# Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41589

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 4, 2011
- **Citation:** R41589

## Text

Economics and National Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Policy
-name redacted-, Coordinator
Specialist in Industry and Trade
January 4, 2011

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41589

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy

Summary
As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States holds what
should be a winning hand of a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and
democratic values. The nation’s security should be secure. Yet the debate over national security
seems to be both intensifying and broadening. The problem appears not only in the difficulty of
finding a winning strategy in the long war against acts of terrorism but having to face economic
constraints that loom large in the public debate. In addition, the global financial crisis and
recession have highlighted the trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and
spending to provide jobs and income for citizens at home. The United States has long been
accustomed to pursuing a “rich man’s” approach to national security. The country could field an
overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs
to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation’s
security. The economy has always been there both to provide the funds and materiel for defense
and to provide economic security for most households. Policies for economic growth and issues
such as unemployment have been viewed as domestic problems largely separate from
considerations of national security.
The world, however, has changed. Globalization, the rise of China, the prospect of an
unsustainable debt burden, unprecedented federal budget deficits, the success of mixed
economies with both state-owned and private businesses, huge imbalances in international trade
and capital flows, and high unemployment have brought economics more into play in
considerations of national security. Traditionally the economy has entered into the national
security debate through its impact on the nation’s hard power: the funding of defense, the efficacy
of the defense industrial base, and the use of economic sanctions and other instruments as nonkinetic tools of warfare. The long-term efficacy of hard power, however, depends greatly on the
ability of a country to provide for it through an ever growing and innovative economy.
National security depends also on soft power, the ability of a country to generate and use its
economic power and to project its national values. This, in turn, depends on long-term factors that
contribute to economic growth and increase the total resource base available not only for defense
but to provide economic security in the form of income and business opportunities for
individuals. Economic growth depends on building human capital. It also depends on science,
technology, and innovation. In addition, the increased integration of the U.S. economy into global
markets means that U.S. security also depends on global economic stability, on a balanced
international economy, the ability to coordinate key economic policies with other leading nations,
and deterring threats to the international financial system. Soft power also enables the country to
project American values through diplomacy, economic assistance, fostering democracy and
human rights, and promoting sustainable development abroad. Congress plays a major role in
each of these elements of national security.
This analysis illustrates how disparate parts of the U.S. economy affect the security of the nation.
Security is achieved not only by military means but by the whole of the American economy. In
national security, the economy is both the enabler and the constraint. This report briefly addresses
each of the above issues and provides a context and some possible alternatives to current policy.
The purpose of this report is not to provide an exhaustive analysis but to survey the landscape,
show how each issue relates to national security, examine possible Congressional actions, and
refer the reader to relevant CRS products and analysts.

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Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy

Contents
National Security and the Congressional Interest .........................................................................1
National Security Strategy.....................................................................................................2
Twenty-First Century Challenges to National Security...........................................................3
The Role of the Economy in U.S. National Security ....................................................................4
Other Roles of the Economy in National Security..................................................................6
Macroeconomic Issues in National Security ..........................................................................8
The Federal Deficit and Military Spending......................................................................9
Reducing the Federal Budget Deficit ............................................................................. 14
Traditional Microeconomic Issues in National Security ....................................................... 15
The Dedicated Defense Industry in the United States..................................................... 16
Defense Acquisition and Contracting Processes............................................................. 20
Base Closures and the Local Impact of Defense Spending ............................................. 23
Economic Growth and Broad Conceptions of Security .............................................................. 24
Human Capital.................................................................................................................... 25
College, K-12, and Early Childhood Education ............................................................. 25
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education..................................... 28
International Education and Exchange........................................................................... 31
Immigration .................................................................................................................. 34
Research, Innovation, Energy, and Space............................................................................. 39
Investing in Research .................................................................................................... 39
Transforming the Energy Economy ............................................................................... 44
Space Capabilities......................................................................................................... 47
Globalization, Trade, Finance, and the G-20 .............................................................................. 49
Instability in the Global Economy ....................................................................................... 50
Savings and Exports............................................................................................................ 54
Boosting Domestic Demand Abroad.................................................................................... 56
Open Foreign Markets to U.S. Products and Services .......................................................... 59
Build Cooperation with International Partners ..................................................................... 63
Deterring Threats to the International Financial System....................................................... 66
Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Aid .................................................................... 69
Democracy and Human Rights ............................................................................................ 69
Sustainable Development .................................................................................................... 72
International Science Partnerships as a Tool for Development ............................................. 75
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 77

Figures
Figure 1. The Economy and National Security.............................................................................6
Figure 2. Shares of the Federal Budget by Major Function ........................................................ 11
Figure 3. Federal Government Budget Outlays and Receipts ..................................................... 12
Figure 4. U.S. Federal Debt and as a Percent of GDP ................................................................ 14
Figure 5. Permanent Employment-Based Admissions, First, Second, and Third
Preferences ............................................................................................................................ 36

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Figure 6. Temporary Employment-Based Visas Issued............................................................... 37
Figure 7. Quarterly GDP Growth Rates for Selected Countries .................................................. 52

Tables
Table 1. Compound Annual Growth Rates for Federal Research and Development and for
Federal Research.................................................................................................................... 43

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 78

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Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy

National Security and the Congressional Interest1
U.S. national security underpins the system in which Americans live. National security is
essential to an environment and geographical space in which people can reside without fear. It
consists, first, of physical security on both the international and domestic sides. This includes
protection from threats external to the country and safety in the homeland. These generally are
accomplished through hard power and homeland security efforts. Second, it consists of economic
security—the opportunity and means for people to provide for their own well being under an
economic system that is vibrant, growing, and accessible. Third, U.S. national security involves
outreach through soft power in an attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of people across the
globe. Soft power complements hard power, and, in cases, may substitute for it. Also, the myriad
links between governments, businesses, and people across national borders means that American
security increasingly depends on countries and activities in far flung places on the globe.
Traditionally, the economy entered into the national security debate through four issues: the
defense industrial base, base closures and program cuts, international economic sanctions, and
export controls. These issues still garner much of the attention from the vantage point of the
military. From the point of view of the nation as a whole, however, economic security takes on a
broader meaning.
This report examines the role of the economy in national security from both macroeconomic and
microeconomic points of view. The macroeconomic issues center on the budget and deficit
reduction. The microeconomic issues focus on providing for the general well-being of the people
and in supporting other components of national security. This report also examines the major
sources of long-term economic growth and progress and policies that affect them. It further
addresses the coordination of policies among nations, particularly the G-20, and foreign policies
that affect human rights, the development of democracy, and U.S. economic assistance. This
broad review of economics and national security illustrates how disparate parts of the U.S.
economy affect the security of the nation and that security is something achieved not only by
military means but by the whole of the American economy and how it performs. In national
security, the economy is both an enabler and a constraint.
The economic issues related to national security are both broad and complex. In order to keep this
report to a manageable length, this study takes the President’s 2010 National Security Strategy as
a beginning construct and largely limits the analysis to the issues raised there. The purpose of this
report is to provide an overview of the economic contributors to national security as well as to
furnish links to further resources. Issues, such as reducing the federal budget deficit, immigration,
international trade, or innovation, are related to national security in ways that are too numerous
and complex to address fully here. Further information can be found in the CRS reports cited or
can be obtained by contacting the CRS analysts indicated.
In the United States, the renewed public debate over national security appears to be generated
primarily by three global changes. The first is the nature of the external threat to physical
security—the rise of terrorism and militant Islam. The second is the aftermath of the global
financial crisis, particularly the large federal budget deficit and slow rate of recovery. The third is
1

Sections of this report without authorship indicated in footnotes were prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in
Industry and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy

the growing presence of emerging nations, such as China, India, and Brazil, and the shift of
economic power toward them. These changes have created gaps and trade-offs that arguably are
undermining the sense of security of Americans. Some may say, “What good is protection from a
future threat, when I am unemployed because my job just went to China?” Others may say, “What
good is a high salary, if I am dead in a terrorist attack?
This debate over national security reaches deep into the fiber of American society. It is not merely
political theater, and it is receiving a fillip by the weakened U.S. economy. A vibrant, growing,
and dominant economy can hide a multitude of problems. Even though wealth and economic
means cannot guarantee U.S. security, it can buy a comfortable sort of insecurity.
The economic issue of the day now centers on what measures to take to return the economy to its
long-term growth path and reduce the gap between the potential and actual levels of U.S. gross
domestic product. If the economy were to grow faster, many of the constraints on the federal
budget would be eased. There are two major schools of thought on this matter. The Keynesian
approach to growth is to continue government deficit spending through the recession and initial
recovery phase in order to offset lower consumption by households and reduced levels of
investment by businesses. When the economy recovers, the deficit can be reduced. The supply
side approach is to cut the federal budget deficit now because deficits may discourage investment
by causing uncertainty about future policy changes that will be needed to restore fiscal balance.
The supply side approach also attempts to keep taxes on entrepreneurs low in order to induce
them to invest more in productive capacity and create more jobs. Each approach recognizes that
the long-term security of the nation depends greatly on having a vibrant and growing economy.
Congress plays a major role in each element of national security. Whether it be policies dealing
with the military, economy, budget, education, economic growth, technology, international
relations, or opening markets abroad, Congressional action is essential. Not only does Congress
provide funding for these elements of national security, but it provides oversight, defines the
scope of U.S. action, and provides a crucible in which U.S. policies are debated and often
determined. Congress allocates the resources to respond to national security threats, and in so
doing it plays a part in determining the relative strength of hard and soft power options and the
roles individual agencies will play.

National Security Strategy
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433)
required that the President provide a National Security Strategy (NSS) for Congress. This
document presents the major national security concerns of the country and how the existing
administration plans to deal with them. The George W. Bush Administration’s issued its final NSS
in March 2006,2 and in May 2010, the Obama Administration released its first NSS.3
The 2010 NSS noted numerous world conditions, laid out a national security strategy, and set
some goals, many of them economic. It began with three observations:
•

the world is now in a moment of transition, of sweeping change;

2

The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC, March 16, 2006.
The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, May 2010. (Hereafter referred to as the 2010
National Security Strategy or 2010 NSS.)
3

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•

globalization has both opened opportunities and intensified the dangers
Americans face from terrorism, the spread of deadly technologies, economic
upheaval, and changing climate; and

•

even as the war in Iraq ends and the focus of military action has turned to
Afghanistan, a superior military is necessary as the United States faces multiple
threats from nations, nonstate actors, and failed states.

The NSS then laid out some goals, both military and economic, along with policies deemed
necessary to ensure a safe and secure United States. Those related to the economy were:
•

in order to build an America that is stronger, more secure, and able to overcome
challenges while appealing to aspirations of people around the world, the United
States must foster economic growth, reduce the federal budget deficit, educate
our people, develop clean energy alternatives, pursue science and innovation, and
build capabilities and alliances to pursue interests shared with other countries and
peoples;

•

the United States seeks an international order and cooperation with other nations
that will counter violent extremism and insurgency, stop the spread of nuclear
weapons, combat climate change, sustain global growth, and help countries feed
themselves; and

•

the United States will continue to advocate for and advance human rights,
economic development, and democracy as a bulwark against aggression and
injustice.

Twenty-First Century Challenges to National Security
The challenge of the twenty-first century is to adapt U.S. policy to account for how the world has
changed. These changes can be highlighted by reviewing some traditional perceptions that helped
shape U.S. security policy. During the latter half of the twentieth century, five large ideas seemed
to have permeated politics in the Western world writ large:
•

peaceful settlement of issues was better than going to war (no more world wars,
although regional conflicts persisted);

•

other countries would tolerate U.S. hegemony in exchange for keeping the peace;

•

the United States and Europe could determine policy on most major international
issues;

•

the United States could assist countries to democratize because democracies were
more likely than dictatorships to have shared values and to keep the peace; and

•

Western culture was appealing and more universal than any other.

These fundamental ideas played a large role in shaping and maintaining U.S. national security
first in a bipolar world shrouded in the Cold War and then in a more multi-polar system in which
countries, such as China, have gained relative economic power and have brought a different set of

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interests and values to the table. While each of the above ideas has carried over to a certain extent
into the twenty-first century, each also has eroded considerably. 4
Similarly, in the economic and financial realm, four large ideas or priorities helped shape both
U.S. domestic and international economic policy:
•

market capitalism was superior to socialism (high standards of living, vibrant
entrepreneurs, and innovation were nourished best by free markets);

•

security considerations trumped economics (e.g., wars had to be won even at
high economic cost; U.S. retaliation against allies in trade disputes [such as those
with Japan and South Korea] had to be tempered by its potential impact on
alliance relationships);

•

economic growth and employment were best fostered by monetary and fiscal
policy rather than by industrial policies that “picked winners and losers”; and

•

imbalances in trade and capital flows were largely self correcting (foreign
exchange rates determined by capital markets and appropriate government fiscal
and monetary policy would bring balance into international accounts).

These economic and financial precepts still hold sway, but they are being challenged by an
evolving and demanding security and economic environment. The rise of the Asian model of
development with mixed market and socialist economies, large state-owned enterprises in China
and the Middle East, government intervention into foreign exchange markets, and overt
protection of domestic industries from import competition along with chronically large trade
deficits and rising national debt of the United States and many European nations have called most
of these economic ideas into question. In the globalized and conflicted world of today, the United
States may require a more nuanced and direct approach to the economy in order to ensure the
long-term security of the nation.

The Role of the Economy in U.S. National Security5
For several decades following World War II, providing national security was conceptually simple.
The United States maintained the world’s preeminent military backed by the world’s largest
economy and led the Western world by providing power-based leadership, serving as a beacon for
democratic values, and maintaining a system of military alliances. The conventional wisdom was
that Washington could provide security for the nation primarily by keeping Soviet bombs at bay
and communist ideology from creeping across the planet. The economy always was there, both to
fund the military and underpin the provision of economic security for households. Policies for
economic growth and issues such as unemployment were viewed as domestic problems largely
separate from considerations of national security.
As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States still has a
preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. However, the
economy has come more into play because the country has long been accustomed to pursuing a
4
For a discussion of many of these ideas, see Steven Weber and Bruce W. Jentleson, The End of Arrogance, America
in the Global Competition of Ideas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
5
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Industry and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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“rich man’s” approach to national security strategy. The United States could field an
overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs
to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation’s
security. 6
The world, however, has changed, and with it so have the challenges of providing U.S. national
security. Setting aside questions concerning the size, composition, and capability of the U.S.
military, the economy enters into the debate on national security through three overlapping roles.
The first is the economy as the source of funds, materiel, and personnel for the military. The
second is the economy as a provider of economic security and well-being for Americans. The
third is the economy as the foundation for interaction among countries and of building shared or
competing interests. This includes the flow of wealth generated by trade that allows countries to
build their military and financial power, in particular the steady flow of oil revenues into the
Middle East and the large trade surplus by China. It also includes U.S. legitimacy and resource
availability as it strives to help other countries develop and to foster human rights and democracy
abroad.
In the United States, the domestic economic policy debate is divided into two major areas. The
first centers on how to divide the existing economic pie or how to allocate existing economic
resources among competing interests. This debate focuses on the macroeconomy, specifically on
the level of the federal budget and its deficit; on the ability of the economy to fund both national
defense and social programs and on issues such as savings, investment, and international trade.
This deficit issue involves both cost and opportunity cost—both the size of the budget and the
alternatives foregone by allocating funds to one use instead of another. It also revolves around
whether current costs should be shifted to future generations by borrowing today to cover the
federal budget deficit and expecting future taxpayers to repay the resulting debt.
The second issue is how to enlarge the existing pie or how to increase economic growth and
productivity in order to generate more resources for all programs. Growth depends both on
sufficient aggregate demand by households, businesses, and government and by growing and
productive supply. Over the long-term, the growth of supply depends on the microeconomic side
of the economy and includes science and technology, education, business methods, natural
resource use, and other elements of the economy that generate economic activity and progress.
Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of how the economy enters into national security
considerations. National security is sought through a combination of hard power, soft power, and
economic opportunity. The economy underpins each of these by providing funding, human and
other resources, capital, products, and an appealing culture and economic model. The operation of
the economy, in turn, relies on government fiscal, monetary, and industrial policies; on the quality
and quantity of human resources; on progress in science and technology; and on the global
economy through trade and capital flows.

6

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “National Security Strategy in an Era of Growing Challenges and Resource Constraints,”
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Perspective, June 2010.

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Figure 1.The Economy and National Security

NATIONAL SECURITY
PHYSICAL SECURITY

ECONOMIC SECURITY NATIONAL VALUES

HARD POWER
National Defense
Homeland Security

Economic Opportunity
Jobs, Income Security

SOFT POWER
Diplomacy, Aid
Culture, Media

U.S. ECONOMY
Defense Industrial Base

Fiscal, Monetary
and Industrial
Policies

Human Resources
Education
Immigration

Competitive U.S. Industries

Innovation
Science
Technology

World Economy
Trade
Capital Flows

Source: Congressional Research Service

Other Roles of the Economy in National Security
The issues in Figure 1 comprise the focus of this report and are those emphasized in the 2010
National Security Strategy. The economy and economic tools, however, enter into national
security considerations in several other ways. These include economic sanctions, export controls,
economic incentives, expeditionary economics, and economic issues as a cause of conflict. They
are briefly presented here because of their relevance to current security policy.
Economic incentives or disincentives can be both an adjunct to and substitute for hard power. The
use of hard power or the threat of using it by the military often is buttressed by economic tools
such as financial and economic sanctions, financial incentives to change the behavior of potential
enemies before or during combat, or reestablishing a local economy after combat (expeditionary
economics).
Economic and financial sanctions lie between diplomacy and open warfare. They are used either
to punish countries for some action or to induce them to change their behavior without resorting
to kinetic means (shooting them). The sanctions on Iran and North Korea imposed by the United
Nations are two prominent examples of the use of this tool. Sanctions tend to be coercive but not
lethal and less likely to trigger open warfare. The efficacy of economic and financial sanctions,
such as a trade embargo, however, depends greatly on cooperation by countries near the target
country. In the North Korean case, although the trade and financial sanctions are being

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implemented by nations, such as South Korea, Japan, and the United States, they cannot work
well without the full cooperation of China.7
Related to economic sanctions are export controls. Under the Export Administration Act (P.L. 9672) Congress delegates to the Executive Branch the authority to regulate foreign commerce by
controlling exports of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. These are exports that have both
civilian and military applications and that may contribute to the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weaponry. Congress is considering reauthorizing and rewriting this act.
In the policy debates, there are those who advocate that controls be liberalized in order to
promote exports. Although exports of particular goods and technologies can adversely affect U.S.
national security, some argue that current export controls are too strict and hinder U.S. businesses
in competing for sales abroad. They claim that many products under export control are available
from other exporting countries and that the resultant loss of market share and jobs can harm the
U.S. economy. This, in turn, has a negative effect on U.S. national security. Others, however,
argue that further liberalization of export controls may compromise national security goals by
putting sensitive products into the hands of potential adversaries. Those in this camp tend to view
security concerns as being paramount in the U.S. export control system and that such controls can
be an effective method to thwart proliferators, terrorist states, and countries that can threaten U.S.
national security interests.8
As for the role of financial incentives as a weapon in open combat, armies have long been able to
buy loyalties, pay potential enemies not to fight, finance local security forces consisting of
unemployed potential insurgents, or offer rewards for the capture or killing of particular enemy
leaders. This goes beyond, for example, carrying sacks of money into meetings with tribal sheiks.
Such financial incentives can complement direct military campaigns by establishing a rewardbased system in which members of the local citizenry view siding with the U.S. military
preferable to aiding, or actually becoming, the adversary. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps
Small Wars Manual stresses the importance of focusing on the social, economic, and political
development of the people as well as on destruction. 9 In Iraq, the use of financial incentives and
the direct funding of armed Sunni militias as a key factor in the Awakening in Anbar province has
been extensively debated.10

7
See CRS Report R40684, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1874, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin and (name redacted). U.N. sanctions have resulted in several high-profile
interdictions of both weapons-related shipments and luxury goods bound for North Korea. The financial sanctions also
have made it more difficult for North Korea to operate in international markets. However, China constitutes a large gap
in the circle of countries that have approved U.N. Security Council resolutions and are expected to implement them.
China has interdicted some shipments of material to North Korea that were related directly to nuclear and ballistic
missiles, and it has cancelled a joint industrial project with a North Korean entity on the prohibited list. Still, China
takes a minimalist approach to implementing sanctions on North Korea. North Korea continues to use air and land
routes through China with little risk of inspection, and luxury goods from China and from other countries through
China continue to flow almost unabated to Pyongyang. In addition, North Korea reportedly uses front companies in
China to procure items under sanction.
8
Export controls are addressed in CRS Report RL31832, The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and
Debate, by (name redacted).
9
U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, c2009), 1-1 to 1-31; Max Boot, “A
Century of Small Wars Shows They Can be Won,” New York Times Week in Review, July 6, 2003.
10
See, for example, John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” The Washington Quarterly,
January 2009, p. 45. Nir Rosen, The Myth of the Surge, New America Foundation, Washington, DC, March 6, 2008.
American Forces Press Service, “U.S. Military Makes Last Payment to ‘Sons of Iraq’,” March 12, 2009. Roberto J.
González, “Bribing the “Tribes,” How Social Scientists Are Helping To Divide And Conquer Iraq,” Z Magazine,
(continued...)

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An emerging field of economics addresses how to re-establish a viable economy during or after
an invasion or counter-insurgency campaign. This is referred to as expeditionary economics. The
chaos and destruction following hot battles present an economic condition ripe for corruption and
extortion often with a security, economic, and governmental infrastructure that does not function.
Yet during and in the aftermath of war, street markets often thrive, vendors can price gouge, and
civilians have to go somewhere for food, water, and necessities. The questions of expeditionary
economics include who should set up and govern such markets (particularly if the existing
government has been toppled), how to allocate military resources between waging war and
providing security for citizens, and eventually how to build a self-sustaining economy. This
entails creating jobs, extending basic services to citizens, improving infrastructure, and making
progress toward fiscal sustainability.11 These are particularly difficult if they must be done while a
war or counter-insurgency campaign is being conducted—as is the case currently in Afghanistan.
A further role of economics in national security centers on economic factors as a contributor to
conflicts both among countries and within national borders. Access to resources, such as oil,
diamonds, water, and territory, continues to create tensions and can be a casus belli that either
may lead to overt hostilities between contesting countries or incite sectional and factional
violence within nations. The list of territorial claims in dispute among nations is long, and history
is replete with examples of conflicts over diamonds, oil, or other minerals. Even though the
sharing of resources, such as river water by India and Pakistan, can necessitate cooperation
between countries, it also holds the potential for conflict, although, so far, conflicts over water
have been minimal.

Macroeconomic Issues in National Security
At the macroeconomic level, the recession of 2008-2009 in combination with the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and rising costs for domestic social programs have pushed the U.S. budget deep into
deficit. Alarm bells have been sounding from many quarters that the nation is on an unsustainable
fiscal path.12 The issues for Congress include whether to slow the growth of the budget deficit and
how to do so without compromising national security, how to achieve a balance between military
and civilian expenditures, and whether a “peace dividend” is forthcoming as expenditures for the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan diminish.
Economic growth requires both sufficient demand on the macroeconomic level and increased
productivity at the microeconomic level. Microeconomic policies combine with monetary and
fiscal policies at the macroeconomic level to attempt to enlarge the overall size of the economy in
order to provide the “rising tide that lifts all ships.”

(...continued)
December 2008.
11
Leif Rosenberger, Expeditionary Economics (EE): From Aid … to Market & Trade, A presentation featured at the
2010 Topical Symposium: Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?, National Defense
University, Washington, DC, August 25, 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/
Economic_Security_ROSENBERGER_PPT.pdf.
12
See, for example, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Establishes Bipartisan National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, Press Release, Washington, DC, February 18, 2010.

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The Federal Deficit and Military Spending13
The macroeconomic debate centers on the federal government’s budget and its components in
general and military expenditures in particular. The expectation is that the current and projected
growth in the national debt is not sustainable and, given the slow recovery from the financial
crisis, the nation is facing a period of increased austerity that will compel deep cuts in the federal
budget. The question is when those cuts should be made and to what extent the Pentagon is to be
included or exempt from budget cuts. In August 2010, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the national debt is the single biggest threat to national security.14
In theory, the budget for the national security community, including the military and homeland
security, should be sufficient to address foreign threats, defend the homeland, prevail in ongoing
wars, and help define and advance U.S. interests abroad, including, to a certain extent, projecting
U.S. democratic values and human rights.15 In practice, there is considerable disagreement on
how best to address these tasks and the ways and means necessary to carry them out. Without
concurrence on the tasks, one can hardly expect a public policy consensus on the optimal size of
the military budget and whether the amount being spent is too great or too small. The line of
reasoning in the public debate, therefore, tends to be that the military budget is either too large or
too small relative to what the country can afford, to past expenditures, to the overall federal
budget, to what is spent on other programs, or to what other nations spend. Another line of
reasoning is that the military budget also is too large or too small relative to current war fighting
needs, to rising threats from non-state actors (such as terrorists) or from states with nuclear
weapon programs (such as North Korea and Iran), or for its participation in alleviating the effects
of natural disasters (such as earthquakes, tsunamis, infectious diseases, or climate change).
U.S. defense expenditures account for nearly $700 billion in annual budget outlays, including
some $400 billion in contracts for goods and services. 16 The impact on U.S. gross domestic
product exceeds $1 trillion. U.S. defense expenditures are roughly equal to those of the next 14
countries combined, 17 account for about 20% of the U.S. federal budget, and comprise an
estimated 4.9% of U.S. gross domestic product.18
Since the debate over military spending is quite extensive, a detailed review of that debate lies
beyond the purview of this report. Here we cite a statement from the Secretary of Defense plus
two representative studies, one for increasing or maintaining defense expenditures and the other
for considering cuts. We also present some relevant economic data.
In 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates called for significant cuts in defense spending. He has
outlined some details of his plans to save $100 billion over the next five years. This includes new
guidelines on how the Pentagon buys goods and services with more fixed price contracts, cutting

13
14

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Industry and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
Michael Cheek, “Mullen: National Debt is a Security Threat,” ExecutiveGov, August 27, 2010.

15
For the Pentagon’s assessment of defense needs, see U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review
Report, Washington, DC, February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
16
For details on the FY2011 defense appropriations bill, see CRS Report R41254, Defense: FY2011 Authorization and
Appropriations, coordinated by (name redacted).
17
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database.
18
See CRS Report RL34424, Trends in Discretionary Spending, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

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overhead, gaining efficiency, and closing the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia.19 (For
further discussion, see the section below on “Defense Acquisition and Contracting Process.)
Secretary Gates, however, has warned against sharp reductions in military spending, arguing that
such cuts would be “catastrophic” to national security. 20
In October 2010, the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and the Foreign Policy
Initiative issued a report claiming that the arguments frequently made for Pentagon spending cuts
are false and that the Pentagon is actually underfunded given the need for comprehensive military
modernization and to prepare fully for the wars of the future. The argument rests primarily on the
global reach and expanding responsibilities of the U.S. military, the need to update military
hardware, and the fact that spending on entitlements, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid,
has outstripped that of the Pentagon. The report noted that even if Pentagon spending of about
$700 billion were eliminated entirely, it would only halve the fiscal deficit of around $1.3 trillion
and hardly put a dent into the $13.6 trillion national debt.21 The report was followed by an op-ed
piece by the heads of the three authoring organizations that argued that a strong military is
necessary to keep the peace, and peace is required for global prosperity. Hence, military spending
is not a net drain on the U.S. economy. 22
A counter view of the debate has been put forward by the Sustainable Defense Task Force.23 On
June 11, 2010, it issued a report that concluded that at a time of “growing concern over federal
deficits, it is essential that all elements of the federal budget be subjected to careful scrutiny. The
Pentagon budget should be no exception.” The report presents options that the Task Force argues
could save up to $960 billion between 2011 and 2020. The options include recommendations that
focus on cutting programs based on unreliable or unproven technologies, missions and
capabilities with poor cost-benefit relationships, capabilities that mismatch or over-match current
and emerging challenges, and management reforms. 24 Based partly on this report, a group of 57
Members of Congress sent a letter to the Commission on Fiscal Responsibility calling on the
Commission to subject military spending to the same rigorous scrutiny that non-military spending
was to receive and to do it in a way that would not endanger national security.25
On December 1, 2010, the Commission released its proposals to reduce the budget deficit. These
proposals included $828 billion in deficit reduction between 2012 and 2015 through cuts in
discretionary spending, tax reform, health care cost containment, mandatory savings, Social
19
Jim Garamone, “Gates Calls for Significant Cuts in Defense Overhead,” American Forces Press Service, May 7,
2010. Dana Hedgpeth, “Gates starts outlining cuts to save $100 billion for defense,” The Washington Post, September
14, 2010. Karen Parrish, “Defense Officials Testify on Cost-saving Measures,” American Forces Press Service,
September 28, 2010.
20
Julian E. Barnes, “Gates Warns Against Defense Cuts,” WSJ Blogs, CEO Council, November 16, 2010.
21
The Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and the Foreign Policy Initiative, Defending Defense,
Setting the Record Straight on U.S. Military Spending Requirements, Washington, DC, October 2010.
22
Arthur C. Books, Edwin J. Feulner, and William Kristol, “Peace Doesn't Keep Itself,” The Wall Street Journal,
October 4, 2010, p. 25.
23
The Sustainable Defense Task Force was formed in response to a request from Representative Barney Frank (DMA), working in cooperation with Representative Walter B. Jones (R-NC), Representative Ron Paul (R-TX), and
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), to explore possible defense budget contributions to deficit reduction efforts that would
not compromise the essential security of the United States.
24
Sustainable Defense Task Force, Debt, Deficits, and Defense: A Way Forwrd, Washinton, DC, June 11, 2010, p. v.
25
Senator Ron Wyden, Rep. Barney Frank, et al., Letter to the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform, October 13, 2010. Available at http://www.house.gov/frank/docs/2010/fiscalcommissiondefenseletter.pdf.

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Security reform, and changes in the budget process. In particular, the Commission recommended
that both security and non-security discretionary spending be cut by an equal percentage. Since
security spending is twice as large as non-security discretionary spending, equal percentage cuts
imply that the amount of cuts in security spending would be twice as large as that in non-security
spending. 26
As shown in Figure 2, since 1980, the share of national defense (excluding Veteran’s Affairs) has
been declining after a bulge in the late 1980s. From 22% in 1980 it is now around 20%. The
figure also demonstrates the argument that defense alone will not solve the budget deficit
problem. Human resources command a larger share of the budget (67% in 2010).
Figure 2. Shares of the Federal Budget by Major Function

100

Percent of Budget
Other

Net Interest
Physical Resources

80

Human Resources

60

40

(Social Security, Medicare,
Health, Education, etc.)

28.1% in 1987
22.7% in 1980
Est. 19.6% in
2011

20

National Defense
0
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000 2
Fiscal Year

4

6

8

10*

*Estimate

Source: Office of Management and Budget, The White House, “The Budget, Historical Tables, Table 3.1—
Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2015.”

Figure 3 shows federal government budget outlays and receipts in trillions of current dollars.
This shows the dramatic impact of the global financial crisis on government revenues from 2008
and the gradual recovery expected through 2015. It also shows the steady increase across the
26

National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth, December 2010.
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf

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budget that has occurred since 2000 and the futility of trying to cut outlays enough to reduce the
budget deficit significantly without considering changes to entitlements (Health [mostly
Medicaid], Medicare, Social Security, and Income Security) in addition to the Other 27 category
and National Defense. Data in Figure 3 are not adjusted for inflation to show how actual
government outlays have changed relative to government receipts. While total receipts are
projected to recover as the economy recovers, government outlays are projected to continue to
rise. How much each will change depends greatly on actions by Congress.
Figure 3. Federal Government Budget Outlays and Receipts

5

$Trillions
National defense
Social security

Health
Net interest

Medicare
Other

Income security
Receipts

4
Other
Net Interest
3
Soc.
Sec.

Total Receipts
2

Inc. Sec.
Medicare

1

Health
National Defense

0
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000 2
Fiscal Year

4

6

8 10* 12* 14*
*Estimate

Source: Office of Management and Budget, The White House, “The Budget, Historical Tables, Table 3.1—
Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2015” and Table 1.1—Summary Of Receipts, Outlays, and
Surpluses or Deficits (−): 1789–2015.

Figure 4 shows the amount of gross federal debt and that held by the public (including the
Federal Reserve). The difference between the two amounts is that debt held in government
accounts. The total debt is the accumulation of federal budget deficits and surpluses. In 2009, at
$11.9 trillion, the gross debt amounted to 83% of U.S. annual gross domestic product. How much
27
Education, training, employment, social services, international affairs, general science, space and technology,
agriculture, administration of justice, general government, environment, and allowances less undistributed offsetting
receipts.

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of a burden is this on the U.S. economy? Currently, the Treasury has few problems in issuing
securities to fund the debt. Treasury securities are in such demand that in late October 2010, in
some secondary markets, investors were willing to accept negative interest rates.28 It is true that
China and Japan combined hold about $1.6 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities, and they are being
pressured to reduce their trade surpluses and, in the case of China, reduce their buying of dollar
assets in order to strengthen the dollar vis-à-vis the renminbi. In the short-term, therefore, the
financing of the deficit does not appear to be a problem. Over the medium- to long-term,
however, interest payments will take an increasingly larger share of the federal budget, and, as
world economies recover, investors may seek higher returns elsewhere. This could cause interest
rates to rise throughout the economy and reduce U.S. well-being as Americans are taxed to make
interest payments to foreign holders of U.S. debt and as fewer investments are made in U.S.
manufacturing and infrastructure because of higher interest costs. The national debt crises in
Iceland, Greece, and Ireland, moreover, have raised the specter of countries nearing default on
sovereign debts and requiring large rescue packages. Although the situation in the United States is
different, at some point markets could become greatly concerned over the large U.S. debt and
take actions adverse to U.S. interests. History has shown that when investors decide to dump a
country’s securities or currency, the drop in confidence is fast and the downward slope steep.29

28

“U.S. Department of the Treasury,” Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, October 2010.

29

Between 1970 and 2007, there were 63 sovereign debt crises and 208 currency crises in which the value of a
country’s currency fell by more than 30%. Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises: A New
Database, International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/008/24, Washington, DC, October 2008, p. 6.

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Figure 4. U.S. Federal Debt and as a Percent of GDP

30

$Trillions

Percent of GDP
*estimate

25

100

Gross Federal Debt
as a Percent of GDP
(Right Axis)

20

120

80

15

60
Gross Federal Debt

10

40

Federal Debt Held
by the Public

5

20

0

0
Federal Budget Deficit or Surplus

-5

-20
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000 2

4

6

8 10* 12* 14*

Fiscal Year
Source: Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Budget, Historical Tables, “Table 7.1—Federal
Debt At The End Of Year: 1940–2015.”
Notes: Gross Federal Debt is Debt Held by the Public (including the Federal Reserve) plus debt held in
Government accounts.

Reducing the Federal Budget Deficit30
The federal budget is currently on an unsustainable path over the next several decades. This is
primarily due to the impending retirement of baby boomers, rising life expectancy, and the
increasing cost of medical care. Under current policies, federal debt, as a consequence of longterm and persistent budget deficits, is projected to grow to levels that may threaten the
government’s ability to meet its security and non-security obligations. As part of the 2010
National Security Strategy, the President calls for achieving long-term fiscal sustainability. To
accomplish this goal, he calls for creating a responsible federal budget that reduces the budget
deficit by making the best use of taxpayer dollars and working with global partners and
institutions.31

30
31

Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Public Finance, Government and Finance Division.
2010 National Security Strategy, p. 34.

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The Administration initially proposed to work toward reducing the deficit using a multi-pronged
approach. Components of this approach include placing a three-year freeze (in nominal dollar
terms) on non-security discretionary spending, implementing a new fee on the largest financial
services companies to recoup taxpayer losses for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and
eliminating “tax loopholes and unnecessary subsidies.”32 The Administration also created the
above-mentioned bipartisan fiscal commission, which is tasked with providing recommendations
to generate additional budgetary savings and further improve the budget outlook in the mediumterm.33 Together, these proposals, also included in the President’s FY2011 Budget, are aimed at
cutting the deficit in half by the end of the President’s current term.
The current economic climate poses challenges to achieving the deficit reduction goals of the
NSS. Numerous actions taken by the federal government in FY2008 and FY2009 have had major
effects on the budget deficit, including two major economic stimulus measures and a variety of
programs in response to the financial turmoil.34 The impact of this legislation, along with health
care reform and any additional legislation enacted, will affect deficit levels in FY2010 and
beyond. The final costs of federal responses to the nation’s economic turmoil will also depend on
the pace of economic recovery, how well firms with federal credit guarantees weather future
financial shocks, and government losses or gains on its asset purchases.
Most budget analysts agree that deficit reduction is key over the long-term in order to stabilize the
economy and establish sound fiscal policy. However, the question over the short- to medium-term
is how to ensure the continuation of economic recovery, while, at the same time, providing
indications that the Administration and Congress are committed to improving the long-term
budget outlook. If a more sustainable fiscal path is not achieved, high budget deficits and the
resulting high levels of federal debt could limit the government’s flexibility in meeting its
obligations or in responding to the emerging national needs. Ultimately, failing to take action to
reduce the projected growth in the debt could potentially lead to future insolvency or government
default.

Traditional Microeconomic Issues in National Security
Microeconomics deals with individuals, households, businesses, and industrial sectors within the
macroeconomy. In addition to providing resources for the defense community needed to provide
physical security, the economy, itself, provides the means for Americans to attain economic
security. Such economic security in the context of national security has received stronger
emphasis in recent years.

32

For more information on the President’s proposal to freeze non-security discretionary spending, see CRS Report
R41174, Impact on the Federal Budget of Freezing Non-Security Discretionary Spending, by (name redacted).
33
By executive order, President Obama created the 18-member commission on February 18, 2010. The commission
comprises 12 sitting Members of Congress, appointed by Senate and House leaders, and 6 additional members
appointed by the President. The recommendations of the commission were required to be submitted to the President by
December 1, 2010, with 14 out of 18 votes needed to report recommendations. President of the United States, Executive
Order 13531—National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, February 18, 2010, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-national-commission-fiscal-responsibility-and-reform. See
also http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/.
34
For more information, see CRS Report R41073, Government Interventions in Response to Financial Turmoil, by
(name redacted) and (name redacted).

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Economic security is the condition of having stable income, employment, or entrepreneurial
support to maintain what one considers to be an acceptable standard of living. As is the case with
physical security, economic security can be an elusive concept. It is of most concern, perhaps, in
its absence: during recessions, periods of high unemployment and bankruptcy, and when there is a
gap between economic expectations and reality. When economic times are difficult, the tradeoff
between physical and economic security comes into clearer focus. Economic security depends
greatly upon (1) an economic growth rate sufficient to keep the rate of unemployment low and
provide opportunities for entrepreneurs, (2) U.S. industries able to compete in international
markets, and (3) U.S. leadership in science, technology, and innovation.
Historically, three microeconomic issues related to defense spending have generated considerable
political debate. The first is the sufficiency of the dedicated defense industry or what is often
called the defense industrial and technological base. This includes whether sufficient civilian
industrial capacity and relevant technology exists to support military procurement (particularly if
there is a surge in needs or a shift in security-related technology that necessitates new capabilities
such as in cyber warfare). The second deals with the Pentagon’s procurement and contracting
process and how to ensure the integrity of the defense supply chain. The third deals with how
defense dollars are spent in local communities and the level of spending that supports jobs in
specific areas—even if the expenditures are for products or roles deemed unnecessary by the
Pentagon (e.g. bases identified for closure or continued procurement of certain big-ticket military
hardware items).
In the following section, these three microeconomic issues are addressed. This is followed by a
section dealing with microeconomic factors that contribute to economic growth. The final section
deals with soft power issues: the international economy and foreign economic assistance, their
role in U.S. national security, and relevant policy issues. Each of these sections contain brief
overviews and provide some context and analysis. They are intended to serve both as a guide to
how the issues relate to national security and to the CRS analysts and CRS reports that deal with
the issues in greater detail.
The Defense Industrial Base and National Security
A post-World War II creation, the civilian defense industry maintains a reciprocal dependency relationship with the
security community. The defense and intelligence community depend on the civilian defense industry to provide them
with cost-effective and technologically sophisticated arms and equipment, while the industry depends on the
government for contracts. Some current issues deal with dual-use technology, globalization, integrity of the supply
chain (particularly for parts), the maintenance of unused industrial capacity unique to the military, mergers and
acquisitions among suppliers, the availability of skilled technical workers, and the influence of the industry in security
policy.

The Dedicated Defense Industry in the United States35
General perceptions and presidential cautions notwithstanding,36 the “military-industrial
complex” familiar to the casual reader of the Wall Street Journal is a relatively recent creation
that took shape during the mid-20th century.

35
36

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
See reference to President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address at the end of this section.

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For the first three quarters of the nation’s history, its defense industry was wholly owned by the
federal government, embodied in a number of federal arsenals operated by the War Department
and government shipyards within the Navy Department. In the preindustrial United States, with
small standing militaries and rare threats to the national defense, the output of this “arsenal
system,” augmented when necessary by purchases from foreign suppliers and contracts with
private gunsmiths and boat builders, proved adequate to meet the nation’s defense needs.
The advent of industrialization and mass mobilization for war, presaged by the nation’s
experience in the Civil War, initiated a gradual change in how the United States approached the
task of providing itself with weapons of war. Throughout the latter half of the 19th century, neither
the Army’s Ordnance Department nor the Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair could
reasonably be considered leaders in the introduction of innovative military technologies. Outside
reformers, such as the President or congressional committees, often had to push both the military
departments and private industry to create a significant domestic war production capacity. Even
so, the United States entered the 20th century with industrialization efforts focused on a rapidly
expanding commercial market. World-class military hardware, when deemed necessary, was
procured abroad from arms makers in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
The American entry into World War I in 1917 saw unprecedented mobilization of the industry and
manpower for the national defense. In many respects, though, the experience provided more
lessons in how not to mobilize industry than how to do so well. The sudden upsurge of material
needs in the Army and Navy overwhelmed the existing military procurement bureaucracies and
the government’s production facilities. Private industries pursuing suddenly lucrative production
contracts flooded the nation’s transportation system and led to a meltdown of the Army’s
distribution network. The popular image of the American doughboy using French and British
weapons in the trenches and flying French, Italian, and British aircraft can be seen as much a
result of the inadequacy of Army procurement and distribution practices than the technical
superiority of European industries.37
The lessons of the First World War were not lost on those who had to plan for a potential
American involvement in World War II twenty-three years later. For the nation’s industry, the
impact of the Great War had been mixed. Though military contracts had proven profitable,
procurement had been overestimated and uncoordinated, the level of technology incorporated in
weapon designs had been low relative to European arms, and type of contracts used had left
liability for early cancellation largely with the companies. The abrupt declaration of the Armistice
in November 1918 had caught many unawares, led to the abrupt termination of many contracts,
and precipitated thousands of court claims against the government.
Between the world wars, defense appropriations plummeted to relatively miniscule levels.
Industry demobilized, turning again to satisfying civilian demand, and the needs of the Army and
Navy could once again be satisfied largely by government arsenals and shipyards.
Paradoxically, the Great Depression helped to set the stage for the creation of a dedicated defense
industry. Military appropriations fell further—to the point that Congress authorized new Navy
construction one ship at a time—and the funds that were made available went to basic

37

By the end of 1917, the long-serving uniformed chiefs of both the Army’s Ordnance (procurement) and
Quartermaster (transportation) Departments had been sacked.

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procurement, not innovative technology development. 38 The rapid rearmament of Europe in the
mid-1930s and the large-scale Japanese assault on China provoked little response from the U.S.
government until the end of the decade, when Congress began increasing defense appropriations
and the War Department undertook to place as many procurement contracts with as wide a
supplier base as possible.
Even with a rapidly expanding domestic war materials market and major armed conflict raging in
Europe and Asia, private enterprise proved reluctant to invest in the war-specific productive
capacity needed to meet the potential demand. Instead, manufacturers remembered the industrial
dislocations of 1918 and 1919 and preferred to focus on a slowly recovering, but more reliable,
civilian market. Nevertheless, with both the Administration and Congress preparing for a
potential military conflict of unprecedented scale, industry had little choice but to negotiate plans
for potential war mobilization. The methods upon which the government agencies and
corporations eventually settled minimized corporate risk while retaining flexibility to meet
unanticipated demands: emphasis on subcontracting, temporary conversion of existing civilian
production capacity to war manufacturing, expansion of existing private plants, and construction
of government-financed, government-owned facilities that would be staffed and operated by
private corporations. While the war effort followed all four paths, the government-financed
expansion of private factories and the government construction of contractor-operated facilities
(the GOCOs) endured to form the core of the post-war military-industrial complex.
When the storm broke at the end of 1941 and the United States entered the conflict, the vastly
expanded production needs of the war again overwhelmed the production capacity of the
government’s arsenal system. This opened war material development and production to a number
of new, primarily civilian, players. Prominent among them, the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, independent of both War and Navy Departments, contracted for military research
and production of innovative weapons such as the proximity fuse, airborne radar, and the
bazooka. Congress encouraged industrial development by liberalizing private corporate financing
through accelerated asset depreciation and allowed the government to guarantee corporate debt.
The Defense Plant Corporation, a government corporation, purchased or built production
facilities operated by contractors. The Office of Production Management—later the War
Production Board—prioritized war material deliveries and controlled nonessential (nondefense)
production.
As the war neared its conclusion, procurement wound down, contracts were terminated,
temporary civilian agencies disbanded, and government controls on labor, finance, and industry
were eased. At war’s end, both armed services and industry demobilized. Defense appropriations
plummeted, and privately owned manufacturing capacity shifted back to civilian production,
straining to satisfy consumer demand held in check by a decade of depression and four years of
war.
But the U.S. could not return to its prewar posture. The nation’s position in world politics and
economics had changed fundamentally by 1945, having assumed worldwide responsibilities in
defense—as demonstrated by the Berlin Crisis, the rise of Communist governments in Europe and
Asia, and in an unexpected war in Korea. The problem, as seen by both the Truman and the
38

In 1934, allegations of misconduct in the award of airmail contracts to commercial air services prompted President
Franklin Roosevelt to cancel all outstanding contracts and ordered the Army Air Corps to take on the responsibility.
The military aircraft and crews proved unable to fly safely in poor weather, forcing the Post Office to resume using
civilian operators after only a few months.

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Eisenhower administrations, was to create a global defense at a price that would not cripple the
domestic economy. The solution that both presidents pursued was technology as a substitute for
high-cost manpower. U.S., indeed Western, defense would rely on a strategy of containing the
influence of the enemy, the Soviet Union, within a defined geographic area.
The military component of this containment strategy would not take the form of large, expensive
standing armies ringing the communist world. Rather, the threat of Soviet-inspired expansion
would be met with the threat of immediate, devastating attack with atomic, later thermonuclear,
weapons delivered by new aircraft, missiles, ships, and submarines.
The ensuing competition among the various military services to establish claims on this
unprecedented approach to high-technology warfare encouraged the rapid rise of something not
seen before, a peacetime civilian sector of industry dedicated to providing the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps with high-quality, cutting edge military systems. The focus on a nuclear
first line of defense combined with strategic alliances prompted a spirited competition among the
military services as each laid claim to some portion of the nuclear mission. The late 1940s and
1950s saw the creation of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command and development of the
intercontinental bombers—later missiles—able to carry nuclear bombs and warheads to any point
in the Soviet Union. Likewise, the Navy doubled the threat to Soviet targets, buying nuclearcapable aircraft and missiles and the large ships and submarines able to carry them close to the
Soviet border. Even the Army staked a claim, creating a doctrine for fighting a contaminated
ground war that would employ smaller nuclear weapons. Referred to as the Pentomic Army, these
atomic soldiers needed both weapons and specialized equipment to operate on the nuclear
battlefield.
The desire to minimize manpower and cost and maximize the effectiveness of firepower helped to
create an expectation that each new military system would perform significantly better than the
one it succeeded. This expectation eventually came to be shared by the military that conceived of,
managed, and used the systems, the legislators who paid for them, and the private corporations
that actually built them. Two important factors reinforced that expectation—the enduring
presence of the Soviet Union, a powerful, sophisticated peer adversary that could project its
presence globally, and the continued strengthening and consolidation of budgeting and program
control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
For the next half-century, each military department would have a well-defined protagonist against
whom it could plan a war, and each would be competing within a centralized budgeting process
for the wherewithal to fight it. As a result, the military departments demanded ever more capable
and sophisticated weapons and supporting systems, and private industry strove to meet the needs
of “the customer.”
As the Cold War continued, some companies, such as Lockheed, General Dynamics, Raytheon,
and others, devoted significant portions of their activities to defense projects. A number of
corporations came to specialize in serving particular defense niches. Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corporation (later Grumman Aerospace Corporation), for example, became known
as the premier builder of fixed wing aircraft for the Navy. Thus, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
could be moved to devote a significant portion of his 10-minute farewell address to the nation on
January 17, 1961 to this new phenomenon.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry.
American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But
now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been

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compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three
and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We
annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States
corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in
the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in
every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the
imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave
implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of
our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry
can compel the proper meshing of huge industrial and military machinery of defense with
our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.39

Defense Acquisition and Contracting Processes40
As part of the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama Administration expressed concern over
the perceived lack of management and oversight over Department of Defense procurement
spending, an amount which “accounts for approximately 70% of all Federal procurement
spending”41 and has stated its intention to reform “Federal contracting and strengthen contracting
practices and management oversight with a goal of saving Federal agencies $40 billion dollars a
year.”42

The Secretary of Defense’s Approach to DOD Business Operations Reform
Facing two wars, a large defense budget, spiraling contracting costs, and a decline in the breadth
and depth of the civilian, organic defense workforce, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has
made several announcements that are intended to fundamentally change DOD operations. In
April 2009 the Secretary announced his intention to embark on a plan to rebalance the workforce
by reducing the number of contractors and the percentage of contracted services, and, at the same
time, increase the size of the organic defense workforce.43

39

Farewell address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961; Final TV Talk 1/17/61 (1), Box 38, Speech
Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library; National Archives and Records
Administration.
40
Prepared by Valerie Grasso, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
41
2010 National Security Strategy, op cit., p. 34.
42
Ibid, p. 35.
43
Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
Arlington, VA, Monday, April 06, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=
1341.

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On August 9, 2010, Secretary Gates unveiled a direct and significant push to change the strategic
direction of the Department and improve the Department’s performance, oversight, and control of
critical services. 44 To accomplish this, he has proposed a reorganization and restructuring of the
Department’s business operations by taking the following actions: (1) shifting overhead costs to
force structure and future modernization accounts, (2) inviting outside experts to suggest ways the
Department can be more efficient, (3) conducting front end assessments to inform the FY2012
budget request, and (4) reducing excess and duplication across the defense enterprise.45
To achieve his objectives, the Secretary has announced a series of targeted, budget-cutting
initiatives designed to “reduce duplication, overhead and excess, and instill a culture of savings
and restraint across DOD.”46 The impact of these initiatives could be significant and include (but
are not limited to) the following reductions. 47
•

Reducing funding for service support contractors by 10% a year for each of the next
three years, and no longer automatically replacing departing contractors with fulltime personnel.

•

Freezing the number of Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agency and
combatant command positions at the FY2010 levels for the next three years. Other
than changes planned for FY2010, no more full-time positions in these
organizations will be created after this fiscal year to replace contractors. Some
exceptions can be made for critical areas such as the acquisition workforce.

•

Freezing at FY2010 levels the number of senior positions—civilian senior
executive and active General and Flag Officers. A senior task force is to assess the
number and location of senior positions, as well as the overhead and accoutrements
that go with them, with results due by November 1, 2010. Gates expected the task
force to recommend cutting at least 50 General and Flag-officer positions and 150
senior civilian executive positions over the next two years.

•

Authorizing each of the military departments to consider consolidation or closure of
excess bases and other facilities where appropriate.

•

Freezing the overall number of DoD-required oversight reports. Immediately
cutting the dollars allocated to advisory studies by 25%, and henceforth, publishing
the actual cost of preparing each report and study prepared by DoD. Conducting a
comprehensive review of all oversight reports, and using the results to reduce the
volume generated internally.

•

Directing an immediate 10% reduction in funding for intelligence advisory and
assistance contracts and freezing the number of senior executive positions in
defense intelligence organizations. Conducting a zero-based review of the
department’s intelligence missions, organizations, relationships, and contracts.

44

Garamone, Jim, “Gates Puts Meat on Bones of Department Efficiencies Initiative,” American Forces Press Service,
August 9, 2010.
45
U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Efficiency Initiatives, Memorandum for Secretaries of the
Military Departments. Robert M. Gates, August 16, 2010.
46
Ibid, p. 1.
47
For the complete list of initiatives, see U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Efficiency Initiatives.
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments. Robert M. Gates, August 16, 2010. The complete list of
proposed efficiency initiatives can be viewed at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0810_effinit/.

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•

Eliminating organizations that perform duplicative functions or have outlived their
original purpose, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration, also known as NII, and organization within
the Joint Staff’s J6 Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems,
the Business Transformation Agency, and the Joint Forces Command.

Analysis48
The NSS objective for procurement reform reflects the view that the federal government has to
become more fiscally accountable to its citizens, and that the policies of past Administrations—
through outsourcing, privatization, competitive sourcing, and managed competitions through
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76—have largely resulted in an increased
presence and use of private sector contractors. In spite of the increased use of contractors, the
federal government has not to date produced a complete and detailed analysis of the costs and
footprint of the contractor workforce or the range of services that contractors perform for the
federal government. This NSS objective also reflects the Obama Administration’s stated view that
DOD, like the rest of the federal government, should carefully identify ways to reduce its
overhead, eliminate wasteful and duplicative programs, and pursue ways to economize and
increase the efficiency of its business operations.
The Secretary’s planned budget reductions as described here represent a significant attempt to
restructure and reduce DOD business operations. These reductions would affect every aspect of
DOD operations and particularly highlight those contracted services that have been the subject of
public scrutiny largely because the nature of the contracts make transparency difficult—such as
the 25% reductions in funding for advisory studies, studies conducted by existing boards and
commissions, and a 10% reduction in funding for intelligence advisory and assistance contractors.
It is difficult to fully evaluate the efficacy of the Secretary’s plan given that the plan was not
accompanied with specifics on how DOD arrived at these budgeting and programmatic decisions.
The impact of such reductions on the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD business operations
remains uncertain. Whether these reductions will achieve real budget savings or improve DOD
business operations is a question that will be raised by both proponents and opponents.
Eliminating DOD agencies and components will, in all likelihood, result in a reduction of
personnel as some positions and possibly functions will be eliminated. However, critical and
inherently governmental functions will need to shift to other DOD agencies and components. The
extent to which this happens will affect the size of the reductions in the defense budget. The 10%
reduction for all service support contractors would reduce the size of the contractor workforce
and might shed light on the breadth and scope of services actually rendered by the contractor
workforce. Without a clear sense of the long-term costs of all DOD personnel—be they
contractor, civilian, or uniformed military—as well as which personnel would be most affected by
the proposed reductions—the question remains as to the impact of the Secretary’s proposed
reductions on the long-term personnel costs and on the future performance of the Department of
Defense.
Given the challenges facing the Department, these proposed reductions could (and may likely)
serve as a starting point to consider deeper cuts and perhaps help the Department to prepare itself
48

Prepared by Valerie Grasso, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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for additional restructuring and reshaping. Many of the initiatives proposed will take months, if
not years, to develop and will likely take longer to begin to harvest the benefits and savings.

Base Closures and the Local Impact of Defense Spending49
Even though the primary purpose of the U.S. defense establishment is to provide security from
foreign threats, expenditures both for procurement and by service personnel, themselves, have a
significant impact on many local communities. When bases are closed or procurement contracts
or programs are cancelled, the employment and expenditure multiplier effects often can be large
and usually generate considerable political pressures.
In September 2005, a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission submitted its final
report to the Administration and implementation is proceeding. 50 Congress can override the
recommendations by disapproving the list of closures as a whole, but the President can veto the
action.
The issue with base closures and loss of defense contracts often has less to do with protecting the
nation than with defending the economic security of those affected. What can be said is that the
economic impact, in general, is proportional to the size of the facility or contract relative to the
size and resources of the local economy, the types of workers involved (whether they have the
skills to find jobs in other industries), and whether the loss is primarily of household expenditures
by military personnel (groceries, gasoline, rents, etc.) or of contracts needed to maintain capitaland skill-intensive manufacturing facilities (e.g. shipbuilding or aircraft production).
Economic impact studies of such actions often rely on multiplier effects. These are defined either
as the number of jobs in the community generated by each job paid for by the military or by how
much economic activity is generated in the local community by a dollar spent by the military. For
the employment multiplier, the concept is that each direct job created generates indirect
employment by those industries that support that job holder. For the income multiplier, the
concept is that a dollar spent in the local community is then re-spent as purchases are made
through the relevant supply chain. The more of each dollar that is spent (not saved) at each round
and the less that is spent on imports the higher the multiplier effect. These multipliers can range
from less than 1 to as much as 2.5 or 3.0 depending on the nature of the military expenditure, and
the economic conditions in the community. When considering a base closure or loss of large
procurement program, the multiplier also depends on the resiliency of the workforce and the
length of the period of adjustment. 51 The more quickly the bases are converted to civilian use, the
higher the value of underlying real estate, the lower the clean-up costs, and the more vibrant the
local and national economy, the lower the impact of the base closure on the local communities.

49

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Industry and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
For information on BRAC, see CRS Report RS22291, Military Base Closures: Highlights of the 2005 BRAC
Commission Report and Its Additional Proposed Legislation, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). For
information on Ft. Belvior, VA, and other effects on the region, see Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness
and Center for Regional Analysis, Assessing the Impact of BRAC in the Northern Virginia Workforce Investment Board
Region, Executive Summary, July 21, 2007; and Jim Turkel, Fort Belvoir BRAC, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
February 2, 2009, Power Point Presentation.
51
For further information, see CRS Report RS22147, Military Base Closures: Socioeconomic Impacts, by (name re
dacted) and (name redacted).
50

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For communities that are adversely affected by a base closure or loss of a large procurement
contract or program, the adjustment period for securing new jobs can be difficult and is normally
longer than four years, with some communities requiring up to 20 years.52 Base realignments or
program cuts also have a fiscal effect on local governments as they deal with changes in their
revenue base and issues such as a mismatch between existing infrastructure (particularly roads
and schools) and the needs of the military. A Government Accountability Office study of 73 base
closures over the 1988 to 2003 period found that the percent of jobs recovered by local
communities ranged from 0% to more than 1,000%.53
The Office of Economic Adjustment serves as the Defense Department’s primary source for
assisting communities that are adversely affected by changes in Defense programs. The Office
offers technical and financial assistance and coordinates the involvement of other federal
agencies.54

Economic Growth and Broad Conceptions of
Security
A microeconomic issue that equally falls into the macroeconomic realm is the rate of economic
growth of the whole economy. The rate of economic growth stems from both demand and supply.
On the demand side are macroeconomic policies that affect total household consumption,
business investment, government spending, and the balance of trade. The above discussion of the
federal budget and total military expenditures is part of the demand side of the economic debate.
On the supply side are microeconomic policies that affect labor productivity, innovation, and the
efficient use of labor and capital. The government policies that affect the supply side of the
economy range from taxes to education, to research and development, and to immigration. In the
following analysis, we exclude discussion of tax policy, an important component of U.S.
industrial competitiveness and entrepreneurship but beyond the purview of this report.55 Instead,
we focus on those items that have been addressed in the 2010 National Security Strategy of the
United States and tend to be more directly related to U.S. national security.
On a global basis, the importance of economic growth to national security was demonstrated in
the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. In February 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis
C. Blair stated in a congressional hearing that instability in countries around the world caused by
the current global economic crisis, rather than terrorism, was the primary near-term security threat
to the United States. The slowdown in growth was causing instability in governments, and he
feared that U.S. allies and friends would not be able to fully meet their defense and humanitarian
obligations. He also saw the prospect of increased refugee flows and a questioning of American

52

Department of Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment, Economic Transition of BRAC Sites, Major Base Closure
and Realignments 1988 -2005, Washington, DC, December 2006, p. 3. The spreadsheets with updated data are
available at http://140.185.104.240/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=220&template=modal.
53
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Base Closures, Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and
Closures, GAO-05-138, January 5, 2005, pp. 35-37.
54
The Office of Economic Adjustment’s home page is at http://www.oea.gov/.
55
For an analysis of business taxes, see CRS Report R41117, Business Tax Issues in 2010, by (name redacted) and
(name redacted).

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economic and financial leadership in the world. 56 While this report focuses on the sources of U.S.
economic growth, these factors operate to promote growth in other countries as well.

Human Capital
Economic growth is highly dependent on increasing the productivity of workers. In this era of a
knowledge-based economy, this increase in productivity depends as much on education and
training as in traditional investments in hardware and equipment. Knowledge is not only a
product that can be bought and sold, but it is a tool that can be used to produce economic and
security benefits. It depends greatly on the ability of workers to generate and use knowledge in
the production process, which, in turn, depends on the skill and education of workers.
Education also plays into national security concerns through the ability of Americans to
understand foreign countries and cultures and to speak certain foreign languages, such as Arabic
and Chinese. In addition, technical and engineering education provides the United States with
workers who can provide direct security benefits, such as technological innovation that keeps the
military at the forefront of technological capabilities and engineering skill that provides advanced
weaponry as well as a secure infrastructure.
U.S. Student Performance
In the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s annual survey of the knowledge and skills of 15year-old students in 70 countries, the United States ranked 14th out of 34 OECD countries for reading skills, 17th for
science, and 25th for mathematics. China was ranked ahead of the United States in all three categories.57

College, K-12, and Early Childhood Education58
The 2010 National Security Strategy proposes that the United States would benefit from
improving education at all levels so that American children can succeed in a global economy. The
NSS supports a comprehensive, developmental approach to education, which includes early
childhood education, elementary and secondary education, postsecondary education, and job
training. The NSS states that one major goal of improving education is to restore U.S. leadership
in higher education by having the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by 2020.

Context
The federal government supports early childhood care and general education programs from birth
through adulthood. Major congressional efforts to enact legislation and support education at all
levels took place in the 1960s.59 To date, Congress has enacted legislation that supports early
56
Walter Pincus and Joby Warrick, “Financial Crisis Called Top Security Threat to U.S.,” Washington Post, February
13, 2009, Internet edition.
57
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PISA 2009 Results: What Students Know and Can Do:
Student Performance in Reading, Mathematics and Science (Volume I), Comparing Countries’ and Economies’
Performance, July 10, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/document/53/
0,3343,en_32252351_46584327_46584821_1_1_1_1,00.html.
58
Prepared by Erin Lomax, Analyst in Education Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.
59
Legislation supporting some education programs (e.g., early childhood programs, vocational education, and some job
training programs) was enacted before the 1960s. The expansion of federal support for these programs generally
occurred in the 1960s.

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childhood education, elementary and secondary education, career and technical education,
postsecondary education, and adult education and job training. The remainder of this section
outlines the legislative context of support for education from early childhood education to adult
education and job training programs.
Federal support for early childhood programs comes in many forms, ranging from grant programs
to tax provisions. Some programs serve as specifically dedicated funding sources for child care
services or education programs. For other programs, child care is just one of many purposes for
which funds may be used.60 Until recently, support for early childhood care and education
programs have been separate from general education programs for older children, youth, and
adults. For example, the largest source of federal funding for comprehensive early childhood
education is the Head Start program,61 which is administered by Health and Human Services. A
recent congressional hearing, however, indicated some interest in incorporating early childhood
education programs into traditional elementary schools. 62
The primary legislation supporting elementary and secondary education is the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110).63 Congress has employed a variety of strategies to support
elementary and secondary education, including (1) compensatory education programs, in which
federal funding is provided to support the education of disadvantaged students; (2) civil rights
statutes, which prohibit discrimination among students according to criteria such as race, color,
national origin, or sex, and which require that a free appropriate public education be made
available to students with disabilities; (3) standards-based reforms, under which recipients of
federal education funding are required to implement challenging educational standards and
assessments; and (4) market-based reforms, which permit parents to signal their educational
preferences by choosing their children’s schools.
The Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act of 1998 (Perkins Act; P.L. 105-332)
is the main source of specific federal funding for vocational education. 64 Vocational education
programs provide occupational preparation mostly at the high school level and at less-than-fouryear postsecondary institutions, such as community colleges. At the high school level, vocational
courses can be classified into three groups: (1) consumer and homemaking education, (2) general
labor market preparation providing general skills that are not related to a particular occupational
field, and (3) specific labor market preparation in occupational fields. At the postsecondary level,
community colleges provide vocational courses that are more broad and can cover areas such as
computer programming and engineering technology.
60
For more information on early childhood care and education programs, see CRS Report R40212, Early Childhood
Care and Education Programs: Background and Funding, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
61
The Head Start program is authorized by P.L. 110-134.
62
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, ESEA Reauthorization: Early
Childhood Education, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 25, 2010.
63
Other major laws relevant to elementary and secondary education include the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA; P.L. 108-446), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 93-112). For more information on the
ESEA, see CRS Report RL33960, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as Amended by the No Child Left
Behind Act: A Primer, by (name redacted).
64
Considerably more federal funding is provided indirectly for postsecondary vocational education through loans and
grants to students attending community colleges and proprietary schools who may enroll in vocational programs. For
more information on the Perkins Act, see CRS Report RL31747, The Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical
Education Act of 1998: Background and Implementation, by (name redacted).

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The largest federal postsecondary education programs are the federal student aid programs
authorized under the Higher Education Act (HEA), federal tax benefits administered through the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and veterans’ education assistance programs.65 The federal
government also supports postsecondary education through a number of targeted programs. For
example, several HEA programs authorize the provision of direct assistance to institutions of
higher education that serve large proportions of low-income individuals and individuals from
minority populations. Other HEA programs support the provision of services and incentives to
help disadvantaged students increase their secondary or postsecondary educational attainment.
The HEA also provides some support for the education and training of workers in certain fields or
occupations, such as teaching and science and engineering occupations.
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA; P.L. 105-220) is the primary federal workforce
development legislation that aims to increase coordination among federal workforce development
and related programs. The majority of WIA funding provides support for job training programs,
which provide a combination of education and training services to prepare individuals for work
and to help them improve their prospects in the labor market. WIA also provides funding for the
Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), which supports an array of literacy programs
targeted to help adults obtain literacy and complete secondary education.66

Analysis
In the 2010 NSS President Obama proposes to ensure national security by providing a “complete
and competitive” education for all Americans, from early childhood through adulthood. The NSS
provides limited detail on the legislative means by which education would be supported; it is
unclear whether the NSS proposes to support existing programs, design new programs, or work to
align current education programs from early childhood through adulthood.
The primary, measureable education goal stated in this section of the NSS is “to restore U.S.
leadership in higher education by seeking the goal of leading the world in the proportion of
college graduates by 2020.” At face value, this measureable goal seems to focus on supporting
early childhood education, elementary and secondary education, and postsecondary education. It
is not directly linked to promoting or supporting career and technical education or adult education
and job training programs. While some career and technical education programs lead to college
degrees from less-than-four-year postsecondary institutions, it is unclear whether these degrees
are included in the stated NSS goal. If the primary goal is to increase the proportion of college
graduates by 2020, the Administration may seek to focus on college-readiness in elementary and
secondary education67 and promoting access to postsecondary education.68
65

For more information on campus-based financial aid programs, see CRS Report RL31618, Campus-Based Student
Financial Aid Programs Under the Higher Education Act, by (name redacted).
66
For more information on WIA, see CRS Report R41135, The Workforce Investment Act and the One-Stop Delivery
System, by (name redacted)
67
The Administration has expressed support for “college- and career-readiness” in elementary and secondary
education. In the Administration’s proposal to reauthorize the ESEA, states must adopt academic standards that
promote college- and career-readiness for all students. For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, A
Blueprint for Reform: The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Washington, DC, March
2010, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf.
68
The Administration has requested significant changes and increases in appropriations to the Federal Pell Grant
program, which helps insure access to postsecondary education by providing grant aid to low-and middle-income
undergraduate students. For more information, see the U.S. Department of Education’s FY2011 Budget Justifications at
(continued...)

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One potential disadvantage of focusing on increasing the proportion of college graduates by 2020
is the possibility of losing focus on job training and worker retraining programs. With record
unemployment rates and a changing economy, the workforce may require more job training and
worker retraining programs in order to promote high-demand skills in emerging industries. The
NSS recognizes that promoting job training programs and high-demand skills in emerging
industries is an important factor in our national security; however, without a stated measureable
objective, the extent to which these programs would be supported is unclear.

Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education69
The 2010 National Security Strategy includes several science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) education provisions. As a question of domestic policy, the STEM
education provisions are relatively generic in nature, consistent with existing federal policy, and
likely to reflect consensus opinion. Nevertheless, policymakers continue to debate how to assure
a capable national scientific and technological workforce and the role of the U.S. STEM
education system in that process. A number of CRS reports explore various aspects of these issues
in greater detail.70

Context
American innovations in science and technology played a central role in ensuring national
prosperity and power over the last century. From the first mechanically propelled flight of the
Wright brothers in 1903 to the development of Google in the 1990s, U.S. scientific and
technological innovations have reshaped the global economy and provided economic mobility
and security for generations of Americans.
Many analysts believe a combination of internal weaknesses and external threats now call the
nation’s historic edge in science and technology into question. In an influential report, Rising
Above the Gathering Storm, 71 the National Academies asserted that the United States is at risk of
losing its comparative advantage in science and technology. In support of this claim, the
Academies cited indications of weakness in the domestic STEM education system and of a
growing threat from other nations in STEM education and achievement.
A suite of data capturing trends in education outputs (e.g. graduation rates) and inputs (e.g.
teacher training) drive concerns about the performance of the U.S. STEM education system. 72
(...continued)
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget11/justifications/o-saoverview.pdf.
69
Prepared by Heather Gonzales, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
70
For additional information see CRS Report R41231, America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 5116)
and the America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69): Selected Policy Issues, coordinated by (name redacted); CRS
Report 98-871, Science, Engineering, and Mathematics Education: Status and Issues, by (name redacted); and
CRS Report RL33434, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education: Background, Federal
Policy, and Legislative Action, by (name redacted).
71
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, Committee on
Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century: An Agenda for America Science and Technology, and
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing
America for a Brighter Economic Future, National Academies Press, 2007, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11463.html.
72
For a comprehensive view of these data, see National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010,
(continued...)

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Among the data most frequently cited as worrisome are U.S. student achievement on science and
mathematics tests and STEM degree attainment. On average, U.S. elementary and secondary
students lag behind other nations on international STEM tests.73 The percentage of U.S. 24-yearolds with STEM degrees is lower than that of many other nations.74 Many analysts believe this
data suggests challenges for the future scientific and technological workforce and the nation’s
capacity for innovation.
Achievement gaps in mathematics and science between various demographic groups also raise
concerns. For example, the average scores of white and Hispanic 17-year-olds on a 2008
nationwide mathematics test75 differed by 21 points. 76 Many analysts believe that traditionally
underrepresented groups must increase their STEM achievements in order to ensure a stable
domestic supply of scientific and technological labor as the national demographic profile shifts
over the next century.

Analysis
In the 2010 National Security Strategy President Obama proposes to ensure national security
partly by investing in STEM education, improving the quality of mathematics and science
teaching, and by expanding education and career opportunities for underrepresented groups. The
President argues these provisions will strengthen human capital and contribute to national
prosperity and security.
As a matter of national security policy, the inclusion of STEM education in the President’s 2010
National Security Strategy represents a change from similar statements produced by the George
W. Bush Administration. This change may be significant to national security analysts, whose
opinions on the inclusion of domestic concerns in national security policy differ. 77
Considered through a domestic policy lens, the STEM education provisions of the President’s
2010 National Security Strategy may have little practical effect on federal policy. Both the Obama
and Bush Administrations78 have supported federal policies that seek to improve U.S. STEM
(...continued)
National Science Foundation, January 15, 2010, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/start.htm.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid. This is a standard metric for measuring degree attainment among the college-age population.
75
Bob Rampey, Gloria Dion, and Patricia Donahue, NAEP 2008 Trends in Academic Progress, U.S. Department of
Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, NCES 2009–479, April 2009,
http://nationsreportcard.gov/ltt_2008/ltt0005.asp?subtab_id=Tab_3&tab_id=tab3#chart.
76
Some education analysts estimate that ten points on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
represents approximately a single grade level.
77
For several perspectives on this debate, see Samuel (Sandy) R. Berger, “Obama’s National Security Strategy: A
Little George Bush, A Lot of Bill Clinton,” Washington Post, May 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052804466.html; Donald Losman, “Economic Security: A National Security
Folly?,” Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 409, August 1, 2001, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1268;
Michael Gerson, “The Promise of National Security, with a Straight Face,” Washington Post, June 3, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2010060102505.html; and Peter Feaver,
“Obama’s National Security Strategy: Real Change or Bush Lite?,” Shadow Government Blog (Foreign Policy), May
27, 2010, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/27/
obama_s_national_security_strategy_real_change_or_just_bush_lite.
78
For an example, see Domestic Policy Counsel, Office of Science and Technology Policy, American Competitiveness
Initiative, February 2006, http://www.nsf.gov/attachments/108276/public/ACI.pdf.

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education as a means to strengthen the economy. Congressional support for the 2007 America
COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69), which in part sought to improve economic competitiveness
through STEM education, reflects a similar position. In this sense, the STEM education
provisions of the National Security Strategy are broadly consistent with existing federal policy.
Nevertheless, many issues in federal STEM education policy remain contentious. While the
STEM education provisions of the President’s 2010 National Security Strategy reflect consensus
positions by and large, generally speaking, opinions vary on how to implement these objectives.
For example, observers disagree about whether the problem with the U.S. scientific and
technological workforce is on the supply side or the demand side. The general consensus seems to
be that the U.S. is not producing enough STEM graduates and scientifically literate citizens.79 As
a result, policymakers have paid much attention to policies that seek to increase the supply of
STEM-trained workers, such as reforms to improve STEM teaching or increase financial aid for
STEM college students.
Other analysts argue that the pursuit of supply side solutions fails to address demand side factors
like the limited attractiveness of scientific careers80 and differential employment rates in certain
STEM fields (for example, surpluses in the life sciences and shortages in engineering). 81 These
analysts argue that the U.S. STEM education system may actually produce too many scientists.
They suggest more attention to policies addressing demand side factors, such as increasing the
number of tenure-track jobs and providing grants for early-career scientists.
Beyond the supply-demand debate are other questions about the relative value of STEM
education data, the interpretation of that data, and implications for policymaking. Reformers
sometimes argue that poor student performance on mathematics and science tests, among other
things, indicates a need to overhaul the U.S. STEM education system.82 Other analysts dispute
claims that poor performance on average should be interpreted as suggesting general reform of
the U.S. STEM education system. The data, they argue, show that the U.S. is a top producer of
the highest- and lowest-scoring students. This distinction, they claim, merits a subtler policy
response targeting only low-performing students. 83
Other issues in STEM education policy include debates about whether STEM education reform
can or should be undertaken outside of general education reform. The scope and scale of federal
STEM education programs is also an open question. Some studies have found a lack of
coordination, or even of an accurate count of federal STEM education programs. STEM
advocates have also advanced a variety of policy options—for example, hands-on learning,
79

This includes both STEM majors who go on to become scientists and scientifically literate non-STEM majors. For
one example of proponents of this position, see American Electronics Association and others, Tapping America’s
Potential, July 2005, http://library.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/050727_tapstatement.pdf.
80
For example, see Beryl Lieff Benderly, “Does the U.S. Produce Too Many Scientists?” Scientific American,
February 22, 2010, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=does-the-us-produce-too-m.
81
Ron Hira, “U.S. Policy and the STEM Workforce System,” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 53: no. 7 (2010), pp.
949-961.
82
For example, see U.S. Department of Education, National Mathematics Advisory Panel, Foundations for Success:
The Final Report of the National Mathematics Advisory Panel, March 2008, http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/
mathpanel/report/final-report.pdf.
83
Hal Salzman and Lindsey Lowell, “Making the Grade,” Nature, vol. 453: no. 1 (May 2008), http://www.nature.com/
nature/journal/v453/n7191/full/453028a.html.

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specialty schools, or teacher training—designed to address various perceived deficiencies.
However, in some cases a dearth of definitive research establishing underlying assumptions adds
a degree of uncertainty to these recommendations.

International Education and Exchange84
According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, notwithstanding the “pervasiveness of the
English language and American cultural influence,” the United States must increase its efforts to
promote international education and exchange in order to succeed in the global economy. To this
end, the Administration proposes to “support programs that cultivate interest and scholarship in
foreign languages and intercultural affairs, including international exchange programs … [and]
welcome more foreign students to our shores.”85 Policy recommendations beyond this general
support for current programs are not specified in this section of the NSS.

Context
According to the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) of Government-Sponsored International
Exchange and Training, the federal investment in this area was over $1.5 billion in FY2008. 86
That year, 250 programs supporting international exchange and training were administered by 15
cabinet-level departments and 51 independent agencies and commissions. Over 2.4 million
people participated in these programs worldwide in FY2008; roughly 55,000 were “U.S.
participants.”87 The IAWG found that programs administered by the State Department accounted
for 45% of all FY2008 U.S. participants.88
The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Office administers the State Department’s
numerous exchange programs, most of which are authorized by the Mutual Education and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (also known as the Fulbright-Hayes Act). The two largest of these
programs, the Citizen Exchange and Fulbright Programs, sent nearly 10,000 Americans abroad in
FY2008.89 The number of Americans studying abroad through federally sponsored programs is
dwarfed by the number that do so without federal support. During the 2007-2008 school year, a
total of 262,416 U.S. students studied abroad.90 This is more than double the number studying

84
Prepared by Jeff Kuenzi, Specialist in Education Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division. For more information on
these issues see CRS Report RL31625, Foreign Language and International Studies: Federal Aid Under Title VI of the
Higher Education Act, by (name redacted), and CRS Report R40989, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and
Current Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
85
NSS, p. 29.
86
Maura M. Pally, FY 2009 Annual Report (Includes FY 2008 Inventory of Programs), Interagency Working Group on
United States Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training, Washington, DC, 2009, p. 14. It should be
noted that the IAWG “define[s] these programs broadly, collecting data on programs that include individuals who
receive training in their home countries or who benefit from alternative technological approaches…(such as digital
video conferences, distance learning programs, and other remote communications,” FY2009 Annual Report, p. 13.
Moreover, the inventory includes programs supporting a wide range of activities from year-long fellowships to half-day
seminars. All annual inventories are available at http://www.iawg.gov/reports/annual/.
87
Ibid, p. 14.
88
Ibid, p. 17.
89
Ibid, pp. 199-200.
90
Institute of International Education, Open Doors 2009, New York, NY, 2009, Table 20.

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abroad a decade earlier (113,959 in 1997-1998) and over five times the number (48,483) doing so
during the 1985-1986 school year.91
The major federal programs supporting foreign language and area studies at U.S. colleges and
universities originated in the National Defense Education Act of 1958. These programs were
consolidated into Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) by the Education
Amendments of 1980 and are administered by the U.S. Education Department (ED). The impact
of federal assistance to post-secondary institutions may be evident in the growth of foreign
language bachelor’s degrees awarded since enactment. The number of such degrees increased
from 4,527 at the end of the 1959-1960 school year to 19,457 in 1969-1970.92 Foreign language
degree output began to dwindle by the late 1970s, falling to 11,550 in 1985-1986, and has since
steadily increased to 20,977 in 2007-2008.93 Meanwhile, bach

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41589. Public record. Not legal advice.