# U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41971 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** August 8, 2011 - **Citation:** R41971 ## Text U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Asian Affairs (name redacted) Analyst in European Affairs August 8, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41971 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Summary A robust discussion has arisen around U.S. policy towards Burma. Some Members of Congress, senior officials in the Obama Administration, noted Burma scholars, and representatives of various interest groups have weighed in on this discussion, offering their views on the merits of current U.S. policy towards Burma and what policy changes ought to be made. Among the commentators, there is general agreement that more than 20 years of political and economic sanctions, and nearly two years of “pragmatic engagement,” have not led to the achievement of the stated goals of U.S. policy towards Burma—the release of all political prisoners from detention and the transfer power to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. However, there is little agreement as to why U.S. policy has been unsuccessful and what needs to be done to increase the likelihood of achieving the stated goals. Some analysts see the holding of parliamentary elections, the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in November 2010, the formal dissolution of Burma’s military regime, and its replacement by a mostly civilian government as evidence of the advent of a new era in Burma. Others view these events as thinly veiled ruses designed to hide the continuation of repressive military rule behind the veneer of seemingly civilian institutions. Both groups of commentators point to various recent events to support for their recommendations for the conduct of U.S. policy towards Burma. Other factors complicate the formulation of U.S. policy towards Burma. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma is a member, has called for the end of all sanctions on Burma. The European Union recently lifted its visa ban for several senior officials in the new Burmese government. Neighboring China, India, and Thailand have recently increased their investments in Burma, particularly in its energy sector. Inside Burma, the outbreak of fighting between the Burmese military and several ethnic-based militias has reportedly led to serious human rights abuses and another wave of Burmese refugees in the region. The current discussions have generally focused on three related issues: (1) the effectiveness of the U.S. sanctions regime; (2) the value of high-level meetings with Burmese officials; and (3) the ability to coordinate policies towards Burma with other nations. To some, the basic premise of U.S. policy is fundamentally flawed, and a completely new approach is needed. To others, the main problem with U.S. policy has been in its lack of focus and inadequate implementation. Some question whether or not any U.S. policy can have an appreciable impact on Burma’s military leaders and foster progress towards U.S. objectives in Burma. The installation of a new government in Burma and the appointment of Derek J. Mitchell to serve as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma are viewed as creating a “honeymoon period” in which Congress and the Obama Administration can review and, if desired, adjust U.S. policy towards Burma. The genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma was largely driven by Congress passing legislation after particularly egregious actions by Burma’s ruling military junta. The 112th Congress is currently considering legislation (H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res. 17) that would renew certain import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. If the history of the development of U.S. policy towards Burma is indicative, any dramatic new development in Burma—either good or bad—could prompt Congress into action. Congressional Research Service U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 Why Burma? .................................................................................................................................... 2 Current U.S. Policy .......................................................................................................................... 4 Conduct of Policy ...................................................................................................................... 4 The U.S. Sanctions Regime ....................................................................................................... 7 U.S. Aid to Burma ..................................................................................................................... 8 Perceived Problems with U.S. Policy ...................................................................................... 10 Major Developments in Burma in 2010 ........................................................................................ 11 The 2010 Elections .................................................................................................................. 11 The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi .......................................................................................... 13 Burma in 2011 ............................................................................................................................... 14 The New Parliaments .............................................................................................................. 14 The New Union Government .................................................................................................. 16 President Thein Sein.......................................................................................................... 16 The Vice Presidents ........................................................................................................... 17 The Ministers .................................................................................................................... 17 The National Defence and Security Council and the State Supreme Council................... 18 Changes in the Burmese Military ............................................................................................ 19 The Human Rights Situation.......................................................................................................... 21 Human Rights Under the SPDC .............................................................................................. 21 Human Rights Under the New Government............................................................................ 23 Political Prisoners .................................................................................................................... 25 Burma’s Militias and Refugee Problem ......................................................................................... 26 The Ethnic-Based Militias ....................................................................................................... 27 Burma’s Refugees.................................................................................................................... 28 The Economy ................................................................................................................................. 30 Burma’s Relations with North Korea............................................................................................. 33 Implications for U.S. Policy .......................................................................................................... 36 The Sanctions Debate .............................................................................................................. 36 The Effectiveness of Sanctions ......................................................................................... 37 The International Context.................................................................................................. 38 Enforcement of Sanctions ................................................................................................. 43 The Engagement Debate.......................................................................................................... 45 The Role of Congress .................................................................................................................... 45 Maintenance and Enforcement of Existing Policy .................................................................. 46 Modifying U.S. Policy ............................................................................................................. 46 Figures Figure 1. Burmese Refugee Camps ............................................................................................... 29 Congressional Research Service U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Tables Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Burma by Fund, FY2006-FY2011 ....................................................... 9 Table 2. Mass Prison Reprieves ..................................................................................................... 26 Table 3. GDP Growth Rates........................................................................................................... 31 Table B-1. Reports Requires under U.S. Burma Sanction Laws ................................................... 50 Table D-1. Burma’s Ministers and Their Portfolios....................................................................... 53 Appendixes Appendix A. Map of Burma .......................................................................................................... 49 Appendix B. Reports Required Under U.S. Burma Sanctions Laws ............................................. 50 Appendix C. Parliamentary Election Results by Political Party .................................................... 52 Appendix D. Burma’s Ministers and Their Portfolios ................................................................... 53 Appendix E. Burma’s Ethnic-Based Militias ................................................................................. 55 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 56 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 56 Congressional Research Service U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Introduction Current U.S. policy towards Burma (Myanmar)1 can be characterized as the balancing of bilateral engagement and an assortment of political and economic sanctions—an approach sometimes referred to as “pragmatic engagement.” In addition, the Obama Administration is attempting to convince other nations to adopt a similar policy towards Burma. The stated intent of U.S. policy is to persuade and/or pressure Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), to release all political prisoners from detention and transfer power to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. Recent political developments in Burma may be harbingers of change with implications for U.S. policy. The SPDC held national parliamentary elections on November 7, 2010, after a relatively short and controversial campaign period in which opposition parties claimed they faced harassment, intimidations, and limited access to the media.2 On the day of the election, media outside of Burma reported allegations of vote-rigging and election fraud, including the lastminute appearance of large numbers of “advance votes.” Six days after the election, Aung San Suu Kyi,3 the preeminent leader of Burma’s democracy movement, was released from house arrest. Despite the controversies surrounding the campaign and the election, the official election results released on December 7, 2010, announced that the SPDC-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) had won over three-quarters of the parliamentary seats. The new bicameral parliament convened for the first time on January 31, 2011, in the new capital city of Nay Pyi Taw.4 Its main tasks were the selection of a new President and two Vice Presidents, and the confirmation of the new government ministers. Most of the new government appointments went to former SPDC members or military officers. On March 30, 2011, Senior General Than Shwe formally dissolved the SPDC and former General, Prime Minister, and SPDC First Secretary Thein Sein became Burma’s new president. The initial responses of the 112th Congress and the Obama Administration to the political developments in Burma have been generally critical. In a press release issued the day of Burma’s parliamentary election, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the United States was “deeply disappointed” by the elections, noting that “[t]he electoral process was severely flawed, precluded an inclusive, level playing field, and repressed fundamental freedoms. As a result, the elections were neither free nor fair.”5 On November 18, 2010, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 1677, denouncing “the one-sided, undemocratic, and illegitimate actions of the 1 In 1989, the ruling military junta changed the country’s official name from Burma to Myanmar. The United States— along with several other nations—officially continue to refer to the nation as Burma. The United Nations and most Asian nations have adopted the name Myanmar. 2 For more about the controversial election campaign in Burma, see CRS Report R41447, Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). 3 Burmese names do not have formal surnames and frequently include honorifics. For example, Aung San Suu Kyi will sometimes be referred to as “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” In this case “Daw” is an honorific, used with older women. This report will not use honorifics and will refer to Burmese people using their full name. 4 Burma’s 2008 constitution designates the city of Nay Pyi Taw, also known as Naypyidaw, as the capital. However, the State Department continues to recognize Rangoon, also known as Yangon, as the capital. 5 Office of the Secretary of State, “Burma’s Elections,” press release, November 7, 2010. Congressional Research Service 1 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that seek to legitimize military rule through a flawed election process.” The international response to the political developments in Burma has been mixed. Australia, Canada, and the European Union were also critical of the conduct of the November election, and have kept their own sanctions on Burma largely intact. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, by contrast, welcomed the election results and the installment of a new government, and subsequently called for the removal of all sanctions on Burma. The convening of Burma’s new parliament and the official transfer of power to President Sein and his ministers has precipitated a debate over the effectiveness of the current U.S. policy and possible strategies to foster political change in Burma. One of the pivotal issues in this debate is the degree to which recent political events represent either a shift of power from the military to a largely civilian government, or an elaborate ruse by which the SPDC remains in control of the country. A second major issue is whether or not U.S. policy can significantly impact political developments in Burma, and if so, what should be the main components of that policy. A third issue is which of the various U.S. goals should be given priority in the short run, and which goals are better viewed as long-run objectives. For the last 20 years, Congress has played a major role in formulating U.S. policy towards Burma, particularly in the imposition of sanctions. The 112th Congress may decide to take legislative action with respect to U.S policy towards Burma, as past Congresses did. The 110th Congress, responding to the violent suppression of a popular protest in Burma in 2007, tightened sanctions on Burma by passing the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (2008 JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286). The 108th Congress passed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) following a crackdown on opposition parties, which included the arrest and detention of Aung San Suu Kyi. The 101st, 103rd, and 104th Congresses passed similar sanction-tightening measures, generally after anti-democratic and/or repressive actions by the SPDC. Why Burma? A number of scholars have questioned why the United States has had such a sustained interest in Burma.6 As described in another CRS report, U.S. relations with Burma remained comparatively normal following the military coup in 1962; punitive sanctions were first imposed following the brutal suppression of a peaceful and popular protest movement in 1988.7 Over the next 20 years, the United States gradually adopted more sanctions and increased the pressure on Burma’s ruling military in an effort to end the repression and promote democracy. There is little question about the military junta’s legacy of human rights violations and its violent suppression of the people of Burma. However, Burma is not the only nation in Asia where the government has been accused of serious human rights violations. Yet, as one noted Burma scholar 6 Among the more noted commentators on U.S. policy in Burma are: Aung Din, Priscilla Clapp, Suzanne DiMaggio, Michael Green, Fred Hiatt, Bertil Lintner, David I. Steinberg, Derek Tonkin, Sean Turnell, and Maung Zarni. 7 For details of the genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 2 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress recently pointed out, current U.S. sanctions on Burma are in some ways stricter than those imposed on the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea).8 Burma also appears to be of little geopolitical or global economic importance for the United States. Its location between China and India may make Burma important to those two contending regional powers, but the United States has no apparent strategic interest in Burma. Burma’s known natural gas and oil fields are attractive to energy companies around the world, but are neither sufficient or necessary for the United States to meet its foreseeable energy demand. Despite Burma’s apparent lack of importance and uniqueness, the United States for over two decades has diligently pursued a policy designed to end military repression and promote democracy—with arguably little to show for the effort. As a result, a broad and wide-ranging discussion on U.S. policy towards Burma has emerged, with possible implications for U.S. policies towards other nations. Some observers have argued that the U.S. policy towards Burma has proven that sanctions never work and that sanctions on Burma—and by extension, any other nation—should be lifted. Other analysts maintain that the SPDC’s behavior over the last 20 years demonstrates that Burma’s military leaders are not open to reason and that engagement in any form is destined to fail. Some commentators also decry U.S. efforts to coordinate policies with other countries toward Burma, noting that other nations have other priorities and readily realize the limits on how far the United States is willing to press its case regarding Burma. Some commentators see less grandiose lessons in the history of U.S. policy towards Burma, suggesting the problems lie in the conduct of the policy and not that the policy is fundamentally flawed. To these observers, the problems with U.S. sanctions on Burma are that the sanctions are not strict enough, not properly targeted, and/or not adequately enforced. Similarly, these observers argue the lack of results from direct dialogue stems from insufficient time, unclear intent, and/or inappropriate priorities in the talks. Past efforts to coordinate Burma policies with other nations have fallen short of their desired goals, according to some analysts, because the United States was not flexible enough to allow other nations to adopt a different approach to achieve the same overall objectives. A final group of writers on U.S. policy focus more on analyzing how events of the past few years—particularly the establishment of a new parliament and the installation of a new president—may have changed the political dynamic inside Burma, and the implications for U.S. policy. To some, the changes inside Burma are purely cosmetic, with the military still firmly in control. According to these analysts, the United States should not reward the SPDC for its charade, and in the opinion of some, should increase the pressure on Burma’s military leadership. To others, the changes inside Burma are flawed, but real, and with the proper support and encouragement, could gradually lead to an end of flagrant violations of human rights and the eventual restoration of democracy. These commentators suggest that the United States consider selectively removing sanctions and increasing channels of bilateral interaction in order to bolster the elements of change inside Burma that will promote democracy. To help understand the interplay of these distinct, but interrelated policy discussions, this report reviews current U.S. policy towards Burma, as well as recent developments in the country. The report then examines the implications for future U.S. policy and considers what actions, if any, the 112th Congress may take with respect to U.S. policy towards Burma. 8 David I. Steinberg, “Disparate Sanctions: US Sanctions, North Korea and Burma,” East Asia Forum, June 23, 2011. Congressional Research Service 3 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Current U.S. Policy In September 2009, the Obama Administration announced a change in U.S. policy towards Burma after seven months of review, discussion, and consultation.9 The existing sanctions regime remained in place, but new elements of U.S. policy were added—the willingness to engage in direct dialogue with the SPDC on how to promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and to cooperate to a greater extent with the SPDC on international security issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation and counternarcotics efforts. Outside of the new willingness to engage in direct dialogue, the Obama policy has continued the policies of the two preceding administrations with the same goals—namely, to support “a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens.”10 In order to achieve these goals, the Obama Administration pressed Burma’s military leaders to release all its political prisoners, end all its conflicts with ethnic minorities, cease its human rights violations, and initiate “a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.”11 Conduct of Policy At present, the Obama Administration and Congress appear to generally agree on the goals of U.S. policy in Burma. Disagreement tends to arise over the setting of priorities among the stated goals and devising the proper strategy to increase the odds of achieving those goals. Given the events of the past nine months in Burma, one of the more pressing questions is determining what positive changes are more likely to occur in the short run, and which are probably better viewed as longer term objectives. In addition, other questions concern the proper balance between the various instruments of U.S. policy—sanctions, direct talks, coordination with other nations, etc.—and what to realistically respect from the use of each of those instruments. Several key Executive Branch officials are responsible for the development and implementation of U.S. policy towards Burma. The relevant U.S. laws explicitly designate the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and U.S. Trade Representative as having the responsibility and authority to carry out the various components of the U.S. sanctions regime against Burma. Using granted presidential powers, past Presidents have delegated their sanctionrelated authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative—and in some cases, have allowed the stipulated official to “redelegate” authority to other U.S. government officials or agencies.12 Among the current government officials who play an active role in the implementation of U.S. policy towards Burma are: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs Joseph Yun, and former Deputy 9 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Burma,” press release, September 28, 2010. Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 This has been done via several Presidential Executive Orders, as well as Presidential Proclamation 8294 (“To Implement Amendments to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,” Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 191, October 1, 2008, pp. 57223-57227) and Presidential Determination No. 2009–11 (“Limited Waiver of Certain Sanctions Imposed by, and Delegation of Certain Authorities Pursuant to, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008,” Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 12, January 21, 2009, pp. 3957-3958). 10 Congressional Research Service 4 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs and current Ambassador to Indonesia Scot Marciel. Future U.S. policy towards Burma is to be coordinated by Derek Mitchell who was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011 as Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. Mitchell was nominated for the position on April 15, 2011. The position, which holds an ambassadorial ranking, was created by the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s AntiDemocratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286). According to the JADE Act, the Special Representative is responsible for coordinating U.S. policy towards Burma, consulting with foreign governments on relations with Burma, and consulting with Congress on U.S. policy towards Burma. Mitchell co-authored an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2007 that advocated a new U.S. policy towards Burma very similar to the approach adopted by the Obama Administration in 2009.13 According to the Obama Administration, the existing U.S. sanctions on Burma will remain in place “until we see concrete progress towards reform.”14 The Obama Administration has reserved the right to implement or recommend additional, targeted sanctions if warranted by circumstances inside Burma. Alternatively, the Obama Administration may relax sanctions or call for the removal of sanctions if the political situation in Burma meets the specified criteria set in existing U.S. law. In addition to relaxing sanctions, the Obama Administration could alter other aspects of U.S. policy that are known to irritate the SPDC and Burma’s military. For example, the SPDC routinely complains about the continued use of the name, “Burma,” by the U.S. government, despite the SPDC’s officially changing the country’s name to Myanmar in 1989. Another known source of irritation for the SPDC is the restriction on travel within the United States placed on official diplomatic representatives from Burma.15 Since its announcement of a new Burma policy, the Obama Administration has held several direct discussions with SPDC officials, including at the first ASEAN-U.S. leaders meeting in Singapore on November 15, 2009, which both President Obama and Burma’s Prime Minister General Thein Sein attended.16 A few days prior to the ASEAN-U.S. leaders meeting, Assistant Secretary Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel traveled to Burma to meet with Prime Minister Thein Sein—the highest level U.S. delegation to visit Burma in 14 years.17 Campbell and Marciel also met with Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of other opposition parties and ethnic minorities. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell also visited Burma from May 9-10, 2010, and had meetings with SPDC officials, NLD leaders (including Aung San Suu Kyi), and leaders from various ethnic minority groups. In December 2010, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun traveled to Burma where he met with SPDC officials, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, and representatives of various ethnic minority groups. 13 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1 (January/February 2007), pp. 147-158. 14 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Burma,” press release, September 28, 2010. 15 The United States places limits on the travel of Burmese diplomats in the United States. For example, members of Burma’s delegation to the United Nations are not allowed to travel beyond 20 miles from the United Nations without prior written approval. U.S. diplomats in Burma face similar restrictions on their travel in Burma. 16 While the two leaders attended the meeting, they did not have a separate bilateral meeting. 17 Tim Johnston, “Scant Details on Reaction to U.S. Envoys’ Burma Visit,” Washington Post, November 6, 2009. Congressional Research Service 5 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun traveled again to Burma from May 18-20, 2011—becoming the first U.S. official to visit the country following the installation of the new government. During his visit, Yun met with Deputy Speaker of Burma’s Lower House Nanda Kyaw Swar, Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, Aung San Suu Kyi, and other opposition leaders. According to a press release from the U.S. embassy in Burma, in his meetings with the Deputy Speaker and Foreign Minister, Yun reiterated that progress in bilateral relations “would depend on the Burmese government taking meaningful, concrete steps towards democratic governance, respect for human rights, and the release of all political prisoners.…”18 Two days before Yun’s arrival, Burma’s President Thein Sein announced a partial amnesty for selected prisoners in Burma (see “The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi ” below). It would appear that the Obama Administration has determined that the amnesty announcement was not sufficient to warrant the relaxation of sanctions or other possible changes in relations. The purposes of the bilateral talks have not always been clear. The initial meetings with Burmese officials and various opposition groups seemed to focus on establishing relations and fostering a willingness to engage in dialogue. More recent meetings appear to have involved more substantive discussions of the current situation in Burma and future paths to progress. The talks have not indicated that the SPDC and the Tatmadaw are willing to consider direct talks involving representatives of the various opposition groups – which the United States and others consider a necessary condition for national reconciliation. The perceived lack of progress on political reform and national reconciliation may have shifted the U.S. focus for the bilateral talks onto the release of political prisoners and the improvement of human rights situation. However, there are few signs of improvement on either of those issues. The Obama Administration has continued the past practice of consulting with the international community to foster the desired changes inside Burma, including an intensified effort to engage with ASEAN, China, and India. Prior to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed U.S. support for ASEAN’s call for free and fair elections in Burma. The United States has also raised the political situation in Burma with China at various fora. During his November 2010 trip to India, President Obama called on the Indian parliament to speak up for democracy and human rights in Burma.19 As with the bilateral talks with Burma, the intent of the Obama Administration’s effort to consult with the international community on Burma policy has not been readily apparent to observers. It seems unlikely – and unrealistic – for the Obama Administration to expect other nations to adopt a similar policy of “pragmatic engagement” involving a combination of sanctions and direct dialogue with Burmese officials and leaders given the recent statements by several of the key nations. One plausible objective may be agreeing on what changes should occur in Burma, and what role each nation and the United Nations may play in fostering those changes. 18 U.S. Embassy—Rangoon, “U.S. Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Travel to Burma,” press release, May 20, 2011. 19 The full text of the President’s speech is available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/ remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india. Congressional Research Service 6 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress The U.S. Sanctions Regime20 U.S. sanctions targeted solely at Burma are specified in five federal laws, a series of Presidential Executive Orders, and certain Presidential Determinations. The five laws are: • Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (Section 138)(P.L. 101382)—requires the President to impose “such economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines to be appropriate,” unless the President certifies certain conditions pertaining to human rights and counternarcotics have been met; • Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 307)(P.L. 87-195), as amended by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236)—withholds U.S. contributions to selected international organizations with programs in Burma; • Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (Section 570)(P.L. 104-208)21—imposes various specific sanctions on Burma, unless the President certifies that certain human rights and democracy standards have been met; • The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) (P.L. 108-61)— requires the President to impose a ban on the import of products of Burma;22 freeze assets of certain Burmese officials; block U.S. support for loans to Burma from international financial institutions; and ban visas for certain Burmese officials; and • The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286)—bans the direct and indirect import of products containing Burmese jadeite and rubies; expands the list of Burmese officials subjected to visa bans and financial sanctions; and allows the placement of restrictions on use of correspondent accounts to provide services to Burmese officials. The BFDA and JADE Act also require the President, the State Department and the Treasury Department to provide selected congressional committees with reports on the implementation of their sanctions provisions (see Appendix B). Four Presidential Executive Orders (E.O.) currently in force impose sanctions on Burma. The four E.O.s are: • E.O. 13047—Issued on May 20, 1997, by President Bill Clinton, it bans all new investments in Burma, as required by Section 570; • E.O. 13310—Issued on July 28, 2003, by President George W. Bush, it brings the sanction regime into compliance with certain provisions of the BFDA, 20 For more detailed information about U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma, by (name redacted) 21 The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 was merged into Title 1 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997. 22 The general import ban is subject to renewal. The 112th Congress is considering H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res. 17 which would renew the import ban for another year. Congressional Research Service 7 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress including the freezing of assets of certain Burmese officials and the prohibition of the provision of financial services to Burma; • E.O. 13448—Issued on October 18, 2007, by President Bush, it added to the list of Burmese officials and entities subject to the freezing of assets; and • E.O. 13464—Issued on April 30, 2008, by President Bush, it added to the list of Burmese officials and entities subject to the freezing of assets. President Bush also issued Presidential Determination No. 2009-11 on January 15, 2009, providing a limited waiver of some of the sanctions in the JADE Act stating that doing so was “in the national interest of the United States.”23 The existing U.S. sanctions specifically targeted at Burma can be generally divided into several broad categories. First, there are bans on issuing visas to certain Burmese government officials (particularly the former and present leadership of the State Peace and Development Council [SDPC] and the Union Solidarity Development Association [USDA]), members of their families, and their business associates. Second, there are restrictions on the provision of financial services to certain Burmese government officials, members of their families, and their business associates. Third, certain assets of selected Burmese individuals held by U.S. entities have been “frozen.” Fourth, there is a general prohibition on the import of goods of Burmese origin. Fifth, there is a prohibition on the import of certain types of goods and goods from certain companies. Sixth, there is a ban on new U.S. investments in Burma, including investments in third country companies.24 Seventh, there are restrictions on the provision of bilateral and multilateral assistance to Burma. The enforcement of the sanctions is handled by multiple government agencies. The visa ban and related provisions are administered by the State Department, as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The restrictions on the provision of financial services and the “freezing” of the assets of certain Burmese officials is the responsibility of the U.S. Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The restrictions on the importation of certain Burmese products is managed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security. Enforcing restrictions on provision of bilateral or multilateral assistance is the responsibility of the designated U.S. representative to the applicable agency or international body. U.S. Aid to Burma The existing sanctions laws contain provisions that do allow U.S. aid to Burma for humanitarian assistance and in cases of natural disasters. Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208)25 prohibits bilateral assistance to Burma except for humanitarian assistance; assistance promoting human rights and democratic values; and counter-narcotics assistance (under specific conditions). The law does 23 Executive Determination 2009-11, “Limited Waiver of Certain Sanctions Imposed by, and Delegation of Certain Authorities Pursuant to, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008,” 74 Federal Register 3957-3958, January 21, 2009. 24 Investments made prior to May 21, 1997—such as Unocal’s investment in the Yadana gas project—are not affected by the new investment ban. 25 The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, was merged into Title 1 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997. Congressional Research Service 8 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress provide for a presidential waiver—either temporary or permanent—if the President “determines and certifies to Congress that the application of such sanction would be contrary to the national interest of the United States.” No such waiver is currently in effect. Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Burma by Fund, FY2006-FY2011 (US$ millions) Fiscal Year Total Development Assistance Economic Support Fund Global Health and Child SurvivalUSAID 2006 10.890 10.890 2007 12.990 10.890 2.100 2008 43.758 12.895 2.083 2009 35.400 33.300 2.100 2010 38.600 36.500 2.100 2011b 38.527 36.427 2.100 0.717 P.L. 480a 28.063 Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, multiple years. a. P.L. 480 Title II Food Assistance Program. b. Figures provided to CRS by State Department. Following the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the United States provided over $85 million in assistance to help victims in Burma.26 The United States provided an additional $1.5 million in assistance after Cyclone Giri struck Burma in October 2010. When providing this assistance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) took measures to ensure that aid money went directly to either U.N. agencies or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and that none of the funds were paid to Burmese government officials or other sanctioned entities.27 Besides support following natural disasters, U.S. aid to Burma has generally been distributed in neighboring countries, with Thailand receiving much of the assistance to support Burmese refugees in camps along the border (see “Burma’s Refugees”). Much of U.S. assistance for Burma is administered through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). According to USAID’s webpage on Burma assistance, USAID “provides humanitarian assistance to people in Burma, internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as migrants and refugees in 10 Thai provinces along the Thailand-Burma border.”28 Some of the specific Burma programs supported by USAID include: • programs to combat avian influenza (AI), HIV/AIDS, and other infectious diseases; 26 Burma was struck by a category 3 cyclone on May 2, 2007, resulting in the deaths of approximately 130,000 people. For more information on the destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis and the international relief effort, see CRS Report RL34481, Cyclone Nargis and Burma’s Constitutional Referendum, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 27 This was confirmed by a recent Government Accountability Office report (U.S. Government Accountability Office, Burma: UN and U.S. Agencies Assisted Cyclone Victims in Difficult Environment, but Improved U.S. Monitoring Needed, GAO-11-700, July 2011). 28 http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/burma/. Congressional Research Service 9 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress • education programs for Burmese IDPs, migrants, and refugees in Thailand; • training and assistance to strengthen community-based organizations in refugee camps in Thailand; and • support for Burmese organizations seeking to protect human rights, civil liberties, and press freedom in Burma and Thailand. USAID typically allocates funds by providing grants to international and local NGOs. USAID has used its Burma funds to provide grants to a number of different organizations, including the American Refugee Committee, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the U.N. World Food Program. In October 2010, USAID posted a solicitation for a Personal Services Contractor (PSC) to serve as Burma Country Program Manager to be located in Burma, subject to visa approval. If this position is successfully filled, it will be the first U.S. aid worker stationed in Burma in many years. Perceived Problems with U.S. Policy The Obama Administration has readily admitted some frustration with the results of its Burma policy. When asked during the State Department’s daily press briefing on March 10, 2010, for signs of progress in Burma resulting from the new policy, Assistant Secretary Philip J. Crowley stated that “so far, those results are lacking.”29 Following his May 2010 trip to Burma, Assistant Secretary Campbell stated that the Obama Administration was “profoundly disappointed by the response of the Burmese leadership.”30 In his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 2, 2011, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun stated “We are disappointed by the lack of any results from our repeated efforts at dialogue.”31 There appear to be several sources of frustration within the Obama Administration with respect to Burma. First, the SPDC has reportedly been relatively unresponsive in the high-level meetings, preferring to confine discussion to the exchange of formal statements that avoid or evade the issues raised by U.S. officials. Second, the current U.S. sanction regime may not be effectively targeted so as to be able to apply pressure for change. Third, other nations are seemingly reluctant or unwilling to discuss ways to coordinate Burma policies, thereby creating opportunities for the SPDC to circumvent efforts by the United States and other countries to apply political and economic pressure. There are indications that the Obama Administration is examining a possible rebalancing of its Burma policy. In part, this rebalancing may reflect its disappointment with the apparent ineffectiveness of the current approach. The rebalancing may also be in response to the formation of a new government and its possible implications for the future of Burma. Finally, Special Representative Mitchell may wish to pursue a restructuring of the strategic approach of U.S. policy towards Burma. 29 U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing,” press release, March 10, 2010. U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, Burma, “Assistant Secretary Campbell’s Remarks on Visit to Burma,” press release, May 10, 2010. 31 Department of State, “Block Burmese JADE Act and Recent Policy Developments,” press release, June 2, 2011. 30 Congressional Research Service 10 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Major Developments in Burma in 2010 The year 2010 proved to be an eventful year for Burma, with the country struck by another major cyclone32 and racked by periodic conflicts between the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw (“Royal Force”), and various insurgent groups in eastern Burma (see “The Ethnic-Based Militias” below). However, what may prove to be the most politically significant events for the year both took place in November—the national elections to select the nation’s first civilian parliament in 20 years, and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The elections, held on November 7, were portrayed by the SPDC as the completion of the fifth step in its seven-step process for the creation of a “disciplined democracy” in Burma.33 However, to the United States and many other nations the elections were neither free nor fair, and denoted little progress in the return to civilian rule Burma. By contrast, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi was greeted by the international community as a possibly pivotal event that might lead to the resumption of talks between the SPDC and the various opposition groups in Burma about possible national reconciliation. The 2010 Elections Burma’s first parliamentary elections in 20 years were held on November 7, 2010. At stake were 168 seats in the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw, or National Assembly) and 325 seats in the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw, or People’s Assembly) of the Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), as well as 661 seats in the 14 Regional and State Hluttaws.34 Candidates from 37 different political parties ran in the election, including the SPDC-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and a splinter group from the NLD, the National Democratic Force (NDF). The NLD was prohibited from participating in the election after it refused to re-register as a political party.35 Voting was held after a relatively short and controversial campaign period, in which opposition parties maintained they faced harassment, intimidation and limited access to the media.36 Opposition leaders and international observers also complained about the SPDCimposed election laws.37 32 Cyclone Giri, a category 4 cyclone, struck the coast of Burma on October 22, 2010, killing over 150 people and leaving tens of thousands of people homeless. The United States initially provided $300,000 in emergency relief supplies. On January 11, 2011, the United States announced it would provide an addition $1.5 million in food assistance. 33 For more information on the SPDC’s seven-step roadmap to democracy, see CRS Report R41218, Burma’s 2010 Elections: Implications of the New Constitution and Election Laws, by (name redacted). 34 Elections were not held for five seats in the Lower House and for 12 seats in the Regional and State Hluttaws because of the ongoing military conflicts in those areas of Burma. No date has been announced for elections for those seats. 35 The NLD decided against reregistering because certain provisions in the election laws may have prohibited some NLD leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, from running in the election, as well as required the NLD accept that the 1990 election results were invalid. The laws also severely constrained the use of funds to conduct a campaign. 36 For more about the controversial election campaign in Burma, see CRS Report R41447, Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). 37 For more about the various provisions of the elections laws, see CRS Report R41218, Burma’s 2010 Elections: Implications of the New Constitution and Election Laws, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 11 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress News accounts of the conduct of the election vary widely in their assessments. The SPDCrun media in Burma reported a high turnout and few voting irregularities. The opposition press in exile (such as Irrawaddy and Mizzima) and some international observers reported a light turnout and serious voting irregularities. Among the more serious claims of voting fraud were reports of ballot box stuffing and the delivery of large numbers of unexplained “advance votes” to many polling places. In some cases, the “advance votes” were delivered after preliminary results indicated that an opposition candidate had won the election. The Controversial Creation of the USDP The creation of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was the source of some political controversies in Burma. The USDP officially applied for recognition as a political party on April 29, 2010, when then-Prime Minister Thein Sein and 26 other government officials submitted the necessary documents to the Union Election Commission (UEC). However, a provision in the Political Party Registration Law appears to prohibit civil services personnel from forming a political party. On June 8, 2010, the UEC recognized the USDP as a political party, ruling that the Prime Minister and other officials were not civil servants. On July 16, 2010, the assets of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a SPDC-run “grassroots organization” claiming over 24 million members, were transferred to the USDP, providing the new political party with both the money and a network of contacts to use in the upcoming campaign. The asset transfer became controversial because another provision in the Political Party Registration Law prohibits a party from obtaining or using directly or indirectly money, buildings, vehicles, or property owned by the State. Several opposition parties maintained that the USDA asset transfer violated this law, and the USDP should therefore either be barred from the election or required to relinquish the assets. The UEC decided otherwise, allowing the USDP to keep the USDA’s assets. In a press release issued the day of the parliamentary election, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the United States was “deeply disappointed” by the elections, noting that “[t]he electoral process was severely flawed, precluded an inclusive, level playing field, and repressed fundamental freedoms. As a result, the elections were neither free nor fair.”38 Secretary Clinton also indicated that allegations of intentional Internet slowdowns, voter intimidation, and fraudulent “advance voting” schemes were “very troubling.” On December 7, 2010, the Union Election Commission (UEC), which was responsible for conducting the parliamentary elections, announced the official results. According to the UEC, 77% of Burma’s eligible voters voted, with 93% of the votes cast deemed valid. The USDP won in a landslide, picking up 129 seats (77%) in the Upper House, 259 seats (80%) in the Lower House, and 495 seats (75%) in the Regional and State Hluttaws (see 0). When coupled with the 25% of the seats in the Upper and Lower House reserved for military personnel (to be appointed by the Tatamadaw’s Commander in Chief), the USDP/military bloc holds a supermajority in both houses, which would allow them to amend Burma’s constitution. The main opposition party, the NDF, won a total of 16 seats—eight in the Lower House, four in the Upper House, and four in Regional and State Hluttaws. Several ethnic minority parties—the All Mon Region Democracy Party, the Chin Progressive Party, the PaO National Organization, the Rakhine Nationals Progressive Party, and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party—won 10 or more seats, but were unable to win enough seats to control any of the 14 Regional or State Hluttaws. The international response to Burma’s 2010 elections was mixed. The House of Representatives passed H. Res. 1677 on November 18, 2010, denouncing “the one-sided, undemocratic, and illegitimate actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that seek to legitimize military rule through a flawed election process.” President Obama, who was traveling in India at 38 Office of the Secretary of State, “Burma’s Elections,” press release, November 7, 2010. Congressional Research Service 12 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress the time, released a statement saying the “elections in Burma were neither free nor fair, and failed to meet any of the internationally accepted standards associated with legitimate elections.”39 Despite pressure from President Obama, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made no official statement regarding Burma’s elections. The ASEAN Chairman, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, issued a statement on November 11, 2010, welcoming the election as “a significant step forward in the implementation of the 7-point Roadmap for Democracy.”40 China also welcomed the election, referring to is as “a critical step for Myanmar in implementing the seven-step road map in the transition to an elected government.”41 A senior official with the Indonesian government stated, “While we are welcoming the results of the [Burmese] elections, we are urging reconciliation.”42 The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on November 13, 2010. She had been under detention since her conviction in August 2009 for allowing an uninvited U.S. visitor, John Yettaw, to stay overnight in her home without notifying Burmese authorities. The court-ordered sentence of three years in prison was commuted to house arrest for up to 18 months by SPDC leader, Senior General Than Shwe. At the time of her conviction in 2009, she was already under house arrest that had been imposed “for her own safety” on May 30, 2003, after clashes between her supporters and pro-SPDC demonstrators. Many international observers viewed her trial and conviction as a way for the SPDC to minimize her influence in the November 2010 parliamentary elections. The length of her commuted house arrest meant she was eligible for release only after the election was held. Since her release, Aung San Suu Kyi’s movements have been closely monitored by Burmese authorities, who have also placed restrictions on who she is allowed to see. Her younger son, Kim Aris, was granted permission to visit her soon after her release from house arrest. She has also been allowed to meet with several U.N. and U.S. officials, including Vijay Nambiar, chief of staff for U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun. In early July, she traveled outside of Rangoon for the first time to Pagan (Bagan) despite veiled threats against her in the government-run press (see “Human Rights Under the New Government”). While she reportedly has permission to travel out of the country, Aung San Suu Kyi has so far refrained from international travel perhaps because she fears she may not be allowed reentry into Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi has focused her energies since her release on several activities. First, she has been educating herself on the situation in Burma and the international attitudes towards the country.43 Second, she has been holding frequent meetings with the NLD’s aging leadership (frequently referred to as the “Uncles”) as well as with NLD members. Third, she has helped 39 The White House, “Statement by President Obama on Burma’s November 7 Elections,” press release, November 7, 2010. 40 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Chair Issues Statement on Myanmar Elections,” press release, November 11, 2010. 41 “China Welcomes Myanmar’s Smooth General Election,” Xinhua, November 9, 2010. 42 Mustaqim Adamrah, “Indonesia ‘Welcomes’ Myanmar Election Results,” Jakarta Post, November 16, 2010. 43 During her house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi had very limited contact with the outside world. She was allowed to listen to the radio and read newspapers, but was forbidden to use the Internet, watch television, or use the telephone. Outside contact was generally limited to her doctor and two residential maids, although she was permitted to meet twice with Kurt Campbell in 2009 and 2010, and once with Joseph Yun. Congressional Research Service 13 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress direct the reformation of the NLD as a political force in Burma by submitting appeals for the NLD’s reinstatement as a political party (rejected by Burma’s courts) and organizing public awareness events. Fourth, Aung San Suu Kyi has reached out to the international community to express her views and those of the NLD on the situation in Burma and what she thinks is the appropriate international response. In June 2011, she testified by video at a hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. The SPDC’s decision to end Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest was greeted with guarded approval by the Obama Administration. The White House issued a statement “welcoming her long overdue release,” but then pointed out that her release “does not change the fact that she, and the political opposition she represents, has been systematically silenced, incarcerated, and deprived of any opportunity to engage in political processes that could change Burma.”44 The statement went on to call for the release of all political prisoners in Burma (see “Political Prisoners”). Burma in 2011 The transition to the new government began early in 2011, with the new Union Parliament meeting for the first time on January 31, 2011. Prior to the parliament’s first session, the SPDC established relatively restrictive rules and procedures for the Union Parliament. The main tasks for the Union Parliament’s first session was the selection of Burma’s President and two Vice Presidents, the selection of speakers for both houses of parliament, and the confirmation of ministerial nominations—undertakings that the parliament successfully completed before adjourning on March 30, 2011. Also on March 30, Senior General Than Shwe formally dissolved the SPDC, officially transferred power to the new government, and appointed General Min Aung Hlaing as his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese military.45 The New Parliaments Burma’s various parliaments—the Upper House and the Lower House of the Union Parliament, and the 14 Regional and State Hluttaws—met for the first time on January 31, 2011, in their specially constructed buildings in Nay Pyi Taw. Access to the parliament buildings was limited to members of the parliaments, their staff and other government officials. No media were allowed. The second session of the Union Parliament is scheduled to begin on August 22, 2011.46 The parliamentary meetings proceeded under rules released by the SPDC on January 11, 2011, but created on October 21, 2010—16 days before the parliamentary elections.47 The rules reportedly include strict limitations on the clothes to be worn by the members of the parliament, contact with the media, and the length and content of comments that can be made on the floor of the parliament. Under the SPDC-imposed rules, all questions must be submitted in advance and 44 White House, “Statement by the President on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi,” press release, November 12, 2010. Wai Moe, “Than Shwe Officially Dissolves Junta,” Irrawaddy, March 30, 2011. 46 The official summons to the Union Parliament and its two houses were published in the New Light of Myanmar on August 1, 2011. 47 Article 443 of Burma’s new constitution grants the SPDC the authority to promulgate laws that remain in force after the new government is established. For more information, see Htet Aung, “Burma’s Disciplined Democracy,” Irrrawaddy, January 20, 2011. 45 Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress the Speaker has the authority to edit or block the submitted questions. The SPDC rules also prohibit outside discussion or distribution of parliamentary documents; violators, including the members of the parliaments, are to be sentenced to at least two years in prison, a fine of approximately $250, or both. The Union Parliament chose Former General, Prime Minister, and SPDC member Thein Sein as President. The two Vice Presidents selected were former General and SPDC Secretary Tin Aung Myint Oo and Dr. Sai Mauk Kham, an ethnic Shan member of the Upper House from the USDP. The Speakers for the Lower and Upper Houses are former SPDC members Thura Shwe Man and Khin Aung Myint, respectively. The Speakers for all 14 Regional and State Hluttaws are USDP members; 10 were previously generals in the Tatmadaw. After his selection as Lower House Speaker Thura Shwe Man reportedly told chamber members to refrain from spending too much time in debate.48 Upper House Speaker Khin Aung Myint reportedly made a similar statement to his chamber’s members. In an article in the government-run newspaper, The Mirror, he was quoted as saying, “The Parliament representatives are to serve the interests of the people unanimously, no matter which party they are from [sic].… The precious time will be lost if they argue with each other. The Parliament should not be in a debate-like situation.”49 State and Regional Power: A Path for Political Change? The Schedules One and Two of the 2008 constitution distinguishes between the types of laws that the Union Parliament and the State and Regional Parliaments have the right to enact. In addition, the constitution provides for 14 separate State and Regional Governments, each headed by a Chief Minister, who is appointed by Burma’s President, subject to the approval of the State or Regional Parliament. The Chief Ministers report directly to the President. Some observers have speculated that the separate, protected powers of the State and Regional Parliaments may provide a mechanism for the gradual transformation of Burma into a more democratic government. This is seen as being most likely in States where ethnic minorities constitute a larger portion of the population. Other observers, however, note that the constitution contains additional provisions that can be used by the President and the Commander-in-Chief to maintain control over troublesome States or Regions. The President has the power to dismiss Chief Ministers and require the reorganization of state and regional ministries. In the case of an emergency in a State or Region, the President can assume both legislative and executive power in that State or Region. If the emergency should threaten to cause the dissolution of the Union, a loss of national sovereignty, or involve an insurgency or violence, the Commander-in-Chief may assume power over the State or Region. On June 29, 2011, President Thein Sein reorganized the ministries in the Kachin State and the Saigaing Region. On June 30, he reorganized the ministries in the Bago Region, the Chin State, the Kayan State, and the Yangon Region. In all six cases, the reorganization also involved the appointment of new ministers. It waits to be seen if this reflects a Union Government policy of asserting tight control over the States and Regions. Early assessments of the function of Burma’s new Union Parliament have been mixed. Richard Horsey, a former International Labor Organization (ILO) officer in Burma, notes that the Upper House and Lower House met separately on 14 days and jointly for 18 days while in session, with meetings often lasting only a few minutes, “earning it the epithet, ‘the fifteen-minute parliament’ among some activists.”50 However, Burmese commentator Kyaw Kyaw maintains that members of parliament have used their limited ability to submit questions to 48 Myo Thant, “A Parliament without Debate?,” Mizzima, February 2, 2011. As cited in Myo Thant, “A Parliament without Debate?,” Mizzima, February 2, 2011. 50 Richard Horsey, The Initial Functioning of the Myanmar Legislatures, SSRC, May 17, 2011. 49 Congressional Research Service 15 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress good use, forcing government ministers to publicly address issues “that are not normally discussed in domestic media.”51 Another key factor that may limit the power of Burma’s new Union Parliament is the new constitution. Under the constitution, the President and his cabinet have fairly broad powers, and the Union Parliament has limited oversight and review of the actions and decisions of the executive branch, but the constitution does provide the Union Parliament with the ability to appoint and impeach the President, Vice Presidents, and government ministers. The constitution also grants the Burmese military virtual autonomy from the Union Parliament, beyond possible budgetary control.52 The New Union Government Burma’s new President, Vice Presidents and Ministers are collectively referred to in Burma’s constitution as the “Union Government.” As the country’s executive branch, the Union Government assumed responsibility for the administration and operation of Burma’s domestic and foreign policies after the formal dissolution of the SPDC. The Union Government has the constitutional power to set policies, propose the national budget, and conduct foreign affairs, subject to the approval of the Union Parliament. The constitution also provides some additional powers to the President not often found in other countries, making Burma’s President potentially the most powerful political figure in the country. However, if the President attempts to overreach in exerting his power, he can be impeached by the Union Parliament, and replaced by one of the two Vice Presidents. President Thein Sein Thein Sein was born on April 20, 1945. He is a graduate of Burma’s elite military school, the Defence Services Academy. His military career included posting in various parts of Burma, including the Shan State, the home of several ethnic-based militias (see “The Ethnic-Based Militias”). After the downfall of the former intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt in 2004 based on allegations of corruption, Thein Sein was made the SPDC’s First Secretary and promoted to Lieutenant General. In 2007, he was appointed Prime Minister when his predecessor, Soe Win, became ill with leukemia. He oversaw the drafting of Burma’s new constitution and played an important role in the transformation of the USDA, the SPDC’s civilian organization, into the USDP, the SPDC-backed political party. He is viewed as one of the more moderate SPDC leaders, and disinclined to take unnecessary risks. If President Thein Sein can effectively administer the operation of the new ministries, manage relations with the Tatmadaw, and avoid conflict and controversy with the Union Parliament, he could guide the nation’s transition away from military rule. Under the constitution, he is limited to two five-year terms, providing him with up to 10 years to make a clear break with Burma’s past. However, his military background and his past position as SPDC Prime Minister—as well as his presumed loyalty to Than Shwe—raises doubts about his willingness to dramatically depart 51 Kyaw Kyaw, “Burma’s Parliamentary System Explained,” New Mandala, April 1, 2011. The Parliament’s ability to use the budget to control either the President or the Tatmadaw is mitigated by a constitutional provision that allows the continuation of expenditures based on the previous year’s budget if the Parliament fails to approve the current year’s proposed budget. 52 Congressional Research Service 16 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress from Burma’s oppressive, paternalistic governance system. Thein Sein also suffers from heart problems (he reportedly has a pacemaker) and may have been reluctant to accept the Presidency.53 The Vice Presidents The Union Government’s two Vice Presidents are former General and SPDC Secretary Tin Aung Myint Oo and Dr. Sai Mauk Kham, a Shan member of the Union Parliament from the USDP. Under Burma’s constitution, the three nominees for President and Vice President are selected separately by the Upper House, the Lower House, and the military’s members of the Union Parliament. The Lower House nominated Thein Sein, who was selected as President. The Upper House nominated Sai Mauk Kham and the military members nominated Tin Aung Myint Oo. Tin Aung Myint Oo was born on May 29, 1950. Like Thein Sein, he is a graduate of the Defence Services Academy. He served in the Army, and rose to the rank of Lieutenant General. Prior to his appointment as Vice President, he was First Secretary for the SPDC. His nickname while in the Army was Thiha Thura, “Courageous as a Lion.” On November 12, 2009, he unexpectedly resigned from his position with the SPDC and the Army.54 At one time, he was chairman of the Trade Policy Council, which has the authority to grant export and import licenses and grant foreign companies permission to invest in the country. Tin Aung Myint Oo is considered a “hardliner.” The media has also reported that Tin Aung Myint Oo may be trying to undermine the authority of President Thein Sein to set the stage for a possible military coup.55 Another source claims that a power struggle has emerged between Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann for de facto control over the military and the government.56 Sai Mauk Kham, born in 1950, graduated from Mandalay Medical Institute and became a physician. He is from the Shan ethnic minority, and is known as a strong advocate of Shan culture. He reportedly developed close ties with Tin Aung Myint Oo, when the latter was commander of the North-East Regional Command (which includes the Shan State). Many observers maintain that Sai Mauk Kham was chosen as Vice President so that one of the three top positions was filled by an ethnic minority. He is expected to wield little power in the government. The Ministers President Thein Sein’s cabinet consists of 30 Ministers holding 34 separate portfolios (see Appendix D). The three Ministers for Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw (as stipulated in the constitution) and are active military officers. Among the rest of the Ministers, 4 are recently retired military officers and 15 were Ministers or Deputy Ministers in the SPDC government. The cabinet reflects strong continuity from the SPDC government, as well as a significant presence of current or past military officers. As one commentator observes, however, the presence of military officers in the cabinet is not surprising given that “the military has been the pre53 “Profile: Burmese leader Thein Sein,” BBC, February 4, 2011. Speculation at the time of his resignation attributed his departure to a dispute between his son and the grandson of SPDC leader Than Shwe. 55 Larry Jagan, “Burma’s Octopus Strangles Reform,” Irrawaddy, July 7, 2011. 56 Aung Zaw, “The Rut and Roar Begins in Burma,” Irrawaddy, July 8, 2011. 54 Congressional Research Service 17 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress eminent institution for more than half a century,” and a military education and career have offered better prospects than a civilian education and civil service.57 It is unclear if the continuity of Ministers represents an effort by the SPDC to retain control over the Union Government or reflects a lack of other sufficiently skilled people to carry out the ministerial duties. The National Defence and Security Council and the State Supreme Council Burma’s constitution establishes a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) with significant powers over the government, particularly in times of national or regional emergencies. The NDSC has 11 members—the President; the two Vice Presidents; the Speakers of the two chambers of the Union Parliament; the Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw; and the Ministers of Border Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs. In the current government, all of the NDSC members are active or retired military officers, except for Vice President Sai Mauk Kham. Under the constitution, the President can declare a regional or national emergency after consulting with the NDSC. In the case of a national emergency that could result in disintegration of the country or loss of sovereignty, the President’s declaration can transfer all legislative, judicial, and executive power to the Commander-in-Chief for up to one year, and the Union Parliament, Union Government, and judiciary are dissolved. The President can extend the national emergency declaration twice for up to six months each time after consultation with the NDSC. Once the emergency is over, the NDSC assumes legislative, executive and judicial power until a new Union Parliament is chosen, a new President is selected, and new judges appointed. To some observers, the powers of the NDSC and the prominent role of the military among the NDSC members provide the SPDC and the Tatmadaw with the ability to topple a Union Parliament or Union Government that attempts to undermine or challenge the role of the military in Burma’s governance. Similarly, the constitution’s provisions for the President and the NDSC to declare regional emergencies could be used to corral Regional or State Hluttaws that stray too far from the military’s chosen path for the nation’s political or economic development. In February 2011, the Irrawaddy, a leading opposition news agency operating out of Thailand, reported that an unnamed source close to the military said that Than Shwe and the SPDC were going to create a “State Supreme Council” to be the top governmental body in Burma.58 According to the source, the State Supreme Council would consist of Senior General Than Shwe, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, Lower House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, President Thein Sein, Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo, retired Lieutenant General Tin Aye, and two other senior military generals. In April 2011, the Asia Sentinel reported on rumors circulating in Burma that the State Supreme Council was still to be formed, and that while it was to supposed to have only advisory power, it would actually be the ultimate power in Burma.59 Burma’s constitution has no provision for a State Supreme Council in either an advisory role or as the ultimate power in the country. Political observers in Burma differ on the veracity of the unconfirmed reports of the creation of the State Supreme Council. While such an entity would be 57 Richard Horsey, Who’s Who in the New Myanmar Government, SSRC, April 14, 2011. “Than Shwe to Head Extra-Constitutional ‘State Supreme Council,’” Irrawaddy, February 10, 2011. 59 Larry Jagan, “The Look of Burma’s New Government,” Asia Sentinel, April 1, 2011. 58 Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress technically unconstitutional, the combined votes of the USDP and the military in the Union Parliament would be sufficient to amend the constitution to legalize the State Supreme Council. Changes in the Burmese Military Burma’s political changes have also had potentially important consequences for the Tatmadaw and its future. The creation of the USDP involved several senior military officers stepping down from their military posts to participate in the parliamentary elections. The formation of the Union Government also took some senior officers out of their military uniforms and moved them into civilian clothes.60 As a result, there has been a significant change in the top positions in the military. The new Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (as of March 30, 2011) is General Min Aung Hlaing. Another graduate of the Defence Services Academy, he is 54 years old, younger than President Thein Sein and two Vice Presidents. Prior to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, he was acting Joint Chief of Staff (after current Upper House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann stepped down to run in the parliamentary elections). Troops under his command have staged attacks on armed ethnic groups in various parts of Burma, including the assault on the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in 2009 that led to the flight of an estimated 37,000 ethnic Kokang into China.61 One of his first major actions after being promoted to Commander-in-Chief was to form a new national intelligence unit under his direct control. The national intelligence unit reportedly will be responsible for domestic political and security affairs.62 Min Aung Hlaing is generally regarded as a hardliner, with strong loyalty to Than Shwe. Under Burma’s constitution, the Commander-in-Chief is a powerful figure in the Burmese government. The constitution grants the Tatmadaw complete autonomy and gives the Commander-in-Chief authority over military affairs. The Commander-in-Chief appoints 25% of the members of the Union Parliament and 25% of the seats in the regional and state hluttaws. He also nominates the Ministers of Border Affairs, Home Affairs, and Defence. The Commander-inChief—along with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and the three Ministers nominated by the Commander-in-Chief—are members of the National Defense and Security Council. In the case the President declares a national emergency, the Commander-in-Chief assumes all executive, legislative, and judicial power. Besides a new Commander-in-Chief, the Tatmadaw also has new officers in almost every senior military posting. The new Deputy Commander-in-Chief is Lieutenant General Soe Win, who served with Min Aung Hliang along Burma’s border with China. He replaced Vice Senior General Maung Aye.63 Virtually all of the senior positions in the military are filled with officers appointed since the November elections, including all 14 of the regional commanders. 60 Two of the overseas opposition new agencies, the Irrawaddy and Mizzima, both published political cartoons featuring officers removing their military uniforms and putting on the traditional Burmese clothes required for Members of Parliament, satirizing the “change in government.” 61 Min Aung Hlaing reportedly ordered the arrest of Brigadier General Win Maung following the assault on the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army for his failure to detain Peng Jiasheng, the leader of the MNDAA. 62 “Burma Forms New Intelligence Unit,” Irrawaddy, May 3, 2011. 63 The current status of Maung Aye is unknown. There were unconfirmed reports that he was arrested in August 2010 after he refused to “retire” from the military and accept a senior position in the government. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress The political status of the Tatmadaw may be changing in important ways. Whereas in the past the regional commanders also were effectively in charge of the administration of the region or state (and allegedly were able to extort substantial kickbacks from local businesses), the new constitution assigns administrative responsibilities to Chief Ministers for each state or region.64 Six of the 14 Chief Ministers are ex-military commanders and three are ex-SPDC Ministers, often of higher rank than the newly appointed regional commanders. It is too early to tell if the newly appointed military officers will accept their change in status (and loss of economic power) and if the Chief Ministers will be able to exert control over their state or region. According to one report, the power struggle between the regional commanders and the Chief Ministers has already begun.65 The new Commander-in-Chief may have given a sign in July 2011 on how he will react to power struggles between regional commanders and the new local governments. On July 1, 2011, at least six regional commanders were reassigned, with some sources claiming 12 of the 14 commanders were replaced.66 On July 5, Brigadier General Tun Than was dismissed as Commander of Rangoon Command because of allegations of corruption.67 Since then, two more regional commanders have been placed under investigation for allegations of corruption.68 In addition, the SPDC potentially altered the nature of Burma’s military when it issued the People Military Service Law on November 4, 2010.69 The new law mandates that every Burmese citizen is required to undergo military training and to serve in the armed forces. All Burmese citizens— men and women—may be required to serve between 24 and 36 months in the military if called into duty by a newly created drafting committee. Exemptions are provided for members of religious orders, the disabled, and housewives with children. Previously, Burma officially had a volunteer military, and many people willingly joined the military because it provided their families with special benefits, such as better housing and greater access to scarce foods and consumer goods. The special privileges afforded to Tatmadaw families have reportedly been reduced since the parliamentary elections. To some observers, the diminution of the powers of the regional commanders and the creation of a military draft are part of an effort to professionalize Burma’s military, and reduce the Tatmadaw’s political powers. Other analysts are unconvinced that there is a plan to transform the Tatmadaw, or if there is such a plan, that it will prove effective. These analysts assert that the culture of Burma’s military, with its high reliance on loyalty, will prevent a major change in its traditions of privilege and entitlement, or in the military’s historical disregard for the common Burmese citizen. 64 The 14 Chief Ministers for regions and states are appointed by Burma’s President, subject to the approval of the Regional or State Hluttaw. 65 Yan Pai, “Military, Regional Govts at Odds over Business Concessions,” Irrawaddy, May 27, 2011. 66 Wai Moe, “Regional Commanders Reshuffled,” Irrawaddy, July 4, 2011. 67 “Brigadier General Tun Than, Commander of Rangoon Command, is Dismissed,” Mizzima, July 7, 2011. 68 “Five Military Generals Under Investigation in Naypyidaw,” Irrawaddy, July 28, 2011. 69 “People Military Service Law,” State Peace and Development Council Law No. 27/2010, November 4, 2010. Congressional Research Service 20 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress The Human Rights Situation For decades, Burma’s military leaders used political and economic oppression to maintain control over the country. On several occasions, the SPDC or its predecessors violently put down popular protests in order to remain in power.70 During most of its reign in Burma, the SPDC used tight control over the political and economic activities of Burmese citizens to suppress opposition and extract a privileged socio-economic status for the Tatmadaw. According to several Burma analysts, the SPDC and the Tatmadaw treat the country as if they are an army of occupation. With the arrival of the new Union Government and the official departure of the SPDC, it is uncertain if there will be a significant change in the human rights situation in Burma. The early indications are mixed, with some signs of a loosening of government control and other signs of a tightening of authoritarian rule. The actions of the Tatamadaw, in particular, since the first meeting of the Union Parliament have been especially troubling, suggesting that the military intends to continue its past disregard for human rights. Burma’s history of serious human rights violations has led to calls for the creation of a U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI). In his September 2010 report to the U.N. Secretary General, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana repeatedly indicated his support for the establishment of a COI under the auspices of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council, or the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC).71 On June 17, 2011, U.S. Ambassador to the UNHRC Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe reiterated that the United States supports the creation of a COI.72 In addition to the United States, 15 other nations have publicly endorsed the creation of a COI.73 The COI has not been endorsed by the other ASEAN member nations, China, India, or Japan. Human Rights Under the SPDC The most recent reports of the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the U.S. Department of State, and the major international human rights organizations all describe pervasive and severe human rights abuses under SPDC rule. On March 18, 2011, the UNHRC stated that it “strongly condemns the ongoing systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar.”74 In its assessment of events in Burma in 2010, Human Rights Watch wrote, “The ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continued to systematically deny all basic freedoms to citizens and sharply constrained political participation. The rights of freedom of 70 The violent suppression of protest movements include the crackdowns of the “8888 Uprising” of 1988, in which an estimated 3,000 civilians were killed, and the “Saffron Revolution” of 2007, in which an unknown number of civilians were killed. According to the SPDC, the official number of dead was 13 (including Japanese reporter Kenji Nagai). Western media and opposition groups estimate several hundred people were killed during the protests. 71 Tomás Ojea Quintana, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, United Nations General Assembly, A/65/368, New York, NY, September 15, 2010. 72 Htet Aung, “US Vows to Continue Pressing for Burma COI,” Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, June 17, 2011. 73 Nations that have publicly endorsed the creation of a Commission of Inquiry are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. 74 United Nations Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/HRC/16/L. 11, March 18, 2011. Congressional Research Service 21 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress expression, association, assembly, and media remained severely curtailed.”75 Freedom House described the human rights situation under SPDC rule in starker language: “The military junta has long ruled by decree and controlled all executive, legislative, and judicial power; suppressed nearly all basic rights; and committed human rights abuses with impunity.”76 The depth and breadth of human rights violations by the SPDC, the Tatamadaw, and their associates in Burma have been extensive. Human rights abuse in Burma has been both political and economic in nature. Among the more common and egregious human rights violations reportedly committed by the SPDC and its supporters are: • Abritrary and unlawful detention, disappearance, torture, and murder of Burmese citizens by the Tatmadaw and other security forces; • Systematic restriction of freedom of speech and the press; • Limitations on freedom of association (including a de facto ban on labor unions) and assembly; • Restrictions on the religious practices of religious groups not legally recognized; • Denial of citizenship and other legal rights to selected ethnic minorities; • Discrimination against certain ethnic minorities in education, employment, and cultural activities; • Restrictions on the ability of citizens to participate in elections and the political process (including the dissolution or non-recognition of political parties); • The falsification and fabrication of election results; • The illegal displacement of people (particularly certain ethnic minorities) and seizure of property; • Official condoning of violence against women, particularly by Tatmadaw soldiers (including rape in conflict areas); • Child labor, including the recruitment of children as soldiers; • Involuntary servitude and forced labor, especially in conflict areas; • Trafficking in persons, especially women and girls from ethnic minorities; • Denial of workers’ rights (including the prohibition on the right to strike, organize, and bargain collectively; forced mandatory overtime; and unsafe working conditions); • Widespread corruption and extortion by military officers and civil servants; and • Indifference to and/or disregard of reports of human rights violations. The legal devices by which the SPDC has systemically violated the human rights of Burma’s citizens are also extensive. The SPDC-written and -approved constitution appears to guarantee many of the civil and economic liberties for the Burmese people, but usually subject to conditions, such as the “prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility or public 75 76 Human Rights Watch, Burma: Country Report, January 2011. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011 - Burma (Myanmar), January 2011. Congressional Research Service 22 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress order and morality.” The constitution also preserves the continuity of all existing laws and directives issued by the SPDC and its predecessors, unless they are superseded by new laws passed by the Union Parliament. These include some of Burma’s more notorious laws, which the SPDC used to detain and imprison opposition political leaders, union organizers, and other dissidents: • The Law Protecting the Peaceful and Systematic Transfer of State Responsibility and the Successful Performance of the Functions of the National Convention against Disturbances and Oppositions—a 1996 law prohibiting “inciting, demonstrating, delivering speeches, making oral or written statements and disseminating” in order to: undermine the stability of the State, community peace and tranquility, the prevalence of law and order, and/or undermine national reconciliation; • The Unlawful Associations Act—originally a British law adopted in 1908 and amended in 1954, this law prohibits membership or participation in any association declared unlawful by the President; and • The Law Relating to the Formation of Organizations—promulgated in 1998, the law requires virtually all organizations in Burma to register with the government, and anyone supporting an unregistered organization may be imprisoned for up to five years. In addition, the SPDC created multiple security forces with the legal authority to monitor, harass, detain, and imprison individuals engaged in undesirable activities. Under the new constitution, the Tatamadaw have full autonomy and are not subject to civilian oversight, which allows the military to abuse human rights with virtual impunity. Burma’s police force, which is under the administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, was frequently used by the SPDC to monitor and detain political activists and human rights organizers, particularly in urban areas. Inside the Ministry of Defense, Military Security Affairs was an another vehicle to repress civil and economic freedoms in Burma. Prior to its transformation into a political party, the USDA operated as a “neighborhood watch” arm for the SPDC to uncover local leaders of dissent. Security personnel in these agencies routinely screened mail, monitored telephone calls and email, and conducted illegal raids—generally with little fear of reprisal from the SPDC. Human Rights Under the New Government It may be too soon to determine if the Union Government will support the military’s tradition of widespread human rights abuse in Burma or use this time of transition to develop a new policy of greater respect for political and economic liberties. The widespread presence of ex-military officers in the high echelons of the Union Government—including several ex-SPDC leaders in key positions—does not seem to set the stage for dramatic shifts in policies and practices with respect to human rights. During the first few months of its existence, the Union Government has shown some signs of maintaining strict and tight control over Burma. The Network for Human Rights Documentation– Burma (ND-Burma) claims that its field workers found evidence of 167 cases of human rights violations in Burma during the first three months of 2011.77 According to the organization, the 77 Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Burma: January (continued...) Congressional Research Service 23 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress most common human rights violations during this time period were forced labor (mostly the military’s use of civilians as porters), the confiscation or destruction of property (principally undercompensated land seizures for commercial use), and the military’s conscription of child soldiers. Since the end of March, there continue to be reports of human rights violations by the Burmese government. Reporters without Borders obtained copies of a directive of the Ministry of Communications, Posts, and Telegraphs tightening the regulation of Internet cafes, “including a requirement to keep the personal data of all their clients along with a record of all the websites they visit, and make it available to the authorities.”78 They also reported that the Rangoon-based weekly, True News, had been shut down for alleged inaccuracies in a story on mobile phones. The opposition news agency Mizzima reported on June 8, 2011, that government troops in the Mon State were using civilians as “human shields” in order to avoid attacks by a local ethnic-based militia, the Karen National Union (KNU).79 Other human rights abuses that have allegedly occurred since the beginning of the year include the continued arbitrary detention of political and labor organizers, the rape of minority women by Burmese soldiers in conflict areas, and the financial harassment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Signs are also emerging of a possible growing impatience within Burma’s leadership with the actions of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. On June 28, 2011, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is responsible for domestic security, reportedly sent a letter to NLD Chairman Aung Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi informing the organization that it must act in accordance with the law.80 The letter stated that certain activities of the NLD—erecting signboards and flags, issuing statements, holding meetings, publishing periodicals and videos—were considered violations of the law. The Ministry indicated that if the NLD wishes to continue these activities it should either register as a political party or as a social organization. The NLD is unlikely to register either as a political party or a social organization, as that would require it to renounce the results of the 1990 elections and accept the legitimacy of the 2008 constitution and the new Union Government. The following day, the government-run newspaper, New Light of Myanmar ran an opinion article that was highly critical of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and contained seemingly veiled threats against the Nobel Laureate and her political party.81 Following a defense of the legitimacy of the 2008 constitution, the November 2010 elections, and the Union Government, the author states, “Yet, there are certain persons who are attempting to get the nation in a terrible mess.…” Later in the article, the author accuses the NLD of “making unreasonable demands” and being reliant on “external elements [that] are contrary to the people’s desires and interests.” Noting her pending national tour, the author writes, “We are deeply concerned that if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi makes trips to countryside regions, there may be chaos and riots, as evidenced by previous incidents.” This last phrase appears to be a reference to her aborted 2003 national tour, which (...continued) March 2011, May 18, 2011. 78 Reporters without Borders, Surveillance of Media and Internet Stepped Up under New Civilian President, May 17, 2011. 79 Kun Chan, “Villagers Forced to Serve as Human Shields and Porters by Burmese Soldiers,” Mizzima, June 8, 2011. 80 “Home Affairs Ministry Sends Letter to U Aung Shwe, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Informing They Are to Act in Accord with Law,” New Light of Myanmar, June 29, 2011. 81 Pyae Sone Aung, “Right to Make Choice Still in Hand,” New Light of Myanmar, June 29, 2011. Congressional Research Service 24 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress ended following an attempt on her life and resulted in her being placed under house arrest.82 A subsequent paragraph asserts that the NLD is “trying to politically test the patience of the government,” and suggests the NLD “should stop doing so to avert unnecessary consequences.” Despite the letter from the Ministry and the article in New Light of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi traveled to the city of Pagan (Bagan) during the first week of July without incident. On July 18, 2011, she attended ceremonies honoring her father, late General Aung San, for the first time in nine years. Then, on July 25, 2011, Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement Minister Aung Kyi, who had previously served as the SPDC’s official liaison to Aung San Suu Kyi, met with her for over an hour. No details of the content of the meeting were released. The new government has taken some actions that may indicate potential improvements in some areas. The New Light of Myanmar reported on June 3, 2011, that the Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo and Senator John McCain had discussed allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to resume its visits to Burmese prisoners. The SPDC halted ICRC visits in 2006. The Ministry of Information announced that as of June 10, 2011, five categories of publications—sports, entertainment, technology, health, and children’s literature—would no longer be subject to pre-publication censorship, but would still be subjected to post-publication censorship.83 Nevertheless, all other weekly journals, monthly magazines, and books will continue to be required to submit their proposed drafts to the Burmese censorship board ahead of publication. Regardless of the future policies of the new Burmese government, at this juncture, the human rights situation in Burma remains poor. On June 1, 2011, Freedom House released a special report, The Worst of the Worst, 2011: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, which designated Burma among the nine most repressive countries in the world.84 On June 15, 2011, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe included Burma among a list of 13 countries that continue to abuse human rights, stating, “Burma continued to hold over 2,000 political prisoners and routinely violated the rights of its citizens, including ethnic minority populations.”85 Political Prisoners As of March 2011, 2,073 political prisoners reportedly remained in detention in Burma, according to the Thailand-based advocacy group, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).86 Burma’s political prisoners include members of the NLD and other opposition parties, 82 On May 30, 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade and her supporters were attacked by counter protesters near the town of Depayin, resulting in the killing of an unknown number of people. The NLD maintains that counter-protesters were actually SPDC security officials sent to assassinate Aung San Suu Kyi and that 70 or more people were killed. An unpublished police investigation of the incident claims only four people died during the incident, and that NLD supporters were carrying weapons with the intention of attacking the counter protesters. 83 “Burmese Censors Ease Conditions,” Irrawaddy, June 8, 2011. 84 Freedom House, The Worst of the Worst, 2011: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, June 1, 2011. The other eight most repressive countries were Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 85 United Nations Hurman Rights Council, Council Hears Reports on Côte d'Ivoire and Syria, Holds General Debate on Human Rights Situations That Require Its Attention, June 15, 2011. 86 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), “Monthly Chronology March, 2011,” press release, March 2011, http://www.aappb.org/. Congressional Research Service 25 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress representatives of various ethnic groups in Burma, Buddhist monks and nuns, student and youth organizers, and other dissidents. Conditions for the political prisoners are reportedly harsh.87 On May 16, 2011, President Thein Sein issued Order No. 28/2011 commuting all death sentences to life in prison and reducing the duration of all prison sentences by one year (exclusive of remission days).88 The amnesty resulted in the release of 14,578 prisoners, of which 55 were considered political prisoners.89 The SPDC has made several mass releases of prisoners in the past, also with few political prisoners included among those reprieved (see Table 2). Approximately 20 political prisoners in Insein Prison in Rangoon reportedly began a hunger strike following the amnesty’s announcement to express their disapproval of the continued detention of over 2,000 political prisoners, and to demand better conditions and treatment for political prisoners.90 According to the AAPP, seven of the hunger strikers were placed in special “punishment cells” for demanding better conditions.91 Table 2. Mass Prison Reprieves Total Prisoners Political Prisoners 5,588 26 334 253 January 3, 2007 2,831 50 September 23, 2008 9,002 10 Date January 3, 2005 July 6, 2005 February 20, 2009 6,313 24 The SPDC and the new government have generally denied that there are political September 17, 2009 7,114 128 prisoners in Burma and have asserted that the May 16, 2011 14,578 55 status of prisoners is an internal matter. New Light of Myanmar has not run any stories on Source: Burma Bulletin, May 2010 the hunger strike in Insein Prison. However, the June 3 edition of the paper, in two separate stories covering Senator John McCain’s visit, did report that Senator McCain asked about the status of political prisoners and was told by Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin and Vice President Aung Myint Oo that there are no political prisoners in Burma.92 One of the stories included Senator McCain’s statement that the according to the statistics of the International Human Rights Council, there are 2,000 political prisoners in Myanmar. Burma’s Militias and Refugee Problem The predominately ethnic Burman SPDC has long discriminated against many of the nation’s over 100 ethnic minorities. In some of the more serious cases, the SPDC and the Tatmadaw have been accused of committing grievous human rights abuses against certain Burmese ethnic 87 According to a story in the Los Angeles Times, some prisoners are tortured and placed in solitary confinement for years. Others are forbidden to speak. Medical care is limited, and the provided food is “barely edible.” ("Political Prisoners in Burma Face Bleak Conditions,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2010) 88 “Government Grants Amnesty for Prisoners,” New Light of Myanmar, May 17, 2011. 89 “Bogus Amnesty Keep Political Prisoners Behind Bars,” Burma Bulletin, May 2011. 90 Ba Kaung, “Prisoners Go on Hunger Strike Following Amnesty,” Irrawaddy, May 23, 2011. 91 Saw Yan Naing, “Seven Hunger Strikers Sent to ‘Dog Cells,’” Irrawaddy, May 25, 2011. 92 The New Light of Myanmar, June 3, 2011, pp. 1, 8. This appears to be the first direct denial by a Burmese official of the existence of political prisoners in Burma to appear in the New Light of Myanmar. Congressional Research Service 26 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress minorities. The reasons for the discrimination and maltreatment are complex and varied. Some ethnic minorities claim that a major cause of the discrimination is religious persecution. In other cases, the maltreatment appears to be primarily based on ethnicity. An important source of tension between the Burmese military and some of the ethnic minorities of eastern and northern Burma is the continued presence of ethnic-based militias. Over the last 60 years, the Burmese military and these militias have fought, frequently resulting in the internal displacement of the local civilian population and/or the flight of civilians across international borders. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of Burmese refugees are scattered across Southeast Asia, many in camps located in Bangladesh and Thailand. A flare-up of fighting between the Tatmadaw and the militias occurred in the first half of 2011, causing another round of refugees to flee the conflict areas. The Ethnic-Based Militias During the campaign period for the November 2010 elections, the Burmese military launched a series of attacks against ethnic-based militias in eastern and northern Burma. The Tatmadaw assaults were reportedly in retaliation for the militias’ rejection of a SPDC proposal to transform the militias into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or pyithusit (government-run local militias) under the authority of the Tatmadaw. The Burmese military specifically targeted the Kachin Independence Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army, and the United Wa State Army. The conflicts between the Tatmadaw and the militias continued unabated during the first session of the Union Parliament and the establishment of the Union Government, indicating that either the new government supports the military campaign or lacks the power to control the military. Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Burma has struggled to maintain its national unity due to tensions between the majority Burmans and the country’s over 100 ethnic minorities. The Panglong Agreement of 1947 between the Burmese colonial government (represented by Aung San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi) and representatives of several ethnic minorities provided for “full autonomy in the internal administration for the Frontier Areas,” which was understood to mean the traditional homelands for the ethnic minorities. The Kachin, in particular, maintain that the Panglong Agreement included provisions for a “separate Kachin State within a Unified Burma,” with the demarcation to be determined by “the Constituent Assembly,” or Burma’s parliament. Soon after Burma’s independence, the Panglong Agreement collapsed, and several ethnic-based militias arose, primarily in northern and eastern Burma.93 The Burmese military and the various militias fought off-and-on throughout much of the new republic’s early years. Following the coup in 1962, Burma’s military junta adopted a more aggressive stance towards the ethnic-based militias, launching a series of campaigns that led to hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing across Southeast Asia. Many of the refugees ended up in camps in neighboring Thailand. In the 1990s, the Burmese military changed its tactics towards the ethnic-based militias, offering a cease-fire and relative autonomy if the militias and their associated political parties agreed to remain part of Burma and accept the legitimacy of the military junta. This new policy was generally attributed to Prime Minister and Chief of Intelligence General Khin Nyunt, the creator 93 A list of the various ethnic-based militias is provided in Appendix E of this report. Congressional Research Service 27 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress of Burma’s “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy.” Several of the militias accepted the agreement, but some refused. For about a decade, conflict between the Tatmadaw and the militias was comparatively infrequent. The ceasefire agreements generally held, and the Burmese military and the non-ceasefire militias seemed willing to accept a military standoff. On October 18, 2004, SPDC leader Than Shwe announced that General Khin Nyunt had resigned for health reasons. Khin Nyunt was almost immediately arrested, and subsequently tried on corruption charges and sentenced on July 21, 2005, to 44 years in jail. Many of Burma’s senior intelligence officers were also arrested and Burma’s intelligence bureau was disbanded. The removal of Khin Nyunt corresponded with a change in the SPDC approach to the militias to a more hardline stance. A number of the leaders of the ethnic opposition groups were detained and given long jail sentences. For example, General Hso Ten of the ceasefire Shan State Army-North was sentenced to 106 years in prison. Various efforts have been made to end the fighting or establish a ceasefire. Representatives of the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are engaged in ongoing talks. On July 28, 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi released an open letter to President Thein Sein and the ethnic-based militias calling for an immediate ceasefire and offering her assistance in ending the hostilities.94 The Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), a coalition of representatives of ethnic groups from the Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon and Shan States, released a statement on August 1, 2011, welcoming Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter and offer of assistance.95 The Union Government has not officially responded to the offer. The possibility of convening a second Panglong Conference with participants from the ethnic minorities, the NLD, and the new Union Government has been raised by some of the ethnic minorities in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have expressed their tentative support for the concept. However, the SPDC, the Union Government, and the Tatmadaw have rejected the proposal. Burma’s Refugees The renewed fighting between the Tatmadaw and the militias has precipitated a new wave of refugees fleeing the conflicts in eastern and northern Burma. In the northern Kachin State, over 10,000 people have reportedly moved near or across the border with China to avoid the skirmishes between the Tatmadaw and the KIA. In southeastern Burma, more than 15,000 Karen have reportedly crossed into Thailand to escape fighting between Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and the Burmese military. The renewed fighting and flight of refugees may be creating some tension between the new Union Government and the governments in China and Thailand. China, whose major hydroelectric projects may have contributed to the conflict in Kachin State, is reportedly applying pressure on Burma to stop the assaults on the KIA.96 Similarly, Thailand is reportedly pressuring the Union Government to rein in the Tatmadaw to staunch the flow of refugees from southeastern 94 Tun Tun, “Suu Kyi’s ‘Open Letter’ Calls for Immediate Cease-fire in Ethnic Areas,” Mizzima, July 28, 2011. “ENC Statement on the ‘Open Letter’ of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” August 1, 2011. 96 China’s hydroelectric investments in the Kachin State supposedly upset the Kachin leadership, who felt that they were not adequately consulted or compensated (for expropriated land) before work on the project began. 95 Congressional Research Service 28 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress Burma. Thailand has also held talks with Burma about ways of repatriating more of the Burmese refugees living in camps along their mutual border. Figure 1. Burmese Refugee Camps The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report, Global Trends 2010, states that Burma is the world’s fifth largest source of refugees, after (in order) Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.97 According to the UNHCR, Burmese refugees currently number over 415,000. UNHCR also estimates that there are over 62,000 internally displaced people in Burma, plus over 797,000 “stateless persons.”98 Many of Burma’s refugees live in camps located along the borders with Bangladesh and Thailand (see Figure 1). According to the ThailandBurma Border Consortium (TBBC), the camps in Thailand contained over 141,000 Burmese refugees as of the end of 2010—42,000 more than were registered with the UNHCR. Roughly 80% of the refugees in the Thai camps are ethnic Karen, with another 10% Karenni. Other ethnic minorities in the camps include Chin, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The camps in Bangladesh are home to over 28,000 Burmese refugees, mostly Rohingyas from western Burma. In addition to the refugees located in the camps in Bangladesh and Thailand, tens of thousands of Burmese have reportedly settled in other countries in South and Southeast Asia. Malaysia has over 15,000 registered Burmese (mostly Rohingyas) who have entered illegally (under Malaysian law) but have obtained UNHCR registrations.99 Refugees International estimates that over 200,000 unregistered Rohingya refugees are living in Bangladesh, in addition to the 28,000 living 97 United Nation High Commission for Refugees, Global Trends: 2010, June 2011. The “stateless persons” consist primarily of ethnic Rohingyas, whom the Burmese government does not recognize as Burmese citizens. 99 Malaysia does not recognize the legal status of refugees and is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 98 Congressional Research Service 29 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress in camps. Representatives of Burmese refugees in India claim that over 80,000 Burmese refugees are living in India, consisting mostly of Chin, who are escaping religious discrimination and persecution for their Christian beliefs. Burmese refugees are also located in smaller numbers in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Singapore. While ongoing efforts are made to resettle Burmese refugees to other nations, the continual outflow of Burmese people often exceeds the annual number of resettlements. Refugees not registered with the UNHCR or residing in camps often risk arrest, detention, and deportation back to Burma. The situation for Burmese refugees in Malaysia has received particular attention, with allegations that Malaysia and Thailand officials were involved in human trafficking and extortion of Rohingyas.100 The Economy The available economic statistics for Burma are widely regarded as unreliable and inaccurate (see text box). The Central Statistical Organization (CSO) in the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development lacks the technical expertise and resources to obtain accurate economic data. In addition, Burma has an extensive “underground economy,” in which many Burmese citizens augment their standard of living through unrecorded and unreported work and commerce. Also, the SPDC has intentionally kept portions of the state-run economy secret—most notably, the real value of the proceeds from natural gas and oil—to evade international sanctions and domestic and international scrutiny. Despite the lack of reliable data, economists who monitor Burma generally agree that it is among the poorest countries in the world and is the poorest country in Southeast Asia. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranks Burma 132nd on its human development index.101 Its people suffer from widespread poverty, particularly its rural population. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 19% of the population is undernourished and 32% of its children are malnourished. The most recent UNDP household survey revealed a reduction in the percentage of households living in poverty from 32% in FY2005 to 26% in FY2010.102 However, some Burma observers are reportedly skeptical about the UNDP survey results, pointing to the lack of reliable census data upon which to base the sample survey.103 The general consensus on the main reason why Burma’s economic situation is so bad is gross mismanagement by the SPDC. Burma’s economic system has been described as a “kleptocracy” in which the country’s most profitable and valuable industries and businesses are owned or controlled by SPDC members, their families, or their supporters.104 In 2010, the SPDC proceeded with the “privatization” of many government-owned assets that some critics claim mostly involved the transfer of property to the SPDC leaders, their families, and their most loyal 100 For more details, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Trafficking and Extortion of Burmese Migrants in Malaysia and Southern Thailand, committee print, 111th Cong., 1 sess., April 3, 2009, S. Prt. 111-18. 101 Burma was ranked just below Cameroon and just above Yemen. The only Asian nations with lower rankings are Nepal (138th) and Afghanistan (155th). 102 Burma’s fiscal year runs from April to March. 103 Thea Forbes, “UNDP Survey Cites Significant Reduction in Poverty in Burma,” Mizzima, June 10, 2011. 104 For example, see Mary Callahan, “Myanmar’s Perpetual Junta,” New Left Review, November-December 2009, pp. 27-63. Congressional Research Service 30 U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress supporters.105 Just prior to its formal dissolution, the SPDC transferred ownership of rubber plantations, jade mines, and gold mines to junta leader Than Shwe and members of his family.106 Burma is considered one of the world’s most corrupt countries. In its 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Transparency International ranked Burma 176th in the world—tied with Afghanistan and just above the most corrupt country in the world, Somalia.107 Corruption reportedly is common at all levels of society. In particular, some regional military commanders allegedly receive payments from the legal (e.g., timber, jade, and ruby mining) and illegal (e.g., opium and methamphetamines) businesses operating in the territories under their command. According to one report, President Thein Sein’s priority agricultural development program has already been sidetracked into a bribery and extortion racket by local authorities and bankers.108 Burma’s Inaccurate Economic Data: The Case of GDP Growth Rate One example of the general inaccuracy of Burma’s official economic statistics is its reported gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. In its staff report for the 2007 Article IV consultation with Myanmar, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) include [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41971. Public record. Not legal advice.