# Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41307 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** January 13, 2011 - **Citation:** R41307 ## Text Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments (name redacted) Specialist in South Asian Affairs January 13, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41307 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Summary A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. Pakistan is praised by U.S. leaders for its ongoing cooperation with U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory. Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions and political setting combine with perilous security circumstances and a history of troubled relations with neighbors to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern. The development hinders progress toward key U.S. goals, including the defeat of Al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. terrorist groups, Afghan stabilization, and resolution of the historic Pakistan-India rivalry that threatens the entire region’s stability and that has a nuclear dimension. Long-standing worries that American citizens have been recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by Pakistan-based elements have become more acute in the past year, especially following a failed May 2010 bombing attempt in New York City that was linked to the “Pakistani Taliban.” A bilateral Pakistan-India peace process was halted after a November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai was traced to a Pakistan-based terrorist group. This process, strongly supported by the United States, remains moribund, and serious mutual animosities persist. Pakistan is wary of India’s presence in Afghanistan, where Islamabad seeks a friendly and perhaps malleable neighbor, and has had troubled relations with the Kabul government. A perceived Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Pakistan’s political setting remains fluid, with a weak ruling coalition struggling to stay in power. While the most recent iteration of direct military rule ended in 2008, Pakistan’s military and intelligence institutions are seen to possess inordinate political power. Rampant inflation and unemployment, along with serious food and energy shortages, elicit considerable economic anxiety in Pakistan. These pressures were hugely exacerbated by unprecedented devastation resulting from mid-2010 flooding. The U.S. government and international financial institutions are among those strongly urging Islamabad to more quickly institute economic reform. The Obama Administration continues to pursue close and mutually beneficial relations with Islamabad. As part of its strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan, the Administration’s Pakistan policy includes a tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as the conditioning of U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating militancy and in further fostering democratic institutions. A Special Representative was appointed to coordinate U.S. government efforts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid and by the end of FY2010 had obtained about $10.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including more than $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Pakistan also has received more than $8 billion in military reimbursements for its support of and engagement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts against Islamist militants. This report reviews key current issues and developments in Pakistan and in U.S.-Pakistan relations. It will be updated periodically. Congressional Research Service Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Contents Overview: Key Current Issues and Developments .......................................................................1 The Obama Administration Strategy............................................................................................3 Notable Developments in Obama Administration Engagement ..............................................5 Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative (SRAP)....................................................5 Policy Reviews, Trilateral Summitry, and Ensuing Diplomacy in 2009 ............................6 Regional Stabilization Strategy, Strategic Dialogue Sessions, Report to Congress, and Policy Review III in 2010 ......................................................................................8 The Passing of SRAP Richard Holbrooke...................................................................... 11 Assessment of Current U.S.-Pakistan Relations ................................................................... 12 Major Recent Developments ..................................................................................................... 13 Mid-2010 Floods ................................................................................................................ 13 Leaked Diplomatic Cables .................................................................................................. 14 The Assassination of Salman Taseer .................................................................................... 16 An Increasing Pakistani Turn to China?............................................................................... 16 Other Notable Recent Developments................................................................................... 17 Increasing Islamist Militancy .................................................................................................... 17 Official U.S. Designation of Pakistan-Based Terrorists ........................................................ 19 Al Qaeda in Pakistan........................................................................................................... 20 Threats to Punjab and Sindh................................................................................................ 21 Lahore and Southern Punjab.......................................................................................... 21 Karachi ......................................................................................................................... 22 The Swat Valley .................................................................................................................. 23 The 2009 Swat Accord and Reactions............................................................................ 24 Accord Fails, Army Moves In ....................................................................................... 25 Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency .................................................................................... 26 Pakistani Views on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ........................................................... 28 The January 2010 London Conference .......................................................................... 29 Pakistani Moves Against the Afghan Taliban and Potential Role in Negotiations ........... 30 U.S./NATO Supply Routes............................................................................................ 32 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan.................................................... 33 Other Recent Developments in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations..................................... 33 Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies........................................................................ 34 The Pakistani Taliban .................................................................................................... 34 The Demise of Baitullah Mehsud .................................................................................. 35 Pakistani Military Operations in the Tribal Agencies ........................................................... 36 Bajaur ........................................................................................................................... 37 South Waziristan ........................................................................................................... 37 North Waziristan ........................................................................................................... 39 Other Agencies ............................................................................................................. 40 Analysis of Pakistani Military Operations ..................................................................... 41 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) .................................................................................... 43 Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency......................................................... 44 Shifts in Pakistani Public Attitudes ............................................................................................ 47 Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals..................................................................................... 49 Attempted Times Square Bombing ...................................................................................... 49 Congressional Research Service Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments David Headley and Other Notable Cases ............................................................................. 50 U.S. Government Response................................................................................................. 51 U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Cooperation ............................................................................. 52 Joint Security Initiatives/Programs ...................................................................................... 52 2008 Frontier Corps Deaths and U.S. Special Forces Raid................................................... 54 2010 Cross-Border NATO Raids and Frontier Corps Deaths................................................ 54 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks ............................................................................ 55 U.S. Policy.................................................................................................................... 55 Pakistani Protest and Debate Over the Tactic................................................................. 57 Rivalry and Conflict With India................................................................................................. 59 The “Composite Dialogue” Process..................................................................................... 59 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks and the LeT ................................................................................ 61 The Kashmir Dispute .......................................................................................................... 61 Competition in Afghanistan................................................................................................. 62 Nuclear Weapons, Power, and Security...................................................................................... 63 Deteriorated Economic Circumstances ...................................................................................... 64 Power Supplies ................................................................................................................... 66 Taxation.............................................................................................................................. 66 Corruption .......................................................................................................................... 67 Textile Manufacturing and Overseas Market Access ............................................................ 67 Domestic Political Upheaval ..................................................................................................... 69 President Zardari and the National Reconciliation Ordinance .............................................. 70 The 18th Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution............................................................... 71 Tensions Between the Executive and the Judiciary .............................................................. 71 Parliamentary Coalition Weakness ...................................................................................... 72 Recent Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 73 Press Freedom..................................................................................................................... 73 “Disappearances” and Extrajudicial Killings by Security Services ....................................... 74 Blasphemy Laws................................................................................................................. 74 U.S. Foreign Assistance and Congressional Action .................................................................... 75 The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP)....................................................................... 77 U.S. Economic, Development, and Humanitarian Assistance............................................... 77 U.S. Security Assistance...................................................................................................... 78 Defense Supplies........................................................................................................... 79 Training and Law Enforcement ..................................................................................... 82 Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 111th Congress ................................................ 83 Figures Figure 1. Map of Pakistan ......................................................................................................... 87 Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas ................................................................. 88 Congressional Research Service Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Tables Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002FY2010.................................................................................................................................. 85 Contacts Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 89 Congressional Research Service Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Overview: Key Current Issues and Developments A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Current top-tier U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; stability in neighboring Afghanistan; domestic political stability and democratization; nuclear weapons proliferation and security; human rights Pakistan in Brief protection; and economic development. Population: 184 million; growth rate: 1.6% (2010 est.) Pakistan remains a vital U.S. ally in U.S.-led Area: 803,940 sq. km. (slightly less than twice the size anti-terrorism efforts. Yet the outcomes of of California) U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, Capital: Islamabad while not devoid of meaningful successes, Heads of Government: Prime Minister Yousaf Raza have seen a failure to neutralize anti-Western Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari (both of the Pakistan militants and reduce religious extremism in People’s Party) that country, and a failure to contribute Ethnic Groups: Punjabi 45%, Pashtun 15%, Sindhi 14%, sufficiently to stabilizing Afghanistan. Saraiki 8%, Muhajir 8%. Baloch 4%, other 6% Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Saraiki 10%, Domestic terrorist bombings and other Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 8%; Baluchi, English (official), militant attacks became a near-daily scourge and others 14% in 2008 and continue at a high rate to date, Religions: Muslim 95% (Sunni 75%, Shia 20%), Christian, with Islamist extremism spreading beyond Hindu, and other 5% western tribal areas and threatening major Pakistani cities. In the assessment of a former Life Expectancy at Birth: female 68 years; male 64 years (2010 est.) senior U.S. government official, “Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world Literacy: 50% (female 36%; male 63%; 2005 est.) today. All of the nightmares of the twenty-first Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $463 billion; per century come together in Pakistan: nuclear capita: $2,494; growth rate 4.4% (2010) proliferation, drug smuggling, military Currency: Rupee (100 = $1.17) dictatorship, and above all, international 1 Inflation: 15.5% (year-on-year, December 2010) terrorism.” When asked in early 2010 what worried him the most of all foreign policy Defense Budget: $4.11 billion (2.6% of GDP; 2009) issues, Vice President Joseph Biden answered U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $3.53 billion (primarily “Pakistan,” which he said has deployable textiles and apparel); imports from U.S. $1.86 billion nuclear weapons, “a real significant minority (incl. raw cotton and military equipment) (2010 est.) of radicalized population,” and “is not a Sources: CIA World Factbook; U.S. Department of completely functional democracy.”2 A longCommerce; Government of Pakistan; Economist time U.S.-based observer sees the Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; The Military Balance fundamentals of the Pakistani state in 2011 “either failing or questionable,” and proffers that, with all current U.S. policies proving ineffective, Pakistan is moving in a direction of “comprehensive failure,” perhaps in as few as 1 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618, 31, July 2008. (see the June 2010 index at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/ the_failed_states_index_2010). 2 “CNN Larry King Live, Interview With Vice President Joseph Biden; Senator John Kerry (D-MA), and Teresa HeinzKerry (Part 2),” Federal News Service transcript, February 13, 2010. Congressional Research Service 1 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments four years.3 The U.S. State Department issues stern warnings on the risks of travel to Pakistan, and many independent country indices rank the Pakistani state as a failed or failing one. 4 The Pakistani state and people are paying a steep price for their participation in the fight against Islamist militancy and extremism. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi claims that, in the post-9/11 period, Pakistan has incurred some 31,000 casualties and has “arrested, apprehended, and eliminated 17,000 terrorists.” Socioeconomic costs have been high, as well, and include massive human displacement; increased funding for security and law enforcement institutions, and reconstruction; sharply reduced investment and capital flight; and all manner of less tangible infrastructural and cultural costs. Pakistani government officials estimate financial losses of up to $40 billion since 2001. The severe psychological toll on the Pakistani people has led to an upsurge in reports of depression, anxiety, paranoia, and post-traumatic stress disorders.5 Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions, fluid political setting, and perilous security circumstances present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. On the economic front, the Islamabad government faces crises that erode their options and elicit significant public resentment. On the political front, a weak civilian leadership, ongoing power struggles between the executive and judiciary, and discord in federal-provincial relations all serve to hamper effective governance. On the security front, Pakistan is the setting for multiple armed Islamist insurgencies, some of which span the border with Afghanistan and contribute to the destabilization of that country. Al Qaeda forces and their allies remain active on Pakistani territory. The compounded difficulties faced by Pakistan and those countries seeking to work with it, along with the troubling anti-American sentiments held by much of the Pakistani public, thus present U.S. policy makers with a daunting task.6 Despite some positive signs, the progress of U.S.-Pakistan relations in the post-2001 era has produced few of the main outcomes sought in both capitals. Religious, ethnic, and political violence in Pakistan has only increased, as has an already intense anti-Americanism. While a reasonably free and fair election did seat a civilian government in 2008, that government remains weak and saddled with immense economic and other domestic problems. Meanwhile, the security institutions maintain a hold on the formulation of foreign and national security policies, and some elements appear to have lingering sympathies for the Afghan Taliban and other Islamist militant groups. From the U.S. perspective, Pakistan’s status as a hotbed of religious extremism has only become more secure in recent years, Al Qaeda continues to operate in the tribal areas, and 3 “Pakistan’s Road to Disintegration,” Council on Foreign Relations interview with Stephen Cohen, January 6, 2011, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/23744/pakistans_road_to_disintegration.html. 4 In February 2011, the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning to Americans, stating that, “The presence of Al Qaeda, Taliban elements, and indigenous militant sectarian groups poses a potential danger to American citizens throughout Pakistan,” with terrorists regularly attacking civilian, government, and foreign targets. It also stated that the movement of U.S. government personnel in the consular cities of Karachi and Peshawar continues to be “severely restricted” (see http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5269.html). In its 2010 Global Peace Index, Sydneybased Vision of Humanity ranked Pakistan 145th out of 149 countries, identifying the internally displaced population, rates of incarceration, military spending per capita, gender inequality, and corruption as especially serious factors (see http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2010/scor). Foreign Policy magazine’s Failed State Index again ranked Pakistan 10th in the world with a “critical” score for 2010, citing especially acute group grievances and factionalized elites (see the June 2010 index at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/the_failed_states_index_2010). 5 Qureshi quoted in “The Silent Surge” (interview), Newsweek (online), March 29, 2010; Arshad Ali, “Socio Economic Cost of Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Pakistan Research Unit Brief 57, April 11, 2010; “Pakistan Psychologists Issue Health Warning,” Reuters, May 13, 2010. 6 An instructive recent review is Robert Hathaway, “Planet Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2010. Congressional Research Service 2 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Afghanistan remains unstable more than nine years after the U.S.-led intervention there.7 More recently, there are disturbing signs that Pakistan serves as a site for the recruiting and training of American nationals intent on carrying out terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland.8 In late 2010, an unnamed senior Pakistani military official, widely believed to be Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani himself, described Pakistan as having “transited from most sanctioned ally to most bullied ally.” He located Pakistani resentment in the perception that the United States continues to pursue a “transactional relationship” with Pakistan, that it seeks “controlled chaos” inside Pakistan, and that its true strategy is to “denuclearize” Pakistan. Kayani has thus far resisted U.S. efforts at persuasion and has shown other flashes of defiance in recent months, including issuing a reportedly personal order to close the Torkham border crossing after two Pakistani solders were killed by a NATO helicopter in September. 9 Notwithstanding Pakistan’s ongoing and serious problems—including rampant domestic militancy, political and economic crises, and deep-seated resentments toward the United States and neighboring India—Obama Administration decision makers appear to see no viable alternative but to continue supporting the country and are ready to “double down” with additional military and economic support. This reportedly was the message Vice President Biden carried with him during a January 2011 visit to Islamabad.10 While there, the U.S. Vice President reiterated his and President Obama’s view that Pakistan is “absolutely vital” to U.S. interests, and he took the opportunity to correct some key misconceptions held among Pakistanis, including that the United States represents a threat to their sovereignty (“I would respectfully suggest that it’s the extremists who violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and corrupt its good name”), that America disrespects or is an enemy of Islam, that U.S. policies favor India in ways that could lead to Pakistan’s weakening, and that the U.S. will “abandon” Pakistan.11 The Obama Administration Strategy A key aspect of the Obama Administration’s approach to Pakistan has been development of a more coherent policy to include a tripling annual nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, with a particular focus on conflict-affected regions, and on focusing increased U.S. military aid to Islamabad on counterinsurgency goals while conditioning such aid on that government’s progress in combating militancy. President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton all supported the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2008 in the 110th Congress (which was never passed), and they strongly encouraged the 111th Congress to pass a newer version of that legislation. This Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009 (H.R. 1886) was passed by the full House in June 2009, then reconciled with the Senate bill passed that September. President Obama signed the resulting 7 For a broad overview of many of these issues, and recommendations for a more effective U.S. approach, see C. Christine Fair, et al., “Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?,” RAND Project Air Force, May 2010. 8 See also CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 9 “Pakistan the ‘Most Bullied Ally,’” Dawn (Karachi), November 30, 2010; “U.S. Courts Pakistan’s Top General, With Little Result,” Washington Post, January 1, 2011. 10 “U.S. to Offer More Support to Pakistan,” Washington Post, January 8, 2011. 11 “Vice President Jospeh R. Biden Jr. and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani Deliver Remarks at the Presidential Palace in Islamabad,” CQ Transcriptions, January 12, 2011. Congressional Research Service 3 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009 into P.L. 111-73 on October 15, 2009. The legislation is commonly referred to as the “Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill.” Even as President-elect, Obama asserted that Afghanistan cannot be “solved” without “solving Pakistan” and working more effectively with that country, saying he believed Pakistan’s democratically-elected government understands the threat and would participate in establishing “the kind of close, effective, working relationship that makes both countries safer.”12 Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari said his country looked forward to a “new beginning” in bilateral relations, but repeated his admonition that Pakistan “needs no lectures on our commitment [to fighting terrorism]. This is our war.” His government repeatedly has asked the Obama Administration to strengthen Pakistan’s democracy and economic development in the interest of fighting extremism. 13 Despite Pakistani hopes that President Obama would more energetically engage diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kashmir problem, the Administration has offered no public expressions of support for such a shift. Secretary of State Clinton has recognized the dangers of rising tensions in Kashmir while also deferring calls for greater U.S. involvement there, saying during her confirmation hearing that the U.S. role will continue to be as it was under the previous Administration: settlement facilitation, but no mediation.14 In what many observers considered to be a bracing U.S. government wake-up call to Islamabad, Secretary Clinton told a House panel in April 2009 that “the Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates followed with his own warning that U.S.-Pakistan relations could suffer if Islamabad did not “take appropriate actions” to deal with the militant threat.15 Days later, President Obama himself expressed “grave concern” about the situation in Pakistan, offering that the “very fragile” civilian government there did not appear to have the capacity to deliver basic services to the Pakistani people. He did, however, acknowledge that the Pakistani military was showing more seriousness in addressing the threat posed by militants.16 The Administration’s tone shifted considerably after Pakistani forces launched major offensive operations against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley. Senior U.S. officials—including President Obama in his December 1, 2009, speech—laud Pakistan’s military operations against indigenous Taliban militants.17 Yet these officials also want Islamabad to enlarge the scope of such operations to include action against a broader array of extremist threats, including those of the greatest concern to India and Western countries. As articulated by Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen, “We must help Pakistan widen its aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and terrorism—those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan, the wider South Asia region, and the globe.”18 Secretary Gates paid an unannounced visit to Pakistan in early 2010 with a central wish to “relinquish the grievances of the past ... and instead focus on the promise of the future.” In speaking to an audience of Pakistani military officers, he sought to push back against the rumors fuelling anti12 See the December 7, 2008, “Meet the Press” transcript at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28097635. Asif Ali Zardari, “Partnering With Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, January 28, 2009; Asif Ali Zardari, “’Democracy is the Greatest Revenge’” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2009. 14 See http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. 15 Transcript: House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on “New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration,” April 22, 2009; “Pentagon Chief in Taliban Warning,” BBC News, April 23, 2009. 16 “Obama Transcript: First 100 Days,” CNN.com, April 29, 2009. 17 “US Praises Pakistan Progress Vs. Taliban,” Associated Press, August 17, 2009. 18 Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, December 2, 2009. 13 Congressional Research Service 4 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Americanism there, stating unequivocally that the United States “does not covet a single inch of Pakistani soil [nor] military bases,” nor does it “desire to control Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”19 More intensive diplomacy and U.S. assurances that Pakistan will play a major role in the political future of Afghanistan may have contributed to persuading Pakistani leaders—especially military officers—that they need no longer rely on extremist groups to maintain influence. The U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, who died in December 2010, attributed Pakistan’s early 2010 moves against the Afghan Taliban to the “cumulative effect” of hard work and multiple visits to Pakistan by numerous senior U.S. officials.20 Yet some in Congress express continuing skepticism about Islamabad’s commitment to resolving the Afghan insurgency and to a genuine partnership with the United States.21 Meanwhile, many observers in Pakistan complain that U.S. diplomacy remains too skewed toward security issues and overly reliant on military-to-military relations, at some cost to public diplomacy. Reports suggest that even those Pakistanis with traditionally strong ties to the United States have begun seeking alternative destinations for work, education, and travel, a sign of troubled U.S.-Pakistan relations in the new decade. 22 Notable Developments in Obama Administration Engagement Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative (SRAP) Two days after taking office, President Obama announced the appointment of former Clinton Administration diplomat Richard Holbrooke to be Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). The SRAP’s central task is to coordinate across the entire U.S. government to achieve U.S. strategic goals in the region. In accepting the job, Holbrooke called the Pakistan situation “infinitely complex” and noted the need to coordinate what he called a “clearly chaotic foreign assistance program.”23 Prior to the announcement, there was speculation that the new U.S. President would appoint a special envoy to the region with a wider brief, perhaps to include India and even Kashmir. The State Department insisted that Holbrooke’s mandate is strictly limited to dealing with “the Pakistan-Afghanistan situation.” Given Holbrooke’s reputation as a “bulldozer” with strong and sometimes negative views about South Asia’s circumstances, his appointment caused some consternation in the region. 24 Before his untimely death, Holbrooke made numerous trips to the region and, despite setbacks, contended that U.S.-Pakistan relations were improving. 19 Robert Gates, “’Our Commitment to Pakistan’” (op-ed), News (Karachi), January 21, 2010; U.S. Embassy’s January 23, 2010, transcript at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-10012303.html. 20 Michael Hirsh, “Obama’s Pakistan Successes,” Newsweek (online), February 23, 2010; Fareed Zakaria, “A Victory for Obama,” Newsweek, March 12, 2010; Holbrooke’s March 2, 2010, comments at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/ rmks/2010/137693.htm. 21 “Key Senator Lashes Out at Pakistan Government,” CNN.com, October 1, 2010; “Congress Getting Frustrated With Pakistan as a War Ally,” Washington Times, October 5, 2010. 22 “Shamshad Ahmad, “Where is US Public Diplomacy?” (op-ed), News (Karachi), January 13, 2010; “Many Disillusioned Pakistanis Look Beyond U.S. for Work, Education, and Travel,” Washington Post, May 24, 2010. 23 In 2008, Holbrooke penned a Foreign Affairs article in which he declared that Afghanistan and Pakistan “now constitute a single theater of war.” Among the major problem areas identified with regard to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, he called pacifying the “insurgent sanctuaries” in Pakistan’s tribal areas as being the toughest, noting that “Pakistan can destabilize Afghanistan at will—and has” (“Mastering a Daunting Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008). 24 “New Envoy Unnerves South Asia,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2009; “South Asian Chasm of Mistrust Awaits (continued...) Congressional Research Service 5 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Policy Reviews, Trilateral Summitry, and Ensuing Diplomacy in 2009 Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review I In February 2009, President Obama ordered a policy review bringing together various U.S. government strategy proposals for Afghanistan and Pakistan. A month later, he announced a new strategy conceiving of the two countries as part of “one theater of operations for U.S. diplomacy and one challenge for our overall policy.”25 The strategy is rooted in the assumption that, “The United States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” All elements of U.S. national power— including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—are to be brought to bear in attaining the “core goal” of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and in preventing their re-emergence in Pakistan or Afghanistan. To this end, the Administration seeks to overcome the “trust deficit” the United States faces in the region and to “engage the Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.”26 Early in his tenure, Ambassador Holbrooke asserted that, of the many challenges faced by the Administration in formulating its policy, the most daunting was dealing with western Pakistan and the “red lines” set by Islamabad barring foreign troops from operating there.27 Holbrooke believed the new approach differed from that of the previous Administration in its aim of better integrating “stove-piped” policies, in its greater resource endowment, and in its proposed effort to more directly counter the propaganda of Islamist radicals in the region. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator John Kerry welcomed the new strategy as “realistic and bold.” Then-House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Howard Berman also voiced strong support for the President’s plan to boost civilian assistance efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. President Zardari called the strategy “positive change” and welcomed increased U.S. aid as the best way to combat militancy. 28 Even well before the U.S. President announced the (...continued) Obama’s Envoy,” Reuters, February 8, 2009. 25 “Administration Officials Hold a News [sic] on the Administration’s Interagency Policy Review on Pakistan and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, March 27, 2009. 26 There are seven key aspects of the Administration’s primary strategy for U.S.-Pakistan relations: (1) bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation, (2) engaging and focusing Islamabad on the common threat posed by extremism, (3) assisting Pakistan’s capability to fight the extremists, (4) increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan, (5) exploring other areas of bilateral economic cooperation, (6) strengthening Pakistani government capacity, and (7) asking for assistance from U.S. allies for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Administration thus supports a policy that would significantly increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan and that sets “benchmarks” for measuring Islamabad’s success in combating extremism. President Obama stated that “we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training, and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. After years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check.” See the “White Paper” at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf. 27 “Administration Officials Hold a News [sic] on the Administration’s Interagency Policy Review on Pakistan and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, March 27, 2009. 28 “President Obama’s Afghanistan- Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy,” U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center briefing, March 27, 2009; “Interview with Amb. Holbrooke and Gen. Petraeus,” Jim Lehrer Newshour (PBS) transcript, March 27, 2009; Sen. Kerry’s statement at http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=310648; Rep. Berman’s statement at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=603; “Pakistan’s President Praises Obama and Offers New Concession to Opposition,” New York Times, March 28, 2009. Congressional Research Service 6 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments new regional strategy, Islamabad had expressed support for a regional approach and warned that a past overemphasis on the military dimension had not proven fruitful. 29 May 2009 Trilateral Summit and Ensuing Diplomacy Following a February 2009 trilateral meeting of top diplomats from the United Sates, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the format had proved valuable enough to continue on a regular basis.30 In May 2009, President Obama hosted the Pakistani and Afghan presidents in Washington, DC, where he characterized their meeting as one of “three sovereign nations joined by a common goal”: to permanently defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The U.S. President expressed being pleased that his counterparts were serious in addressing the threat posed by such extremists and he stated that such trilateral meetings would continue on a regular basis.31 In October 2009, following energetic Pakistani counterinsurgency efforts in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPk, formerly the North West Frontier Province or NWFP) and the launching of a ground offensive in South Waziristan, Secretary Clinton paid a visit to Pakistan, where she had meetings with senior political and military leaders, as well as frank and open interactions with civil society members. The lead U.S. diplomat impressed many Pakistanis with her willingness to hear and respond to criticisms of American policy; the three-day visit may have done much to repair still extensive damage in bilateral relations. A former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States lauded the Secretary’s “striking and impressive display of public diplomacy,” contrasting it with what she called the “patronizing style” of Ambassador Holbrooke. 32 When then-National Security Advisor General James Jones, met with President Zardari in Islamabad in late 2009, he reportedly delivered to the Pakistani leader a personal letter written by President Obama which conveyed an “expectation” that Zardari rally his country’s political and national security institutions in a united campaign against regional extremism. By some accounts, Jones and White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan told their interlocutors that the United States was prepared to take unilateral action in the absence of rapid Pakistani movement. Such action could include expanding drone strikes to Baluchistan and resuming Special Operations missions across the Durand Line. Shortly after, Pakistan’s foreign minister told reporters, “We will not do anything, more or less, at the prodding of others.” Zardari later delivered his own letter to the U.S. President indicating that Pakistan recognized the common threat, but was intent on following its own timeline and operational needs. 33 29 See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/Feb/PR_62_09.htm. See http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119864.htm. 31 See http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900331.pdf. 30 32 “Clinton Suffers Barbs and Returns Jabs in Pakistan,” New York Times, October 30, 2009; “Clinton in Pakistan Encounters Widespread Distrust of U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2009; Maleeha Lodhi, “Testing Times for Pakistan-US Relations” (op-ed), News (Karachi), November 10, 2009. See also Najamuddin Shaikh, “Did Clinton’s Visit Make a Difference?” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), November 13, 2009. 33 “Pakistan Told to Ratchet Up Fight Against Taliban,” New York Times, December 8, 2009; “Pakistan Won’t Be Pushed by Foreign Pressure: Qureshi,” Dawn (Karachi), November 16, 2009; “Pakistan’s Zardari Resists U.S. Timeline for Fighting Insurgents,” Washington Post, December 16, 2009. Congressional Research Service 7 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review II The Obama Administration completed a second Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review in late 2009. In apparent recognition that recent U.S. policy toward Pakistan had failed to achieve Washington’s main objectives, President Obama announced on December 1, 2009, that he would seek to shift the nature of the bilateral relationship: In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.34 The latter clause on safe havens was perhaps the most categorical high-visibility official statement to date, and the President continued encouraging Pakistan’s leaders to sustain their fight against extremists and to eliminate terrorist safe havens in their country.35 Some in Congress were critical of President Obama’s continued dependency on a Pakistani ally they view as unreliable and perhaps insufficiently determined to combat the extremist elements seen as most threatening to the United States.36 Regional Stabilization Strategy, Strategic Dialogue Sessions, Report to Congress, and Policy Review III in 2010 January 2010 Regional Stabilization Strategy In January 2010, the SRAP’s office released its Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Maintaining a primary focus on disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda forces in the region, the document acknowledges that, There remains mistrust between our two countries, but we see a critical window of opportunity created by the recent transition to democratic, civilian rule and the broad, sustained political support across Pakistan for military operations against extremists. We seek to lead the international community in helping Pakistan overcome the political, economic, and security challenges that threaten its stability, and in turn undermine regional stability. The strategy has sought to further mobilize the international community and improve coordination among the 60 countries and international organizations providing assistance to Pakistan, as well as among the 40-odd Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan.37 34 See the text of the President’s December 1, 2009 speech at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 35 See the December 1, 2009, White House Fact Sheet at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/way-forwardafghanistan. 36 “Congress Worries About Obama’s Plan for Pakistan,” New York Times, December 3, 2009. 37 Key initiatives for Pakistan are four: (1) committing sizeable resources to high-impact economic and development projects, and doing so by increasing the amount of aid channeled directly through Pakistani institutions (such projects focus on energy, agriculture, water, health and education, assistance to displaced persons, and strengthening democratic (continued...) Congressional Research Service 8 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Despite this document and rhetoric, Pakistani officials continued to express dissatisfaction with the bilateral relationship, especially with regard to U.S. recognition of the perceived threat to Pakistan represented by India. After meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke in January 2010, Foreign Minister Qureshi noted, “A very strong perception in Pakistan that, despite our very good relations, the United States has not paid sufficient attention to Pakistan’s concerns, security concerns vis-à-vis India.”38 March 2010 Strategic Dialogue Session President George W. Bush had launched a “Strategic Dialogue” process with Pakistan that included high-level meetings in 2007 and 2008. The Obama Administration revived this forum in March 2010, when a large delegation of senior Pakistani leaders visited Washington, DC. Although the delegation was officially led by Foreign Minister Qureshi, many observers saw the Army Chief, General Kayani, as being the dominant figure in planning the Islamabad government’s agenda and the dominant participant in ensuing bilateral talks, in some ways overshadowing the foreign minister.39 In the lead-up to the dialogue, Qureshi issued categorical statements about the need for Washington to “do more” in its relations with Islamabad: “We have already done too much.... Pakistan has done its bit, we have delivered. Now it’s your turn.” Islamabad’s unusual step of presenting a 56-page document containing requests for expanded military and economic aid was seen by some as a signal that Pakistan was willing to more openly align itself with U.S. interests, but with a possible price. Rumors circulated that Pakistan had agreed to roll back its indigenous militant networks in return for guarantees from the United States and other major governments that it would get special consideration in regional political and economic affairs, perhaps even to include civil nuclear cooperation deals. 40 Obama Administration officials were uniformly positive in their characterizations of the Pakistanis’ visit. A joint statement issued at the close of the two-day Strategic Dialogue session noted the elevation of engagement to the Ministerial level, as well as the creation of a Policy Steering Group “to intensify and expand the sectoral dialogue process.” Secretary Clinton paid tribute “to the courage and resolve of the people of Pakistan to eliminate terrorism and militancy,” and the United States “reaffirmed its resolve to assist Pakistan to overcome socioeconomic challenges.” Pakistan, for its part, expressed its appreciation for U.S. security assistance.41 Some Pakistani analysts were unhappy with the outcome of the talks, arguing that, beyond the pageantry, little of substance was gained by Islamabad on its key priorities—preferential trade, access to civil nuclear technology, and U.S. assistance in resolving dispute with India.42 (...continued) institutions); (2) sustaining and expanding Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities, and disrupting illicit financial flows to extremists; (3) assisting with the recovery of displaced persons; and (4) expanding U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and “countering extremist voices.” The strategy also lists extensive “milestones,” or metrics, for determining progress in each of these areas (see http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf). 38 See the U.S. Embassy’s January 14, 2010, transcript at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-10011401.html. 39 “Army Chief Driving Pakistan’s Agenda for Talks,” New York Times, March 21, 2010 S. Khalid Husain, “The CivilMilitary Angst” (op-ed), News (Karachi), April 21, 2010. 40 Qureshi quoted in “US Should Also Do More: FM Qureshi,” Dawn (Karachi), March 18, 2009; “U.S. Sees Hope in Pakistan Requests for Help,” Wall Street Journal, March 23, 2010; “Pakistan, US Agree on New Afghan Set-Up,” News (Karachi), March 10, 2010. 41 See the U.S.-Pakistan March 25, 2010, joint statement at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-10032603.html. 42 See, for example, Maleeha Lodhi, “How Strategic Was the Washington Dialogue? (op-ed), News (Karachi), March (continued...) Congressional Research Service 9 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments The Administration’s September 2010 Report to Congress Section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32) requires the President to issue biannual reports to Congress on progress toward U.S. policy objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Administration’s delivered a September 30, 2010, report covering the first eight months of 2010, and its unclassified sections contained extensive discussion of three of the five “supporting objectives” directly relevant to Pakistan.43 The overall tone of the report was considered by most readers to be sober and realistic, pointing out areas of progress while not shying from recognition of significant ongoing obstacles to same. Discussion on one key objective—efforts to enhance Pakistan’s civilian government capacity and stability—found that government remaining stable for the reporting period while also coming under persistent broad-based challenges, especially those posed by a “fragile” economic situation badly exacerbated by the floods, and by continuing battles between the executive and judiciary. The reported offered that, “President Zardari’s declining popularity and low support among Pakistani political stakeholders stood out as the most obvious factor impacting” the civilian government’s circumstances. On another key U.S. objective—developing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities—the report noted Pakistan’s successful military operations in several FATA and KPk regions and the general ability of security forces to hold these areas. Yet it also contended that Pakistan’s army had “stopped short of the kind of large-scale operations that would permanently eject extremist groups” from their western Pakistani havens and identified a “fundamental problem” in that organization’s “inability to transition to effective hold and build efforts in cleared areas.” Perhaps most alarmingly for a Washington audience, the Pakistani military was seen to be continuing to “avoid military engagements that would put it in direct conflict with the Afghan Taliban or Al Qaeda forces in North Waziristan,” and the report concluded this avoidance was “as much a political choice as it is a reflection of an under-resourced military prioritizing its targets.” October 2010 Strategic Dialogue Session The October 2010 Strategic Dialogue session was the unprecedented third of the year and was intended to examine progress in the implementation of agreements related mostly to assistance that had been made during the summer. In the lead-up to the event, the Obama Administration announced its intention to further boost military assistance to Pakistan, at least in part as a means of encouraging more rapid and robust Pakistani military operations in the FATA.44 In a joint appearance with her Pakistani counterpart, Secretary Clinton lauded progress on the “action plans” created by each of the Dialogue’s 13 working groups, formally announced a new MultiYear Security Assistance Commitment to Pakistan (involving an intention to request from Congress $400 million in annual foreign Military Financing Funds for FY2012-FY2016, a boost of $100 million per year from current levels), and again reiterated her contention that reform of Pakistan’s tax system was a primary need. 45 President Obama met personally with Pakistani (...continued) 30, 2010. 43 Two other objectives were discussed in classified annex only. 44 “U.S. Plans Increased Military Aid for Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2010. 45 See the State Department’s October 22, 2010, transcript at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149815.htm. Congressional Research Service 10 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments delegates, underlining the importance of the Dialogue in “moving the relationship toward a true partnership based on mutual respect and common interests.”46 The resulting Joint Statement expressed mutual satisfaction with progress made since the March and July sessions, noted that the Obama Administration would “redouble its efforts” to win congressional support for ROZ and enterprise fund legislation, and announced President Obama’s plans to visit Pakistan in 2011.47 Press reports indicated that, in private, U.S. officials warned their Pakistani counterparts that continued inaction against certain militant groups in western Pakistan could jeopardize future U.S. financial largesse, perhaps even to include a cut in coalition support fund reimbursements.48 Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review II The Administration’s annual Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review was not released in unclassified form but for a five-page summary. This December 16, 2010, document conveyed an unchanged overarching goal (disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda in the region) and claimed notable gains, most especially what it called unprecedented pressure on Al Qaeda in Pakistan, resulting in their weakening. Recognizing that sustained denial of extremist safe havens is necessary for ultimate success, the Administration remains “relentlessly focused on Pakistanbased Al Qaeda.” It calls for “greater cooperation with Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan” and acknowledges that effective development strategies are required to complement military means.49 The December strategy review was described by the Acting SRAP as being a “clear-eyed and realistic” assessment of a “tough foreign policy challenge.” While recognizing ongoing problems, it noted “significant progress” on combating Al Qaeda in Pakistan and “significant activity” by the Pakistani military to shut down sanctuaries used by Islamist militants in the border region. 50 In commenting on the review, senior Pentagon officials lauded what they called substantial improvement in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship during 2010, and a daily and measureable improvement in coordination of counterterrorism efforts.51 The Passing of SRAP Richard Holbrooke Ambassador Holbrooke’s sudden December 14, 2010, death was costly for U.S. diplomacy and could prove to be a lasting setback for efforts to stabilize and realize other U.S. policy goals in the region. Holbrooke was seen to be a champion of increased economic assistance to Pakistan and a bulwark against those in the U.S. government who focus on militarized approaches to the region. His deputy and now Acting Special Representative, Frank Ruggerio, is characterized as a highly competent diplomat, but one without extensive knowledge of Pakistan and, more importantly, without the personal clout that Holbrooke wielded. In this respect, there are concerns among some observers that the influence of U.S. military leaders on U.S. policy in the region could 46 See the October 20, 2010, White House release at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/20/readoutpresident-obama-s-meeting-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 47 See the October 22, 2010, text at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149815.htm. 48 “U.S. Warns Pakistan: Fight Taliban or Lose Funding,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2010. 49 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/overview-afghanistan-and-pakistan-annual-review. 50 See the State Department’s December 16, 2010, transcript at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/12/153039.htm. 51 See the Pentagon’s December 16, 2010, transcript at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid= 4742. Congressional Research Service 11 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments further increase. Secretary Clinton dispatched the Acting SRAP to Islamabad and Kabul in January to reassure leaders in both capitals that U.S. policy toward the region would not change with Holbrooke’s passing. 52 Assessment of Current U.S.-Pakistan Relations The outlook for progress in Pakistan’s political, economic, and security circumstances in 2011 is fairly poor. 53 Because of this, progress toward attainment of U.S. goals in its engagement with Pakistan is likely to remain difficult, and serious mutual distrust persists in the relationship. Pakistani officials often complain that the United States is insufficiently concerned with Islamabad’s regional security perspective, and they offer criticism that Washington is not moving to provide greater market access for Pakistani exports.54 Moreover, Pakistan continues to push for a civil nuclear cooperation deal with the United States. To date, the Obama Administration has flatly rejected any discussions with Pakistan on this issue. 55 Meanwhile, with the Islamabad government coming under the immense dual pressures of natural disaster and widespread armed insurgency in the autumn of 2010, and concurrent negative developments in U.S.-Pakistan relations, U.S. officials became all the more concerned about political instability in Pakistan. Observers in Washington see in Pakistan an unstable ally that may not have the determination, much less the capacity, to deliver what the United States is seeking.56 In late September, Ambassador-Designate Cameron Munter conveyed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a belief that Pakistan requires a strong civilian government and that common U.S.-Pakistan successes can be achieved only “with a strong partner in Pakistan’s democratically-elected government.” He vowed to continue to work aggressively to improve the U.S. image in Pakistan.57 Some analysts, alarmed by signs that mutual disconnect are increasing, call for urgent reparative action from both Islamabad and Washington. Major tasks facing Pakistan include reforming its political system (especially by completing the transition from a presidential to parliamentary system, and by further improving both interprovincial and center-province relations) and reordering its economic priorities in order to foster greater domestic and foreign investment. The United States, for its part, can move more quickly to reduce tariffs on Pakistani textile exports, relax what some see as overly stringent visa restrictions, speed the flow to Pakistan of military equipment needed for counterinsurgency operations, and, in the longer term, channel its foreign 52 “Holbrooke Death Leaves Hole in U.S. ‘AfPak’ Team,” Reuters; “Holbrooke’s Death Leaves Void in War Strategy,” Washington Post; “Richard Holbroooke Often Struggled to be Heard on Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, all December 14, 2010; State Department’s January 10, 2011, transcript at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/ rmks/rmks/154599.htm. 53 A former Pakistani diplomat warns that political and economic turmoil clouds prospects for greater stability in 2011, seeing the current “lame duck” government as being too preoccupied with its own survival to effect meaningful economic reform (Maleeha Lodhi, “Pakistan: Living on the Edge,” Atlantic Council (online), January 11, 2011). 54 “Pakistan Feels US Has Let It down,” Dawn (Karachi), October 18, 2010. 55 See the October 19, 2010, statement of then-Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Frank Ruggiero at http://www.state.gov/s/special_rep_afghanistan_pakistan/2010/149666.htm. 56 “Worries Grow Over Pakistan Stability,” Washington Post, October 1, 2010; Yochi Dreazen, “A Wavering Ally,” National Journal, October 16, 2010. 57 “Sen. John Kerry Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Cameron Munter to be Ambassador to Pakistan,” CQ Transcriptions, September 23, 2010. Congressional Research Service 12 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments assistance into high-visibility, high-impact infrastructure projects, especially those related to energy and water resources. 58 It may be that the most useful near-term “deliverable” for Pakistan would be increasing U.S. market access for Pakistani exports.59 Many American analysts make explicit calls for a tougher U.S. line toward Pakistan by “demanding” more counterterrorism operations, and perhaps offering Islamabad a stark choice between positive incentives and negative consequences. Some call for the creation of more explicit counterterrorism benchmarks, as well as for the United States to shift more emphasis on alternative supply lines into Afghanistan and so remove Pakistan’s ability to “hold the [Western] coalition ransom” by disrupting the supply line that runs from Karachi.60 President Obama’s decision to travel to India without any stops in Pakistan created anxiety among Pakistani officials who see signs of Washington’s “pro-India” tilt as destabilizing for the region. By refraining from direct engagement in the Kashmir dispute, moving forward U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation, and seeming to sympathize with New Delhi’s perspective on the root sources of regional terrorism, the Obama Administration’s policies may continue to make difficult any effective winning of hearts and minds in Pakistan. Islamabad reacted angrily to President Obama’s November endorsement, delivered in New Delhi, of a permanent U.N. Security Council seat for India, calling the position “incomprehensible.”61 Major Recent Developments Mid-2010 Floods62 Pakistan in mid-2010 experienced a catastrophic natural disaster that precipitated a humanitarian crisis of major proportions. Widespread flooding affected about 20 million Pakistanis and inundated about one-fifth of the country’s total land area. A joint Asian Development Bank-World Bank needs assessment estimated that Pakistan had suffered $9.7 billion in direct and indirect costs, roughly double the amount of damage caused by Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake. 63 Floodinduced devastation was so extensive that it could take decades to rebuild lost infrastructure.64 58 See Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,” Atlantic Council, June 2010. 59 Bush Administration Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called such an initiative “the single most efficient thing we can do for Pakistan” (“Council on Foreign Relations Holds a Discussion on U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, November 12, 2010). 60 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Get Tough on Pakistan” (op-ed), New York Times, October 19, 2010; Ashley Tellis, “Change the Rules of the Game in Pakistan,” Foreign Policy, November 2010. 61 “Pakistan Officials Concerned About Obama’s Decision to Bypass Nation on Trip,” Washington Post, November 4, 2010; “Pakistan Hits at US Stance on India,” Financial Times (London), November 10, 2010. 62 See also CRS Report R41424, Flooding in Pakistan: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name re dacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted), and CRS Report R41358, Security and the Environment in Pakistan, by (name redacted) et al. 63 See the October 14, 2010, release at http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2010/13363-pakistan-flooding-assesments. 64 “The Costs of Pakistan’s Floods,” Council on Foreign Relations Analysis Brief, August 10, 2010; “Pakistan Flood Sets Back Infrastructure by Years,” New York Times, August 26, 2010. Congressional Research Service 13 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments The floods stemmed from abnormally heavy rains during the monsoon season in July and August. This led to flooding in the Indus River Basin which traverses Pakistan from north to south. Excess water led the Indus River and its tributaries to breach their levees and inundate adjacent and downstream floodplains. Some 2,000 people were killed by the flooding and an estimated eight million Pakistanis were displaced from their homes. The number of people affected was significantly greater than seen in several major disasters around the world since 2000. Little clean drinking water was available for many of those affected and remains a problem to date. Many of those affected, particularly children, have faced potential disease outbreaks, particularly diarrhea and cholera. The catastrophic loss of livestock and crop lands and extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure are projected to have long-term negative effects on Pakistan’s food security and economic performance. Pakistani officials organized their emergency response at the federal, provincial and district levels. The Pakistan National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) is responsible for overall coordination of disaster response efforts by both the government and the international community. The NDMA works closely with federal ministries, government departments, the armed forces, U.N. agencies, and donors to mobilize, receive, and deploy relief goods.65 Relief activities have also been coordinated by provincial-level and district-level governments. The Pakistani military took the lead in providing emergency relief to affected areas, eventually diverting about 70,000 regular and paramilitary troops to such efforts. As with the 2005 earthquake, the disaster illuminated the extremely limited capacity of Pakistan’s government institutions to effectively address crises situations. This is especially so with regard to the country’s civilian administration. The United States has been the leading international contributor to the relief effort, and by November had devoted more than $571 million in FY2010 and FY2011 funds to this cause.66 The U.S. military also provide in-kind support, including transport aircraft, helicopters, and crews, distributing some 25 million tons of relief supplies in an effort that formally ended December 1. In September, the full House passed H.Res. 1613, which expressed condolences to and solidarity with the Pakistani people in the aftermath of the floods. The resolution also supported the use of “Kerry-Lugar-Berman” funds for long-term rehabilitation and recovery while urging a “reexamination” of spending priorities for such funds with a view toward ensuring appropriate address of the Pakistani people’s needs. Leaked Diplomatic Cables In July and again in November 2010, the WikiLeaks website posted thousands of sensitive U.S. diplomatic cables, many of them with content relevant to U.S. foreign relations in South Asia. The cables reportedly illuminated what may be deep fissures in the strategic goals of the United States and Pakistan, especially in the area of Pakistan’s support for Taliban-linked groups. They also reportedly revealed efforts by U.S. diplomats to support Islamabad’s weak civilian government while at the same time recognizing that the true locus of power on national security and foreign policy is at the military’s headquarters in Rawalpindi.67 65 United Nations, Pakistan: Floods Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan, United Nations, November 2010, http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=47teGm9PeB8%3d&tabid=93&mid=676. 66 See USAID fact sheets at http://www.usaid.gov/pakistanflooding. 67 “Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance With Pakistan,” New York Times, November 30, 2010. Congressional Research Service 14 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Islamabad’s official response in July was to call the cables “misplaced, skewed and contrary to the factual position on the ground.”68 In November, Islamabad stated that, “We are not in a position to comment on the veracity of U.S. internal documents. We consider the extremely negative reports carried on Pakistan-Saudi relations attributed to WikiLeaks as misleading and contrary to the facts.” On a report that the U.S. government had sought to reacquire highly enriched uranium provided to Pakistan decades earlier, the Foreign Ministry commented: “Pakistan is an advanced nuclear technology state. No one can touch Pakistan’s nuclear facilities or assets.… The U.S. suggestion to have the [nuclear] fuel transferred was plainly refused by Pakistan. The suggestion that the reactor is producing HEU is completely incorrect.”69 U.S. officials contended that the mid-2010 release of classified documents by WikiLeaks presented an overly simplified and inaccurately negative perspective on U.S.-Pakistan relations, saying they did not reflect a significant deepening of military and civilian ties in recent months and years. The United States later expressed to Islamabad “deep regrets” at the disclosure of communications meant to be confidential and “condemned” it. Senior U.S. officials subsequently sought to play down the importance of “out of context” documents. 70 There have been concerns that leaked diplomatic cables could further undermine U.S. efforts to build trust with Pakistan. A roundtable of Washington-based experts found the episode could have two concrete effects: (1) The airing of private statements made by Gulf State leaders critical of Pakistan’s civilian government could make those leaders more reticent in future meetings with U.S. officials and (2) by exposing both U.S. efforts to reclaim enriched uranium from Pakistan and the (limited) presence of U.S. Special Forces soldiers operating inside Pakistan, the revelations have fueled virulent Pakistani national suspicions that the United States has a covert agenda that fundamentally violates the country’s sovereignty. 71 Other observers saw in the cables evidence of Pakistani instability and unreliability as a U.S. ally, with an ineffectual government and security institutions that continued to selectively support Islamist extremist groups there, perhaps including the Al Qaeda-linked Haqqani network. Moreover, suggestions found in some cables that no amount of U.S. assistance to Pakistan would alter that country’s strategic orientation reveal the depth of U.S. uncertainty about the alliance. 72 In contrast, some commentators saw in the cables positive news beyond the obvious Pakistani weaknesses: officials from both sides working with determination to increase trust and cooperation in difficult circumstances. With Pakistani news outlets focused solely on the sensational aspects of the cables, “media hysteria” is identified as a negative exacerbating factor.73 68 See the Foreign Ministry’s July 26, 2010, statement at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2010/July/ PR_169.htm. 69 See the Foreign Ministry’s November 29, 2010, response at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2010/Nov/ PR_294.htm. 70 “U.S. Says Pakistan Ties Have Strengthened,” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2010; “U.S. Officials Try to Minimize Damage in Pakistan,” Washington Post, December 1, 2010; “Clinton and Zardari Play Down ‘Out of Context’ Wikileaks,” Agence France Presse, December 2, 2010. 71 See “Will WikiLeaks Hobble U.S. Diplomacy?,” Council on Foreign Relations Expert Roundup (online), December 1, 2010. 72 “Leaks Paint a Picture of an Unreliable Pakistan,” BBC News, December 1, 2010; “Cables Reveal U.S. Misgivings About Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2010. 73 Syed Yahya Hussainy, “Wikileaks Actually Shows US–Pakistan Relations Are Strong,” New Pakistan (online), December 2, 2010. A representative example is one Pakistani commentator’s claim that the leaked cables “prove” that “Pakistan has been practically reduced from a sovereign state to an American colony” (Ansar Abbasi, “After the Wikileaks Deluge” (op-ed), News (Karachi), December 2, 2010). Congressional Research Service 15 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments The Assassination of Salman Taseer On January 4, Salman Taseer, the governor of the Punjab province, was assassinated when one of his own security team shot him 26 times in broad daylight while other bodyguards looked on. A senior figure in the PPP, Taseer was among the country’s most liberal politicians, and he had incurred the wrath of Islamists and other conservatives with his vocal criticisms of the country’s blasphemy laws. His killer, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, had apparently told other police officers of his plans, but was assigned to guard Taseer anyway. Qadri may have had links with one of the radical Islamist groups leading public resistance to changes in the blasphemy laws.74 The assassination, strongly condemned by Secretary Clinton, was widely viewed as a major blow to liberal forces in Pakistan. At least one unnamed Obama Administration official says it is “a reminder of how we’re still losing ground in Pakistan.”75 An Increasing Pakistani Turn to China? Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s. China’s continuing role as a primary arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying complete weapons systems. Chinese companies and workers are now pervasive in the Pakistani economy. Most recently, China intends to build two new civilian nuclear reactors in Pakistan in what would be an apparent violation of international guidelines (see the “Nuclear Weapons, Power, and Security” section below). As U.S.-India ties deepen, many observers see Islamabad becoming more reliant than ever on its friendship with Beijing. 76 President Zardari undertook his fifth trip to China as the head of his government in July 2010, and Islamabad seeks full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which it currently holds observer status. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s December 2010 visit to Islamabad, the two governments signed 12 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) covering a broad range of cooperative efforts and designated 2011 as the “Year of ChinaPakistan Friendship.” Also during the visit, Pakistani and Chinese businesses signed contracts covering cooperation in oil and gas, mining, space technology, heavy machinery, manufacturing, and other areas worth some $15 billion. This added to the nearly $20 billion worth of government-to-government agreements reached.77 Some cynical observers reject claims that China can in any way “replace” the West as a source of significant foreign investment for Pakistan; one leading commentator deemed the MoUs worthless and noted that Beijing has produced only nominal flood relief aid.78 74 “Pakistan Killer Had Revealed Plans,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2011; “Former Boss Feared Pakistan Suspect’s Extremism,” Reuters, January 6, 2011.. 75 “Staring Into the Abyss,” Economist (London), January 6, 2011; official quoted in “A Pakistani Assassin’s Long Reach,” New York Times, January 8, 2011. 76 “At Odds With the U.S., Pakistan Deepens Ties With China,” Time, November 1, 2010. 77 See the December 19, 2010, Pakistan-China Joint Statement at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2010/Dec/ Pr_310.htm; “Fresh From India, Wen Builds Pakistan Trade Ties,” Reuters, December 18, 2010. 78 See Najam Sethi, “Pak-China Relations: Fact and Friction” (op-ed), Friday Times (Lahore), December 24, 2010. Congressional Research Service 16 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Other Notable Recent Developments • In August 2010, a delegation of Pakistani military officers in the United States for a conference departed the country early and in protest after saying they had been unjustly removed from a flight to Florida, then interrogated and rudely treated by security officials at Dulles International Airport in Virginia. The Pakistani Army called the treatment “unwarranted” and canceled the visit. A State department spokesman attributed the incident to misunderstanding and miscommunication between the delegation and flight crew, and the Department expressed regret to Islamabad. Yet the events fit well into a Pakistani narrative in which its citizens and even ranking officials meet with discriminatory treatment in the United States.79 • When, in December 2010, the identity of the CIA’s Pakistan station chief became public and that figure quickly left the country, some U.S. officials were reportedly convinced that his cover had been intentionally blown by Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, possibly in retaliation for civil lawsuit that had recently been filed in a New York court. The suit, brought by relatives of some of the victims of the 11/08 Mumbai terrorist attack, implicated the ISI chief and summoned his testimony. An ISI official angrily denied any Pakistani involvement in the revelation, and Islamabad announced that the summons would not be obeyed. 80 Increasing Islamist Militancy Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007, but the rate of attacks and number of victims may have peaked in 2009.81 The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center reports a major decline in terrorist incidents in 2010 as compared to the previous year, with 687 terrorist incidents in Pakistan in 2010 (down from 1,915 in 2009) resulting in 1,051 fatalities (down from 2,670). Despite the declined rate, the figures again placed the country third in the world on both measures, after Afghanistan and Iraq. Suicide bombing is a relatively new scourge in Pakistan. Only two such bombings were recorded there in 2002; that number grew to 59 in 2008 and 84 in 2009, before dropping to 29 in 2010 (the lowest level since 2005). Still, Pakistan was last year the site of far more deaths caused by suicide bombing (556) than any other country and accounted for about one-quarter of all the world’s such bombings.82 A particularly alarming development in recent years is the significantly increased incidence of militants making direct attacks on Pakistani security institutions. 83 There have also been more 79 “Pakistan Army Cancels US Talks Over Security Checks,” Reuters, September 1, 2010; State Department’s September 1, 2020, statements at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/09/146601.htm; “A Serious Blow to Pak-US Military Relationship,” Business Recorder (Karachi), September 3, 2010. 80 “Pakistani Role Suspected in Revealing U.S. Spy’s Name,” New York Times, December 17, 2010; “Pakistan Says It Didn’t Tell Spy’s Identity,” New York Times, December 19, 2010. 81 Pakistan suffered its worst spate of terrorism ever in the final three months of 2009, when the country suffered 29 major attacks, or an average of roughly one every three days. 82 See http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html. 83 For example, a March 2010 suicide car bombing of the facilities of a special counterterrorism investigate unit in (continued...) Congressional Research Service 17 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments attacks on foreign-based charitable organizations, such as the March assault of the KPk offices of the American Christian group World Vision by about a dozen masked gunmen, which left six Pakistani employees dead. According to the State Department’s most recent Country Reports on Terrorism (August 2010), Foreign terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda and its affiliates, continued to operate and carry out attacks in Pakistan. Violence stemming from Sunni-Shia sectarian strife and ethnic tensions, limited to certain geographical areas, claimed civilian lives. Similar to last year, attacks occurred with greatest frequency in the regions bordering Afghanistan, including Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Attacks targeting the country’s major urban centers, including Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Karachi, and Rawalpindi, continued to increase. The coordination, sophistication, and frequency of suicide bombings continued to climb in 2009.84 The myriad and sometimes disparate Islamist militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of which have displayed mutual animosity in the past, appear to have become more intermingled and mutually supportive since 2009 (see “Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan,” below).85 According to U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen, speaking in December 2009, It’s very clear to me, over the last 12 to 24 months, that these organizations are all much closer than they used to be, whether it’s Pakistan Taliban and Al Qaida, or Al Qaida/Afghan Taliban, [Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Jaish-e-Mohammed]—they’re all working much more closely together. So I think it doesn’t accurately reflect the need or the strategy to single out one group or another. They’re very much all in this in ways, together, that they weren’t as recently as 12 months ago.86 This developing “syndicate” of armed Islamist extremist in Pakistan even incorporates the apparently tactical joining of TTP and LeT forces.87 An extensive 2010 study found that Pakistan-based militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and other countries. This threat persists, according to the report, due mainly to Islamabad’s lack of an effective “population-centric” strategy, the government’s refusal to make a systematic break with all militant groups, and the inability of Pakistan’s army and paramilitary forces to clear and meaningfully hold territory. The study determined that Pakistan will continue to be unsuccessful in addressing its indigenous militant threat over the long term unless its government undertakes two major changes. First, Islamabad is urged to take a “population-centric” approach to counterinsurgency that makes civilian security the central goal. Reforming and strengthening local police forces would be central to this effort. Second, Pakistan must conclusively relinquish militancy as a policy tool. (...continued) Lahore killed at least 15 people and destroyed the entire building. Days later, twin suicide attacks on other army targets in the same city killed dozens more (“Suicide Car Bombers Strikes Pakistani Intelligence Unit,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 2010; “Twin Suicide Attacks Hit Military Sites in Pakistan,” New York Times, March 12, 2010). 84 See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140887.htm. 85 See Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict Across the FATA and NWFP,” New America Foundation, April 2010. 86 See the Pentagon’s December 16, 2009, release at http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1298. 87 “Insurgents Set Aside Rivalries on Afghan Border,” New York Times, December 28, 2010. Congressional Research Service 18 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments This process could be facilitated by a U.S. policy that focuses on altering Pakistan’s strategic calculus. For its part, Washington is urged to reduce its reliance on Pakistan, especially through development of alternative supply lines to Afghanistan, and to be more willing to use foreign policy “sticks” such as withholding of aid in the absence of measureable progress, while also seeking means of offering the strategic “carrots” most valued by Islamabad.88 Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan Islamist militant groups operating in and from Pakistani territory are of five broad types: • Globally-oriented militants, especially Al Qaeda and its primarily Uzbek affiliates, operating out of the FATA and in the megacity of Karachi; • Afghanistan-oriented militants, including the “Quetta shura” of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, believed to operate from the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta, as well as Karachi; the organization run by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, in the North Waziristan tribal agency; and the Hizb-I Islami party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG), operating further north from the Bajaur tribal agency and Dir district; • India- and Kashmir-oriented militants, especially the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM), based in both the Punjab province and in Pakistan-held Kashmir; • Sectarian militants, in particular the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the latter closely associated with Al Qaeda, operating mainly in Punjab; and • Domestically-oriented, largely Pashtun militants that in 2007 unified under the leadership of now-deceased Baitullah Mehsud as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), then based in the South Waziristan tribal agency, with representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven FATA agencies, later to incorporate the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed in the northwestern Malakand and Swat districts of the former North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Official U.S. Designation of Pakistan-Based Terrorists In 2010, the U.S. government accelerated its official designation of terrorists and terrorist groups, as well as their financial support networks operating in Pakistan. In June, five U.S. Senators sponsored legislation to instruct the Secretary of State to designate the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This “Combating the Pakistani Taliban Act of 2010 (S. 3560) did not move out of committee. However, during a July nomination hearing for the newly named Commander of U.S. Central Command, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Gen. James Mattias both agreed that the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura should be designated as FTOs.89 In August, Secretary Clinton ordered that, under Executive Order 13224, the TTP be named an FTO, and that TTP leaders Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali ur Rehman be named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The announcement was made in September, when the Justice Department unsealed criminal charges against Mehsud, accusing him of conspiring in the deadly suicide bomb attack on the CIA outpost in Khost, Afghanistan, and senior counterterrorism official Daniel Benjamin also noted that the U.S. government was offering $5 million reward for information leading to the arrest of either of the two militant leaders.90 In 88 Seth Jones and Christine Fair, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,” RAND, June 2010. 89 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Nomination of Gen. James Mattias to U.S. Central Command,” CQ Transcripts, July 27, 2010. 90 Federal Register 75, 169, p. 53732, September 1, 2010; State Department’s September 1, 2010, transcript at (continued...) Congressional Research Service 19 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments November, the State Department also designated Jundallah, an Iran-oriented militant group operating in Baluchistan near the Iranian border, as an FTO.91 The Treasury Department is continuing its efforts to isolate terrorist figures and curtail terrorist financing in the region. In November, it targeted the financial support networks of both the LeT and JeM.92 Al Qaeda in Pakistan93 U.S. leaders remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists operate with impunity on Pakistani territory, and that the group appears to have increased its influence among the myriad Islamist militant groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as well as in the densely populated Punjab province and in the megacity of Karachi. In early 2009, the Obama Administration declared that the “core goal” of the United States should be to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”94 The President continues to assert that Al Qaeda represents the top-most threat to U.S. security, and the State Department’s most recent Country Reports on Terrorism flatly stated that “In 2009, Al Qaeda’s core in Pakistan remained the most formidable terrorist organization targeting the U.S. homeland.”95 Recent unclassified assessments place more than 300 Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan’s tribal areas.96 While taking questions from senior Pakistani journalists during an October 2009 visit to Pakistan, Secretary of State Clinton offered a pointed expression of U.S. concerns that some elements of official Pakistan maintain sympathy for most-wanted Islamist terrorists: Al Qaeda has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002. I find it hard to believe that nobody in [the Pakistani] government knows where they are and couldn’t get them if they really wanted to. And maybe that’s the case. Maybe they’re not gettable.... I don’t know what the reasons are that Al Qaeda has safe haven in your country, but let’s explore it and let’s try to be honest about it and figure out what we can do.97 Pakistani officials are resentful of such suggestions, and the Islamabad government claims that Al Qaeda chief bin Laden is not in Pakistan.98 A 2010 analysis calculated that more than one-third of all “serious terrorist plots” in the West since 2004 were operationally linked to Al Qaeda or its allies inside Pakistan.99 Evidence suggests (...continued) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/146545.htm. 91 See the November 3, 2010, release at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/11/150332.htm. 92 See the November and December 2010 releases at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ tg944.aspx; http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg980.aspx; and http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg991.aspx. 93 See also CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins. 94 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf. 95 See the State Department report at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm. 96 “New Estimate of Strength of Al Qaeda is Offered,” New York Times, July 1, 2010. 97 State Department Press Release, “Roundtable With Senior Pakistani Editors,” October 30, 2009. 98 “Bin laden Not in Pakistan, Prime Minister Says,” New York Times, December 4, 2009. 99 Paul Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline,” New American Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy (continued...) Congressional Research Service 20 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments that some of the 9/11 hijackers were themselves based in western Pakistan in early 2001, and a former British Prime Minister has estimated that three-quarters of the most serious terrorism plots investigated in Britain had links to Al Qaeda in Pakistan.100 Moreover, as tensions between Pakistan and India remain tense more than two years after the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, Secretary Gates warned that groups under Al Qaeda’s Pakistan “syndicate” are actively seeking to destabilize the entire South Asia region, perhaps through another successful major terrorist attack in India that could provoke all-out war between the region’s two largest and nuclear-armed states.101 Al Qaeda apparently was weakened in Pakistan in 2009 and 2010 through the loss of key leaders and experienced operatives. Drone strikes, Pakistani military operations, and internal rifts all combine to degrade the group’s capabilities. Pakistan’s late 2009 offensive in South Waziristan appears to have pushed Al Qaeda operatives from that region, and some reporting suggests that Taliban fighters in western Pakistan have become wary of assisting Al Qaeda elements. 102 The CIA Director claims that improved coordination with the Pakistani government and “the most aggressive operation that CIA has been involved in in our history” have forced top Al Qaeda figures even deeper into hiding while disrupting their ability to plan future attacks.103 Yet some U.S. officials saw the group and its allies rebuilding their damaged infrastructure in 2010. Moreover, while the strategic goals of Al Qaeda and the Quetta Shura Taliban diverged following the former’s relocation into the FATA after 2001, Al Qaeda continues to function as a “force multiplier” for myriad militant groups in western Pakistan, providing manpower, specialized knowledge, propaganda, and general advice.104 Threats to Punjab and Sindh Lahore and Southern Punjab Lahore—the provincial capital of Punjab and so-called cultural heart of Pakistan—was for many years mostly unaffected by spiraling violence elsewhere in the country. This conclusively ended with three major terrorist attacks in less than three months in early 2009.105 Militants from (...continued) Paper, February 2010. 100 “In Military Campaign, Pakistan Finds Hint of 9/11,” New York Times, October 30, 2009; “Brown Offers Pakistan Anti-Terror Aid,” Washington Post, December 15, 2008. 101 “Al Qaeda Could Provoke New India-Pakistan War: Gates,” Agence France Presse, January 20, 2010. 102 “Al Qaeda Weakened as Key Leaders Are Slain in Recent Attacks,” Associated Press, September 19, 2009; “Setbacks Weaken Al Qaeda’s Ability to Mount Attacks, Terrorism Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2009; “US Intelligence Shows Al Qaeda Fleeing South Waziristan - Gates,” Reuters, December 11, 2009; “Some U.S. Officials See a Growing Taliban-Al Qaeda Rift,” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2010. 103 “CIA Director Says Attacks Have Hobbled Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, March 18, 2010. 104 “FBI Director: Al Qaeda Spreading, Rebuilding,” Associated Press, January 20, 2010; Anne Stenersen, “Al Qaeda’s Allies,” New American Foundation, April 2010. 105 On March 3, 2009, terrorists attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team as it was being driven through central Lahore. Six players were wounded, and six policemen in another vehicle were killed along with two by-standers. Most or all of the assailants escaped, and the security lapses were a major international embarrassment for the Pakistani state. Then, on March 30, TTP militants attacked a police academy in Manawan—near the Indian border and only a few miles from central Lahore—killing eight cadets and wounding scores more before elite commandos secured the facility in a daylong siege. Finally, on May 27, terrorists tried to attack the Punjabi headquarters of the ISI. Suicide bombers were prevented from reaching the target, but their explosives leveled a neighboring building and the assault left 27 people (continued...) Congressional Research Service 21 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments western Pakistan have appeared intent on attacking Lahore to demonstrate the extent of their capabilities and to threaten the government’s writ throughout the country. 106 More bomb attacks on Sufi shrines, including some notable ones in Punjab, have demonstrated that militants are specifically targeting more moderate Pakistani Muslims.107 Islamist militants have in recent years been increasing their influence in southern Punjab, where most anti-India groups have originated and where a number of Taliban cells have already been discovered. A 2009 report from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group urged Islamabad to end its effort to differentiate between militant networks and instead move toward a “zerotolerance” policy, especially with regard to Punjab-based Sunni extremist organizations.108 The somewhat misnamed “Punjabi Taliban,” a loose conglomeration of banned militant groups in the Pakistani heartland, are comparatively better educated and better equipped than their Pashtun countrymen to the west, and are notable for having in many cases enjoyed state patronage in the recent past.109 In June 2010, Interior Minister Malik offered a rare public admission that extremist groups were well-entrenched in southern Punjab. He also conceded that Punjabi groups such as the LeJ, SSP, and JeM were close allies of both the Taliban and Al Qaeda.110 According to several Pakistani experts, Punjab has become a major recruiting ground and planning hub for terrorists, and also provides a source of many militants fighting in Afghanistan. Some analysts hold the provincial ruling (Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz) party responsible for fostering extremism there by taking religiously conservative and strongly right-wing positions while failing to openly criticize militancy. There has even been evidence that officials from the Sharif brothers’ PML-N use militant groups to drum up political support, even to the extent of funding institutions linked to the Jamaat-u-Dawa, a front group for the LeT.111 Karachi The megacity of Karachi is among the world’s largest, and is also Pakistan’s leading business and finance hub. The Sindh provincial capital generates two-thirds of all government revenue and one-quarter of the country’s GDP.112 Extremists also appear to be moving from the FATA to the Sindhi capital of Karachi in large numbers in recent months and years, exacerbating preexisting (...continued) dead, including an ISI agent, 12 policemen, and several civilian bystanders. 106 “Sense of Crisis Deepens in Pakistan After Lahore Attack,” Reuters, March 3, 2009; “Why Attack Lahore?,” BBC News, March 30, 2009; “Insurgent Threat Shifts in Pakistan,” Washington Post, March 31, 2009. 107 “Attacks on Sufi Islamic Shrines Complicate War on Militants,” Washington Post, October 30, 2010. 108 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” Asia Report No. 164, March 13, 2009. 109 “The Rising Phoenix of Punjabi Taliban,” Weekly Pulse (Islamabad), November 5, 2010; Hasan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4, April 2009. 110 “Official Admits Militancy Has Deep Roots in Pakistan,” New York Times, June 3, 2010. See also “Pakistani Militancy Spreads to Country’s Heartland,” Associated Press, June 16, 2010. A crackdown came in July 2010, when up to 78 suspected militants were detained, but such actions have no apparent lasting mitigating effect (“Police Widen Operation Against Banned Groups in Southern Punjab,” Express Tribune (online), July 13, 2010). 111 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Attacks and Beyond” (op-ed), Friday Times (Lahore), June 4, 2010; “Pakistan’s Punjab ‘in Denial’ Over Local Militants,” Reuters, June 8, 2010; “Hafiz Saeed Rubs Shoulders With Party Chiefs in Lahore,” Dawn (Karachi), June 14, 2010; “Pakistan ‘Gave Funds’ to Group on UN Terror Blacklist,” BBC News, June 16, 2010. 112 “Volatile Mix of Politics and Crime Plagues Karachi,” Reuters, November 15, 2010. Congressional Research Service 22 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments ethnic tensions and perhaps forming a new Taliban safe haven in Pakistan’s largest city. 113 Taliban fighters are increasingly present in Karachi, and reports indicate that the megacity has become a favored destination for numerous international jihadis. 114 Militants fleeing from battles in Swat and the FATA have sought refuge in Karachi, where some 2,800 have been arrested in government anti-terrorism sweeps. Hundreds of thousands of flood refugees only added to ethnic tensions in the summer of 2010.115 Under threat of expanded U.S. drone strikes on Quetta, senior Afghan Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar himself, may have moved to Karachi, perhaps even with the support of ISI elements. 116 The megacity’s sprawling ethnic Pashtun neighborhoods provide ideal hideouts for both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban fighters. The disproportionate political representation enjoyed by the city’s Muhajir community engenders ethnic grudges among Pashtuns.117 These Pashtun militants are said to have established “mafia-like” criminal syndicates in Karachi to raise millions of dollars to sustain their insurgencies through kidnaping, bank robberies, and extortion.118 The Swat Valley Pakistan has since 2007 faced a “neo-Taliban” insurgency in the scenic Swat Valley of the KPk’s Malakand district, just 100 miles northwest of the capital, where radical Islamic cleric Maulana Fazlullah and some 5,000 of his armed followers sought to impose Sharia law. This rebellion against the state was notable as the only with geographic reach beyond the “tribal belt” and in part of Pakistan’s “settled areas” nearer the Indus river plains. Fazlullah, also known as “Maulana Radio” for his fiery (and unlicensed) FM broadcasts, moved to create a parallel government like that established by pro-Taliban commanders in South Waziristan. Some 2,500 Frontier Corps soldiers were deployed to the valley, and the army soon took charge of the counterinsurgency effort at the request of the provincial governor, massing about 15,000 regular troops. By the close of 2007, militant elements in the area were reported to be in retreat, and the Pakistani government claimed victory. Yet, in 2008, with militants still active in Swat, government officials reportedly struck a peace deal. That deal collapsed by mid-year, with sporadic and sometimes heavy fighting in Swat continuing throughout the year. By all accounts, Islamist insurgents greatly expanded their influence in Swat in 2008, and many observers asserted that, by 2009, the state’s writ had completely vanished from the valley. 119 113 “Taliban Find Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Karachi,” Reuters, May 14, 2010. Long-standing tensions between ethnopolitical rivals roiled Karachi in 2010, with assassinations and spates of political killings leaving hundreds of people dead in targeted attacks. 114 “Karachi Faces Growing Taliban Menace,” BBC News, June 19, 2010; “International Jihadists Use Karachi as Hub,” Spiegel (Berlin), November 25, 2010. 115 “Crush of Refugees Inflames Karachi,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2010. 116 “Terrorists From Swat, FATA Active in Karachi: Malik,” Daily Times (Lahore), February 10, 2010; “Sheltered in Karachi,” Newsweek, December 7, 2009; “In Violent Karachi, Pakistani Insurgency Finds a Haven and a Forge,” New York Times, May 22, 2010. 117 Only 4 of Karachi’s 178 boroughs are controlled by Pashtun politicians. Of the Sindh provincial assembly’s 168 seats, the Pashtun ANP party holds only 2 (“Karachi Turns Deadly Amid Pakistan’s Rivalries,” New York Times, November 18, 2010). 118 “Taliban Militants Find Breathing Rooms in Slums of Karachi, Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, February 28, 2010; “Taliban Use Pakistani City as Hub for Lucrative Organized Crime,” New York Times, August 29, 2009. 119 “In Pakistan, Radio Amplifies Terror of Taliban,” New York Times, January 25, 2009; Kamila Hyat, “Debacle in Swat” (op-ed), News (Karachi), January 22, 2009. Congressional Research Service 23 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments The 2009 Swat Accord and Reactions By early 2009, the KPk chief minister was calling the Swat problem a full-blown rebellion against the state, and President Zardari himself conceded that militant forces had established a “huge” presence in his country. Shortly after, Zardari reportedly agreed in principle to restore Sharia law in the Swat region in a bid to undercut any popular support for the uprising there.120 In addition to bringing Islamic law to the entire Malakand division of the KPk (including Swat), the accord, announced in February of that year, included requirements that the Taliban recognize the writ of the state, give up their heavy weapons and refrain from displaying personal weapons in public, denounce suicide attacks, and cooperate with local police forces. In return for such gestures, the government agreed to gradually withdraw the army from the region. Pakistanis appeared to strongly support the government’s move.121 In April, Zardari signed a regulation imposing Islamic law after Parliament passed a resolution recommending such a move. A White House official was critical of the Sharia deal in Swat, saying that solutions to Pakistan’s security problems “don’t include less democracy and less human rights.” A State Department spokesman emphasized that the United States was “very concerned” and maintained a view that “violent extremists need to be confronted.”122 Pakistan’s lead diplomat in Washington sought to assure a skeptical American audience that his government was not offering any concessions or ceding any ground to the Taliban, but rather was “attempting to drive a wedge” between Al Qaeda and Taliban militants on the one hand, and an indigenous Swati movement on the other, as part of a “pragmatic” strategy “to turn our native populations against the terrorists.”123 Still, most observers saw the deal as a blatant capitulation and unprecedented surrender of territory to a militant minority beyond the FATA, and as part of a disturbing broader trend. 124 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan marked it as a day of “humiliating submission” by the government.125 A senior independent Pakistani analyst and former army general said the government “has yielded under compulsion at a time when Talibanization is sweeping the country and overwhelming the state.” Even a senior Pakistani Islamist politician, told Parliament that the Taliban were threatening the Pakistani capital. The peace deal was particularly alarming for India, where officials feared it would further exacerbate the existing Islamist militant threat they face. 126 120 “Pakistani Violence Intensifies As Policy Wobbles,” Reuters, February 10, 2009; “Taliban is in ‘Huge’ Amounts of Pakistan: Zardari,” Reuters, February 13, 2009; “Pakistan Restores Islamic Law to Pacify Swat Valley,” Reuters, February 16, 2009. 121 “Secret Details of Swat Peace Accord,” News (Karachi), April 11, 2009. According to one opinion survey taken in March 2009, an impressive 80% of Pakistani respondents supported the government’s decision to sign the Swat accord, with nearly that percentage believing the deal would bring peace to the region. More alarmingly, however, a majority (56%) also expressed support for potential future Taliban demands to impose Sharia law in major Pakistani cities (see http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp). 122 “US Criticizes Islamic Law Deal in Pakistan,” Associated Press, April 14, 2009; State Department’s April 12, 2009, release at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/04/121748.htm. 123 Husain Haqqani, “We’re Not Ceding Ground” (op-ed), USA Today, February 19, 2009. 124 See, for example, Shuja Nawaz, “ Wariness in Pakistan” (op-ed), Boston Globe, February 22, 2009; Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Deal With the Devil” (op-ed), Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2009. 125 HRCP press release, April 14, 2009. London-based Amnesty International warned that the deal could legitimize human rights abuses that have taken place as Taliban influence increases. New York-based Human Rights Watch called the move a “grave threat” to the rights of women, especially (AI press release, February 16, 2009; HRW press release, April 15, 2009). 126 Talat Masood, “Implications of the Deal” (op-ed), News (Karachi), April 20, 2009; “Taliban Nearing Capital, Warns Fazl,” News (Karachi), April 23, 2009; “Pakistan’s Swat Offensive Leaves India Skeptical,” Reuters, May 18, 2009. Congressional Research Service 24 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments Accord Fails, Army Moves In As with past iterations of truce deals in the nearby FATA, the Swat accord was seen to give militants breathing space and an ability to consolidate their gains. Reports immediately arose that Taliban forces were moving into the valley by the thousands to establish training camps in the forests around Mingora, Swat’s largest town. 127 Fears that, rather than being placated by the truce, militants would use their Swat positions as a springboard from which to launch further forays were quickly confirmed. In April 2009, Taliban forces moved into the neighboring Buner district, now only 60 miles from the Pakistani capital. Local tribal militias put up resistance, but were quickly overwhelmed, and the Pakistani army had no local presence. Within two weeks Taliban forces were said to have taken full control of Buner. 128 In response, Pakistani paramilitary troops supported by helicopter gunships engaged militants in Buner and Lower Dir. At the same time, the army accused the militants of “gross violations” of the accord.129 Pakistani commandos were airdropped into Buner’s main town and regained control, but heavy fighting forced many hundreds of civilians to flee. The fighting pitted about 15,000 government troops against an estimated 4,000-5,000 militants. As militants appeared to consolidate their hold on large swaths of the KPk, alarm grew in Washington that the Pakistani government may have lacked the will to sustain the fight. Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen expressed being “gravely concerned” about the progress made by militants, and he indentified Pakistan’s simultaneous pursuit of peace deals and military operations as “strategic moves” that were, from an American perspective, “at cross purposes.”130 Secretary of Defense Gates concluded that the Swat agreement’s “failure,” followed by militant movements into neighboring Buner, was a “real wakeup call for the Pakistani government.”131 Heavy combat raged in May 2009, with militants putting up strong resistance. When Taliban forces returned in large numbers to Mingora, Swat’s main city, army leaders reportedly resolved to finally abandon negotiations and press ahead with a larger offensive, this time with greater support from the Pakistani public.132 By the close of June 2009, the army was claiming to have cleared the last remaining Taliban stronghold in Swat. By November, police patrols were a common sight in Mingora, signaling a return of relative normality to the Valley, and TSNM leader Maulana Fazlullah reportedly fled to Afghanistan.133 127 “Truce in Pakistan May Mean Leeway for Taliban,” New York Times, March 6, 2009. “Pakistani Taliban Begin Imposing Rule in New Area,” Reuters, April 13, 2009; “Buner Falls to Swat Taliban,” Dawn (Karachi), April 22, 2009. 129 Inter-Services Public Relations press release, May 2, 2009, at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/2. 130 “Taliban Advance, Pakistan’s Wavering Worry Obama Team,” Washington Post; “U.S. Questions Pakistan’s Will to Stop Taliban,” New York Times, both April 24, 2009; “DoD News Briefing With Adm. Mullen From the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.,” May 4, 2009. 131 “Interview With Secretary Gates,” CNN.com, May 3, 2009. 132 “The Taliban Tightens Hold in Pakistan’s Swat Region,” Washington Post, May 5, 2009; “Pakistani Army Posed for New Push Into Swat,” New York Times, May 6, 2009. 133 See the June 4, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/6/4; “Pakistani Troops Clear Taliban Stronghold in Swat,” Reuters, July 1, 2009; “Police Return to Former Taliban Haven,” BBC News, November 15, 2009. 128 Congressional Research Service 25 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments A senior Pakistani official reportedly claimed the two-month-long Swat offensive left more than 3,500 militants dead, but Islamabad’s official body count stood at roughly half that number. No top Taliban commanders are known to have been killed or captured and, by many accounts, the military succeeded only in establishing control of Malakand’s urban centers and main roadways. Particularly skeptical observers suspect that the Pakistani military has vastly over-reported Taliban casualties in a possible effort to impress an American audience and so continue to receive large assistance packages.134 Swat residents apparently continue to rely on the military to maintain order and continue to feel insecure in the face of a lingering threat from pro-Taliban militants that the still struggling police forces have found difficult to neutralize. Moreover, efforts to repair the shattered regional economy have yielded limited results and cold require at least $1 billion in state funding. As of late 2010, more than one year after most displaced citizens returned home, government services remain almost entirely absent.135 Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency136 An ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan remain matters of serious concern to U.S. policy makers. It is widely held that success in Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan, and that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the longstanding animosity between Islamabad and Kabul. In late 2008, Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen said he viewed Pakistan and Afghanistan as “inextricably linked in a common insurgency” and had directed that maps of the Afghan “battle space” be redrawn to include the tribal areas of western Pakistan. 137 As Presidentelect, Barack Obama asserted that Afghanistan cannot be “solved” without “solving Pakistan” and working more effectively with that country.138 Numerous other senior U.S. officials—both civilian and military—share the view that Pakistan and Afghanistan are best considered as a single “problem set” in the context of U.S. interests.139 This conceptual mating of the two countries was not well received in Pakistan; President Zardari was himself openly critical of a strategy linking “AfPak,” saying the two countries were too distinct from one another to be “lumped together for any reason.” Pakistani military officials echoed the sentiment. 140 Still, most independent analysts agree that, so long as Taliban forces enjoy “sanctuary” in Pakistan, their Afghan insurgency will persist (see Figure 2). Obama Administration intelligence officials continue to inform Congress of a crucial Pakistani link to the Afghan insurgency. According to former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, testifying before a House panel in early 2010, “The safe haven that Afghanistan insurgents have in Pakistan is the group’s most important outside support. Disrupting that safe haven won’t be sufficient by itself to 134 “Pakistan’s Victories Over the Taliban: Less Than Meets the Eye,” Time, June 1, 2009; “Taliban Losses Are No Sure Gain for Pakistanis,” New York Times, June 28, 2009. 135 “Pakistan Faces Tough Task Rejuvenating Battered Swat,” Reuters, March 25, 2010; “Taliban ‘Reappear’ in Swat Valley,” BBC News, April 29, 2010; “Pakistan Slow to Rebuild Swat Valley a Year After Offensive,” New York Times, November 13, 2010. 136 See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. 137 Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2008. 138 See the December 7, 2008, “Meet the Press” transcript at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28097635. 139 “Petraeus: Afghan, Pakistan Problems Are Really One,” Associated Press, January 9, 2009; “National Security Advisor Say Pakistan is Top U.S. Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2009. 140 “Zardari Rejects Obama’s AfPak Strategy,” Financial Times (London), September 10, 2009; “Army Expresses Reservation Over Af-Pak Policy,” Dawn (Karachi), September 16, 2009. Congressional Research Service 26 Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments defeat the insurgency, but disrupting insurgent presence in Pakistan is a necessary condition for making substantial progress.141 National Intelligence Estimates on Pakistan and Afghanistan issued in early December 2010 reportedly took a bleak view of the situation and suggested that U.S. success in Afghanistan was not possible so long as insurgents continued to find safe haven in western Pakistan.142 As recently as January 2011, Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen said, “It is absolutely critical that the safe havens in Pakistan get shut down. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without that.”143 Some independent analysts echo the claim that targeting Afghan Taliban leaders in Baluchistan is a requirement for curbing the Afghan insurgency. 144 Afghan officials openly accuse Pakistani officials of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. Pakistan’s mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory. The “Kandahari clique” reportedly operates not from Pakistan’s tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta.145 Many analysts believe that Pakistan’s intelligence services have long known the whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Some reports indicate that elements of Pakistan’s major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban and other extremists forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing training and fire support for Taliban offensives (see also “Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency” below). 146 Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani interest. They ask interested partners to enhance their own efforts to control the border region by undertaking an expansion of military deployments and checkposts on the Afghan side of the border, by engaging more robust intelligence sharing, and by continuing to supply the counterinsurgency equipment requested by Pakistan. Yet, despite efforts by both the Islamabad and Kabul governments to secure it, the shared border remains highly porous, with corrupt border guards allowing more-or-less free movement of militants and smugglers.147 Pakistan has contributed about $330 million to Afghan development and reconstruction since 2001. 141 Transcript: “Senate Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Current and Projected Threats to the United States,” February 2, 2010. 142 “Afghan, Pakistan Intelligence Reports Bleak,” Associated Press, December 11, 2010. 143 [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41307. Public record. Not legal advice.