# Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41254

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** May 17, 2011
- **Citation:** R41254

## Text

Defense: FY2011 Authorization and
Appropriations
(name redacted),
Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
May 17, 2011

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41254

Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations

Summary
The President’s FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, requested authorization of
$725.9 billion in new budget authority in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act. In
addition to $548.9 billion for the regular (non-war) operations of the Department of Defense
(DOD), the authorization request included $159.3 billion for ongoing military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total DOD request for FY2011 to $708.2 billion. The request
also included $17.7 billion for defense-related activities of the Department of Energy.
The President’s FY2011 DOD appropriations request, totaling $709.0 billion, was accompanied
by a request for a supplemental FY2010 DOD appropriation of $33.7 billion. The supplemental
request included $33.0 billion for war costs and $655 million to pay DOD’s share of the cost of
humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake.
The $548.9 billion appropriation requested for DOD’s so-called “base budget”—that is, all
activities other than war costs—was $18.2 billion higher than the amount appropriated for DOD
non-war costs in FY2010. By DOD’s estimate, this 3.4% increase would have amounted to a
“real” increase of 1.8% in purchasing power, after taking into account the cost of inflation.
On May 28, 2010, the House passed H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2011, which would have authorized $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related
activities, a reduction of less than $3 million from the Administration’s request for programs
covered by that legislation. The House bill would have added to the budget $485 million to
continue development of the alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), despite warnings
by Defense Secretary Robert H. Gates that he would recommend a veto of any bill that would
continue that project. An amendment adopted by the House would have repealed a 1993 law that,
in effect, bars from military service those who are openly homosexual.
On June 4, 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2011
National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3454; S.Rept. 111-201), which would have authorized
$725.7 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of $240.7 million from
the Administration’s request. The committee bill would have repealed the “don’t ask, don’t tell”
law and it would not add funds for the JSF alternate engine. Controversy over the “don’t ask,
don’t tell” repeal and other provisions blocked Senate action on S. 3454 for months.
Meanwhile, informal negotiations among senior members of the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees produced a compromise bill, the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 6523). This bill was cleared for the President on
December 22, 2010, and was signed by the President on January 7, 2011 (P.L. 111-383). The
enacted defense authorization bill included no provision relating to the “don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy, which was repealed by separate legislation (H.R. 2965; P.L. 111-321).
Neither the House nor the Senate passed any FY2011 appropriations bills before the fiscal year
began on October 1, 2010, so DOD—like other federal agencies—was funded through the first
six months of FY2011 by a series of continuing resolutions. The legislative battle over the
FY2011 budget wound up on April 15, 2011, when the President signed H.R. 1473 (P.L. 112-10),
funding Defense and other agencies through the balance of FY2011. For DOD, the bill provided a
total of $688.6 billion, which is $20.4 billion less than the President’s request. The bill included
no funds for the JSF alternate engine.

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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations

Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act ............................................................................ 2
Status of Legislation ........................................................................................................................ 4
FY2011 National Defense Budget Overview (Budget Function 050) ............................................. 5
FY2011 War Costs and FY2010 Supplemental ......................................................................... 6
Real Growth and “Security Agencies” ...................................................................................... 7
FY2011 DOD Base Budget ............................................................................................................. 9
Projected Growth Rate and Proposed Efficiencies .................................................................. 10
Defense Budget as Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ................................................. 14
Long-term Planning: Strategies and Budgets................................................................................. 15
FY2011 Base Budget Highlights and Potential Issues................................................................... 17
Military Personnel ................................................................................................................... 17
Military Pay Raise ............................................................................................................. 18
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell ........................................................................................................ 19
Military Health Care Costs ...................................................................................................... 20
Procurement and R&D ............................................................................................................ 21
Army Combat Force Modernization Programs ................................................................. 22
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans................................................................... 23
Aircraft Programs .............................................................................................................. 26
Ballistic Missile Defense................................................................................................... 28
Military Construction .............................................................................................................. 29
Aircraft Carrier Homeport ................................................................................................. 29
Marine Corps Relocation to Guam.................................................................................... 30
US CYBERCOM..................................................................................................................... 30
State Department Role in Security Assistance......................................................................... 31
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date ................................................................. 34
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454, H.R. 6523) ..................... 34
Military Personnel Issues (Authorization) ........................................................................ 36
Sexual Assault ................................................................................................................... 37
Medical Care (Authorization) ........................................................................................... 38
Fort Hood Shooting Incident ............................................................................................. 38
Ballistic Missile Defense, Strategic Weapons, and the New START Treaty
(Authorization) ............................................................................................................... 39
Shipbuilding (Authorization) ............................................................................................ 41
Aircraft (Authorization) .................................................................................................... 42
Ground Combat Vehicle and Brigade Combat Team Modernization
(Authorization) ............................................................................................................... 44
Military Construction: Carrier Homeport and Guam (Authorization) .............................. 45
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Issues ..................................................................................... 46
Security Assistance and the State Department (Authorization) ........................................ 46
Cybersecurity (Authorization)........................................................................................... 47
FY2011 Congressional Budget Ceilings (“302b Allocations”) ............................................... 48
FY2011 Defense Appropriations Bill ...................................................................................... 49
Military Personnel and Medical Care Issues (Appropriations) ......................................... 52
Missile Defense and Strategic Strike (Appropriations) ..................................................... 52

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Shipbuilding (Appropriations) .......................................................................................... 53
Aircraft (Appropriations) .................................................................................................. 53
Ground Combat Vehicles (Appropriations) ....................................................................... 53

Figures
Figure 1. Total DOD Appropriations, FY2001-FY2011 .................................................................. 9
Figure 2. DOD Budget (Excluding Post-9/11 War Costs), FY1948-FY2014 ................................ 10
Figure 3. Proposed Spending Categories Relevant to a Budget ‘Freeze’ ...................................... 13
Figure 4. DOD Appropriations as Share of GDP, FY1976-2015 ................................................... 14
Figure 5. Authorized Active Duty End Strength, FY1987-FY2011 ............................................... 18

Tables
Table 1. Summary: DOD Funding in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization (H.R.
5136, S. 3454, H.R. 6523) ............................................................................................................ 3
Table 2. National Defense Authorization Act, FY2011 (H.R. 5136; S. 3454; H.R. 6523) .............. 4
Table 3. FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800; H.R. 1473)................................................... 4
Table 4. FY2011 National Defense Budget Request (Function 050)............................................... 5
Table 5. FY2009-FY2011 DOD Discretionary Appropriations (Including Military
Construction and DOD Family Housing) ..................................................................................... 6
Table 6. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request .................................................................. 7
Table 7. Security Agency and Non-security Agency Discretionary Budget Authority
Enacted and Requested, FY2009-FY2011 .................................................................................... 8
Table 8. Projected and Alternative DOD Base Budgets, FY2011-FY2015 ................................... 11
Table 9. Defense Outlays as Share of GDP, FY2008-FY2011 ...................................................... 14
Table 10. DOD Base Budget Discretionary Funding Request by Title. FY2010-FY2011 ............ 17
Table 11. FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454, H.R. 6523) ............ 35
Table 12. FY2011 Appropriations Subcommittee Discretionary Spending Ceilings
(“302(b) Allocations”) ................................................................................................................ 48
Table 13. FY2011 Department of Defense Appropriations (unnumbered House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee draft bill; S. 3800; H.R. 1473) ................................................... 51
Table A-1. FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (by account) ......................................... 55
Table A-2. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Missile Defense Funding:
Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 64
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Missile Defense Funding:
Appropriations ............................................................................................................................ 68
Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Army and Marine Corps Programs:
Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 72

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Table A-5. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Army and Marine Corps Programs:
Appropriation.............................................................................................................................. 75
Table A-6. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:
Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 77
Table A-7. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
Aircraft Programs: Authorization ............................................................................................... 81
Table A-8. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).............................................................................. 83
Table A-9. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Navy, Marine, and Air Force
Aircraft Programs: Appropriation ............................................................................................... 85

Appendixes
Appendix. Selected Program Summary Tables.............................................................................. 54

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 89

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Most Recent Developments
Until FY2011 was more than half over, the Department of Defense (DOD)—like all other federal
agencies that depend on appropriated funds—was funded by a series of continuing resolutions
which, in general, allowed the agencies to keep spending money at what had been their rate of
expenditure during FY2010. These temporary funding measures also included some restrictions
on agencies’ activities, including a prohibition on the start of any new programs unless
specifically allowed for.
On April 15, 2011, the President signed an omnibus funding bill for the balance of FY2011 (H.R.
1473; P.L. 112-10), which incorporated a fully detailed FY2011 DOD appropriations bill
providing a total of $659.9 billion for all DOD activities except military construction.1 This
amounted to a reduction of $18.2 billion from the total the President had requested for the
FY2011 DOD appropriations bill.
For DOD’s military construction budget, which is funded in a separate appropriations bill that
also pays for the Department of Veterans Affairs and certain other agencies, H.R. 1473 provided
$17.8 billion, a reduction of $2.2 billion from the President’s request.
Military Construction Appropriations Report
This report deals with military construction issues raised by the annual defense authorization act. However, for an
analysis of military construction appropriations issues, see CRS Report R41345, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs,
and Related Agencies: FY2011 Appropriations, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).

As enacted, the section of H.R. 1473 that corresponded to a regular, annual DOD appropriations
bill incorporated $4.4 billion worth of reductions to the President’s request that were applied to
broad categories of spending rather than to specific programs, including:
•

$2.0 billion rescinded from DOD funds appropriated for prior fiscal years;2

•

A total of $1.5 billion cut proportionately from every project and program funded
by the bill’s accounts for Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and
Research and Development;

•

$723 million from the total appropriated for civilian pay; and

•

$125 million from the total appropriated for federally funded research and
development corporations (FFRDCs) such as RAND.

The bill also made significant reductions to the amounts requested for some major weapons
programs, including:

1

In addition to the amounts appropriated for DOD in this bill the total amount appropriated for DOD in FY2011
included $10.9 billion for the accrual payments that fund the so-called “Tricare for Life” program which extends
coverage under the military health care program to Medicare-eligible military retirees and their dependents. The annual
Tricare for Life accrual payment, based on actuarial calculations, is made on the basis of a permanent appropriation,
rather than as an element of the annual appropriations bill. For FY2011, the total appropriated for DOD—including the
Tricare for Life accrual payment and military construction funds, was $688.6 billion.
2
Funds appropriated in prior years that are rescinded are used to partly offset the cost of newly appropriated programs;
Thus, they reduce the amount of the new budget authority required by the bill.

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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations

•

$1.7 billion cut from the $10.2 billion requested for continued development and
production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter;

•

$473 million from the $934 million requested for a new ground combat vehicle
for the Army; and

•

$325 million cut from the $864 billion requested to develop a new mid-air
refueling tanker for the Air Force.

The hundreds of cuts to the President’s DOD budget made by H.R. 1473 were partly offset by
some 226 instances in which the bill added funds to the request.3 Among the amounts the bill
added to the budget request are:
•

$495.0 million for nine F/A-18E/F Navy strike fighters,

•

$1.38 billion for equipment for the National Guard and reserve components;

•

$661.7 million for various medical research programs;

•

$523.2 million to foster innovative research;

•

$293.2 million for Israeli missile defense systems; and

•

$165.0 million to increase funding for the Military Career Advancement Account
(MyCAA) program, which provides tuition assistance to the spouses of service
members;

The bill did not add funds to continue development of an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter.

FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act
The version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act passed May 28 by the House
(H.R. 5136; H.Rept. 111-491) would have authorized $725.9 billion for DOD and other defenserelated activities, which was $2.7 million less than the Administration requested. The version of
the bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 4, 2010, (S. 3454; S.Rept.
111-201), would have authorized $725.7 billion, a reduction of $240.7 million from the
Administration’s request.
The Senate did not act on this version of bill, partly because of opposition to a provision that
would have repealed a 1993 law (10 U.S.C. 654) that, in effect, had barred from military service
those who are openly homosexual, establishing a policy colloquially referred to as “don’t ask,
don’t tell.” S. 3454 was set aside after the Senate, on December 9, 2010, rejected a motion to
invoke cloture on motion to begin consideration of the bill. The vote was 57-40 in favor of
invoking cloture, which would have required 60 “yea” votes.

3
This is about one-eighth the number of additions Congress has made to DOD budget requests for the past few years.
According to a database of congressional earmarks in appropriations bills, which is maintained by the Office of
Management and Budget, there were 2,085 earmarks in the defense appropriations bill for FY2008, 2,084 in the bill for
FY2009, and 1,758 in the FY2010 bill. See OMB, “FY2010 Earmarks by Appropriations Subcommittee” accessed at
http://earmarks.omb.gov/earmarks-public/2010-appropriations-by-spendcom/summary.html.

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Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees negotiated a compromise version
of the authorization bill (H.R. 6523), which dropped the provision relating to the “don’t ask; don’t
tell” policy and which was cleared for the President on December 22, 2010. The President signed
the bill on January 7, 2011 (P.L. 111-383).
Table 1. Summary: DOD Funding in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization
(H.R. 5136, S. 3454, H.R. 6523)
(amounts in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)

Administration
request for
Authorization

House-passed
H.R. 5136
5/28/1

Senate
committeereported
S. 3454
6/4/10

Base Budget

548.871

548.869

550.314

548.055

War Costs (“Overseas
Contingency Operations”)

159.336

159.335

157.648

158.750

Total

708.207

708.204

707.962

706.805

H.R. 6523
Enacted
(P.L. 111-383)
1/7/2011

Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 5136, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.Rept. 111-491; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to
Accompany S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, S.Rept. 111-201. House
Armed Services Committee Print, HASC No. 6, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement, to accompany H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383.
Notes: These amounts include funding for military construction and DOD family housing, but exclude funds
authorized by the bill for defense-related nuclear energy programs conducted by the Department of Energy and
certain other defense-related federal activities outside of DOD that the federal budget includes in budget
function 050 (“national defense”). A summary table including all authorizations in the bill is printed as Table A1.
Totals may not add due to rounding.

Both the versions of the authorization passed by the House and Senate generally supported the
Administration’s budget request. In particular, both versions—and the enacted H.R. 6523—
supported President Obama’s position by not adding to the budget funds to continue production of
the C-17 long-range cargo plane.
On two other high profile issues, the original House-passed bill challenged Administration
positions that were backed by the original Senate bill:
•

authorizing a 1.9% increase in basic pay for military personnel instead of the
1.4% increase requested by the President, which was authorized by the Senate
bill; and

•

authorizing $485 million not requested in the budget to continue development of
an alternate jet engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a project the Bush and
Obama Administrations both have tried to terminate.

The enacted version of the FY2011 bill, H.R. 6523, authorized the 1.4% basic pay raise, as
requested, and $485 million for the alternate engine for the F-35.

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Status of Legislation
Table 2. National Defense Authorization Act, FY2011 (H.R. 5136; S. 3454; H.R. 6523)
House
Passage
H.R.
5136

House
Report
H.Rept.
111-491

229-186
5/28/10

5/21/10

H.R. 6523
Senate
Report
S.Rept.
111-201

Senate
Passage
S. 3454

--

Conf.
Report

--

6/4/10

House
Passage
341-48
12/17/10

Senate
Passage
u/c
12/22/10

Public
Law
P.L. 111383
1/7/11

Note: In lieu of a conference report on the enacted version of the bill (H.R. 6523), see House Armed Services
Committee Print HASC No. 5, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 6523, December,
2010.

Table 3. FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800; H.R. 1473)
FY2011 Continuing
Resolution
(H.R. 1473)
Passage

Subcommittee
Markup
House
(draft bill)

Senate
(S. 3800)

House
Report

House
Passage

9/27/10

9/14/10

--

--

Senate
Report
(S. 3800)
S.Rept.
111-295
9/16/10

Senate
Passage

Conf.
Report

--

--

House

Senate

Public
Law

260-167
4/14/11

81-19
4/14/11

P.L. 112-10
4/15/11

Note: Division A of the FY2011 continuing resolution (H.R. 1473) is a complete DOD appropriations bill. Since
the final version of the bill was negotiated without a formal conference, there is no conference report. Nor is
there a Joint Explanatory Statement discussing the legislative intent behind provisions of the bill. The text of the
agreed on bill as well as detailed funding tables are printed in the "Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157, number 55 (April 14, 2011),
pp. H2697-H2788.

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FY2011 National Defense Budget Overview
(Budget Function 050)
The President’s FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, included $738.7 billion in
new budget authority for the so-called “national defense” function of the federal government
(function 050), which includes the military activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and
defense-related activities of other agencies, the largest component of which is Energy Department
work related to nuclear weapons and nuclear powerplants for warships.4
Of that total, $733.3 billion is discretionary spending, most of which requires an annual
appropriation.5 The FY2011 budget for the 050 function also includes a net sum of $5.3 billion in
mandatory spending, the largest share of which is for military retirees who are authorized to
receive “concurrent receipt” of their full military pension and a disability pension from the
Department of Veterans Affairs (Table 4).6
Table 4. FY2011 National Defense Budget Request (Function 050)
(amounts are in billions of dollars)
Discretionary

Mandatory

Total

Department of Defense,
Base Budget

548.9

3.9

552.8

Department of Defense,
war costs

159.3

0

159.3

Other “national defense”
activities

25.2

1.4

26.6

Total

733.4

5.3

738.7

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), March 2010, Table1-9, “National Defense Budget Authority-Function 050,” pp. 14-15.

In addition to $548.9 billion requested for the regular (non-war) operations of the Department of
Defense (DOD) in FY2011, the budget request included $159.3 billion for ongoing military
operations, primarily funding the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total DOD
request for FY2011 to $708.3 billion. The Administration also requested $33 billion in
supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2010 war costs, in order to cover the cost of the
President’s decision, announced on November 30, 2009, to deploy an additional 30,000 troops to
Afghanistan. This “surge” would bring to 98,000 the total number of U.S. troops in that country
in FY2011. Added to the funds previously appropriated for war costs in the FY2010 DOD
appropriations bill enacted December 19, 2009 (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118), the requested

4

Civil works activities of the Army Corps of Engineers are not included in the “national defense” budget function.
Accrual payments to support medical care for military retirees under the so-called Tricare-for-Life program are
counted as discretionary spending, but are funded under a permanent appropriation.
6
Mandatory spending for concurrent receipt and other activities is partially offset by various receipts and income from
trust funds.
5

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supplemental funds would bring the total amount appropriated for FY2010 war costs to $162.6
billion (Table 5).
Table 5. FY2009-FY2011 DOD Discretionary Appropriations
(Including Military Construction and DOD Family Housing)
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009
Enacted

FY2010
Enacted

FY2010
Supplemental
Request

FY2011
Requested

Base Budget

513.1

530.7

n/a

548.9

“Economic Stimulus” package

7.4

n/a

n/a

n/a

War Costs/Overseas
Contingency Operations

145.8

129.6

33.0

159.3

Haiti Relief Operations

n/a

n/a

.7

n/a

Total

666.3

660.3

33.7

708.3

Sources: CRS calculations based on National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011 (“The Green Book”). Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2010, Table1-9, “National Defense Budget AuthorityFunction 050,” pp. 14-15 and CRS Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas
Contingency Operations, coordinated by (name redacted) and (name redacted), Table F-1, pp. 62-72. Totals may
not add due to rounding.
Note: Base budget amounts Include accrual payments to support medical care for military retirees under the socalled Tricare-for-Life program, which is discretionary spending, but is funded pursuant to a permanent
appropriation.

FY2011 War Costs and FY2010 Supplemental
The Administration’s $159.3 billion request for war costs in FY2011 was roughly $3 billion lower
than the FY2010 war budget (including the pending supplemental request that would increase the
FY2010 amount by $33 billion). For the third year in a row, the budget request reflected a shift in
emphasis from operations in Iraq to those in Afghanistan (Table 6).

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Table 6. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request
(in billions of dollars and shares of total)

Total:
FY2001FY2008

FY2009

FY2010
Enacted in
2009

FY2010
Supplemental
Request

FY2010
Total with
Supplemental
as Enacted
7/27/10

FY2011
Request

IRAQ
Funding

$553.5

$92.0

$59.6

$1.0

$60.6

$45.8

Share of Total

78%

62%

46%

3%

38%

29%

Funding

$159.2

$56.1

$69.1

$30.0

$98.9

$113.5

Share of Total

22%

38%

54%

97%

62%

71%

Funding

$712.7

$148.2

$128.7

$31.0

$159.5

$159.3

Share of Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

AFGHANISTAN

TOTAL

Source: CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs,
coordinated by (name redacted), based on Table 8-5 in DOD,
FY2011 Budget Request Overview, Febraury 1, 2010;
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
Notes: CRS calculations exclude non-war funding in supplementals, and include funds from DOD’s regular
budget used for war needs.

War Funding
For an analysis of some issues raised by the Administration’s funding request for military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and for congressional action on the FY2010 supplemental appropriations request for war costs, see CRS
Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs, coordinated by (nam
e redacted). For further information on war costs, see CRS Report RL33110,
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted).

Haiti Operations Supplemental
On March 24, 2010, the Administration amended its FY2010 DOD supplemental funding request
to include an additional $655 million to pay for humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, which was
struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake. The DOD relief effort included the
deployment of 18 Navy ships, 830 cargo flights and nearly 21,000 military personnel.

Real Growth and “Security Agencies”
DOD is one of the federal agencies the Administration has defined as “security agencies” that are
exempt from the budget freeze on discretionary spending by non-security agencies. Compared
with the amount appropriated for the DOD base budget in FY2010, the requested FY2011 base
budget would be an increase of 3.4%, amounting to a 1.8% “real growth” in purchasing power
(that is, taking account of the cost of inflation).

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The budget request also would provide real growth in spending for other “security agencies”—a
category that it defined as including the Department of State and “other international programs,”
the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security and the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy.7
In sum, the Administration requested $719.2 billion for discretionary programs of the security
agencies (excluding war costs), which is 5.2% more than was appropriated for those programs in
FY2010. For non-security agencies—that is, all other discretionary programs—the
Administration requested $386.4 billion, a 1.5% decrease from their FY2010 appropriations
(Table 7).
Table 7. Security Agency and Non-security Agency Discretionary Budget Authority
Enacted and Requested, FY2009-FY2011
(amounts are in billions of dollars)
FY2009
enacted

FY2010
enacted

FY2011
requested

Regular
Appropriations

American
Recovery and
Reinvestment
Act
(“Stimulus
Package”)

513.2

7.4

530.8

548.9

National Nuclear Security Administration
(Department of Energy)

9.1

--

9.9

11.2

Department of Homeland Security

42.1

2.8

39.4

43.6

Department of Veterans Affairs

47.6

1.4

53.1

57.0

State and other International Programs

38.1

0.4

50.6

58.5

Subtotal, Security Agencies

650.1

12.0

683.7

719.2

Subtotal, Nonsecurity Agencies

354.1

253.1

392.1

386.4

Security Agencies
DOD (excluding war costs)

Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2011, Table S-7, “Funding Levels for
Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” pp. 130-31.
Note: Nonsecurity Agencies are all federal agencies not listed as “Security Agencies.”

7

For the Energy Department’s Nuclear National Security Agency (NNSA), which was designated as a “security
agency” and, thus, exempt from its budget freeze, the Administration requested $11.2 billion in FY2011, 13.5% more
than was appropriated for the agency in FY2010. However, the Administration also requested $6.5 billion for other
defense-related Energy Department activities which OMB designates as part of the “National Security” function of the
budget (Function 050) and which are covered by the annual National Defense Authorization Act, but which the
Administration did not designate as “security agencies” that were exempt from the budget freeze. Office of
Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011, Table 5.1, “Budget
Authority by Function and Subfunction, 1976-2015,” p. 94, and Department of Energy, “Summary Table: Budget by
Appropriation,” accessed at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/11budget/Content/Apprsum.pdf.

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FY2011 DOD Base Budget
The $548.9 billion requested for the FY2011 DOD base budget is $18.2 billion higher than the
$531.0 billion appropriated for DOD non-war costs in FY2010. By DOD’s estimate, this 3.4%
increase would provide a 1.8% increase in real purchasing power, after taking into account the
cost of inflation. The request would continue the relatively steady upward trend in DOD base
budgets since FY1998, which was the low-water mark of the post-Cold War retrenchment in
defense funding (Figure 1).
Figure 1.Total DOD Appropriations, FY2001-FY2011
(dollars in billions)

Source: DOD; Briefing on the FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010, accessed at
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_BudgetBriefing.pdf

Adjusted for inflation (using DOD deflators), the requested FY2011 base budget would be DOD’s
third largest since the end of the Korean War, after the amounts appropriated for FY1985 and
FY1986 at the peak of the Reagan Administration’s defense buildup (Figure 2).

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Figure 2. DOD Budget (Excluding Post-9/11 War Costs), FY1948-FY2014
amounts in millions of dollars

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 6-8, “Department of Defense BA by Title,” pp. 109-114. Data for FY2001-FY2011
from CRS analysis based on distinction between base budget and war costs for those years in DOD; Briefing on
the FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010 (see Figure 1, above).
Notes: Data for FY2010 and FY2011 based on Administration’s February 2010 budget request. Data for the
FY1976 transition quarter are omitted.

Projected Growth Rate and Proposed Efficiencies
For the four years following FY2011 (FY2012-FY2015), the Administration projects annual
increases in the DOD base budget that would exceed inflation, on average, by 0.8%. This falls
short of the 2% real growth rate that Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, in congressional
testimony on May 14, 2009, would be needed to pay for the investments the Department planned
to make through FY2015 (Table 8).8

8

Transcript, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the FY2010 DOD budget request, May 14, 2009. Accessed
at
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congressional/111/congressionaltrans
cripts111-000003117540.html@committees&metapub=CQ-CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=1&seqNum=1.

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Table 8. Projected and Alternative DOD Base Budgets, FY2011-FY2015
(total budget authority, including mandatory, in billions of dollars)

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2011FY2015,
total

Administration Plan (current dollars)

552.8

570.1

585.7

601.8

620.2

2,930.6

Administration Plan (constant FY2011
dollars)

552.8

558.8

562.7

566.3

571.5

2,812.1

percent real growth

1.8%

1.1%

0.7%

0.6%

0.9%

n/a

Amount that would provide 2% real
growth, compounded (current dollars)

553.9

576.4

600.0

624.6

650.7

3,005.6

Amount by which 2% real growth budget
would exceed Administration Plan
(current dollars)

1.1

6.3

14.3

22.8

30.5

75.0

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 6-8, “Department of Defense BA by Title,” p. 114. Data concerning 2% real growth
rate are CRS calculations based on data in Table 6-8. Figures may not add due to rounding.

In a May 8, 2010, speech, Secretary Gates proposed bridging that gap between the cost of
sustaining the current force and the budgets he expected in the future by reducing DOD’s
overhead costs by $10 billion annually, in order to sustain its current forces with the budgets he
expected in the future, given the country’s current difficult economic circumstances. Sustaining
the current force, Secretary Gates said, would require, “real growth in the defense budget ranging
from two to 3% above inflation.... But, realistically, it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the
real growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure.”9
The solution Secretary Gates proposed was to shift funds within the budget, providing the
necessary real growth in those accounts that directly support combat forces, but offsetting the
additional cost by an equivalent reduction in spending for administrative and support activities
such as personnel management, acquisition oversight, and DOD’s medical program. Phrased in
terms of military jargon, Secretary Gates proposed increasing the amount spent on DOD’s
fighting force—the “tooth”-- by decreasing the amount spent on administrative and support
functions—the “tail.”
The goal is to cut our overhead costs and to transfer those savings to force structure and
modernization within the programmed budget: In other words, to convert sufficient “tail” to
“tooth” to provide the equivalent of roughly two to three percent real growth.... Simply
taking a few percent off the top of everything on a one-time basis will not do. These savings
must stem from root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and added to over time.10

Citing an estimate by the Defense Business Board11 that DOD’s tail absorbs roughly 40% of the
department’s annual budget,12 Gates told reporters that a shift of about $10 billion from those
9
Secretary Gates delivered this address at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs), “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, KAS, May 8,
2010”, accessed at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1467.
10
Ibid.
11
The Defense Business Board, is a federal advisory committee that provides management advice to the Secretary of
(continued...)

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support functions to the part of the budget that directly supports combat units would provide a
total real increase of about 3% in the “tooth”-related part of the FY2012 DOD budget request.13
On August 9, 2010, Secretary Gates announced several initiatives he said would reduce the cost
of DOD’s headquarters and support bureaucracies. Among these were:
•

a 10% reduction in funding for service support contractors in each of the next
three years;

•

a reduction in the number of generals and admirals by 50 and a reduction in the
number of senior DOD civilians by 150 over the next two years; and

•

elimination of the Joint Forces Command, the Business Transformation Agency
and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration.14

On September 14, 2010, Secretary Gates announced 23 additional initiatives, all of which were
intended to increase the efficiency with which DOD contracts for goods and services—activities
which, he said, account for about $400 billion of the roughly $700 billion the department spends
annually. Among these contracting and acquisition initiatives were:
•

a requirement that weapons program managers treat an “affordability target” as a
key requirement of each new system, on a par with the usual performance
requirements such as speed or data transmission rate;

•

various contracting revisions intended to reward contractors for managing their
programs more efficiently; and

•

several changes in contracting rules intended to reduce the cost of contracts for
services, which account for more than half DOD’s annual contracting budget.15

Some Members of Congress contend that the Administration’s projected real budget increases,
even if realized, would be inadequate, given the steadily rising cost of personnel and operations.
For example, Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, then the ranking minority Member of
the House Armed Services Committee, commented in a February 4, 2010, Heritage Foundation
lecture that the planned budgets would force DOD to scale back some planned acquisition
programs:
One percent real growth in the defense budget over the next five years is a net cut for
investment and procurement accounts.16
(...continued)
Defense.
12
Defense Business Board, Report to the Secretary of Defense: Task Group Report on Tooth-to-Tail Analysis, April
2008, accessed at http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/Tooth_to_Tail_Final_Report.pdf.
13
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Media Availability with Secretary Gates en route to
Kansas City, MO, May 7, 2010, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4621.
14
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative,” August 9, 2010, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1496
15
See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with Under
Secretary Carter with Opening Remarks by Secretary Gates from the Pentagon,” September 14, 2010, accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4684, on September 16, 2010.

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On the other hand, some Members object to exempting DOD (and other “security agencies”)
from the Administration-imposed budget freeze on discretionary spending (Figure 3). For
example, Representative Barney Frank has called for reductions in the DOD budget based on the
termination of unnecessary weapons programs and a retrenchment from some of overseas military
deployments.
[President Obama’s] announcement that he is going to begin deficit reduction, while
exempting the ever-increasing military budget from the same scrutiny that goes to other
federal expenditures means either that deficit reduction in both the near and long term is
doomed to failure, or that devastating cuts will occur in virtually every federal program that
aims at improving the quality of our lives.17

Figure 3. Proposed Spending Categories Relevant to a Budget ‘Freeze’
amounts in billions of current dollars

Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2011. Data for Security Agencies
(excluding war costs) and Non-Security Agencies drawn from Table S-11, “Funding Levels for Appropriated
(“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 174. Data for Mandatory Spending and Net Interest drawn from
Table S-4, “Proposed Budget by Category,” p. 151.
Notes: Besides DOD, the Obama Administration defines as “security agencies” the following: the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of State “and other international

(...continued)
16
Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, “Building a Robust National Defense,” accessed at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Building-a-Robust-National-Defense.
17
Rep. Barney Frank, "You Can't Succeed at Deficit Reduction Without Really Trying," Congressional Record, daily
edition, February 4, 2010, p. E157.http://www.house.gov/frank/speeches/2010/02-02-10-deficit-reduction-militaryspeech.pdf.

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programs,” and the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy. Ibid.,Table S-11,
“Funding Levels for Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 174.

Defense Budget as Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The FY2011 DOD base budget request amounts to 3.6% of the GDP, by the Administration’s
calculations—the same percentage as the FY2010 base budget (Table 9).
Table 9. Defense Outlays as Share of GDP, FY2008-FY2011
2008

2009

2010

2011

DOD Base Budget
(without war costs)

3.3%

3.5%

3.6%

3.6%

DOD Total Budget

4.1%

4.5%

4.7%

4.7%

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 7-7, “Defense Shares of Economic and Budgetary Aggregates,” pp. 223-24, and Office
of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request, briefing slides accessed at
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_BudgetBriefing.pdf.

Viewed over the long haul, the FY2011 request would mark the leveling off of a relatively steady
upward trend in the DOD share of GDP since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Figure 4).
Figure 4. DOD Appropriations as Share of GDP, FY1976-2015

Source: CRS calculations based on Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense
Budget Estimates for FY2011 (“The Green Book”), Table 7-7, “Defense Shares of Economic and Budgetary
Aggregates,” pp. 223-24.
Notes: Discussions of the DOD share of the GDP typically use data based on DOD outlays for each fiscal year,
as in Table 5, above, This chart is based on annual levels of DOD budget authority, because available outlay data
do not separate war costs from base budget expenditures. Year to year changes in outlays lag corresponding
movements in budget authority, but over a long period, trends in the ratio of DOD budget authority to GDP
should closely track trends in the ratio of DOD outlays to GDP.

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Long-term Planning: Strategies and Budgets
The Administration did not propose in its FY2011 DOD budget request as many significant
changes to major weapons programs as had been incorporated into its FY2010 request.
Nevertheless, the FY2011 budget sustains the initiatives launched in the previous budget.
Moreover, the budget request reflects the strategy and force planning assumptions that are
embodied in DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a legislatively mandated assessment of
defense strategy and priorities, the most recent of which was released on February 1, 2010, to
accompany the FY2011 budget request.
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
For a more comprehensive review of the 2010 QDR, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010:
Overview and Implications for National Security Planning, by (name redacted).

The four QDRs produced in 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2010 document an ongoing evolution of DOD
strategic thinking that has seen a shift away from emphasizing the readiness of U.S. forces to
wage smaller versions of Cold War-era conventional wars, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Increasingly, U.S. planners have focused on the need for U.S. forces to be ready for a diverse
array of missions.18 Two key assumptions running through the 2010 QDR are particularly relevant
to the Administration’s budgetary priorities.
The first of these key assumptions is that DOD’s top priority is fighting and winning the ongoing
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the report says, the department must rebalance
its priorities to put more emphasis on support for forces engaged in current operations, and
institutionalize capabilities for counterinsurgency, stability, and counter-terrorism operations,
such as those currently being conducted by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Among the near-term initiatives recommended by the QDR toward this end are increased funding
to acquire helicopters, UAVs, improved intelligence and analysis capabilities, counter IED
technologies, and AC-130 gunship aircraft.19 The report also recommends some longer-term
initiatives, including the conversion of one heavy Army brigade combat team (BCT) into a
Stryker brigade—such brigades use wheeled Stryker armored vehicles for mobility. The report
says that “several more BCTs” may be converted “as resources become available and future
global demands become clearer.”20
A second basic assumption asserted throughout the 2010 QDR is that no adversary in prospect
over the next 10-20 years is likely to directly confront U.S. conventional, military capabilities as
embodied in armored brigades, aircraft carrier task forces, and squadrons of advanced jet fighters.
Instead, the argument goes, any foe—whether a violent, radical non-state terrorist group or a
technologically advanced near-peer competitor—will try to challenge U.S. forces
“asymmetrically,” that is, by using unconventional tactics and technologies to exploit U.S.
18

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2010, at
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
19
“UAVs” refers to unmanned or unpiloted aerial vehicles, particularly used for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. IEDs are improvised explosive devices, including roadside, car, and truck bombs.
20
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2010, p. 24 at
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

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limitations. The report challenges the widely held notion that there is a spectrum of conflict,
ranging from unsophisticated insurgents or terrorists at the low end to sophisticated national
armies at the high end. Instead, the QDR says, “low-end” terrorist groups may use advanced
technologies such as precision-guided missiles and near-peer competitors may use guerrilla-like
“indirect means” of attack, such as a cyber-war campaign to degrade the computer networks on
which U.S. forces rely heavily.
The 2010 QDR emphasizes the importance of the military’s ability to operate effectively in
cyberspace, which it characterizes as one more domain of operations along with air, sea and
space. The report also asserts that DOD must strengthen its capabilities to actively defend its
cyber-networks. Towards this end, the report calls for several specific steps, including:
developing a more comprehensive approach to DOD operations in cyberspace; developing a
greater cyber expertise and awareness within DOD; centralizing command of cyber operations;
and collaborating more closely with other agencies and levels of government to enhance cyber
security.
The 2010 QDR does not abandon the long-standing policy that U.S. forces should be able to win
two major regional wars that occur nearly simultaneously in widely separated theaters of action.
However, the report assigns equal importance to ensuring that U.S. forces can respond flexibly
and effectively when required to conduct concurrently, at various points around the globe, several
missions of different types. For example, one scenario the QDR said U.S. forces should be able to
handle combined a major operation to stabilize another country, sustaining deterrence of a
potential aggressor in another region, conducting a medium-sized counter-insurgency mission in
yet another country, and providing support to U.S. civil authorities in the wake of some major
disaster or terrorist attack.
The 2010 QDR emphasizes the importance of preparing U.S. forces to deal with one particular
type of asymmetric threat that has potentially significant implications for conventional U.S.
forces: a so-called “anti-access, area-denial” capability that China and other potential adversaries
appear to be developing. The argument is that China or Iran could use a variety of both simple
and sophisticated technologies to target U.S. forward bases in nearby nations and naval forces
operating relatively close to shore, which are the basis of the U.S. ability to project power in
regions far from the U.S. homeland. Such power projection capabilities are the bedrock of U.S.
alliances in Europe and Asia and the key to U.S. efforts to bolster stability in other important
regions as well. Such capabilities are also expensive. The cost of power projection capabilities is
one reason why U.S. defense spending dramatically exceeds that of any other nation.
Those sinews of U.S. power projections may be increasingly vulnerable to attack. Overseas
ground bases may be increasingly vulnerable to ballistic missile, cruise missile, and bomber
attacks. Naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers and other service combatants, may be
increasingly vulnerable to anti-ship cruise missiles; modern, quiet diesel electric submarines;
smart mines that can be activated on command and maneuvered into place; small, fast boats laden
with explosives; or, at the high end of the technological spectrum, ballistic missiles with
maneuverable warheads that can be redirected in flight to strike moving ships.
The QDR makes a number of recommendations for countering anti-access strategies, including
increased reliance on long-range strike weapons and submarines that would be less vulnerable to
such methods. For instance, long-range strike forces might include a new manned or unmanned
bomber, perhaps armed with long-range cruise missiles for stand-off attacks. Measures to defeat
enemy sensors and engagement systems include development of offensive “electronic attack”

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capabilities, which remain highly classified. Missile defense may be a major and expensive part
of measures to protect forward deployed forces.

FY2011 Base Budget Highlights and Potential Issues
The FY2011 base budget request reflected some major initiatives of long standing, and others—
particularly in acquisition—that were launched by the Obama Administration in its FY2010
budget (Table 10). Following are some highlights:
Table 10. DOD Base Budget Discretionary Funding Request by Title. FY2010-FY2011
(current dollar amounts in billions)
FY2010

FY2011

Change, FY210FY211

Military Personnel

$135.0

$138.5

+2.6%

Operations and Maintenance

184.5

200.2

+8.5%

Procurement

104.8

112.9

+7.7%

Research and Development

80.1

76.1

-5.0%

Military Construction and
Family Housing

23.3

18.7

-19.6%

Revolving and Management
Funds

3,1

2.4

-23.7%

$530.7

$548.9

+3.4%

Total

Source: DOD; Briefing on the FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010, accessed at:
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_BudgetBriefing.pdf

Military Personnel21
The FY2011 budget request would fund 1.43 million active duty personnel in the regular
components.22 This amounts to a 4.7% increase over the end-strength of 1.38 million in FY2000,
which was the low point in a reduction in active-duty manpower that began in FY1987 and
accelerated during the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Additional Detail on Selected FY2011 Military Personnel Issues
For a more comprehensive review of military personnel issues in the FY2011 budget, see CRS Report R41316,
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by (name redacted).

21

Prepared in collaboration with (name redacted), Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
This total includes 26,000 personnel who comprise what DOD regards as a temporary expansion to fill billets
associated with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It does not include 79,000 members of the reserve
components (including the National Guard) who are serving full-time, nor does it include the much larger number of
reserve component personnel who have been temporarily called to active duty in connection with ongoing combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
22

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From an active-duty end-strength of 2.18 million in FY1987, the high-water mark of the Reagan
defense buildup, active duty end-strength was reduced by about one-third across each of the
services during the drawdown of the early 1990s. Since the start of combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps rebounded to 562,400 and
202,100, respectively. Both goals have been met, three years earlier than had been planned
(Figure 5). In 2010, Congress authorized an additional, temporary increase in the Army’s active
duty strength, which is reflected in the FY2011 request for an Army end-strength of 569,400.
Figure 5. Authorized Active Duty End Strength, FY1987-FY2011
(end-strength levels in thousands)
2500

end-strength in thousands

2000

1500

1000

500

0

FY87

FY90

FY93

FY96

FY99

FY02

FY05

FY08

FY11

Air Force

607

567

450

388

371

359

360

330

332

Marine Corps

200

197

182

174

172

173

178

189

202

Navy

587

592

536

428

373

376

366

329

328

Army

781

764

599

495

480

480

502

525

569

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 7-5, “Department of Defense Manpower,” pp. 217-18.
Notes: Data do not include temporary end strength authority of 30,000 for the Army and 9,000 for the Marine
Corps, in effect during the period FY2005-FY2009 nor additional temporary end strength authority of 22,000 for
the Army and 13,000 for the Marine Corps in effect during FY2009-FY2010.
Data for FY2011 are the Administration’s request.

Military Pay Raise
The budget included nearly $1 billion to give military personnel a 1.4 % raise in basic pay
effective January 1, 2011. This increase would equal the average increase in private-sector pay
and benefits as measured by the Labor Department’s Employment Cost Index (ECI), as required
by law.23 In addition, the Basic Allowance for Housing, a non-taxable cash payment to service
23

Title 37, United States Code, Section 1009.

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members who do not live in government-provided housing (which can add about 20% to a service
member’s basic pay), was scheduled to increase by 4.2% in FY2011.
In each year but one since FY2004, Congress has approved raises in military basic pay that were
0.5% higher than the ECI increase, on the grounds that military pay increases had lagged behind
civilian pay hikes during the 1980s.24
DOD officials contend that service members currently are better paid than 70% of private sector
workers with comparable experience and responsibility and that the $340 million it would cost to
provide the higher 1.9% raise across-the-board would provide more benefit to the department if it
were spent, instead, on reenlistment bonuses and special pays for military personnel in critical
specialties. Military advocacy groups insist, however, that service members need the higher
increase to close a “pay gap” between military personnel and their civilian peers.25

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
The FY2011 DOD funding bills provided a vehicle for legislative initiatives by supporters and
opponents of President Obama’s decision to revise a 1993 law26 and DOD regulations that, in
effect, bar from military service those who are openly homosexual. Under a compromise policy
reached in 1993, colloquially referred to as
Analysis of Issues Related to the ‘Don’t
“don’t ask, don’t tell,” service members are
Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy
not to be asked about nor allowed to discuss
For
more
comprehensive
analyses of issues related to
their same-sex orientation.

legislation and DOD policy concerning service of openly
homosexual persons in the armed forces, see CRS
Reports CRS Report R40782, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”:
Military Policy and the Law on Same-Sex Behavior, by (name
redacted), and CRS Report R40795, “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”: A Legal Analysis, by (name redacted).

Some Members of Congress contend that the
presence in combat units of openly
homosexual personnel would undermine the
units’ cohesion and combat effectiveness.
Some critics oppose changing the current
policy while the tempo of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan is imposing stress on the services.
Other legislators have called for immediate repeal of the 1993 law or, at least, a moratorium in the
discharge of service members for violating the don’t ask, don’t tell policy. Two bills introduced in
the 111th Congress would have repealed the law and replace it with a policy of nondiscrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation—H.R. 1283 and S. 3065.27
In his January 27, 2010, State of the Union Address, President Obama called for repealing the
1993 legislation and adopting a policy of nondiscrimination against persons with a same-sex
orientation. DOD launched a study, slated for completion by December 1, 2010, on how such a
change in law and policy would be implemented. Secretary Gates has opposed repeal of the 1993
law pending completion of that study. On March 25, 2010, he announced changes in the
department’s procedures for enforcement of the current law, providing that only a general or flag
officer would have the authority to initiate an investigation and separate someone who had
24

Congress did not increase the proposed pay raise in FY2007.
See CRS Report R41316, FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues,
coordinated by (name redacted).
26
Title 10, United States Code, Section 654.
27
CRS Report R40782, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Military Policy and the Law on Same-Sex Behavior, by (name red
acted) and CRS Report R40795, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: A Legal Analysis, by (name redacted).
25

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engaged in homosexual conduct, and that third party information alleging homosexual conduct by
a service member must be given under oath.
In a May 24, 2010, letter to President Obama, Senators Carl Levin and Joseph I. Lieberman and
Representative Patrick J. Murphy proposed an amendment to the FY2011 Defense Authorization
Act that would repeal the 1993 legislation barring openly homosexual persons from military
service after (1) the current DOD review has been completed: and (2) the President, the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to Congress that policies
and regulations have been prepared that would allow the repeal of the ban to be implemented in a
way that is, “consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit
cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the armed forces.”28
In a letter responding to the three Members, then Office of Management and Budget Director
Peter R. Orzag said that, while the Administration would have preferred that congressional action
on the issue await completion of the current DOD study, the Administration “understands that
Congress has chosen to move forward with legislation now,” and that the Administration supports
the draft amendment.29
In a statement to reporters on May 25, 2010, DOD press spokesman Geoff Morrell reportedly
said:
Secretary Gates continues to believe that ideally, the [Defense Department] review should be
completed before there is any legislation to repeal the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ law. With
Congress having indicated that is not possible, the secretary can accept the language in the
proposed amendment.30

On September 9, 2010, Federal Judge Virginia A. Phillips ruled that the 1993 law was
unconstitutional. One month later (on October 12, 2010), Judge Phillips enjoined DOD “from
enforcing or applying the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Act.” On October 19, 2010, the Ninth Circuit
temporarily stayed Judge Phillips’ injunction while the court considers the stay for the rest of the
appeals process.
Two days later, on October 21, 2010, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Clifford Stanley
issued a memorandum stating that only five senior DOD officials would have the authority to
discharge service members for homosexual behavior as defined in the law.

Military Health Care Costs31
The FY2011 budget request included $50.7 billion for the DOD health care system that employs
85,000 military personnel and 53,000 civilian DOD employees. The system serves 9.5 million

28

Draft legislative amendment accessed on the White House Press Office website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Lieberman_NDAA_DADT_Amendment.pdf.
29
Peter R. Orzag, letter to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, accessed on the White House Press Office website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Sen_Lieberman.pdf.
30
Donna Miles, “Gates Can Accept ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Amendment,” Armed Forces Press Service, May 25, 2010.
accessed at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59321.
31
Prepared in collaboration with (name redacted), Analyst in Military Health Care Policy.

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eligible beneficiaries through 56 hospitals, 363 out-patient medical facilities, and 275 dental
clinics.
The system’s cost, which was $19 billion in FY2001, has more than doubled in the 10 years since
then. The cost of the medical program is projected by DOD to increase annually at a rate of 5-7%
through FY2015, when it is projected to account for 10% of the planned DOD budget.
In addition to the cost of general inflation and new developments in medical technology, DOD
officials attribute the steady increase in military health care costs to several factors, including:
•

an increase in the number of retirees using DOD’s TRICARE medical insurance
rather than other, less generous insurance plans for which they are eligible;

•

an increase in the frequency with which eligible beneficiaries use DOD medical
services;

•

legislatively mandated increases in benefits, such as expanded access to
TRICARE for reservists; and

•

no increase in fees and copayments for TRICARE beneficiaries since 1995, when
the program was created.

The Bush Administration’s DOD budget requests for FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 proposed to
increase enrollment fees and copayment requirements for those TRICARE beneficiaries who
were not eligible for Medicare. Each year fee increases were proposed, Congress passed
legislation to prohibit them.32
Although the Obama Administration’s 2011 budget did not include any legislative proposals to
increase TRICARE annual fees or copayments, Secretary Gates stated in a February 1, 2010,
press conference, “We certainly would like to work with the Congress in figuring out a way to try
and bring some modest control to this program .... We absolutely want to take care of our men
and women in uniform and our retirees, but at some point, there has to be some reasonable
tradeoff between reasonable cost increases or premium increases or co-pays or something and the
cost of the program.”33

Procurement and R&D
The FY2011 request would have increased the total amount provided for development and
procurement of weapons and equipment from $184.9 billion in FY2010 to $189.0 billion in
FY2011. The proportion of the total DOD budget dedicated to procurement would have slightly
increased from 56% to 60%, while the proportion going to R&D would decline from 44% to
40%.
In part, that shift reflected the transition into production of some major programs that have had
relatively large R&D budgets in recent years, the largest of which is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
32

CRS Report RS22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for Congress, by (name redacted); and
CRS Report R40711, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues,
coordinated by (name redacted).
33
Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,” press
release, February 1, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4549.

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For that program, a total of $11.2 billion was appropriated in FY2010: $4.0 billion for R&D and
$7.2 billion for procurement. For FY2011, the total budget request was only slightly higher—
$11.2 billion—however that total includes $2.3 billion for R&D and $9.0 billion for
procurement.34
The Administration proposed few new cuts in major weapons programs beyond those it proposed
in its FY2010 DOD budget.35 But it reiterated two of the proposed cuts that Congress rejected in
2009.The FY2011 budget request included no funds either for production of additional C-17
wide-body cargo jets or for development of an alternate jet engine for the F-35. In 2009, when the
Obama Administration also requested no funding for either of those programs, Congress added
$2.5 billion to the FY2010 DOD funding bills for 10 C-17s and $465 million to continue work on
the alternate engine.

Army Combat Force Modernization Programs
Some Members of Congress have raised questions about the Army’s Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) Modernization program, intended to develop a new generation of ground combat
equipment, for which the Administration requested $3.2 billion in FY2011. One controversial
element of the program is the design of a proposed new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
The BCT Modernization program replaced the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which had
been intended to develop a new generation of combat equipment to replace current systems, such
as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. By 2009, FCS involved
efforts to develop 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive
communications and information network. On April 6, 2009, however, Secretary of Defense
Gates recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of FCS, which
was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis.
Secretary Gates said he acted because there were significant unanswered questions in the FCS
vehicle design strategy and because, despite some adjustments to the MGVs, the emerging
vehicles did not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
In place of MGV, the Army launched the GCV program intended to field by 2015-2017 a family
of fighting vehicles based on mature technologies and designed to readily incorporate future
network capabilities. Another potential oversight question for Congress is whether the Army is
rushing the development of the GCV, thereby inviting undue risk that would set the stage for
another unsuccessful acquisition program.36
On August 25, 2010—after the two Armed Services committees had drafted their respective
versions of the FY2011 national defense authorization bill—the Army cancelled the existing
34

Figures do not add due to rounding.
Opposition to additional procurement of F-22 fighters was not an initiative of the Obama Administration. The
preceding Bush Administration had decided cap the number of F-22s at the 183 planes already funded. There was an
effort to add funding for additional F-22s to the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill, but the effort was dropped after
President Obama threatened to veto any bill funding additional F-22s. See CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22
Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
36
CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV):
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and Nathan Jacob Lucas.
35

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competition for the GCV development contract and announced it was revising the performance
specifications the new vehicle would have to meet. The Army restarted the GCV competition on
November 30, 2010.
While the MGV component of FCS was terminated, other elements of the FCS program including
sensors, unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, and a modified FCS command and control
network were incorporated into the Army’s (BCT) Modernization program under which the
service plans to “spin out” the components, as they become available, to all 73 Army BCTs by
2025. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the FCS components that the
Army plans to deploy under the “spin out” approach have not demonstrated their effectiveness in
field exercises.37

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans38
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships included two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total
of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are
relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces
will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollars, or about 18% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: “If
the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has
over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be
able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”39
Specific shipbuilding issues that were discussed at hearings on the Navy’s proposed FY2011
budget include the following:

37
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Position Army's Ground Force
Modernization Effort for Success, GAO-10-406, March 2010.
38
Prepared in collaboration with Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs.
39
Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan,” May 2010, p. vii.

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Next Generation Ballistic Missile Submarine SSBN(X)
The Navy is currently conducting development and design work on a planned class of 12 nextgeneration ballistic missile submarines, or SSBN(X)s,1 which the service wants to procure as
replacements for its current force of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The SSBN(X)
program, also known as the Ohio-class replacement program, received $497.4 million in research
and development funding in the Navy's FY2010 budget, and the Navy's FY2011 budget requested
an additional $672.3 million in research and development funding for the program. Navy plans to
call for procuring the first SSBN(X) in FY2019, with advance procurement funding for the boat
beginning in FY2015.
The Navy preliminarily estimates the procurement cost of each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7
billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to roughly one-half of the Navy's budget each year
for procuring new ships. Some observers are concerned that the SSBN(X) program will
significantly compound the challenge the Navy faces in ensuring the affordability of its long-term
shipbuilding program. These observers are concerned that procuring 12 SSBN(X)s during the 15year period FY2019-FY2033, as called for in Navy plans, could lead to reductions in procurement
rates for other types of Navy ships during those years. The Navy's report on its 30-year (FY2011FY2040) shipbuilding plan states: "While the SSBN(X) is being procured, the Navy will be
limited in its ability to procure other ship classes." (See CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X)
Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name r
edacted).)
Options for reducing the cost of the SSBN(X) program or its potential impact on other Navy
shipbuilding programs include procuring fewer than 12 SSBN(X)s; reducing the number of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to be carried by each SSBN(X); designing the
SSBN(X) to carry a smaller SLBM; stretching out the schedule for procuring SSBN(X)s and
making greater use of split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding) in procuring them;
funding the procurement of SSBN(X)s in a part of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget
other than the Navy’s shipbuilding account; and increasing the Navy’s shipbuilding budget.

DDG-51 Destroyers and Ballistic Missile Defense
The FY2010 budget that the Navy submitted to Congress last year proposed ending procurement
of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers at three ships and resuming procurement of Arleigh
Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget supported this proposal. The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission called for procuring two
DDG-51s in FY2011 and six more in FY2012-FY2015.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget also proposed terminating the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser
program as unaffordable. Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the Navy
had previously envisaged, the Navy is proposing to build an improved version of the DDG-51,
called the Flight III version, starting in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the current
version of the DDG-51, called the Flight IIA version, in FY2010-FY2015, followed by
procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Flight III DDG-51s are to carry a smaller
version of the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) that was to be carried by the CG(X).
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested $228.4 million in research and development
funding for the AMDR.

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The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable
Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015.
Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration’s announcement of its
intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks—
that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing
faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from
U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain
the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing nonBMD missions.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requested a total of
$2,161.6 million for the Aegis BMD program. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested a
total of $457.0 million for BMD-related efforts. FY2011 issues for Congress included whether to
approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight III DDG-51 design and start
procuring it in FY2016, whether to approve, reject, or modify the FY2011 MDA and Navy
funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy with
additional direction concerning the program.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
The FY2011 budget requested $1.59 billion to fund two of a planned force of 55 Littoral Combat
Ships (LCS), which are relatively small and inexpensive vessels (compared to other U.S.
warships) designed to operate in shallow water carrying interchangeable weapons modules that
would equip them either to fend off attacks by small boats, clear underwater minefields, or hunt
submarines. As initially planned, the Navy was to buy several copies of each of two quite
different versions of LCS designed by two industry teams—one led by Lockheed Martin, the
other by General Dynamics—before selecting one of the designs to comprise most of the LCS
fleet.
On September 16, 2009, the Navy accelerated its timetable for choosing between the two designs,
announcing it would select a single design to which all LCSs procured in FY2010 and subsequent
years would be built. Under this plan, the winning contractor would build 10 LCSs over the fiveyear period FY2010-FY2014, at a rate of two ships per year. The Navy would then hold a second
competition—open to all bidders other than the winning firm—to select a second shipyard to
build up to five additional LCSs to the same design in FY2012-FY2014 (one ship in FY2012, and
two ships per year in FY2013-FY2014). These two shipyards would then compete for contracts to
build LCSs procured in FY2015 and subsequent years.
On November 3, 2010, Navy officials announced that they were seeking approval from Congress
to pursue a different acquisition strategy, buying 10 ships from each of the competing industry
teams.40

40

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=57007

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Aircraft Programs41
Fighter aircraft are a major component of U.S. military capability and account for a significant
portion of U.S. defense spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
collectively had an inventory of about 3,500 fighters. Because fighters built in large numbers
during the 1980s are nearing the end of their service lives, there is a concern that the services may
fall short of the number of planes needed because of budgetary limits on the rate at which
replacement fighters can be procured. Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air
Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft by 2024. Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine
Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200
aircraft, by about 2018.
A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft is the overall affordability of DOD's plans for
modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress and elsewhere
for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization is heading for
an eventual budget "train wreck" as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with insufficient
amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition.42

F-35
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), being procured in different versions for the Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Navy, is the key to DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plans, which call for
acquiring a total of 2,443 JSFs at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of December 31, 2009) of
about $238 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2002 dollars, or more than $300 billion
in current prices. The F-35 program is DOD's largest weapon procurement program in terms of
total estimated acquisition cost. Hundreds of additional F-35s are slated to be purchased by
several U.S. allies, eight of which are cost-sharing partners in the program.43
The Administration's FY2011 budget requested a total of $11.3 billion for the F-35 program,
including $2.5 billion in Air Force and Navy research and development funding and $8.8 billion
in Air Force and Navy procurement funding.44
Although the F-35 was conceived as a relatively affordable strike fighter, some observers are
concerned that in a situation of constrained DOD resources, F-35s might not be affordable in the
annual quantities planned by DOD, at least not without reducing funding for other DOD
programs. As the annual production rate of the F-35 increases, the program will require more than
$10 billion per year in acquisition funding at the same time that DOD will face other budgetary
challenges. Supporters of the F-35 might argue that, as a relatively affordable aircraft that can be
procured in similar, though not identical, versions for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, the
F-35 represents the most economical and cost-effective strategy for avoiding or mitigating such
shortfalls.

41

Prepared in collaboration with (name redacted), Specialist in Military Aviation.
CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
43
CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name red
acted).
44
Development and procurement of Marine Corps aircraft are funded through the Navy's budget.
42

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On October 18, 2010, the British government announced, as part of a far-reaching plan to reduce
its defense spending, that it would reduce the number of F-35s it planned to buy from the initially
planned 138 planes to as few as 40. Moreover, the British now plan to buy none of the verticaltakeoff version of the plane, designated the “B” model, of which Britain’s Royal Navy had been
slated to make the second-largest purchase, after the U.S. Marine Corps.45

F-35 Alternate Engine
For four successive years, Congress has rejected Administration proposals to terminate the
program to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt &
Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The
Administration's FY2011 budget submission again proposed to terminate the program.
Through FY2009, Congress has provided approximately $2.5 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter
alternate engine program. DOD has estimated that the program would need an additional $2.9
billion through 2017 to complete the development of the F136 engine.46 In a September 15, 2010,
letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, the GAO said that the DOD
estimate, “should be viewed as one point within a range of possible costs depending on the
factors and assumptions used, and not as an absolute amount.”47
Critics of the proposal to terminate the F136 alternate engine argue that termination was driven
more by immediate budget pressures on the department than the long-term pros and cons of the
F136 program. They argue that engine competition on the F-15 and F-16 programs saved money
and resulted in greater reliability. Some who applaud the proposed termination say that singlesource engine production contracts have been the norm, not the exception. Long-term engine
affordability, they claim, is best achieved by procuring engines through multiyear contracts from
a single source.
Cancelling the F136 engine poses questions on the operational risk—particularly of fleet
grounding—posed by having a single engine design and supplier. Additional issues include the
potential impact this termination might have on the U.S. defense industrial base and on U.S.
relations with key allied countries involved in the alternate engine program. Finally, eliminating
competitive market forces for DOD business worth billions of dollars may concern those who
seek efficiency from DOD’s acquisition system and raises the challenge of cost control in a
single-supplier environment.
Continuing F136 development raises issues of impact on the F-35 acquisition program, including
possible reduction of the numbers of F-35s that could be acquired if program funds are used for
the alternate engine. It also raises issues of the outyear costs and operational concerns stemming
from the requirement to support two different engines in the field.

45

Government of the United Kingdom, Securing Britain in and Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defense and Security
Review, October, 2010, pp. 22-23. Accessed at
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf.
46
CRS Report R41131, F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
47
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment of DOD's Funding Projection for the F136
Alternate Engine, GAO 10-1020R, September 15, 2010, p.2.

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KC-X
The Administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget requested $863.9 million in Air Force
research and development funding for its third attempt since 2003 to acquire a new fleet of midair refueling tankers, designated KC-X, that would replace its aging fleet of KC-135 tankers. An
initial effort, that involved leasing new tankers from Boeing, was blocked by Congress. A
subsequent competition pitted Boeing, which offered a tanker based on its 767 jetliner, against the
team of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS),
which offered a tanker based on the EADS Airbus A330.
On February 24, 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) released its Request for Proposals for a
program to build 179 new KC-X aerial refueling tankers for the Air Force, a contract valued at
roughly $35 billion.
Bidding closed on July 9, 2010, with three offerors submitting bids. The European Aeronautic
Defense and Space Company (EADS) offered a KC-X design based on the Airbus A330 airliner,
to be built in Mobile, AL. Boeing offered a KC-X design based on its 767 airliner, to be built in
Seattle, WA, and Wichita, KS. A team of the Ukranian airframe maker Antonov and U.S.
Aerospace offered a variant of the An-124 freighter, with production location uncertain; this bid
was excluded for arriving after the deadline, and the GAO subsequently denied U.S. Aerospace’s
protest of the exclusion.48
On February 24, 2011, DOD announced it would award the new tanker contract to Boeing. On
March 4, EADS announced it would not challenge that decision.
The KC-X acquisition program has been a subject of intense interest because of the dollar value
of the contract, the number of jobs it would create, the importance of tanker aircraft to U.S.
military operations, and because DOD's attempts to acquire a new tanker over the past several
years have been highly contentious. The history of those earlier attempts forms an important part
of the context for DOD's proposed new KC-X competition, particularly in terms of defining the
required capabilities for the KC-X, and designing and conducting a fair and transparent
competition.

Ballistic Missile Defense
The George W. Bush Administration had planned to deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic a
modified version of the land-based BMD system currently deployed in Alaska and California.
The Obama Administration dropped that plan in favor of the so-called Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA), which calls for deploying BMD-capable Aegis ships (and, eventually, a relocatable, landbased version of the Aegis system and associated Standard missile) to defend Europe and,
eventually, the United States against potential ballistic missile attacks from Iran. The
Administration has said that similar BMD capabilities could be pursued in other regions such as
the Middle East and Northeast Asia.49

48

CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-46A Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted).
49
For additional analysis, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by (name reda
cted) and (name redacted).

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The Administration requested a total of $2.27 billion in FY2011 for programs associated with the
PAA, including $712 million for development efforts unique to PAA and an additional $1.56
billion to continue development and procurement of the Aegis ship-borne BMD system that
would be integral to PAA as well as other missile defense missions.

Military Construction50
The $18.7 billion requested in the FY2011 base budget for military construction and family
housing is nearly 20% lower than the corresponding appropriation for FY2010. Most of the
reduction is the result of a decline from $7.9 billion to $2.7 billion in the amount that is being
spent to build new facilities for units that are moving to new sites as a result of the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. Most of that BRAC-related construction was
funded in earlier budgets, since the deadline for completing the moves is September 15, 2011.
In addition, the budget for military family housing dropped from $2.3 billion in FY2010 to $1.8
billion in the FY2011 request. According to DOD officials, this is a result of a policy, begun in
the late 1990s, of privatizing military family housing. The amounts appropriated for the Basic
Allowance for Housing paid to personnel who do not live in government furnished housing has
increased over the past decade, partly because more service members are paying rent to private
landlords and partly because of a policy decision that housing allowances (which are pegged to
regional home rental and utility costs) should cover a larger proportion of a service member’s
housing costs.

Aircraft Carrier Homeport
The FY2011 DOD bills provided a vehicle for those Members of Congress opposed to the Navy’s
plan to move to Mayport, FL, one of the five nuclear powered aircraft carriers currently
homeported in Norfolk, VA. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) final report on the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 1, 2010, endorses the Navy’s desire to
establish Mayport as a second Atlantic Fleet carrier home port. The report stated:
To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will
homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida.

Because all carriers currently in service are nuclear powered, such a move would require the
construction of new, specialized nuclear support facilities at the Mayport site, near Jacksonville.
In addition, such a move would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity
associated with homeporting an aircraft carrier, which some sources estimate as being worth
hundreds of millions of dollars per year.51
Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the proposal to homeport
an aircraft carrier at Mayport, endorsing the argument made by DOD and the Navy that the
benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs
associated with moving a CVN to Mayport, which the Navy estimates would total $589.7 million.
50

Prepared in collaboration with (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense.
CRS Report R40248, Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for
Congress, by (name redacted).
51

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That total includes $46.3 million for dredging, which Congress approved in its action on the
FY2010 DOD budget, but with the proviso that it was not prejudging the issue of the carrier
homeport.
Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition
to the proposal, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet
CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could
achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.

Marine Corps Relocation to Guam
The Administration’s budget included $139 million for facilities on the U.S. territory of Guam, in
the western Pacific for use by 8,000 Marines, their families, and support personnel slated to move
to that island from the Japanese island of Okinawa. The planned move is the result of extensive
negotiations between the Departments of State and Defense and the Government of Japan. DOD
also plans to move additional military personnel to Guam from their current stations in the United
States. These relocations are expected to be completed by 2014-2016.
Guam is a mountainous island with an area roughly three times that of the District of Columbia,
and a population of about 178,000. Estimates of the permanent increase in population due to the
planned influx of military personnel, their families, DOD personnel, and supporting contractors
have ranged as high as 56,000. In addition, some analysts have estimated that as many as 25,000
temporary workers would be needed to build the planned facilities, a number amounting to 14%
of the population. These analysts question whether Guam’s current transportation, electrical and
utility grid could support such a surge in the island’s population.52

US CYBERCOM
The Administration’s budget supported the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) as a component of the U.S. Strategic Command that is intended to centralize
command of DOD networks and to coordinate their protection and operation. The reorganization
of cyber forces began in October 2008 when Secretary Gates directed that the Joint Task Force
for Global Network Operations (JTF GNO), which was responsible for defending DOD’s global
information grid against cyber attack, be placed under the operational control of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW), which was responsible for
“offensive” information operations, including cyber attacks on adversaries. This integration into
one organization of responsibility for both offensive and defensive cyber operations marked a
departure from the historical segregation of those two capabilities.53 In June, 2009, Secretary
Gates took the consolidation of DOD cyber operations one step further, directing the U.S.
Strategic Command to establish U.S. Cyber Command as one of its components with
responsibility for both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The director of the National

52

See CRS Report RS22570, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, by (name redacted), and CRS Report R40731,Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations, coordinated by (name redacted).
53
For background, see CRS Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities
and Related Policy Issues, by (name redacted).

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Security Agency (NSA) was nominated to lead the new command while retaining the NSA
directorship.54
Some observers contend that co-locating offensive and defensive cyber capabilities represents the
militarization of cyberspace and that NSA involvement will impinge upon the privacy of civilian
information systems. Others maintain that centralized command will better organize and
standardize DOD cyber practices and operations and that the new command will be responsible
only for defending DOD networks, providing support for civil authorities upon request.
The Administration’s FY2011 budget request for Air Force Operations and Maintenance
reportedly included $139 million to stand up U.S. Cyber Command, an increase of approximately
$105 million above the FY2010 Cyber Command budget that would fund the lease of temporary
facilities and infrastructure at Ft. Meade, MD, where the organization is to be located.55

State Department Role in Security Assistance
Some elements of the FY2011 DOD budget request reflected what the Obama Administration
describes as an effort to “rebalance” the roles of DOD and the State Department in providing
foreign assistance, particularly security assistance. The FY2011 NDAA legislation does not
include two programs previously funded by DOD because the Administration requested these
controversial items in the Department of State budget:
•

The so-called “Section 1207” program to provide crisis reaction funding for
reconstruction, security and stabilization activities, that are up for funding in the
State Department/USAID Complex Crisis Fund ($100 million in the State
Department budget);56 and

•

The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, that is, the PCCF ($1.2 billion
in the State Department Budget).

In FY2012, the State Department also will take responsibility for Iraq police training. The DOD
budget request for FY2011 includes funding for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISSF), used for
Iraqi police training, even though the State Department FY2011 budget request also includes
police support funding for the FY2011 transition year.57 (Funding for the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund (ASFF) to train the Afghan National Police remains in the DOD budget.)58

54

Cyber Command was officially activated by the Secretary of Defense on May 21, 2010, after the Senate confirmed
the nomination of NSA Director Lt. Gen. Keith B.Alexander to head the new command (while retaining his NSA post)
with the rank of General.
55
Officials in the U.S. Strategic Command have cited the figures that appear in the following article by DOD’s inhouse news service, however, CRS is unable to independently verify the actual numbers from DOD budget documents
with the exception of the approximately $105 million requested covering classified aspects of U.S. Cyber Command
standup. See, “Cybersecurity Seizes More Attention, Budget Dollars,” by John J. Kruzel, Armed Forces Press Services,
February 4, 2010, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57871.
56
DOD funding was authorized by Section 1207 of P.L. 109-163 as amended.
57
The Administration’s supplemental appropriations request for FY2010 included $650 million to initiate this transfer.
For further analysis of the FY2010 request, see CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster
Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs, coordinated by (name redacted).
58
For details on ISSF and ASFF funding, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted).

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In its FY2011 budget request, the Department of State stated that the transfer of the Section 1207,
PCCF, and Iraqi police training will “begin to rebalance the roles between DOD and State.”59
Nevertheless, within weeks of the Administration’s release of its FY2011 budget request,
statements by some Pentagon officials seemed to call for DOD to maintain, if not expand, its
current role in security assistance. The Administration is engaged in an extensive interagency
review over the appropriate division of security assistance authorities, which the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) took note of in the report accompanying its version of the FY2011
NDAA (S.Rept. 111-201), stating it “welcomes this review and looks forward to any proposals
for enhancing U.S. security assistance that result from this process.”
In a February 24, 2010, speech, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said that advising and
mentoring foreign security forces is becoming a key military mission. He cited changes that the
armed forces are making in their own organization to facilitate their role in advising, training and
assisting partner nations. His remarks reflect recommendations contained in the February 8, 2010,
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report that called for all four armed services “to strengthen
and institutionalize” their capability to train and advise the security forces of partner nations.
Secretary Gates’ remarks were reinforced by a March 3, 2010, speech by Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who urged that military power should not be considered the
last resort of the state, “but as potentially the best, first option” when combined with diplomacy
and other instruments of national power. Both Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen, as well as the
QDR report, encouraged lawmakers to substantially bolster civilian capabilities to assist foreign
governments in preventing, containing, and recovering from conflict. All three described a new
relationship between defense and diplomacy, which “are no longer discrete choices … but must in
fact, complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations,“ according
to Chairman Mullen.
Consistent with this position, the Administration’s FY2011 DOD budget request leaves under
DOD’s control other controversial security assistance programs, notably the so-called “Section
1206” program to train and equip the security forces of other countries threatened by terrorists,
for which the budget included $489.5 million.60 The DOD budget also contains a funding request
for the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program ($33.3 million), and two new DOD security
assistance programs created in FY2010: the Defense Institution Reform Initiative to promote the
institutional development of foreign defense ministries ($5.7 million); and a related program to
provide legal instruction to foreign military members and civilian government officials ($1.6
million). The FY2011 request also would launch a new program, the Stability Operations
Fellowship Program ($5.0 million), but Congress has turned down this proposal in the past.
While affirming in his February speech that the State Department should maintain the lead,
Secretary Gates described the current national security system as outmoded, with the roles of
defense and diplomacy designed for a different set of threats than those the United States faces
today. According to some defense experts, some Members have considered introducing

59

For additional analysis of the State Department funding request for these programs, see CRS Report R41228, State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2011 Budget and Appropriations, op.cit.
60
DOD funding for this program was authorized by Section 1206 of P.L. 109-163, as amended. For more information
on Section 1206 funding, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction
Capabilities, by (name redacted) .

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legislation based on one Gates’ proposal, a pooled fund for security assistance to which DOD,
State, and USAID contribute, but instead are awaiting the Administration’s own proposal.

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Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to
Date
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454,
H.R. 6523)
The version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act passed May 28 by the House
(H.R. 5136; H.Rept. 111-491) would authorize $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related
activities, which is $2.7 million less than the Administration requested. The version of the bill
reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 4, 2010, (S. 3454; S.Rept. 111-201),
would authorize $725.7 billion, a reduction of $240.7 million from the Administration’s request.
The Senate did not act on this version of bill, partly because of opposition to a provision that
would have repealed a 1993 law (10 U.S.C. 654) that, in effect, had barred from military service
those who are openly homosexual, establishing a policy colloquially referred to as “don’t ask,
don’t tell.” S. 3454 was set aside after the Senate, on December 9, 2010, rejected a motion to
invoke cloture on motion to begin consideration of the bill. The vote was 57-40 in favor of
invoking cloture, which would have required 60 “yea” votes.
Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees subsequently negotiated a
compromise version of the authorization bill (H.R. 6523), which dropped the provision relating to
the “don’t ask; don’t tell” policy which was cleared for the President on December 22, 2010, and
signed by the President on January 7, 2011 (P.L. 111-383).
As is customary, H.R. 6523 authorized lump-sum totals to be appropriated for each several dozen
appropriations accounts in the DOD and Energy Department budgets (Table 11). However,
neither the text of the bill nor the accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement61 included the
customary funding tables allocating those totals among specific programs.
Lump-sum Authorizations With No Program Detail in H.R. 6523
As enacted, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, H.R. 6523, does not include funding
details for specific procurement and R&D programs (in most cases), either in the text of the bill, or in the
accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement (Committee Print HASC No. 5). So, with a handful of exceptions, the final
version of the authorization bill does not authorize specific amounts for any acquisition program.
In following synopsis of action on the FY2011 authorization bill, funding levels requested by the Administration for
some programs and the levels approved for those programs by the House-passed and Senate committee-reported
versions of the authorization bill are included to provide context for other program-related actions incorporated in
the final version of the bill. Authorization levels requested and approved by the House-passed and Senate committeereported versions of the bill are presented in the Appendix.

61
The Joint Explanatory Statement, equivalent to a conference report, was published by the House Armed Services
Committee as a Committee print, “Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committees on Armed Srevices of the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives on H.R. 6523, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011,” December 22, 2010, accessed at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111HPRT63160/pdf/CPRT111HPRT63160.pdf.

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Table 11. FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454, H.R. 6523)
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Administration
request

House-passed
(H.R. 5136)

Senate Armed
Services
Committee
reported
(S. 3454)

H.R. 6523
as enacted
(P.L. 111-383)

Procurement

111,377

111,246

111,751

110,433

Research and Development

76,131

76,473

76,799

76,587

Operation and Maintenance

167,879

167,620

168,224

168,151

Military Personnel

138,541

138,541

138,541

138,541

Other Authorizations

36,197

36,243

36,265

36,153

530,124

530,124

531,579

529,864

Military Construction,

14,209

14,649

14,197

13,653

Family Housing

1,823

1,823

1,823

1,823

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

2,715

2,715

2,715

2,715

0

-441

0

0

Subtotal, Military Construction,
Base Budget

18,747

18,745

18,735

18,191

Total, DOD Base Budget

548,871

548,869

550,314

548,055

Division C: Department of Energy
Nuclear National Security Agency
(NNSA) and Other Authorizations

17,716

17,716

17,721

17,716

Total, National Defense Budget
Function (050), FY2011 Base Budget

566,587

566,585

568,034

565,892

FY2011 Overseas Contingency
Operations, DOD

159,336

159,335

157,648

158,750

Grand Total, FY2011 National
Defense

725,922

725,920

725,682

724,642

Division A: DOD Base Budget
(except Military Construction)

Subtotal, DOD Base Budget
(except MilCon)
Division B: Military Construction
(Base Budget)

General Reductions

Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report on H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2011 H.Rept. 111-491, pp. 4-13; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report on S. 3454, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2011, S.Rept. 111-201, pp. 5-9; House Armed Services Committee, Committee Print
HASC No. 5, “Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Legislative Text and Joint
Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 6523, Public Law 111-383.”

Following are highlights of H.R. 5136 as passed by the House, S. 3454 as reported by the Senate
Armed Services Committee, and the final version of the authorization bill, H.R. 6523 as enacted
(P.L. 111-383).

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Military Personnel Issues (Authorization)62
All three versions of the defense authorization bill would authorize, as requested, a total endstrength of 1.43 million members for the active-duty components of the four armed services. This
is an increase of 7,400 over the end-strength authorized for FY2010.

Military Compensation
The Senate committee bill and the final version authorized a 1.4% increase in military basic pay,
as requested by the Administration.The House-passed bill would have authorized a 1.9% raise
which, the committee said, would have added $380 million to the FY2011 military personnel
costs (Section 601).
The final bill did not include provisions in the House bill would have authorized (1) an increase
in the monthly allowance paid to married personnel who are separated from their families by
deployment, from $250 to $285 and (2) an increase in the monthly payments to personnel whose
assignments subject them to risk of hostile fire or imminent danger, from $225 to $260.
In its report to accompany S. 3454, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess DOD’s use of cash incentives to recruit and
retain highly qualified individuals into hard-to-fill specialties that are essential in wartime. In
particular, it directs GAO to review the process by which DOD identifies specialties for which
such incentives are offered. The Senate committee also directed GAO to assess the efficiency and
accuracy of the process by which DOD determines the size of the housing allowance paid to
service members assigned to any given base who do not occupy government-provided housing.

“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
The final version of the FY2011 defense authorization act did not include a controversial
provision, included in both the House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the bill,
that would have repealed the 1993 legislation barring openly homosexual persons from military
service. Such a provision was enacted as a free-standing law (H.R. 2965, P.L. 111-321).
On May 27, 2011, the House had adopted by a vote of 234-194 an amendment to H.R. 5136 by
Representative Patrick Murphy that would repeal the 1993 legislation barring openly homosexual
persons from military service after (1) the current DOD review has been completed; and (2) the
President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to
Congress that policies and regulations have been prepared that would allow the repeal of the ban
to be implemented in a way that is, “consistent with the standards of military readiness, military
effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the armed forces.” This provision,
which was incorporated in the House bill as Section 536, was substantially the language that had
been agreed to in negotiations between proponents of repeal and Administration officials.
On June 1, 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 16-12 to include in S. 3454 a
substantially identical provision (Section 591). On September 21, 2010, the Senate voted on a
62

For background, see “Military Personnel,” pp. 17, ff. For appropriations action, see “Military Personnel and Medical
Care Issues (Appropriations)”, p. 52.

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motion to invoke cloture on debate over whether to begin consideration of the bill. During the
brief debate preceding that vote, Senator John McCain, the senior Republican member of the
Armed Services Committee, contended that Senate action on the bill was premature since DOD
had not yet concluded its review of the effects of repealing the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. The
motion to invoke cloture, which would have required 60 votes for adoption, failed on a vote of
56-43.

Abortions in Military Medical Facilities
The final version of the bill did not include a provision of the Senate committee version that
would have repealed an existing law that prohibits the use of any military facility to perform
abortion, with certain exceptions. This action would have allowed DOD to return to the policy it
followed in 1993-1995 of allowing military facilities to provide abortions using private funds.63
Although repeal has been advocated on the grounds that such an action would protect U.S.
service members stationed overseas, the Senate committee provision would have applied to all
DOD facilities, foreign and domestic.

Alternative Career Track for Officers
The enacted version of the authorization bill did not include a House-passed provision that would
have authorized a pilot program to assess the value of allowing a certain number of officers to
pursue a more varied range of mid-career educational programs and assignments outside of their
service for the sake of broadening their experience and strategic judgment. To allow for this
richer mixture of experience, participants would have been given leeway to skip or delay some of
the established requirements and deadlines for promotion and might be required to commit to a
longer-than-usual period of service

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41254. Public record. Not legal advice.