# Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41856

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** July 1, 2013
- **Citation:** R41856

## Text

Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
(name redacted)
Specialist in Foreign Policy
(name redacted)
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
July 1, 2013

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41856

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance

Summary
In the post-2001 era, the United States has viewed Pakistan as a key ally, especially in the context
of counterterrorism and Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan has been among the leading
recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years, although assistance
levels have fluctuated considerably over the decades of Pakistani independence. In the wake of
9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more
than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance, and more than two-thirds
appropriated in the post-2001 period. Many observers question the gains accrued to date,
variously identifying poor planning, lack of both transparency and capacity, corruption, and slow
reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by
U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.
Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future
direction of the U.S. aid program. Relations have remained tense since that time, although civilian
aid has continued to flow and substantive defense transfers are set to resume later in 2013.
Disruptions in 2011 included the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a NATO
military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers
dead. The latter development led Islamabad to bar U.S. and NATO access to vital ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea for a period of more than seven
months. More recently, the 113th Congress is focusing on measures to reduce the federal budget
deficit. This backdrop appears to be further influencing debate over assistance levels to a topranking recipient that many say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally. For many
lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United
States—not least its role in Afghan reconciliation efforts—with the pervasive and mutual distrust
bedeviling the bilateral relationship.
The 111th Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73)
authorizing the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for five
years (FY2010-FY2014) and requiring annual certification for release of security-related aid.
Such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009, the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF, within Defense Department appropriations) and the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF, within State-Foreign Operations
Appropriations). The 112th Congress enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance.
Among these were certification requirements for nearly all FY2012 assistance (in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012—P.L. 112-74) and for FY2013 Coalition Support Funds
(CSF, military reimbursements funded out of the Pentagon) and PCF (in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2013—P.L. 112-239). Similar provisions appear in pending FY2014
legislation. In September 2012, the Administration waived FY2012 certification requirements
under included national security provisions and, in February 2013, it issued a waiver to allow for
the transfer of major defense equipment in FY2013.
The Administration has requested nearly $1.2 billion economic and security aid to Pakistan for
FY2014. This represents a steep decline from total FY2012 assistance of about $1.9 billion
(excluding CSF). Estimated FY2013 allocations are not yet available. This report will be updated
as warranted by events. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations, by (name redacted). See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid
Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by (name redacted) and (name re
dacted).

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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Key Issues and Recent Developments ............................................................................................. 3
Relevant Provisions in FY2013 Public Law.............................................................................. 3
Relevant Provisions in Pending FY2014 Legislation ................................................................ 4
Waiver of Certification Requirements Conditioning U.S. Assistance ....................................... 4
The Shakil Afridi Case and U.S. Assistance .............................................................................. 5
“Kerry-Lugar-Berman” Assistance Targets ............................................................................... 6
Assistance to Pakistan’s Energy Sector ..................................................................................... 6
March 2013 Auditor General’s Report ...................................................................................... 7
2012 GLOCs Reopening and Coalition Support Funds Release ............................................... 8
Flooding and Humanitarian Assistance ..................................................................................... 9
Fluctuating U.S. Aid to Pakistan Before 9/11 .................................................................................. 9
U.S. Aid to Pakistan After 9/11 ...................................................................................................... 10
Bilateral Economic, Development, and Humanitarian Assistance .......................................... 11
FATA Development Plan ................................................................................................... 12
The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009......................................... 13
Debate in Pakistan Over the “KLB” Bill........................................................................... 18
Security Assistance .................................................................................................................. 19
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) ......................................................................................... 20
Defense Supplies ............................................................................................................... 22
Military Training and Law Enforcement ........................................................................... 24
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
(PCF/PCCF) ................................................................................................................... 25
Other International Economic Donors ..................................................................................... 26
FY2014 Request for Aid to Pakistan and Objectives..................................................................... 27
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 29
Conditions on Aid to Pakistan ................................................................................................. 29
Debate Overview ............................................................................................................... 29
Current Conditionality and Administration Certifications/Waivers .................................. 31
Government Reform ................................................................................................................ 33
Corruption, Transparency, and Oversight Issues ..................................................................... 34
Corruption and Transparency ............................................................................................ 34
U.S. Government Oversight and Auditing ........................................................................ 36
Aid Delivery and Security Concerns ....................................................................................... 38
Branding and Public Diplomacy.............................................................................................. 39
Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs................................................................. 41
Conclusions.................................................................................................................................... 42

Figures
Figure 1. Pakistani Views of the United States .............................................................................. 40
Figure A-1. U.S. Aid in Current and Constant Dollars .................................................................. 43
Figure B-1.FY2013 Budget Request for Aid to Pakistan .............................................................. 44

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Figure C-1.Official Development Assistance to Pakistan, by Donor ............................................ 45

Tables
Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2001FY2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 2. Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Funds ..................................................................... 17

Appendixes
Appendix A. History of U.S. Aid to Pakistan ................................................................................ 43
Appendix B. Current Year Request ................................................................................................ 44
Appendix C. Major Donor Bilateral Development Assistance to Pakistan, CY2010 .................... 45
Appendix D. Principles and Purposes of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
2009 ............................................................................................................................................ 46

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 47

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Introduction1
Experts commonly list Pakistan among the most strategically important countries for U.S. policy
makers. The 113th Congress is grappling with troubled and even deteriorated U.S.-Pakistani
relations, as well as the need to balance Pakistan’s importance to U.S. national security interests
with U.S. domestic budgetary pressures.
In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous
Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been a central U.S. foreign policy effort.
Global and South Asian regional terrorism, and a nearly 12-year-long effort to stabilize
neighboring Afghanistan, are viewed as top-tier concerns. Pakistan’s apparently accelerated
nuclear weapons program and the long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir continue to
threaten regional stability. Pakistan is identified as a base for numerous U.S.-designated terrorist
groups and, by some accounts, most of the world’s jihadist terrorist plots have some connection to
Pakistan-based elements. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories
remaining rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political
setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.
Opinion surveys show a large and consistent majority of Pakistanis holding strongly unfavorable
views toward the United States.2 Meanwhile, Americans tend to have poor views of Pakistan; one
survey—taken soon after the May 2011 bin Laden raid—found only 2% identifying Pakistan as a
U.S. “ally.”3 Aware of these and other concerns, the U.S. government has provided large-scale
foreign assistance to Pakistan with an eye toward short-term U.S. security interests and longerterm interests in realizing a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistani state.
The United States has provided significant aid to Pakistan over the nearly 66 years since that
country’s independence, but at levels that fluctuated widely. Major aid flows during some periods
and drastic cuts in others contributed to creating a perception among many in Pakistan that the
United States is not a fully reliable ally. At the same time, some U.S. lawmakers continue to
question providing large amounts of aid to a Pakistani government that is seen as an unreliable
partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts—as evidenced in 2011 by revelations that Al Qaeda
founder Osama bin Laden found refuge in a Pakistani city for several years and that the Haqqani
Network of Afghan insurgents may continue to receive support for Pakistan’s main intelligence
service. To many, Pakistan also appears incapable of providing sustainable economic
development and security for its own people, and often is unaccountable to the United States for
aid results. Beyond these issues, some question whether the aid results in public diplomacy

1

For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name re
dacted). See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting
Requirements, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
2
A June 2012 Pew Global Attitudes poll found that 74% of Pakistanis considered the United States an “enemy” (a 5%
increase over 2011), while only 9% considered it to be a “partner.” A May 2013 Pew survey found only 11% of
Pakistani’s hold a favorable view of the United States, the lowest percentage in a decade (see “Pakistani Public Opinion
Ever More Critical of U.S.,” June 27, 2012, at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-evermore-critical-of-u-s; “On Eve of Elections, A Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” May 7, 2013, at
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-dismal-public-mood-in-pakistan ).
3
Another 11% called Pakistan “friendly,” while 38% called it “unfriendly” and 23% identified Pakistan as “an enemy
of the United States” (see http://today.yougov.com/news/2011/05/23/2-call-pakistan-ally-us).

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benefits for the United States. Meanwhile, only a small percentage of Pakistanis appear to view
U.S. assistance to their country as having a positive impact.4
Pakistan is a poor, fragile, and insecure state, representing a daunting challenge to U.S. and other
foreign donors. Pakistan’s estimated per capita GDP of $2,881 (at purchasing power parity) in
2012 ranks it 141st of 187 world countries (by comparison, the U.S. figure is $51,248 and India’s,
with seven times as many citizens as Pakistan, is $4,063). From 2008 to 2010 the country
experienced aggregate inflation of nearly 50% against GDP growth of less than 13%. Pakistan’s
education sector is among the world’s least effective: the government devotes less than 3% of
GDP to education and nearly one-quarter of primary school age children have no formal
education of any kind. Less than half of Pakistanis have access to modern energy services, and
the energy infrastructure is so overburdened that chronic electricity shortages result in rolling
blackouts lasting 16 or more hours per day, even in vital business centers such as Karachi. Potable
water shortages are widespread, and a dilapidated health sector provides insufficient access to
basic health services, meaning that many citizens—women and children, especially—die each
year from preventable diseases. Meanwhile, security threats remain rife: Pakistan is home to
multiple Islamist, separatist, sectarian, and other politically motivated militants and terrorist
groups. Reports indicate that as many as 49,000 Pakistanis have died in terrorism- and/or
insurgency-related violence since September 2001; more than 5,100 civilians are said to have
been killed in bomb blasts or suicide attacks since 2008.5
The post-2001 U.S. assistance program for Pakistan has seen notable accomplishments, not least
in the area of humanitarian relief related to that country’s devastating 2005 earthquake and 2010
floods. U.S. aid has measurably improved Pakistan’s energy, health, and education sectors,
bolstered its infrastructure, and facilitated better governance and gender equity.6 In the security
realm, U.S. assistance has provided Pakistan’s military and law enforcement agencies with
equipment and training that has improved their capacity to combat the country’s indigenous
terrorism threat. It has also contributed to successes realized by the Pakistani military in offensive
military operations undertaken in tribal areas, and enabled Pakistan to better support U.S.-led
military operations in Afghanistan. Pakistani law enforcement agencies have received equipment
and training.
However, by most objective measures, U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 2001 has not achieved its
central goals, especially as Islamist extremism and militancy there have increased, the civilian
government remains unstable, and the national economy continues to suffer. Many independent
assessments of the U.S. aid program are critical of the way Washington has delivered and
overseen aid. In the representative words found in a June 2012 study,
International, particularly U.S., military and civilian aid has failed to improve Pakistan’s
performance against jihadi groups operating on its soil or to help stabilize its nascent
democracy. Lopsided focus on security aid after the 11 September 2001 attacks has not
4

A May 2013 Pew Global Attitudes poll found only 8% of Pakistani respondents saying the impact of U.S. economic
and military aid was “mostly positive”; roughly two-thirds said the impact was “mostly negative” (see “On Eve of
Elections, A Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” May 7, 2013, at http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/chapter-3attitudes-toward-the-united-states-and-american-policies).
5
Data in this paragraph from IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013; World Bank Country Strategy
Progress Report; USAID, “U.S. Assistance to Pakistan—Sectoral Working Papers;” and “Pakistani Victims: War on
Terror Toll Put at 49,000,” Express Tribune (Karachi), March 27, 2013.
6
See a collection of USAID fact sheets at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets.html.

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delivered counterterrorism dividends, but entrenched the military’s control over state
institutions and policy, delaying reforms and aggravating Pakistani public perceptions that
the U.S. is only interested in investing in a security client.7

This critique, like many others, urges the United States to apply conditions on military, but not
civilian, assistance, and to give both the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
and its implementing partners more freedom to devise and prioritize their efforts. Some observers
fault the U.S. government for failing to put security aid and development aid on distinct tracks.
These analysts further contend that the Obama Administration and Congress may both have
overestimated the pace at which the United States could enlarge the assistance program, and been
too optimistic about the ability of U.S. agencies to quickly and extensively implement KLB
effectively.8

Key Issues and Recent Developments
Relevant Provisions in FY2013 Public Law
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2013 became P.L. 112-239 just days
before the 112th Congress adjourned. The act contains limitations, conditions, and waiver
authorities for Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursements and Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund (PCF) disbursements. In addition, the certification requirements for most forms of U.S.
assistance found in Section 7046 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74)
continue to obtain in FY2013, as do certification requirements for the release of most security aid
found in Section 203 of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73).
Section 1227 of the FY2013 NDAA limits CSF reimbursements to Pakistan to $1.2 billion in the
current fiscal year, and it prohibits any such reimbursements for the roughly seven-month period
(November 2011-July 2012) that Pakistan had barred NATO from transiting along its Ground
Lines of Communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan with the Arabian Sea. Payment of
FY2013 CSF to Pakistan cannot be made unless the Secretary of Defense certifies that security is
being maintained along the GLOCs, that Pakistan is taking demonstrable steps on
counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and other militant extremist
groups, and that it is countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Secretary
may waive this certification requirement in the interest of U.S. national security.
Section 1228 of the act extends PCF through the current fiscal year. Disbursement of such funds
requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to certify that
Pakistan is demonstrating efforts to counter IEDs, cooperating on counterterrorism efforts, and
not detaining Pakistani citizens, including Dr. Shakil Afridi, as a result of their cooperation with
the U.S. government on counterterrorism efforts. The Secretary may also waive this certification
requirement in the interest of U.S. national security.

7

“Aid and Conflict in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 227, June 2012.
Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Daniel Cutherell, “More Money More Problems: A 2012 Assessment of the US
Approach to Development in Pakistan,” Center for Global Development, July 2012.
8

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Relevant Provisions in Pending FY2014 Legislation
Section 1211 of the pending NDAA for FY2014 (H.R. 1960), passed by the full House on June
14, 2013, would limit FY2014 CSF reimbursements to Pakistan to $1.5 billion. Furthermore,
disbursement of such funds would require the Secretary of Defense to certify that Pakistan is
maintaining the security of and not interfering with the movement of U.S. shipments along its
GLOCs; that it is taking demonstrable steps to support counterterrorism operations, to disrupt the
conduct of cross-border attacks on NATO and allied troops in Afghanistan, to counter the threat
of IEDs, and to conduct cross-border coordination with Afghan and U.S. troops; and that it is not
using its military or any security assistance provided by the United States to persecute nonviolent
minority groups for their political or religious beliefs. The bill would allow the Secretary to waive
this certification requirement in the interest of U.S. national security.
Section 9014 of the pending Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2014 (H.R. 2397),
introduced in the House on June 17, 2013, would preclude any FY2014 CSF payments to
Pakistan unless the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, certifies that
Pakistan is cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region (for the first time naming
the anti-India Lashkar-e-Taiba among the targeted groups); not supporting terrorist activities
against U.S. or allied troops in Afghanistan and Pakistani security agencies are not intervening
extra-judicially in the country’s political and judicial processes; dismantling IED networks;
preventing nuclear proliferation; implementing policies to protect judicial independence and due
legal process; issuing visas in a timely manner for U.S. visitors engaged in counterterrorism
efforts or assistance programs; and providing humanitarian organizations access to detainees. The
bill would provide the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, authority
to waive these restrictions in the interest of U.S. national security.
The FAULT Act (H.R. 1922, referred to House committees on May 9, 2013) would limit
assistance to Iran, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan on the finding that U.S. taxpayer
dollars “should not be distributed to those who seek to do harm to Americans or our allies,” and
that Pakistan is among those countries that “have engaged in activities that undermine the security
and foreign policy objectives of the United States....” Enactment would end all foreign assistance
to listed countries with the exception of an annual maximum $50 million in agricultural or
medical goods. Such limitations on a specific country could be waived if the President reports to
Congress that the country has made fundamental changes in an extensive array of governmental
policies or for humanitarian aid. The bill would also require the President to terminate Pakistan’s
status as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

Waiver of Certification Requirements Conditioning U.S. Assistance
In August 2012, the State Department quietly notified Congress of its intention to cite U.S.
national security provisions in waiving two certification requirements that placed conditions on
U.S. assistance to Pakistan. These provisions required the Secretary of State to certify that
Pakistan was cooperating with the United States on a range of counterterrorism, nonproliferation,
democracy, and other issue-areas. Weeks later, then-Secretary Clinton formally notified Congress
that the Administration would continue the U.S. aid flow by waiving certifications required in
Section 203 of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73) and in Section
7046 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), finding that it was in the

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national security interest of the United States to do so. This marked the first time the Obama
Administration waived aid sanctions on Pakistan.9
In February 2013, in order to resume arms transfers to Pakistan in the current fiscal year, the
Administration issued a more limited Section 203 waiver when Deputy Secretary of State Thomas
Nides quietly removed restrictions on the issuance of export licenses for major defense
equipment. License applications are now being considered on a case-by-case basis.10 To date, the
Administration has neither certified Pakistan nor issued a blanket national security waiver for
FY2013 under Section 203 provisions.

The Shakil Afridi Case and U.S. Assistance
In May 2012, a tribal court in Pakistan convicted Shakil Afridi of treason and sentenced him to 33
years in prison. Afridi was a physician who had worked with the CIA in an apparently
unsuccessful attempt to collect DNA samples from Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound
previous to the May 2011 U.S. commando raid there. Members of the U.S. Congress reacted
strongly and with considerable bipartisan anger to news of Afridi’s sentencing. A day later, a
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee approved an amendment to the FY2013 State and Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill that would withhold $33 million ($1 million for each year of the
sentence) of requested Foreign Military Financing aid to Pakistan. Senator Rand Paul was among
several Members who have sought to end all foreign assistance to Pakistan until Afridi is released
and the charges dropped; he pushed for the Senate to consider such provisions in his bill (S.
3576). On September 22, 2012, the bill was defeated by a vote of 10-81.
Some Members of the 113th Congress remain seized of the issue. In the Senate, the pending S.
158 would naturalize Dr. Afridi as a U.S. citizen, and S. 164 would prohibit further U.S.
assistance to Pakistan until he is released and the charges dropped. A pending House resolution
with 18 cosponsors (H.Res. 86) would express the sense of the House that Afridi is an American
hero and should be immediately released from Pakistani custody.
During an April 2013 House hearing on the Administration’s FY2014 foreign affairs budget
proposal, one Member asked Secretary of State John Kerry how long the United States will use
“quiet diplomacy” in an effort to see Afridi freed, “rather than just cutting off their aid?” The
Secretary responded by saying,
Cutting off aid to Pakistan would—would not be a good move, certainly at this point in time,
for a lot of different reasons. We are working with Pakistan with respect to nuclear safety
and nonproliferation. We are working with Pakistan to get our supplies both in and out of
Afghanistan.11

9

Congress had permanently waived all proliferation and debt-arrearage sanctions on Pakistan in October 2002, and the
Bush Administration issued six waivers of democracy-related sanctions—for FY2002-FY2007—until these were
permanently waived following a 2008 determination that a democratic government had been restored in Islamabad.
Further discussion is in the “Current Conditionality and Administration Certifications/Waivers” section below.
10
See the State Department’s February 15, 2013, release at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/documents/
NoticetoExporters_Pakistan.pdf.
11
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the State
Department and Foreign Affairs,” CQ Transcripts, April 17, 2013.

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“Kerry-Lugar-Berman” Assistance Targets
The aspiration to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan for FY2010FY2014, as authorized by the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (EPPA, also
known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman or “KLB bill”), was met only in FY2010. Amounts fell short
by $414 million in FY2011, by $433 million in FY2012, and by $428 million in the FY2013
request. For FY2014, the Administration has requested just over half of the legislation’s
authorized amount. By way of explanation, Administration officials say Congress did not
appropriate the funds for FY2011 and FY2012. For FY2013 and FY2014, the Administration
request fell significantly short of $1.5 billion due mainly to budgetary constraints. The legislation
includes a sense of Congress that its provisions be extended for another five years (FY2015FY2019), however the authorization itself ends in FY2014.

Assistance to Pakistan’s Energy Sector
Perhaps the most pressing problem facing the new Pakistani government of Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif, seated in June 2013, is the country’s shambolic energy sector. The proximate issue
is an estimated $5 billion in “circular debt” in the power sector, debt caused largely by a failure of
most Pakistanis to pay their electricity bills (theft and corruption are other major factors).12
Electricity shortages are a problem that has become increasingly severe over the past decade, and
Pakistani homes and businesses now commonly face “rolling blackouts” of up to 16 hours per
day in cities and up to 22 hours per day in rural areas due to load shedding. A peak national
demand of about 15,000 megawatts (MW) is often 50% greater than generation capacity. The
crisis is said to shave as much as 4% from the country’s GDP and 1.5% from the GDP’s rate of
growth.13 The government’s current goal is to reduce load shedding to just three or four hours per
day within six months.
According to the State Department’s FY2014 Congressional Budget Justification, assistance to
Pakistan’s energy sector is the “highest priority,” and the Administration’s request for $265
million in FY2014 funding for this effort accounts for more than one-third of all civilian aid
requested for the coming fiscal year. The goal is to support the Pakistani government in
“developing a policy environment that will attract private sector investment and increase cost
recovery, decrease technical and commercial losses, and add megawatts to the grid through
visible generation projects.”14
By the end of 2013, U.S. AID expects to have added fully 900 MW to Pakistan’s power grid,
enough to power some 2 million homes and businesses. An added 300 MW is planned by the end
of 2014. The great majority of this added capacity will come from improvements of the
Muzafargarh and Jamshoro power stations (serving the cities of Multan and Hyderabad,
respectively), as well as modernization of the Tarbela Dam near Islamabad. There is a particular
focus on boosting Pakistan’s hydropower potential by funding projects to improve capacity at five
dams (Mangla, Kurram Tangi, Gomal Zam, Satpara, and Tarbela). The Tarbela Dam is one of the
12

The government sells electricity at a price some 25% less than the cost of production and is increasingly unable to
make up the shortfall. This leaves oil importers owed by power plants that are themselves owed by distribution
companies that are unable to collect payment from consumers.
13
“Electricity, Gas Shortages Go Through the Roof,” Dawn (Karachi), April 20, 2013; “Pakistan’s Leader Sets a Real
Power Play,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2013.
14
See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208291.pdf, p. 584.

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world’s largest and supplies fully 16% of the country’s electricity. In March 2013, a project to
restore three of the dam’s generators was completed, adding 128 megawatts to the national power
grid. The United States had provided the $16.5 million needed for the repairs. In mid-2012,
Congress released $280 million in new assistance for Pakistan’s energy sector; these funds will
support projects at Mangla and Kurram Tangi.15

March 2013 Auditor General’s Report
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for USAID and the Departments of State and Defense
issues quarterly reports on the progress and oversight of the U.S assistance program in Pakistan.
The most recent covers developments through March 2013, at which time the AID Mission in
Pakistan had a total of 258 staff, with a net gain of 8 so far in 2013. It conveys U.S. Embassy
reporting that, to date, $3.98 billion in FY2010-FY2013 civilian assistance funds had been
obligated. The report notes serious and continuing challenges to effective aid delivery:
Challenges to implementation of the civilian assistance program in Pakistan remain in every
sector. Limited local technical capacity has affected the implementation of many assistance
efforts. Many programs operate under difficult security conditions, and implementing
partners and program participants have been subject to criticism and harassment for their
association with U.S. Government efforts. Program staffing and events have been hampered
by the denial of visas and visa extensions to U.S. Government employees and implementing
partners, and project personnel have been kidnapped and killed in areas where security is
lacking. Despite these challenges, implementation of assistance programs continued. May
2013 parliamentary elections held the promise of a historic, peaceful transfer of civilian
power in Pakistan that, in turn, had the potential to produce changes in government priorities
and the direction of assistance programs.16

The USAID OIG has taken action, including investigations and audits, to protect against waste
and theft.
The report also lays out nine major risk factors that jeopardize the U.S. aid program in Pakistan:
1. Political risks (political and economic instability limits progress in aid delivery);
2. Operating restrictions (strict Pakistani government rules limiting the ability of U.S.
personnel to travel hinder project implementation and monitoring);
3. Resistance to reform (entrenched interests sometimes resist needed economic policy
reforms and political interference undermines the decision-making process of managers
in the Pakistani power sector);
4. Vulnerability to natural disasters (flooding is exacerbated by poor water storage and
management practices, and delays project implementation in affected areas);
15

“U.S. Releases New Funds for Pakistani Energy Projects,” State Department release, August 3, 2012; World Bank,
“Expanding the Power of the Tarbela Dam,” February 6, 2013; “US-Funded Restoration of Tarbela Dam Complete—
Olson,” Dawn (Karachi), March 5, 2013.
16
Inspectors General of the Departments of State, Defense, and USAID, “Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on
the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan,” March 31, 2013, p. 1, at http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/auditreports/Pakistan_Quarterly_Report_as_of_03312013.pdf.

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5. Leadership turnover (high-level officials in both countries will often spend less than two
years in their positions, affecting program planning, coordination, and implementation);
6.

Adverse environmental impact (some projects have the potential to degrade the natural or
physical environment);

7. Limited institutional capacity (outside of Punjab, many Pakistani institutions have low
capacity and a dearth of experienced staff, increasing the risk of resources being lost
through inefficiency and/or theft);
8. Inadequate financial management in Pakistani government institutions (increases the
difficulty of accountability and reporting): and
9. Security risks (U.S. officials have reduced ability to conduct direct monitoring and
evaluation in conflict-affected areas).
Strategies to mitigate each of these risks are being implemented. These include numerous
capacity-building and NGO training programs; the use of accounting firms to conduct pre-award
assessments and audits; maintenance of an in-country oversight presence; and working
cooperatively with Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau, the country’s lead law
enforcement agency for corruption investigations, among others.17

2012 GLOCs Reopening and Coalition Support Funds Release
In angry response to the inadvertent killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by NATO forces in late 2011,
Islamabad closed the vital ground lines of communication (GLOCs) used by NATO forces to
access Afghanistan and placed bilateral relations “on hold.” Ties then remained largely frozen
during the first half of 2012. In July 2012, negotiations finally succeeded in resolving the bilateral
impasse and the GLOCs were reopened. The breakthrough came following a telephone call to
Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar in which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We are
sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military.”18 The State Department indicates that
civilian aid flows were uninterrupted during the seven-month period.
In an apparent quid pro quo for the GLOCs’ reopening, the Administration announced it would
release $1.18 billion in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) military reimbursements for Pakistan’s
support during the period July 2010-May 2011. Congress took no action to block the transfer. The
payment, the first since December 2010, equaled 60% of the $1.88 billion claimed by Pakistan for
that period.19 At the close of 2012, the Defense Department issued another $688 million CSF
payment covering the period June-November 2011. Congress has prohibited any provision of
CSF for the period that the Pakistani GLOCs were closed. At present, CSF requests for July 2012
and beyond are being taken under consideration.

17

Ibid., p. 59-62.
See http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194502.htm.
19
The vast majority of the reimbursements ($1.08 billion) was for Pakistan Army expenses; about 60% was for food,
water, medical services, and vehicle repairs and maintenance.
18

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Flooding and Humanitarian Assistance
For three consecutive summers (2010-2012), Pakistan experienced major seasonal flooding that
resulted in hundreds of deaths and negatively affected nearly 5 million people with deteriorated
living conditions. The most recent round, in 2012, forced some 350,000 people to flee their
homes, bringing the total still-displaced population to more than 750,000 at year’s end. According
to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Islamabad government
pledged $91 million toward relief and continues to coordinate response efforts.
State Department and USAID humanitarian and complex emergency assistance for Pakistan
totaled nearly $135 million in FY2012, bringing total FY2010-FY2012 U.S. flood-relief provided
to Pakistan to more than $735 million in funds and in-kind aid and services. During the first half
of the current fiscal year, another $77 million in humanitarian assistance had been disbursed.20

Fluctuating U.S. Aid to Pakistan Before 9/11
Over the past six decades, the United States has turned aid to Pakistan on and off to correspond
with U.S. foreign policy objectives and to reflect the state of the bilateral relationship. Aid was
provided or restricted for numerous reasons over those 60 years. In some years, U.S. aid would
support balance in the region and contain Soviet expansionism; in other years, the U.S.
government would withhold aid because of nuclear weapons proliferation and lack of
democratization gains. U.S. aid levels to Pakistan (after adjusting for inflation) peaked in 1962
when Pakistan aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as
the “Baghdad Pact”; see Figure A-1). President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously called Pakistan
America’s “most allied ally in Asia.” In contrast, U.S. aid to Pakistan was at its lowest level in the
1990s after the Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and President George H. W.
Bush suspended aid to Pakistan in 1990 because of its nuclear activities.
During and immediately after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States
suspended military assistance to both sides. This resulted in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S.
relationship and a perception among many in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable
ally. In the mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s efforts to respond to India’s 1974
underground nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. President Jimmy Carter
suspended most U.S. aid in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium enrichment
facility. However, in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the United States viewed
Pakistan as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In 1981, therefore, the
Reagan Administration negotiated a five-year, $3.2 billion economic and military aid package
with Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan
resistance, as well as home for millions of Afghan refugees, many of whom have yet to return.
In 1985 Congress passed the Pressler Amendment (§620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961) that required the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
explosive device during the fiscal year for which the aid was provided. President Reagan and
President George H. W. Bush certified Pakistan each year until 1990.
20

USAID, “Pakistan—Floods and Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2013, March 29, 2013.

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After the 1990 suspension of aid to Pakistan, U.S. aid to that country remained at low levels not
seen since the early 1950s, largely due to a disengagement from Pakistan and Afghanistan after
the defeat of the Soviet Union there, as well as an overall reduction in foreign aid in an effort to
balance the U.S. budget. This left a lasting effect on Pakistani perceptions of the United States.
Former Pakistani Army Chief and President Musharraf repeatedly voiced a narrative in which
Pakistan joined the United States to “wage jihad” in Afghanistan in the 1980s, only to see
“disaster” follow when the “military victory was bungled up” and the United States then left the
region “abandoned totally.” When combined with ensuing sanctions on U.S. aid, this left many
Pakistanis with the sense they had been “used and ditched.”21 According to the succeeding
Pakistani President Asif Zardari, writing in January 2009, “Frankly, the abandonment of
Afghanistan and Pakistan after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s set the stage
for the era of terrorism that we are enduring.”22
Unpredictability of U.S. aid has contributed to Pakistan’s view that the United States is an
unreliable partner. That view may play a role in Pakistan’s level of cooperation with the United
States on various national security issues while keeping its options open with U.S. competitors,
such as China. The Pakistani Prime Minister’s May 2011 state visit to Beijing was viewed by
many as an implicit response to a recent deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan ties.23

U.S. Aid to Pakistan After 9/11
Following a decade of alienation in the 1990s, U.S. relations with Pakistan were once again
transformed in dramatic fashion, this time with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a pivotal ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism
efforts. Post-9/11 U.S. aid to Pakistan rose dramatically and included a $600 million emergency
cash transfer in September 2001. In 2003, President George W. Bush hosted then-Pakistani
President General Pervez Musharraf at Camp David, MD, where he vowed to work with
Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of
$600 million each, split evenly between military and economic aid, began in FY2005.24
From FY2000 at $36.76 million to FY2001 at $187.7 million, U.S. aid increased five-fold, and in
FY2002 (the first post-9/11 fiscal year) aid increased by another nearly 11-fold to $2,000 million.
Aid trended up between 2006 and 2010; FY2007 was the first year of the Bush Administration’s
plan to devote $750 million in U.S. development aid to Pakistan’s tribal areas over a five-year
period. The 2010 U.S. aid to Pakistan of some $4.3 billion represented an increase of 2,185%
when compared to the pre-9/11 level in FY2001. In FY2010, Pakistan ranked second among top
U.S. aid recipients, after Afghanistan and before Israel. It ranks third in FY2012 with U.S. aid
estimated at $2.1 billion, about half of the FY2010 peak.
About two-thirds of U.S. aid from FY2002 to FY2012, some $15.8 billion (including Coalition
Support Fund reimbursements), has supported security assistance in Pakistan. Of that, about $9.5
billion has been funded through Defense Department appropriations, with $6.4 billion in security
21

“President’s Address at Royal United Services Institute, London,” January 25, 2008.
Asif Ali Zardari, Partnering With Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, January 28, 2009.
23
“Pakistan’s Gilani visits ally Beijing Amid US Rift,” Associated Press, May 16, 2011.
24
The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (P.L. 108-447) established a new “base program” of $300
million for military assistance for Pakistan.
22

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assistance for Pakistan funded through the Department of State appropriations. Economic
assistance for Pakistan from FY2002 to FY2012 has totaled more than $7.8 billion. About 85%
(or $6.6 billion) of that was within the Economic Support Fund (ESF),25 which grew dramatically
in FY2009 and FY2010, but has been scaled back since.
Over the years, disbursements of aid to Pakistan generally track appropriation levels of aid.
However, in some years not all aid appropriated is actually disbursed. For example, of the $400
million in PCF/PCCF funds in 2009, a total of $125 million has been received by Pakistan. With
other accounts, some funds are transferred to meet certain needs on the ground. During years of
natural disasters, some funds from ESF have been transferred to the International Disaster
Assistance (IDA) or the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account. (See Table 1 for both
appropriation and disbursement levels.)

Bilateral Economic, Development, and Humanitarian Assistance
The United States provides bilateral economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to
Pakistan through a number of funding accounts: the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Food for
Peace Title II (P.L. 480), Global Health and Child Survival, as well as International Disaster
Assistance (IDA), and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). Often funds within ESF are
transferred to IDA or MRA for emergency assistance, such as in response to the Pakistan flooding
crisis in 2010.
In FY2012, ESF funds reflected about 85% of U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan, with the
above-noted accounts making up the remaining 15% (see Table 1). Some of the largest increases
in ESF funding were from FY2009 and FY2010 supplemental appropriations passed by Congress.
ESF is used to fund a wide array of activities. In Pakistan the program is used to help establish
political parties and bolster Pakistan’s ability to conduct elections; help the government provide
services to its citizens; promote delivery of health-related technologies, such as vaccines; provide
basic education support, such as building schools and providing funds for text books and
teachers; and improve the quality of universities in Pakistan.
ESF funds also provide help for the government of Pakistan to pursue economic reforms, such as
improving tax collection, strengthening border management, and building infrastructure—roads
and power supply—to improve citizens’ faith in their government and promote job growth and
stability. ESF promotes agriculture, which is a key component of job growth in rural districts, and
supports linkages between farmers, markets, and business service providers to increase access to
modern farm equipment. ESF also promotes private-sector competitiveness to strengthen the
business community, create jobs, and expand the economy.
Food for Peace aid to Pakistan fluctuates from year to year, largely related to needs on the
ground. During years of humanitarian crisis (either natural or war-related), food aid levels can
rise dramatically. The 2010 floods in Pakistan created a severe humanitarian crisis, affecting more
than 20 million people and resulting in the United States more than doubling food aid over the
previous year’s level, from $55 million in 2009 to $124 million in 2010.

25

ESF is a bilateral economic assistance program employed to advance U.S. strategic and political interests through the
use of foreign aid.

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Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) funding levels within the past decade range from $14
million in FY2002 to $34 million in FY2009 and totaled $249 million from FY2002 to FY2012.
This program provides funds to Pakistani nongovernmental organizations, national, and
provincial organizations to partner and fight more effectively the spread of HIV/AIDS and
support the national HIV/AIDS strategy, among other things.

FATA Development Plan
Pakistan’s western tribal areas are remote, isolated, poor, and traditional in cultural practices. The
social and economic privation of the inhabitants may make the region an attractive breeding
ground for violent extremists. The U.S.-assisted development initiative for the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), launched in 2003, has sought to improve the quality of
education, develop healthcare services, and increase opportunities for economic growth and
micro-enterprise specifically in Pakistan’s western tribal regions.26 A senior USAID official
estimated that, for FY2001-FY2007, about 6% of U.S. economic aid to Pakistan was allocated for
projects in the FATA.27 Facilitating economic development through road-building has been a key
aspect of the effort; to date, the United States has devoted more than $280 million for roads and
other infrastructure projects in Pakistan’s tribal region.28
Skepticism has arisen about the potential for the policy of significantly boosted FATA-specific
funding to be effective. Corruption is endemic in the tribal region and security circumstances are
so poor that Western nongovernmental contractors find it extremely difficult to operate there.
Moreover, as much as half of the allocated funds reportedly are devoted to administrative costs.
Islamabad insists that implementation of aid programs in the FATA be carried out wholly by
Pakistani civil and military authorities and that U.S. aid, while welcomed, must come with no
strings attached. Attacks on aid workers exacerbate a circumstance in which corruption and
tangled bureaucracy thwart U.S. aid efforts in the FATA. In 2009, the KPk governor himself
complained that very little new assistance funds were reaching the tribal belt.29
According to former USAID Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force Director James Bever, aid efforts
in the FATA have been hampered by the limited presence of Pakistani federal ministries and
constrained provision of services. Some Pakistan-based analysts raise like concerns and have
recommended that the United States and other international donors refrain from handing control
of development programs in the crucial FATA region to the Pakistani government until political
reforms and effective financial oversight mechanisms are in place.30 Given such limitations,
USAID’s primary aim is to build confidence in the Pakistani government by working with the
FATA Secretariat on small-scale projects in relatively secure areas. All of the activities are
developed, monitored, and evaluated in partnership with the FATA’s civilian authorities.31
26
See the March 16, 2010, USAID release at http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/
statement-usaid-afghanistan-pakistan-task-force-director.
27
Statement of Acting Deputy USAID Administrator James Kunder before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December 6, 2007.
28
See the June 18, 2013, U.S. Embassy press release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr_061812.html.
29
“Violence Mars US Aim to Win Hearts, Minds,” Associated Press, February 27, 2009.
30
“Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No, 178, October 21, 2009, at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6356.
31
Testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, “U.S. Aid to Pakistan (Part II): Planning and Accountability,” March 16, 2010.

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The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009
A key aspect of the Obama Administration’s early approach to Pakistan was an intention to triple
annual nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, with a particular focus on
conflict-affected regions, and increased U.S. military aid to Islamabad on counterinsurgency
goals while conditioning such aid on that government’s progress in both combating militancy and
further democratizing. As Senators in the 110th Congress, President Obama, Vice President Joe
Biden, and Secretary of State Clinton all supported the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act
of 2008 (which was never voted upon), and they strongly encouraged the 111th Congress to pass a
newer version of that legislation.
During the first session of the 111th Congress, the full House passed a parallel Pakistan Enduring
Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009 (H.R. 1886) and, three months later, the
Senate unanimously passed The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 1707), both
authorizing a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for at least five years (through FY2014).
President Obama signed the resulting Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009
into P.L. 111-73 in October 2009. The legislation is sometimes referred to as the “Kerry-LugarBerman” or “KLB” bill (see the law’s principles and purposes in Appendix D).
Then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman and current Secretary of State John Kerry
lauded the legislation as the product of extensive “bicameral, bipartisan, and inter-branch
consultation” that was meant to “forge a new long-term relationship between the people of
America and Pakistan.” Then-House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative
Howard Berman emphasized the importance of forging a “true strategic partnership with Pakistan
and its people.” Then-Secretary of State Clinton called the legislation’s passage “a historic
chapter” in bilateral relations that would “strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation
between the American people and the Pakistani people.”32 Independent analysts viewed the
legislation as a landmark expression of the U.S. Administration’s and Congress’s intent to provide
significant, long-term support for its Pakistani allies.

Economic and Development Assistance Under the EPPA
The EPPA authorizes $1.5 billion annually for economic and development aid to Pakistan from
FY2010 to FY2014 to support democratic institutions and the expansion of rule of law, promote
economic freedoms and sustainable economic development, support investment in people, and
strengthen public diplomacy in Pakistan. The act states that no funds may be made available
unless the Administration submits a Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report to the appropriate
congressional committees (the Administration submitted the report in December 2009). It also
limits aid to $750 million unless the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and
Pakistan (or, if vacant, the Secretary of State) certifies to Congress that aid provided thus far is
making reasonable progress toward achieving U.S. objectives. The act allows for the Secretary of
State to waive this certification requirement if it is in the U.S. national security interests to do so.
It provides a sense of Congress that the same level of economic aid should continue in FY2015FY2019 “subject to an improving political and economic environment in Pakistan.”

32
Sen. Kerry’s September 24, 2009, release at http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=318241; Rep. Berman’s
September 30, 2009, release at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=659; Secretary
Clinton’s October 6, 2009, remarks at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130314.htm.

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Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2012
(available funds via appropriations, with disbursements in parentheses, rounded to the nearest millions of dollars)
Program or
Account
1206

FY2002FY2006

FY2007

28

14

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2013
(est.)

FY2012

FY2002FY2013
Total

FY2014
(req.)

131

139

—

e

—

n/a

312

—

47d

39e

1

n/a

265
(159)

e

32
(25)

49
(37)

54
(72)

(25)

43
(n/a)

(n/a)

FMF

971
(971)

297
(297)

298
(298)

300
(300)

294h
(83)

295
(148)

296

n/a

2,751
(2,097)

300

IMET

7
(7)

2
(2)

2
(2)

2
(2)

5
(5)

4
(0.4)

5

n/a

27
(18)

5

INCLE

224
(140)

24
(10)

22
(33)

88g
(35)

170h
(16)

114
(29)

75

n/a

717 (263)

74

NADR

33
(28)

10
(6)

10
(1)

13g
(5)

24
(3)

25
(14)

20

n/a

135
(57)

18

—

—

—

400
(125)

700
(160)

800
(376)

452

n/a

2,352
(661)

0

1,295

396

517

989g

1,236

1,277

849

6,559

397

CSH/GHCS

105
(43)

22
(25)

30
(18)

34
(31)

30
(21)

28
(19)

—

n/a

249
(157)

—

DA

161
(93)

95
(29)

30
(32)

—

—
(45)

―
(19)

—

n/a

286
(218)

—

ESF

1,639c
(1,419)

394d
(269)

347
(86)

1,114
(209)

1,292h
(672)

919
(658)

905

n/a

6,610
(3,313)

766

133
(133)

―

50
(50)

55
(55)

124
(124)

51
(51)

96
(96)

63
(63)

572
(572)

—

6

11
(1)

—

—

—
(1)

—
(1)

—

n/a

17
(3)

—

CN

PCF/PCCF
Security Aid
Total

Food Aidi
HRDF

CRS-14

n/a

Program or
Account

FY2002FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013
(est.)

FY2002FY2013
Total

FY2014
(req.)

IDA

70
(53)

50
(9)

50
(6)

103
(27)

232
(245)

145
(127)

54
(54)

n/a

704
(521)

—

MRA/ERMA

38
(38)

4
(4)

—
(10)

60
(61)

91
(49)

43
(45)

12
(12)

n/a

248 (219)

—

Economic Aid
Total

2,152

576

507

1,366g

1,769

1,186

1,067

63

8,686

766

CSFa

4,947

731

1,019

685e

1,499

1,118

688

n/a

10,687

Grand Total

8,394

1,703

2,043

3,040g

4,504

3,581

2,604

63

25,932

1,163

Sources: U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development.
Abbreviations: 1206: Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, global train and equip; Pentagon budget); CN:
Counternarcotics Funds (Pentagon budget); CSF: Coalition Support Funds (Pentagon budget); CSH: Child Survival and Health (Global Health and Child Survival, or
GHCS, from FY2010); DA: Development Assistance; ERMA: Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance; ESF: Economic Support Funds; FC: Section 1206 of the NDAA
for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181, Pakistan Frontier Corp train and equip; Pentagon budget); FMF: Foreign Military Financing; HRDF: Human Rights and Democracy Funds; IDA:
International Disaster Assistance (Pakistani earthquake and internally displaced persons relief); IMET: International Military Education and Training; INCLE: International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security); MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance; NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and
Related (the majority allocated for Pakistan is for anti-terrorism assistance); PCF/PCCF: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
(Pentagon budget through FY2010, State Department thereafter)
Notes: n/a=not available. Country allocations were not available at the time of publication. Disbursements may not be spent in the same year as funds are appropriated
or may reflect transfers from one account to another and thus may exceed some years’ appropriations levels. MRA/ERMA appropriations are not allocated specifically by
country; these disbursements are estimates that reflect payments to nongovernmental organizations or international organizations for MRA/ERMA-funded protection and
humanitarian assistance in Pakistan. Food Aid data only shows disbursements since food aid appropriations are not designated by country.
a.

CSF is Pentagon funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S. military operations. It is not officially designated as foreign assistance.

b.

Includes $220 million for Peacekeeping Operations reported by the State Department.

c.

Congress authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 and FY2004 ESF allocations to cancel a total of about $1.5 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
From FY2005-FY2007, $200 million per year in ESF was delivered in the form of “budget support”—cash transfers to Pakistan. Such funds have been mostly
“projectized” from FY2008 on.

d.

Includes $110 million in Pentagon funds transferred to the State Department for projects in Pakistan’s tribal areas (P.L. 110-28).

e.

This funding is “requirements-based”; there are no pre-allocation data.

CRS-15

f.

Congress appropriated $1.69 billion for FY2012, and the Administration has requested $1.75 billion for FY2013, in additional CSF for all U.S. coalition partners.
Pakistan has in the past received more than three-quarters of such funds. The FY2013 Defense Appropriations bill passed by the House in July 2012 would limit CSF
payments to $650 million in the next fiscal year.

g.

Includes a “bridge” ESF appropriation of $150 million (P.L. 110-252), $15 million of which the Administration later transferred to INCLE. Also includes FY2009
supplemental appropriations of $539 million for ESF, $66 million for INCLE, and $2 million for NADR.

h.

The Administration’s request for supplemental FY2010 appropriations includes $244 million for ESF, $40 million for INCLE, and $60 million for FMF funds for
Pakistan. These amounts are included in the estimated FY2010 total.

i.

P.L.480 Title I (loans), P.L.480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid
totals do not include freight costs.

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The Department of State has been bundling ongoing aid programs for Pakistan as EPPA economic
assistance, including what some would label security assistance (for law enforcement and
nonproliferation). Using this tactic, the EPPA goal of providing $1.5 billion of economic aid to
Pakistan was met in the first year, but not in FY2011 or FY2012. State Department officials say
that the shortfall occurred because Congress did not fully fund the FY2011 or FY2012 requests.
The FY2013 request was also below the EPPA funding authority level, and the FY2014 request is
about half of the $1.5 billion goal. The decrease to civilian assistance for FY2014 is primarily a
reflection of both overall budgetary and implementation constraints, according to Department of
State officials. They believe that despite the reduction, the FY2014 request reflects a continued
U.S. commitment to robust civilian assistance cooperation, particularly in the priority sectors:
energy, economic growth (including agriculture), stabilization, education, and health.33 (See
Table 2.)
Table 2. Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Funds
(in millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2010

FY2011

FY2012
estimate

FY2013
request

FY2014
request

$1,292.0

$918.9

$904.7

$928.3

$765.7

GHCS-USAID

$29.7

$28.4

—

—

INCLE

$170.0

$114.3

$75.0

$124.0

$74.0

NADR

$23.9

$24.8

$20.8

$19.0

$17.9

Total

$1,515.6

$1,086.4

$1,000.5

$1,071.3

$857.6

ESF

Source: Department of State, F Bureau, November 1, 2011, and May 3, 2013.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; GHCS=Global Health & Child Survival, INCLE=International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs.

A November 2011 State Department report on civilian engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan
repeatedly emphasized a need for patience in implementing an aid program as large and complex
as that with Pakistan. It asserted that the approach under KLB is innovative in four notable ways:
(1) a focus on alignment with Pakistani priorities; (2) a focus on visible infrastructure projects,
especially “signature” projects such as dams and roads; (3) a focus on priority sectors and regions
vulnerable to violent extremism; and (4) a whole of government effort that taps expertise from a
variety of U.S. agencies. In 2011, State reduced the number of projects in an effort to create a
“more streamlined, visible portfolio.”34

Security Assistance Under EPPA
The EPPA authorizes each year from FY2010 to FY2014 “such sums as may be necessary” for
security assistance. Security assistance and arms transfers are prohibited by the act unless the
Secretary of State certifies that the government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with U.S.
efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons-related material supplier networks and make significant
33

E-mail communication with officials at the Department of State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance, May 3, 2013.
Department of State, “Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement,” November 2011, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176809.pdf.
34

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efforts to combat terrorist groups, and if Pakistan’s security forces are not impeding political or
judicial processes there. The Secretary of State may waive these limitations if doing so is deemed
to be in the U.S. national security interest. Secretary Clinton issued the first such certification in
March 2011.
The EPPA also clarifies activities related to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
(PCCF), established by Congress in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32),
including that aid within the PCCF is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance.

Debate in Pakistan Over the “KLB” Bill
In what many considered to be a surprisingly visceral reaction, significant segments of Pakistani
officialdom and society were highly critical of the EPPA, seeing in its language an intent to
interfere with and dictate to Pakistan on sensitive foreign policy and national security issues,
perhaps even with malicious goals. The “conditioning” of assistance was the focus of criticism.
The main opposition party in Islamabad (the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz or PML-N)
expressed “strong reservations” over the law’s conditions and requested that the government
present the details for parliamentary approval. Even secular parties within the ruling coalition
described the bill as “interference” in Pakistani affairs.35 The Lahore High Court Bar Association
unanimously passed a resolution rejecting the law, saying its imposition of “cruel conditions”
represented a violation of Pakistani integrity and sovereignty.36 In one representatively rancorous
statement, a Pakistani commentator said the law was “less an assistance program than a treaty of
surrender,” and he criticized its terms and conditions as amounting to a “ten-fold increase in
national humiliation.” Another saw the conditions as aimed at “clipping the wings of Pakistan’s
mighty security establishment.”37 President Zardari himself rejected all such complaints as
misguided and misinformed.
The most serious criticism, however, came from the Pakistani military establishment itself. A
statement following the 122nd Corps Commander Conference in October 2009 included an
expression of “serious concern regarding clauses [of the law] impacting on national security.” In
the diplomatic context, this was taken as an unusually explicit and strong condemnation; Army
chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was reported to have energetically complained in person to
visiting U.S. commander General Stanley McChrystal, focusing especially on clauses related to
civilian control over the military, and references to the Afghan “Quetta shura” and the Lashkar-eTaiba’s Muridke compound, which locate U.S.-designated terrorists on Pakistani territory.38
The widely negative and oftentimes vitriolic nature of Pakistani reactions caught many U.S.
officials by surprise and spurred the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership to issue an
unusual formal rebuttal of “myths” surrounding the bill. Primary among these was the widely
held—and patently false—assumption that conditions had been placed on the $7.5 billion in
nonmilitary aid authorized for Pakistan. Other important corrections of the record included
35

“PML-N Asks Govt to Present Kerry-Lugar Bill in Parliament,” News (Karachi), September 29, 2009; “Kerry-Lugar
Bill Interference in Pakistan’s Affairs: ANP,” Daily Times (Lahore), October 11, 2009.
36
“LHCBA Passes Resolution Condemning Kerry-Lugar Bill,” Daily Times (Lahore), October 1, 2009.
37
Ayaz Amir, “Kerry-Lugar: Bill or Document of Surrender?” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore); “Imtiaz Gul, “KerryLugar Aimed at Dispiriting the Army?” (op-ed), Friday Times (Lahore), both October 2, 2009.
38
See the October 7, 2009, ISPR release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/10/7;
“U.S. Aid Package Riles Pakistan’s Army,” New York Times, October 8, 2009.

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clarifications that nothing in the bill threatened Pakistani sovereignty in any way; that the
conditions placed on military aid only reinforced standing policies of the Pakistani government
and military; and that the United States neither required nor desired an oversight role in internal
Pakistani military operations such as promotion decisions, among several others.39 Senator Kerry
then traveled to Islamabad days later in a largely successful effort to allay Pakistani concerns.
Secretary of State Clinton was in Islamabad the same month, only two weeks after Senator Kerry
and, when asked about the strongly negative reactions in Pakistan to the U.S. legislation, she
expressed American “shock”:
For the United States Congress to pass a bill unanimously saying that we want to give $7.5
billion to Pakistan in a time of global recession when we have a 10 percent unemployment
rate, and then for Pakistani press and others to say we don’t want that, that’s insulting—I
mean, it was shocking to us. So clearly, there is a failure to communicate effectively.40

Many independent observers saw the unexpectedly strong Pakistani reaction as being fueled and
perhaps even generated by a combination of military elements and opposition political forces who
shared a common cause of weakening the Pakistan People’s Party-led civilian government. Antigovernment media outlets eagerly participated. More specifically, this perspective had Army
Chief Kayani engaged in an ongoing struggle with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani
over ultimate control of the country’s military. One effect of the U.S. legislation was to place the
United States in the middle of this battle.41 However, the spate of criticisms ended almost as
quickly as it had begun, and by the end of 2009, Pakistani officials and most media critics had
fallen silent.

Security Assistance
As noted above, U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation accelerated rapidly in the post-9/11 period,
and President George W. Bush formally designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2004.
The close U.S.-Pakistan security ties of the Cold War era, which came to a near halt after the
1990 aid cutoff, were restored as a result of Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism
campaign. In 2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to
refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft and, three years later,
Washington announced that it would resume sales of new F-16 fighters to Pakistan after a 16-year
hiatus. During the Bush Administration, a revived U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group
(DCG)—moribund from 1997 to 2001—sat for high-level discussions on military cooperation,
security assistance, and anti-terrorism. The forum continued under the Obama Administration.
Pentagon officials have for some time been frustrated by the allegedly feckless counterinsurgency
efforts of the internally squabbling Islamabad government. Reports indicate that U.S. officials
have been disheartened by signs that the Pakistani military is slow to shift away from a
conventional war strategy focused on India, and they have made clear the United States stands
ready to assist Pakistan in reorienting its army for counterinsurgency efforts. This is not a task the
Pakistani military leadership has appeared eager to complete. In an effort to more effectively
channel U.S. security assistance so as to specifically strengthen Pakistan’s counterinsurgency
39

See the SFRC’s October 9, 2009, release at http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=318845.
See the State Department’s October 30, 2009, release at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/131103.htm.
41
“Pakistan Aid Places U.S. in the Midst of a Divide,” New York Times, October 13, 2009.
40

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capabilities, the Pentagon proposed, and Congress later endorsed, creation of a dedicated fund,
the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF), later designated as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund (PCCF).42
In addition to conditions on security assistance found in the EPPA, Pakistan is subject to more
general conditionality on such aid. For example, in the spring of 2010, concerns arose that
allegedly serious human rights abuses by the army—especially in the Swat Valley northwest of
Islamabad—including extrajudicial killings and the holding of thousands of suspected militants in
indefinite detention, would trigger so-called “Leahy Amendment” restrictions on future U.S.
security assistance (§620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended)), also
known as the Leahy Amendment, states that “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or
the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human
rights”).43 Later that year, the Obama Administration announced that it would abide by these
provisions by withholding train and equip funding for several Pakistani army units believed to be
complicit in human rights abuses, and it remains concerned about potential mass disappearances
of detainees into the hands of Pakistani security forces.44

Coalition Support Funds (CSF)
At the Bush Administration’s behest, Congress in FY2002 began appropriating billions of dollars
to reimburse Pakistan and other nations for their operational and logistical support of U.S.-led
counterterrorism operations. These “coalition support funds” (CSF) have accounted for nearly
half of U.S. financial transfers to Pakistan since 2001; as of June 2013, nearly $10.7 billion had
been disbursed. The amount equals roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of Pakistan’s total military
expenditures during this period. Nearly all reimbursements are for Pakistan army expenses; navy
and air force expenses account for only about 2% of all Pakistani military claims under CSF.
According to the Department of Defense, CSF payments have been used to support many scores
of Pakistani army operations and help to keep more than 100,000 Pakistani troops in the field in
northwest Pakistan by paying for their food, ammunition, clothing, and housing. They also
compensate Islamabad for coalition usage of Pakistani airfields and seaports. Roughly half of
CSF payments are for food and ammunition: A Pentagon document shows that, of the $672

42
Appearing before both Senate and House panels in May 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates urged Congress to quickly
provide significant new counterinsurgency funding for Pakistan, arguing that the newly authorized PCF/PCCF should
be overseen by U.S. military commanders rather than by State Department civilians. Yet many in Congress voiced
doubts about the wisdom of creating a major new stream of military funding under Pentagon oversight, as such aid
traditionally has been subject to Foreign Assistance Act restrictions. When the House Appropriations Committee took
up the issue, its members determined to place PCCF oversight in the hands of the State Department after FY2010, a
plan then endorsed by the full House (“Gates Pushes Congress to Boost Pakistan Aid,” Washington Post, May 1, 2009;
“Democrats Steer Pakistan Security Account to State,” Associated Press, May 7, 2009).
43
“Pakistan Army Accused of Extrajudicial Killings, Human Rights Abuses,” Washington Post, April 5, 2010;
“Pakistan Holding Thousands in Indefinite Detention, Officials Say,” Washington Post, April 21, 2010. When asked
directly during a June 2010 Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, Secretary Gates assured Congress that his
department was working to ensure that the “Leahy Law” is being implemented in both Pakistan and Afghanistan
(statement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates before the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 16, 2010).
44
“Pakistani Army Chief Orders Video Inquiry,” New York Times, October 7, 2010; “Pakistani Troops Linked to
Abuses Will Lose U.S. Aid,” New York Times, October 22, 2010; “Disappearances With Reported Ties to Pakistan
Worry U.S.,” New York Times, December 30, 2010.

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million paid to reimburse the Pakistani army for support during June-November 2011, $212
million was for food and another $116 million was for ammunition.45
During the latter years of the Bush Administration, concerns grew in Congress and among
independent analysts that standard accounting procedures were not being employed in overseeing
these large disbursements from the U.S. Treasury. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
was tasked to address oversight of coalition support funds that go to Pakistan. Its 2008 report
found that, until about one year before, only a small fraction of Pakistani requests were
disallowed or deferred. In early 2007, the value of rejected requests spiked considerably, although
it still represented one-quarter or less of the total. The apparent increased scrutiny corresponded
with the arrival in Islamabad of a new U.S. Defense Representative, Vice Admiral Michael
Lefever, who reportedly played a greater role in the oversight process. GAO concluded that
increased oversight and accountability was needed over Pakistan’s reimbursement claims for
coalition support funds.46
The State Department claims that Pakistan’s requests for CSF reimbursements are carefully vetted
by several executive branch agencies, must be approved by the Secretary of Defense, and
ultimately can be withheld through specific congressional action. However, a large proportion of
CSF funds likely have been lost to waste and mismanagement over the years, given a dearth of
adequate controls and oversight. The Bush Administration may have concluded in late 2008 that
Pakistan diverted much of the funds toward a military buildup focused on India.47
Senior Pentagon officials reportedly have taken steps to overhaul the process through which
reimbursements and other military aid are provided to Pakistan. The National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181) for the first time required the Secretary of
Defense to submit to Congress itemized descriptions of coalition support reimbursements to
Pakistan. More recent NDAAs require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress detailed
quarterly reports on the uses of CSF. In 2010, the now deceased Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador, Richard Holbrooke, claimed that about 60%-65% of
Pakistan reimbursement requests under CSF are fulfilled (a Pentagon document shows that the
payment of $688 million made in December 2012 represented about 68% of the total Pakistani
claim).48 When questioned about CSF oversight at a 2011 House hearing, the Commander of U.S.
Central Command stated that he had “some very keenly attentive field grade officers in
Islamabad” who track the money “very, very carefully.”49 Subsequent press reporting suggests
45
“Itemized List of Expenses Paid to Pakistan from Coalition Support Funds for Military Support to Operation
Enduring Freedom June through November 2011” (undated).
46
See http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf. See also “Pentagon Puts Brakes on Funds to Pakistan,” Los Angeles
Times, May 7, 2008.
47
“Pakistani Military ‘Misspent Up to 70% of American Aid,’” Guardian (London), February 28, 2008; “Revamping
Aid to Pakistan is Expected in Bush Report,” New York Times, December 7, 2008. In mid-2008, the leader of
Pakistan’s ruling party, now-President Zardari claimed, without providing evidence, that, as president, Pervez
Musharraf had been passing only a fraction of the funds over to the Pakistani military, leaving some $700 million of
reimbursements per year “missing” (quoted in “Where’s the Money?,” Sunday Times (London), August 10, 2008).
48
See the State Department’s March 2, 2010, release at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2010/137693.htm;
“Itemized List of Expenses Paid to Pakistan from Coalition Support Funds for Military Support to Operation Enduring
Freedom June through November 2011” (undated).
49
Statement of General James Mattis in “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal
2012 Budget for the Defense Department’s U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command,” CQ
Transcripts, March 3, 2011.

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that this is being accomplished, and that U.S. auditors are now more attentive in their examination
of Pakistani claims.50

Defense Supplies
Major U.S. arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for
counterterrorism operations, along with a number of “big ticket” platforms more suited to
conventional warfare. In dollar value terms, the bulk of purchases are made with Pakistani
national funds, although U.S. grants have eclipsed this in recent years. The Pentagon reports total
Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth $5.2 billion for FY2002-FY2011 (sales of
F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account for more than half of this). Congress also has
appropriated more than $3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Pakistan since
2001; more than two-thirds has been disbursed to date. These funds are used to purchase U.S.
military equipment for longer-term modernization efforts. Pakistan also has been granted U.S.
defense supplies as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Major post-2001 defense supplies provided
or soon to be provided under FMF include
•

eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment (valued at
$474 million; four delivered, but three of these were destroyed in a 2011 Islamist
militant attack on Pakistan Naval Station Mehran);

•

2,007 TOW anti-armor missiles ($186 million);

•

at least 5,600 military radio sets ($163 million);

•

six AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars ($100 million);

•

six C-130E transport aircraft and their refurbishment ($76 million);

•

the USS McInerney, an ex-Perry class missile frigate (via EDA, $65 million for
refurbishment, delivered and now the PNS Alamgir); and

•

20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters (via EDA, $48 million for refurbishment, 12
delivered).

Supplies paid for with a mix of Pakistani national funds and FMF include
•

up to 60 Mid-Life Update kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft (valued at $891
million, with $477 million of this in FMF; Pakistan’s plans are to purchase 45
such kits, 8 have been delivered); and

•

115 M-109 self-propelled howitzers ($87 million, with $53 million in FMF).

Notable items paid for entirely with Pakistani national funds include
•

18 new F-16C/D Block 52 combat aircraft (valued at $1.43 billion);51

50

By some accounts, Pakistan has “routinely” submitted “unsubstantiated” or “exaggerated” claims, and denial rates
climbed from less than 2% in 2005 to 44% in 2009 (“U.S. Balks at Pakistani Bills,” Wall Street Journal, May 17,
2011).
51
The first of the new F-16s were delivered in June 2010, when three aircraft were inducted into the Pakistani Air
Force at the Shabaz Air Base near Jacobabad. The final plane was delivered in February 2012. These advanced aircraft
are subject to especially stringent security to prevent any technology leakage to third parties.

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•

F-16 armaments including 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles; 1,450 2,000-pound
bombs; 500 JDAM bomb tail kits for gravity bombs; and 1,600 Enhanced
Paveway laser-guided bomb kits, also for gravity bombs ($629 million);

•

100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($298 million);

•

500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles ($95 million); and

•

six Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns ($80 million).

Other major articles transferred via EDA include
•

14 F-16A/B combat aircraft; and

•

59 T-37 military trainer jets.52

Under Coalition Support Funds (part of the Pentagon budget), Pakistan has received 26 Bell 412
utility helicopters, along with related parts and maintenance, valued at $235 million. Under
Section 1206 (global train and equip), Frontier Corps, and PCF/PCCF authorities, Pakistan has
received 4 Mi-17 multirole helicopters (another 6 were provided temporarily at no cost), 4 King
Air 350 surveillance aircraft, 450 vehicles for the Frontier Corps, 20 Buffalo explosives detection
and disposal vehicles, helicopter spare parts, night vision devices, radios, body armor, helmets,
first aid kits, litters, and other individual soldier equipment. Pakistan is eager to receive more
counterinsurgency hardware for use in western Pakistan, potentially including armored personnel
carriers, laser target designators, laser-guided munitions, and more night-vision goggles and
surveillance gear. They also request better and more sophisticated surveillance and
communications equipment, along with more attack and utility helicopters.
Despite the provision of equipment suited to unconventional warfare, some analysts have
continued to criticize the programming of security-related aid to Pakistan. Foremost among these
are assertions that the Pakistani military maintains an institutional focus on conventional warfighting capabilities oriented toward India and that it has used U.S. security assistance to bolster
these capabilities while paying insufficient attention to the kinds of counterinsurgency capacity
that U.S. policy makers might prefer to see strengthened.53 For example, of the some $2.1 billion
in Foreign Military Financing disbursed for Pakistan from FY2002-FY2012, more than half has
been used by Islamabad to purchase weapons of limited use in the context of counterterrorism (of
that amount, about $1.2 billion was used to upgrade P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and F-16
combat aircraft, and for the purchase of TOW anti-tank missiles and launchers).
Counterarguments contend that such purchases facilitate regional stability and allow Pakistan to
feel more secure vis-à-vis India, its better equipped neighbor.
During the course of late 2009 fighting in South Waziristan, Pakistan received low-profile but
significant U.S. assistance in the form of transport helicopters, parts for helicopter gunships, and
infantry equipment, along with unprecedented intelligence and surveillance video sharing from
American UAVs. In anticipation of further counterinsurgency operations, the United States
52

Figures reported by the U.S. Department of Defense. See also CRS Report RS22757, U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan, by
(name redacted).
53
The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), limits FY2009 Foreign Military Financing for Pakistan to
counterterrorism programs only, and it bars the Administration from using such funds for any programs initially funded
under Section 1206 of the 2006 defense authorization (P.L. 109-163), which pertains to Pentagon programs for training
and equipping foreign military forces.

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provided the Pakistani air force with about 1,000 quarter-ton bombs, along with up to 1,000 kits
for making gravity bombs laser-guided-capable.
The Defense Department has characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti-armor
missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications. The State Department has claimed that,
since 2005, FMF funds have been “solely for counterterrorism efforts, broadly defined.”54 Such
claims elicit skepticism from some observers, and analysts who emphasize the importance of
strengthening the U.S.-India strategic partnership have called U.S. military aid to Pakistan
incompatible with U.S. strategic goals in the region. Moreover, U.S. officials are concerned that
Pakistan has altered some conventional U.S.-supplied weapons in ways that could violate the
Arms Export Control Act. Such alleged modifications include expanding the capability of both
Harpoon anti-ship missiles and P-3C naval aircraft for land-attack missions. The Islamabad
government categorically rejects the allegations.55 Indian observers were unsurprised by the
claims; New Delhi’s leaders continuously complain that Pakistan diverts most forms of U.S.
defense assistance toward India. Some more suspicious analysts even see purpose in such a
dynamic: a U.S. wish to maintain Pakistan’s viability as a regional balancer to Indian hegemony.56
Pakistani officials have continued to complain that U.S.-supplied defense equipment, especially
that most needed for counterinsurgency operations such as attack and utility helicopters, has been
too slow in coming. The then-Pakistani Ambassador to the United States was quoted as claiming
that, in his first two years in Washington (2008-2010), Pakistan received only eight used Mi-17
transport helicopters and that Pakistan’s military operations were hindered by a lack of
equipment. Such claims rile U.S. officials, who document that the United States has provided
Pakistan with at least 50 helicopters since 2006—12 of them armed Cobra models—and who note
that the delivery of more top-line attack helicopters was delayed only by Pakistani inaction.57

Military Training and Law Enforcement
The George W. Bush Administration launched an initiative to strengthen the capacity of the
Frontier Corps (FC), a 65,000-man paramilitary force overseen by the Pakistani Interior Ministry.
The FC has primary responsibility for border security in Pakistan’s western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KPk) and Baluchistan provinces, which border Afghanistan. In 2007, the Pentagon began using
its funds to train and equip the FC, as well as to increase the involvement of the U.S. Special
Operations Command in assisting with Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. Americans have also
engaged in training Pakistan’s elite Special Service Group commandos with a goal of doubling
that force’s size to 5,000. These efforts continued under the Obama Administration. The U.S.
program to train Pakistan’s paramilitary forces reportedly has been hampered by Pakistan’s
reluctance to send troops who are needed for urgent operations elsewhere. Some analysts also
54

F-16 aircraft are reported by some to be effective in Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts, with improved training and
enhanced capabilities allowing for more precise targeting resulting in fewer civilian casualties (see the December 17,
2009, statements of a Pentagon official at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4528);
State’s release at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/97946.htm.
55
“U.S. Says Pakistan Made Changes to Missiles Sold for Defense,” New York Times, August 30, 2009; Foreign
Ministry’s August 30, 2009, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/Aug/PR_335_09.htm.
56
“Aid to Pakistan ‘Invariably Directed’ Against India - Minister,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, August 17, 2009;
Gurmeet Kanwal, “US Arms Sales Are Propping Up Pakistan as a Regional Challenger,” Institute for Defense Studies
and Analysis (New Delhi), February 11, 2010.
57
“Pakistan Wants Combat Copters,” Washington Times, June 16, 2010; author interviews with Pentagon officials.

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contend that only U.S. military personnel (as opposed to contractors) can effectively train
Pakistani soldiers. The Balochistan Frontier Corps may be committing serious human rights
violations against suspected separatist militants there.
Other security-related programs for Pakistan are aimed especially at bolstering Islamabad’s
counterterrorism and border security efforts, and have included U.S.-funded road-building
projects in the KPk and FATA. The United States also has undertaken to train and equip new
Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target terrorist elements. U.S.funded military education and training programs seek to enhance the professionalism of
Pakistan’s military leaders, and develop respect for rule of law, human rights, and democratic
values. At least 2,000 Pakistani officers have received such training since 2001.
U.S. security assistance to Pakistan’s civilian sector is aimed at strengthening the country’s law
enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification
systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group. U.S. efforts
may be hindered by Pakistani shortcomings that include poorly trained and poorly equipped
personnel who generally are underpaid by ineffectively coordinated and overburdened
government agencies. Pakistan’s weak criminal justice sector is marked by conviction rates below
10%, poorly trained investigators, and rampant corruption. Some analysts link the problem to
democratization more broadly, and urge much greater U.S. and international attention to
bolstering Pakistan’s civilian security sector.58 The findings of a 2008 think-tank report reflected a
widely held view that Pakistan’s police and civilian intelligence agencies are better suited to
combating insurgency and terrorism than are the country’s regular army. The report found that
Pakistan’s police forces are “incapable of combating crime, upholding the law, or protecting
citizens and the state against militant violence,” and placed the bulk of responsibility on the
politicization of the police forces. The report recommended sweeping reforms to address
corruption and human rights abuses.59

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability
Fund (PCF/PCCF)
Title III of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32; H.Rept. 111-105),
appropriated $400 million for the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State, for the newly established Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) to provide assistance for
Pakistan’s security forces to bolster their counterinsurgency efforts. The House Appropriations
Committee recommended that the funding be in the DOD appropriations for FY2009 and that the
Secretary of Defense authority would expire with the expiration of the funds. An additional $400
million was appropriated within the State Department appropriations to be made available as of
September 30, 2009, for its Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). The committee
recommended that the Secretary of State authority (PCCF) would be assumed in subsequent fiscal
years. The committee noted that DOD would be responsible for delivery of the assistance.

58

See “Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 196, December 6,
2010.
59
“Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 157, July 14, 2008.

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Other International Economic Donors
Of the $5.1 billion in total aid committed for Pakistan in 2010, about 24% was from multilateral
agencies and 76% from bilateral sources. The United States is the largest single bilateral donor of
development assistance to Pakistan, providing more than half of all bilateral commitments
(56.3%) in 2010. Japan committed 11.7%, Germany committed 5.5%, and the United Arab
Emirates committed 1.7% that same year.
The largest multilateral agency commitments in 2010 were $430 million from the World Bank’s
International Development Association (as compared with $1.9 billion in FY2009), $270 million
from European Union Institutions, and $290 million from the Asian Development Fund. See
Appendix C for bilateral economic development aid commitments to Pakistan by other donor
countries in FY2009.
Global cooperation involving a “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” (FODP) group was launched in
September 2008, when President Zardari and the top diplomats of the United Arab Emirates,
Britain, and the United States were joined by foreign ministers from Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, and representatives of China, the European Union, and the
United Nations. A resulting statement expressed agreement to work in strategic partnership with
Pakistan to combat violent extremism; develop a comprehensive approach to economic and social
development; coordinate an approach to stabilizing and developing border regions; address
Pakistan’s energy shortfall; and support democratic institutions.60
In April 2009, 31 countries and 18 international institutions sent representatives to an
FODP/Donors’ Conference in Tokyo. There Ambassador Holbrooke announced the
Administration’s intent to provide a total of $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan over the 20092010 period, bringing to more than $5 billion the total offered by the international community in
addition to the $11.3 billion International Monetary Fund package first arranged in late 2008. In
the lead-up to the 2009 conference, Pakistani officials called for a “Marshall Plan” for Pakistan
that would provide $30 billion in international donations over a five-year period. The Pakistani
Ambassador to the United States is among those who called the proposed $5.7 billion in aid
“miniscule” when compared to the bailouts being provided to American automobile and other
companies, a characterization that rankled some in Congress.61
At an FODP summit meeting in New York in September 2010 co-chaired by President Obama,
President Zardari, and British Prime Minister (name redacted), the forum reiterated its central
goals, but no further specifics were discussed pending more detailed Pakistani development
proposals. The FODP’s Third Ministerial Meeting took place in October 2010, when donors
continued to press Pakistan to reform its economy, especially through an expansion of the tax
base.62
China, a close and long-standing ally of Pakistan in part because of its own rivalry with India, has
provided some aid and loans to Pakistan, but nothing close to the level of the United States and
other major donors. Between 2004 and 2009, China provided $9.0 million in grant assistance and
60

See State’s September 26, 2008, release at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/110353.htm.
“Pakistan Asks U.S. for 30 Billion Dollar ‘Marshall Plan’ to Stabilize Region” (interview), Washington Times, April
8, 2009.
62
“Friends Tell Pakistan to Shape Up in Exchange for Aid,” Daily Times (Lahore), October 16, 2010.
61

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$217 million in loans to Pakistan.63 China, through large-scale and mainly extractive investment
projects, stands to gain access to resources in Pakistan, and may even benefit from a planned
pipeline that would deliver Iranian natural gas through Pakistan.

FY2014 Request for Aid to Pakistan and Objectives
The FY2014 budget request indicates the level of importance the Obama Administration places
on a stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan because of its “critical role” in the region with
respect to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, nuclear nonproliferation, regional stability, the peace
process in Afghanistan, and regional economic integration and development: “As the United
States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, FY2014 U.S. assistance needs to reflect
[America’s] continued robust engagement of Pakistan and its role in the region.”64
For FY2014, the Administration is requesting a total of $1,162.57 million within the International
Affairs 150 function (State-Foreign Operations Appropriations). Of this amount, about two-thirds
is for economic assistance and one-third is for security assistance. The total includes $281.2
million, considered to be Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) that is not part of the core
request but is identified by the Administration as extraordinary, temporary funding needs for
frontline states. Consistent with the EPPA, the FY2014 civilian assistance will focus on five key
areas: energy, stabilization, social services (especially health and education), economic growth
(including agriculture), and improving governance, including transparency and gender equality.
Security assistance will focus on building counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities,
strengthening military-to-military cooperation, and supporting the ability for Pakistan to provide
security for its citizens, particularly along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
The Administration’s FY2014 budget request seeks $765.7 million (and $252.2 million in OCO
funds) within the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for energy assistance, economic growth and
agriculture, education, health, and cross-cutting issues, such as supporting gender equality, human
rights, better governance, and political participation.
•

Energy—Within ESF, the Administration is requesting $264.7 million to support
a policy of attracting private sector investment, increase cost recovery, decrease
technical and commercial losses, and add power to the grid.

•

Economic Growth—The $137.0 million request for FY2014 ESF funds would
promote international and regional trade, develop manufacturing and service
sector links, and support the private sector. The USAID agriculture program
would continue to provide training to farmers to improve productivity and learn
new techniques and management practices.

•

Education—The FY2014 request of $53.0 million would be used to support
provincial governments in Pakistan to improve basic education programs,
provide scholarships for talented, but economically disadvantaged students to

63

The Center for Global Development, Pakistan Aid Facts, by Wren Elhai, August 26, 2010. http://blogs.cgdev.org/
mca-monitor/2010/08/pakistan-aid-facts.php?utm_source=nl_weekly
64
Program information is based on details found in the Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justification for
FY2014, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives pp. 583-593.

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attend a top Pakistani university, and improve academic programs at the
university level.
•

Health—A FY2014 request for $58.0 million within ESF would support
improvements in delivering essential family planning, maternal, and child health
services through high-impact, evidence-based interventions.

•

Cross-cutting Issues—Other ESF funds are requested for FY2014 to support
gender equity, human rights, civil society, strengthening good governance, and
increasing political participation.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $300 million for Pakistan in the FY2014 request, would
provide support for the counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) capabilities of
Pakistan’s security forces and would encourage U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military engagement.
International Military Education and Training (IMET), $5.0 million for Pakistan in the
FY2014 request would build professional and personal ties between U.S. and Pakistani military
personnel. Students would receive instruction at military schools in the United States and learn
about democratic values, as well as military techniques.
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), $17.87 million
for Pakistan in the FY2014 request would provide training to build the capacity for Pakistan to
detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats and improve border security.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), $45.0 million (plus $29.0
million of OCO funds) for Pakistan in the FY2014 request would help through training,
equipment, and instructor development, to build Pakistan’s capability for civilian law
enforcement and criminal investigative techniques and crime management. It would also build on
successes to reduce opium poppy production and illegal narcotics trafficking.
Monitoring and Program Evaluation. The Administration continues to foster community and
third-party oversight of aid programs in Pakistan. The oversight combines with USAID
monitoring and regular audits done by State and USAID Inspector Generals, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, the Pakistan Auditor General, and Pakistani accounting firms
to expand the capability of conducting audits.
In August 2011, USAID initiated a five-year, $71 million monitoring and evaluation contract that
provides for third-party monitoring and evaluation services across all USAID projects. Critics
contend that many of the stated institutional and development goals of U.S. assistance to Pakistan
remain largely unmet. For much of the post-2001 period, this was at least in part due to a
perceived U.S. overreliance on security-related aid, which has accounted for the great bulk of
U.S. assistance to Pakistan.65 Many observers argue that it would be more useful to target U.S.
assistance programs in such a way that they more effectively and more directly benefit the
country’s citizens.

65
A major 2007 study found that only about one-tenth of U.S. post-2001 aid was directed toward development,
governance, and humanitarian programs (Craig Cohen, “A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2007).

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Issues for Congress
A number of issues concern many in Congress about making Pakistan one of the top U.S. aid
recipients, not the least of which is its willingness or capability to be a reliable partner. Notable
issues follow.

Conditions on Aid to Pakistan
Debate Overview
One idea long floated in foreign assistance critiques is the “conditioning” of aid to Pakistan,
mainly through the creation of benchmarks and certification that they have been met. For
example, in 2003, a task force of senior American South Asia watchers issued a report on U.S.
policy in the region that included a recommendation to directly link U.S. support for Islamabad to
that government’s own performance in making Pakistan a more “modern, progressive, and
democratic state.”66 Some commentators have emphasized that, to be truly effective,
conditionality should be applied by many donor countries rather than just the United States and
should be directed toward the Pakistani leadership—especially the military—to the exclusion of
the general public.67 In the wake of political crises and deteriorating security circumstances in
Pakistan in the late 2000s, some senior Members of Congress became more vocal in calling for
conditions on further U.S. assistance in the absence of improvements in these areas.68
Many analysts, however, including policymakers in the George W. Bush Administration and some
in the Obama Administration, have contended that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan had a past
record of failure and likely would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions of
the United States as an unreliable partner. From this perspective, putting additional pressure on an
already weak Islamabad government might lead to significant political instability in Pakistan.69
For numerous Pakistan watchers, a policy of enhanced cooperation and structured inducements is
viewed as likely to be more effective than a policy based on pressure and threats. In a May 2011
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Ranking Member Senator Richard Lugar stated,
“American conditionalities, ‘you need to do A, B and C,’ is not necessarily helpful. What is
helpful is identifying the most appropriate projects and then following through, not changing
midcourse.”70
One senior Washington-based analyst, a longtime advocate against placing conditions on U.S. aid
to Pakistan, instead offered an admittedly modest approach: he argued for modifying current U.S.
policy through more forceful private admonitions to Islamabad to better focus its own
66
Specifically, the experts urged directing two-thirds of U.S. aid to economic programs and one-third to security
assistance, and conditioning increases in aid amounts to progress in Pakistan’s reform agenda (“New Priorities in South
Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,” Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force
Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, October 2003).
67
See, for example, Frederic Grare, “Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2007.
68
See, for example, “Senate Leader Wants Bush to Pressure Pakistan,” Reuters, January 10, 2008; “Democrat
Questions US Aid to Pakistan,” Associated Press, May 27, 2008.
69
See, for example, Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 2007.
70
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on U.S. Policy and its Limits in Pakistan, May 5, 2011.

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counterterrorism efforts while also targeting Taliban leadership, increasing provision of U.S.
counterinsurgency technologies and training to Pakistani security forces, and establishing
benchmarks for continued provision of coalition support funding.71 Private admonitions are
considered by some analysts to be meaningless in the absence of public consequences, however.
Since the deterioration of bilateral relations in 2011, more analysts have urged the U.S.
government to use its leverage in Pakistan by increasing the cost to Islamabad of persisting with
its alleged support for selected Islamist militant groups. This would come through greater
conditionality, perhaps leading to (limited) aid sanctions.72
For Pakistanis themselves, aid conditionality in U.S. legislation can raise unpleasant memories of
1985’s so-called Pressler Amendment, which led to a near-total aid cutoff in 1990. Islamabad’s
sensitivities are thus acute: in 2007, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry said aid conditions legislated
in the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) “cast a
shadow” on existing U.S.-Pakistan cooperation and create linkages that “did not serve the interest
of bilateral cooperation in the past and can prove to be detrimental in the future.”73 Calls for
further conditionality from some in Congress led Islamabad to again warn that such moves could
harm the bilateral relationship and do damage to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, the State
Department in 2009 reported being “comfortable” with congressional conditions and “confident”
that required certifications could be issued (such certifications were issued only once and the
requirements were waived by the Admiration for FY2012 and FY2013).74
After Osama bin Laden was found in a military cantonment city not far from Islamabad, expert
witnesses at a May 2011 Senate hearing asserted that certification and conditionality should be
taken far more seriously than they have been in the past, but that economic assistance to Pakistan
should continue. However, Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, reportedly suggested at the time that he would favor a curtailment of development
rather than security aid, the argument being that short-term U.S. interests in combating terrorism
and Afghan insurgents trump longer-term interests in seeing Pakistan transformed into a more
prosperous and democratic state. Senior Pakistani officials continue to insist that “onerous”
restrictions on aid are counterproductive, arguing that Pakistan needs support, not criticism.75

71

Ashley Tellis, “Pakistan: Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 56, December
2007.
72
See, for example, Paul Miller, “How to Exercise U.S. Leverage Over Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2012.
73
See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/july/PR_199_07.htm.
74
“Pakistan Rejects Call for Conditions on U.S. Aid,” Reuters, January 11, 2008; State Department claim at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/97946.htm.
75
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing Transcripts, pp. 8, 9, 13, May 5, 2011; Sen. Levin quoted in “Pakistan
Military Aid Safer Than the Economic Aid,” The Cable (ForeignPolicy.com), May 11, 2011; “Sherry Says Strict
Congressional Curbs Won’t Help US-Pak Ties,” Nation (Lahore), May 20, 2012.

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Current Conditionality and Administration Certifications/Waivers76
Key Congressional Conditions on U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
The most notable sets of conditions on U.S. assistance to Pakistan are found in two laws: the
country-specific Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, and the State and foreign
operations appropriations provisions found in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L.
112-74). In the former, Section 203 contains the most explicit and stringent conditions on U.S. aid
to Pakistan in the post-2001 period. As noted above, these substantive conditions apply only to
security-related assistance for FY2011-FY2014 and arms transfers for FY2012-FY2014
(nonmilitary aid is not subject to conditions in this law).77 The law precludes such assistance and
transfers until the Secretary of State certifies annually for Congress that the Pakistani government
(1) is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks
relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant
information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
(2) had during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is
making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups ... including taking into
account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such
as A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its
intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has
conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the
territory or people of neighboring countries; B) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and
associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating
in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighboring
countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in
other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided
with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and C) strengthening counterterrorism and
anti-money laundering laws; and
(3) is ensuring that its security forces are not materially and substantially subverting the
political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

The law includes a provision allowing the Secretary to waive this certification requirement if s/he
finds that it is important to U.S. national security interests to do so.
Section 7046(c) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 added another layer of
conditionality requiring special certification from the Secretary of State to release assistance
funds. These provisions would restrict all FY2012 transfers under ESF, INCLE, FMF, and PCCF,

76

For a complete review of Pakistan-specific conditionality and reporting requirements, see CRS Report R42116,
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by (name redacted) and (name re
dacted).
77
For these purposes, “security-related assistance” is defined as grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2311 et. seq). It does not include assistance authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available under
any provision of law that is funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense) or amounts
appropriated or otherwise available to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32).

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and so for the first time placed conditions on military and nonmilitary aid. Under this law, the
Secretary was required to certify that Pakistan was
(1) cooperating with the United States in counterterrorist efforts against Haqqani Network,
the Quetta Shura Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Al Qaeda, and other
domestic and foreign terrorist organizations, including taking steps to end support for them
and preventing them from basing and operating in Pakistan and carrying out cross border
attacks into neighboring countries;
(2) not supporting terrorist activities against U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan, and
Pakistan military and intelligence agencies are not intervening extra-judicially into political
and judicial processes in Pakistan;
(3) dismantling i

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41856. Public record. Not legal advice.