# DNA Databanking: Selected Fourth Amendment Issues and Analysis

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41847

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** August 16, 2011
- **Citation:** R41847

## Text

DNA Databanking: Selected Fourth
Amendment Issues and Analysis
-name redactedLegislative Attorney
August 16, 2011

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41847

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

DNA Databanking: Selected Fourth Amendment Issues and Analysis

Summary
Over the past few decades, state and federal lawmakers have promoted the development of
databases containing DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) profiles for individuals who are under the
supervision of the criminal justice system due to their known or suspected involvement in a
felony or other qualifying crime. Congress has demonstrated concern toward some aspects of
DNA databanking by requiring expungement of a DNA profile in certain circumstances,
prohibiting most non-forensic uses of DNA profiles and databases, and restricting familial
searching. However, in general, Congress has taken a supportive attitude toward DNA
databanking and has incentivized the development, expansion, and integration of DNA databases.
As DNA database programs have widened in scope and grown in numbers, their consistency with
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has increasingly been
challenged. In the context of compulsory DNA collection, courts have widely upheld laws
mandating the collection of DNA from persons who were convicted and are subject to the penal
system’s custody or supervision. Far fewer cases have addressed whether DNA collection from
arrestees is also constitutional. The two federal circuit courts of appeals to hear the question
upheld the mandatory DNA profiling of indicted arrestees, but no federal court has assessed the
constitutionality of profiling arrestees in the absence of a judicial finding of probable cause.
Courts have generally upheld the use and permanent storage of a lawfully databanked DNA
profile. However, not all courts agree that any post-conviction use of those profiles is
constitutionally acceptable. In particular, observers are now raising questions about the Fourth
Amendment consistency of using databases for non-forensic purposes and for familial
searching—that is, using the DNA databases to locate potential relatives of an unidentified
suspect. Currently, these concerns are largely confined to the scholarly literature—they have not
come before a federal court—and are primarily centered on state database programs. Unlike some
state DNA databases, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) and the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) can not be used for either non-forensic research or intentional familial
searching. However, the increase in states that authorize familial searching suggests that it may
not be long before the constitutionality of familial searching comes before a federal court.
As these issues percolate up to the courts, new advances and revelations in the science of forensic
analysis and databanking may have potentially significant legal implications. Several courts have
suggested that new forensic techniques and scientific findings would require them to reevaluate
their legal conclusions and analysis. In particular, research into the scope and nature of the
information revealed by the “junk” DNA used in forensic analysis may alter how courts measure
the intrusiveness of DNA profiling if it suggests that “junk” DNA reveals more sensitive
information about its source than scientists previously thought.

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DNA Databanking: Selected Fourth Amendment Issues and Analysis

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background on Law Enforcement Use of DNA .............................................................................. 2
Statutory Framework ....................................................................................................................... 4
Expansion of Statutory Authorities for DNA Profiling ............................................................. 5
Expungement Provisions ........................................................................................................... 7
Fourth Amendment Overview ......................................................................................................... 8
Search or Seizure....................................................................................................................... 8
“Reasonableness” Inquiry When the Fourth Amendment Applies............................................ 9
Collecting DNA ............................................................................................................................. 10
Prisoners, Parolees, Probationers, and Supervised Releasees ................................................. 11
Arrestees.................................................................................................................................. 12
Using and Retaining Databanked DNA......................................................................................... 13
Post-Sentence Privacy Rights.................................................................................................. 14
Informational Privacy Rights................................................................................................... 15
Academic Research and Non-forensic Information .......................................................... 16
Familial Searching and Information About Genetic Relationships................................... 17
Implications of New Research on Junk DNA................................................................................ 18
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 19

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 20
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 20

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DNA Databanking: Selected Fourth Amendment Issues and Analysis

Introduction
In recent years, state and federal laws have facilitated law enforcement’s expanded use of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) for investigating and prosecuting crimes.1 These laws authorize
compulsory collection of biological matter, which local law enforcement agencies send to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for analysis. The FBI then stores unique DNA profiles in a
national distributive database, through which law enforcement officials match individuals to
crime scene evidence.
Early laws authorized compulsory extraction of DNA only from people convicted for violent or
sex-based felonies, such as murder, kidnapping, and offenses “related to sexual abuse”—crimes
associated with historically high recidivism rates and for which police were likely to find
evidence at crime scenes.2 However, in recent decades, new laws have greatly extended the scope
of compulsory DNA collection, both by expanding the range of offenses triggering collection
authority and, more recently, by authorizing compulsory collection from people who have been
arrested but not convicted.
Opponents of DNA databases suggest that DNA databases are “Orwellian” because of the amount
of information about private citizens that they put into the control of the government.3 The most
frequent criticism is that the programs violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.4
Several federal courts have heard cases alleging that it is unconstitutional for an individual’s preor post-trial release to be conditioned on DNA collection. Another Fourth Amendment argument,
albeit a less litigated one, contends that it is unconstitutional to permit the use of databanked
DNA profiles for purposes other than identifying a genetic match with a suspect.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ privacy from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the government. Federal courts have generally held that compulsory DNA collection from a
person who has been convicted of a felony or other qualifying crime and placed under the
supervision of the criminal justice system does not constitute an unreasonable search under the

1

For more on the progression of federal legislation authorizing use of DNA, see CRS Report R41800, DNA Testing in
Criminal Justice: Background, Current Law, Grants, and Issues, by (name redacted).
2
For example, offenses triggering DNA collection authority under the original DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
of 2000, P.L. 106-546 (2000), included murder, voluntary manslaughter, and other offense relating to homicide;
offenses relating to sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or other abuse of children, or transportation for illegal sexual
activity; offenses relating to peonage and slavery; kidnapping; offenses involving robbery or burglary; certain offenses
committed within Indian territory; and attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses.
3
Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1180 (describing the arguments of DNA database critics as allusions “to a
police state reminiscent of George Orwell’s dystopia portrayed in 1984”). See, e.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402
F.3d 175, 194 n.11 (3rd Cir. 2005) (McKee, J., dissenting) (characterizing the DNA Act as ushering in an “Orwellian
intrusion”); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 870 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The compulsory
extraction of blood samples and the maintenance of permanent DNA profiles of American citizens is, unfortunately, the
beginning not the end. 1984 arrives twenty years later than predicted.”).
4
Litigants have also brought challenges under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well
as under other legal and constitutional theories. See Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science
Challenges for Trial Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the Polybutadiene Meets the Bitumen, 18 WIDENER L. J. 309,
361-62 (2009) (listing different theories used to challenge the constitutionality of DNA database and compulsory
collection statutes). See also United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp.2d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenges under
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution). However, this report is limited to a discussion of
challenges brought under the Fourth Amendment.

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Fourth Amendment.5 These courts found that a convicted felon has a diminished expectation of
privacy and that DNA profiling is a minimal intrusion into that privacy.6 Far fewer cases have
given the federal courts an opportunity to decide whether DNA collection from arrestees is also
constitutional. The two federal circuit courts of appeals to hear the question upheld the mandatory
DNA profiling of indicted arrestees, but no federal court has assessed the constitutionality of
profiling arrestees in the absence of a grand jury indictment or judicial finding of probable cause.
Similarly, the courts have not yet had an opportunity to articulate the constitutional limits on how
databanked DNA profiles may be used.
This report traces the expansion of the statutory authorities for DNA databases and identifies
emerging areas of consensus and discord among the federal courts over the Fourth Amendment
consistency of compulsory DNA collection and the use of DNA databases. It also predicts
additional Fourth Amendment issues that may come before both Congress and the federal courts
in the near future.

Background on Law Enforcement Use of DNA
DNA is a complex molecule found in the nucleus and mitochondria of an organism’s cells.7 It
consists of two strands of nucleotides, the sequence of which contains the information that forms
the basis of the human genetic code. The vast majority of human DNA is exactly the same, but
small variations in the sequencing of the nucleotides create people’s distinguishing
characteristics.8 Only identical twins share the same DNA profile.9
With the help of DNA profiling technology, forensic scientists can examine different regions—or
“loci”—of DNA to develop a DNA profile of the person from whom the DNA was extracted.10
Because forensic analysts examine a select group of loci, the resulting DNA profile may not
necessarily be unique to that individual.11 However, advances in technology have enabled
analysts to produce increasingly discriminating profiles. Today, the probability that two unrelated

5
E.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied 552 U.S. 1042 (2007); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1343 (2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549
U.S. 1044 (2006); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Banks, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Castillo-Lagos, 147 Fed. App’x. 71 (11th Cir. 2005).
6
See, e.g., Weikert, 504 F.3d at 27, 30-33 (finding that a convicted felon on supervised release “has a substantially
diminished expectation of privacy” and collecting a blood sample is a “minimal” intrusion that is not meaningfully
augmented by the government’s subsequent use of that sample to create and databank a DNA profile); Amerson, 483
F.3d at 29 (finding that the appellants have “diminished” expectations of privacy and the collection of their DNA for a
DNA database is a “small” intrusion of privacy).
7
For a more in-depth discussion of DNA and its use in law enforcement, see CRS Report R41800, DNA Testing in
Criminal Justice: Background, Current Law, Grants, and Issues, by (name redacted).
8
See Human Genome Program, U.S. Department of Energy, Primer on Molecular Genetics (Washington, DC, 1992),
http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/publicat/primer/primer.pdf.
9
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
10
In the United States, forensic scientists use “short tandem repeat” technology to analyze 13 DNA loci. Department of
Energy, Human Genome Project Information: DNA Forensics, at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml.
11
NATIONAL POLICING IMPROVEMENT AGENCY, NATIONAL DNA DATABASE ANNUAL REPORT 2007-2009, 7 (2009).

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individuals would share a DNA profile derived from an uncontaminated sample of DNA from a
cell’s nucleus is estimated to be one in a billion at most.12
DNA profiles are often compared to fingerprints.13 As with fingerprints, law enforcement officers
collect DNA samples from specific classes of individuals, such as prisoners. However,
compulsory DNA collection generally entails blood or saliva samples rather than finger
impressions, and DNA profiles can later match any of many types of biological matter obtained
from crime scenes.14 For these reasons, DNA matching is considered a complement to, rather than
merely a supplement for, fingerprint analysis in identifying criminal suspects.15
The FBI administers DNA storage and analysis for law enforcement agencies across the country.
FBI analysts create DNA profiles by “decoding sequences of ‘junk DNA.’”16 So-called “junk
DNA” is the name for DNA loci that are “not presently recognized as being responsible for trait
coding.”17 Because junk DNA is not currently “associated with any known physical or medical
characteristics,” its use in forensic analysis prevents, at least for the time being, DNA profiles
from containing private or sensitive information about the subject.18
Typically, a law enforcement agency’s phlebotomist collects a blood or saliva sample from the
subject pursuant to state or federal law. The sample may then be analyzed and converted into a
DNA profile by a public laboratory (or outsourced by that public lab to a private one) that adheres
to the FBI’s Quality Assurance Standards.19 Assuming the laboratory and analyst that generated
the profile are adequately credentialed, the resulting DNA profile may then be entered into the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).20 CODIS includes DNA profile databases composed at
the local, state, and national levels.21 At the national level, the National DNA Index System
(NDIS) facilitates sharing of DNA profiles among participating law enforcement agencies

12
See id.; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES, 5-7 (2009), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf.
13
The term “DNA fingerprinting” was coined in 1985. L.A. Foreman et. al., Interpreting DNA Evidence: A Review, 71
INT’L STATISTICAL REVIEW 473, 474 (2003) (giving credit to a 1985 article in Nature for coining the term). However,
the analogy between fingerprinting and DNA profiling has since drawn criticism from both the legal and scientific
communities. See, e.g., Foreman, supra, at 474 (describing the term “DNA fingerprinting” as “misleading”); United
States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp.2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (criticizing the comparison as “pure folly”). Given this
criticism, a frequently used argument against DNA databases is “genetic exceptionalism”—that is, the theory that DNA
profiles are fundamentally different from other types of identification and medical records. George J. Annas, Genetic
Privacy, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 135, at 136-37 (David Lazer ed.,
2004).
14
Under federal statute and analogous state laws, officials collect DNA from “tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample.” See
42 U.S.C. §14135a(c)(1). To facilitate especially “reliable” DNA analysis, FBI guidelines direct federal law
enforcement officials to rely on blood samples. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 817.
15
DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74933-34.
16
Amerson, 483 F.3d at 76.
17
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818.
18
See id. at 818, 837 (suggesting that, by virtue of looking only at the subject’s junk DNA, the government’s invasion
of the subject’s privacy is minimal); H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 at 27.
19
JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 270 (2010). In addition to signing a memorandum of
understanding agreeing to adhere to these standards, state laboratories submitting DNA profiles to the National DNA
Index System must also be accredited and audited annually. Id. at 271.
20
DNA INITIATIVE, COMBINED DNA INDEXING SYSTEM, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/codis.
21
DNA INITIATIVE, LEVELS OF THE DATABASE, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/levels.

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throughout the United States.22 At each level, profiles are categorized into forensic (crime scene)
profiles, offender profiles, and arrestee profiles.23
As of March 2011, NDIS contained over 9,535,059 offender profiles.24 CODIS is primarily
evaluated by the number of criminal investigations that CODIS aids.25 As of March 2011, CODIS
had assisted more than 135,500 investigations,26 suggesting that between 1% and 2% of all
samples taken from an offender have assisted a criminal investigation.27

Statutory Framework
The categories of individuals from whom law enforcement officials may require DNA samples
have expanded in recent years. The federal government and most states authorize compulsory
collection of DNA samples from individuals convicted for specified criminal offenses, including
all felonies in most jurisdictions and extending to misdemeanors, such as failure to register as a
sex offender or crimes for which a sentence greater than six months applies, in some
jurisdictions.28 In addition, the federal government and some states now authorize compulsory
collection from people whom the government has arrested or detained but not convicted. As
amended, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act 2000, discussed below, authorizes
compulsory collection from individuals in federal custody, including those detained, arrested, or
facing charges, and from individuals on release, parole, or probation in the federal criminal
justice system.29 Under the federal law, if an individual refuses to cooperate, relevant officials
“may use or authorize the use of such means as are reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and
collect a DNA sample.”30 State laws vary, but nearly all states authorize compulsory DNA
collection from people convicted for specified crimes, and a small but growing number of states
also authorize compulsory collection from arrestees.31

22

See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (CODIS), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/
codis/codis.
23
DNA Initiative, Levels of the Database, supra note 21.
24
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CODIS—NDIS STATISTICS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndisstatistics.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See id. See also Michael T. Risher, Warrantless Collection of DNA From People Merely Accused of a Crime Raises
Not Only Privacy Concerns But Also Questions About Efficacy, 88 CRIM. L. REP. 320 (December 15, 2010) (stating
that, according to FBI statistics, the “hit” rate as of September 2010 was 1.4%). The FBI also breaks down the number
of offender profiles and investigations aided by state on its website. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—NDIS
Statistics, supra note 24. For a more detailed synthesis and overview of studies regarding the utility of DNA databases
to criminal investigations, see CRS Report R41800, DNA Testing in Criminal Justice: Background, Current Law,
Grants, and Issues, by (name redacted).
28
For more information on state laws regarding compulsory DNA collection, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DNA DATABASE (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21808..
29
42 U.S.C. §14135a. See also 18 U.S.C. §3142(b) (“The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person
[charged with an offense] ... subject to [inter alia] the condition that the person cooperate in the collection of a DNA
sample from the person if the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 ...”).
30
42 U.S.C. §14135a(a)(4)(A).
31
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DNA DATABASE (2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21808 (indicating 24 states that authorize DNA collection from arrestees).
(continued...)

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Expansion of Statutory Authorities for DNA Profiling
At the federal level, statutory authority for compulsory DNA collection has expanded relatively
rapidly. During the 1990s, a trio of federal laws created the logistical framework for DNA
collection, storage, and analysis. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 provided funding to law
enforcement agencies for DNA collection and created the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System to
facilitate the sharing of DNA information among law enforcement agencies.32 Next, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 authorized grants to states for developing
and upgrading DNA collection procedures,33 and the Crime Identification Technology Act of
1998 authorized additional funding for DNA analysis programs.34 The resulting framework
centers on CODIS; more than 180 law enforcement agencies throughout the country participate in
the system.35
In recent years, federal and state laws have expanded law enforcement authority for collecting
DNA in at least two ways. First, laws have increased the range of offenses which trigger authority
for collecting and analyzing DNA. In the federal context, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000 limited compulsory extraction of DNA to people who had been convicted of a
“qualifying federal offense.”36 Under the original act, “qualifying federal offenses” included
limited but selected felonies, such as murder, kidnapping, and sexual exploitation.37 After
September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the “qualifying federal offense” definition
to include terrorism-related crimes.38 In 2004, the Justice for All Act further extended the
definition to reach all crimes of violence, all sexual abuse crimes, and all felonies.39 Similarly,
almost all states now authorize collection of DNA from people convicted of any felony.40
Second, laws have authorized compulsory DNA collection from people who have been detained
or arrested but not convicted on criminal charges. The DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005
authorized collection “from individuals who are arrested or from non-U.S. persons who are
detained under the authority of the United States.”41 The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006 subsequently substituted “arrested, facing charges, or convicted” for the word
“arrested” in that authority.42 The U.S. Department of Justice implementing regulations took
effect January 9, 2009.43 Mirroring the statutory language, it requires U.S. agencies to collect
(...continued)
However, many of the state laws authorizing collection from arrestees limit the scope of such collection to people
arrested for specified violent or serious crimes.
32
P.L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2065 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§14131-14134).
33
P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
34
P.L. 105-251, 112 Stat. 1871 (1998).
35
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CODIS BROCHURE, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis_brochure.
36
42 U.S.C. §14135a(a)(1)(B).
37
P.L. 106-546, §3, 114 Stat. 2726, 2729-30 (2000).
38
P.L. 107-56, §503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001).
39
P.L. 108-405, §203(b), 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §14135a(a)(2)).
40
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DNA DATABASE (2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21808.
41
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Tit. X, P.L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960. 42 U.S.C. §14135a(a)(1).
42
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, sec. 155, P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §14135a(a)(1)).
43
DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,932,
(continued...)

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DNA samples from “individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from nonUnited States persons who are detained under authority of the United States.”44 As mentioned,
some states have likewise enacted laws authorizing collection of arrestees’ DNA.45 Legislation
was proposed in both the 111th and 112th Congress to provide incentives to encourage states to
establish processes for collecting DNA from persons arrested for specified state offenses.46
As discussed below, courts measure the intrusiveness of DNA databanking programs by
considering both the circumstances under which a DNA profile was collected and the uses to
which that DNA profile can be put upon its inclusion in a database. It is, therefore, noteworthy
that, in addition to expanding the number and variety of circumstances under which DNA
profiling is statutorily required, policymakers have expanded the number and variety of purposes
for which databanked profiles can be used. In particular, the number of states that permit “familial
searching” is increasing. Familial searching is a DNA database search method based on “partial
matches” between the DNA profile searched and one—or several—of the DNA profiles in the
database.47 By contrast, a “routine” search of a DNA database compares a complete, wellpreserved DNA sample from a single source with the databanked profiles.48 It is also a “high
stringency” search, which means that it is a very discriminating search intended to produce only a
“direct match.”49 However, in some circumstances, a crime laboratory seeking to perform a
routine search may find it necessary to conduct a lower stringency search, perhaps because the
DNA sample being processed is degraded.50 In that case, the search could generate partial
matches that are less accurate than a direct match at predicting the identity of the sample’s
source.51

(...continued)
74,935.
44
28 C.F.R. §28.12(b).
45
See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-2511(e)(2) (authorizing DNA collection from individuals arrested for any felony or
certain other crimes); N.M. Stat. §29-16-6(B) (authorizing collection of DNA samples from individuals arrested for
specific violent felonies); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-310.2:1 (requiring collection of DNA samples from “arrested for the
commission or attempted commission of a violent felony”).
46
Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2011, H.R. 988, 112th Cong. (2011); Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA
Collection Act of 2011, S. 517, 112th Cong. (2011); Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010, H.R. 4614,
111th Cong. (as passed the House, May 18, 2010). Specifically, the legislation would authorize incentive grants and
bonus payments for states that institute a “minimum” or “enhanced” “DNA collection process,” respectively. A
“minimum” process entails searching the federal DNA database “at least one time” against samples from individuals
“arrested for or charged with” specified types of state offenses, such as those including an element of sexual contact
that are punishable by at least five years imprisonment. An “enhanced” process requires the collection of samples, to be
included in the federal database, from individuals “arrested for or charged with” a broader range of state law offenses,
such as those with a sexual conduct element that are punishable by more than one year imprisonment. For an overview
of existing federal grant programs related to the collection and law enforcement use of DNA, see CRS Report R41800,
DNA Testing in Criminal Justice: Background, Current Law, Grants, and Issues, by (name redacted).
47
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) ON THE CODIS PROGRAM AND THE
NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet.
48
See id.; Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 3, 17-18 (2010).
49
See FBI, supra note 47; Gabel, supra note 48, at 17.
50
See FBI, supra note 47; Gabel, supra note 48, at 17.
51
See FBI, supra note 47; Gabel, supra note 48, at 17.

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In some states, partial matches may be recorded and used in a criminal investigation.52 Although
some commentators characterize this method of generating partial matches as a type of familial
searching, the FBI does not.53 According to the FBI, familial searching entails taking a complete
and well-preserved DNA sample from a single source and, usually after conducting an
unsuccessful high stringency search, conducting a lower stringency search with the intent of
generating partial matches.54 In other words, under the FBI’s definition, a familial search is a
deliberate database search for potential relatives of the suspect—not for the suspect himself.55
These searches may not be conducted in the National DNA Index System (NDIS),56 but the FBI
has developed provisional procedures for authorizing the release of inadvertently obtained partial
match information to law enforcement.57 As for state databases, some states prohibit familial
searching by law58 or by informal policy,59 while others have permitted it.60

Expungement Provisions
Although Congress has encouraged DNA databanking, it has also constrained the government’s
authority to use and retain all DNA profiles indefinitely. In particular, federal law mandates
expungement of DNA samples upon an arrestee’s showing of discharge or acquittal or a convict’s
showing that the conviction was overturned.61 These provisions apply to DNA collected by state
and local law enforcement officers, in addition to DNA collected in the federal justice or
detention systems. However, DNA profiles of convicts who complete their sentences are not
eligible for expungement under federal law.
Expungement occurs upon written request; it does not occur automatically.62 To have a DNA
profile expunged from the database, its source must submit, in addition to the written request, a
52

For a map of states that permit partial matching and familial searching and those that do not, see COUNCIL FOR
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, STATE RULES ON PARTIAL/FAMILIAL SEARCHING,
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/usa/usa2.html.
53
See FBI, supra note 47; Gabel, supra note 48, at 17. See also Natalie Ram, DNA Confidential, SCIENCE PROGRESS
(November 2, 2009), available at http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/11/dna-confidential (referring to this method as
“partial match reporting” rather than “familial searching”).
54
FBI, supra note 47. See Gabel, supra note 48, at 18.
55
See Gabel, supra note 48, at 18.
56
FBI, supra note 47. See Gabel, supra note 48, at 18.
57
FBI, supra note 47; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Interim Plan for the Release of
Information In the Event of a “Partial Match” at NDIS, (July 20, 2006), http://www.bioforensics.com/conference08/
Familial_Searches/CODIS_Bulletin.pdf.
58
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Public Safety, §2-506(d) (prohibiting searches of the state DNA database “for the purpose
of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of the
individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired”).
59
According to the Council for Responsible Genetics, several states, including Alaska, Maine, Michigan, and Vermont,
include prohibitions on either partial match or familial searching in lab manuals. Council for Responsible Genetics,
supra note 52. See also Ram, supra note 53 (stating that research revealed that at least 12 states have unwritten policies
on partial match reporting or familial searching).
60
See, e.g., Press Release, Governor McDonnell Announces Virginia Department of Forensic Science to Begin Using
Familial DNA Searches in Virginia (March 21, 2011), available at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/News/
viewRelease.cfm?id=648 (announcing that the Virginia Department of Forensic Science developed the capability to
perform familial searches and issued a policy for considering requests from law enforcement officials to conduct these
searches).
61
42 U.S.C. §14132(d).
62
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CODIS—EXPUNGEMENT POLICY, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/
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certified copy of a final court order establishing that the conviction was overturned or that
charges were dismissed, not filed, or resulted in acquittal.63

Fourth Amendment Overview
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a right “of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”64 Two
fundamental questions arise in every Fourth Amendment challenge. First, does the challenged
action constitute a search or seizure by federal or local government and thus trigger the Fourth
Amendment right?65 Second, if so, is the search or seizure “reasonable”?

Search or Seizure
Different tests trigger the Fourth Amendment right depending on whether a litigant challenges
government conduct as a seizure or as a search. Seizures involve interference with property
rights; a seizure of property occurs when government action “meaningfully interferes” with
possessory interests or freedom of movement.66
In contrast, searches interfere with personal privacy. Government action constitutes a search when
it intrudes upon a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”67 A reasonable expectation of
privacy requires both that an “individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
searched object” and that “society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”68
In general, people have no reasonable expectation of privacy for physical characteristics they
“knowingly expos[e] to the public.”69 In evaluating whether people “knowingly expose”
identifying characteristics, the Supreme Court has sometimes distinguished the drawing of blood
and other internal fluids from the taking of fingerprints. At times, it has signaled that people lack
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their fingerprints,70 but it has held that extraction of blood,
(...continued)
codis_expungement. See also Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 26 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 309, 341 (2010) (stating that exonerated arrestees and offenders may not be informed about the possibility of
having their DNA records expunged and, even if they are, the procedures for getting the profile expunged may be
overly burdensome).
63
42 U.S.C. §14132(d). See also FBI, supra note 62 (detailing procedures for expungement).
64
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65
Courts have applied the Fourth Amendment to state and local government actions since 1961, when, in Mapp v.
Ohio, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as having incorporated the Fourth Amendment to the
states. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
66
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 716 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result); Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 696 (1981).
67
Some justices and experts have noted the circularity of the combination of this definition and the general Fourth
Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
However, such criticisms have not yet caused the Court to reconsider its test, except perhaps for the narrow category of
interiors of homes, for which the Court has found a near-automatic reasonable expectation of privacy by virtue of
privacy in the home having “roots deep in the common law.” See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
68
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
69
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
70
See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an
(continued...)

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urine, and other fluids implicates an intrusion upon a reasonable expectation of privacy,
presumably because the former category is “knowingly exposed” to the public while the latter
category generally is not.71
Under modern Supreme Court precedent, a further complicating factor is that reasonable
expectation of privacy depends not only on the type of evidence gathered, but also on the status of
the person from whom it is gathered. The inquiry is not simply a yes-or-no determination, but
appears to include a continuum of privacy expectations. For example, in United States v.
Knights,72 the Court held that the “condition” of probation “significantly diminished” a
probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.73 This diminished privacy expectation did not
completely negate the probationer’s Fourth Amendment right; however, it affected the outcome
under the Court’s Fourth Amendment balancing test.74

“Reasonableness” Inquiry When the Fourth Amendment Applies
When government action constitutes a search or seizure, “reasonableness” is the “touchstone” of
constitutionality.75 A search by law enforcement officers is reasonable if supported by a warrant
backed by probable cause.76 However, some searches do not need to meet this warrant standard.
For example, searches that entail only a limited intrusion of the suspect’s privacy, such as a patdown, satisfy Fourth Amendment strictures if justified by “reasonable suspicion” based on
“specific reasonable inferences.”77 Courts have generally analyzed the Fourth Amendment
consistency of DNA databanking programs under yet another reasonableness test: the “general
balancing,” or “totality-of-the-circumstances” test, which determines the constitutionality of
certain “suspicionless” searches that the courts have deemed particularly non-intrusive and/or
necessary.78 This general balancing test weighs the “degree to which [a search or seizure] intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy” with “the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”79

(...continued)
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.”). Later, in Hayes v. Florida, the Supreme
Court seemed to suggest that fingerprinting does constitute a search, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (referring to
fingerprinting as less intrusive than other types of searches and seizures), a shift in keeping with the Court’s broader
trend toward classifying more activity as constituting a search and leaving the heart of the constitutional analysis for the
Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry. Thus, it appears that although the Court views the drawing of blood as a
greater intrusion than fingerprinting, both activities now qualify as searches.
71
See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“We have long recognized that a
‘compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content’ must be deemed a Fourth
Amendment search” (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-768 (1966)).
72
534 U.S. 112 (2001).
73
Id. at 119-120.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 118.
76
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
77
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 27 (1968).
78
See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 426 (6th
Cir. 2008).
79
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).

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Historically, courts used the general reasonableness test in three situations: (1) when a routine,
administrative purpose justified regular searches; (2) where a long-recognized warrant exception
existed, such as for border searches; and (3) where a “special nee[d], beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, [made] the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable.”80 Recently,
the Supreme Court cast its Fourth Amendment analysis in “totality-of-the-circumstances” terms
in addressing a suspicionless search of a parolee’s pockets. In that case, Samson v. California,81
the Court seemed to apply the general balancing test because the petitioner, as a parolee, had
diminished legitimate expectations of privacy that were easily outweighed by the state’s
substantial interests.82 In other words, the Court found that the search was particularly nonintrusive because the petitioner was subject to the penal system’s supervision.
The status of a search’s subject within the penal system is now an accepted justification for
evaluating the Fourth Amendment consistency of that search under the general reasonableness
test.83 Notably, however, while prisoners, parolees, probationers, and supervised releasees all have
diminished privacy rights, their privacy rights are not all diminished equally. Instead, the privacy
rights of prisoners, parolees, probationers, and supervised releasees exist on a spectrum.84
Prisoners have virtually no privacy rights but each subsequent category has slightly greater
privacy rights than the one preceding it.

Collecting DNA
The Supreme Court has not accepted a case reviewing a compulsory DNA collection statute.
However, the courts have uniformly held that compulsory DNA collection and analysis
constitutes a search, and thus triggers Fourth Amendment rights.85 Accordingly, compulsory DNA
collection and profiling laws violate the Fourth Amendment if they fail the reasonableness test.

80
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1986) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring)).
81
547 U.S. 843 (2006).
82
Id. at 847, 847 n.1.
83
See id. See also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114-120 (2001) (evaluating a warrantless search of a
probationer’s home under the general reasonableness test because the conditions placed on his probation significantly
diminished the reasonableness of his expectation of privacy); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1986)
(applying the general reasonableness test to a search of a person’s home because the person was on probation).
84
See, e.g., Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 425 n.2, 426-27 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing a “privacy continuum” on
which “a parolee ... has less diminished privacy rights than a prisoner”). Parole and supervised release are sometimes
conflated, but they represent two distinct forms of post-incarceration supervision by the state. See UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2010 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 484 (2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/ToC_PDF.cfm. Whereas parolees are on release from incarceration
before the end of their sentence, supervised releasees are serving a term of state supervision after their initial term of
incarceration. See id.
85
See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1042 (2007) (“It is settled
law that DNA indexing statutes, because they authorize both a physical intrusion to obtain a tissue sample and a
chemical analysis to obtain private physiological information about a person, are subject to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment.”).

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Prisoners, Parolees, Probationers, and Supervised Releasees
As stated, on the “privacy continuum” prisoners, parolees, probationers, and supervised releasees
share diminished, but not necessarily equivalent, privacy rights.86 Moreover, according to the
federal appeals courts, the privacy rights of all four types of convicted offenders are diminished to
such an extent that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their DNA or DNA profile.87
Indeed, the vast majority of U.S. Courts of Appeals have upheld either the federal law mandating
DNA collection and analysis from prisoners, parolees, and probationers or a similar state law.88
In these cases, the only source of conflict between the courts appears to be the appropriate
rationale for evaluating these laws under the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test.89 A majority of
courts use the state’s court-ordered supervision of the subject as their sole rationale for applying
this standard.90 However, some federal circuit courts of appeals have applied the traditional
special needs methodology, assessing whether the collection of the subject’s DNA was justified
by a “special need beyond the ordinary needs of normal law enforcement” before evaluating
whether the government’s acquisition and use of the subject’s DNA was reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances.91 Although courts have noted this analytical distinction, it may have
no practical import because, regardless of the standard applied, courts have consistently upheld
compulsory post-conviction DNA collection laws.92

86

See Wilson, 517 F.3d at 425 n.2.
See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding provision of the federal law mandating
DNA collection from a supervised releasee); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding
provisions of the federal law mandating DNA collection from a probationer); Wilson, 517 F.3d at 423 (upholding a
state law mandating DNA collection from a prisoner).
88
E.g., Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3 (holding for the First Circuit that the federal law is consistent with the U.S. Constitution);
Amerson, 483 F.3d at 89 (upholding the federal law), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1042 (2007); United States v. Hook, 471
F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding the federal law), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1343 (2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451
F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding the federal law), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1044 (2006); United States v. Kriesel, 508
F.3d 941, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the federal law); United States v. Banks, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007)
(upholding the federal law); United States v. Castillo-Lagos, 147 Fed. App’x. 71 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding the federal
law); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding the Virginia statute). See also Padgett v. Donald, 401
F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Georgia statute); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
Wisconsin statute); Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Oklahoma statute); Schlicher v.
Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Kansas statute); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the Colorado statute).
89
See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78 (stating that the courts have nearly unanimously upheld state and federal DNA
databanking laws, but, in doing so, have used two different approaches); Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924 (“The only
disagreement among the circuits is what analytical approach to use in upholding the [DNA collection] statutes.”);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Confronted with challenges to the federal DNA Act
and its state law analogues, our sister circuits and peers in the states have divided in their analytical approaches”
between a traditional special needs analysis and a direct assessment of reasonableness).
90
See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F.3d at 426 (finding that the direct application of the general balancing test is appropriate in a
case involving a prisoner). See also Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78 (describing the Second Circuit’s insistence on the
traditional special needs test methodology as in conflict with the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
91
See, e.g., Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78-80 (articulating the traditional methodology of a special needs test, justifying its
application to compulsory DNA collection laws, and applying it).
92
See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F.3d at 427 n. 4 (“Even if we were to apply the more stringent special-needs test, there is no
reason to believe the ultimate result would be different.”).
87

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Arrestees
To date, only a handful of state93 and federal94 judicial decisions address compulsory collection of
DNA from persons awaiting a criminal trial, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the
constitutionality of this policy. However, recently two federal circuit courts of appeals—the Ninth
Circuit and the Third Circuit—held that conditioning an arrestee’s pre-trial release on DNA
sampling is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. These cases may indicate the approach to this
question that other federal circuits are likely to take.
In United States v. Mitchell95 and United States v. Pool,96 the Third and Ninth Circuits
respectively upheld the government’s request of a criminal arrestee’s DNA sample after the
arrestee had been indicted but before trial.97 Both applied the general reasonableness test on the
grounds that the subject of the DNA profile was an arrestee and therefore had sufficiently
diminished privacy rights to be subjected to reasonable suspicionless searches.98
The courts also adopted similar views of the extent to which (1) the arrestee’s privacy rights were
diminished because of the probable cause determination justifying arrest; (2) DNA collection and
databanking intruded upon a person’s privacy interests; and (3) DNA profiling served a
substantial government interest.
In both cases, the arrestee had been indicted by a grand jury prior to his arrest. For the Ninth
Circuit, Pool’s indictment was a “watershed event” after which the arrestees’ privacy rights were
so diminished as to make warrantless and suspicionless searches reasonable.99 The Third Circuit,
93

This report focuses on federal court decisions, but several state courts have also reviewed the collection of DNA
from arrestees, with mixed results. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s statute authorizing
DNA collection from arrestees. Anderson v. Virginia, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Vir. 2006), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1054 (2008).
In contrast, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a state law authorizing collection of a DNA sample “upon a
finding of probable cause, but before any conviction …” violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. In the Matter of the Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 486
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
94
In addition to the two federal district court cases discussed in this report, two other federal judicial decisions, both
issued in December 2009, are of interest. First, in Friedman v. Boucher, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
denied Nevada police officers’ motion for qualified immunity where the officers, acting on their own volition rather
than pursuant to any state or federal law, forced the collection of DNA from a man in pre-trial detention for the purpose
of comparing his DNA to evidence available in “cold cases.” 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit
emphasized the lack of statutory authority and the absence of a strong governmental interest in the case. Given those
fact-specific underpinnings for its decision, it is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit’s rationale would apply in a future
case in which statutory authority and a different governmental interest existed. Second, in Haskell v. Brown, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California denied a motion to enjoin the enforcement of a California statute
requiring the collection of DNA from adults arrested for felony offenses. 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D.Cal. 2009).
Because the case arose at the preliminary injunction stage, it is unclear how much weight the decision might have on a
future challenge to California’s law.
95
United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4718, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15272 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011), rev’g 681 F.Supp.2d
597 (W.D.Pa. 2009).
96
United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’g 645 F. Supp.2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
97
In Pool, the defendant was granted pre-trial release. For that reason, a provision of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
§3142(b), which requires DNA collection as a condition of pre-trial release, provided a supplementary basis of
statutory authority.
98
See Mitchell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS at *43; Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218-19 (writing that the judicial or grand jury
finding of probable cause for an arrest was a “watershed event” after which arrestees’ privacy rights were so
diminished as to make certain suspicionless searches reasonable).
99
Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218-19.

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however, left undecided whether grand jury indictment—or a judicial finding of probable cause—
was a necessary prerequisite for finding that the arrestee had substantially reduced privacy
rights.100 This suggests that, in future cases, courts might find that a person who is detained solely
upon the arresting officer’s finding of probable cause might have greater privacy rights in his
DNA profile than either Mitchell or Pool.101
On the extent of the privacy intrusion, both courts characterized DNA profiling as no more
intrusive than fingerprinting or photographing a suspect.102 In adopting this position, the Third
Circuit rejected the lower court’s description of DNA collection as an act of “information
science”—a “quantum leap” in terms of intrusiveness from the “identification science” involved
in fingerprinting.103 Having determined that the only intrusion entailed in DNA collection was the
identification of the arrestee, the Third Circuit wrote that the indictment and subsequent arrest of
a person deprives the arrestee of any legitimate privacy right in anonymity.104
The Third and Ninth Circuits also agreed that the government’s interests in DNA databanking are
sufficiently important to outweigh any privacy intrusion created by DNA collection. In Pool, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the government had two “substantial” interests in DNA profiling: (1)
identifying the arrestee so as to determine who is in government custody and whether that person
may have been involved in other crimes; and (2) discouraging the arrestee from violating the
conditions of pre-trial release.105 The Third Circuit in Mitchell characterized the “most
compelling” government interest as the accurate identification of arrestees, reasoning that this
information helps the state determine whether or not the arrestee should be detained pending
trial.106 Moreover, the Third Circuit wrote, the government needs this information “as soon as
possible,” which means that the government’s interest in identifying the arrestee is not served
equally well by collecting his DNA after conviction rather than before it.107

Using and Retaining Databanked DNA
In addition to the constitutionality of compulsory DNA collection, a second set of emerging
Fourth Amendment issues with DNA database programs concerns the retention and use of DNA
samples and profiles. For example, in United States v. Mitchell,108 discussed above,109 the arrestee
argued that the indefinite retention of his DNA profile would violate the Fourth Amendment.110
However, the Third Circuit declined to reach the merits of his argument because Mitchell’s DNA

100
Mitchell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS at *71, n.22 (“[W]e need not reach the question of whether any additional probable
cause requirement other than the requirements inherent in the statute—that an individual is arrested—is necessary.”).
101
See id.
102
Id. at 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS at *64-65; Pool, 621 F.3d at 1221-22.
103
Mitchell, 681 F.Supp.2d at 609.
104
See id.
105
Pool, 621 F.3d at 1223.
106
Id. at 76, 79.
107
Id. at 79-80.
108
United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4718, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15272 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011).
109
Supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
110
Mitchell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS at *71-72.

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sample had not yet been collected, rendering its potential retention not yet ripe for judicial
review.111
Federal law requires the FBI to expunge DNA profiles for people who receive acquittals or whose
convictions are overturned.112 Courts have pointed to these provisions as reducing the
intrusiveness of collecting DNA samples from arrestees.113 This case law suggests that sources of
lawfully collected and databanked DNA maintain some degree of privacy interests in their DNA
profiles. However, it is not clear whether convicted felons retain those rights as well, and, if they
do, what types of actions would unreasonably intrude upon those rights.

Post-Sentence Privacy Rights
The federal expungement provisions do not address storage of DNA from people who have
successfully completed their sentences. Rather, once a person’s DNA profile has been entered into
CODIS database, “police at any level of government with a general criminal investigative interest
... can tap into that DNA without any consent, suspicion, or warrant, long after his period of
supervised release ends.”114 Convicted felons who have completed their sentences have initiated
Fourth Amendment challenges to the government’s indefinite storage of their DNA profiles and
samples.115 However, few courts have been convinced by their arguments. In particular, judicial
skepticism of genetic exceptionalism has made it difficult for defendants to overcome the
established constitutionality of the government’s indefinite retention of fingerprints and other
identification records of convicted felons.116
Nevertheless, like the cases over DNA collection from an arrestee, cases upholding the
government’s use and storage of databanked DNA after its source completes his sentence diverge.
In particular, dicta in state and federal court opinions augur judicial divergence over the extent to
which an offender retains privacy rights in his DNA sample and profile after his full release from
the penal system.

111

Id. at 72.
42 U.S.C. §14132(d).
113
See, e.g., Pool, 621 F.3d at 1227 n.16 (“The alleged intrusion on any of Pool’s rights is also reduced by the
provision that the DNA sample may be expunged if he is not found guilty or his case is dismissed.”).
114
United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 952 (9th Cir. 2007).
115
See, e.g., Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 68 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2007); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
116
See, e.g., Boroian, 616 F.3d at 67 (“[I]dentification records of convicted felons, such as fingerprints or mugshots,
are routinely retained by the government after their sentences are complete and may be expunged only in narrowly
defined circumstances ... [P]recedents hold that the government’s matching of a lawfully obtained identification record
against other records in its lawful possession does not infringe on an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy.”);
United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is well established that the state need not destroy
records of identification—such as fingerprints, photographs, etc.—of convicted felons, once their sentences are up. The
same applies to DNA.”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Police departments across the
country could face an intolerable burden if every ‘search’ of an ordinary fingerprint database were subject to Fourth
Amendment challenges. The same applies to DNA fingerprints ... CODIS operates much like an old-fashioned
fingerprint database (albeit more efficiently).”). See also Stevenson v. United States, 380 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967) (holding that a defendant had no constitutional right to the expungement of his mugshots
and fingerprints after his conviction was set aside).
112

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The First Circuit acknowledged this apparent dissensus in its 2010 case, Boroian v. Mueller.117 In
that case, the court upheld the government’s indefinite retention and periodic matching of a
felon’s DNA after his sentence was completed.118 However, it also expressly refused to hold “as
some courts have suggested” that, upon a DNA sample’s lawful extraction and databanking, its
source “loses a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to any subsequent use of that
profile.”119 Instead, the First Circuit ruled that, once a qualified offender’s DNA “profile has been
lawfully created and entered into CODIS ... the FBI’s retention and periodic matching of the
profile against other profiles in CODIS for the purpose of identification is not an intrusion on the
offender’s legitimate expectation of privacy.”120 In other words, Boroian suggests that there could
be circumstances in which the post-sentence retention and use of a DNA profile violate its
source’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
As the First Circuit in Boroian pointed out, however, several state courts have not reached such a
limiting conclusion,121 and their more expansive view may have support within the federal
judiciary. For example, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii held in State v. Hauge122 that
“once a blood sample and DNA profile is lawfully procured from a defendant, no privacy interest
... in either the sample or the profile” prevents its indefinite use and retention by the
government.123 Significantly, Judge Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit expressed support for this perspective in his concurrence in the 2004 case Green v.
Berge,124 in which he wrote that lawfully obtained DNA samples may be put to a wide variety of
uses beyond indefinite storage and periodic matching because “the Fourth Amendment does not
control how properly collected information is deployed.”125

Informational Privacy Rights
The difference between the First Circuit’s view in Boroian and Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in
Green has significant implications for the potential uses of DNA databases and the information
they contain. Database opponents characterize laws that authorize or condone the use of DNA
databases to research anything other than a suspect’s identity as making the database program
particularly intrusive.126 Although these concerns have yet to form the basis of a Fourth
117

616 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010).
118
Id. at 68.
119
Id. (emphasis in original).
120
Id.
121
Id. See also State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003) (holding that the defendant had no reasonable privacy
interest in his DNA sample or profile after it had been lawfully collected); Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 16-17 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (“[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize as reasonable [the defendant’s] continued expectation of
privacy in blood samples lawfully collected by police” (emphasis in original)).
122
79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003)
123
Id. at 144 (Haw. 2003) (emphasis added).
124
354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbook, J., concurring).
125
Id. at 680.
126
See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, supra note 62, at 335 (contending that familial searching could unlawfully invade the
privacy of the “offender or arrestee, his family members, and the family itself” and expressing concern over the
possibility that, in some states, a DNA database could be used to conduct research on its sources’ traits and diseases);
Gabel, supra note 48, at 4-5 (arguing that cases involving familial DNA searches “raise legitimate concerns about the
rise of the silent informant” and “represent a troubling addition to the increasing collection, retention, and use of
genetic information”). See also Memorandum from Seth Axelrad for The American Society of Law, Medicine and
Ethics (ASLME), available at http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axelrad3.pdf (describing different state policies
(continued...)

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Amendment challenge to a DNA databanking program, they are premised on a belief that people
retain a substantial privacy interest in the information encoded in their DNA even after they have
been convicted and their DNA lawfully included in a DNA database.

Academic Research and Non-forensic Information
Congress has generally sought to restrict the non-forensic use of DNA databases to those with the
potential to enhance the forensic utility of CODIS.127 The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
of 2000 criminalized both (1) the knowing disclosure of a sample or DNA analysis to someone
who is not authorized to receive it and (2) the unauthorized acquisition or use of such a sample or
analysis.128 However, federal law does not also entitle individuals aggrieved by the misuse of
their profiles to pursue a private cause of action against those responsible.129 In other words,
federal law prohibits most non-forensic uses of DNA databases but does not specifically authorize
private individuals to enforce this prohibition.
While database opponents would like to see federal law incorporate a private cause of action,
their primary concern is with state laws that permit a wider range of non-forensic uses of state
DNA databases. Some state legislatures, for example, have expressly authorized the use of the
state DNA database for medical and academic research.130 In the eyes of database opponents,
these states have established databanking programs that are more intrusive for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment than those that follow the stricter federal standards.131

(...continued)
toward the non-forensic use of DNA databases).
127
See 42 U.S.C. §14132(b)(3) (authorizing the use of DNA profiles in CODIS for forensic identification purposes,
related legal proceedings, and, once personally identifiable information is removed, a “population statistics database”).
See also D.H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259, 276 (2006)
(explaining how population statistics databases, protocol development, and quality control research all fit within the
“identification paradigm”).
128
P.L. 106-546, §3(a)(5), codified at 42 U.S.C. §14135e(c).
129
Compare e.g., id. (making the knowing or intentional disclosure or use of a confidential DNA forensic record or
analysis a felony but not establishing a private cause of action for the aggrieved individual) with RI GEN. LAWS §121.5-15 (criminalizing violations of the confidentiality conditions on the use of DNA samples and authorizing a person
aggrieved by a violation to bring a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees) and VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, §1941 (criminalizing violations of the confidentiality conditions on the use of DNA samples and authorizing a
person aggrieved by a violation to pursue a private action for all “appropriate relief”).
130
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §28.176(2)(d) (permitting DNA profiles contained in the database to be used, inter
alia, for an “academic,” “research,” or “statistical” analysis if “personal identifications” are removed); Ala. Code §3618-31 (authorizing the creation of a “DNA population statistical database” that may be used to, inter alia, “provide data
relative to ... disease or disability” and “assist in other humanitarian endeavors including, but not limited to, educational
research or medical research or development”). See also ARK. CODE ANN. §12-12-1018(d) (authorizing the creation of a
“population database” composed of DNA samples stored in the database with the “personal identification” removed).
131
See, e.g., Suter, supra note 62, at 335, 338 (stating that “vague legislative limits on the uses of the samples” risk, if
not empower, government searches that exceed their legal boundaries and raise “civil liberty concerns by increasing the
extent and breadth of government intrusions”). But see Kaye, supra note 127, at 260 (rejecting some of the theories,
both legal and scientific, that underpin this argument). Database opponents are also concerned that not all states have
expressly prohibited using DNA databases—and the information contained therein—for non-forensic research. See,
e.g., Suter, supra note 62, at 336 (stating that there are 40 jurisdictions that neither authorize nor prohibit non-forensic
uses and, in those states, there is “uncertainty as to the legal limits” on the uses of stored samples). For example, Idaho
lists permissible uses of collected DNA samples and profiles but does not expressly prohibit potential non-forensic
uses. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§19-5505, 19-5514.

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Although these claims have not been raised before a federal judge, they can draw support from
language in existing case law. Several courts have considered, as part of their Fourth Amendment
analysis, both the range of purposes for which a given DNA database can be used and the
penalties for any misuse.132 However, courts have also indicated that, until a case presents facts
establishing that a DNA database was used for a non-forensic purpose, a court cannot accurately
measure any resulting privacy intrusion or assess its Fourth Amendment reasonableness.133

Familial Searching and Information About Genetic Relationships
Although concerns about possible non-forensic use of DNA databases are reflected in state and
federal laws, the universe of possible forensic uses of DNA databases has generated greater public
concern in recent years. In particular, the technique known as “familial searching” has received
widespread media attention—both positive and negative—over the last decade.134
The FBI defines a familial search as a deliberate database search for potential relatives of the
suspect. Federal courts have not yet had an occasion to assess the constitutionality of familial
searching. The arrestee in United States v. Mitchell,135 discussed above,136 argued that one reason
that developing his DNA profile is more intrusive than obtaining his fingerprints is that, through
the former, the government can obtain information about his biological relationships and any
criminal activity by a member of his family.137 However, the court did not address this argument
in its analysis, finding, inter alia, that Mitchell had failed to provide any evidence to establish the
possibility that his DNA—which had not yet been collected—would be used in this way.138
Some privacy interests implicated by familial searching are different from those implicated by
more routine DNA database searches.139 In particular, commentators have asserted that familial
searching may violate two types of—and more than one person’s—privacy interests.140 The first
type is the privacy interests of the person whose DNA profile was located as a partial match.
Commentators assert that this person has a privacy interest in information about his genetic
relationships, information that may be revealed by a familial search of the DNA database.141 The
second set of privacy interests belongs to family members of the person whose profile was a

132
See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1192, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007) (weighing “the plaintiffs’ diminished
privacy rights, the minimal intrusion involved in obtaining a DNA sample, and the Act’s restrictive provisions” against
the governmental interests (emphasis added)); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that
the privacy invasion occasioned by the maintenance of DNA profiles is minimal because, inter alia, “the Act severely
limits the circumstances and purposes for which the DNA profiles can be released”).
133
See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 87; United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2004).
134
See, e.g., Maura Dolan, State to Double Crime Searches Using Family DNA, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2011); Jessica
Cerretani, Whodunit? BOSTON GLOBE (October 31, 2010); Natasha Singer, In Fighting Crime, How Far Should a
Genetic Net Reach? N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010); Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE (March 17, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/id/2213958.
135
United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4718, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15272 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011).
136
Supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
137
Mitchell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS at * 62-64, n.19.
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., Suter, supra note 62, at 327-28.
140
See, e.g., id. at 342.
141
See, e.g., id. at 342, 343.

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partial match.142 Law enforcement may violate these privacy rights if, while following up on the
lead provided by the partial match, they collect DNA from the partial match’s family members
without a warrant.143 These family members may have privacy interests in their genetic identities
as well as in their genetic relationship—or lack thereof—with the person whose DNA was
profiled.
Because the constitutionality of familial searching has not yet reached the federal courts, the
existence of a reasonable privacy interest in genetic relationships remain a largely untested
assertion. Commentators defend its existence on the grounds that, unlike other types of
information, people do not knowingly expose their genetic relationships and, moreover, may not
necessarily be credited with knowledge—let alone amenability to public exposure—of their
genetic kin.144

Implications of New Research on Junk DNA
Despite the “rapid pace of technological development in the area of DNA analysis,”145 much of
DNA’s scientific value remains a mystery. As mentioned, FBI analysts rely on junk DNA
precisely because it is not believed to reveal sensitive medical or biological information. Partly
for that reason, proponents of expansive DNA collection argue that any privacy intrusion
resulting from DNA storage or analysis is minimal at most. For example, when he introduced the
amendment that authorizes collection and analysis of DNA from arrestees in the federal system,
Senator Kyl emphasized that storage of DNA samples would not intrude upon individuals’
privacy rights, stating that “the sample of DNA that is kept ... is what is called ‘junk DNA’—it is
impossible to determine anything medically sensitive from this DNA.”146 Likewise, courts have
assumed that DNA analysis and storage involves only a minimal privacy intrusion.
However, language in some opinions suggests that this assumption might change if scientists
discover new uses for junk DNA. The First, Second, and Third Circuits have all suggested that
“discovery of new uses for ‘junk DNA’ would require a reevaluation of the [Fourth Amendment]
reasonableness balance.”147 In addition, at least two judges on the Ninth Circuit have expressed
142

See Mitchell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS at * 63, n.19 (suggesting that the subject of a DNA profile lacks standing to
assert the Fourth Amendment rights of his biological relatives in keeping their genetic kinship with him private).
143
See, e.g., State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33-34 (Wash. 2007) (upholding the constitutionality of collecting DNA by
posing a fictitious law firm, inviting the suspect to join a class action lawsuit via mail, and collecting his saliva from the
sealed return envelope). See also Suter, supra note 62, at 358 (suggesting that a partial match alone cannot satisfy the
probable cause test because current forensic testing does not establish a sufficiently high probability of a biological
connection between the source of the partial match and the suspect).
144
See, e.g., Suter, supra note 62, at 364 (listing circumstances in which the source of the databanked profile with
similarities to the suspect’s may be unaware that he had a sibling who was given up for adoption or that one of his
children is the product of his partner’s adultery).
145
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007).
146
151 CONG. REC. S13757 (daily ed. December 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
147
United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4718, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15272, at *60 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011) (“Should
technological advancements change the value of ‘junk DNA,’ reconsideration of our Fourth Amendment analysis may
be appropriate.”); United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85
n.13 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Should the uses to which ‘junk DNA’ can be put be shown in the future to be significantly greater
than the record before us today suggests, a reconsideration of the reasonableness balance would be necessary”). See
also Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that “so-called ‘junk’ DNA might
someday be found to contain genetic programming material,” but stating that the court’s opinion must be based on “the
(continued...)

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concern about the potential for profiles developed from junk DNA to yield more sensitive
information about their sources in the future.148
Scientific research on junk DNA is still emerging, and some research suggests that junk DNA
contains more genetic information than previously assumed. For example, in October 2008,
University of Iowa researchers released study findings showing that junk DNA has the potential
to “evolve into exons, which are the building blocks for protein-coding genes.”149 Other scientists
have similarly hypothesized that there are “gems among the junk” in DNA.150 Hence, a remaining
question is whether use of junk DNA will continue to offer superficial identifying information or
whether it will reveal more detailed medical or biological characteristics.

Conclusion
The nation, all 50 states, and many localities have adopted some type of DNA database program.
Over time, Congress and state legislatures have expanded the types of crimes and circumstances
that can result in DNA collection and databanking. Congress has demonstrated concern toward
some aspects of DNA databanking by requiring expungement of a DNA profile in certain
circumstances, prohibiting most non-forensic uses of DNA profiles and databases, and restricting
familial searching. However, in general, Congress has taken a supportive attitude toward DNA
databanking and incentivized the development, expansion, and integration of DNA databases.
As DNA database programs have widened in scope and grown in numbers, their consistency with
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has increasingly been
challenged. In the context of compulsory DNA collection, courts have widely upheld laws
mandating the collection of DNA from persons who were convicted and are subject to the penal
system’s custody or supervision. Far fewer cases have given the federal courts an opportunity to
decide whether DNA collection from arrestees is also constitutional. The two federal circuit
courts of appeals to hear the question upheld the mandatory DNA profiling of indicted arrestees,
but no federal court has assessed the constitutionality of profiling arrestees in the absence of a
judicial finding of probable cause.
Courts have generally upheld the indefinite use and storage of a lawfully databanked DNA profile
after its source’s conviction. However, not all courts agree that any post-conviction use of those
profiles is constitutionally acceptable. In particular, observers are now raising questions about the
(...continued)
facts as they are … today.”).
148
For example, in Pool, Judge Lucero wrote separately from the Ninth Circuit’s majority opinion to emphasize that, if,
in the future, a litigant proved that a CODIS DNA profile yields information unavailable from a fingerprint or
photograph, the “defendant’s interests could be vastly different” from Pool’s and the “totality-of-the-circumstances
test” would need to be conducted anew. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1230-31 (Lucero, concurring). In Kincade, Judge Reinhardt
wrote in his dissenting opinion that “The fact that scientists currently lack the capacity to comprehend the full
significance of the data stored within junk DNA samples is irrelevant” to the Fourth Amendment analysis because the
DNA profiles are retained forever and the advance of science will make them “only more revealing in time.” 345 F.3d
at 850 (emphasis added).
149
Lin L, Shen S, Tye A, Cai JJ, Jiang P, et al., Diverse Splicing Patterns of Exonized Alu Elements in Human Tissues,
4 PLOS GENETICS 1 (2008), http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pgen.1000225.
150
W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, 29 SCI. AM. 49 (2003), http://www.imb.uq.edu.au/
download/large/TheUnseenGenome.pdf.

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Fourth Amendment consistency of using databases for non-forensic purposes and for familial
searching. Currently, these concerns are largely confined to the scholarly literature—they have
not come before a federal court—and primarily centered on state database programs. Unlike some
state DNA databases, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) and the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) can not be used for either non-forensic research or intentional familial
searching. However, the increase in states that authorize familial searching suggests that it may
not be long before the constitutionality of familial searching comes before a federal court.
Much of the Fourth Amendment analysis of these issues depends on the current state of scientific
knowledge on DNA and, more importantly, “junk” DNA—that is, the subset of DNA used to
create databanked profiles. Decisions upholding DNA databanking programs have often
described junk DNA as empty or meaningless genetic material because it is believed to reveal no
sensitive information about its source. However, recent scientific research is challenging the
accuracy of this description. While it may be too early for courts to give weight to this new
research as fact, some have suggested that the constitutionality of DNA database programs should
be reevaluated if “junk” DNA is ultimately found to reveal sensitive genetic information.

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Legislative Attorney
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Acknowledgments
Portions of this report were originally authored by (name redacted).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41847. Public record. Not legal advice.