as operate in the
littorals and rivers.

33

Information from this section is taken from CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and USSO COM website, http://www.socom.mil.

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Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)
AFSOC provides specialized fixed and rotary wing support to USSOCOM units. In addition to
aircraft support, AFSOC also provides Combat Controllers, Pararescue Jumpers, Special
Operations Weather Teams, and Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) to support special
operations. AFSOC is currently establishing a capacity to train and advise partner nation aviation
units as part of foreign internal defense initiatives.

Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
Established in 2005, MARSOC is the newest USSOCOM subcomponent. It consists of three
Marine Special Operations Battalions, a Marine Special Operations Support Group, a Marine
Special Operations Intelligence Battalion, and the Marine Special Operations School.

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)34
According to USSOCOM, JSOC is a sub unified command charged with studying special
operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization.
JSOC also plans and conducts special operations exercises and training and develops joint special
operations tactics.
USOCOM also notes JSOC “is comprised of an impressive amalgamation of rigorously screened
and accessed, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians,” and “past and present members
of JSOC have participated in all of our Nation’s wars and contingency operations since it was
activated in 1980.” Press reports suggest JSOC is home to USSOCOM’s national mission forces
which reportedly conduct highly sensitive combat and supporting operations against terrorists on
a worldwide basis.35

Other Components
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)36
JSOU’s stated mission is to
Educate Special Operations Forces executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected
other national and international security decision-makers, both military and civilian, through
teaching, research, and outreach in the science and art of Joint Special Operations.

34
Information in this section is taken from the JSOC web page, http://www.socom.mil/Pages/
JointSpecialOperationsCommand.aspx.
35
Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 2, March/April 2004
and Sean D. Naylor, “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command,” Army Times, February 13, 2006; and U.S. Army
Special Operations Command News Service, “Gates Nominates McRaven, Thurman for Senior Posts,” Release
Number: 110303-02, March 3, 2011, http://www.soc.mil/UNS/Releases/2011/March/110303-02.html.
36
Information in this section is taken from the JSOU web page, https://jsou.socom.mil.

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Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC)37
With the August 2010 disestablishment of JFCOM, SOCJFCOM was transferred to USSOCOM,
where it was renamed SOC-JC. SOC-JC’s mission is to train conventional and special operations
force commanders and their staffs in the employment of Special Operations Forces focusing on
the full integration of SOF and the conventional forces in both planning and execution to enhance
warfighting readiness.

Ongoing Operations
USSOCOM operates on a global basis in both overt and classified modes. Missions range from
foreign internal defense to counterterrorism, but the primary emphasis for U.S. SOF is attacking
terrorists and terror cells worldwide. While USSOCOM’s primary focus of these activities is the
USCENTCOM region, USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven stated, “U.S. special
operations forces are in 78 countries around the world, supporting U.S. policy objectives.”38

Selected Current Issues39
SOF Support to Combatant Commanders
In testimony, Admiral McRaven noted that even when operations conclude in Afghanistan,
historical data suggest that there will be a constant demand for a “steady state” SOF-deployed
force of almost 12,000 SOF troops to support COCOM requirements. As SOF forces continue
their Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-mandated growth, USSOCOM assesses they will have
adequate capacity by FY2017 to meet the anticipated COCOM demand without placing undue
risk to global counterterrorism (CT) operations. This FY2017 target is predicated on
USSOCOM’s self-imposed growth rate of 3% to 5% annually, which is intended to maintain the
overall quality of special operations forces.

Efforts to Address “Fraying” of the Forces
In March 2011, then USSOCOM Commander Admiral Eric Olson testified that the decade-long
wars had resulted in some “fraying around the edges” for U.S. SOF.40 This almost constant state
of deployment had resulted in significant time away from families and limited time for needed
professional training and education and created a great deal of pressure on SOF and their families.
As a result of a study initiated under Admiral Olson, a lack of predictability resulting from a
demanding operational tempo and increased difficulties for SOF troops reconnecting and
reintegrating into family activities after returning from deployments were identified as two
37
Information in this section is taken from Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities website,
http://www.sojc.socom.mil.
38
Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2013 Defense Authorization as it Relates
to the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command March 8, 2012, p. 10.
39
Information in this section is taken from the Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander,
United States Special Operations Command Before the 112th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, March 7,
2012.
40
Ibid., p. 5.

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primary sources of ongoing stress.41 As a result, Admiral McRaven has established a task force
that has been tasked with building and implementing innovative solutions across USSOCOM to
address these stressors.

Continued Efforts to Expand USSOCOM Authorities and Control of Deployed
SOF
Reports suggest USSOCOM will continue to push for more control over deployed special
operations forces. At present, once U.S. SOF deploys into a region, they are controlled by a
geographic combatant commander and USSOCOM can no longer control where they go or what
mission they perform. According to USSOCOM officials, “Admiral McRaven is looking for the
freedom to move forces where he needs them and when he needs them.” This requirement
seemingly suggests USSOCOM is currently allocating its SOF units to combatant commands
with little to no mission guidance, which, in itself, might be considered problematic. Given
USSOCOM’s counterterrorism mandate, it would appear that USSOCOM could task these SOF
units with missions at the national level, which would be mutually supportive of the combatant
commander’s regional missions for the SOF unit. If USSOCOM gets expanded authorities, it
would exert enhanced control primarily through TSOCs, which currently work exclusively for
each combatant commander, but USSOCOM contends that TSOCs operate “without any greater
centrality to recognizing how the actions of one TSOC in his regional area of responsibility can
do things that influence another region.” If USSOCOM gets the additional authorities it has
requested, it could give the USSOCOM Commander the ability to have a direct relationships with
the TSOCs. While these enhanced authorities might benefit USSOCOM, they might also violate
the principal of “unity of command” despite USSOCOM’s insistence that combatant commanders
would have to approve any of USSOCOM’s moves of deployed SOF units.
One report suggests that “turning SOCOM into a global combatant command would create
constant friction with regional commands” and that efforts to gain additional authorities were
perceived by some as a “power grab.” The potential for a dual chain of command could result in
unnecessary friction between USSOCOM and geographic combatant commands and host
countries, possibly having an unintended detrimental impact on the deployed SOF unit. Because
there appears to be a number of contentious issues regarding enhanced USSOCOM authorities,
Congress might choose to examine these issues in greater detail.

U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
Website: http://www.stratcom.mil

Mission42
USSTRATCOM’s primary responsibility is the stewardship and employment of U.S. nuclear
weapons and to detect, deter, and prevent attacks against the United States and our allies and to
41

Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Information in this section is taken from USSTRATCOM’s web page, http://www.stratcom.mil, and Statement of
General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, March 29, 2011.
42

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join with the other combatant commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail. Specific
responsibilities include planning, synchronizing, advocating, and employing capabilities to meet
the United States’ strategic deterrence; space operations; cyberspace operations; global strike;
missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); and combating weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).

History43
USSTRATCOM was established October 1, 2002. USSTRATCOM has provided intelligence,
planning, and cyber support to coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. It monitors orbiting
satellites and space debris, allowing spacecraft to avoid collision. USTRATCOM has also
deployed systems to provide limited protection against ballistic missile attack.
The missions most directly associated with USSTRATCOM and its predecessors are deterrence
and global strike. These were the missions of Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1946 to 1992
and of the first USSTRATCOM from 1992 to 2002. Though best known for its connection with
the nuclear deterrent, SAC conducted conventional bombing operations during the Korean War
and Vietnam War and the first Persian Gulf War, 1991.
On June 1, 1992, SAC was replaced by a new unified command, USSTRATCOM. The new
command’s primary mission was to deter attack, especially nuclear attack, on the United States
and its allies and, if deterrence failed, employ nuclear forces in response.
The U.S. military began operating in space in the late 1950s, with many of the early systems
developed to meet SAC’s needs for surveillance, warning, meteorology, and communications. By
1985, space activities had grown to such a scale that DOD created a new unified command,
USSPACECOM, to manage military space operations. Secretary Rumsfeld’s initiative to merge
USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM led to the creation of the current USSTRATCOM in 2002.
Two other areas took on increasing importance beginning around 2000: missile defense and
cyberspace operations. By September 2004, the United States had deployed a limited system that
offered some protection to North America and had opened discussions about extending the
system to cover allies.
The U.S. military’s reliance on computer networks grew exponentially in the 1980s and 1990s.
National leaders took steps to protect defense networks in 1998, creating a Joint Task Force for
Computer Network Defense and assigning it to USSPACECOM. As computer attacks against
DOD become more sophisticated and frequent there were calls to place greater emphasis and
visibility on cyber operations. Defense Secretary Robert Gates favored a new sub-unified
command under USSTRATCOM that would recombine offensive and defensive computer
network operations. Established May 21, 2010, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was
fully operational on October 31, 2010.

43

http://www.stratcom.mil/history/.

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Subcomponents
Service Subcomponents44
Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC)
AFGSC is responsible for the Air Force’s three intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) wings,
two B-52 Stratofortress wings, and the sole B-2 Spirit wing. AFGSC has two numbered air forces
that are tasked with providing capabilities to combatant commands. The Eighth Air Force controls
the long-range nuclear bomber assets (B-52s and B-2s) and the Twentieth Air Force controls the
ICBM wings.

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
AFSPC provides space and cybersecurity forces for USSTRATCOM. It has two numbered air
forces providing these capabilities. The Fourteenth Air Force controls and supports several
satellite systems including the Global Positioning System (GPS); Defense Satellite
Communications Systems Phase II and III; and the Defense Meteorological Support Program. In
addition, the Fourteenth Air Force has Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch vehicles at its disposal to put
payloads into orbit. The Twenty-Fourth Air Force plans and conducts cyberspace operations in
support of combatant commands.

U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT)
ARSTRAT conducts space and missile defense operations and provides planning, integration,
control, and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions.

Fleet Forces Command
Fleet Forces Command is responsible for the entire Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the
waters around Central and South America extending into the Pacific to the Galapagos Island.

Marine Corps Forces U.S. Strategic Command (MARFORSTRAT)
MARFORSTRAT serves as the Marine Corps service component to USSTRATCOM.

44

http://www.stratcom.mil/service_components/.

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Functional Components45
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
USCYBERCOM is a sub unified command that is subordinate to USSTRATCOM.
USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to defend
DOD information networks and also conducts cyber space activities to enable U.S. military
activities.

Joint Functional Component Command-Global Strike (JFCC-GS)
JFCC-GS optimizes planning, integration, execution, and force management of assigned missions
to deter attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions, and bases.

Joint Functional Component Command– Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD)
JFCC-IMD synchronizes operational-level global missile defense planning, operations support,
and the development of missile defense effects for DOD.

Joint Functional Component Command-Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR)
JFCC-ISR plans, integrates, and coordinates intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in
support of strategic and global operations and strategic deterrence.

Joint Functional Component Command- Space (JFCC-Space)
JFCC-Space is responsible for executing continuous, integrated space operations to deliver
theater and global effects in support of national and combatant commander objectives.

Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC)
JIOWC provides joint information operations planning, execution, and operational-level
integration of Electronic Warfare, Operations Security, and Military Deception across DOD to
support USSTRATCOM, joint force commanders, and U.S. national objectives. On September
12, 2011, President Obama signed Change One to the 2011 UCP, which transfers the Information
Operations, Military Deception, and Operations Security missions from USSTRATCOM to the
Joint Staff so it is possible the structure and missions of JIOWC may change significantly in the
near future.

45

http://www.stratcom.mil/functional_components/, and U.S. Strategic Command “Snap Shot,”–A Summary of
USSTRATCOM Facts and Information, March 2011.

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USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
(SCC-WMD)
SCC-WMD plans, advocates, and advises the USSTRATCOM commander on WMD-related
matters.

Ongoing Operations46
According to USSTRATCOM’s commander, USSTRATCOM’s major ongoing operation is to
detect, deter, and prevent attacks against the United States and to join with the other combatant
commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail. One aspect of this operation is the “around
the clock” command and control of U.S. nuclear forces. USSTRATCOM is also involved in
implementing the new START treaty and efforts to sustain and modernize the nuclear triad and
the nuclear weapons complex.
USSTRATCOM provides support to other combatant commanders in the areas of integrated
missile defense and ISR operations. Not unlike its nuclear deterrence activities, USSTRATCOM
and USCYBERCOM operate on a daily basis to improve their ability to operate and defend the
DOD information network and make sure critical activities can continue, even in the face of
adversary attempts to deny or disrupt them. USSTRATCOM is also responsible for U.S. military
space operations on a day-to-day basis such as launching satellites and monitoring activities in
space.

Selected Current Issues47
Nuclear Weapons Sustainment48
In March 2012, the USSTRATCOM commander noted during a Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) hearings his concerns over the sustainment of the nation’s nuclear weapons.
In testimony, he noted that as U.S. nuclear weapons age, the United States faces continued
erosion of the nuclear enterprise’s physical and intellectual capital, necessitating investment in
stockpile certification, warhead life extension, and infrastructure recapitalization. Without these
investments, USSTRATCOM will not be able to maintain the nation’s nuclear deterrent.

Possible Shortfalls in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Analysts49
During congressional testimony, the USSTRATCOM commander noted that the command’s
ability to process and analyze data from “increasingly capable ISR platforms is also a growing
46

Statement of General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, March 27, 2012.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., p. 13. For additional information on U.S. nuclear weapons, see CRS Report RL30345, U.S. Nuclear Weapons:
Policy, Force Structure, and Arms Control Issues, by (name redacted).
49
Statement of General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, March 27, 2012, p. 16.

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challenge.” It was suggested not only are analysts dealing with more data but also with an
increased operational tempo, which imposes even greater demands on the timeliness of their
analysis and reporting. Conservative USTRATCOM estimates suggest the command would need
a 100% increase in analysts to meet COCOM requirements—which USTRATCOM believes is
“an unrealistic level of growth in almost any environment, let alone a fiscally constrained one.”

USCYBERCOM Workforce50
The USSTRATCOM commander expressed about USCYBERCOM’s technical capacity and
workforce. Noting that USCYBERCOM needs the best trained and educated people in its
cyberspace workforce, concerns were expressed that the U.S. education system might not be
emphasizing the appropriate academic disciplines. A possible solution to this situation could be
“encouraging and improving science, technology, engineering, and math education from an early
age.” Another factor contributing to workforce concerns was the belief that “traditional military
recruitment and retention programs may not be the best or fastest way to build a stable cyber
cadre for the long term.”

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Website: http//:www.transcom.mil

Mission51
Develop and direct the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project strategic
national security capabilities; accurately sense the operating environment; provide end-to-end
distribution process visibility; and support joint, U.S. government, and Secretary of Defenseapproved multinational and nongovernmental logistical requirements.

History52
World War II, the Berlin blockade, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War demonstrated the need
for the United States to maintain a capable and ready transportation system for national security.
A 1978 exercise exposed significant gaps in understanding between military and civilian
participants: mobilization and deployment plans fell apart, and as a result, the United States and
its NATO allies “lost the war.” Two major recommendations came out of the exercise. First, the
Transportation Operating Agencies (later called the Transportation Component Commands)
should have a direct reporting chain to the JCS. Second, the JCS should establish a single
manager for deployment and execution. As a result, the JCS formed the Joint Deployment Agency
(JDA) in 1979 at MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
50

Statement of General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, March 27, 2012, p. 25. For additional information on USCYBERCOM, see CRS Report R40836,
Cybersecurity: Current Legislation, Executive Branch Initiatives, and Options for Congress, by (name redacted)
and John Rollins.
51
Information in this section is taken from http://www.transcom.mil/about/whatIs.cfm.
52
Taken directly from http://www.transcom.mil/about/briefHistory.cfm.

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Although the JDA had responsibility for integrating deployment procedures, it did not have
authority to direct the Transportation Operating Agencies or Unified and Specified Commanders
to take corrective actions, keep data bases current, or adhere to milestones. In April 1987
President Reagan ordered the SECDEF to establish a Unified Transportation Command (UTC), a
directive made possible in part by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986,
which revoked the law prohibiting consolidation of military transportation functions.
Designated the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), its mission was to
provide global air, sea, and land transportation to meet national security needs. It had three
transportation component commands—the Air Force’s Military Airlift Command (replaced by Air
Mobility Command in 1992), the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Military
Traffic Management Command, (renamed Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command in 2004). On June 22, 1987, the President nominated Air Force General Duane H.
Cassidy as the first USTRANSCOM commander. The commander of USTRANSCOM received
operational direction from the National Command Authority (NCA) through the CJCS. There
were, however, some deficiencies in this new command arrangement. The services retained their
single-manager charters for their respective transportation modes. Even more restrictive,
USTRANSCOM’s authorities were limited primarily to wartime.
As a result, during peacetime, USTRANSCOM’s component commands continued to operate
day-to-day much as they had in the past. They controlled their industrial funds and maintained
responsibility for service-unique missions, service-oriented procurement and maintenance
scheduling, and DOD charters during peacetime single-manager transportation operations. They
also continued to have operational control of forces.
DOD learned much from the strategic deployment for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and foremost
among those lessons was USTRANSCOM and its component commands needed to operate in
peacetime as they would in wartime. Consequently, on February 14, 1992, the SECDEF gave
USTRANSCOM a new charter. Stating the command’s mission to be “to provide air, land, and
sea transportation for DOD, both in time of peace and time of war,” the charter greatly expanded
the authorities of the USTRANSCOM commander. Under the new charter, the Service Secretaries
assigned the components to the USTRANSCOM commander in peace and war. In addition, the
military departments assigned to him, under his combatant command, all transportation assets
except those that were service-unique or theater-assigned. The charter also made the
USTRANSCOM commander DOD’s single-manager for transportation, other than service-unique
and theater-assigned assets.
On September 16, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld designated the USTRANSCOM
commander as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) to serve “as the single entity to direct and
supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system” in order to “improve the overall
efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities - deployment, sustainment and
redeployment support during peace and war.” As the DPO, USTRANSCOM partnered with other
COCOMs, the services, defense agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and
industry to improve the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
Since 2003, USTRANSCOM has gained additional responsibilities related to its role as the
Distribution Process Owner. In 2004, USTRANSCOM became the portfolio manager for DOD
logistics information technology systems, and received acquisition authority for procuring
information technology systems, carrying out research projects and obtaining services needed to
transform the DOD supply chain.

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Subcomponents53
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)
“SDDC provides ocean terminal, commercial ocean liner service and traffic management services
to deploy, sustain and redeploy U.S. forces on a global basis. The command is responsible for
surface transportation and is the interface between DOD shippers and the commercial
transportation carrier industry. This includes movement of servicemembers household goods and
privately owned vehicles. SDDC is the nation’s largest customer to the moving industry with
more than 500,000 household goods moves a year. The command also provides transportation for
troops and materiel to ports of departure in the U.S. and overseas and manages 24 ports
worldwide, including military terminals at Sunny Point, N.C., and Concord, Calif.”

Military Sealift Command (MSC)
“MSC provides sealift transportation services to deploy, sustain and redeploy U.S. forces around
the globe. MSC provides sealift with a fleet of government-owned and chartered U.S.-flagged
ships. MSC executes Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) contracts for chartered
vessels. Sealift ships principally move unit equipment from the U.S. to theaters of operation all
over the world. In addition to sealift ships, MSC operates a fleet of prepositioned ships
strategically placed around the world and loaded with equipment and supplies to sustain Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency operations. These ships remain at
sea, ready to deploy on short notice, which significantly reduces the response time for the
delivery of urgently needed equipment and supplies to a theater of operation.”

Air Mobility Command (AMC)
“AMC provides strategic and tactical airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation services
for deploying, sustaining and redeploying U.S. forces wherever they are needed. Many special
duty and operational support aircraft are also assigned to AMC (including Air Force One). In
addition, AMC contracts with commercial air carriers through Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
and other programs for movement of DOD passengers and cargo. AMC’s air fleet provides swift
response as an element of America’s global reach.”

Ongoing Operations54
USTRANSCOM conducts military and commercial transportation, distribution process
integration, terminal management, aerial refueling, and global patient movement on a daily basis.
In 2011, the Air Mobility Command (AMC) deployed a rotational force of over 60 C-130 tactical
airlift aircraft, plus 120 KC-135 and KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft. AMC also employed 21 C-17
transport aircraft in dedicated support of USCENTCOM and across all COCOMs, on a daily
basis, at least one-third of AMC’s air mobility fleet was used to support global operations. The
Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
53

http://www.transcom.mil/about/cocom.cfm.
Statement of General William Fraser, USAF, Commander, United States Transportation Command Before the House
Armed Services Committee on the State of the Command, March 7, 2012.
54

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Command (SDDC) moved over 19.9 million tons of cargo worldwide. USTRANSCOM noted
MSC tankers delivered 1.6 billion gallons of fuel to support global operations and SDDC had
moved over 3,500 pieces of mission essential cargo by commercial sealift and then used airlift to
transport this cargo to Afghanistan.

Selected Current Issues55
Ground Supply to Afghanistan
The Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC), when open, remain the quickest
and most cost-effective route for surface transportation into Afghanistan. Ground transportation
through Pakistan had been curtailed since November 2011, and in early July 2012 the PAK
GLOC was reopened after extensive negotiations. It should be noted there is no guarantee the
Pakistani government will not close the PAK GLOC if there are future disputes with the U.S.
government or NATO. USTRANSCOM continues efforts to expand surface networks that supply
Afghanistan. Called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), USTRANSCOM’s stated priority
is to enhance and improve this network. In 2011, over 40% of all cargo supporting Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) moved through the NDN’s truck, water, rail, and air routes. In 2011, a
total of 27,000 containers were delivered via NDN surface transportation—an increase of 15%
from 2010. The importance of the NDN to USTRANSCOM’s operations will likely grow as U.S.
forces begin leaving Afghanistan in preparation for handing over security responsibilities to the
Afghan government by 2014.

Guam and Building Toward USTRANSCOM’s Future56
As part of the Administration’s shift in strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region,
USTRANSCOM noted during testimony the importance of Guam as a key multimodal logistics
node. USTRANSCOM expressed its support of infrastructure improvements to ensure successful
distribution operations in the region. USTRANSCOM has partnered with the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) and, with congressional approval, has invested $101.3 million in the
recapitalization of the fuel hydrant infrastructure and $61 million in a JP-8 pipeline between Apra
Harbor and Anderson Air Force Base.

55
56

Ibid.
Ibid.

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Geographic Combatant Commands
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)57
Website: http://www.africom.mil

Mission
“Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by
strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when
directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to
provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.”58
“USAFRICOM is responsible for U.S. military relations with 54 African countries including the
islands of Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, along with the Indian
Ocean islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. U.S. Central Command
maintains its traditional relationship with Egypt, though USAFRICOM coordinates with Egypt on
issues relating to Africa security.”59

A Different Kind of Combatant Command60
Dr. Cynthia Watson, a professor at the National War College and author of “Combatant
Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagements,” observes USAFRICOM has a different type
of mission, noting
USAFRICOM allows the U.S. government, particularly DOD, to work toward a more stable
environment in which political and economic growth can take place with three former U.S.
commands consolidated into a single new one to best work out the U.S. government efforts.
Africa Command hopes to avoid that traditional combatant command goals of warfighting in
favor of war prevention, making its orientation quite different from other parallel
organizations.

History61
Africa’s previous command arrangements (USEUCOM has had responsibility for most of Africa
since the end of World War II)62 reflect the relatively low level of importance assigned to the
African continent within the U.S. military structure. Before the creation of USAFRICOM, Africa
57

For additional information on USAFRICOM see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by (name redacted).
58
Fact Sheet: United States Africa Command, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.
59
AFRICOM FAQs, http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQ.asp.
60
Cynthia A. Watson, p. 174.
61
Information in this section is taken from Milady Ortiz, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Way of Thinking,” National
Security Watch, Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare,” March 13, 2008.
62
Cynthia A. Watson, p. 174.

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generally received less attention than other regions under the three aforementioned military
commands. USCENTCOM was focused on U.S. security priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
USEUCOM was preoccupied with NATO, relations with European allies and Russia. USPACOM
was primarily focused on regional powers such as China, India, and North Korea. There was a
consensus that the previous command arrangements for Africa represented a “suboptimal
organizational structure.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed that previous command
arrangements for the African continent were “an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold
War.” U.S. foreign policy in the region, like its military involvement, was primarily concerned
with Cold War geopolitics rather than African policy and development. Scholars have referred to
this policy attitude as “benign neglect,” designating Africa as the “stepchild” of U.S. foreign
policy. This attitude continued after the end of the Cold War, when the opportunity to articulate
coherent policy was overlooked. While the transformation of the geopolitical landscape was
significantly altered by the fall of the Soviet Union, America’s attention was focused on the newly
freed Eurasian states. In 1995, in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, DOD noted
that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”
Events in the late 1990s began to change U.S. perception of security interests in Africa. In 1998,
two U.S. embassies in Africa were bombed. While many scholars believe these twin bombings
marked a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region, the domestic terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, forced a reassessment of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Africa and its role in the
global war on terrorism. The growing strategic importance of Africa for the United States was
subsequently articulated in government documents. In the 2002 National Security Strategy, the
concept of weak states and their role in global instability was an important theme. The 2006
National Security Strategy solidified the newly important role of Africa, observing, “Africa holds
growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this administration.” The National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 50) signed by President Bush in September 2006 provided
the first update to overall U.S. strategy toward Africa since 1992.
Africa’s abundance of natural energy resources has made it an attractive region for countries the
United States, China, and India seeking additional resources. U.S. officials note three areas are of
particular concern: (1) the number of soft targets (e.g., embassies and consulates); (2) the
recruiting potential for young, angry, marginalized youth from Somalia to Morocco; and (3) the
potential of sanctuary for international terrorists (particularly in large ungoverned spaces). Africa
has also been a target terrorist activity: there were attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania, and
Kenya, in 1998; on targets in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002; and in Algiers in 2007. In particular, the
Horn of Africa is of concern to terrorism experts and military personnel.63 In addition to terrorism
concern, the growth of international piracy in the region has become a serious problem for the
international community.64
On February 6, 2007, the White House announced a presidential directive to create a new unified
combatant command in Africa. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) commenced official
operations on October 1, 2007, and remained a sub-unified command under U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM) until October 2008. On October 1, 2008, USAFRICOM was declared
fully mission capable and took over the role of geographic combatant command for Africa. While
63

For additional information on regional terrorism see CRS Report R41473, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The
U.S. Response, by (name redacted).
64
For additional information on piracy around the Horn of Africa see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of
Africa, by (name redacted) et al.

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the USAFRICOM headquarters remains in Germany, there are aspirations to possibly move it to
Africa sometime in the future but regional sensitivities and security concerns have made this a
challenging proposition.

Subcomponents
U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)65
Headquartered in Vicenza, Italy, USARAF is the Army component to USAFRICOM. In concert
with national and international partners, it conducts sustained security engagement with African
land forces to promote peace, stability, and security in Africa. If required, USAFRICOM can
deploy as a contingency headquarters in support of crisis response. USAFRICOM is staffed by
the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), which prior to August 2008 was an airborne task
force that supported NATO in both combat and humanitarian operations.

U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF)66
“NAVAF is part of a combined U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR)/NAVAF headquarters and
is tasked with the conduct of the full range of maritime operations and theater security
cooperation in concert with coalition joint interagency and other partners in order to advance
security and stability in Europe and Africa. Their combined areas of responsibility cover
approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Pole to Antarctica; as well as the
Adriatic, Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean and North Seas. NAVEUR-NAVAF
[headquartered in Naples, Italy] covers all of Russia, Europe and nearly the entire continent of
Africa. It encompasses 105 countries with a combined population of more than one billion people
and includes a landmass extending more than 14 million square miles.” The U.S. Sixth Fleet
supports NAVAF operations in the AFRICOM AOR and is headquartered in Naples, Italy.

U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA)67
“AFAFRICA, or 17th Air Forces, conducts sustained security engagement and operations to
promote air safety, security, and development in Africa. AFAFRICA is located at Ramstein Air
Base in Germany.”

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF)
MARFORAF, located Stuttgart, Germany, is the Marine’s service component headquarters for
USAFRICOM. “MARFORAF conducts operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation
activities throughout the African Continent.”68

65

http://www.usaraf.army.mil/.
http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/.
67
http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOMfactsheet05AUG2011.pdf.
68
Ibid.
66

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Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
“CJTF-HOA is USAFRICOM’s forward operating task force located at Camp Lemonnier in
Djibouti. It is one of more than 23 tenant organizations. CJTF-HOA has approximately 2,000
people assigned on rotating tours. While the core staff works at Camp Lemonnier, most of the
service members assigned to CJTF-HOA are “embedded” in partner nations performing a range
of activities—building partner security capability, capacity, and infrastructure through regional
cooperation; military-to-military programs; civil-military affairs projects; and professional
military education programs. Through an indirect approach, the task force, along with coalition
and other U.S. defense components, provides support to regional organizations to help foster
cooperation, enhance collective peace-keeping, improve humanitarian assistance, and support
civil-military operations.”69

Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAFRICA)
“On October 1, 2008, SOCAFRICA was established as USAFRICOM’s Theater Special
Operations Command—a functional, sub-unified special operations command for Africa.
SOCAFRICA contributes to USAFRICOM’s mission through the application of the full spectrum
of special operations forces capabilities including civil affairs, information operations, theater
security cooperation, crisis response, and campaign planning.”70 SOCAFRICA is headquartered
in Stuttgart, Germany.

Ongoing Operations
U.S. Deployment to Central Africa71
On October 14, 2011, President Obama informed Congress that on October 12, 2011, a small
team of U.S. military personnel began deploying to Uganda and that by November about 100
U.S. military personnel—primarily U.S. Special Forces—would be deployed to Central Africa to
act as advisors to partner forces who are attempting to kill or capture the leadership of the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is a nonreligious terror group that routinely kidnaps children
and forces them to serve as soldiers which has committed multiple acts of terror in the region
over the past two decades. U.S. forces are operating in Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the mission has been characterized as a
mission of “months as opposed to years.”
In the past, USAFRICOM has provided training and equipment to a variety of central African
militaries. USAFRICOM’s involvement has been credited with helping central African forces
attrite the LRA to about 200 core fighters and about 600 supporters. USAFRICOM notes that
about 100 U.S. service members continue to operate in Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as advisors. While not characterized as an
69

AFRICOM FAQs, http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQ.asp.
USSOCOM 2011 Fact Book, http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOMFactBook2011.pdf.
71
Information in this section is taken from The White House Office of the Press Secretary to the speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, October 14, 2011; and Lisa Daniels, “Official: Troops
in Central Africa for Months, Not Years,” American Forces Press Service, October 26, 2011, and USAFRICOM
Information Paper, “U.S. Military Support to African Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army,” February, 2012.
70

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“open-ended commitment” USAFRICOM regularly “reviews and assesses” the effectiveness of
this effort to determine if continued involvement is warranted.

Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)
“OEF-TS is the US Military regional plan against terrorist and violent extremists. OEF-TS is the
military component to Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), together with other
USG organizations, OEF-TS will help enhance stability and deter terrorist activity on the African
continent, with an emphasis on greater security in North Africa. USAFRICOM is working with
international partners in a regional approach to common areas of concern such as commerce,
education and economic development. OEF-TS works with the partner nations to expand military
-to-military cooperation, ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, assist regional
units, and establish mechanisms to promote better regional cooperation, communications, and
intelligence-sharing.”72

Exercises73
USAFRICOM uses exercises to encourage the development of partner nation’s security
capabilities and instilling professionalism in Africa’s various military and security forces. These
exercises range from traditional land combat operations, to logistics and medical operations,
humanitarian aid and disaster response, to counterterrorism training.

Selected Current Issues
Regional Threats74
The USAFRICOM commander testified that Africa accounts for 14 of the world’s 20 weakest
states and these fragile states lack the capacity or political will to confront demographic, political,
social, and economic challenges. Threats in the region include activities of Al Qaeda and its
affiliates in East Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. Illicit trafficking and violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) also pose threats to regional security and U.S. national interests. Of further
concern, many man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) disappeared from unsecured
storage sites during the 2011 Libyan conflict and could potentially be trafficked to extremist
groups.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Challenges
The USAFRICOM commander testified that ISR continues to be a challenge.75 USAFRICOM is
reportedly seeking an expansion of ISR activities in Africa and is seeking additional assets,
particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to adequately cover the continent.76
72

USAFRICOM, OEF Trans-Sahara, http://www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20100526130828.
Fact Sheet: USAFRICOM 2012 Exercises, February 2012.
74
Statement of General Carter F. Ham, USA, Commander United States Africa Command Before the House Armed
Services Committee, February 29, 2012.
75
Ibid.
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Additional Forces Allocated to USAFRICOM77
Reports suggest that beginning in 2013, as U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan begins to
decrease, more troops will be available for USAFRICOM. As early as March 2013, the Army
reportedly plans to deploy around 1,200 troops to Africa, primarily to participate in partner
building, engagement, and training activities, but these forces could also rapidly respond to
sudden challenges or crises in the region. In addition, largely in response to the September 11,
2012, attacks in Benghazi that killed the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other Americans, a
dedicated U.S. SOF Commander’s in-Extremis Force was established in early October 2012.
Previously, USAFRICOM had shared this force with USEUCOM. While USAFRICOM
reportedly stated their in-Extremist Force will be stationed in Ft. Carson, Colorado—home of the
10th Special Forces Group—some suggest that this force will spend most of its time forwarddeployed to Africa in order to be more responsive. The allocation of both general-purpose Army
forces and U.S. SOF in-Extremis forces offers the commander of USAFRICOM more flexibility
in conducting engagement and training operations and also affords an added element of security
that can be deployed in the event of crisis.

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
Website: http://www.centcom.mil

Mission
“With national and international partners, U.S. Central Command promotes cooperation among
nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports
development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional
security, stability, and prosperity.”78

History
The Iranian hostage crisis that played out from 1979 to 1981 and the 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan served to underscore the need to strengthen U.S. presence in the region; President
Carter established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in March 1980 and President
Reagan took steps to transform the RDJTF into a permanent unified command over a two-year
period. USCENTCOM was formally established on January 1, 1983.
By late 1988, the regional strategy largely focused on the potential threat of a Soviet invasion of
Iran. The new USCENTCOM commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, believed an
invasion of Iran was unlikely and began to focus on the possible emergence of a new regional
threat—Iraq. On August 2, 1990, these beliefs became a reality when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The
(...continued)
76
Craig Whitlock, “Military Expands Spying in Africa,” New York Times, June 14, 2012.
77
Information in this section is taken from John Vandiver, “AFRICOM Announces New Rapid Reaction Forces,” Stars
and Stripes, December 19, 2012, and Kristina Wong, “Army Plans to Shift Troops to U.S. Africa Command,” The
Washington Times, December 24, 2012.
78
http://www.centcom.mil.

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United States and other nations responded quickly by forming a coalition and deploying forces to
Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi aggression. On January 17, 1991, U.S. and coalition forces
launched Operation Desert Storm with an air interdiction campaign, which prepared the theater
for a coalition ground assault. The primary coalition objective, the liberation of Kuwait, was
achieved on February 27, and the next morning a cease-fire was declared, just 100 hours after the
commencement of the ground campaign.
Even though formal hostilities ended after the hundred hour war, there were other security
concerns. Operation Provide Comfort was implemented in April 1991 to provide humanitarian
assistance to the Kurds and enforce a “no-fly” zone in Iraq. In August 1992, Operation Southern
Watch began in response to Saddam’s noncompl

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42077. Public record. Not legal advice.
