# Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41368 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** December 22, 2022 - **Citation:** R41368 ## Text Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Updated December 22, 2022 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41368 SUMMARY Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations R41368 December 22, 2022 U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Jim Zanotti Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of Specialist in Middle a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the future of Eastern Affairs bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and informal holds on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of Clayton Thomas continued cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Specialist in Middle (NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Eastern Affairs Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency—perhaps partly due to Erdogan’s unorthodox policy of keeping interest rates relatively low—have led to speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) might be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections planned for June 2023 if competitive elections occur. If a different Turkish president were to win 2023 elections and take power, some domestic and foreign policy changes could be possible. Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as an important mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships with other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power (including via the export of drone aircraft); and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. Congressional oversight and legislation could affect arms sales, sanctions, military basing, and U.S. political and financial engagement with Turkey’s government (including in connection with elections). The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkish leaders’ have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, Greece and Cyprus, and the Middle East. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. In June, Turkey agreed on a framework deal for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but Turkey has delayed ratifying their accession while demanding that the two countries help Turkey act against people it considers to be terrorists. Longstanding disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas have spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, as well as renewed disagreements regarding Greek islands close to Turkey’s coast. Turkey’s improved relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—perhaps partly stemming from common concerns about Iran—appear to be further supports for Turkey’s struggling economy. Syria and Iraq: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern borders with Syria and Iraq have deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to: (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s military could undertake another ground operation against PKK-linked Syrian Kurds, despite reported U.S. and Russian expressions of concern. Congressional Research Service Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1 Country Overview and the Erdogan Era ......................................................................................... 3 Political Assessment .................................................................................................................. 5 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 5 2023 Elections..................................................................................................................... 7 Economic Assessment ............................................................................................................... 9 Overview and Ongoing Problems ....................................................................................... 9 Energy ............................................................................................................................... 10 Turkey’s Kurdish Issue ........................................................................................................... 13 Background ....................................................................................................................... 13 Government Approaches to the Kurds .............................................................................. 14 Religious Minorities ................................................................................................................ 15 Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia .................................................................................... 15 Alevis ................................................................................................................................ 16 Turkish Foreign Policy .................................................................................................................. 17 General Assessment ................................................................................................................ 17 Regional Security Concerns .................................................................................................... 19 Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President? ........................................................... 22 Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 23 Background ....................................................................................................................... 23 Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine ................................................................................... 24 Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation .......................................................... 26 Black Sea Access .............................................................................................................. 27 Mediating Russia-Ukraine Differences (Including Grain Export Deal) ........................... 29 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland................................................................. 30 Issues with Other U.S. Allies and Partners.............................................................................. 31 Greece and the Republic of Cyprus .................................................................................. 31 Background ................................................................................................................. 31 Tensions During 2022 ................................................................................................. 35 Israel and Sunni Arab Governments ................................................................................. 37 The Syrian Conflict ................................................................................................................. 39 Background ....................................................................................................................... 39 Further Turkish Military Operations? ............................................................................... 43 Iraq .......................................................................................................................................... 44 U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 45 Congressional Action and Options ................................................................................................ 46 Responses to Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, CAATSA Sanctions, and Informal Holds ............................................................................................. 47 Possible F-16 Sales ................................................................................................................. 49 U.S./NATO Presence in Turkey .............................................................................................. 51 Other Sanctions ....................................................................................................................... 54 Russia ................................................................................................................................ 54 Iran .................................................................................................................................... 54 Syria .................................................................................................................................. 54 Election Oversight ................................................................................................................... 54 Political and Economic Engagement with Turkey’s Government .......................................... 55 Congressional Research Service Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figures Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context ................................................ 6 Figure 3. Turkish Political Party Preferences .................................................................................. 7 Figure 4. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country ........................................................................ 11 Figure 5. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure .................................................. 12 Figure 6. Turkish Public Opinion: Are These Countries Turkey’s Friends? ................................. 19 Figure 7. Turkey’s Military Presence Abroad ............................................................................... 20 Figure 8. Map of Black Sea Region and Straits ............................................................................ 28 Figure 9. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute ...................................................................................... 33 Figure 10. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean ........................................................ 34 Figure 11. Syria Conflict Map ....................................................................................................... 41 Figure 12. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey .................................................. 53 Figure B-1. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending ............................................. 60 Figure B-2. Turkish Arms Exports, 2000-2021 ............................................................................. 61 Figure B-3. Turkish Arms Export Partners, 2012-2020................................................................. 61 Figure B-4. Bayraktar TB2 Drone ................................................................................................. 63 Figure B-5. Countries Interested in Bayraktar TB2 Drone Aircraft .............................................. 64 Appendixes Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey ............................................................................ 56 Appendix B. Some Drivers of Turkish Foreign Policy ................................................................. 59 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 66 Congressional Research Service Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Introduction and Issues for Congress While U.S.-Turkey1 ties have been consistently complicated since Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, tensions in at least the past six years have produced a number of crises and have led to questions about the status and future of the bilateral relationship (see “U.S. Relations” and “Congressional Action and Options” below). Although the United States and Turkey, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies since 1952, share some vital interests, harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on differences in geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics:    Turkey’s domestic setting and 2023 elections. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP), in power since 2003, rule in a largely authoritarian manner. Erdogan has steadily consolidated control through elections and increasing dominance over the country’s security apparatus and other key institutions. Structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy (including major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency) have led to speculation that Erdogan and the AKP might be vulnerable in presidential and parliamentary elections planned for June 2023. Concerns about winning reelection in partnership with the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyet Halk Partisi, or MHP) may partly explain Erdogan’s domestic and foreign policies. Polls suggest that an opposition coalition led by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP) and Good Party (Iyi Parti) may have a chance to defeat Erdogan and the AKP in the elections. Some observers argue that an election may not be fully free or fair because of Erdogan’s control or influence over the judiciary and media in Turkey.2 If a different president were to win 2023 elections and take power, some policy changes could be possible, but might be limited in areas of core or longstanding national security concern. Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey appears to compartmentalize its relationships with United States, Russia, the European Union (EU), and its regional neighbors depending on various circumstances. For example, Turkey received an S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia in 2019 and continues to cooperate with it in other areas even after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Turkey has provided Ukraine with military, political, and economic support in response to the conflict, and has worked with other countries in its region, perhaps partly as a means of countering Russian regional power. U.S. relations. Policy differences and public acrimony between Turkey and the United States—including over the S-400 and Kurds in northern Syria—have highlighted bilateral tensions. Yet, bilateral ties have somewhat improved due to 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or other equivalents (e.g. the German “Turkei,” the French “Turquie,” etc.) in Turkish government documents and communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the body to “Türkiye.” Some U.S. government statements use “Türkiye,” while others continue to use “Turkey.” Vivian Salama and Jared Malsin, “Turkey’s push to change how the world pronounces its name causes a flap,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2022. 2 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations  Turkey’s emergence as a potential regional counterweight to Russia and a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, among other things. President Biden has voiced support for arms sales to bolster Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet (see “Possible F-16 Sales” below). Congressional actions and options. U.S.-Turkey tensions have led to a number of congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. These include sanctions for Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia, informal congressional holds and proposed legislation aimed at restricting arms sales, and other efforts to limit strategic cooperation or empower Turkey’s rivals like Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Options for further legislative action or oversight could address topics including possible F-16 sales; existing or new sanctions relating to the S-400, Syria, and Russia; Turkey’s upcoming election, and U.S. political and economic engagement with Turkey’s government. Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance Geography Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas People Population: 83,047,706. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. % of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% (2020) Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017) Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) Congressional Research Service 2 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Economy GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $38,759 Real GDP Growth: 5.0% Inflation: 73% Unemployment: 10.8% Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 4.5% Public Debt as % of GDP: 37.5% Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 5.7% International currency reserves: $67.1 billion Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022 end-of-year estimates or projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook. Country Overview and the Erdogan Era Turkey’s large and diversified economy, strong military, Muslim-majority population of over 83 million, and geographic position straddling Europe and the Middle East make it a significant power in both regions. For decades since its founding in the 1920s, the Turkish republic relied upon its military, judiciary, and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term inspired by Turkey’s republican founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) “secular elite” to protect it from political and ideological extremes—sacrificing at least some of its democratic vitality in the process. Major political developments in Turkey over the past two decades—including those described below— appear to stem partly from significant socioeconomic changes that began in the 1980s. The military-guided governments that came to power after a coup that occurred in 1980 helped establish Turkey’s export-driven economy. This contributed to the gradual political awakening of a largely Sunni Muslim middle class from Turkey’s Anatolian heartland. The continued trajectory of these 1980s-initiated socioeconomic changes helped fuel Turkey’s dramatic transformation after 2002, led by the Islamist-leaning AKP and President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan. The AKP won governing majorities four times—2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015—during a period in which Turkey’s economy generally enjoyed growth and stability. During his first decade as Turkey’s leader, Erdogan worked to reduce the political power of the secular elite, with broad support among several Turkish constituencies that supported reforms to bring Turkey closer to EU standards. He subsequently clashed with rivals for power, including previous allies in the Fethullah Gulen movement.3 Domestic polarization intensified after 2013: nationwide antigovernment protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park took place that year, and corruption allegations later surfaced against a number of Erdogan’s colleagues in and out of government.4 After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of governance. 3 Gulen is a former Turkish state-employed imam who founded an international socioreligious movement that exercised considerable influence in Turkish media, politics, and society until Erdogan and Turkish authorities acted against thousands of its alleged members and sympathizers, starting in late 2013 and intensifying after a failed July 2016 coup involving renegade elements within the military. For more information on Gulen and the Gulen movement, see CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 4 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, February 3, 2014. Congressional Research Service 3 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Erdogan’s consolidation of power has continued and arguably accelerated since 2014. In response to the 2016 coup attempt staged by rogue military officers, the government detained tens of thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media outlets.5 Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen movement orchestrated the coup attempt, in which more than 250 people were killed and thousands were injured.6 Forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted the apparent efforts of some renegade military personnel (including airstrikes targeting Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament building) to seize state control. Some leading opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.7 Additional developments expanded Erdogan’s presidential powers further, most notably controversial victories in an April 2017 constitutional referendum and June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections (see below). In July 2018, parliament lifted the state of emergency that it had instituted after the coup attempt, but enacted many of its features into law for three years (extended for another three years in July 2021). However, the positive economic conditions that helped propel Erdogan’s early political popularity have turned into largely negative ones in the past four years, leading to uncertainty about his popularity. Human Rights Concerns in Turkey During the second decade of President Erdogan’s leadership of Turkey, domestic and international observers have raised claims about human rights violations that they assert—amid some opposing views—are more widespread and systematic than in the country’s past eras. During the 2000s, some of these observers expressed hopes that reducing the role of Turkey’s military in its institutions of civilian governance could lead to a more liberal democracy—and perhaps European Union membership. Since then, however, many have voiced worries about the largely unchecked, Islamist-tinged civilian rule that Erdogan justifies on the basis of elections of questionable legitimacy.8 Official analyses from the United States and European Union, as well as unofficial reports from human rights monitors and other third parties, identify a number of issues,9 including the following:  Practices by the government or its supporters (e.g., media control, censorship, intimidation, voter fraud or manipulation) that may undermine the “free and fair” nature of Turkey’s elections.  Arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, and improper interrogation practices (including instances of torture), and some general erosion of the justice sector’s independence and evidentiary standards.  Imprisonment, forced closures or asset transfers, and other measures targeting journalists, civil society leaders, Erdogan’s political opponents, and independent institutions. The government justifies some measures on the basis of countering terrorism, even though sometimes those targeted appear to have had only minimal 5 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkey 2021 Report, October 19, 2021. 6 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America, July 15, 2019. Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 7 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. 8 See, for example, Gorkem Altinors and Umit Akcay, “The authoritarian consolidation attempt in Turkey,” European Consortium for Political Research, February 22, 2022; Dimitar Bechev, Turkey Under Erdogan: How a Country Turned from Democracy and the West, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022. 9 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Turkey,” World Report 2022; Freedom House, “Turkey,” Freedom in the World 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations or superficial contacts with organizations classified by Turkey as terrorist groups—such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the Fethullah Gulen movement.  Significant limits on the right to assemble and protest.  Conditions on and legal prosecution of content posted on key Internet and social media sites (i.e., YouTube, Facebook, Twitter), including an October 2022 law criminalizing “disinformation.”  Weakened protections for women. In 2021, Erdogan withdrew Turkey from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (abbreviated as the Istanbul Convention because it was signed in Istanbul in 2011), triggering statements of concern among some domestic and international observers that perpetrators may be encouraged, not discouraged. In the months leading up to Turkey’s withdrawal, some domestic religious and conservative groups lobbied against the convention on the grounds that it degraded family values and advocated for LGBTQ.  Increased spending on Sunni Muslim religious (imam hatip) secondary schools, and expanded religious instruction in other schools. As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey has agreed to accept the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), but in some cases has refused to implement rulings, leading to speculation that Turkey may be removed from the Council.10 Specific concerns regarding the treatment of Turkey’s large ethnic Kurdish population and its religious minorities are discussed in various sections below. Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a pragmatic populist, a protector of some historically marginalized groups, a budding authoritarian, or an Islamic ideologue.11 While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example, unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if foreign sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have nuclear weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey’s economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected with those of the West for decades. Erdogan and various other key Turkish figures (including political party leaders and potential presidential candidates for 2023) are profiled in Appendix A. Political Assessment Overview President Erdogan retains sweeping power over Turkey. At the same time, he presides over a polarized electorate and faces substantial domestic and international criticism for governing in an authoritarian manner. Many Turks’ opposition to his continued rule, along with Turkey’s ongoing economic challenges, could undermine Turkey’s future stability and prosperity, whether or not it leads to Erdogan leaving office. Erdogan won the June 2018 presidential elections with about 53% of the vote, but the AKP won just under 43% of votes in the concurrent parliamentary elections. To maintain a parliamentary majority, Erdogan’s AKP has relied on the MHP (see Figure 2 below). The MHP is the country’s traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for opposing political accommodation with the 10 Ali Kucukgocmen, “Turks risk losing Europe’s human rights protections after court spurned,” Reuters, November 10, 2022. 11 See, for example, Bechev, Turkey Under Erdogan; Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2020; Bilge Yabanci, “Religion, Nationalism, and Populism in Turkey under the AKP,” Middle East Institute, October 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Kurds. The MHP also provided key support for the constitutional amendments approved in 2017. Erdogan started courting nationalist constituencies around the time Kurdish voter support for the AKP decreased in 2015 with the end of Turkey-PKK peace negotiations and the resumption of armed conflict (see “Government Approaches to the Kurds” below). Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in connection with the June 2018 elections,12 which was also the case with the April 2017 constitutional referendum.13 Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Bipartisan Policy Center. Note: Each square represents 12 parliamentary seats. In 2019 local elections, the AKP maintained the largest share of votes but lost some key municipalities to opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP). The AKP’s most significant losses in those elections included the capital, Ankara, and Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city and economic hub. The Istanbul municipal election was particularly controversial: though CHP candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appeared to win a narrow victory in the March 2019 election, the AKP disputed his vote total and the election was 12 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, 2018 (published June 25, 2018). 13 OSCE, Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017). Congressional Research Service 6 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations annulled by the Supreme Electoral Council. In the closely watched June 2019 re-vote, Imamoglu won a decisive victory over AKP candidate and former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. 2023 Elections Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are planned for June 2023. Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable.14 In one late 2022 poll (see Figure 3), three parties from an opposition coalition (CHP-Iyi-DEVA) outperformed AKP-MHP by a 36%-32% margin. In the same poll, Erdogan’s approval rating was 38%, the percentage who said things in Turkey were headed in the wrong direction was 59%, and the percentage who said the economy was the most important issue was 67%.15 Figure 3. Turkish Political Party Preferences (as of late 2022) How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the outcome (see “Government Approaches to the Kurds” below).16 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,17 (2) opposition parties 14 Ben Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan,” New York Times, December 5, 2022; “Polls indicate close race between rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,” BIA News, October 12, 2022; Berk Esen, “The opposition alliance in Turkey: A viable alternative to Erdogan?” SWP Comment (German Institute for International and Security Affairs [SWP]), August 2022. 15 “Al-Monitor/Premise poll finds tight race for Erdogan in Turkey's elections,” Al-Monitor, December 7, 2022. 16 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment, April 2022. 17 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Congressional Research Service 7 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations can convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,18 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.19 In February 2022, the CHP and the Good (or Iyi) Party, along with four smaller parties (including two established in 2019 and 2020 by Ahmet Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, prominent former AKP figures), signed a joint electoral manifesto, forming “the most comprehensive opposition platform” since 1950, according to one observer.20 The primary pledge of this electoral coalition is to return Turkey to the parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting executive power. Opposition figures have also criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to a range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see “Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?” below).21 The coalition seeks to select a joint presidential candidate to run against Erdogan, probably from the CHP. Party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (who has an Alevi background—see “Alevis” below) generally polls lower than Istanbul mayor Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas (see Appendix A).22 Though Imamoglu’s candidacy may be jeopardized by a criminal conviction (see text box), public visibility from his mayorship may have helped widen his and the CHP’s appeal.23 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers have expressed doubt about the opposition coalition’s prospects, citing ideological differences between its constituent parties.24 Imamoglu’s Criminal Case and Potential Political Ban Istanbul mayor and CHP member Ekrem Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity because of a December 2022 criminal conviction. The charge of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council stemmed from a remark that Imamoglu said he made about the annulled March 2019 election (discussed above) in response to an insult against him from Turkey’s interior minister.25 The court sentenced Imamoglu to jail and banned him from political activity for two years and seven months, but both penalties are subject to appeal, and the timing of the appellate process is unclear.26 In the meantime, Imamoglu continues to serve as mayor and engage politically. Imamoglu and other opposition figures denounced the verdict and judicial process as politicized and a sign of government attempts to sideline Erdogan’s potential electoral opponents.27 18 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, November 1, 2021. 19 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022. 20 Esen, “The opposition alliance in Turkey”; Seren Selvin Korkmaz, “The strategies and struggles of the Turkish opposition under autocratization,” Middle East Institute, October 4, 2022. 21 “Türkiye’s CHP forms technocratic committee to advise the govt,” Yetkin Report, December 4, 2022; Berk Esen, “Post-2023 election scenarios in Turkey,” SWP Comment, September 2022; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2022. 22 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February 15, 2022; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” 23 Gonca Tokyol, “Wielding Istanbul’s clout, Kaftancioglu and the CHP take aim at 2023 elections,” Turkey recap (Substack), November 16, 2022. 24 See, for example, James Ryan, “The path ahead in Turkey’s upcoming electoral campaign,” War on the Rocks, November 10, 2022. 25 “Turkish court orders jail, political ban for Erdogan rival,” Reuters, December 14, 2022; Andrew Wilks, “Cases against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022. 26 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15, 2022. 27 Ibid; Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Istanbul mayor given two-year jail sentence and ‘political ban,’” Middle East Eye, December 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In response to the December court ruling, a State Department statement included the following passage: His [Imamoglu’s] conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. We remain gravely concerned by the continued judicial harassment of civil society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases. The people of Turkey deserve the ability to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms without fear of retribution. The right to exercise the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association is enshrined in Turkey’s constitution, its international law obligations, and its OSCE commitments. We urge the government to cease prosecutions under criminal “insult” laws, and to respect the rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens, including by ensuring an open environment for public debate.28 Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.29 Economic Assessment Overview and Ongoing Problems The AKP’s political successes during the 2000s were aided considerably by robust Turkish economic growth. Growth rates were comparable at times to other major emerging markets, such as the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Key Turkish businesses include diversified conglomerates (such as Koc and Sabanci) from traditional urban centers as well as “Anatolian tigers” (small- to medium-sized export-oriented companies) scattered throughout the country. Since 2012, however, growth has at times slowed or reversed, and the Turkish economy has experienced significant volatility. The “low-hanging fruit”—numerous major infrastructure projects and the scaling up of low-technology manufacturing—that largely drove Turkey’s economic success in the 2000s and early 2010s may be unlikely to produce similar results going forward. Turkey’s relatively big current account deficit increases its vulnerability to higher borrowing costs. Concerns among domestic and foreign market actors about rule of law in Turkey may also drive volatility. In July 2018, Erdogan gave himself the power to appoint central bank rate-setters and appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak to serve as treasury and finance minister, leading some observers to discern greater politicization of Turkey’s monetary policy.30 Albayrak resigned in November 2020, and Erdogan replaced his successor around a year later, mirroring the frequent personnel churn at Turkey’s central bank, where Erdogan fired three bank chiefs (and numerous other officials) from 2019 to 2021.31 That turmoil contributed to the steady depreciation over several years of Turkey’s currency, the lira, putting further strain on the economy. As of 28 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction and Sentencing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu,” December 15, 2022. 29 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14, 2021. 30 See, for example, Marcus Ashworth, “Erdogan’s New Dynasty Makes Turkey Uninvestable,” Bloomberg, July 10, 2018. 31 Jared Malsin and Anna Hirtenstein, “Turkey’s Erdogan fires central bank officials, fueling economic uncertainty,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 9 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations December 2022, the value of the lira had declined around 28% for the year, and nearly 80% since 2018. At least some of these economic challenges appear to stem from Erdogan’s longstanding and ideologically-motivated opposition to high interest rates. Erdogan, contrary to mainstream economic thinking, has expressed the view that lowering interest rates is a means to combat inflation.32 Turkey’s central bank hiked interest rates several times in 2020 and 2021, but in late 2021 returned to the interest rate cuts called for by Erdogan, despite a rising annual inflation rate that reached 85% in October 2022, the highest since 1998.33 Some unofficial estimates have suggested that actual inflation may be well over 100%.34 A persistent current account deficit has put further stress on Turkey’s central bank reserves, which have declined as part of government efforts to bolster the lira, reportedly leading Turkey to seek capital infusions from elsewhere. Turkey has sought currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and also has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (both from tourism and from Russia’s nuclear agency, which is building a nuclear power plant in southern Turkey) that contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation” below).35 According to one media account, Turkey’s central bank received $24.4 billion in unaccounted-for funds in the first seven months of 2022.36 In 2021, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force had placed Turkey on an increased monitoring or “grey” list for deficiencies in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.37 The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private sector companies. The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts, minimum wage increases, and subsidies for basic expenses, along with borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.38 Erdogan has publicly rejected calls to turn to the International Monetary Fund for a financial assistance package. In December 2021, the government announced a plan to insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency depreciation, in apparent coordination with a significant state-backed market intervention.39 Energy Turkey’s strategic location makes it relevant for world energy markets as a transit country while also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own domestic energy needs, which are 32 “Is Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s monetary policy as mad as it seems?” Economist, January 27, 2022. 33 Beril Akman, “Turkey slashes interest rate in line with Erdogan’s demand,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2022; “Yearly inflation in Turkey rises to new 24-year high of 85%,” Associated Press, November 3, 2022. 34 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish inflation hits 85.5% as doubts linger over official data,” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022. 35 Laura Pitel “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022; Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute, November 7, 2022. 36 Louis Ashworth, “Who’s stuffing Turkey?” Financial Times, September 13, 2022. 37 Financial Action Task Force, “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - October 2021,” available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoringoctober-2021.html. 38 Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”; Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022. 39 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations considerable: Turkey imports around $45 billion of oil and gas annually.40 With few hydrocarbon resources of its own (pending recent Black Sea discoveries mentioned below), Turkey is generally dependent on imports from other countries. Turkey seeks to diversify its energy suppliers, while positioning itself as a regional and global energy transport hub and developing its own domestic energy production capabilities. Turkey’s most important energy provider by volume has traditionally been Russia, which provides Turkey with significant amounts of natural gas and oil. Russia’s share of Turkey’s natural gas imports fell from around 58% in 2013 to 34% in 2020, but rebounded to 44% in 2021 (see Figure 4).41 Turkey’s largest oil suppliers are Iraq (30% in 2021) and Russia (24%).42 Turkey faces challenges in maintaining and broadening its efforts at diversification, including some pertaining to long-term supply contracts and physical infrastructure. Figure 4. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country (in millions of cubic meters) Source: Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), 2021 Annual Report. Turkey has also sought to leverage its geography to position itself as a crucial transit country for global energy trade routes, mostly though natural gas pipelines. In January 2020, Presidents Erdogan and Putin inaugurated the TurkStream pipeline project (see Figure 5), which carries Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to southern and central Europe via Turkey.43 A planned second line is to extend northward as far as Austria. Russian energy infrastructure projects involving Turkey could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing legislation. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA, P.L. 115-44) authorizes sanctions on individuals or entities that invest in or engage in trade for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines. In October 2017, the Trump Administration published guidance noting that sanctions would not apply to projects for which 40 “Turkey – Country Commercial Guide,” U.S. Department of Commerce, July 26, 2022. 41 Turkey Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Annual Natural Gas Market Report 2021. 42 EPDK, Annual Oil Market Report 2021. 43 CRS In Focus IF11177, TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe, by Sarah E. Garding et al. Congressional Research Service 11 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations contracts were signed prior to August 2, 2017, the date of CRIEEA’s enactment. However, in July 2020, the Administration updated that guidance and stated that while the initial TurkStream pipeline would not be subject to sanctions, the second line would be. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) enacted in December 2019 included, as Title LXXV, the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 (PEESA). This Act mandates sanctions—subject to a presidential waiver for national security reasons—for actors involved in laying subsea pipeline for TurkStream and possible successor projects on a going-forward basis. In the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA, Section 1242 of the FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283), Congress expanded the scope of targeted and potentially sanctionable activities related to TurkStream and other projects. Turkey has also been important for the U.S. and European effort to establish a southern corridor for pipelines to Europe that bypass Russia. In late 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan reached deals for the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP);44 the project was inaugurated in June 2018.45 In November 2020, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) commenced operations, bringing Azeri gas to Italy via TANAP.46 Figure 5. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State, HIS, ESRI, European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas, Bulgartransgaz. Geopolitical dynamics may pose challenges. For example, reports suggest that Turkey would like to bolster its position as a hub for natural gas from Russia, but any such plans may run counter to European countries’ aims to phase out Russian natural gas.47 Difficulties in relations with Greece, 44 The terms of the Turkey-Azerbaijan agreement specified that 565 billion-700 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas would transit Turkey, of which 210 bcf would be available for Turkey’s domestic use. 45 “Leaders open TANAP pipeline carrying gas from Azerbaijan to Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 12, 2018. 46 Dimitar Bechev, “The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline: Why it matters and what comes next?” Middle East Institute, December 2, 2020. 47 Ragip Soylu, “Could Turkey become a gas hub for Europe?” Middle East Eye, November 13, 2022; Vladimir Soldatkin and Oleysa Astakhova, “Analysis: Europe wary of Turkish hub to hide gas ‘made in Moscow,’” Reuters, December 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt are likely to complicate Turkish efforts to play a larger role in the development and transport of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Greece and the Republic of Cyprus” and “Israel and Sunni Arab Governments” below). Turkey has opportunities to increase domestically-produced sources of energy.48 In August 2020, President Erdogan announced a Turkish discovery of offshore natural gas deposits in the Black Sea.49 Turkey expects production to begin in 2023 and reach its maximum by 2028, potentially satisfying a large portion of Turkey’s natural gas needs, though Turkey requires additional capital to fully develop its natural gas infrastructure.50 Beyond natural gas production, Turkey seeks to generate nuclear power, entering into an agreement with a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s state-run nuclear company) to have it build and operate what would be Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, near the Mediterranean port of Mersin. Construction began in April 2018, with operations on the first of four reactors expected to begin in 2023; Turkey’s energy minister has said the site, which is scheduled to be completed in 2026, will meet 10% of Turkey’s electricity demand.51 Despite speculation among observers that U.S. and European sanctions could affect Rosatom’s ability to continue financing and constructing the project, Rosatom has publicly asserted sanctions on Russia will not impact Akkuyu.52 Turkey abandoned plans for Japan to assist with the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Sinop on the Black Sea coast in January 2020; in October 2022, Turkey and Russia reportedly began talks over Rosatom taking on construction of another four reactors at Sinop.53 Turkey’s Kurdish Issue Background Ethnic Kurds constitute approximately 19% of Turkey’s population.54 Kurds are largely concentrated in the less economically developed southeast, though populations are found in urban centers across the country. Some Kurds have resisted various aspects of Turkish state authority in parts of the southeast—a dynamic that also exists between Kurds and national governments in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This resistance and harsh Turkish government measures to quell Kurdish demands for rights have fed tensions that have occasionally escalated since the foundation of the republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish military has periodically countered an on-and-off separatist insurgency and urban terrorism campaign by the PKK. The initially secessionist demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved toward the less ambitious goal of greater cultural and political autonomy.55 According to the U.S. government and EU, the PKK partially 48 Turkey supplies about half of its own coal, which accounts for 28% of Turkey’s total primary energy supply (TPES), and all types of renewable energy, which account for 17% of TPES. Oil and natural gas account for 32% and 25% of TPES, respectively. Turkey 2021: Energy Policy Review, International Energy Agency, March 2021. 49 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Erdogan Unveils Biggest Ever Black Sea Natural Gas Discovery,” Bloomberg, August 21, 2020. 50 See Wayne C. Ackerman, “Turkey: a new emerging gas player with resources and infrastructure,” Middle East Institute, June 15, 2022. 51 “Construction begins on fourth Turkish reactor,” World Nuclear News, July 21, 2022. 52 “Turkish nuclear plant threatened by Russian sanctions,” Al Jazeera, May 16, 2022; “EU sanctions will not impede Akkuyu nuclear plant financing: Rosatom,” Anadolu Agency, November 28, 2022. 53 “Turkey, Japan scrap partnership in Sinop nuclear plant in Turkey’s north,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 20, 2020; Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey asks Russia to build another nuclear plant, defying US,” Bloomberg, October 20, 2022. 54 CIA World Factbook, Turkey (accessed November 2022). 55 Kurdish nationalist leaders demand that any future changes to Turkey’s constitution (in its current form following the 2017 amendments) not suppress Kurdish ethnic and linguistic identity. The first clause of Article 3 of the constitution Congressional Research Service 13 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations finances its activities through criminal activities, including its alleged operation of a Europe-wide drug trafficking network.56 The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but has flared periodically since then. The PKK uses safe havens in areas of northern Iraq under the nominal authority of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), while also reportedly maintaining links to Kurdish groups in Syria (as discussed below). The Turkish military’s approach to neutralizing the PKK has routinely been criticized by Western governments and human rights organizations for being overly hard on ethnic Kurds. Turkish authorities have imprisoned thousands and displaced or disrupted the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others for suspected PKK involvement or sympathies.57 Government Approaches to the Kurds PKK Designations by U.S. Government Until the spring of 2015, Erdogan appeared to Designation Year prefer negotiating a political compromise with Foreign Terrorist 1997 PKK leaders over the prospect of armed Organization 58 conflict. However, against the backdrop of Specially Designated 2001 PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups’ success in Syria Global Terrorist and domestic political considerations, Erdogan Significant Foreign 2008 then adopted a more confrontational political Narcotics Trafficker stance with the PKK. Within that context, a complicated set of circumstances involving terrorist attacks and mutual suspicion led to a resumption of violence between government forces and the PKK in the summer of 2015. As a result of the violence, which was concentrated in southeastern Turkey and was most intense from 2015 to 2016, thousands of fighters and hundreds civilians died.59 In addition to mass population displacement, infrastructure in the southeast has suffered significant damage. U.S. officials, while supportive of Turkey’s prerogative to defend itself from attacks that it alleges come from the PKK or PKK allies, have advised Turkey to show restraint and proportionality in its actions.60 Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey’s government cracked down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Dozens of elected Kurdish mayors were removed from office and replaced with government-appointed “custodians.” In November 2016, the two then-co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, or HDP) were arrested along with other parliamentarians under various charges of crimes against the state; some remain imprisoned, along with other party leaders and reads, “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Because the constitution states that its first three articles are unamendable, even proposing a change could face judicial obstacles. 56 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Five PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers,” April 20, 2011. 57 See, for example, Cengiz Candar, Turkey’s Mission Impossible: War and Peace with the Kurds, Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Lexington Books, 2020. 58 As prime minister, Erdogan had led past efforts to resolve the Kurdish question by using political, cultural, and economic development approaches, in addition to the traditional security-based approach, in line with the AKP’s ideological starting point that common Islamic ties among Turks and Kurds could transcend ethnic differences. 59 International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer,” last updated November 10, 2022. 60 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” November 28, 2022; Mark Landler and Carlotta Gall, “As Turkey Attacks Kurds in Syria, U.S. Is on the Sideline,” New York Times, January 22, 2018. Congressional Research Service 14 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations members who have been detained on similar charges since 2016. Turkish officials routinely accuse Kurdish politicians of support for the PKK, but these politicians generally deny close ties. In June 2021, Turkey’s Constitutional Court accepted an indictment from a state prosecutor seeking to close the HDP and ban many of its members from politics. The HDP is the successor to a number of pro-Kurdish parties that the state has shut down throughout Turkey’s history going back to the early 1990s.61 As of December 2022, the court has yet to rule on the closure case. The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK dealings may depend on a number of factors, including    which Kurdish figures and groups (imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan [profiled in Appendix A], various PKK militant leaders, the professedly nonviolent HDP) are most influential in driving events; Erdogan’s approach to the issue, which has alternated between conciliation and confrontation; and possible incentives to Turkey’s government and the Kurds from the United States or other actors for mitigating violence and promoting political resolution. Religious Minorities The status of religious minorities in Turkey has attracted some congressional attention. Religious minorities are generally concentrated in Istanbul and other urban areas, as well as the southeast, and collectively represent around 0.2% of Turkey’s population. Adherents of non-Muslim religions and minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) often attract, and to some extent rely on, legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries. The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. This arrangement was originally used to enforce secularism (often referred to as “laicism”), partly to prevent religion from influencing state actors and institutions as it did under Ottoman rule. However, since at least 2015, observers have detected some movement by state religious authorities in the direction of the AKP’s Islamist-friendly worldview, and successive Department of State International Religious Freedom Reports indicate that the Turkish government limits the rights of religious minorities.62 U.S. concerns focus largely on the rights of Turkey’s Christian and Jewish communities, which have sought greater freedom to choose leaders, train clergy, own property, and otherwise function independently of the Turkish government.63 Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia Some Members of Congress have expressed grievances through proposed congressional resolutions and letters on behalf of the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of 61 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye, March 20, 2021. 62 See also, e.g., Ceren Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP (Cambridge University Press), 2018. 63 Since 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has given Turkey designations ranging from “country of particular concern” (highest concern) to “monitored.” As of the 2022 report, Turkey is among 12 countries recommended for the State Department’s Special Watch List. For additional information on Turkey’s religious minorities, see the State Department’s Report on International Religious Freedom for 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity based in Istanbul.64 The Patriarchate, along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the reopening of its Halki Theological School, which was closed after a 1971 ruling by Turkey’s Constitutional Court prohibiting the operation of private institutions of higher education.65 The State Department issued a statement in July 2021 marking the 50th anniversary of Halki’s closure and urged Turkey to allow its reopening.66 In the past, Erdogan reportedly has said that Halki’s reopening would depend on measures by Greece to accommodate its Muslim community.67 Turkey has converted some historic Christian churches from museums into mosques, most notably Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya in Turkish), a sixth-century Greek Orthodox cathedral that had been converted to a mosque after the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and then became a museum during the early years of the Turkish Republic. A popular movement to convert the site back into a mosque gained strength in recent years, culminating in President Erdogan’s public support for such a move during the March 2019 local elections campaign.68 In July 2020, a Turkish court invalidated the 1934 decree that created Hagia Sophia as a museum, and President Erdogan subsequently approved its conversion to a mosque and led the first prayers there. The move, seen as a political overture to conservative Turkish nationalists, was criticized by the Trump Administration, a number of Members of Congress, and the EU Foreign Affairs Council.69 Alevis About 10 to 20 million Turkish Muslims are Alevis (of whom about 20% are ethnic Kurds). The Alevi community has some relation to Shiism and may contain strands from pre-Islamic Anatolian and Christian traditions.70 Alevism has been influenced by Sufi mysticism that emphasizes believers’ individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its lack of centralized leadership and its reliance on secret oral traditions. Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of secularism in Turkey, which they reportedly see as a form of protection from the Sunni majority.71 In October 2022, President Erdogan announced plans to 64 See, for example, H.R. 3056 in the 117th Congress. During the 112th Congress in 2011, the House passed H.Res. 306—“Urging the Republic of Turkey to safeguard its Christian heritage and to return confiscated church properties”— by voice vote. During the 113th Congress in 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Committee favorably reported the Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act (H.R. 4347). The Turkish government does not acknowledge the “ecumenical” nature of the Patriarchate, but does not object to others’ reference to the Patriarchate’s ecumenicity. 65 The Patriarchate also presses for the Turkish government to lift the requirement that the Patriarch be a Turkish citizen, and for it to return previously confiscated properties. 66 State Department, “50th anniversary of the closing of Halki Seminary,” July 29, 2021. 67 Stelyo Berberakis, “Patriarch hopes to reopen seminary after talks with president,” Daily Sabah, May 11, 2018; “Turkey ready to open Halki Seminary in return for a mosque in Greece: report,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 8, 2015. 68 “Turkey’s Erdogan Says He Plans to Change Hagia Sophia’s Title from Museum to Mosque,” Reuters, March 29, 2019. In 2014, then-Prime Minster Erdogan responded to activists calling for Hagia Sophia to be opened as a mosque by saying that other extant mosques in the area should be fully utilized before any change would be made to Hagia Sophia. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What caused Erdogan’s change of heart on Hagia Sophia?” Al-Monitor, March 29, 2019. 69 State Department, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability,” July 15, 2020; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Risch Statement on Turkey’s Hagia Sophia,” July 10, 2020; Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council, July 13, 2020. 70 For additional historical background, see Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing territorial diversity, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 11-18. 71 According to a scholar on Turkey, “Alevis suffered centuries of oppression under the Ottomans, who accused them of not being truly Muslim and suspected them of colluding with the Shi’i Persians against the empire. Alevi Kurds were Congressional Research Service 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations create a new government directorate to oversee financial support to cemevler (Alevi houses of worship), with some Alevis welcoming the initiative and others rejecting it.72 Arab Alawites in Syria and southern Turkey are a distinct Shia-related religious community. Turkish Foreign Policy General Assessment Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia— with which it has a long history of discord—including in political-military situations involving Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. A Turkish analyst has argued that Turkish foreign and security policy is shaped by three key objectives: attaining long-term strategic autonomy in key geopolitical affairs and self-sufficiency in defense technologies, building new partnerships to minimize Turkey’s over-dependence on its traditional Western allies and avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. 73 Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these actors and maintain its leverage with them.74 For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the European Union since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to remain somewhat dependent on these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties.75 victims of the early republic’s Turkification policies and were massacred by the thousands in Dersim [now called Tunceli] in 1937-39. In the 1970s, Alevis became associated with socialist and other leftist movements, while the political right was dominated by Sunni Muslims. An explosive mix of sectarian cleavages, class polarization, and political violence led to communal massacres of Alevis in five major cities in 1977 and 1978, setting the stage for the 1980 coup.” Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 14. 72 Sibel Hurtas, “Erdogan’s pre-election gesture to Alevis met with suspicion,” Al-Monitor, October 14, 2022; Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Erdogan’s Alevi reform initiative met with praise and scepticisim,” Middle East Eye, October 18, 2022. 73 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, 2022. 74 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. 75 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy Analysis, February 17, 2022. Congressional Research Service 17 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey and the European Union (EU) Turkey has a long history of partnership with the EU (and its predecessor organizations) and began negotiations to join the EU in 2005. Talks stalled shortly thereafter and Turkey’s membership now appears unlikely, at least in the near future. Some scholars have interpreted resistance to Turkish EU accession as rooted in a fear among some EU states that Turkey’s large Muslim population would fundamentally change the cultural character of the EU and dilute the power of the EU’s founding Western European states in particular.76 Turkey’s unwillingness to normalize diplomatic and trade relations with the Republic of Cyprus (an EU member since 2004) presents a major obstacle to its accession prospects. Other EU concerns over Turkey’s qualifications for membership center on the treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women’s rights, and the proper and transparent functioning of Turkey’s democratic and legal systems.77 Debate within the EU regarding the extent to which Turkey meets EU standards has intensified since President Erdogan’s consolidation of power starting around 2013. Erdogan has engaged in anti-European rhetoric with audiences both at home and among the substantial Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. Despite the lack of significant progress in accession negotiations, the EU has provided Turkey with more than €9 billion in preaccession financial and technical assistance since 2002. Citing concerns about Turkish backsliding on reforms, the EU reduced pre-accession assistance levels in 2018. Annual assistance levels that ranged from between €493-626 million for 2014-2017 dropped to slightly less than €400 million for 2018-2020.78 Turkey has received additional funding since then under an overall EU budget of €14.2 billion for 2021-2027 for Turkey and six Balkan countries. Turkey’s compartmentalized approach to foreign policy may to some extent reflect domestic political concerns. Because Erdogan’s control over parliament depends on the AKP’s coalition with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to preserve support from core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment with the West.79 Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression seems to contribute to domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse, as well as support for Erdogan’s “neoOttoman” narrative of restoring Turkish regional prestige. Geopolitics: A Key Driver of Turkish Foreign Policy Turkey’s geography has deep implications for its relations with neighbors and outside powers. Turkey is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits), which are critical maritime chokepoints connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Historically, Turkey’s political, economic, and military strength has helped it shape developments in areas of close proximity. Its traditional rival for regional primacy has been Iran, but since the middle of the 20th century countries such as Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have developed aspects of military or economic power that approach or outstrip Turkey’s in some ways. For centuries, the influence of the Turkish state, and the Ottoman Empire that preceded it, has been checked and countered by outside powers intent on some measure of control in the regions surrounding Turkey for strategic and economic purposes. After the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the 16 th century, its strength waned. Gradually, it lost influence and territory to Russia, other European powers, and nationalist movements in the Balkans, Middle East, and North Africa. Before the Empire disintegrated after its defeat in World War I, its rulers spent the Empire’s last decades resorting to balance-of-power politics and military action to prolong its survival. The Turkish Republic succeeded the Ottoman Empire and sought to create a stable nation-state for Turkish Muslims within a smaller territorial area. To retain control throughout Anatolia (or Asia Minor) and in the Eastern Thrace peninsula on the European side of the Straits, Turkey fought a 1919-1922 war of independence against Greek, Armenian, and French forces. 76 “Does ‘Muslim’ Turkey belong in ‘Christian’ Europe?” Pew Research Center, January 13, 2005; Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, eds., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 77 European Commission, Türkiye 2022 Report. 78 See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180817-revised-indicative-strategy-paper2014-2020-for-turkey.pdf. 79 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, New York: Routledge, 2013 (3 rd edition). Congressional Research Service 18 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations These historical experiences and continued interactions between Turkey, its many neighbors, and several larger powers with regional interests, have influenced a Turkish approach to foreign policy that balances cautious accommodation with assertive claims when national priorities (which have fluctuated over time) are at stake. Turkey’s sizable and restive Kurdish minority—approximately 19% of its population—makes it vulnerable to Kurdish demands for autonomy, and to outside actors that aid Kurdish groups around Turkey’s borders in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks in those relationships while building other global relationships. One reason Turkey may seek to increase economic ties with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and other regional countries is to reduce its vulnerability to economic sanctions or other coercive tactics by the United States or European Union countries. The Turkish public appears to regard very few countries—Western or non-Western—as friendly to Turkey (see Figure 6). Figure 6. Turkish Public Opinion: Are These Countries Turkey’s Friends? (% basis) Source: M. Aydin, M. Çelikpala, S. Akgul-Açıkmeşe, E. Canan-Sokullu, S. Guvenç, O. Şenyuva, S. Kaya-Sonmez, Quantitative Research Report: Public Perception on Turkish Foreign Policy 2022, Kadir Has University Turkish Studies Group, Global Academy, Akademetre, September 8, 2022. Notes: Decimal points are conveyed in the European style (with commas instead of periods). TRNC refers to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which (as described below) is recognized only by Turkey. See Appendix B for some other drivers of Turkish foreign policy, including arms procurement and exports of drone aircraft, economics and energy, and leadership approaches. Regional Security Concerns Security considerations are critical in Turkish foreign policy calculations and overseas deployments (see Figure 7). Turkish leaders often base their stances on perceived threats or opportunities, with their general priority being to safeguard Turkey’s maritime approaches and border areas. A number of more peripheral areas within the region remain important, but as Congressional Research Service 19 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations secondary concerns. NATO membership is important for Turkey in part because its collective defense promise may deter threats from regional actors outside of the alliance. Figure 7. Turkey’s Military Presence Abroad (as of August 2022) Examples of priority concerns in Turkey’s immediate vicinity include:  Border concerns in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s leaders have expressed concerns about vulnerabilities to Kurdish militancy, refugee flows, and foreign influence near Turkey’s southern borders with Iraq and Syria. Border threats have heavily influenced Turkish policies since the advent of the PKK in the 1980s. These policies—oriented toward containing cross-border Kurdish influence–evolved further after the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. Turkey’s efforts to control developments near its southern borders have continued and expanded during Syria’s civil war, due largely to: (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. support for PKK-aligned Syrian Kurds against the Islamic State, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces that complicate and somewhat constrain Turkish action in northern Syria (see “The Syrian Conflict” below).  Cyprus and Greece. Turkey has engaged in decades-long disputes—with elements of military conflict—regarding political outcomes in Cyprus and with Congressional Research Service 20 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Greece over islands and maritime/airspace boundaries (see “Greece and the Republic of Cyprus” below).  Turkey’s control over the Straits. Soviet designs on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits arguably played a major role in Turkey’s decision to invite U.S. support and ultimately join NATO in the early years of the Cold War. Turkish control over the Straits remains a priority amid Russia-Ukraine conflict (see “Black Sea Access” below). Issues that are significant, but relatively peripheral, include:  General stability and governance in the Middle East and North Africa. Beyond Syria and Iraq, Turkey under Erdogan has played direct or indirect roles in some regional countries’ internal armed or political struggles (especially Libya and Egypt). Turkey also sided politically with Qatar in its 2017-2020 standoff with Arab Gulf countries and Egypt, though it has improved relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past two years (see “Israel and Sunni Arab Governments” below). Additionally, Turkey has provided political support for the Palestinian Sunni Islamist movement Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that engages in violent conflict against Israel (and receives some aid from Iran). In some cases, Erdogan has combined a pro-Islamist tilt with the pragmatic pursuit of gain, such as by using ties with Libya’s Government of National Accord/Unity to safeguard Turkey’s commercial interests and enter into favorable maritime boundary demarcation agreements.80 Some observers have expressed concern that the preferences Erdogan and the AKP have shown for Islamist figures and movements have provoked instability in at least some cases.81  Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish leaders have consistently supported Azerbaijan in territorial conflicts with Armenia, including in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey and Azerbaijan share strong economic, military, cultural, and linguistic ties, while Turkey has historical animosities with Armenia and its Russian protector.82 Armenia poses little military threat to Turkey’s eastern border. In 2022, a new Turkey-Armenia dialogue launched, offering a potential path to normalization, including via the opening of their land border. President Erdogan has maintained that normalization is “interdependent” with further progress in resolving Armenia’s differences with Azerbaijan, stating in August 2022 that Turkey would “open our doors after problems with Azerbaijan are solved.”83  Iran’s role in the region. Turkey is Iran’s historical rival, and the government remains leery of Iranian actions and intentions in the region. Yet, Turkey is less outwardly hostile to Iran than are Israel and some Arab states. Turkey and Iran have a centuries-long history of coexistence, Iran’s current regime has avoided directly threatening Turkey, and their leaders maintain important diplomatic and trade ties—including on energy (see “Iran” below for a discussion of sanctions or possible penalties against some Turkish entities for 80 Emadeddin Badi, “To Advance Its Own Interests, Turkey Should Now Help Stabilize Libya,” War on the Rocks, May 24, 2021. 81 Anchal Vohra, “Erdogan’s War with Arab Monarchies Is Over,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; M. Hasim Tekines, “What Would a Post-Erdogan Turkish Foreign Policy Look Like?” War on the Rocks, December 8, 2021; Marwa Maziad and Jake Sotiriadis, “Turkey’s Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability,” Middle East Institute, April 21, 2020. 82 Patrick Keddie, “What’s Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?” Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020. 83 “President Erdogan Sees ‘Opportunity’ to Mend Armenia Ties,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 21, 2022; Amberin Zaman, “Armenia Clings to Turkish Peace Talks to Avert War with Azerbaijan,” Al-Monitor, August 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations energy-related dealings with Iranian parties). However, Turkey has supported Sunni political parties and militias in Syria and Iraq partly to counter Iran-allied groups.84 Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President? In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.85 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern: (1) addressing Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence in Syria and Iraq; (2) exercising Turkish influence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (including by countering Greece and ethnic Greek Cypriots, and supporting ethnic Turkish Cypriots); and (3) balancing relations with Ukraine, Russia, and the West to address conflict and its consequences while seeking to avoid dependence on any of them. However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such changes may include:    Economic policy. Providing more flexibility to central bank and other officials on monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems. ECHR rulings. Giving greater consideration to ECHR rulings calling for the release of imprisoned civil society figure Osman Kavala86 and Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas (see Appendix A for a profile of Demirtas). Less Islamist influence. Reducing (1) references to Islamic identity and symbols as rallying points for regional policies, and (2) Turkish support for or willingness to host certain Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions. Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the United States and European countries.87 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western states, such as by pursuing arms purchases from Russia, closer ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—see “Russia” below), or new military operations in northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish government 84 Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Middle East Reset: A Precursor for Re-Escalation?” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, August 2022. 85 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” 86 In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced Kavala to life imprisonment after convicting him of conspiring against the government. The ECHR had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said that Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022. In July, the ECHR ordered Turkey to release Kavala and pay him damages. If Turkey does not comply, it could have its voting rights and membership in the Council of Europe suspended. Nazlan Ertan, “Europe’s top court reprimands Turkey for jailing philanthropist,” AlMonitor, July 11, 2022. 87 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” Congressional Research Service 22 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition might become more passive on foreign policy, even in some situations when U.S. officials request a more active Turkish role. U.S. steps to help a potential new Turkish government—whether on arms sales, sanctions, the economy, or other matters—could encourage an improvement in bilateral relations. For information on U.S.-Turkey trade and investment, see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. If, however, Turkish leaders or domestic audiences assess that any such steps are likely to bind future Turkish actions to U.S. interests, those concerns could limit a new Turkish government’s willingness to embrace them. Russia Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could be motivated by a combination of factors, including:  Alternative to the West. Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the West via hedging behavior, as discussed above.  Economic opportunism. Erdogan’s assessment of an opportunity to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and energy ties with Russia. Western sanctions have reduced the pool of Russia’s economic partners and thus have arguably increased Turkish leverage with Russia.  Chances to increase regional influence at Russia’s expense. Turkish calculations that potentially declining Russian influence in its near abroad could present opportunities for Turkey’s relative rise in influence if it involves itself more in issues and organizations spanning Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. At the same time, Turkey has moved closer to a number of countries that were part of the Soviet Union or otherwise in Russia’s historical sphere of influence, likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power. These include Ukraine, Poland, and states in the Baltic, South Caucasus, and Central Asia regions.88 Background Turkey and Russia have a centuries-long history of geopolitical conflict and reluctant mutual accommodation. Relations reached a relative low point in 2015-2016, when Turkey downed a Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia temporarily imposed sanctions. After that, President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin cultivated closer ties. Putin showed support for Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and subsequently allowed Turkey to carry out military operations in northern Syria over the next two years that helped roll back Kurdish territorial control and reduce refugee flows near Turkey’s border. The S-400 transaction and cooperation on natural gas pipelines and nuclear energy are other collaborative aspects of Turkey-Russia relations. 88 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond”; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 23 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations While Turkey-Russia cooperation could undermine Turkey’s relationships with the United States, the European Union, and NATO to some degree, Turkish and Russian interests diverge significantly in several places throughout the region. Some observers have remarked that Turkey’s use of relatively inexpensive drone aircraft and proxy forces in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh have frustrated Russia’s aspirations in these places—ironically by borrowing some of the tactics Putin has used to frustrate Western designs in its near abroad.89 Other observers suggest that Turkish military measures in these places may be less about setting limits to Russian action or influence, and more about encouraging greater Turkey-Russia diplomatic engagement to coordinate political outcomes.90 In 2022, Turkey’s involvement in Ukraine (discussed below) has become the most prominent case under discussion regarding the implications for Turkey-Russia relations. Differences between Turkish and Russian leaders may not lead to a major rupture between the two countries. Turkey’s cooperation or competition with different actors may depend on the specific circumstances of each issue, rather than total alignment with or opposition to any great power—be it the United States, Russia, or another country. As one example, more than three years after taking delivery of the S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia, Turkey does not appear to have activated the system for general use and seems to remain open to negotiating with the United States about whether to do so. Erdogan has stated that Turkey may join the SCO, raising questions about his actual intentions to do so, and whether doing so would be a signal of greater alignment with Russia (and perhaps China), or of increased Turkish strategic autonomy and regional prominence.91 In addition to Russia and China, the SCO—a multilateral organization covering political, economic, and security matters—includes most Central Asian countries, as well as India and Pakistan. The SCO is not a formal alliance like NATO. Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.Turkey ties. One former U.S. official has said: Turkey will avoid picking a side in the sense of a binary, zero-sum outcome to the war. Ukrainian defeat and dismemberment would be an unmitigated disaster for Turkey, but a defeated and potentially unstable Russia would negatively impact Turkish interests in Syria and the Caucasus, as well as its economy. 92 Turkey’s links with Russia—especially its S-400 acquisition—have fueled significant U.S.Turkey tensions. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—may have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in 89 See, for example, Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. 90 Asli Aydintasbas, “Hedge politics: Turkey’s search for balance in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2022; Guney Yildiz, “Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and NagornoKarabakh,” SWP Comment, March 24, 2021. 91 Nazlan Ertan, “Why Erdogan’s Shanghai ambitions are risky business,” Al-Monitor, September 20, 2022; Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils.” 92 Rich Outzen, quoted in “How long can Turkey play both sides in the Ukraine war?” Atlantic Council, August 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations parallel with other NATO countries.93 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion and opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including Crimea),94 Turkey has supplied Ukraine with armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles, as well as humanitarian assistance.95 Nevertheless, Turkey’s leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate the conflict (discussed below). One Turkish analyst has written: Russian geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey closer to the geopolitical West, but it is doubtful that this process will make the geopolitical West as indispensable for Turkey as it was during the Cold War, or function as a geo-political anchor in the way it did then.96 Another Turkish analyst has observed that some experts argue Turkey is successfully building “a new geo-strategic axis” through drone diplomacy and other security and energy partnerships with Ukraine (see text box below) and other “Western-leaning post-Soviet and former Warsaw Pact nations” that surround Russia. (see also Appendix B)97 Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.98 In 2017, a Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their respective defense industries.99 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.100 In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives. Turkish expertise with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skills in designing and constructing aerospace engines and missiles.101 Additionally, Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.102 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,103 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has delivered additional 93 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. 94 “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,” PBS Newshour, September 19, 2022. For information on Crimean Tatars and their relations with Turkey, see Joseph Massad, “Crimean Tatars caught between Russia and Ukraine,” Middle East Eye, October 3, 2022; “Türkiye grants Crimean Tatars indefinite leave to remain,” Daily Sabah, August 11, 2022; Emad Ahmed, “Who are the Crimean Tatars? The Turkic Muslim minority loyal to Ukraine,” Middle East Eye, March 3, 2022. 95 For information on the MRAPs, see Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August 22, 2022. 96 Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” SWP Comment, May 20, 2022 97 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 98 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. 99 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. 100 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. 101 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 102 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes Navy International, October 3, 2022. 103 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, Congressional Research Service 25 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.104 Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s successful use of TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships— often in coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have destroyed Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.105 The TB2’s main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production capacity.106 Baykar also has planned for a testing, training, and maintenance center near the factory.107 Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.108 Ukraine’s importance as an alternative source for Turkey in procuring engines may have increased after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to concerns about Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.109 Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia (see “Energy” above). These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.110 For the first nine months of 2022, Turkey-Russia trade volume was up sharply year-on-year from 2021.111 The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. Decreases in Russian and Ukrainian tourism have affected Turkey’s economy, and Turkey’s government is wary of potential Russian actions that could harm Turkey’s economy even more, such as cutoffs of natural gas and wheat exports or military operations that might increase refugee flows to Turkey.112 A European Union price cap arrangement on Russian oil shipments has cast doubt on insurance coverage for oil tankers transiting the Straits as of December. Turkey has been requiring tankers to document coverage to mitigate concerns of financial risk from a spill or other costly incident.113 In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to boost Turkey-Russia cooperation across economic sectors.114 Reportedly, many European companies prohibited by sanctions from exporting directly to Russia, or otherwise wary of doing so, use Turkey as a base 2022. For more information on TB2s, see Appendix B and Figure B-4. 104 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022. 105 Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” New Yorker, May 16, 2022. 106 Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2022. 107 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates geopolitical stage,” Defense News, August 8, 2022. 108 Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022. 109 Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022. 110 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December 10, 2022. 111 Yoruk Isik, “In Turkish-Russian relations, the Ukraine grain deal is not the point,” Middle East Institute, November 9, 2022. 112 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” SWP Comment, April 6, 2022. 113 “Turkey oil tanker logjam snarls Russia oil sanctions,” Reuters, December 9, 2022. 114 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 26 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations for re-exports to Russia.115 Additionally, since the Russian invasion, Turkey has welcomed sanctioned Russian oligarchs as tourists and investors. Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. In June 2022, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo reportedly visited Turkey to raise concerns over the movement of some Russian assets and business operations to Turkey,116 and in August Adeyemo sent a letter to Turkish business groups warning of penalties if they worked with Russian individuals or entities facing sanctions.117 In September, several Turkish banks that had adopted the Mir payment system (a Russian equivalent of Visa or MasterCard) stopped accepting it.118 Some observers have asserted that arrangements between Turkey and Russia could help Erdogan address Turkey’s financial problems ahead of 2023 elections.119 Rosatom (the Russian stateowned company building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, as mentioned above) began implementing a plan in July 2022 to wire up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary, while also seeking a credit line to finance the plant’s construction with Turkish treasury bonds.120 A former Turkish central banker has argued that this transactional structure would minimize the risk of Turkish institutions facing U.S. sanctions for the movement of Russian funds to Turkey.121 Russia also agreed that Turkey could partially pay for Russian gas imports in rubles rather than dollars.122 Black Sea Access Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Straits (see Figure 8) under the 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux Convention”) has implications for U.S. interests.123 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of war between Russia and Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which generally bars belligerent countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are returning to their base of origin).124 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for Ukraine.125 (The United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms since it went into effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.) 115 Barbara Moens et al., “Erdoğan walks a fine line as the Ukraine war’s double agent,” Politico EU, August 17, 2022. 116 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor, June 22, 2022. 117 Elif Ince et al., “Russian Superyachts, Subject to Sanctions, Find a Haven in Turkey,” New York Times, October 24, 2022. 118 Ibid. 119 Sinem Ozdemir, “Turkey, Russia partnership essential to both,” Deutsche Welle, August 12, 2022; Fehim Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline,” Al-Monitor, August 10, 2022. 120 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East Eye, July 30, 2022. 121 Ugur Gurses, quoted in Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline.” 122 Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline.” 123 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2022. Text of the Convention is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-theStraits.pdf. 124 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022. 125 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 27 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 8. Map of Black Sea Region and Straits Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may prevent Russia from replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some Russian ships and present some threats with uncrewed surface vessels carrying drone aircraft, Russia’s fleet remains dominant in the northern Black Sea and controls the key Ukrainian port of Mariupol as of late 2022.126 In March 10, 2022 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that Turkey (under the Montreux Convention) has formally closed the Straits only to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent countries, while advising all other non-Black Sea-littoral countries to refrain from sending warships through the Straits. Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other countries from transit could put NATO at a disadvantage.127 One has asserted that Black Sea access is “essential for the alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania and Bulgaria.128 It is unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside 126 H.I. Sutton, “Russian Navy Pulls Warships from Black Sea into Port After Attacks,” USNI News, November 7, 2022. 127 Isik, “In Turkish-Russian relations, the Ukraine grain deal is not the point”; Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog, March 5, 2022. 128 James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com, March 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 28 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations from Russia) to take direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom of navigation, and how that could affect regional security. Mediating Russia-Ukraine Differences (Including Grain Export Deal) Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of contention. A Ukrainian analyst has argued that Turkey has positioned itself as a mediator “not just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war.”129 Additionally, Turkish and Ukrainian officials have signed a memorandum of understanding for Turkish involvement in helping rebuild Ukrainian infrastructure.130 In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly alleviate global supply concerns.131 Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.132 More than eight million tons of grain and other foodstuffs had been exported from Ukrainian ports as of late October.133 Turkey played a major role in getting guarantees from Ukraine to convince Russia to return to the deal in November after it pulled out for a few days over allegations of Ukrainian attacks on its ships and complaints about obstacles to Russian exports of grain and fertilizer.134 Later in November, the parties renewed the initial four-month agreement for another four months (to March 2023). Ukraine has complained that Turkey and other countries have purchased stolen Ukrainian wheat from Russia, with Turkish officials promising to investigate but not announcing any conclusive findings as of December 2022.135 In President Biden’s November meeting with President Erdogan on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Indonesia, he expressed appreciation for Erdogan’s efforts to renew the deal, as well as a hope that it would continue.136 In late 2022, Turkey’s mediation efforts expanded beyond the grain deal. Erdogan helped broker a Russia-Ukraine prisoner exchange in September. In November, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns reportedly met his Russian counterpart in Ankara to convey a message about potential Russian nuclear weapons use and to discuss detained Americans in Russia.137 A few days before Burns’s visit, President Erdogan said that he was committed to moving toward a peace dialogue, while criticizing U.S. and Western stances toward Russia.138 Erdogan’s chief 129 Iliya Kusa, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War,” Wilson Center, June 13, 2022. 130 “Turkey and Ukraine sign agreement for reconstruction of war-torn country,” Middle East Eye, August 18, 2022. 131 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” Associated Press, July 22, 2022. 132 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. 133 Ezgi Akin, “Russia returns to Ukraine grain deal, easing food crisis fears,” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2022; 134 Ibid. 135 “Turkey says it is investigating claims of Russia shipping stolen Ukrainian grain,” Reuters, June 23, 2022. 136 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November 15, 2022. 137 Fatma Tanis, “Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine. Now it wants them to talk peace,” NPR, November 16, 2022. 138 “Turkey seeks Ukraine peace talks despite Western actions, Erdogan says,” Reuters, November 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 29 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations adviser and spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, later said that Russia “is interested in finding and reaching a new deal with the West, and more particularly with the United States.”139 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies requires the unanimous agreement of existing members. The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK and the Fethullah Gulen movement.140 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist group.) Turkey demanded that both countries lift the suspension of arms sales they have maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.led anti-Islamic State coalition.141 Turkey removed its objections to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June 2022 agreement between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the agreement, the three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work against the PKK.142 While Turkey’s decision to remove its objections generally drew plaudits from other NATO members, during the delay some Western officials had raised questions about Turkey’s commitment to strengthening NATO. President Erdogan maintained that Turkey might delay its parliamentary ratification of the accession process.143 With Hungary likely to ratify Swedish and Finnish accession by early 2023, Turkey could remain the only country delaying the process.144 Erdogan has said that he is more concerned about Sweden than Finland, but Finland insists it will wait until both countries can join NATO together. In November, Erdogan stated that he expected Sweden’s new government to take concrete steps to implement the June 2022 agreement. He also demanded the extradition of various individuals, including a prominent journalist from a now-defunct pro-Gulen media outlet.145 Observers note that Sweden and Finland are unlikely to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.146 An unnamed 139 Tanis, “Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine.” 140 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, 2022. 141 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 18, 2022; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. 142 Agreement text available at Twitter, Ragip Soylu, June 28, 2022 – 2:48 PM, at https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/ 1541856195257966592. 143 Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan says Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO memberships not done deal,” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2022. 144 William Mauldin and Michael R. Gordon, “Sweden and Finland on Track for NATO Membership,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2022. 145 Ayla Jean Yackley, “Erdoğan demands Sweden do more to get Turkey’s approval to join Nato,” Financial Times, November 8, 2022. 146 Ben Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Congressional Research Service 30 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations European diplomat was quoted as saying, “It remains to be seen if Erdogan thinks he’s got enough signs of goodwill from Sweden and it’s therefore in his political and military interest to declare victory, or if he thinks sticking to the current line will serve his re-election campaign.”147 In December, Sweden reportedly extradited a man who had been convicted in Turkey in 2015 of being a PKK member. Turkish officials have welcomed the action and expressed hope for additional extraditions and steps on countering terrorist-related financing.148 Also in December, Finland’s defense minister signaled openness to resuming arms export permits to Turkey.149 At a December press conference with Sweden’s and Finland’s foreign ministers, Secretary of State Blinken reiterated strong U.S. support for the two countries’ NATO accession and said that they have addressed Turkey’s security concerns in tangible ways. He stated that “it is not a bilateral issue between the United States and Turkey and it’s not going to turn into one,” while also expressing confidence that the process will come to a successful conclusion soon.150 Issues with Other U.S. Allies and Partners Turkey’s regional policies have contributed to difficulties with some of its neighbors that are (like Turkey) U.S. allies or partners. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus Background Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, waxing and waning at various points but bringing the sides close to military conflict on several occasions (see timeline below). The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves (see Figure 9 and Figure 10 for maps of some of the areas in dispute). Since a relative spike in Turkey-Greece tensions in 2019, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt. Timeline of Some Major Events: Disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediter [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41368. Public record. Not legal advice.