# Pakistan-U.S. Relations > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41832 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** May 24, 2012 - **Citation:** R41832 ## Text Pakistan-U.S. Relations (name redacted) Specialist in South Asian Affairs May 24, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41832 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations Summary In a security alliance since 2004 and “strategic partners” since 2006, the United States and Pakistan for decades experienced major shifts in the nature and tone of their relations. In the post9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy efforts. Vital U.S. interests are seen to be at stake in its engagement with Pakistan related to regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. As a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and as the world’s most rapid proliferator of nuclear weapons, Pakistan presents a combination that places it at the top of many governments’ international security agendas. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently yearslong and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of providing significant U.S. foreign assistance to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Although Obama Administration officials and most senior congressional leaders spent most of 2011 consistently recognizing Pakistan as a crucial ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to core U.S. interests deepened over the course of the year. The Pakistani military and intelligence services are seen to be too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant organizations operating from Pakistani territory as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests. U.S.-Pakistan relations are fluid at present, but running a clearly negative course: still based on several national interests shared by both countries, yet marked by levels of mutual distrust and resentment that are likely to catalyze a new set of assumptions for future ties. The tenor of interactions has been increasingly negative in a slide predating a series of crises in 2011. These included a CIA operative shooting dead two Pakistanis in Lahore, bin Laden’s killing, suspension of most bilateral security cooperation, a spike in Haqqani Network attacks in Afghanistan, and an incident in which two dozen Pakistani soldiers were inadvertently killed by NATO aircraft. The latter calamity led Pakistan to shut down NATO’s road access to Afghanistan and demand an apology that has not been forthcoming in intervening months. Access remains closed to date. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $24 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. FY2013 legislation in the 112th Congress would cut U.S. assistance funding significantly from both the levels requested by the Administration and from those Congress approved for FY2012. Provisions also would introduce more rigorous restrictions and certification requirements on such aid. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report R41856, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, and CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, both by (name redacted) and (name re dacted); and CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, by (name redacted) and Mary Beth Nikitin. Congressional Research Service Pakistan-U.S. Relations Contents Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1 Policy Discussion............................................................................................................................. 3 Pre-2012 Setting ........................................................................................................................ 3 Debate Over Future Policy Options........................................................................................... 5 Notable Developments in 2011 ........................................................................................................ 7 High-Profile Political Assassinations ........................................................................................ 7 The Raymond Davis Affair........................................................................................................ 7 Death of Osama bin Laden ........................................................................................................ 8 Attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station ............................................................................ 10 Torture and Killing of Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad ......................................................... 11 Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance ....................................................................... 11 “Memogate” and Domestic Civil-Military Tensions ............................................................... 12 Salala Border Incident ............................................................................................................. 13 Notable Developments in 2012...................................................................................................... 14 U.S. Congressional Hearing and Legislation on Baluchistan .................................................. 14 Pakistan’s Parliamentary Review of the Bilateral Relationship .............................................. 14 NATO Summit in Chicago ...................................................................................................... 16 Conviction and Sentencing of Doctor Shakil Afridi ................................................................ 16 Administration Assessments and Bilateral Diplomacy .................................................................. 17 March 2011 Assessment and FY2011 Certification ................................................................ 17 September 2011 Assessment.................................................................................................... 18 April 2012 Pentagon Report to Congress ................................................................................ 19 Recent Bilateral Diplomacy..................................................................................................... 19 Controversy and Furor Over UAV Strikes ..................................................................................... 21 The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation............. 23 Acute Questions About the ISI’s Role ..................................................................................... 23 Continuing Intelligence Cooperation....................................................................................... 25 Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency .............................................................................................. 26 Ongoing Turmoil in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations .............................................................. 27 Afghan Reconciliation and Pakistan’s Role ............................................................................ 28 Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations ..................................................................... 29 A Haqqani Role in Afghan Reconciliation or FTO Designation? ........................................... 31 Pakistan and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan....................................... 32 U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication ........................................................................ 33 Indigenous Islamist Militancy and Pakistani Military Operations................................................. 34 Indigenous Militancy ............................................................................................................... 34 Text Box: Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan ................................................................ 36 Domestic Military Operations ................................................................................................. 37 FATA Militancy Dynamics and Possible Negotiations ............................................................ 38 New Counterterrorism Pressure on Islamabad ........................................................................ 39 Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals ........................................................................................ 39 Progress in Pakistan-India Relations ............................................................................................. 41 Background and Resumption of the Composite Dialogue ...................................................... 41 Congressional Research Service Pakistan-U.S. Relations Positive Recent Developments ................................................................................................ 42 Pakistan-China Relations ............................................................................................................... 43 Pakistan-Iran Relations and U.S. Sanctions................................................................................... 45 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security ................................................................................. 45 Deteriorated Economic Circumstances .......................................................................................... 46 Overview and IMF Bailout ...................................................................................................... 46 Current Status and IFI Assessments ........................................................................................ 49 Domestic Political Setting and Instability...................................................................................... 50 Overview ................................................................................................................................. 50 Recent Political Developments................................................................................................ 52 Prime Minister’s Conviction for Contempt of Court ........................................................ 52 The Rise of Imran Khan .................................................................................................... 52 An Islamist Rightwing Resurgence ................................................................................... 53 Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................................... 53 U.S. Foreign Assistance and Coalition Support Reimbursements ................................................. 54 Figures Figure 1. Map of Pakistan ................................................................................................................ 9 Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas .................................................................... 18 Figure 3. Indian and Pakistani Gross National Product at PPP, 1980-2011 ................................... 47 Figure 4. Indian and Pakistani Gross National Product per Capita, 1980-2011 ............................ 47 Figure 5. Current Representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly by Party ................................ 51 Tables Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2013 ......................................................................................................................... 56 Appendixes Appendix. Notable Related Provisions in FY2013 Legislation ..................................................... 58 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 60 Congressional Research Service Pakistan-U.S. Relations Overview A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Pakistan is at the locus of several top-tier policy areas of urgent concern, including regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. Today Pakistan is identified as a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and is the world’s most rapid proliferator of nuclear weapons, a combination that places it at the top of the international security agenda. Pakistan has been praised by U.S. leaders for its post-2001 cooperation with U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests deepened dramatically in 2011 and may be altering the nature of the relationship in 2012. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgents and anti-India militants operating from its territory. Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions and precarious political setting combine with perilous security circumstances and a history of difficult relations with neighbors to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. The Pakistani people have paid a heavy price as Islamist radicalism has spread in the country and as its border region near Afghanistan has become a haven for local insurgents, as well as Arab and Uzbek jihadists. Islamabad claims that the “war on extremism” has cost the country more than 37,000 civilian lives, nearly 6,300 security forces, and $78 billion in financial losses.1 The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center reports there was an average of more than 26 terrorist attacks each week in Pakistan in 2011; only Afghanistan and Iraq suffered a higher number of incidents.2 Pakistani officials regularly seek to remind the American audience of the country’s sacrifices.3 May 2011 revelations that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden (OBL) had found apparently years-long refuge inside Pakistan marked a new era of intensive U.S. government scrutiny of a now tense and even adversarial relationship. In September that year, the then-top U.S. military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, issued unprecedentedly strong and public accusations that Pakistan was providing support to Afghan insurgents who attack U.S. interests. Given Mullen’s strenuous efforts to develop a close working relationship with his Pakistan counterpart, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the pronouncement was taken as a supreme expression of U.S. frustration. To bookend 2011’s bilateral turbulence of historic scale, in late November NATO troops in Afghanistan came under fire from two Pakistani army outposts just across the shared border at Salala. Retaliatory airstrikes left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. A Pentagon investigation determined poor coordination and miscommunication were to blame, and that NATO troops had responded appropriately. Pakistan’s government and people alike have expressed fury at what some suspect was an intentional strike. Following the incident, Pakistani officials moved to scrap and renegotiate all existing bilateral agreements with the United States related to supply lines into 1 Sherry Rehman, “Pakistan and the U.S.: A New Beginning?” (op-ed), Chicago Tribune, May 20, 2012. See the National Counterterrorism Center database at http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html. 3 Some analysts view Pakistan’s “narrative of victimhood” as being at least partly disingenuous, given the distinctions its government seems to make between terrorists who attack Pakistan and all others (see, for example, Sadanand Dhume, “Pakistan: Victim of Terrorism?” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2011). 2 Congressional Research Service 1 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Afghanistan and any covert American activities inside (or over) Pakistani territory, primarily those generated early in the 2000s by the governments of President George W. Bush and President-General Pervez Musharraf. Islamabad has continuously demanded a full apology from Washington as requisite for restored cooperation. Yet of the several ways Islamabad’s anger was expressed, the most contentious has been its closure of the Pakistani ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that allow NATO supplies to transit into Afghanistan. Despite much anticipation of an imminent deal to reopen them, the GLOCs remain closed to date and the issue was blamed for overshadowing a May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago. Media reports have the Pakistani negotiators seeking as much as $5,000 per truck, or what would be a 20-30-fold increase over last year—and senior U.S. officials refusing to entertain such a fee hike while railing at perceived “extortion” and “price gouging.”4 Only days after the failure to strike a deal on the GLOCs in Chicago, a Pakistani doctor who reportedly had participated in a CIA operation to identify bin Laden family DNA received a 33year prison sentence for treason, perplexing an American audience and angering many, including senior Members of Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee responded within hours by attaching a unanimously approved provision to dock $1 million from U.S. aid funding in the FY2013 State and Foreign Operations appropriation for each year of the sentence unless the doctor is freed. The Administration has stated that it saw no reason for the conviction. In many practical respects, the cooperative aspects of bilateral relations have remained frozen in 2012, even before this most mutual exasperation in May. The two governments—and, at a lower level, the diplomatic and security agencies within them—seem at loggerheads after a grueling series of crises. Anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remain rife among ordinary Pakistanis; opinion surveys find that the United States has of late replaced India as the nation least favored by Pakistanis (a significant development, given the visceral, decades-old Pakistan-India rivalry). Meanwhile, Americans tend to have increasingly poor views of Pakistan.5 The State Department warns Americans on the high risks of travel in Pakistan, and its own diplomats face travel restrictions there. American civilians have been abducted in Pakistan over the past decade. One, Daniel Pearl, was executed.6 Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern. Its arguably growing influence hinders progress toward key U.S. goals, including the defeat of Al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. terrorist groups, Afghan stabilization, and resolution of the historic Pakistan-India 4 “Levin and McCain: Don’t Pay Pakistan Exorbitant Trucking Fees,” Foreign Policy Cable (online), May 22, 2012. A May 2011 survey found only 2% of the American sample identifying Pakistan as a U.S. “ally.” Another 11% called Pakistan “friendly,” while 38% called it “unfriendly” and fully 23% identified Pakistan as “an enemy of the United States.” A February 2012 Gallup survey similarly found only 15% of Americans holding a favorable attitude toward Pakistan (as compared with 75% for India), down three points from the same period in 2011 (see http://today.yougov.com/news/2011/05/23/2-call-pakistan-ally-us; Gallup results at http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 152735/americans-give-record-high-ratings-several-allies.aspx. 6 See the February 2012 Travel Warning at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5661.html. The August 2011 kidnaping of Warren Weinstein, a 70-year-old American development expert, from his Lahore home alarmed observers, especially because Weinstein had lived in Pakistan for seven years and appeared to have been an active friend of Pakistani economic growth. Five months later, Weinstein was reported to be in the custody of Al Qaeda-allied Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants in North Waziristan and has since appeared in a video in which he pleads for his life and conveys his captors’ demands that the U.S. government free convicted terrorists imprisoned in the United States. The White House has condemned the kidnaping but rules out any negotiations with Al Qaeda (“Warren Weinstein, Maryland Man Kidnapped in Pakistan, Pleads for His Life in Video,” Washington Post, May 7, 2012). 5 Congressional Research Service 2 Pakistan-U.S. Relations rivalry that threatens the entire region’s stability and that has a nuclear dimension. Long-standing worries that American citizens have been recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by Pakistan-based elements have become more acute. Several most-wanted enemies of the United States are widely believed to reside in Pakistan, among them Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, Taliban chief Mullah Omar, and Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani. Some American intelligence officials reportedly suspect that Zawahiri may be receiving protection from elements of the Pakistani government.7 Over the past year, increasing numbers in Congress have more forcefully questioned the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and the wisdom of large-scale U.S. aid. Some openly call for the curtailment of all U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan, and legislation significantly undercutting the Administration’s FY2013 aid request, as well as placing new conditionality on both aid and military reimbursements, is moving through Congress in May 2012 (see Appendix). Congress appropriated about $2 billion in direct aid for Pakistan in FY2012, placing it among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance (see Table 1). Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States has told U.S. lawmakers that “onerous” restrictions being placed on U.S. aid will be counterproductive to the goal of restoring cooperation and trust.8 It seems clear that the closure of Pakistani GLOCs to Afghanistan has not been the logistical catastrophe that many pundits in both the United States and Pakistan had expected. In this respect, by keeping the routes closed, Islamabad has “played its trump card” in relations with Washington and not realized the hoped-for gains. Pakistan now risks finding itself increasingly isolated diplomatically, and working positively with the United States and NATO may be the only way to change this course. By bowing to domestic political pressures, the civilian government’s negotiating strategy could see the country lose billions of dollars in foreign assistance, as well as its ability to influence post-war Afghanistan.9 Policy Discussion Pre-2012 Setting In his June 2011 announcement of a U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, President Obama said the United States “will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region” and “will insist that it keep its commitments” to neutralize terrorist safe havens in its territory. In August, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta openly acknowledged the complicating factors of Pakistan’s ties to anti-Afghan and anti-India terrorist groups, but still insisted that the United States “has no choice but to maintain a relationship with Pakistan.”10 Until the potential bilateral breakdown in 2012, many, if not most, independent observers concurred that continued engagement with Pakistan is the only realistic 7 “America’s Next Most Wanted,” Newsweek, May 7, 2012. “Sherry Says Strict Congressional Curbs Won’t Help US-Pak Ties,” Nation (Lahore), May 20, 2012. 9 Najam Sethi, “Terms of Reengagement” (editorial), Friday Times (Lahore), May 18, 2012; “Pakistanis Fear Being Left Too Isolated,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2012. 10 White House transcript at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forwardafghanistan; “We Must Keep Pakistan Ties: Panetta,” Agence France Presse, August 16, 2011. 8 Congressional Research Service 3 Pakistan-U.S. Relations option for the United States, although some high-visibility analysts counsel taking an increasingly confrontational posture toward Islamabad. As part of the Administration’s strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan, its Pakistan policy has included a tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as the conditioning of U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating militancy and in further fostering democratic institutions. However, in July 2011, the Administration suspended up to $800 million in planned security assistance to Pakistan and appears to be more rigorously evaluating Pakistan’s cooperation and progress before releasing further aid. At least $1 billion in approved “coalition support fund” (CSF) reimbursements to Pakistan also remains undisbursed due to bilateral disagreements and acrimony. Developments in 2011 have seemed to validate a preexisting view of many observers that Pakistani behavior is unlikely to change given the long-held geostrategic perspectives of decision makers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, home of the Pakistan Army’s GHQ. If true, this means Pakistan will continue to tolerate safe havens for “friendly” militant groups regardless of U.S. aid levels or overt threats.11 By many accounts, Pakistan’s apparently schizophrenic foreign policy behavior is a direct outcome of the Pakistan military’s perceived strategic interests. This leads analysts to encourage full-throated U.S. support for Pakistan’s civilian authorities as the only viable means of reducing conflict both inside Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbors. The current U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, is among those who has insisted that Pakistan requires a strong civilian government and that common U.S.-Pakistan successes can be achieved only “with a strong partner in Pakistan’s democratically elected government.”12 Still, now four years after their seating, there are few signs that Pakistan’s civilian leaders are willing and able to seriously address the outcomes of their country’s security policies and move them in the direction of moderation. Even in domestic discussions these leaders continue to shirk responsibility for increased rates of extremism there, and to place the bulk of blame on the United States. This perspective—apparently widespread among the Pakistani public, as well—arguably omits enthusiastic official Pakistani participation in supporting Islamist militancy in the region (including the provision of vital support to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime throughout most of the 1990s). By nearly all accounts, this support continues, albeit selectively, to date. President Obama has not visited Pakistan while in office, and his decision to travel to India in 2010 without any stops in Pakistan exacerbated anxiety among Pakistani officials who see signs of a “pro-India” tilt in Washington as destabilizing for the region. By refraining from engagement in the Kashmir dispute, moving forward with U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation without any similar offer to Pakistan, and seeming to sympathize with New Delhi’s perspective on the root sources of regional terrorism, the Administration’s India policies are viewed suspiciously and even as threatening by Pakistani leaders and citizens, alike. Moreover, Afghanistan’s October 2011 choice to establish closer and more overt ties with India, Pakistan’s primary rival, and the ensuing May 2012 U.S.-Afghanistan tie-up, is grist for those figures—most especially within Pakistan’s security institutions—who argue that Pakistan increasingly is under threat of strategic encirclement by external forces that seek to weaken and perhaps dismember the country. 11 Timothy Hoyt, “Pakistan, an Ally by Any Other Name,” Proceedings, July 2011; “Pakistan Unlikely to Help the US in War,” Associated Press, September 23, 2011. 12 “Sen. John Kerry Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Cameron Munter to be Ambassador to Pakistan,” CQ Transcriptions, September 23, 2010. Congressional Research Service 4 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Debate Over Future Policy Options The tumultuous events of 2011, peaking as they did with the Salala incident and resulting Pakistani fury, may combine to mark the end of the “post-9/11 period” of bilateral relations. For 2012 and beyond, many analysts foresee a far more narrow, issue-based engagement—often referred to as “transactional ties”—and a setting aside of the kind of broad strategic partnership envisioned by the late Amb. Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s original Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the January 2012 words of Pakistan’s top military spokesman, “From here on in we want a very formal, business-like relationship. The lines will be drawn. There will be no more of the free run of the past, no more interpretation of rules. We want it very formal with agreed-upon limits.”13 Movement of FY2013 congressional legislation suggests such limits will include new restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. Many analysts appear to foresee a “transactional” relationship as the best realistic alternative to a potential slide into noncooperation on both sides. A more focused, issues-based engagement might better address and serve the interests of both governments, in part by bringing greater transparency and credibility to the alliance. Ambassador Sherry Rehman, Pakistan’s latest envoy to the United States, was appointed in late November 2011.14 In an opinion piece published just before the Chicago summit opened, Amb. Rehman set forth Islamabad’s prerequisites for “resetting” the bilateral relationship to include (1) apologizing for the Salala incident; (2) releasing suspended CSF reimbursements; (3) increasing counterterrorism intelligence sharing; (4) halting drone strikes; and (5) shifting to a policy of “trade not aid” by enhancing Pakistan’s access to U.S. markets.15 Two former U.S. diplomats—agreeing that the outlook is poor for any “strategic bond” as sought over the past decade—counsel the forging of a more normal, but constructive relationship by reducing mutual expectations; reducing, but better targeting, U.S. economic aid programs; fostering more substantive business ties between the two countries; and offering more energetic, if discreet, U.S. support for initiatives that could promote regional stability, including those between Pakistan and India, and perhaps even to include dropping U.S. opposition to the IranPakistan gas pipeline project.16 Another South Asia expert and former advisor to Amb. Holbrooke finds reason for optimism in the more humble domestic status of the Pakistani military (and the corresponding benefits this entails for democratization), and improvements in Pakistan-India relations. He urges the Obama Administration to take account of these factors and not overemphasize a purely security-oriented 13 Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas quoted in “Pakistan, US Assume Less Cooperation in Future,” Associated Press, January 2, 2012. 14 Rehman was appointed in late November 2011 after the essentially forced resignation of Husain Haqqani. Rehman, a prominent former journalist and human rights advocate, was close to Benazir Bhutto and is among the government’s few vocal proponents of moderation. As a parliamentarian, she authored key legislation such as the Women’s Empowerment Bill, the Anti-Honor Killings Bill, the Domestic Violence Prevention Bill, and the Hudood Repeal Bill. She was also at the forefront of (thus far failed) efforts to reform the country’s controversial blasphemy laws. 15 Sherry Rehman, “Pakistan and the U.S.: A New Beginning?” (op-ed), Chicago Tribune, May 20, 2012. 16 Teresita and Howard Schaffer, “Resetting the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,” Foreign Policy (online), March 19, 2012. Congressional Research Service 5 Pakistan-U.S. Relations approach that could risk derailing such positive trends by eliciting even stronger anti-American nationalism among the Pakistani people and thus restoring credibility to the military.17 In the view of many U.S. analysts, Pakistan’s May 2012 intransigence on the issues of GLOCs and insistence on an apology for Salala may prove costly and represent a missed opportunity to work cooperatively with the United States in the region. One commentator who argues this urges the U.S. government to stay firm in pressuring Islamabad on counterterrorism, especially with Pakistan’s leverage reduced. Another sees Pakistan’s unrelenting stance being “a catastrophic mistake” and “a triumph of short-term thinking over long-term, of scheming over strategy.”18 Even before the post-Salala breakdown of relations, some high-profile analysts were calling for a new U.S. policy to shift to a more adversarial posture toward Pakistan on the assumption that President Obama’s (and President George W. Bush’s) engagement policies have failed. One senior commentator suggests “focused hostility” toward Pakistan that would hold its military and intelligence services accountable while not harming the Pakistani people more generally. This could entail targeting individuals for sanction, as well as sharply cutting military aid. Another goes further, contending that Pakistan should be considered an enemy of the United States, at least as far as Afghanistan policy is concerned, the logic being that open admission of core disagreement on this issue would benefit both countries. A third argues that only credible threats to end all assistance to Islamabad and “retaliate” if Pakistan fails to comply with U.S. demands will convince Pakistani leaders that genuine cooperation is in their best interests.19 Another former Holbrooke advisor is among those who reject any such U.S. shift to a more adversarial approach as counterproductive and likely to put the entire U.S.-led project in Afghanistan at risk of failure. A Washington-based Pakistani analyst likewise views a “two Pakistans” approach as unworkable and misguided, contending that U.S. policies aimed at exploiting an internal Pakistani disconnect would likely strengthen that country’s conservative Islamist elements and further fuel anti-American sentiments. Instead, this observer asserts that a more “passive” U.S. approach rooted in the provision to Islamabad of security assurances and targeted efforts to bolster Pakistan’s civilian governance institutions would be most prudent.20 It remains to be seen whether the Pakistani military’s willingness to abide the current, largely economic rapprochement with India is a tactical choice to ease security and international diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, or if it represents a more strategic shift in Rawalpindi’s perspective. Even if Pakistan is well positioned to enjoy the tactical “victory” that (it believes) would come through realization of a pliable, heavily Pashtun-influenced post-NATO government in Kabul, the country’s geostrategic status could well suffer from the international isolation that might ensue. Many commentators offer that a rapidly changing South and Central Asian calculus should propel the Pakistani state to favor energy and trade cooperation with its neighbors over its traditional focus on conflict with India, “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and the status of Kashmir. In this way, Pakistan might transcend the perpetual insecurity that has marked most of 17 Vali Nasr, “Pakistan Spring Emerging From Winter of Discontent” (op-ed), Bloomberg News, April 15, 2012. Lisa Curtis, “Pakistan Missed Opportunity to Repair Ties With U.S.,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief #3613, May 22, 2012; David Ignatius, “Pakistan’s Blown Chance” (op-ed), Washington Post, May 17, 2012. 19 Bruce Riedel, “A New Pakistan Policy: Containment” (op-ed), New York Times, October 15, 2011; Anatol Lieven, “With A Friend Like This” (op-ed), New York Times, November 1, 2011; Stephen Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs (online), November 29, 2011. 20 Alexander Evans, “Tough Talk is Cheap,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012; Moeed Yusuf, “Fixing Pakistan’s CivilMilitary Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation,” U.S. Institute of Peace Peace Brief 125, May 3, 2012. 18 Congressional Research Service 6 Pakistan-U.S. Relations its existence.21 The worldview of Pakistan’s security services and, to some extent, domestic public are hindrances to a more robust pursuit of such policies by the country’s civilian leaders. Notable Developments in 2011 High-Profile Political Assassinations On January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, was assassinated by a member of his own security team. A senior figure in the national coalition-leading Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Taseer was among the country’s most liberal politicians, and he had incurred the wrath of Islamists and other conservatives with vocal criticisms of the country’s controversial blasphemy laws. His killer, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, was since lauded as a hero by significant sections of Pakistani society, and even leaders of the country’s majority Barelvi Muslim sect, usually considered to hold moderate interpretations of Islam, were vocal supporters of the assassin. Taseer’s assassination, strongly condemned by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was a major blow to liberal forces in Pakistan. Meanwhile, on March 2, 2011, gunmen ambushed the car of Minorities Minister Shabaz Bhatti— the federal cabinet’s only Christian member—and shot him to death. Bhatti had long campaigned for tolerance toward Pakistan’s religious minorities and had, like Governor Taseer, openly called for reform of the blasphemy laws. Secretary Clinton expressed being “shocked and outraged” by Bhatti’s killing, calling it “an attack on the values of tolerance and respect for people of all faiths and backgrounds championed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father.”22 Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani was the only senior government official to attend Bhatti’s funeral. President Zardari addressed the two assassinations with an English-language op-ed in which he contended that, “A small but increasingly belligerent minority is intent on undoing the very principles of tolerance upon which [Pakistan] was founded.”23 Despite such claims, the Taseer and Bhatti assassinations and subsequent events were widely seen as evidence that Islamist radicalism is increasing in Pakistan.24 The Raymond Davis Affair On January 27, 2011, Raymond Davis, an American working at the U.S. Consulate in Lahore, shot and killed two men who approached his vehicle in urban traffic. Davis contends he acted in self-defense when the men tried to rob him at gunpoint. However, Pakistani authorities accused Davis of murder and a court barred the government from releasing him despite insistence from top U.S. officials that diplomatic immunity shielded him from prosecution. President Obama 21 A representative example of this argument is Sunil Datta, “Pakistan Stands Isolated in South Asia” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), April 21, 2012. 22 See the U.S. Embassy’s March 2, 2011, release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-11030205.html. 23 Asif Ali Zardari, “In Pakistan, Standing Up to Extremists” (op-ed), Washington Post, March 6, 2011. 24 In a sign that the Pakistani public largely supports “Islamization” more generally, a May 2011 poll found fully twothirds of respondents answering “yes” to the question, “Should the government take steps to ‘Islamize’ society?” Nearly 30% thought the government should take steps toward Islamization “all at once” (see http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2011-05-31). Congressional Research Service 7 Pakistan-U.S. Relations described Davis as being “our diplomat.”25 Only more than three weeks after the incident did the U.S. government admit that Davis was in fact a CIA contractor and member of a covert team that was tracking militant groups inside Pakistan. The controversy around Davis’s legal status led some in Congress to openly suggest that U.S. assistance to Pakistan might be reduced or curtailed if the case was not resolved in a satisfactory manner.26 In mid-February, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Kerry traveled to Islamabad in an effort to reduce escalating tensions, taking the opportunity to express the “deepest sorrow” felt by top U.S. leaders at the loss of life.27 In late February, the CIA opened direct negotiations with the ISI in an effort to secure Davis’s release. On March 16, 2011, after weeks of closed-door negotiations, political pressure by Pakistani officials on the courts, and, finally, a pledge of $2.3 million in diyat, or “blood money,” for the victims’ families, Davis was freed and flown out of the country.28 Top U.S. officials denied there had been any quid pro quo arrangement related to Davis’s release or that the United States had provided the financial compensation. Death of Osama bin Laden29 On May 2, 2011, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden was located and killed in the mid-sized Pakistani city of Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in a compound one-half mile from the country’s premier military academy and just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad (see Figure 1). The location and circumstances of OBL’s death exacerbated Washington’s long-held doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to the ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism, and brought calls to curtail U.S. assistance to Pakistan. The news of OBL’s whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and potential complicity in his refuge. President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, told reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system” in Pakistan.30 For a wide array of observers, the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL left only two realistic conclusions: either Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive, or the country’s military and intelligence services were grossly incompetent in their search for top Al Qaeda leaders. In either case, after many years of claims by senior Pakistani officials—both civilian and military—that most-wanted extremist figures were finding no refuge in their country, Pakistan’s credibility suffered a serious blow.31 25 “Press Conference by the President,” White House transcript, February 15, 2011. H.Res. 145 called for a “freeze” on all monetary assistance to Pakistan until such time Davis was released (the resolution did not emerge from committee). 27 See the U.S. Embassy’s February 16, 2011, release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-110216004.html. 28 Diyat is a tenet of Islamic law sanctioned by Pakistani jurisprudence and reportedly used in at least half of homicide cases there (“‘Blood Money’ Tradition Might Help Resolve U.S.-Pakistani Row,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2011). 29 For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41809, Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations, coordinated by John Rollins. 30 Quoted in “Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011. 31 A listing of some of the oftentimes categorical, high-profile Pakistani denials about OBL specifically are in “Osama bin Who?,” Foreign Policy (online), May 2, 2011. 26 Congressional Research Service 8 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Figure 1. Map of Pakistan Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services came under rare domestic criticism for being unable to detect and intercept a foreign military raid deep inside Pakistani territory, and for ostensible incompetence in detecting the presence there of the world’s most-wanted terrorist. Army Chief Gen. Kayani warned that Pakistan would not tolerate any future incursions. Parliament subsequently issued a strong condemnation of the U.S. raid and again called for a halt to U.S.launched drone strikes in western Pakistan. It also threatened to close land lines of communication through Pakistan that were considered vital to supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, public demonstrations took a bellicose, anti-American cast.32 32 A May 2011 Gallup survey found that more than eight in ten Pakistanis who were aware of the U.S. operation (continued...) Congressional Research Service 9 Pakistan-U.S. Relations The developments fueled bilateral distrust and acrimony unseen in the post-2001 period. Congress pointedly questioned the wisdom of continued engagement with a national government that may at some levels have had knowledge of OBL’s whereabouts; figures from both major parties expressed disbelief at Pakistan’s allegations of ignorance and called for greater oversight and accountability for future U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Still, senior Members tended to take a more measured view, with the House Speaker voicing the opinion that circumstances called for “more engagement [with Pakistan], not less.”33 Such sentiments tracked well with the view of many independent observers that—despite ample reasons for discouragement and distrust—the United States has had no choice but to continue to engage Pakistan in “a bad marriage.” President Obama and other top U.S. officials maintained a generally positive posture toward Pakistan in the weeks following the Abbottabad raid, while also noting that serious questions had arisen over the circumstances of OBL’s refuge. The U.S. government reportedly has no conclusive evidence indicating that official Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s whereabouts. Privately, senior Administration officials reportedly became divided over the future of the bilateral relationship, with some at an apparent loss for patience and advocating strong reprisals for perceived Pakistani intransigence. Attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station On May 22, 2011, a team of heavily armed militants penetrated security barriers and stormed Pakistan’s premier naval base, the Mehran Naval Station near Karachi. Ten security personnel and four militants were killed in the ensuing 16-hour-long gun battle; two other militants are believed to have escaped before Pakistani commandos regained control of the base. The militants were able to destroy two U.S.-supplied P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in their hangar. The attack, which the Pakistani Taliban claimed was revenge for the killing of bin Laden, was the second major embarrassment of the month for the beleaguered Pakistani military, which seemed at a loss to explain how such a damaging breach could occur. The ability of a handful of attackers to wreak such havoc left the security services open to scathing criticism from the generally promilitary Pakistani media, and also brought into question the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials.34 Suspicions quickly arose that the base’s attackers had inside help, given especially their ability to carefully avoid detection and take effective cover once inside. Within days a former navy commando was arrested in connection with the case. Three navy officers, the base commander among them, are to be court-martialed on charges of negligence in connection with the attack, an unusual disciplinary action for the Pakistani military demonstrating the seriousness of the breach.35 (...continued) disapproved of it; only 13% approved. A majority opined that OBL should have been captured alive. The unaffiliated Gallup Pakistan found 51% of Pakistanis saying they were “sad” about OBL’s death (Gallup data at http://www.gallup.com/poll/147611/pakistanis-criticize-action-killed-osama-bin-laden.aspx; Gallup Pakistan data at http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/16-05-11.pdf). 33 Quoted in “Boehner: US Should Not Back Away From Pakistan,” Associated Press, May 3, 2011. 34 “Pakistan Military Faces New Questions After Raid,” New York Times, May 24, 2011; “Pakistan Media Ridicules Military After Attack,” Reuters, May 24, 2011. The growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and infrastructure only increases the potential threat posed by determined militants (see Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” CTC Sentinel, June 2011). 35 “Three Pakistani Naval Officers to Be Court Martialed Over Base Attack,” New York Times, August 4, 2011. Congressional Research Service 10 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Torture and Killing of Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, is accused of ordering the torture and murder of investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, who disappeared in May 2011 just after penning an article suggesting that the Mehran attack was carried out because the Pakistan Navy was trying to crack down on Al Qaeda cells that had infiltrated the service. Shahzad, whose writing had riled the Pakistani establishment repeatedly in the past, reportedly had received numerous threats from the ISI. In a rare public statement, the ISI denied playing any role in Shahzad’s fate. A closed government inquiry into the death began in June; unnamed U.S. officials later said there was sufficient classified intelligence to conclude that senior ISI officials had directed the brutal attack on Shahzad in an effort to silence critics. Soon after, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen went on record with the claim that Shahzad’s killing “was sanctioned by the [Pakistani] government.”36 In January 2012, an official Commission of Inquiry reported to the Pakistani government that it was unable to identify the culprits behind Shahzad’s murder while also recommending that the country’s intelligence agencies “be made more law-abiding through a statutory framework carefully outlining their respective mandates and roles” and that they be made “more accountable through effective and suitably tailored mechanisms of internal administrative review, Parliamentary oversight, and judicial redressal of citizens’ grievances against them.”37 Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance In July 2011, the Obama Administration made some significant changes in its security-related aid policy toward Pakistan. According to congressional and State Department sources, $440-$500 million worth of scheduled counterinsurgency (COIN) training and equipment for Pakistan was put under suspension due to the recently reduced U.S. military trainer presence there, along with obstacles to fulfilling other agreements between the two countries. In addition, Islamabad’s delays in processing U.S. visa requests led to the suspension of $300 million in planned FY2011 Coalition Support Fund reimbursements. Although the Administration presented the move as being necessitated by technical factors, observers saw it as a message and warning to Islamabad that key assistance spigots could close in the absence of improved cooperation. A Pakistani military spokesman dismissed the development as having no effect on his organization’s ability to conduct future combat operations, and he repeated the Army Chief’s suggestion that more U.S. security assistance be reprogrammed toward development projects in Pakistan.38 In the view of some observers, the Administration’s decision was more likely to elicit greater resentment than greater cooperation from Pakistani leaders, and could be taken as validation by ordinary Pakistanis who see the United States as a fickle and unreliable ally.39 36 “U.S. Admiral Ties Pakistan to Killing of Journalist,” New York Times, July 8, 2011. “Report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Gruesome Incident of the Abduction and Murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad,” January 10, 2012, at http://app.com.pk/en_/images/pdf/report.pdf. A Human Rights Watch response accused the Commission of failing to interview key military intelligence officials in the course of its investigation, and of appearing “fearful of confronting the ISI” over the issue. The Pakistan military in turn reiterated a firm denial of ISI involvement and accused HRW of “choking under heaps of bias (Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Shahzad Commission Results Marred By Free Ride for ISI,” January 30, 2012; ISPR release, February 16, 2012). 38 “Pakistan Says It Doesn’t Need US Military Aid,” Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2011. 39 “In Pakistan, Many Say Aid ‘Snub’ Dims US Sway,” Associated Press, July 11, 2011. 37 Congressional Research Service 11 Pakistan-U.S. Relations “Memogate” and Domestic Civil-Military Tensions In October 2011, Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz penned a high-visibility op-ed piece that made passing reference to a memorandum allegedly “dictated” to him in May 2011— only days after bin Laden’s death—by then-Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani.40 The unsigned memo was meant for the eyes of J.C.S. Chief Adm. Mullen, and it bluntly requested U.S. assistance in averting an allegedly imminent military coup, as well as U.S. support for Islamabad’s civilian government to install friendly new leaders for the country’s military and intelligence services, leaders who would fully cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Once uncovered, the Pakistani Supreme Court, with the military’s prodding, launched an investigation to reveal the actual author and purpose of the document, and the resulting “Memogate” scandal cost Haqqani his job and brought immense pressure on President Asif Zardari.41 Both Zardari and Haqqani deny any involvement in the memo’s authorship. Ijaz was shown to be a less-than-credible witness and, while it is still incomplete, the investigation largely fizzled out when testimony did not appear to find evidence of wrongdoing by the civilians.42 Amb. Haqqani was subsequently allowed to leave Pakistan. Yet the civilmilitary clash brought substantive concerns that President Zardari might face overthrow by the military. In mid-December, Pakistan’s senior-most army and intelligence officers submitted to the Supreme Court statements that the memo was genuine and represented evidence of a conspiracy against the army. Prime Minister Gilani responded with an open warning that “conspiracies are being hatched to pack up the elected government” and said that the military “cannot be a state within a state” and is “answerable to parliament.”43 Rumors of an impending military coup were so ubiquitous in December that the army publically pledged to continue supporting democracy; Gen. Kayani was quoted as saying all such rumors were “speculation.” Still, during the final week of 2011, the civilian government remained infuriated that both the army and intelligence chiefs had circumvented them in engaging the court. Prime Minister Gilani again called the move unconstitutional and illegal, a claim denied by the equally infuriated military.44 Despite widespread alarm about the status of Pakistan’s democratic government, the Pakistani public appears increasingly averse to another round of direct military rule and, unlike in the past, opposition politicians are not seeking the military’s help. Add to this an assertive judiciary and a vocal watchdog media, and the odds of Pakistan seeing a military coup in the foreseeable future 40 Mansoor Ijaz, “Time to Take On Pakistan’s Jihadist Spies” (op-ed), Financial Times (London), October 10, 2011; “Pakistani Businessman Says ‘Coup’ Memo Was Dictated,” Reuters, November 18, 2011. The document itself is at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/111117_Ijaz%20memo%20Foreign%20Policy.PDF. 41 Amb. Haqqani was for a period prohibited from leaving Pakistan. The alleged “ongoing harassment and mistreatment” he suffered was decried by at least three U.S. Senators, who called on Islamabad authorities to resolve the matter in ways consistent with civilian rule of law (see their January 5, 2012 statement at http://lieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2012/1/statement-of-senators-lieberman-mccain-kirk-onhusain-haqqanis-mistreatment-in-pakistan. 42 “The Fizzling Out of Memogate” (editorial), Express Tribune (Karachi), February 1, 2012. 43 “Pakistan’s Memo Scandal Pits Military Against Zardari Government,” Washington Post, December 16, 2011; Gilani quoted in “Pakistani Premier Warns of Plotting by Military,” New York Times, December 22, 2011. 44 See the ISPR’s January 11, 2012, release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/1/ 11. Congressional Research Service 12 Pakistan-U.S. Relations are considered quite low.45 By January’s end, Parliament passed a resolution reaffirming its own supremacy and calling on the army and Supreme Court to remain within their constitutional limits. Gilani subsequently softened his criticisms of the military and the crisis atmosphere faded. Salala Border Incident In the early, moonless morning hours of November 26, 2011, U.S. ground forces on a mission very near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border reportedly came under heavy machine gun and then mortar fire from hilltop positions just inside Pakistan. According to the Pentagon, U.S. commanders on the ground had no awareness that two small Pakistan army outposts were in the area and thus believed they were being attacked by Afghan insurgents. NATO air assets were called in as a “show of force,” but the incoming fire did not cease, so an AC-130 gunship, two F15 jets, and two AH-64 Apache helicopters were ordered to neutralize the hilltop positions. By this time, Pakistani liaison officers were telling their American counterparts that Pakistani soldiers were coming under fire, but 24 of these soldiers were killed before the air assault ended. Pakistanis both official and otherwise were infuriated; some openly accused NATO forces of intentionally killing Pakistanis. Prime Minister Gilani described the attacks as being “a grave breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty” and “a flagrant violation of international law.”46 Pakistani anger, which has not subsided to date, was reflected in the immediate closure of NATO’s ground logistics routes through Pakistan, the eviction of U.S. personnel from the Shamsi airfield in Baluchistan, and a boycott of a December Bonn conference on Afghanistan. At the time of this writing, the supply routes have been closed for more that five months, despite Islamabad’s stated intention to allow them to reopen (see “U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication” section below).The Pakistani government has rejected U.S. expressions of “deep regret” and “sincere condolences,” and demands a formal and unconditional apology from Washington.47 The Pentagon quickly launched an investigation in which the Pakistani side refused to participate. That investigation was completed in late December, when the U.S. general heading it announced that, “U.S. forces, given what information they had available to them at the time, acted in selfdefense and with appropriate force after being fired upon” and “there was no intentional effort” to target Pakistanis. It was conceded that serious miscommunication and poor coordination were central factors, but no NATO personnel were found to have acted improperly.48 Pakistan’s military called the “affixing of partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan ... unjustified and unacceptable.” A document detailing the Pakistani perspective was released in January 2012. It conceded that Pakistani forces fired first, but legitimately so in the circumstances. It excoriated the NATO investigators for the “inconceivable” claim that no Pakistani posts were known to be in the area and found the “fundamental cause” of the incident was “the failure of US/ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] to share its near-border 45 Shuja Nawaz, “Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 297, December 2011; “Pakistan Crisis Shows Army’s Limits,” Associated Press, January 17, 2012; George Fulton, “Why Pakistan’s Zardari Will Not Fall to a Military Coup,” Foreign Affairs (online), January 22, 2012. 46 See the November 26, 2011, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article.aspx?id=1013&type=1. 47 Expressions of “deepest condolences” came from both Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta. See http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-112611b.html. 48 “DOD News Briefing With Brig. Gen. Clark Via Teleconference From Hubert Field, Fla.,” Pentagon transcript, December 22, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4952. Congressional Research Service 13 Pakistan-U.S. Relations operation with Pakistan at any level.” It also laid out a timeline suggesting that the incident was “deliberate at some level.”49 Press reporting indicates the Obama Administration came very close to issuing an apology for Salala on several occasions over ensuing months. Advocates, especially within the State Department, have believed an apology would facilitate a reopening of the GLOCs and a mending of relations more generally. Opponents argued that the United States could not give any appearance of weakness given a compulsion to pressure Pakistan on counterinsurgency. Pentagon figures are said to believe an apology would amount to an admission of fault. In late February, Secretary Clinton reportedly was set to apologize to Foreign Minister Khar in London, but that plan was aborted after U.S. military personnel inadvertently burned Korans in Afghanistan. Later, with coordinated insurgent attacks across Afghanistan in April blamed on the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network, those in the Administration arguing for an apology apparently fell silent.50 Notable Developments in 2012 U.S. Congressional Hearing and Legislation on Baluchistan U.S.-Pakistan relations were further riled in February 2012 when the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing on Baluchistan, a Pakistani province that is the site of a long-running violent separatist conflict. At least one witness called for the “partition” of Pakistan into substates, Baluchistan among them. Subcommittee Chairman Representative Dana Rohrabacher subsequently offered H.Con.Res. 104 to express the sense of Congress that the people of Baluchistan had a right to self-determination and to their own sovereign country. Although the resolution has only two co-sponsors and has not emerged from committee to date, congressional attention to the issue infuriated the Islamabad government and sparked a storm of criticism from the Pakistani media. Prime Minister Gilani called it an attack on Pakistani sovereignty and Pakistan’s Ambassador in Washington warned it “would seriously impact bilateral relations.” The Obama Administration distanced itself from the resolution by declaring that it has no policy to support Baluchistan’s independence.51 Pakistan’s Parliamentary Review of the Bilateral Relationship The Salala incident spurred the Islamabad government to essentially freeze relations with the United States pending a broad review of the engagement by its Parliament. This review, originally slated to be complete in the opening months of 2012, was not finalized until April. Some observers were encouraged by the review process as representing an unusual foreign policy assertiveness by a Pakistani civilian government typically subservient to the military. More cynical analysts saw the review process as merely a civilian face being put upon what is fundamentally a reflection of army policy making. The unanimously approved, 14-point 49 “Pakistan’s Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark Into 26th November 2011 US Led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency,” January 23, 2012, at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf. 50 “U.S. Agonizes Over Apology to Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2012. 51 “Fury in Pakistan After U.S. Congressman Suggests That a Province Leave,” New York Times, February 22, 2012; Embassy release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-021912.html. Congressional Research Service 14 Pakistan-U.S. Relations “Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with the United States” was issued on April 13, 2012. Among the points/demands most relevant for U.S. policy makers were the following: • “Immediate cessation of [U.S.-launched] drone attacks inside the territory of Pakistan”; • “Cessation of infiltration into Pakistani territory on any pretext, including ‘hot pursuit’”; • “Pakistani territory including its air space shall not be used for transportation of arms and ammunition to Afghanistan”; • “The condemnable and unprovoked NATO/ISAF attack ... represents a breach of international law and constitutes a blatant violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and “the government of Pakistan should seek an unconditional apology from the United States”; • “Those held responsible for the [Salala incident] should be brought to justice”; • “No verbal agreement regarding national security shall be entered into by the government” and “all such agreements or understandings shall cease to have effect forthwith”; • “No overt or covert operations inside Pakistan shall be permitted”; • “No private security contractors and/or intelligence operatives shall be allowed”; and • “Pakistan’s territory will not be provided for the establishment of any foreign bases.”52 The review’s authors surprisingly added a request that the United States offer a civil nuclear deal to Pakistan similar to the one offered to India in 2005. Throughout the review process and following its completion, the Obama Administration has issued repeated and emphatic expressions of respect for Pakistani democracy and sovereignty, even as drone strikes have continued (albeit at a notably reduced rate). U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Marc Grossman was in Islamabad in late April for the 6th Trilateral Core Group Meeting of the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. His visit marked the first focused, high-level talks since the Salala incident and included substantive discussion of the Parliament’s 14 points. Yet hopes that the bilateral relationship would finally be “reset” and in working order were quickly dashed as Grossman departed without any breakthrough. Pakistan’s demands for a cessation of drone strikes remain a major point of contention—most analysts believe the CIA will be unwilling to relinquish an ability to strike so-called “high-value targets” whenever and wherever the opportunity arises. A continuation of “signature strikes” targeting suspected low-level militants based on “pattern of life” surveillance is also in question. These types of strikes are considered more likely to result in civilian deaths. Some reports suggest that Pakistani leaders will refuse to open NATO’s ground supply lines to Afghanistan via the Karachi port until drone strikes are ended, but no government officials have stated this is the case. 52 Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, April 13, 2012. Congressional Research Service 15 Pakistan-U.S. Relations However, the greater sticking point may be Pakistan’s demands for an unconditional apology for the inadvertent deaths of Pakistani soldiers at Salala. At the time of this writing, none of these major issues are resolved and the U.S. government reportedly is withholding at least $1 billion in military reimbursements and counterterrorism funding pending an agreement on bilateral reengagement. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry continues to insist that Islamabad “will abide by the recommendations of the Parliament both in letter and spirit.”53 NATO Summit in Chicago A May 21-22 NATO summit in Chicago—the first ever held in an American city outside of Washington, DC—formally was focused on making decisions about the alliance’s future engagement in Afghanistan. Pakistan had boycotted a December 2011 NATO conference in Germany following the Salala incident and it remained unclear for months whether the Islamabad government would be invited to the Chicago meeting, or even participate if invited. Only days before the opening session, President Zardari received a personal call to attend from the NATO Secretary-General. Yet, when the time came, the numerous heads of government in attendance met under the shadow of U.S.-Pakistan tensions and the unresolved GLOCs issue. During the session, President Obama apparently refused to meet in person with President Zardari, a snub that combined with an absence of any apology for Salala to seriously chasten the Pakistanis. Indeed, one unnamed senior U.S. official was quoted as saying there was an intent to make Zardari “feel uncomfortable.”54 Some observers in Pakistan, opposition political figures among them, declared that President Zardari’s participation in the summit had been an embarrassment. However, Foreign Minister Khar sounded an upbeat note, arguing that Pakistan was a vital participant and had received an unconditional invitation; Urdu-language editorials were nearly uniform in their (unusual) praise of Zardari for appearing to stand up to international pressure and assert Pakistan’s national interests.55 Conviction and Sentencing of Doctor Shakil Afridi On May 23, 2012, a tribal court in northwestern Pakistan convicted Shakil Afridi of treason and sentenced him to 33 years in prison. Afridi, a doctor who had worked with the CIA in an apparently unsuccessful attempt to collect DNA samples from Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound previous to the May 2011 U.S. commando raid, had been charged under the colonialera Frontier Crimes Regulations and was tried outside of the Abbottabad jurisdiction. The sentence was met with widespread outrage in the United States; the Obama Administration contends there is no reason for Afridi to be held, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee called the sentence “shocking and outrageous,” contending that Afridi “should be praised and rewarded for his actions, not punished and slandered.” A statement from the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the irony that “the only person being punished is the person who helped the United States achieve justice for the murder of thousands of Americans,” and concluded that the development will make efforts to 53 Foreign Ministry press release, May 17, 2012. “U.S.-Pakistan Rift Clouds NATO Summit,” Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2012. 55 “NATO Summit: It Was a Very, Very Successful Visit, Says Khar,” and “Zardari’s Chicago Visit Brought Nothing But Disgrace: Imran,” both in Express Tribune (Karachi), May 22, 2012. 54 Congressional Research Service 16 Pakistan-U.S. Relations maintain a strategic relationship more difficult.56 Islamabad insists the process was in accordance with Pakistani law and should be respected. However, even some Pakistani commentators are questioning the conviction, in particular because he was convicted in a court outside the original jurisdiction, without legal representation, and it is unclear if he has a right to appeal.57 Administration Assessments and Bilateral Diplomacy March 2011 Assessment and FY2011 Certification The Administration’s biannual March 2011 assessment of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy determined that most indicators and metrics against key U.S. objectives had remained static during the reporting period (the latter half of 2010), notably excepting “significant progress” in combating Al Qaeda in the region. On counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, it noted improved cooperation both within the Pakistani armed forces and between those forces and NATO, but found that the last quarter of 2010 “saw no progress on effectively executing the COIN cycle in KPk [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province] and the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]” (see Figure 2): “[W]hat remains vexing is the lack of any indication of ‘hold’ and ‘build’ planning or staging efforts to compliment ongoing clearing operations. As such, there remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan” [emphasis added].58 In apparent conflict with such problematic U.S. government reporting on Pakistan’s progress was a March 2011 certification by Secretary Clinton required under Section 203 of the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73). This certification, which allowed the release of security-related FY2011 aid to Pakistan, included the Secretary’s confirmation that Islamabad was demonstrating “a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts toward combating terrorist groups” and had “made progress” on ceasing support to extremist and terrorist groups, as well as on preventing Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating on Pakistani territory, and in “dismantling terrorist bases” in the country. In the wake of revelations about Osama bin Laden, and persistent complaints from U.S. military commanders that Pakistan was taking action against the Haqqani Network in the FATA, the certification met with considerable skepticism and appeared driven primarily by political considerations rather than by ground realities. When pressed to further explain the certification at an October 2011 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, the Secretary offered, “[A]t the time I made the certification, I closely considered the requirements set forth in the statue and I determined that on balance Pakistan met the legal threshold.”59 To date, there has been no similar certification for FY2012. 56 “Statement By Senators McCain and Levin on Sentencing of Pakistani Doctor Who Assisted in Bin Laden Search,” CQ Transcriptions, May 23, 2012; SFRC press release, May 24, 2012. 57 “Dr Afridi’s Conviction: Some Questions” (editorial), Express Tribune (Karachi), May 24, 2012. 58 See “Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2011” at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/afpak-0311.pdf. 59 “Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Holds Hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan Transition,” CQ Transcriptions, October 27, 2011. Congressional Research Service 17 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. September 2011 Assessment The Administration’s September 2011 assessment—covering January-June with preliminary comment on July and August—brought little positive news beyond reporting “significant successes” against Al Qaeda, a key aspect of the first of several objectives related to Pakistan: On enhancing civilian control and stable government in Pakistan, indicators and metrics “remained static” for the entire reporting period. On developing Pakistan’s COIN capabilities, indicators and metrics remained static through the first quarter of 2011, then began to decline, with “continued negative trends” into the summer. This was attributed in large degree to the “Pakistan-directed” decrease in bilateral security cooperation. On involving the international community in efforts to Congressional Research Service 18 Pakistan-U.S. Relations assist in stabilizing Pakistan, the indicators and metrics were reported to have remained static, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-By Arrangement remaining on hold since August 2010 and only limited progress in funding the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the U.N. Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan.60 April 2012 Pentagon Report to Congress The Pentagon’s most recent biannual report to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan (for the six-month period ending March 31, 2012) noted some positive trends, but flatly stated that, “The Taliban insurgency and its al Qaeda affiliates still operate with impunity from sanctuaries in Pakistan” which “remain the most critical threat” to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. The report contended that the security situation in eastern Afghanistan “remains volatile” and that the city of Kabul continues to face persistent security threats, many of which are “planned in and controlled from Pakistan”: Pakistan’s selective counterinsurgency operations, passive acceptance—and in some cases, provision—of insurgent safe havens, and unwillingness to interdict material such as [improvised explosive device] components, continue to undermine security in Afghanistan and threaten ISAF’s campaign. Pentagon leaders, and U.S. government leaders in general, believe that Pakistan’s desire to see an Afghan government “with primacy for the Pashtuns, and limited Indian influence,” motivates its leadership to allow insurgent sanctuaries to persist on its soil.61 Recent Bilateral Diplomacy In addition to the several destabilizing developments of 2011 discussed above, U.S.-Pakistan relations have been negatively affected by two other notable issues. One area of contention has been freedom of travel for U.S. diplomats in Pakistan. Incidents in which such diplomats have been prevented from moving between cities reportedly have amounted to “official harassment” from a U.S. perspective, but Pakistani officials insist that requiring “No Objection Certificates” for Americans leaving Islamabad is neither new nor U.S.-specific.62 Another irritant was the July 2011 revelation that two U.S. citizens of Pakistani origin had for many years been working illicitly on behalf of the ISI in an effort to influence U.S. Kashmir policy.63 60 White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, September 2011. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf. 62 “American Diplomats in Pakistan Under Pressure,” BBC News, September 8, 2011. 63 The men came under federal indictment for failure to register as foreign agents. One of the accused remains at large in Pakistan, but the other, Virginia resident Ghulam Nabi Fai, was arrested for lobbying U.S. lawmakers and funneling campaign contributions to some in Congress over a 10-year period with at least $4 million in funds provided by the ISI. Fai, longtime director of the Kashmiri American Council—a Washington-based nonprofit group ostensibly dedicated to the cause of Kashmir self-determination—admitted to receiving funds from the ISI but insisted his group maintained independence from its viewpoint. The timing of his arrest, coming on the heels of Pakistan’s arrest of a doctor charged with aiding the CIA operation against Osama bin Laden, led some to conclude that Washington was sending a message to Islamabad. Fai subsequently pled guilty to conspiracy charges and was sentenced to two years in federal prison. 61 Congressional Research Service 19 Pakistan-U.S. Relations President Obama has not traveled to Pakistan since taking office, and the bilateral Strategic Dialogue has not had a formal session since October 2010. However, high-level interactions, especially among military and intelligence officials, have continued to be frequent, albeit with a notable late 2011/early 2012 lapse. In October 2011, the Obama Administration made a major show of diplomatic force when Secretary Clinton led a large, high-level delegation to Islamabad. Accompanied by CIA Director David Petraeus, new Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, Deputy National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, SRAP Grossman, and other senior officials, Clinton sought to impress upon the entire Pakistani civilian and military leadership that the United States will not tolerate the continued existence of militant safe havens in western Pakistan and will take action against them if the Pakistanis do not.64 At the ministerial level, the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue appears to have been postponed indefinitely; formal talks including Secretary Clinton, originally slated for March 2011, have not occurred to date. Yet engagement has continued at other levels: • In February 2012, Secretary Clinton met with Foreign Minister Khar in London, where she conveyed U.S. respect for Parliament’s right to review bilateral relations and take its time in doing so. Yet the Secretary also conveyed U.S. eagerness to “get back to business,” especially on crucial areas such as counterterrorism and Afghanistan. Khar told Clinton that Islamabad needed first to deal with upcoming Senate elections and would soon after deal with Parliament’s recommendations.65 • In March, Amb. Grossman met with President Zardari in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and emphasized that the United States “wants an honest, constructive, and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan and remains committed to continued engagement.”66 • Days after the Grossman-Zardari meet, President Obama sat down with Prime Minister Gilani on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in Seoul, South Korea, where the President reasserted the U.S. desire to see the two countries “move forward on important shared interests, including counterterrorism and fostering a stable Afghanistan.” Like Secretary Clinton, he welcomed Pakistan’s parliamentary review process, and also said the United States would welcome Pakistan’s potential participation in the upcoming Chicago NATO summit.67 • Also in March, senior U.S. and Pakistani military commanders held their first formal talks since the Salala incident when Central Command chief Gen. James Mattis and NATO-ISAF commander Gen. John Allen discussed border coordination issues with Gen. Kayani in Rawalpindi. • In April, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides met with Foreign Minister Khar in Islamabad in an effort to build upon the March conversations. Nides 64 “[Clinton] Interview With Nick Schifrin of ABC News,” State Department transcript, October 20, 2011; “Clinton Issues Blunt Warning to Pakistan,” New York Times, October 20, 2011. 65 “Senior State Department Official on Bilateral Meeting With Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Khar of Pakistan,” State Department transcript, February 23, 2012. 66 “Ambassador Grossman’s Meeting With President Zardari in Dushanbe,” U.S. Embassy release, March 25, 2012. 67 “Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes on President Obama’s Bilateral Meeting With Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan,” White House transcript, March 27, 2012. Congressional Research Service 20 Pakistan-U.S. Relations expressed optimism that the two countries could “achieve a balanced approach that respects Pakistan’s sovereignty and interests but also represents our concerns about our national security.”68 • Later in April, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah visited Pakistan to express a strong U.S. commitment to building and improving ties with Pakistan through civilian assistance and development support.69 • In late April, Amb. Grossman was in Islamabad for the 6th Trilateral Core Group meeting between the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It was also the first high-level U.S. visit following the release of the parliamentary review. He and interlocutor Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani made no breakthroughs on major points of disagreement: Grossman focused on the U.S. desire to see GLOCs quickly reopened, while Jilali reiterated Pakistan’s adamant opposition to further drone strikes. By some accounts, it was Washington’s refusal to apologize for the Salala incident that ultimately torpedoed the session.70 • The U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission—established in 2003 to bring together military commanders for regular discussions on Afghan stability and border security—met for the 35th time in Rawalpindi in mid-May. Controversy and Furor Over UAV Strikes Missile strikes in Pakistan reportedly launched by armed American Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been a controversial, but arguably effective tactic against Islamist militants in remote regions of western Pakistan. The nominally covert program is overseen by the CIA, but reports indicate that President Obama personally approves the targeting “kill list.”71 By one assessment, 118 drone strikes occurred in 2010 alone, more than during the preceding six years combined. Seventy more strikes were reported in 2011.72 The missile strikes in western Pakistan reportedly have taken a significant toll on Al Qaeda and other Islamist extremist militants, but are also criticized as an extrajudicial measure that kills civilians and may also contribute to militant recruitment. The Pakistani government regularly issues protests over the strikes—and the perception that they violate Pakistani sovereignty fuels considerable anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani public. As per a May 2012 Foreign Ministry statement: “We strongly condemn these drone attacks. We regard them as a violation of our territorial integrity. They are in contravention of international law. They are illegal, counterproductive, and totally unacceptable.”73 68 “Deputy Secretary Nides: U.S. Supports People of Pakistan,” U.S. Embassy transcript, April 4, 2012. “USAID Administrator Shah: U.S. Committed to Improving U.S.-Pakistan Ties,” U.S. Embassy release, April 13, 2012. 70 “Transcript of the Joint Press Stakeout by Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani and Ambassador Marc Grossman,” Foreign Ministry release, April 26, 2012; “Lack of a U.S. Apology is Sticking Point for Pakistan,” New York Times (online), April 30, 2012. 71 “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New York Times, May 29, 2012. 72 See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones. 73 Foreign Ministry transcript, May 24, 2012. 69 Congressional Research Service 21 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Still, most observers believe official Pakistan has tacitly allowed the strikes and at times provided intelligence for them.74 Despite Islamabad’s persistent and sweeping rejection of drone strikes on Pakistani territory, informed domestic debate exists, with some analysts welcoming the tactic as necessary and the best of several bad options.75 There is no shortage of accounts suggesting that, as a tactic, the drone campaign has been effective against Al Qaeda and its FATA-based allies.76 Messaging to Pakistan appears to continue to be part of the program’s intent: major strikes closely followed both Raymond Davis’s March 2011 release and the Administration’s July 2011 announcement on partial suspension of U.S. military aid to Islamabad. Most recently, a series of drone strikes came immediately after the May 2012 NATO summit where President Obama refused to meet with his Pakistani counterpart.77 Top Administration figures reportedly differ on the wisdom of continuing UAV strikes in Pakistan, with some State Department and Pentagon figures urging the CIA to reduce the pace of its strikes. While there is said to be widespread agreement on the tactical effectiveness of UAV attacks, proponents of their more judicious use reportedly worry that any intense pace aggravates an already troubled relationship with Pakistan and may risk destabilizing that country.78 A mid2011 White House review of the program ultimately reaffirmed support for the CIA campaign while also instituting some changes: the State Department would play a greater role in strike decisions, Pakistani officials would get more advanced notice, and strikes would be suspended when Pakistani officials were visiting the United States. the changes appear to have reduced the number of “signature strikes” undertaken against large groups of suspected militants.79 In June 2011, the President’s top counterterrorism advisor, in referring to the armed drone program, claimed “there hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.” Three years after taking office, President Obama publically acknowledged and defended the program’s existence, saying it “had not caused a huge number of civilian casualties” and is “kept on a very tight leash.”80 These claims are hotly disputed by independent analysts who track the strikes and estimate that 145-535 civilians have indeed been killed, including scores of children.81 74 Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables reportedly describe Army Chief Gen. Kayani as having requested “continuous Predator coverage” over South Waziristan during Pakistan’s early 2008 military operations there. The Pakistani military denied having made any requests for armed drone support (“Army Chief Wanted More Drone Support,” Dawn (Karachi), May 20, 2011). 75 See, for example, the several related articles in the May 18, 2012, issue of Lahore’s Friday Times. 76 See, for example, Pir Zubair Shah, “My Drone War,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2012. 77 “Drone Strikes Continue in Pakistan As Tension Increases and Senate Panel Cuts Aid,” New York Times, May 24, 2012. 78 “Drone Attacks Split U.S. Officials,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2011. 79 “Signature strike” decisions are based on “pattern of life” surveillance while “personality strikes” target known leaders. In a March 2012 meeting in London with Lt. Gen. Pasha, CIA Director Petraeus reportedly made a personal offer to refrain from undertaking “signature strikes” and to provide the ISI chief with advanced notice on others, but the concessions apparently were rejected out of hand (“U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2011; “Officials: White House Offers to Curtail Drones,” Associated Press, March 27, 2012). 80 John Brennan quoted in “C.I.A. Claim of No Civilian Deaths From Drone Strikes is Disputed,” New York Times, August 11, 2011; President Obama quoted in “Obama Admits ‘Worst-Kept Secret:’ US Flies Drones Over Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 2012. 81 “Covert CIA Drones Kill Hundreds of Civilians,” London Sunday Times, February 5, 2012. An Associated Press assessment found that roughly 70% of those killed by drone strikes are militants, but the New America Foundation finds a success rate of 83% (“New Light on Drone War’s Death Toll,” Associated Press, February 25, 2012; “CIA (continued...) Congressional Research Service 22 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Despite the killing of many hundreds of militants and dozens of their commanders, violence in western Pakistan has hardly subsided as a result of missile strikes. Yet, in present circumstances, and with a coming drawdown of NATO troops in neighboring Afghanistan, many commentators believe the U.S. government may have no better option than to continue employing the tactic. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation Acute Questions About the ISI’s Role Close U.S. links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) date back to the 1980s, when American and Pakistani intelligence officers oversaw cooperative efforts to train and supply Afghan “freedom fighters” who were battling the Soviet Army. Yet mutual mistrust has been ever-present and, in 2008, long-standing doubts about the activities and aims of the ISI compounded. Along with international concerns about the ISI’s assumed decades-long strategy of making use of Islamist militant proxies to forward Pakistan’s perceived interests, the service is also implicated in extralegal abductions and manipulation of domestic politics.82 The agency comes under the direct control of the army and its Director-General, a three-star general, is widely viewed as deputy to the Chief of Army Staff.83 Lt. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam was appointed DG-ISI in March 2012, replacing the retiring Lt. Gen. Pasha. Islam, previously commander of the army’s V Corp based in Karachi, received military training in the United States in 2002-2003. Press reports have called him more open and moderate than his predecessors; he may be a candidate for the COAS position after Kayani’s scheduled 2012 retirement.84 U.S. officials repeatedly have fingered the ISI for actively supporting Afghan insurgents with money, supplies, and planning guidance. There is ongoing conviction among U.S. officials that sanctuaries in Pakistan have allowed Afghan militants to sustain their insurgency and that elements of the ISI continue to support them. Some reporting has cited Afghan insurgent commanders claiming that in the latter months of 2011 the ISI increased its direct contacts with the Taliban, vigorously encouraging more violence, and even supplying them with new highpowered explosives manufactured in Pakistan.85 A classified NATO report detailing information gathered through thousands of interrogations of captured Taliban and Al Qaeda militants was leaked in January 2012 and reportedly indicates that (...continued) Drone War in Pakistan in Sharp Decline,” CNN.com, March 27, 2012). 82 The ISI has come under unprecedented judicial scrutiny related to disappearances and, in 2012, the revival of a 15year-old vote-rigging scandal involving $6.5 million in alleged covert political donations by the ISI that likely helped unseat Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990 (“Court Challenges Put Unusual Spotlight on Pakistani Spy Agency,” New York Times, February 7, 2012). 83 The State Department reports that Pakistan’s military and intelligence services nominally report to civilian authorities, but essentially operate without effective civilian oversight (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, released May 2012). 84 “Kayani’s New Soldier Spy,” India Today (Delhi), April 2, 2012. 85 “Afghan Taliban on Night Raids, New Explosives, the ISI, and Peace,” Newsweek, December 26, 2011. Congressional Research Service 23 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Afghan insurgents continue to receive direct support from the ISI. The report offers that, “Pakistan’s manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly,” and “Senior Taliban leaders meet regularly with ISI personnel, who advise on strategy and relay any pertinent concerns of the government of Pakistan.” NATO officials played down the report’s significance, and Pakistan’s foreign minister called its content “old wine in an even older bottle.”86 The ISI is also regularly linked to anti-India terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai in which some 165 people were killed, 6 Americans among them. During a February 2012 House hearing, Secretary of State Clinton asserted, “[T]here is no doubt in my mind that certain elements of the Pakistani government are more ambivalent about cracking down on terrorism.... [T]here have been relationships between terrorist groups and the military and intelligence services for many decades.”87 Pakistani officials regularly provide assurances that no elements of the ISI are cooperating with militants or extremists. However, to many independent observers, Pakistan’s security services increasingly appear to be penetrated by Islamist extremists.88 Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables reportedly contained claims that Pakistani military officers receive training biased against the United States.89 Some analysts argue that, just as Pakistan’s national identity has continued to be fractured along the lines dividing nationalism from Islamism, Pakistan’s security services can be conceived of as comprising two groups: one, led by Gen. Kayani, is fundamentally nationalist and seeks to maintain the status quo; the other, currently leaderless, is driven by a revisionist Islamist ideology, sometimes with a violent cast.90 Even before the Raymond Davis episode began, reports indicated that CIA-ISI relations were at a nadir, with American officials frustrated at the lack of expanded Pakistani military operations and at signs that elements within the ISI continue to provide backing to certain militant groups. The Davis affair sharpened Pakistani attention to—and acrimony toward—the presence of U.S. security officials and contractors in Pakistan. Revelation of Davis’s status as a CIA contractor led the ISI to demand an accounting of all such operatives working in Pakistan, but most intelligence cooperation may have been frozen immediately upon the January shooting.91 The circumstances of OBL’s death brought more focus on purported ISI links with Islamist extremism.92 Following the May 2011 raid, Pakistan sought to crack down on its own citizens 86 “Pakistan is Helping Afghan Taliban, Says Nato Report,” BBC News, January 31, 2012; “Pakistan Denies Claims in NATO Report of Spy Service Still Aiding Taliban,” Washington Post, February 1, 2012. 87 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal for the State Department and Foreign Operations,” CQ Transcripts, February 29, 2012. 88 “Infiltrators Worry Pakistani Military,” Washington Post, May 28, 2011. In June 2011, a Pakistani brigadier general was arrested and four majors questioned due to their links with the Hizb-ul-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a nonviolent, but outlawed Islamist group that seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The general, whose brother may be a senior intelligence officer, is the most senior officer to face such allegations since 1995 (“Arrest of Pakistani Officer Revives Fears of Extremism Within Military,” CNN.com, June 22, 2011). 89 “Anti-Americanism Rife in Pakistan Army Institution – Wikileaks,” Reuters, May 25, 2011. 90 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan’s Army: Divided It Stands,” Viewpoint Online (undated), at http://www.viewpointonline.net/pakistans-army-divided-it-stands.html. 91 “U.S.-Pakistan Intelligence Operations Frozen Since January,” Reuters, April 9, 2011. 92 The mobile phone of bin Laden’s most trusted courier reportedly contained contacts in the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, a Kashmir-oriented terrorist group with close ties to the ISI and deep roots in the Abbottabad area. Its leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, a sometime ally of OBL, continues to live openly in Islamabad (“Seized Phone Offers Clues to Bin Laden’s Pakistani Links,” New York Times, June 24, 2011). Congressional Research Service 24 Pakistan-U.S. Relations who were found to be working with the CIA.93 Pressure was increased to allow American investigators access to bin Laden’s three widows in Pakistani custody. Such access was subsequently granted. One week after OBL’s death, a Pakistani newspaper seen as close to the country’s military and intelligence services published the purported name of the CIA’s Islamabad station chief. This was the second time in six months that the top covert American operative in Pakistan had been outed, and U.S. officials reportedly believed such disclosures were deliberate as a means for the ISI to demonstrate its leverage and to express anger at U.S. policies.94 After the OBL raid, the ISI leadership was confronted more frequently—and more publically— with U.S. evidence of collusion between Pakistani officials and Afghan insurgents. Such evidence notably included instances in which the CIA alerted Islamabad about the existence of two bombmaking facilities in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), only to have Pakistani army units find the sites abandoned by the time they arrived. This led U.S. officials to assume that the targets had been tipped off about upcoming raids, a charge called “totally false and malicious” by the Pakistani military, which declared that some of the intelligence provided “proved to be incorrect.” Still, U.S. officials repeated the accusations after militants fled two other bomb-making facilities; these officials reportedly believed that Pakistan’s insistence on gaining permission from local tribal elders before entering the area allowed militants to escape.95 Continuing Intelligence Cooperation Concurrent with interagency discord, effective joint intelligence work has continued. Just days after the OBL raid, a Yemeni national described as a “senior” or “midlevel” Al Qaeda operative was arrested in Karachi with the help of U.S.-provided intelligence. Mohammed Ali Qasim Yaqub reportedly had been a key courier between Al Qaeda’s top leaders, and his capture was seen as a good-faith Pakistani effort to mend relations with Washington. In another apparent effort to rebuild confidence, Pakistan pledged in June to grant more than three dozen visas to CIA officers. Most-wanted terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri was reported killed in a June 2011 drone strike in South Waziristan, and the new Al Qaeda chief’s deputy and operational commander, Libyan explosives expert Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, was reported killed in an August strike in North Waziristan (successes in targeting militants in the FATA with unmanned drones likely come with intelligence from Pakistan). In September, Pakistan announced having arrested three allegedly senior Al Qaeda operatives near Quetta with help from technical assistance provided by the CIA. Bilateral intelligence cooperation, especially that targeting Al Qaeda and the “Pakistani Taliban,” has quietly continued even as government-to-government relations have worsened.96 Some reports indicate that the CIA has undertaken a years-long, multibillion dollar effort to establish inside Pakistan a network of “secret friends” of the United States—security officials, intelligence 93 “Arrest Indicates Pakistan Leaders Face Rising Pressure to Curb U.S. Role,” Washington Post, June 15, 2011. “Pakistanis Disclose Name of CIA Operative,” Washington Post, May 9, 2011. 95 “C.I.A. Director Warns Pakistan on Collusion With Militants,” New York Times, June 12, 2011, ISPR press release, June 17, 2011; “Pakistan Still Tipping Off Militants, U.S. Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2011. 96 For example, drone strikes were temporarily halted after the November 2011 Salala border incident, by some accounts providing respite to FATA-based militants. However—and despite Islamabad’s official opposition—they resumed with a mid-January strike that reportedly killed a senior Al Qaeda figure. That attack was taken as evidence that Pakistanis were at some level continuing to assist in targeting (“How Pakistan Helps the U.S. Drone Campaign,” Reuters, January 22, 2012). 94 Congressional Research Service 25 Pakistan-U.S. Relations operatives, counterterrorism fighters, and the like, who could offer an alternative to less trustworthy army and ISI officials.97 Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency98 Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and “strategic depth” with regard to India through friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President-General Zia ul-Haq’s support for Afghan mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001.99 British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893 “Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.100 Both Pakistan and Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat Islamic militancy. Ongoing acrimony between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to U.S. interests. American and Pakistani goals in Afghanistan are far from fully compatible; there is very little agreement beyond the shared interest in a negotiated settlement that leaves Afghanistan relatively stable and secure. Pakistan—and especially its military and intelligence services—is widely believed to be seeking a post-NATO Afghanistan that is deferential to and perhaps even dependent upon Islamabad, with Kabul setting foreign policies that do not run counter to Pakistani interests. In contrast, the U.S.-led coalition endeavors to leave behind a capable and independent Afghanistan. Such a result would almost certainly see the Kabul government increase its cooperation with India. If within this dynamic Pakistan makes use of the Quetta Shura and Haqqani Network as proxies in its dealings with Kabul (as is widely assumed to have been the case for several years now), the Administration’s continued reliance on Islamabad in creating and shaping the reconciliation process is likely to increase Pakistan’s leverage.101 Washington has continued to seek Islamabad’s support for Afghan reconciliation talks, ideally by winning ISI pressure on Afghan insurgency leaders to negotiate. Yet tensions between the two governments’ respective approaches are evident in the fact that Americans want to “fight, talk, 97 See Eli Lake, “America’s Shadow State in Pakistan,” The DailyBeast.com, December 5, 2011. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name re dacted). 99 Documentary evidence indicates that Islamabad provided military and economic support, perhaps including the combat troops, to the Afghan Taliban during the latter half of the 1990s (see “Pakistan: ‘The Taliban’s Godfather’?,” National Security Archive Briefing Book 227, August 14, 2007). 100 Pakistan is home to more than 30 million Pashto-speaking people, most of them living near the border with Afghanistan, which is home to perhaps 15 million ethnic Pashtuns (also known as Pakhtuns or Pathans). A hardy people with a proud martial history (they are disproportionately represented in the Pakistani military), Pashtuns played an important role in the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s. 101 See Ashley Tellis, “Gambling on Reconciliation to Save a Transition: Perils and Possibilities in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, December 2011. Many analysts contend that American and Pakistan objectives in Afghanistan are “fundamentally at odds,” meaning a U.S. reliance on Pakistan to forge Afghan reconciliation is a “dangerous gamble” given the apparent failure of a “decade-long policy of seeking to appease Pakistan and induce its cooperation through large-scale economic and military assistance (first two quotes from Ashley Tellis, third from Christine Fair, in “Rep. Steve Chabot Holds a Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcripts, November 3, 2011. For a detailed argument of why “Pakistan is the problem,” see Tellis’s prepared statement at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/tel110311.pdf). 98 Congressional Research Service 26 Pakistan-U.S. Relations build,” while Pakistanis are seen to be taking a “cease-fire, talk, wait for the Americans to leave” tack. Pakistani officials have been confused by a perceived lack of clarity in U.S. goals for Afghanistan and in pressure from Washington to employ force against anti-Kabul militants in North Waziristan even as the U.S. government seeks to talk with other insurgent groups.102 Some argue that Washington risks rewarding Pakistani intransigence by giving that country’s security services a key role in brokering peace with the same insurgent forces they have fostered. Some even contend that the ISI has spent the past decade trying to reinstate the Taliban regime overthrown by the ISAF coalition in 2001.103 Ongoing Turmoil in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations Senior U.S. officials and nearly all independent observers continue to contend that Pakistani cooperation is necessary for reconciliation and long-term stability in Afghanistan. Islamabad’s relations with Kabul remain troubled, and it is widely understood that Afghan insurgents continue to find safe havens in the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Karachi, as well as in western Pakistan’s tribal agencies. U.S. military commanders identify these havens as central obstacles to successful pacification of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Declassified U.S. government documents indicate that the Taliban’s resurgence in the mid-2000s could not have been possible in the absence of FATA sanctuaries.104 Despite some warming of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in 2010 and early 2011, Afghan officials continue to openly accuse Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. There are signs that Afghan’s historic wariness of Pakistani influence in their country is not abating.105 Many analysts have grown cynical given perceptions of Islamabad’s consistent use of “Pashtun jihadi proxies” to forward its perceived interests and the Pakistani military’s aim to exert dominance of its Afghan neighbors.106 Islamabad can be discomfited by signs that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is not long-term or that the international community may “abandon” the region in ways damaging to Pakistani interests, as was the case during the 1990s.107 Many analysts saw President Obama’s June 2011 announcement of an impending U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan as yet another signal to stakeholder governments and Taliban elements, alike, that the U.S. focus is on an exit strategy and that the United States may not make a long-term commitment to stabilizing the region. 102 “U.S. Seeks Aid From Pakistan in Peace Effort,” New York Times, October 31, 2011. See, for example, Sarah Chayes, “Denying Pakistan” (op-ed), Los Angeles Times, November 23, 2011. 104 “‘No-Go’ Tribal Areas Became Basis for Afghanistan Insurgency, Documents Show,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 325, posted September 13, 2010. 105 See, for example, “Ordinary Afghans Voicing Increasing Distrust of Pakistan’s Intentions,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (online), November 6, 2011. 106 “Talking About Talks: Toward Political Settlement in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 221, March 20, 2012. 107 Members of Pakistan’s nongovernmental foreign policy “elite” are reported to maintain that Pakistan’s key objective is to see a pacific Afghanistan with an inclusive government and a limited Indian presence, even in the area of economic and social development. From this perspective, only significant power-sharing with Afghan Pashtuns will ensure a future Kabul government sensitive to Pakistani interests,(see Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi, “Pakistan, the United States, and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 25, 2011). 103 Congressional Research Service 27 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani interest. In April 2011, Prime Minister Gilani, Army Chief Kayani, and ISI Director Pasha all traveled to Kabul as part of an effort to upgrade the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission earlier that year and so accelerate the peace process. American observers were disturbed by reports that Gilani had used the meetings as an opportunity to wean Kabul away from its strategic partnership with the United States, and instead move closer to Islamabad and seek greater support from China. According to the reports, Gilani criticized America’s “imperial designs” and contended that ending the Afghan war required Kabul and Islamabad to take “ownership” of the peace process.108 The new Joint Commission met in June 2011, with Gilani and President Karzai expressing their commitment to an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” process. The two sides also produced a 23-point “Islamabad Declaration” pledging improved and deepened ties in a wide range of issue-areas.109 However, in the summer of 2011, increased incidence of “reverse infiltration” caused friction between Islamabad and Kabul, especially after more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers were killed in a June cross-border raid by up to 400 militants from Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Later that month Afghan officials accused Pakistan of firing more than 760 rockets into the Kunar, Nangarhar, and Khost provinces over a period of six weeks, killing at least 60 people, including women and children. Pakistan rejected charges that its forces had been involved in any crossborder attacks. Some in Afghanistan see the barrages as part of an orchestrated and official Pakistani effort to “reshape Afghanistan as a Pakistani colony” after International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops draw down.110 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations reached a new nadir in September 2011 when Afghan High Peace Council chairman and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in his Kabul home by a suicide bomber, dealing a major blow to hopes for reconciliation talks. Afghan officials suspect the ISI played a role in the murder, saying the attacker was Pakistani and the attack had been planned in Quetta. They also criticized Islamabad for its alleged failure to cooperate in the related investigation. Pakistani officials denied playing any part in the assassination, but the Afghan president has continued to accuse Pakistan of “using terrorism” as official policy. In October, Afghan intelligence officials claimed to have halted a plot to assassinate Karzai himself and said the alleged culprits were based in the FATA and affiliated with both Al Qaeda and the Haqqanis.111 Afghan Reconciliation and Pakistan’s Role Islamabad strongly endorses current efforts to make peace with the Afghan Taliban and insists that the parameters for such a process should be set by the Kabul government. Pakistan considers itself to be indispensible to successful Afghan peace talks, and Islamabad’s leaders are in large part motivated by a desire to deny India significant influence in a post-conflict Afghanistan. Pakistan has sought to exert control over which Taliban figures can negotiate on this account. In early 2010, the Afghan Taliban’s top military commander and key aide to Mullah Omar, Mullah 108 “Karzai Told to Dump U.S.-Pakistan Urges Afghanistan to Ally With Islamabad, Beijing,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2011. 109 See the June 12, 2011, text at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2011/June/Pr_200.htm. 110 “Pakistan Launching Military Intervention to Subjugate Afghanistan,” MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 703, July 6, 2011. 111 “Karzai Says Pakistan is Supporting Terrorists,” Washington Post, October 4, 2011; “Afghans Say Plot Aimed to Kill Karzai,” Los Angeles Times, October 6, 2011. Congressional Research Service 28 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured in a joint ISI-CIA operation in Karachi. By some accounts, Pakistani elements “orchestrated” the Baradar arrest to facilitate talks with “willing” Taliban commanders and pave the way for reconciliation negotiations. Cynics contend that the ISI’s motives may simply have been to thwart any anticipated negotiations. In mid-2010, Pakistan launched an effort to broker a reconciliation between the Kabul government and the Haqqani Network. This initiative sparked concerns that Islamabad would seek to exploit the political situation—both in the region and in Washington—to mold a settlement giving Pakistan maximal influence in a post-conflict Kabul. Later that year NATO facilitated the secret travel of at least three QST figures and a representative of the Haqqani Network from Pakistan to Kabul for meetings with senior Afghan government officials. It is unclear whether Pakistani officials were included in this process; some reports indicated they were not, others described ISI officials as having participated directly. In another clear indication that Islamabad has substantive influence over top Afghan insurgents, in the fall of 2011 the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan suggested that Pakistan is hesitant to allow Taliban leaders to travel to Kabul for reconciliation talks. He asks that Pakistan support the process by allowing those willing to talk to be given the opportunity to do so. Afghan President Karzai has echoed these complaints, saying insurgent leaders inside Pakistan are not sufficiently independent of Pakistani control to enter into negotiations on their own.112 By early 2012, the Islamabad government appeared to at least be allowing the U.S.-Taliban negotiating initiative to proceed. Then, on an April visit to Islamabad, Afghan President Karzai reportedly asked Pakistani leaders to “use their influence” to prod the Taliban into negotiations, a request that Foreign Minister Khar called “not only unrealistic, but preposterous.” Yet, just a week later, Prime Minister Gilani issued an unprecedented open appeal to the Afghan Taliban leadership and other militant commanders to “participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace.”113 The Obama Administration welcomed the message, even as there remain pervasive concerns that Pakistan’s security services are maintaining ties with and possibly supporting certain Afghan insurgent groups as a means of increasing their leverage in the reconciliation process. To many observers in Pakistan and the region more widely, current U.S. transition planning for Afghanistan appears to be cover for a hasty exit strategy. Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations The terrorist network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, based in the FATA, is commonly identified as the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan. In the words of one expert, The Haqqani Network represents a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. 112 “Envoy: Pakistan Should Aid Talks,” USA Today, September 8, 2011; “Karzai Lashes Out at Pakistan,” Financial Times (London), October 3, 2011. 113 “Meeting in Pakistan Reveals Tensions Over Afghan Talks,” New York Times, February 18, 2012; “Statement of Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Gilani on Afghanistan,” Foreign Ministry transcript, February 24, 2012. Congressional Research Service 29 Pakistan-U.S. Relations This analyst is among many who contend that the group is not reconcilable and must be dealt with through sustained military offensives by ISAF and Afghan forces beyond 2012.114 Islamabad officials have consistently deferred on urgent and long-standing U.S. requests that the Pakistani military launch operations against the Haqqanis’ North Waziristan haven, saying their forces are already stretched too thin. Most observers believe the underlying cause of Pakistan’s inaction is the country’s decades-long relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and a belief held in the army and ISI that his group represents perhaps the best chance for Islamabad to exert Pashtunbased influence in post-ISAF Afghanistan. Over the past year, the Haqqanis have undertaken numerous high-visibility attacks in Afghanistan that infuriated top U.S. and Afghan officials. First, a June 2011 assault on Kabul’s Intercontinental Hotel by Haqqani gunmen and suicide bombers left 18 people dead. Then, in September, a truck bomb attack on a U.S. military base by Haqqani fighters in the Wardak province injured 77 American troops and killed 5 Afghans. But it was a September 13, 2011, attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul that appears to have substantively changed the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations, a well-planned and -executed 20-hour-long assault that left 16 Afghans dead, 5 police officers and at least 6 children among them. Although U.S. officials dismissed the attack as a sign of the insurgents’ weakness, the ability of militants to undertake a complex raid in the heart of Kabul’s most protected [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41832. Public record. Not legal advice.