# American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41416 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** February 19, 2014 - **Citation:** R41416 ## Text American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat /name redacted/ Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism February 19, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41416 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings. Congressional Research Service American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem ........................................................................... 1 How Do People Become Violent Jihadists? ........................................................................ 2 Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots ............................................................................... 2 Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists ................................................................................. 3 Preventive Policing ............................................................................................................. 3 State and Local Authorities ................................................................................................. 4 Investigative Approaches .................................................................................................... 4 Trust and Partnership........................................................................................................... 4 Balancing Security and Liberty ........................................................................................... 4 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 5 Homegrown Violent Jihadists .......................................................................................................... 7 Shortcomings and Strengths ...................................................................................................... 8 Radicalization and Violent Extremism .......................................................................................... 12 From Radicalization to Violent Extremism ............................................................................. 12 Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists ....................................................................... 13 Intermediaries .................................................................................................................... 14 Social Networks ................................................................................................................ 20 The Internet ....................................................................................................................... 22 Jailhouse Jihadism ............................................................................................................. 25 Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks .................................... 27 Overarching Themes................................................................................................................ 27 A Variety of Endgames ...................................................................................................... 28 Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom ......................................................................... 37 The Success of Lone Wolves............................................................................................. 38 Varied Capabilities ............................................................................................................ 39 Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities ......................................................... 41 Intelligence Approaches .......................................................................................................... 42 Preventive Policing ........................................................................................................... 43 The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement....................................................................... 49 Investigative Approaches......................................................................................................... 52 The Capone Approach ....................................................................................................... 52 Agent Provocateur Cases .................................................................................................. 53 Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership ............................................. 59 Engagement and Community Policing .................................................................................... 59 The Tension between Enforcement and Engagement Activities.............................................. 60 Figures Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context ............................................................................................... 42 Congressional Research Service American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Tables Table B-1. Homegrown Violent Jihadist Attacks and Plots since 9/11: Terrorist Profile and Training .............................................................................................................................. 153 Table B-2. Homegrown Violent Jihadist Attacks and Plots since 9/11: Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools ............................................................................................................. 155 Appendixes Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots........................ 66 Appendix B. Tables...................................................................................................................... 153 Contacts Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 157 Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... 157 Congressional Research Service American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Executive Summary This report analyzes homegrown violent jihadist plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It examines post-9/11 law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also briefly discusses the building of trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners largely radicalized abroad such as Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis’s attempt to blow up the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2012), the Printer Cartridge plot (2010), the attempted airline bombing by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the Transatlantic Airliners plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid (December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremists inspired by non-jihadist causes such as radical environmentalism, animal rights, or anti-abortion causes. Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytical findings. A full description of each of the post-9/11 cases is provided in Appendix A of the report. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem “Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “violent jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via violent means. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that there have been 74 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11).1 As part of a muchdiscussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through January 2014, arrests were made for 53 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States. Three of these resulted in attacks. Most of the 2009-January 2014 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. However, it may be too early to tell how sustained this uptick is. Regardless, the apparent spike in such activity after April 2009 suggests that ideologies supporting violent jihad continue to influence some Americans—even if a tiny minority. Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks. Many homegrown violent jihadists possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from 1 Throughout this report, plots involving persons indicted at either the federal or state level are discussed. This report does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending cases. Congressional Research Service 1 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that can develop quickly. How Do People Become Violent Jihadists? Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic. “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to become full-fledged terrorists. Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks, virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent jihad, as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists. Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to CRS analysis, the 74 plots since 9/11 exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, relatively little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities among the plots. • Endgames: In whole or in part, 33 plots involved individuals interested in becoming foreign fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad. Nineteen plots exclusively intended to use explosives or incendiary devices. Three exclusively intended to use or did use firearms. Twenty-seven plots incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the 74 violent plots since 9/11, other schemes intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their jihadist colleagues. • Suicide or Martyrdom: According to publicly available information, 18 plots included individuals who clearly professed interest in killing themselves while engaged in violent jihad. • Success of Lone Wolves: Lone wolves conducted four of the five successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. • Divergent Capabilities: Among the 74 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverged greatly. Some evinced terrorist Congressional Research Service 2 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced. Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists The spate of arrests in recent years should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of ideas. Please see CRS Report R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, for more on this topic. The second context—the focus of this report—is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots (largely involving secretive illegal activity) and the police work used to dismantle them. The latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas. Preventive Policing In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future. In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and disrupted. At the federal level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.2 The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s investigations and make them more proactive, has spurred the use of an investigative tool dubbed “assessments.” These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without factual predication. The revised guidelines have, however, generated some controversy among civil libertarians. Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet— which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting— in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against defendants in at least 36 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that 2 The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement efforts for this report. Congressional Research Service 3 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet to be a uniformly permissive environment. State and Local Authorities The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. More than a decade after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to help coordinate federal, state, and local investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. Investigative Approaches To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism investigations. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown terrorism, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and civil libertarians. Trust and Partnership Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim American communities. Balancing Security and Liberty Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously Congressional Research Service 4 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community members to be unfairly targeting law-abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights. The recruitment and management of informants—essential to many law enforcement investigations—may, however, pose an obstacle to successful community engagement efforts. Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots. There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicates that confidential informants or undercover operatives were used in at least 40 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism cases. In some of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage? Introduction As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through January 2014, arrests were made for 53 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States.3 Three of these resulted in attacks. • In April 2013, two brothers—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—allegedly detonated two homemade bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing 3 people and wounding more than 200. The duo also purportedly shot and killed a police officer in events following the bombing. • In November 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s assault at Fort Hood in Texas claimed 13 lives and wounded more than 30 others. • In June 2009, Abdulhakim Muhammad shot and killed one soldier and wounded another at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR. 3 For this report, “homegrown” or “domestic” describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. “Violent jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via violent means. Jihadists largely adhere to a variant of Salafi Islam—the fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and adhere to the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad. “Plots” include schemes by homegrown violent jihadists to commit violent acts or their plans to join terrorist groups abroad. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 5 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks.4 • In March 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at the Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people. • In March 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar killed 2 U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. The apparent rise in such activity after April 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—are susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad. How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ in their opinions.5 Moreover, the radicalization of violent jihadists may not be an especially new phenomenon for the United States. Estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.6 More broadly, during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since 9/11.”7 Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by jihadist ideas. But as the bombing of the Boston Marathon and the Fort Hood shootings may suggest, a single successful attack can incur scores of casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption. Regardless of their novelty, frequency, or lethality, attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized in the United States remain a security concern. 4 See Appendix A for a summary of publicly available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The summary is presented in reverse chronological order. 5 In May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman emphasized that it is, “difficult to be complacent when an average of one plot is now being uncovered per month over the past year or more—and perhaps even more are being hatched that we don’t know about.” By contrast, an academic study of domestic Muslim radicalization supported by the National Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism” and concludes that “homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.” Another study has suggested that the homegrown terrorist threat has been exaggerated by federal cases that “rely on the abusive use of informants.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Written Testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Hearing: “Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p. 2; David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, January 6, 2010, p. 1. Hereinafter: Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans. See also Charles Kurzman, Muslim American Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11, February 8, 2012; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States (New York: NYU School of Law, 2011), p. 38. 6 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 3. See William Rosenau and Sara Daly, “American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists during the 1980s and 1990s,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) pp. 17-20. 7 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010), p. viii. Hereinafter: Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors. Congressional Research Service 6 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat The bulk of the May 2009-January 2014 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant terrorist groups. A global shift in terrorism toward decentralized, autonomously radicalized, violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home countries appears to have occurred.8 Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist networks to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes in locations far from their bases of operation.9 Homegrown Violent Jihadists This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.10 These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on foreign targets. They can have operational ties to foreign terrorist groups, but most of the plots after April 2009 have not. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially either come from Muslim immigrant communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown violent jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There have been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material support to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone themselves—to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist conflict, such as fighting in Somalia, Syria, or Afghanistan. 8 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 71, 133-146. Hereinafter: Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. 9 Philip Mudd, “Evaluating the Al-Qa!ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) p. 2, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf; Dennis C. Blair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment: Statement for the Record, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf. Hereinafter: Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010. 10 Others have used similar definitions. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian define homegrown as “extremist violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens. See Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2010, p. v, http://csis.org/publication/growing-terrorist-threat. Hereinafter: Nelson and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? For further discussion of definitions of homegrown terrorism, see Sam Mullins, “Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 1, no. 3 (2007), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12&Itemid=54. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use the term “homegrown violent extremist” instead of homegrown violent jihadist. They define “homegrown violent extremist” as “a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.” This definition appears to differ from the one used in this report by 1. largely focusing on whether or not an individual was directed by a foreign organization and by 2. including all sorts of terrorists, not just violent jihadists. See DHS and FBI, Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics,” August 16, 2011, p. 3. Congressional Research Service 7 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Shortcomings and Strengths Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with extensive rosters and greater resources.11 Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally structured than international organizations.12 A former CIA case officer has commented that the threat posed by self-radicalized “lone” bombers lacking support networks, “even those who have been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”13 These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai attacks of November 2008.14 Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning and preparation, such as assaults using firearms.15 However, the possibility that homegrown violent jihadists can commit large strikes that kill or wound numerous victims and disrupt everyday life for thousands of Americans is not out of the question. The bombing of the 2013 Boston Marathon by the Tsarnaev brothers suggests as much.16 Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such homegrown terrorist plots. In March 2010, As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media wing, released an English language video titled “A Call to Arms” featuring American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan as a “trailblazer” who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on conspirators.17 Gadahn encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable targets that 11 Dina Temple-Raston, “Would-Be Bombers in U.S. Hampered by Logistics,” National Public Radio, June 21, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127909962. 12 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71, 133-146; Scott Stewart, Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox, STRATFOR, March 18, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?ip_auth_redirect=1. Hereinafter: Stewart, Jihadism. 13 Art Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” AfPak Channel, a special project of Foreign Policy and the New America Foundation, May 14, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/14/bad_bombmakers. Hereinafter: Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” 14 On November 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous highprofile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 165 people, along with nine terrorists had been killed (one terrorist was captured), and hundreds more injured. Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. For more information, see CRS Report R40087, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests, by K. A. Kronstadt. 15 For more on the deterioration of tradecraft among homegrown violent jihadists, see Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” Exclusive Analysis, “North American Quarterly Terrorism Update,” December 2009, p. 5; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 140. 16 Sari Horwitz, “Investigators Sharpen Focus on Boston Bombing Suspect’s Widow,” Washington Post, May 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/investigators-sharpen-focus-on-boston-bombing-suspectswidow/2013/05/03/a2cd9d28-b413-11e2-baf7-5bc2a9dc6f44_story.html?hpid=z1. Hereinafter: Horowitz, “Investigators Sharpen Focus.” 17 Stewart, Jihadism. Congressional Research Service 8 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat are familiar to them and have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—resonance.18 In an early June 2011 English language video message titled “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task upon Yourself,” Gadahn even more clearly emphasized lone wolf operations. In the video he suggests possible weapons, Let’s take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check, and most likely without having to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?19 Gadahn stresses “targeting major institutions—after a clip showing the logos of such firms as Exxon, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America—and ‘influential public figures.’”20 At about the same time as this video was released, users of jihadist websites apparently began posting potential targets and developing hit lists.21 In the same vein as Gadahn’s video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) has issued an English language propaganda magazine titled Inspire. The magazine has encouraged homegrown violent jihadist activity in the West, focusing on smaller scale strategies such as using a vehicle to run over victims.22 The magazine has featured articles attributed to three prominent violent jihadist propagandists with strong American ties: Gadahn, radical U.S.-born imam Anwar al-Awlaki, and Saudi-born American citizen Samir Khan.23 In September 2011, the latter two died in a widely reported U.S. strike in Yemen.24 This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008 foiled New York City subway bomber Najibullah Zazi received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and coconspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States.25 U.S. authorities assert 18 Ibid; Exclusive Analysis, “Global Jihad Quarterly Update,” May 2010, pp. 6-7. Matthew Cole, “New Al Qaeda Video: American Muslims Should Buy Guns, Start Shooting People,” ABC News, June 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-video-buy-automatic-weapons-start-shooting/story?id=13704264. 20 Ibid. 21 John Hudson, “A Very Odd Al Qaeda ‘Hit List,’” The Atlantic Wire, June 17, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/ global/2011/06/very-odd-al-qaeda-hit-list/38967/; Judson Berger, Al Qaeda-Linked Site Posts “‘Hit List’ of U.S. Targets, Prompting Feds to Send Alert,” Fox News, June 16, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/16/feds-sendalert-after-al-qaeda-linked-site-posts-hit-list-us-targets/#ixzz1QbS44Tc6. 22 Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” Washington Times, Associated Press, October 12, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-secondedition-english-m/print/. 23 Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod= googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States. 24 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” New York Times, September 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-inyemen.html?pagewanted=all. 25 For 10 years prior to the plot, Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City Borough of Queens. Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist organization. See Department of Justice (DOJ), Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing Material Support to al Qaeda,” February 22, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022210.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty.” For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to (continued...) 19 Congressional Research Service 9 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow plotters.26 Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned the attack.27 The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot, involving both individuals in the United States and abroad, may have actually exposed it to greater law enforcement and intelligence agency scrutiny.28 The conventionally perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may, in fact, pose some challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to one terrorism analyst, “The smaller cells tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they are harder to detect…. When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for the FBI…. The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.”29 Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in 2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly generated schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.30 According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and foreign countries.31 While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations, conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and foreign cultural contexts.32 English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture, society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes.33 Three cases involving homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate terrorist plotting: • In February 2011, Colleen LaRose (aka “Jihad Jane”) pled guilty “to all counts of a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide material (...continued) Terror Suspect,” New York Times, September 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html? _r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereinafter: Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.” 26 William K. Rashbaum, “Al Qaeda Figure to Be Indicted in Subway Plot,” New York Times, July 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html. Hereinafter: Rashbaum, July 7, 2010. He is also alleged to have “encouraged” the plotters. See DOJ Press Release, “Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison in One of the Most Serious Terrorist Plots against the United States since 9/11,” November, 16, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/2012/November/12-nsd-1380.html. 27 Ibid. Al Qaeda’s external operations program focuses on targeting the United States and the West. 28 “U.S. Officials Link Al Qaeda Operative to New York Plot,” Daily Times (Pakistan), July 2, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\02\story_2-7-...._pg7_39. The Zazi case has been mentioned as an instance in which National Security Agency collection programs had been used to help thwart a terrorist attack. See CRS Report R43134, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name re dacted) and (name redacted). 29 Rashbaum, July 7, 2010. 30 Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010, p. 7. 31 Nelson and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? p. v. 32 Ibid. 33 Michael Kenney, “Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 265 (April 2010), p. 19. Congressional Research Service 10 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements, and attempted identity theft.”34 She allegedly discussed with her coconspirators how her mainstream American physical appearance would allow her to “blend in with many people.”35 • On March 18, 2010, David Headley, born Daood Sayed Gilani to an American mother and Pakistani father, pled guilty to helping plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, and for plotting to attack the offices of a newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark. Headley was able to use his American citizenship and Pakistani heritage to move between the United States and abroad for seven years during which time he received terrorist training in Pakistan and scouted locations in India and Denmark for terrorist attacks.36 • For 10 years prior to his involvement in a September 2009 plot to trigger explosive devices in New York City’s subways, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City borough of Queens and had family in Pakistan.37 In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Intelligence and Analysis warned, “probable terrorist perception of success in challenging the U.S. even through failed attacks, suggest[s] Al Qaeda and associated groups will try to conduct operations in the United States with increased frequency.”38 It appears that for the foreseeable future, American citizens and lawful permanent residents of the United States radicalized within the nation’s borders will continue to pose a violent jihadist threat.39 34 DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Woman Pleads Guilty in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit Murder Overseas,” February 1, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph020111.htm; Derrick Nunnally et al., “’Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed, Philly.com, March 18, 2010, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/ breaking/88307227.html 35 United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, filed March 4, 2010, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf. 36 Jane Perlez, “American Terror Suspect Traveled Unimpeded,” New York Times, March 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/world/asia/26pstan.html?scp=1&sq= American%20Terror%20Suspect%20Traveled%20Unimpeded&st=cse; DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Resident David Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies,” March 18, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-277.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 18, 2010. The Headley case has been mentioned as an instance in which National Security Agency collection programs had been used to help thwart a terrorist attack. See CRS Report R43134, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 37 On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,” New York Daily News, April 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-0412_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html; Stephanie Simon, “FBI Again Questions Immigrant in Terror Probe,” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB125323086773921349.html. 38 DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Note, IA-0291-10, “Evolution of the Terrorist Threat to the United States,” May 21, 2010, p.1. 39 Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of U.S. Terrorists,” Associated Press, March 18, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvogWD5bjFT7x-mkAwUu2tpIN_cgD9EGKHJ80. Hereinafter: Sullivan and Barrett, March 18, 2010. Congressional Research Service 11 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Radicalization and Violent Extremism Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do not necessarily mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of individuals to ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist viewpoints.40 Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and behavior to justify intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific, closely held ideas.41 Still others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action, as in this definition by DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”42 But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism” as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views (i.e., they move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially supporting, or executing terrorist activity) then the nation’s public safety and security interests are activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows: • “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist, or jihadist beliefs. • “Violent extremism,” for this report, describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” From Radicalization to Violent Extremism Combating homegrown violent jihadists requires an understanding of how radicalization works and formulating ways to prevent the radicalization from morphing into violent extremism.43 In 2007, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) Intelligence Division released a study of domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely circulated within the law enforcement community. The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism. First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam. Next, they go through selfidentification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family 40 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, p. 1. Hereinafter: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization. 41 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416. 42 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2007, p. 4. Hereinafter: Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007. 43 See Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. Congressional Research Service 12 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafi views. The study indicates that, typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack.44 At this point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own fourstage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.45 However, this model and the process it describes—though useful—should be read with caution, according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes. One expert has suggested that There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in the arc of one’s life.46 Some experts have warned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyer belt,” somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence.47 The NYPD report itself acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who begin this progression become terrorists.48 Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety of factors.49 Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty, alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or terrorist activity.50 The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife. 44 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, City of New York Police Department, Intelligence Division, New York, 2007, pp. 6-8, http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/ NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. 45 Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, et al., “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community Responsibility,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 2007, p. 6. 46 Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors, p. 7. 47 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2009), pp. 239-40. 48 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, pp. 10, 19. 49 Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007, p. 5. 50 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization, pp. 1-9; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 48, 50-51, 73-88; Aidan Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of (continued...) Congressional Research Service 13 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global community of Muslims (the Ummah),51 or even waging war against it may also spur radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals.52 CRS analysis of the 74 plots since 9/11 suggests that 31 of them included converts to Islam. As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms. Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define themselves.”53 Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they identify with others; and they desire revenge.”54 Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism. These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons. Intermediaries Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face discussion groups) or in online forums. Some post 9/11 terrorist plots have included an intermediary.55 In certain cases a key intermediary may be a government informant or undercover agent. Four charismatic U.S. citizens have played especially prominent roles in international jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other intermediaries can be difficult. (...continued) Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 422. Hereinafter: Kirby “The London Bombers.” For more on the spiritual incentives involved in joining radical Islamic groups see Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, “The Rationality of Radical Islam,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006) pp. 295-300. 51 The Quran uses the term Ummah to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual communities, great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of believers. See Richard Hooker, World Civilizations, Glossary, 1996, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM. 52 Ibid. 53 John M. Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 236, Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 1, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf. 54 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006), p. 41. 55 Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, Countering Terrorism and Radicalization in 2010 and Beyond: A New Terrorist Threat? Assessing ‘Homegrown Extremism,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 22, 2010, http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism-fact-sheet. Congressional Research Service 14 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Anwar al-Awlaki was a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles prior to being killed in a U.S. counterterrorism operation in Yemen in September 2011.56 Awlaki allegedly served as a leader in the terrorist group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).57 He was a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and had been linked to a number of domestic jihadist plots.58 U.S. officials have said that he directed foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.59 However, according to publicly available sources, his exact connections to homegrown violent jihadists are largely unclear. Before his November 5, 2009, gun rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan exchanged emails with Awlaki. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan. After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.60 The imam and his teachings have influenced people involved in other homegrown violent jihadist plots. Jose Pimentel was building explosive devices when he was arrested after two years of surveillance by the NYPD.61 He sympathized with Al Qaeda and drew inspiration from Awlaki. The would-be bomber is reputed to have tried but failed to correspond with Awlaki via email, and the cleric’s death may have sped up his plotting.62 In December 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, in a plot to bomb an Armed Forces recruiting station. A sting operation by the FBI ensnared Martinez. He allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland, using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a bomb. During the course of his plot, he also allegedly praised Awlaki.63 Naturalized U.S. citizen Farooque Ahmed was arrested in October 2010 for attempting to assist people he believed to be terrorists in planning the bombing of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations.64 Ahmed allegedly 56 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, May 22, 2013. 57 For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by (name redacted). 58 According to media reporting from January 2012, the FBI and DHS warned that after Awlaki’s death, his legacy may still help influence Americans to become homegrown jihadists. See Catherine Herridge, “Al Qaeda in Yemen Targets More American Recruits,” Fox News, January 10, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/01/10/al-qaeda-inyemen-targets-more-american-recruits/. 59 Jeremy Pelofsky, “U.S. Says Al Qaeda Leader Awlaki Directed Underwear Bomber,” Reuters, February 10, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/usa-security-abdulmutallab-idUSL2E8DAFMV20120210; Greg Miller and Spencer S. Hsu, “Muslim Cleric Tied to Bomb Attempt,” The Washington Post, July 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063005343.html. 60 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki,” BBC News, January 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8438635.stm. 61 In February 2014, Pimentel pled guilty to a “single count of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree as a crime of terrorism,” a New York state-level charge. James C. McKinley, Jr., “Man Pleads Guilty to Reduced Charge in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, February 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/ nyregion/manhattan-man-pleads-guilty-to-reduced-charges-in-terror-case.html?_r=0; Joseph Goldstein, William K. Rashbaum, “City Bomb Plot Suspect Is Called Fan of Qaeda Cleric,” New York Times, November 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/nyregion/jose-pimentel-is-charged-in-new-york-city-bomb-plot.html. Hereinafter: Goldstein and Rashbaum, “City Bomb Plot.” See also Tom McElroy, “‘Al-Qaida Sympathizer’ Accused of NYC Bomb Plots,” Associated Press, November 21, 2011. Hereinafter: McElroy, “‘Al-Qaida Sympathizer.’” 62 Ibid. 63 Dina Temple-Raston, “Officials Worry About Some Latino Converts To Islam,” National Public Radio, August 24, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131916271/officials-worry-about-some-latino-converts-to-islam; DOJ Press Release, “Maryland Man Charged in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center,” December 8, 2010, http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba120810.htm. 64 DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Arrested for Plotting Attacks on D.C.-Area Metro Stations with People He Believed to Be al Qaeda Members,” October 27, 2010, http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ (continued...) Congressional Research Service 15 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat possessed a biography of Awlaki and listened to his online sermons.65 Also apprehended in October 2010, U.S. citizen Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who allegedly tried to join overseas extremist groups such as the Taliban, modeled one of the jihadist websites he managed after Awlaki’s teachings. The website offered hyperlinks to Awlaki’s online lectures. According to DOJ, Shehadeh also discussed Awlaki’s ideas with an individual he tried (and failed) to recruit for violent jihad.66 Zachary Chesser, who allegedly tried to join the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab as late as July 2010 and propagandized online, emailed Awlaki. The cleric responded twice, according to court documents.67 In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr. pled guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed Awlaki’s online pronouncements and developed an “execution” hit list that included 15 people Rockwood believed had desecrated Islam.68 According to court documents, Shaker Masri encouraged an FBI cooperating source to “review speeches” by Awlaki.69 Arrested in June 2010 while allegedly trying to join al-Shabaab, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos of and listened to sermons by Awlaki.70 According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City’s Times Square on May 1, 2010, cited Awlaki and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal from Jamaica, as key influences on him.71 Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually convicted of plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an Awlaki lecture.72 U.S. officials believe Awlaki also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.73 In October 2011, (...continued) wfo102710.htm. 65 Carol Cratty, “Accused Would-Be DC Metro Bomber Pleads Not Guilty in Federal Court,” CNN.com, November 9, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-09/justice/virginia.bomb.plot_1_qaeda-al-awlaki-speedy-trial?_s=PM:CRIME; Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “Officials: Muslim Source Turned in Terror Suspect,” Associated Press, October 28, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101028/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_terror_arrest. 66 United States. v. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District for the Eastern District of New York, October 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1400.pdf . 67 United States. v. Zachary Adam Chesser, Affidavit, 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, July 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf. In 2012, al-Shabaab allied itself with Al-Qaeda. See “Somalia Militants Officially Join with Al Qaeda,” CBS News, February 9, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57373985/somalia-militants-officially-join-with-al-qaeda/?tag= contentMain;contentBody. 68 DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation, Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ ak072110.htm. 69 United States v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf. 70 Anti-Defamation League, “New Jersey Residents Arrested for Attempting To Join Somali-Based Terrorist Group,” June 7, 2010, updated July 22, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/new_jersey_al_shabaab.htm. 71 Dina Temple-Raston, “Jamaican Imam Said to Inspire Times Square Suspect,” National Public Radio, May 19, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126962091. For more on Shahzad’s suspected ties to Awlaki, see Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to Militant Cleric,” New York Times, May 6, 2010. 72 Scott Shane, “Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror,” New York Times, November 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19awlaki.html. 73 Jeanne Meserve, “Anti-Terrorism Chief, U.S.-Born Cleric had Major Role in Airline Bombing Try,” CNN.com, June (continued...) Congressional Research Service 16 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat when he pled guilty to his involvement in the plot, Abdulmutallab stated, “I was greatly inspired to participate in jihad by the lectures of the great and rightly guided mujahedeen who is alive, Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, may Allah preserve him and his family and give them victory, Amin, and Allah knows best.”74 A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s sensitivity, told The Washington Post that Awlaki was the first U.S. citizen added to a list of suspected terrorists the CIA was authorized to kill.75 Even after Awlaki’s death, his teachings have influenced would-be plotters. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev has reportedly indicated to authorities that he and his brother, Tamerlan, watched videos of Anwar Al-Awlaki in the period before the siblings allegedly bombed the 2013 Boston Marathon.76 In January 2013, Erwin Antonio Rios, an individual who allegedly desired to travel abroad to wage violent jihad, purportedly discussed the writing of the deceased radical cleric with a law enforcement informant.77 Samir Khan—before he was killed in the same strike as Awlaki—served as the editor of Inspire magazine, launched in 2010 by AQAP.78 Inspire has been described as “a slick magazine for jihadists ... that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular.”79 The magazine is intended to attract would-be jihadists in the West. The Saudi-born Khan lived in Queens, New York, and Charlotte, North Carolina. He radicalized after the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, and moved with his parents to Charlotte in 2004. He left Charlotte in 2009 and joined AQAP in Yemen.80 Prior to leaving the United States, Khan had gained some notoriety as a jihadist blogger and as creator of the online magazine, Jihad Recollections—Inspire’s forerunner.81 (...continued) 30, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/30/leiter.al.awlaki/index.html. 74 See “Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s Statement on Guilty Plea,” Detroit Free Press, October 12, 2011, http://www.freep.com/article/20111012/NEWS01/111012038/Transcript-Read-Abdulmutallab-s-statement-guilty-plea.; Monica Davey, “Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial,” October 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/10/13/us/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-pleads-guilty-in-plane-bomb-attempt.html. 75 Greg Miller, “Muslim Cleric Awlaki is 1st U.S. citizen on List of Those CIA is Allowed to Kill,” The Washington Post, April 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html. 76 Margaret Coker, “Cleric Cited by Tsarnaev Lives On—Online,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323687604578465023366949366.html; Eric Schmitt, et al., “Boston Plotters Said to Initially Target July 4 for Attack,” New York Times, May 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/ 03/us/Boston-bombing-suspects-planned-july-fourth-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 77 United States v. Erwin Antonio Rios, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, February 7, 2013. 78 Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” Washington Times, Associated Press, October 12, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-secondedition-english-m/print/. 79 Robbie Brown and Kim Severson, “2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War,” New York Times, September 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-theamerican-middle-class.html. Hereinafter: Brown and Severson, “2nd American.” Mark Schone and Matthew Cole, “American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki,” ABC News, September 30, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013. Hereinafter: Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi.” 80 Brown and Severson, “2nd American.” 81 Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi”; Aaron Y, Zelin, “American Jihadi,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire_magazine?page=full. Congressional Research Service 17 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Reportedly, Khan and his online publications may have influenced homegrown jihadists. • In November 2012, Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales was arrested for allegedly plotting with three others to join either Al Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to DOJ, he had read articles from Inspire about bomb making and weapons training.82 • In July 2011, U.S. Army private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area. Abdo intended to kill soldiers near the same place where Army Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 individuals in 2009. Federal officials noted that Abdo also possessed an article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items. The article was from Inspire.83 • In November 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation, moments after he tried to detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square.84 According to DOJ, Mohamud wrote articles for Khan’s first magazine, Jihad Recollections.85 Aside from editing Inspire, Khan also contributed to it. Additionally, the magazine included commentary from Awlaki and another American Al Qaeda propagandist, Adam Gadahn.86 Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the organization’s videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California, Gadahn converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in California, Gadahn was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended. One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States, and in another dispatch he urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a video posted on June 20, 2010, Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama, describing him as “treacherous, bloodthirsty, and narrow-minded.”87 82 He had a copy of the seventh edition (fall 2011) of the magazine which included a column by Khan. United States v. Sohiel Omar Kabir, et al., Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Central District of California, November 16, 2012 (unsealed November 19, 2012). 83 DOJ Press Release, “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” July 29, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/ usao/txw/press_releases/2011/Abdo.pdf; David Goodman, “Soldier Held amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,” New York Times, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29awol.html?_r=1. Pierre Thomas, et al., “Fort Hood Suspect Yells Nidal Hasan’s Name in Court,” ABC News, July 29, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/forthood-suspect-naser-jason-abdo-yells-nidal-hasan/story?id=14187568#.UKzj4dVrq1g. Abdo and Santana (from the previous example) apparently read the same bomb making article from Inspire, “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,” from the magazine’s first edition. 84 Jerry Markon, “FBI Foils Elaborate Bomb Plot in Oregon,” Washington Post, November 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112700546.html. 85 United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Affidavit, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, November 26, 2010. 86 Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod= googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States. 87 “American-Born al Qaeda Spokesman Appears in New Video,” CNN.com, June 20, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/ (continued...) Congressional Research Service 18 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Omar Hammami, also known as “Abu Mansour al-Amriki,” is originally from Daphne, Alabama. In 2007, he emerged as a key international intermediary for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab but has since broken with the group.88 In September 2013, he publicly renounced his ties to al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda, and news reports indicated that he was killed by assassins from the terrorist group.89 Before that, he spent years trying to influence would-be violent jihadists to join with the Somali terrorist group. The son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he has been featured in propagandist videos distributed by the group. In one, he instructs recruits in urban warfare. Zachary Chesser saw Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami’s adoption of “al-Amriki” (the American) as part of his own jihadist name—“Abu Talhah AlAmrikee.” Somali officials tie Hammami to al-Shabaab recruitment and financial management. He may also have led battlefield skirmishes. In August 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding indictment against him.90 In October 2011, Hammami released a video calling Western Muslims to violent jihad.91 As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, he led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salafism allegedly sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005, they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia pursuing violent jihad.92 (...continued) US/06/20/al.qaeda.video/index.html; Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/ 070122fa_fact_khatchadourian; “Al Qaeda’s ‘American Voice of Islam,” STRATFOR, September 5, 2006, http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaedas_american_voice_islam?fn=8415719516; Evan Kohlmann, “American Greases alQaida Media Machine,” MSNBC, July 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13842265/. See also Brian Dodwell, “The Abbottabad Documents: The Quiet Ascent of Adam Gadahn,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 5, no. 5 (May 2012), pp. 19-22, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss5.pdf. 88 Christopher Anzalone, “The Evolution of an American Jihadi: The Case of Omar Hammami,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 5, no. 6 (June 2012), p. 10, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss64.pdf. 89 Abdi Guled and Jason Straziuso, “Somalia: Reports indicate American jihadi killed,” Associated Press, September 12, 2013; “‘American al-Shabab’ Disavows Militant Group, al-Qaida,” Voice of America News, September 5, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/american-alshabab-disavows-militant-group-alqaida/1743983.html. 90 Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” The Washington Post, August 1, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization al Shabaab,” August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html; Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times Magazine, January 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/ magazine/31Jihadist-t.htm; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” The Hamilton Spectator, Ontario, Canada, January 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a Secret Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” Mobile Register, September 5, 2009, http://blog.al.com/live/2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “Shabaab al-Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” September 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html. 91 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “Al-Shabab’s Western Recruitment Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 5, no. 1 (January 2012), pp. 19-21, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol5-Iss1.pdf. 92 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 19 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Social Networks Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well. Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual’s personal experiences.93 Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups and plots.94 For example, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev may have been heavily influenced by his elder brother as they allegedly planned the bombing of the 2013 Boston Marathon.95 According to The New York Times, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani, while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s. Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain. The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when in 2007 Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal. The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group’s camps for training in 2009.96 Intermediaries within Networks Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic leaders. DOJ alleges that in 2010, Sohiel Omar Kabir “influenced [Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales and Ralph Deleon] to convert to Islam and introduced [them] to radical and violent Islamic doctrine.... ” This purportedly included posting items online and perusing violent jihadist material on the web.97 DOJ asserts that Kabir listed content related to Al Qaeda on his Facebook page and that, in turn, Santana and Deleon used the Facebook “like” function to highlight some of these links via their own accounts. According to a criminal complaint unsealed in November 2012, the trio and another individual, Arifeen David Gojali, allegedly plotted to travel from Southern California to join either Al Qaeda or the Taliban.98 93 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71-85. Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 96. 95 Miranda Leitsinger, “Classmates of Suspected Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Suggest ‘Brainwashing’ by Older Brother,” NBC News, April 21, 2013, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/21/17851546-classmates-ofsuspected-bomber-dzhokar-tsarnaev-suggest-brainwashing-by-older-brother?lite. 96 Andrea Elliott, “Militant’s Path from Pakistan to Times Square,” New York Times, June 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/23terror.html. Hereinafter: Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010. 97 United States v. Sohiel Omar Kabir, et al., Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Central District of California, November 16, 2012 (unsealed November 19, 2012). 98 Ibid. Facebook describes its “like” function as a “social plugin” that allows users to share content from each other’s (continued...) 94 Congressional Research Service 20 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat In 2009 and 2010, Daniel Boyd and several others were indicted on terrorism charges.99 From November 2006 to 2009, Boyd, a charismatic leader, led a conspiracy involving a network of associates that included his sons Dylan and Zakariya to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men interested in terrorism. The conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of material support to terrorist groups. Using stories of his past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to FBI courtroom testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan.100 In 2011, the Boyds pled guilty to charges related to the case.101 Jihadi Cool Several post-9/11 plots have suggested that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and romanticized notions of revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A desire to protect the Ummah against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more important to Faisal Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric.102 Terrorist recruiters also promote “jihadi cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the Web. In 2007, Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for al-Shabaab, enticed young Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories. According to federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of brotherhood he had experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.103 “Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan.104 Muslim leaders from Alexandria, Virginia, (...continued) Facebook profiles. See http://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/. 99 DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/2010/June/10-nsd-706.html. 100 Mike Baker, “Feds Play Audio Tapes at Tense NC Terror Hearing,” Associated Press, in SCnow.com, August 5, 2009, http://www2.scnow.com/news/2009/aug/05/feds_play_audio_tapes_at_tense_nc_terror_hearing-ar-350281/; DOJ Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009) 101 DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” September 14, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge-1; DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” June 7, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/pressreleases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge; DOJ Press Release, “Raleigh-Area Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges,” February 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/ce020911.htm. 102 Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010. 103 United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court State and District of Minnesota, October 8, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/ 20091124_TERROR_DOCS/faarax.pdf; Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,” National Public Radio, March 26, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f= 1001. 104 Shaiq Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 Years in Prison,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/12/10/ (continued...) Congressional Research Service 21 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat indicated that they had no inkling of radicalization among the five.105 Abroad, as early as 2006, Dutch officials noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in the Netherlands and a perception that jihad was “cool.”106 The Internet The Web plays a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it does in the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking sites, message boards, video hosting sites, and email blurs the lines between readership and authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers, and newsletters.107 This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such forums to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual readers or online spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual propagandizing, financial support, or joining a terrorist network.108 The Web’s impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. A study of 18,130 entries in 2,112 online discussions from more than 15 Arabic-language jihadist forums revealed that “[o]ne fifth of all discussions included an explicit call for more terrorist attacks.... Overall, two thirds of all discussions contain[ed] some form of call for or encouragement of terrorist attacks.”109 One author asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development of a “self-starter” phenomenon110 and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described as a “de-formalized” radicalization experience.111 For this report, “self-starters” are groups that lack ties to major international terrorist networks and do not receive orders from such organizations.112 However, instances of solely virtual radicalization without face-to-face (...continued) ST2009121002234.html?sid=ST2009121002234. 105 Mary Beth Sheridan and Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrests Suggest U.S. Muslims, Like Those in Europe, Can Be Radicalized Abroad,” The Washington Post, December 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/12/11/AR2009121104404.html 106 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat, The Hague, March 2006, p. 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf. 107 Maura Conway, “Terrorism and Mass Communication: Nitro to the Net,” The World Today, vol. 60, no. 8/9 (Aug/Sep 2004), pp. 19-22, http://doras.dcu.ie/513/1/nitro_to_net_2004.pdf. 108 Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 34, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf. 109 Edna Erez, Gabriel Weimann, and A. Aaron Weisburd, “Jihad, Crime, and the Internet: Content Analysis of Jihadist Forum Discussions,” October 31, 2011, Report submitted to the National Institute of Justice in fulfillment of requirements for Award Number 2006-IJ-CX-0038, pp. i, vii, x. 110 Kirby “The London Bombers,” p. 416. 111 Ibid, p. 425. 112 Ibid, p. 415. Congressional Research Service 22 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat interaction seem to be rare.113 Most radicalization apparently requires experience with real-world social networks.114 In other instances, terrorist “wannabes” may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct violence and face-to-face contact with hardcore terrorists.115 Simply, individuals interested in violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even play a much more profound, “cathartic” role, “allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence.”116 In essence, online activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.117 Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably serves to spur radicalization in three ways. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normal[izes] behaviors considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.”118 Terrorists publish rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.119 Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides. 113 One terrorism expert has written: “Although the Internet clearly contributes to radicalization, and possibly to recruitment to jihadist terrorism, it has not yet produced the army of action-oriented acolytes sought by al Qaeda’s leaders.” Brian Michael Jenkins, Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States since 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2011), p. 17. 114 Tim Stevens, “Regulating the ‘Dark Web:’ How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 2 (April 2009), p. 29. For an example of one terrorist’s extensive online radicalization experiences, see Majority and Minority Staff Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism, February 2012. For an extensive discussion of the role of the Internet in radicalization, see Ines von Behr, et al., Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2013). 115 In December 2011, Congressional testimony, Brian Michael Jenkins stated that online activity offers would-be jihadists “the means of vicariously participating in the jihadist struggle without incurring personal risks.” He described such activity as akin to “a kind of psychologically satisfying video game.” See Chris Lefkow, “Al-Qaeda Minting Few Militants Online: US Experts,” AFP December 7, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5gC5qYifcavSLq1Jhl3dyxnGAdmgw?docId=CNG.afdd07c7dff397072b27a36860c352ca.531. 116 Akil N. Awan, “The Virtual Jihad: An Increasingly Legitimate Form of Warfare,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 5 (May 2010), p. 11, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss5.pdf. Hereinafter: Awan, “The Virtual Jihad.” 117 Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12. 118 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 116. Hereinafter: Weimann, Terror on the Internet; Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12. 119 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 23 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist groups. Before he died, Anwar al-Awlaki circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own popular Facebook page and blog.120 The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010, in Pakistan on terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking websites, according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.121 Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston suburb, was arrested on terrorism charges in October 2009.122 Among other alleged activities, Mehanna and co-conspirators translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism and posted them on jihadist websites.123 They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away from core members of Al Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-starting terrorists. The Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist organizations no longer seem necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training abroad. (Mehanna, himself, allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) One terrorism specialist has noted that “there is a sense that these guys are radicalizing on their own.”124 Another has commented that the Web has supplanted mosques as a recruitment venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into their organizations.125 In December 2011, Mehanna was convicted of “conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda; providing material support to terrorists (and conspiracy to do so); conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country; conspiracy to make false statements to the FBI and two counts of making false statements.”126 Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers terrorists operational capabilities.127 Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular structures of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect intelligence about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot soldiers, raise funds, convey operational direction, and provide training or instruction.128 For 120 NEFA Foundation, “Anwar al Awlaki: Pro Al-Qaida Ideologue with Influence in the West,” February 5, 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabackgrounder_alawlaki.pdf. 121 Brigid Schulte, “5 Va. Men Facing Terrorism Charges in Pakistan Write of ‘Noble’ Motivation,” The Washington Post, May 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/AR2010051503548.html 122 Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Guardian.co.uk, Associated Press, foreign, October 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970. 123 Shelley Murphy, “Taking Refuge Where His Woes Began: Sudbury Terror Suspect Presses Case on Internet,” The Boston Globe, February 1, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/ web_is_now_refuge_for_man_caught_online/?page=1 (Hereinafter: Murphy, Feb 1, 2010); Denise Lavoie, Abby Goodnough, and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, October 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html; Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra, U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/ case_docs/1121.pdf. 124 Dina Temple-Raston, “Mass. Arrest Spurs Fear of Homegrown Terrorism,” National Public Radio, October 22, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114020731. 125 Murphy, February 1, 2010. 126 DOJ Press Release, “Massachusetts Man Convicted on Terrorism-Related Charges,” December 20, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/massachusetts-man-convicted-on-terrorism-related-charges. 127 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 56. 128 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 111-140. Congressional Research Service 24 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat example, the Tsarnaevs allegedly followed bomb making instructions from Inspire magazine— available online—while constructing the homemade explosive devices they detonated at the 2013 Boston Marathon.129 Jailhouse Jihadism In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in jihadist prison radicalization.130 But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed by radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes that jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”131 Experts have sounded warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in U.S. jails.132 Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.133 This is at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism, according to a study involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional systems.134 The Federal Bureau of Prisons has acknowledged the possibility of inmate radicalization but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting in federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.135 Based on CRS analysis of the 74 violent jihadist plots since 9/11, only one clearly involved radicalization in prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom found seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual’s radicalization process.136 129 Horowitz, “Investigators Sharpen Focus.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S. Prisons, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2nd sess. September 19, 2006, S. Hrg. 109–954 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), pp. 1-6, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:30597.pdf. 131 James Brandon, “The Danger of Prison Radicalization in the West,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, vol. 2, no. 12 (December 2009), pp. 1-3, http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss12.pdf. Hereinafter: Brandon, “The Danger of Prison.” 132 George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization,” HSPI and CIAG, Washington, DC, September 2006, http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/ out_of_the_shadows.pdf. 133 Brandon, “The Danger of Prison,” p. 4; Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 261 (October 2008), p. 18, http://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/nij/224085.pdf. 134 Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 2009), pp. 586-587, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf. Hereinafter: Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners.” 135 Gary Fields and Suzanne Sataline, “Bomb Case Raises Issue of Islam in Jails,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2009; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124303841574048865.html. 136 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center for Terrorism Research, Washington, DC, April 2009, pp. 14-15, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/ (continued...) 130 Congressional Research Service 25 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as some experts may fear. One case, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot, included at least two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains unclear whether they radicalized behind bars.137 The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison implicated the group, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the “Authentic Assembly of God”). Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases. According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document titled the “JIS Protocol.” In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the United States and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action[,]’ a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. After his release, Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.138 One study has pointed out that James’ radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father had been a member of the Black Panther Party.139 (...continued) HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf. Hereinafter: Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K. 137 Eric Gorski and Rachel Zoll, “Plot Renews Fears of Radical Islam in Prison,” Associated Press, in msnbc.com, May 22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30891721/; Daniel J. Wakin, “Imams Reject Talk That Islam Radicalizes Inmates,” New York Times, May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/nyregion/24convert.html. 138 DOJ Press Release, “Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 16 Years in Federal Prison,” March 6, 2009, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/ la030609ausa.htm (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009); Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, August 24, 2008, updated 2009, http://www.adl.org/ main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 22 Years,” July 23, 2008, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/ la062308usa.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Second Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military, Jewish Facilities Sentenced to Prison,” July 21, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-nsd-634.html; DOJ Press Release, “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges,” August 31, 2005, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/ IGInformationReleases/fourmen_090105.pdf. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005. 139 Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” pp. 581-582. Congressional Research Service 26 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.140 Another study found only broad trends among domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds of them are younger than 30 years old.141 As the above discussion may suggest, generalizing about the individuals involved is problematic. Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African American of a happy childhood who converted to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammad; David Headley, who was born Daood Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother, with Talib Islam, who was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek Mehanna, with the Somali American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in firstand second-generation Muslim American immigrants and native-born Americans who converted to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators. Some plots were aspirational. Many believe others appear to have been pushed along by government informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until uncovered by intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see Appendix A for details on the cases). Table B-1 provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in domestic jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Table B-2 documents the specific plots and attacks, including the target (within/outside the United States), intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or fight abroad), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting. Overarching Themes Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example, conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above, homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since 9/11, 42 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 29 focused on foreign ones, and three conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 44 involved intent to or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 74 homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of 140 141 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 8. Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, p. 10. Congressional Research Service 27 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat endgames, relatively little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots. A Variety of Endgames Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their brethren. Foreign Fighters Thirty-three of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals seeking (at least in part) to become foreign fighters with terrorist groups. Al-Shabaab-related cases concerning young men leaving the United States to fight in Somalia form the paramount example. Other cases involve different destinations, such as Syria and the warring factions involved in its civil war. • According to DOJ, Abdella Ahmad Tounisi, 18 years old at the time of his arrest in April 2013, was apprehended at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport while he tried to board a flight for Istanbul, Turkey. Tounisi, a U.S. citizen, allegedly intended to travel to Syria to join the Nusra Front, a terrorist organization commonly referred to as “al Qaeda in Iraq.”142 • In March 2013, Eric Harroun—of Phoenix, Arizona—was arrested for “conspiring to use a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) [a weapon of mass destruction] while fighting with the al Nusrah Front” in Syria.143 • Five men from Northern Virginia (Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in Sarghoda, Pakistan, in December 2009. They purportedly traveled there hoping to join jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010, they were convicted of terrorism charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court. Prosecutors say the five men also began planning attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant and an air base and other targets in Afghanistan and “territories of the United States.”144 • In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, Ohio—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a lawful permanent resident from Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim 142 DOJ Press Release, “FBI Arrests Suburban Chicago Man on Charge of Supporting Terrorism Overseas,” April 20, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2013/fbi-arrests-suburban-chicago-man-on-charge-of-supportingterrorism-overseas. 143 DOJ Press Release, “Former U.S. Soldier Charged with Conspiring to Use Destructive Device While Fighting with al Qaeda-Affiliated Group in Syria,” March 28, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2013/formeru.s.-soldier-charged-with-conspiring-to-use-destructive-device-while-fighting-with-al-qaeda-affiliated-group-in-syria? utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=washington-press-releases&utm_content= 191247. For more context on the Nusra front, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by (name redacted). 144 Jerry Markon, et al., “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” Washington Post, March 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html. Congressional Research Service 28 American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq.145 On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material support to terrorists.146 Explosives and Firearms Nineteen of the 74 homegrown jihadist plots targeting the United States since 9/11 exclusively involved explosives or incendiary devices. Suspects at least discussed the use of bombs, hand grenades, or missiles in these cases.147 From a broader perspective, 38 cases in whole or in part included schemes revolving around explosives or incendiary devices.148 Historically, most terrorist incidents in the United States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database, about 83% of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007— including violent jihadists as well as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary devices. Roughly 9% involved firearms.149 The deadly bombing of the Boston Marathon, the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square, and Najibullah Zazi’s plot to detonate bombs in the New York City subway system stand out as examples of plots incorporating explosive or incendiary devices. • DOJ claims that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev assembled two bombs using components including pressure cookers, low explosive powder, shrapnel, and adhesive. They concealed the explosive devices inside backpacks and planted them among crowds near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. The brothers then triggered the bombs to devastating effect.150 The FBI and DHS have noted that such devices “contain[ing] the initiator, switch, and explosive charge frequently have been used in Afg [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41416. Public record. Not legal advice.