# U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41108

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** August 1, 2013
- **Citation:** R41108

## Text

U.S.-China Relations:
An Overview of Policy Issues
(name redacted)
Specialist in Asian Affairs
August 1, 2013

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41108

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues

Summary
The United States relationship with China touches on an exceptionally broad range of issues,
from security, trade, and broader economic issues, to the environment and human rights.
Congress faces important questions about what sort of relationship the United States should have
with China and how the United States should respond to China’s “rise.” After more than 30 years
of fast-paced economic growth, China’s economy is now the second-largest in the world after that
of the United States. With economic success, China has developed significant global strategic
clout. It is also engaged in an ambitious military modernization drive, including development of
extended-range power projection capabilities. At home, it continues to suppress all perceived
challenges to the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.
In previous eras, the rise of new powers has often produced conflict. China’s new leader Xi
Jinping has pressed hard for a U.S. commitment to a “new model of major country relationship”
with the United States that seeks to avoid such an outcome. The Obama Administration has
repeatedly assured Beijing that the United States “welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful
China that plays a greater role in world affairs,” and that the United States does not seek to
prevent China’s re-emergence as a great power. China, for its part, has pledged to follow “the
path of peaceful development.” Washington has wrestled, however, with how to engage China on
issues affecting stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Issues of concern for Washington
include the intentions behind China’s military modernization program, China’s use of its
paramilitary forces and military in disputes with its neighbors over territorial claims in the South
China Sea and East China Sea, and its continuing threat to use force to bring Taiwan under its
control. With U.S.-China military-to-military ties improving but still fragile, Washington has
struggled to convince Beijing that the U.S. policy of rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific is not
intended to contain China. The two countries have cooperated, with mixed results, to address
nuclear proliferation concerns related to Iran and North Korea.
While working with China to revive the global economy, the United States has also wrestled with
how to persuade China to address economic policies the United States sees as denying a level
playing field to U.S. firms trading with and operating in China. High on the U.S. agenda is
commercial cyber espionage that the U.S. government says appears to be directly attributable to
official Chinese actors. Other economic concerns for the United States include China’s apparent
backsliding on its World Trade Organization commitments, its weak protections for intellectual
property rights, and its currency policy. In recent months, the United States has strengthened
cooperation with China on efforts to combat climate change, while continuing to work with China
on the development of clean energy technologies. Human rights remains one of the thorniest
areas of the relationship, with the United States pressing China to ease restrictions on freedom of
speech, internet freedom, religious expression, and ethnic minorities, and China’s leaders
suspicious that the United States’ real goal is to end Communist Party rule.
This report opens with an overview of the U.S.-China relationship, recent developments in the
relationship, Obama Administration policy toward China, and a summary of legislation related to
China in the 113th Congress. The report then reviews major policy issues in the relationship.
Throughout, the report directs the reader to other CRS reports for more detailed information
about individual topics. This report will be updated periodically. A detailed summary of 113th and
112th Congress legislative provisions related to China is provided in appendices.

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U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues

Contents
Overview of U.S.-China Relations .................................................................................................. 1
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 3
June 7-8, 2013: The Presidential Summit in Rancho Mirage, CA ............................................ 3
May 20-June 23, 2013: Reported Leaks Involving Intelligence Collection Programs
and Hong Kong ...................................................................................................................... 3
July 10-11, 2013: The 5th Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue ............ 4
July 30-31, 2013: The 18th Session of the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue ....................... 5
Obama Administration Policy on China .......................................................................................... 5
The Policy of Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific ........................................................... 6
Forging a “New Model of Cooperation” ................................................................................... 7
Bilateral Engagement .............................................................................................................. 10
Multilateral Engagement ......................................................................................................... 11
Public Diplomacy .................................................................................................................... 12
Visa Policy ............................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Assistance to China ......................................................................................................... 13
Congressional Action Related to China in the 113th Congress ....................................................... 14
Select Policy Issues........................................................................................................................ 14
Security Issues ......................................................................................................................... 14
The U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship............................................................ 14
China’s Military Modernization ........................................................................................ 16
Cyber Activities Directed Against U.S. National Defense Programs ................................ 18
China’s Reaction to U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific ................................. 18
Maritime Territorial Disputes ............................................................................................ 20
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes ....................................................................... 23
Managing North Korea...................................................................................................... 24
Curbing Iran’s Nuclear Program ....................................................................................... 26
Resolving the Crisis in Syria ............................................................................................. 27
Taiwan ..................................................................................................................................... 27
Cross-Strait Relations ........................................................................................................ 30
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan ................................................................................................ 31
Economic Issues ...................................................................................................................... 32
Basic Facts About the U.S.-China Economic Relationship............................................... 32
Global Rebalancing and China’s 12th Five-Year Plan ....................................................... 33
Cyber-Enabled Theft of Commercial Information ............................................................ 34
The Bilateral Trade Deficit ................................................................................................ 36
China’s Currency Policy.................................................................................................... 37
China’s Holdings of U.S. Treasuries ................................................................................. 37
China’s Compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) Commitments ................... 38
China and the WTO Government Procurement Agreement .............................................. 39
Negotiations Over a U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) ................................. 39
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States................................................... 40
China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) .............................................. 41
Climate Change and Energy Cooperation ............................................................................... 41
Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Issues ................................................................... 44
The Annual State Department Human Rights Report on China ........................................ 45
U.S.-China Dialogues on Human Rights........................................................................... 46
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Xinjiang ............................................................................................................................. 46
Tibet .................................................................................................................................. 47

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with China over Time ............................................................... 36
Table A-1. 113th Congress: Laws Enacted Related to China ......................................................... 49
Table A-2. 113th Congress: Simple Resolution Related to China Agreed to in the House............. 50
Table A-3. 113th Congress: Simple Resolution Related to China Agreed to in the Senate ............ 51
Table B-1. 112th Congress: Laws Enacted Related to China ......................................................... 52
Table B-2. 112th Congress: Concurrent Resolution Related to China ............................................ 56
Table B-3. 112th Congress: Simple Resolution Related to China Agreed to in the House............. 56
Table B-4. 112th Congress: Simple Resolutions Related to China Agreed to in the Senate........... 57

Appendixes
Appendix A. Laws and Resolutions Related to China in the 113th Congress ................................ 49
Appendix B. Laws and Resolutions Related to China in the 112th Congress ................................ 52
Appendix C. Select Upcoming Events in the U.S.-China Relationship ........................................ 60

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 61

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Overview of U.S.-China Relations
As China’s economic and strategic clout has grown over the last three decades, the United States’
relationship with China has expanded to encompass a broad range of global, regional, and
bilateral issues. With China’s economy now the second largest in the world, Washington seeks
Beijing’s cooperation in rebalancing the global economy and sustaining global growth. It hopes
that China, a fellow permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, will help block
the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and assist in resolving the crisis in Syria. The
United States also seeks to encourage China to contribute to peace and stability in the AsiaPacific, including in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. With the
United States focused on restoring its economic strength, Washington is seeking to achieve a socalled level playing field for U.S. firms that trade with and operate in China; to address cyber
intrusions allegedly originating from China that target commercial and military secrets; and to
stem violations of U.S. intellectual property rights in China. With the United States and China
now the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, Washington seeks Beijing’s cooperation in
addressing climate change. Finally, while engaging with China’s authoritarian Communist
government, the United States also seeks to promote human rights and the rule of law in China,
including in the ethnic minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.
Hanging over the relationship is the larger question of whether, as China grows in economic and
military power, the United States and China can manage their relationship in such a way as to
avoid debilitating rivalry and conflict that have accompanied the rise of new powers in previous
eras. On a visit to the United States in February 2012, Xi Jinping, who became China’s top leader
later in the year, said he had reached a consensus with President Obama and Vice President Biden
that the two countries would establish a “new path of cooperative partnership between major
countries featuring harmonious coexistence, sound interactions and win-win cooperation.”1 Some
principles for this “new model” of U.S.-China relationship are already in place. The Obama
Administration has repeatedly assured China that it “welcomes a strong, prosperous and
successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs,” and China has stated that it “welcomes
the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in
the region.”2 But building a relationship that avoids rivalry and conflict remains a work in
progress. Many observers in both Washington and Beijing note deep mistrust on both sides of the
U.S.-China relationship. They note, too, that even as the United States talks of a “new model of
cooperation” with China, it is simultaneously implementing a strategic rebalancing to the AsiaPacific designed, in part, to reassure Asian nations concerned about the strategic implications of
China’s growing power in the region. (See “Forging a “New Model of Cooperation” and “The
Policy of Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” below.)
Xi and his Chinese leadership colleagues assumed their Communist Party posts at the Party’s 18th
Congress in November 2012, and added other posts, in Xi’s case the state presidency, at the
opening session of the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013. Xi is expected to serve as
president for two five-year terms, until 2023. In their early months in office, Xi and his
colleagues have signaled a strong desire to strengthen the U.S.-China relationship. Xi quickly
1

The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Biden and Chinese Vice President Xi at the State Department
Luncheon,” press release, February 14, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/02/14/
president-obama-s-bilateral-meeting-vice-president-xi-china#transcript.
2
Both statements are contained in Joint Statements between the two governments issued in 2009 and 2011.

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accepted President Obama’s invitation to the June 2013 presidential summit, which offered the
opportunity for extended conversation but none of the pomp and circumstance that Chinese
leaders have often demanded for their visits to the United States. China’s new leaders have shown
greater willingness to pressure North Korea over its nuclear program. They have agreed to enter
into a phase of “substantive” negotiations with the United States over a bilateral investment
treaty, dropping some conditions that had stalled negotiations in the past. With the U.S.
government charging that cyber intrusions into U.S. government and private networks are
attributable to official Chinese actors, they agreed to establish a high-level working group on
cybersecurity. They have also committed China’s military to an ambitious schedule of high-level
exchanges and modest operational cooperation with the United States military. China has agreed
to work with the United States to combat global climate change by reducing the consumption and
production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),3 and signed on to a significant joint statement on
climate change.4
Nonetheless, the U.S.-China relationship remains dogged by long-standing mutual mistrust. That
mistrust stems in part from the two countries’ very different political systems. Many in the United
States are uncomfortable with China’s authoritarian system of government and sometimes brutal
suppression of dissent and see continued Communist Party rule in a post-Cold War world as an
anachronism. Some in China believe that when the United States presses China to ease
restrictions on freedom of speech and internet freedom, improve its treatment of religious
practitioners and ethnic minorities, and respect the legal rights of its citizens, the United States’
real goal is to destabilize China and push the Communist Party from power.
Although the U.S. and Chinese economies are heavily interdependent, with two-way trade of
$536 billion in 2012, the two countries’ different economic models have contributed to mistrust.
The state plays a major role in the Chinese economy and state-owned corporations dominate the
ranks of China’s biggest businesses. Unlike the U.S. economy, China’s economy has also in
recent decades depended heavily on exports and investment, rather than consumption, for growth.
Points of contention in the bilateral economic relationship include the United States’ allegations
of Chinese cyberespionage targeting U.S. corporations and government agencies, the related issue
of China’s inability or unwillingness to prevent violations of foreign intellectual property by
Chinese entities, Chinese policies that appear to discriminate against foreign firms, and China’s
currency policy. For their part, PRC officials have criticized the United States for its high levels
of consumption, long-term debt, expansionary monetary policy, and alleged barriers to Chinese
investment in the United States.
Mistrust is particularly pronounced on security matters. The U.S. government sees China’s
military modernization as aimed, in part, at constraining the U.S. military’s freedom of movement
in Asia and deterring U.S. intervention in the event of Chinese use of force against Taiwan. An
immediate concern is that China’s use of coercion in disputes with its neighbors over territory in
the East China Sea and the South China Sea could undermine the stability upon which the
prosperity of the region depends. For their part, some in China’s government have been unnerved
by the late 2011 announcement of a U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing toward Asia, seeing it as
3
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “United States and China Agree to Work Together on Phase Down of
HFCs,” press release, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/united-states-and-chinaagree-work-together-phase-down-hfcs.
4
Department of State, “Joint U.S.-China Statement on Climate Change,” press release, April 13, 2013,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207465.htm.

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emboldening China’s rivals in territorial disputes and seeking to constrain the activities of the
Chinese military. The most long-standing source of grievance for China on the security side of the
bilateral relationship is U.S. policy toward Taiwan, which many in China see as intended to
thwart the PRC’s unification with Taiwan, a cherished PRC goal.

Recent Developments
June 7-8, 2013: The Presidential Summit in Rancho Mirage, CA
As noted above, President Obama and China’s President Xi met June 7-8, 2013, for an unusual
informal-style summit at the Sunnylands Estate in Rancho Mirage, CA. It was their first face-toface meeting since Xi took office as General Secretary of China’s Communist Party in November
2012 and as State President in March 2013. Without the rapidly arranged summit, the two
presidents would not have been scheduled to meet until the G-20 meeting in St. Petersburg,
Russia, in September 2013. The two men held nearly eight hours of discussions over the two
days, a length of time that allowed them to explore a wide range of topics. For the Obama
Administration, one highlight of the meeting was what then-National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon described as “quite a bit of alignment” in the two leaders’ positions on North Korea’s
nuclear program. After the summit, Donilon also reported that China now “acknowledged” U.S.
concerns about what Donilon termed “cyber-enabled economic theft” by entities in China.5 In
addition, the two sides announced at the summit the agreement to work together and with other
countries to reduce their production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), greenhouse
gases that contribute to climate change.

May 20-June 23, 2013: Reported Leaks Involving Intelligence
Collection Programs and Hong Kong
In an interview with Britain’s Guardian newspaper released on June 8, 2013, Edward Snowden, a
former contractor for the National Security Agency, claimed responsibility for leaks to the paper
of classified information about U.S. government intelligence collection programs. He also
revealed that he was in the Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong, having
flown there from his home in Hawaii on May 20, 2013.6 The United States government
subsequently requested that the Hong Kong government arrest Snowden. According to White
House spokesman Jay Carney, Hong Kong authorities acknowledged receipt of the U.S. request
on June 17, 2013, and then, on June 21, 2013, requested additional information about the U.S.
charges. While the U.S. government was “in the process of responding” to the request for
additional information, and after the United States government had informed Hong Kong that it
5

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon,”
transcript, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/09/press-briefing-national-securityadvisor-tom-donilon.
6
Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras, “Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations,” The Guardian, June 8, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/09/edwardsnowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. For additional information, see Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, June 6, 2013,
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/868-dni-statement-on-recentunauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information.

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had revoked Snowden’s U.S. passport, according to Carney, Hong Kong authorities on June 23,
2013, allowed Snowden to board a commercial flight to Moscow, apparently honoring a
temporary travel pass provided to Snowden by the consul at the Embassy of Ecuador in London.7
Carney indicated that the White House believed the Chinese central government in Beijing was
involved in the decision to allow Snowden to leave Hong Kong. “[W]e are just not buying that
this was a technical decision by a Hong Kong immigration official,” Carney told reporters. “This
was a deliberate choice by the government to release a fugitive despite a valid arrest warrant, and
that decision unquestionably has a negative impact on the U.S.-China relationship.”8 A series of
Administration officials have since professed themselves “disappointed” by China’s handling of
the case.”9 According to Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, “The Hong Kong SAR government
has handled the Snowden case in accordance with law, and its approach is beyond reproach.”10
For more information, see CRS Report R43134, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Marshall Curtis Erwin and (name redacted).

July 10-11, 2013: The 5th Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue
The fifth round of the two countries’ premier dialogue mechanism, the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED), took place in Washington, DC, on July 10 and 11, 2013. It was preceded by
the third meeting of the bilateral Strategic Security Dialogue on July 9, and by the first meeting of
the two countries’ new Cybersecurity Working Group on July 8. This round of the S&ED was
presided over by new co-chairs from each government, reflecting the recent political transitions in
each country. One notable outcome of the dialogue, among many dozens of outcomes reported,
was China’s announced interest in entering into the stage of “substantive” negotiations over a
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States. Outcomes from the 5th Round of the
S&ED are discussed in multiple sections of this report.

7
Rory Carroll, “Ecuador Says It Blundered over Snowden Travel Document: Ecuador’s President Reveals the
Whistleblower Was Granted a Temporary Travel Card at 4am ‘Without Authorisation or Validity’,” The Guardian,
July 2, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/02/ecuador-rafael-correa-snowden-mistake?
8
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Daily Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 6/24/2013,”
transcript, June 24, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/24/daily-briefing-press-secretary-jaycarney-6242013.
9
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, for example, stated, “We’re very disappointed in the—in the Chinese government in
how they’ve handled this. And it could have been handled a different way.” Department of Defense, “Department of
Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey from the Pentagon Briefing Room,” press release, June
26, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5265. Deputy Secretary of State William J.
Burns stated that the United States was “very disappointed with how the authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong handled
the Snowden case, which undermined our effort to build the trust needed to manage difficult issues.” U.S. Department
of State, “The U.S.-China Closing Statements for U.S-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” press release, July 11,
2013, http://www.state.gov/s/d/2013/211850.htm.
10
U.S. Department of State, “The U.S.-China Closing Statements for U.S-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,”
press release, July 11, 2013, http://www.state.gov/s/d/2013/211850.htm.

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July 30-31, 2013: The 18th Session of the U.S.-China
Human Rights Dialogue
The 18th session of the bilateral human rights dialogue opened in Kunming, the capital of China’s
Yunnan Province, on July 30, 2013. Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor Uzra Zeya led the U.S. delegation and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department
of International Organizations and Conferences Director-General Li Junhua led the Chinese
delegation.11
For a list of select upcoming events in the bilateral relationship, see Appendix C.

Obama Administration Policy on China
With some in the United States concerned that a rising China poses challenges to the U.S.
economy and to U.S. global leadership, and with many in China believing that the United States
feels threatened by China’s growing economic and military might, President Obama has declared
that the United States welcomes China’s “peaceful rise.” Meeting with his Chinese counterpart in
June 2013, Obama stated that, “it is very much in the interest of the United States for China to
continue its peaceful rise, because if China is successful, that helps to drive the world economy
and it puts China in the position to work with us as equal partners in dealing with many of the
global challenges that no single nation can address by itself.”12 Building on that belief, the Obama
Administration has sought to expand cooperation with China on a wide range of issues, seizing
opportunities for high-level bilateral meetings and adding to the existing plethora of bilateral
dialogue mechanisms.
At the same time, the Administration’s China policy has focused on ways to ensure that China’s
rise is, indeed, peaceful, and that it does not undermine the stability of the world’s most
economically dynamic region or the integrity of the international system. The Administration has
sought to encourage China to abide by international norms, in part through engagement in
multilateral fora. At the same time, the Administration has stepped up its engagement in Asia as
part of its policy of strategic rebalancing, seeking to “give comfort to countries uncertain about
the impact of China’s rise and provide important balance and leadership,” in the words of a
former senior Obama Administration official.13 The Administration has stated that human rights is
a priority in the relationship, but some observers believe that U.S. government advocacy on rights
issues has taken a back seat to the focus on trying to shape Chinese behavior in the economic,
security, and environmental arenas.
Recognizing that China is more than the Chinese Communist Party and the government
bureaucracy, the Administration has expanded its public diplomacy, particularly its electronic
outreach, in order to engage more directly with the Chinese public. It has also overhauled its visa
11

U.S. Department of State, press release, July 26, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/212477.htm.
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the
People’s Republic of China After Bilateral Meeting,” transcript, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-.
13
Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (The Brookings
Institution, 2012), p. 4.
12

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processing services, to facilitate more travel to the United States by Chinese officials and the
Chinese public alike.

The Policy of Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific
In the fall of 2011, the Obama Administration announced that with the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan winding down, the United States was, in President Obama’s words, “turning our
attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.”14 Then-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton described economics as a major motivation for the rebalancing, writing that, “Open
markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade,
and access to cutting edge technology,” and arguing that, “Our economic recovery at home will
depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer
base in Asia.”15 Another major motivation for the rebalance was the desire to shape the
development of norms and rules in the Asia-Pacific and, although articulated less explicitly, to
shape China’s choices as a rising power, while offering reassurance to China’s neighbors through
intensive U.S. engagement in the region.
The military component of the Administration’s rebalancing strategy was outlined in a January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.16 The Guidance described plans to strengthen U.S. treaty
alliances in the region—with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand—and
to expand cooperation with “emerging partners” in order to “ensure collective capability and
capacity for securing common interests.” The Guidance specifically stated that the United States
was “investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India”—a country with which China
fought a war in 1962 and with which China continues to have territorial disputes and a wary
relationship—“to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of
security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” In a paragraph related to China, the document
pledged that the United States would work with its allies and partners “to promote a rules-based
international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new
powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.” Chinese commentators
quickly noted that the document grouped China and Iran together as countries that “will continue
to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities.... ”
Under the rebalancing policy, the Administration has announced a series of moves including new
troop rotations to Australia, naval deployments in Singapore, and military engagements with the
Philippines; stepped up its engagement with regional multilateral institutions; expanded relations
with such “emerging powers” as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; pursued a new relationship with
Burma; and pushed to expand free trade with Asian nations through the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). Confirming the Administration’s continued commitment to the rebalancing at the start of
President Obama’s second term, then-National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon stated in
November 2012 that the vision for Asia driving the rebalancing strategy was for a region “where
the rise of new powers occurs peacefully, [where] the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and
cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce, where multinational forums help promote shared
14

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” press
release, November 16, 2012.
15
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011.
16
U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington,
DC, January 2012.

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values, and where citizens increasingly have the ability to influence their governments, and
universal human rights are upheld.... ”17
A common criticism of the rebalancing policy is that it may be unnecessarily antagonizing China
while leading U.S. allies and partners—among them the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam—to
believe that they have more U.S. support in their disputes with China than the United States is
actually prepared to offer. Those who subscribe to this criticism believe that the rebalancing is
over-focused on military elements and may be eroding already limited U.S.-China strategic trust
and feeding regional instability, rather than minimizing it.18 Other critics suggest that the military
side of the rebalancing may be insufficiently robust, resulting in a U.S. policy that is the
equivalent of “speak loudly and carry a shrinking stick.”19 (For discussion of China’s reaction to
the rebalance, see below, “China’s Reaction to U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific”.)
For more information, see CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, coordinated by (name redacted).

Forging a “New Model of Cooperation”
According to one scholar, “In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 in which a rising power rivaled a ruling
power, the outcome was war.”20 Mindful of that history, China’s new top leader, President Xi
Jinping, has pressed for a U.S. commitment to a “new model” of U.S.-China relationship that
explicitly seeks to avoid strategic rivalry or conflict between a rising China and this era’s
established power, the United States. The desire for such a commitment appears to reflect
President Xi’s concern that facing myriad challenges at home, including a slowing economy and
dangerously high levels of local government debt, China cannot afford debilitating rivalry with
the United States. Talk of the “new model” relationship has come to dominate Chinese discourse
about the relationship with the United States, with Chinese elites deriving reassurance about U.S.
intentions from reported high-level U.S. agreement on the concept. The “new model” language is
less prominent in U.S. discourse about the relationship with China, with senior U.S. officials
sometimes portraying the concept as a Chinese proposal about which the United States still has
questions, creating a potentially significant gap in expectations.21
17
U.S. National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon, President Obama’s Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to the Region,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 15, 2012, http://csis.org/files/attachments/
121511_Donilon_Statesmens_Forum_TS.pdf.
18
Robert S. Ross, “Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 6
(November/December 2012), pp. 70-82.
19
Bruce Klingner and Dean Cheng, “U.S. Asian Policy: America’s Security Commitment to Asia Needs More Forces,”
The Heritage Foundation, August 7, 2012.
20
Graham T. Allison, “Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap,” The New York Times, June 6,
2013.
21
At a briefing before the opening of the 5th Round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2013, for example,
a senior Administration official, speaking on background, responded to a question about the “new model” relationship
by saying, “We have in a number of senior-level discussions over the last few months heard the Chinese talk about a
new type of relationship.... I think it’s important to ask the Chinese side what they—how they would define this
expression.... [I]f we are going to establish a new type of relationship, what we would like to see is something more
concrete in terms of cooperation.... [W]e understand the Chinese side has an interest in realizing a new type of
relationship. But the key for us is to find a way to do that and to build confidence between our two sides so we can
actually achieve what we hope to.” U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing on the Upcoming Strategic and
Economic Dialogue and U.S.-China Relations,” transcript, July 8, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/
(continued...)

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As noted above, on a visit to the United States as vice president in February 2012, Xi reported
that he had reached “important consensus” with his hosts, President Obama and Vice President
Biden, that the two countries should “open a new path of cooperative partnership between major
countries featuring harmonious coexistence, sound interactions and win-win cooperation.”22
Following his summit meeting with President Obama in June 2013, Xi re-stated the concept,
saying that, “China and the United States must find a new path—one that is different from the
inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past. And that is to say
the two sides must work together to build a new model of major country relationship based on
mutual respect and win-win cooperation.”23 President Obama used language that seemed to echo
Xi’s before the start of the June 2013 summit, when he said that he saw the meeting as an
opportunity to discuss “how we can forge a new model of cooperation between countries based
on mutual interest and mutual respect.”24 Senior Chinese officials described the two presidents as
having “reached an important agreement” at the summit to work toward the new model of
relationship, and asserted that this reported agreement has “charted the course” for the future of
the relationship.25
While both countries share a goal of a relationship that avoids conflict, U.S. officials have so far
offered only general principles as a guide to forging such a relationship. Fielding a question about
the concept during a background briefing before the June 2013 presidential summit, one senior
Obama Administration official suggested that the key would be having “the ability to work well
in some areas even when we’re in competition or have strong differences in other areas.” The
official cited the example of recent “constructive cooperation” with China on North Korea at the
same time as the United States was raising concerns with China about official Chinese actors’
alleged involvement in cyber-enabled theft of U.S. commercial information. Another senior
Administration official, speaking on background during the same briefing, suggested that forging
such a relationship would require having “bilateral mechanisms” in place to allow the two
countries “to deal with the greatest sources of instability and competition that could take this
relationship down the pathway toward rivalry.”26
(...continued)
211606.htm.
22
The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Biden and Chinese Vice President Xi at the State Department
Luncheon,” press release, February 14, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/02/14/
president-obama-s-bilateral-meeting-vice-president-xi-china#transcript. In the months after Xi’s 2012 visit to the
United States, English-language commentaries in official Chinese news outlets often described the relationship that
China sought with the United States as a “new type of great power relations.” China has now dropped that translation,
using the term “major country relationship” instead of “great power relations.” The Chinese phrase, “xin xing da guo
), has remained constant. See, for example, “Building New Type of Great Power Relations
guanxi” (
Between China, US,” People’s Daily Online, November 16, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/
8022064.html.
23
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the
People’s Republic of China After Bilateral Meeting,” transcript, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-.
24
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the
People’s Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting,” transcript, June 7, 2013.
25
See remarks by Vice Premier Wang Yang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi, in U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint Opening Session,” transcript, July 10, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2013/07/211773.htm.
26
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on
the President’s Meetings with President Xi Jinping of China,” transcript, June 4, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/06/04/background-conference-call-senior-administration-officials-presidents-me.

新型大国关系

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For China, the new model of relationship involves more specific commitments. According to
China’s top diplomat, State Councilor Yang Jiechi, at the June 2013 summit, President Xi
summed up the meaning of the new model of relationship for President Obama in three sentences:
“seek no conflicts and no confrontation,” “have respect for each other,” and “conduct cooperation
for win-win results.” Yang explained that “have respect for each other” meant that the two
countries should “respect each other’s social system and development road, respect each other’s
core interests and significant concerns, and make common progress through seeking common
points while reserving differences.”27
Acquiescing to China’s demand for “respect” on those terms would require a major reorientation
of U.S. policy. China routinely uses the language of “social system and development road” to
refer to Chinese Communist Party rule. China’s demand for such respect would thus need to be
reconciled with the United States’ longstanding commitment to democracy promotion and
universal human rights. China has defined its “core interests,” meanwhile, to include not just
maintaining Communist Party rule, but also safeguarding China’s “sovereignty and security,
territorial integrity, and national unity,” and sustaining China’s economic and social
development.28 Sovereignty, China has made clear, refers not just to the People’s Republic of
China’s sovereignty over the mainland China, but also the PRC’s claims to sovereignty over
Taiwan and disputed maritime territories in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. China’s
quest for U.S. respect for its core interests thus potentially challenges:
•

U.S. commitments to Taiwan as described in the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 968);

•

the U.S. security treaty commitment to ally Japan over islets in the East China
Sea whose sovereignty is disputed among Japan, China, and Taiwan;

•

U.S. support for treaty ally the Philippines, which is involved in territorial
disputes with China; and,

•

in the case of Chinese use of force to assert its sovereignty claims, the U.S.
“national interest” in peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of
navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea, where
China is involved in territorial disputes with multiple countries.

Finally, China frequently uses the term “national unity” in the context of Tibetan areas of China
and the Xinjiang region in China’s northwest. In seeking respect for China’s core interests,
including safeguarding national unity, China may hope, therefore, that the U.S. government will
refrain from speaking out about conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and foreswear meetings with
Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, whom China accuses of advocating for Tibetan
independence.
Notably, although China has proposed that the United States and China respect each other’s “core
interests,” the United States has never explicitly defined its “core interests,” raising questions
about what China considers them to be.
27
Yang Jiechi’s Remarks on the Results of the Presidential Meeting between Xi Jinping and Obama at the Annenberg
Estate, press release, June 9, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1049263.shtml.
28

Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development,” Review Volume on “Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee’s Suggestions on Setting the Twelfth Five Year Plan for the National Economy and Social
Development,” December 6, 2010.

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Bilateral Engagement
The pace of U.S.-China bilateral interaction at the most senior level has increased dramatically in
recent years. In the 30 years from 1979, the year the United States and China established
diplomatic relations, until the Obama Administration took office in January 2009, the top leaders
of the United States and China met 24 times. In the first term of the Obama Administration alone,
President Obama and his then-counterpart, Chinese President Hu Jintao, met 12 times. The
greater frequency of meetings is related in large part to expanded opportunities to meet on the
sidelines of multilateral meetings. At one time, the only multilateral meetings regularly attended
by the leaders of both countries were annual meetings of the United Nations General Assembly
and, starting in 1993, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meetings. Today, the
two countries’ leaders also meet at G-20 summits, nuclear security summits, and since 2012, at
East Asia Summits. Exchanges of visits also happen with more frequency now than in the past.
President Obama visited China in his first year in office, in 2009, and President Hu made a state
visit to the United States in January 2011. Their vice presidents, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping,
exchanged visits in 2011 and 2012. The first meeting between President Obama and Xi Jinping
since Xi became China’s President in March 2013 took place June 7-8, 2013, in California.
A hallmark of the U.S.-China relationship under the Obama Administration has been the
proliferation of bilateral dialogue mechanisms, building on an already robust set of dialogues
inherited from the George W. Bush Administration. The U.S. government has not published a
comprehensive list, but the Chinese government and state media refer to China and the United
States being involved in “over 90” bilateral dialogue and consultation mechanisms.29 The Obama
Administration argues that the dialogues allow U.S. and Chinese officials to understand each
other’s positions better on a wide range of issues, a first step to finding areas of common interest
and managing differences. Dialogue on strategic issues remains limited, however, with U.S.
officials sometimes complaining that even at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the
Soviet Union had closer consultation on strategic issues, such as nuclear weapons policy, than the
United States and China do now.
The relationship’s highest-profile regularly scheduled dialogue is the annual Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED), created in 2009 by combining two previously existing dialogues.30
On the U.S. side, the Secretary of State leads the strategic track of the dialogue and the Secretary
of the Treasury leads the economic track. In 2011 the two countries inaugurated a Strategic
Security Dialogue (SSD) under the S&ED, co-chaired by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and
the Chinese Executive Vice Foreign Minister, and including the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and a Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff. A first ever “informal
round” of the SSD is scheduled for later in 2013. Other high-profile dialogues include the U.S.China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE), established in 2010, and three
dialogues established before President Obama took office: the Joint Commission on Commerce
and Trade (JCCT), the Ten-Year Framework on Energy and Environment Cooperation, and
the Joint Committee on Environmental Cooperation.31 To broaden interaction to the sub-national
29

Yang Jiechi’s Remarks on the Results of the Presidential Meeting between Xi Jinping and Obama at the Annenberg
Estate, press release, June 9, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1049263.shtml.
30
The S&ED was created by combining the State Department’s U.S.-China Senior Dialogue (known in China as the
China-U.S. Strategic Dialogue), established in 2005, and the Treasury Department’s Strategic Economic Dialogue,
created in 2006.
31
See JCCT factsheet at http://www.export.gov/china/policyadd/jcct.asp?dName=policyadd.

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level, the U.S. and Chinese governments in 2011 instituted a U.S.-China Governors Forum,
intended to help deepen relationships between U.S. governors and Chinese provincial officials,32
and an Initiative on City-Level Economic Cooperation, bringing together U.S. mayors and
Chinese mayors and Party Secretaries. A separate program for mayors, initiated in 2010 by the
U.S. Department of Energy and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, brings together
mayors from the two countries “to examine best practices in eco-city development.”33

Multilateral Engagement
As a means of encouraging China to adhere to international norms and “assume responsibilities
commensurate with its growing global impact and its national capabilities,” in the words of
President Obama’s then-National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon,34 the Obama Administration
has consciously sought to engage with China in multilateral settings. The United States and China
are fellow permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and have worked together
successfully in that setting to pass sanctions targeting North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs,
although China has also blocked some proposed Security Council actions sought by the United
States, most notably a series of actions related to Syria. The Obama Administration elevated the
profile of the G-20 grouping of major economies in part to have a vibrant multilateral forum for
engaging with China on economic issues. In addition, the United States has sought to resolve
trade disputes with China through the rules-based mechanisms of the World Trade Organization,
and engaged with China on climate change through meetings of parties to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change. Washington has also urged Beijing to follow norms on aid,
export credit finance, and overseas investment established by the Paris-based Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), although China is not an OECD member, and
to accept principles related to freedom of navigation contained in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), although the United States itself has not ratified the treaty.35
In Asia, the United States has prioritized its own attendance at meetings of regional multilateral
groups, including the East Asia Summit, which the United States joined in 2011, in part to be able
to engage China in those settings. The advantage of the multilateral settings of regional
institutions, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opined in 2011, is that, “responsible behavior
is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who
take counterproductive actions to peace, stability, and prosperity.”36

32

Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, “U.S.-China Governors Forum Convenes in Utah,” press release,
July 15, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168613.htm.
33
U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,” press
release, July 12, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm.
34
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared
for Delivery: President Obama’s Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to Asia,” November 15, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepareddelivery.
35
Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, Brookings Institution
Press, 2012, p. 70.
36
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “A Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century,” Inaugural
Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture, Washington, DC, January 14, 2011.

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Public Diplomacy
The U.S. Department of State operates multiple Chinese-language blogs and microblogs on
Chinese platforms in an effort to circumvent often heavy-handed Chinese censorship of the
traditional news media and reach out directly to the Chinese public with messages about U.S.
policy. The Embassy’s flagship microblogs each have nearly 700,000 registered followers.37
When followers of U.S. government blogs re-post U.S. blog posts for their own followers, the
U.S. government is sometimes able to reach directly many millions of Chinese who might not
otherwise be exposed to U.S. government messages. That said, although the range of permitted
expression on Chinese social media is broader than in traditional media, China-based microblog
accounts are still subject to Chinese censorship. In July 2012, a Chinese microblog service
disabled a popular microblog operated by the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai, presumably
because government censors felt uncomfortable with the material the Consulate General was
posting.38
The State Department also operates Chinese-language accounts on the online social networking
service Twitter, which is based in the United States and does not censor content. The U.S.
government posts on Twitter sensitive information that is often censored on Chinese social media,
such as U.S. government speeches related to human rights and Internet freedom. The Chinese
government’s policy of blocking access to Twitter from inside China reduces the service’s reach
in the country, but technologically savvy Chinese are able to use virtual private networks to evade
the blocking technologies. The Chinese-language Twitter account operated by the State
Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), @meiguocankao, currently has
just over 38,000 followers, a small fraction of the followers of the U.S. Embassy microblogs in
China. A second account operated by the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs,
@USA_Zhongwen, has just 2,440 followers.
Of longer standing are U.S. government efforts to reach out to the Chinese public through
programming produced by Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the Voice of America (VOA). Both are
overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent entity responsible for
all U.S. government and government-sponsored non-military international broadcasting. RFA’s
stated mission is “to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose
governments prohibit access to a free press.”39 The Chinese government routinely seeks to block
RFA programming from reaching the Chinese public, has not allowed RFA to open a permanent
office in China, and denies RFA journalists temporary visas to report in China.40 VOA’s mandate
is to “present a balanced and comprehensive view of significant American thought and
institutions” and “clearly present the policies of the United States.”41 VOA has had a permanent
37

When accessed on July 29, 2013, the Embassy’s Sina microblog, http://weibo.com/usembassy, had 699,750
followers, while the Embassy’s Tencent microblog, http://e.t.qq.com/USEmbassy, had 667,047 followers.
38
William Gallo, “In Shanghai, US Consulate’s Microblog Disappears,” Voice of America, July 13, 2012.
39
Broadcasting Board of Governors, “RFA President Responds to Press Freedom Findings,” press release, May 3,
2012, http://www.bbg.gov/press-release/rfa-president-responds-to-freedom-of-the-press-findings/.
40
The Heritage Foundation, “H.R. 2899 ‘Chinese Media Reciprocity Act of 2011,’” Testimony before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration Enforcement, June 20, 2012, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
Hearings%202012/Zahn%2006202012.pdf. See also John Eggerton, “Radio Free Asia Voice Denied Chinese Visa:
Dhondup Gonzar Has Not Received Entry Permit One Day Before Opening Ceremonies of 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games,” Broadcasting & Cable, August 7, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/97412Radio_Free_Asia_Voice_Denied_Chinese_Visa.php.
41
Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, Fact Sheet, http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/voa/.

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office in China since the 1980s, although the Chinese government restricts the number of
accredited journalists VOA is permitted to base in China, allowing only one reporter for the VOA
English-language service, known as Central News, and one reporter for the Chinese service.42 The
Chinese government also routinely seeks to block VOA transmissions. Through appropriations,
Congress has supported the BBG’s efforts to provide Chinese and other audiences whose home
media are subject to censorship with means of accessing the blocked websites of BBG
broadcasters through proxy servers and other tools.
For more information about the Internet in China, see CRS Report R42601, China, Internet
Freedom, and U.S. Policy, coordinated by (name redacted), and CRS Report R41007,
Understanding China’s Political System, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

Visa Policy
In January 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order requiring the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security, in consultation with others, to develop a plan to streamline visa and
foreign visitor processing worldwide, “in order to create jobs and spur economic growth in the
United States, while continuing to protect our national security.” The Executive Order set targets
of increasing non-immigrant visa processing capacity in China and Brazil by 40% over the
subsequent year, and of reducing wait times for visa interviews to within three weeks of receipt of
application in most cases.43 Meeting these goals was a major 2012 focus for the U.S. mission in
China. In FY2012, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and U.S. consulates in four other Chinese cities
jointly issued 1.2 million non-immigrant visas, an increase of 36% over FY2011.44 China, Brazil,
and Mexico are the only U.S. missions that currently process more than 1 million non-immigrant
visas per year. In addition, in an August 2012 report to the White House, the State Department
reported that it had succeeded in reducing the average wait time for a visa interview in China to
under 10 days, despite the large increase in visa applications.45 The Commerce Department has
predicted a 198% increase in Chinese visitors from 2012 levels by 2016.46

U.S. Assistance to China
The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development say they engage China
“primarily as a development partner with the resources to invest in its own future.” U.S.
assistance is designed to “protect and promote U.S. national interests and values,” particularly in
the areas of promoting rule of law, strengthening the judiciary, improving health, and helping
42

The Heritage Foundation, “H.R. 2899 ‘Chinese Media Reciprocity Act of 2011,’” Testimony before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration Enforcement, June 20, 2012.
43
Executive Order 13597, “Establishing Visa and Foreign Visitor Processing Goals and the Task Force on Travel and
Competitiveness,” 77 Federal Register 3473, January 24, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-24/pdf/
2012-1568.pdf.
44
U.S. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, Table XIX: Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by Issuing Office
(Including Border Crossing Cards) Fiscal Years 2003-2012, Report of the Visa Office 2012,
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY12AnnualReport-TableXIX.pdf.
45
Department of State and Department of Homeland Security, Executive Order 13597: Improvements to Visa
Processing and Foreign Visitor Processing 180-Day Progress Report, August 2012.
46
Department of State and Department of Homeland Security, Executive Order 13597: Improvements to Visa
Processing and Foreign Visitor Processing 180-Day Progress Report, August 2012.

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Tibetan communities.47 Appropriations for assistance to China peaked in FY2010 at $46.9
million. FY2012 funding was $28.3 million, or 60% of the 2010 level. Most direct recipients of
State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) grants have been
U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and universities.
See CRS Report RS22663, U.S. Assistance Programs in China, by (name redacted).

Congressional Action Related to China in the
113th Congress
The 113th Congress has so far passed two laws with provisions related to China, P.L. 113-6, the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, and P.L. 113-17, directing the
Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the International
Civil Aviation Organization Assembly. On February 15, 2013, the House agreed to a simple
resolution on North Korea (H.Res. 65) that includes provisions related to China. On July 29,
2013, the Senate agreed to a simple resolution reaffirming strong U.S. support for the peaceful
resolution of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime
domains (S.Res. 167), including multiple references to China. Summaries of all legislation on
China enacted or agreed to in the 113th and 112th Congresses are included as appendices to this
report. (See Appendix A and Appendix B.)

Select Policy Issues
Congress faces challenges in exercising oversight over the United States’ relationship with a
China that is rapidly growing in economic, military, and geopolitical power. Selected policy
issues for Congress related to the bilateral relationship are summarized in the sections below,
starting with security issues and Taiwan, followed by economic issues, climate change and
renewable energy cooperation, and human rights issues.

Security Issues
The U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship
Since coming into office, the Obama Administration has repeatedly called for a stronger militaryto-military relationship with China. “Leaving the military dimension of our dialogue
underdeveloped on both sides causes us to run unnecessary risk,” Vice President Joe Biden
argued in July 2013, observing that China’s military is expanding its presence in Asia at the same
time that the United Sates is implementing its rebalancing to the Asian Pacific, bringing the two

47
U.S. Department of State, The Foreign Assistance Dashboard, http://www.foreignassistance.gov. Note that totals on
the site do not currently include State Department Human Rights and Democracy Fund spending in China or Peace
Corps programs.

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militaries into greater proximity. Dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation between the two
militaries must expand, he said, because “We have to know what each other are doing.”48
A 2009 U.S.-China joint statement issued in the name of President Obama and his counterpart at
the time, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao, pledged the two countries to “take concrete steps to
advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations in the future.” A 2011 joint statement
similarly pledged the two governments to pursue “a healthy, stable, and reliable military-tomilitary relationship.” Moves to strengthen the military-to-military relationship did not begin to
gain momentum until after the 2011 joint statement, however, as the transition from Hu Jintao to
Xi Jinping as China’s top leader began unfolding. Some analysts believe an unusual visit to the
Pentagon accorded to Xi in February 2012, when he visited the United States as Vice President,
may have helped win his support for more regular exchanges, and that his strong relationship with
the Chinese military has allowed him to bring the Chinese military along with him.
Operational cooperation between the two militaries remains extremely limited, but in remarks in
Singapore in June 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel characterized dialogue between the two
militaries as “steadily improving.”49 Among the positive developments in the relationship that he
cited in his remarks were the following.
•

Xi’s February 2012 Pentagon visit and visits to China by the chief of the Pacific
Command Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III (July 2012); then-Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta (September 2012); and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Martin Dempsey (April 2013);

•

China’s first ever participation as an observer of the U.S.-Philippine Balikatan
joint military exercise in April 2013;

•

A first-ever U.S.-China joint anti-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden in
September 2012;

•

A first-ever U.S. invitation to China to participate in the United States’ largest
military exercises in the Pacific, the Rim of the Pacific or RIMPAC exercise, in
the summer of 2014, and China’s April 2013 acceptance of the invitation;

•

An agreement for the United States and China to co-host a Pacific Army Chiefs
Conference for the first time.

Since then, the two governments have agreed that the United States will host a visit from China’s
Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan in August 2013,50 and from China’s Naval
Commander Wu Shengli in September 2013, and that Hagel will visit China in 2014.51 In June
2013, the two militaries both participated in a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief military
exercise under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’

48
U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint Opening Session,” press release, July
9, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211773.htm.
49
Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the IISS Asia Security Summit, Shangri-La Hotel,
Singapore,” June 1, 2013.
50
U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary Hagel’s Meeting with Chinese State Councilor Yang,” press
release, July 12, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16151.
51
U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,” press
release, July 12, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm.

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Meeting Plus.52 In July 2013, the two countries expanded the agenda of a meeting of the civilianmilitary Strategic Security Dialogue to include two new topics: missile defense and nuclear
policy. The same SSD meeting produced an agreement “to actively explore a notification
mechanism for major military activities” and to continue to discuss rules of the road for air and
maritime activities.”53
Further development of the military-to-military relationship is subject to restrictions imposed by
Congress. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65)
bars exchanges or contacts with China’s military that include “inappropriate exposure” to a range
of subjects, including surveillance and reconnaissance operations and arms sales.54 The provision
remains a major irritant in the bilateral relationship, with Chinese authorities arguing that it
signals U.S. ill will. For its part, China remains wary that closer ties will expose vulnerabilities in
its weaker force. It has also been suspicious of the intentions behind the U.S. policy of
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.
For more information, see CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for
Congress, by (name redacted).

China’s Military Modernization
China’s military modernization has been fueled by two decades of steadily increasing military
spending. According to the DOD report to Congress, China’s officially disclosed military budget
increased an average of 9.7% annually in inflation-adjusted terms over the decade from 2003 to
2012. At $114 billion, China’s officially announced budget for 2013 represents an increase of
10.7% over 2012. The Pentagon believes China’s actual military spending is higher than the
officially disclosed figures, with the report to Congress estimating that China’s military spending
for 2012 was in the range of $135 billion to $215 billion.
The United States has long been concerned about the intentions behind China’s military
modernization. In the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance that outlined the military
component of the U.S. rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific, for example, the Department of
Defense (DOD) stated that, “The growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by
greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.”55 China
has repeatedly offered assurances that it is committed to peace and to working within the existing
52

Martin Sieff, “ASEAN Defense Ministers Host Disaster Relief, Military Medicine Exercise,” Asia Pacific Defense
Forum, June 26, 2013, pp. http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/06/28/asean-disasterrelief.
53
U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue V Strategic Track Select Outcomes,” fact
sheet, July 12, 2013.
54
The restrictions are contained in Section 1201 of the NDAA for FY2000. They bar military-to-military exchanges or
contacts that include “inappropriate exposure” to 12 operational areas: “1.) Force projection operations; 2.) Nuclear
operations; 3.) Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations; 4.) Advanced logistical operations; 5.) Chemical
and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction; 6.) Surveillance and
reconnaissance operations; 7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare;
8.) Military space operations; 9.) Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces; 10.) Arms sales or military-related
technology transfers; 11.) Release of classified or restricted information; 12.) Access to a Department of Defense
laboratory.”
55
U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington,
DC, January 2012.

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international system, not challenging it. Chinese officials have also stated that China has neither
the desire nor the capability to challenge the United States position in Asia. In comments
following his summit meeting with President Obama in June 2013, President Xi Jinping pledged
that, “China will be firmly committed to the path of peaceful development.” He also reiterated
China’s acceptance of the United States presence in Asia, observing, “When I visited the United
States last year, I stated that the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries
of China and the United States. I still believe so.”56 U.S. officials, however, have pressed China to
move beyond such broad assurances to more transparency about its decisions related to
modernization of the Chinese military.
In its 2013 report to Congress on military developments involving the PRC, the Department of
Defense (DOD) stated that it believed China’s military modernization is “designed to improve the
capacity of [China’s] armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional
military conflict.”57 DOD assessed that the “principal focus and primary driver of China’s
military investment” is preparing for a contingency involving Taiwan, over which the PRC claims
sovereignty. The DOD report observed, though, that China’s military modernization also appears
increasingly focused on developing capabilities for extended-range power projection and
operations in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare, as well as other
missions, including anti-piracy missions, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, and regional military operations.
Of particular concern to the U.S. government are Chinese capabilities that appear aimed at
allowing China to deter intervention by American forces in a conflict in the Western Pacific. The
United States describes such capabilities as being for “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD)
missions; Chinese refers to such missions as “counter-intervention operations.” Among Chinese
weapons programs of concern to the United States is China’s “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic
missile (ASBM) known as the DF-21D. The Pentagon report described the DF-21D as giving the
PLA “the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific
Ocean.” China has also test flown an indigenously produced fifth generation stealth fighter
aircraft prototype, the J-20, and appears to be developing a second advanced stealth aircraft,
tentatively identified as the J-31. The DOD report stated that such planes are intended to
strengthen China’s “ability to strike regional airbases and facilities,” presumably including U.S.
military bases in Asia. The military development that has stirred the greatest national pride in
China is the September 2012 commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, although it has so far
provided China with more symbolic than real military power. Acquired from Ukraine in 1998, it
was previously known as the Varyag and is now known as the Liaoning. The DOD report to
Congress predicted that the carrier would reach operational effectiveness “in three to four years”
and that, “China will probably build several aircraft carriers over the next 15 years.”
For more information, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

56
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the
People’s Republic of China After Bilateral Meeting,” transcript, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-.
57
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, May 7, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.

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Cyber Activities Directed Against U.S. National Defense Programs
In DOD’s 2013 annual report to Congress on military developments involving China, the U.S.
government for the first time stated that some cyber-intrusions targeting U.S. government and
other computer systems, “appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and
military.” The report went on to accuse China of using “computer network exploitation (CNE)”
capabilities to collect intelligence from government and sectors of the U.S. economy that support
U.S. national defense programs. The report did not acknowledge what damage might have been
caused by such intrusions.58 Responding to the allegations in the report, a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesperson told reporters, “We resolutely oppose hacking attacks of any form and
stand ready to have calm and constructive dialogue with the U.S. on the cyber security issue.
Unwarranted accusations and hyping will do nothing but undermine our joint efforts for dialogue
and poison the atmosphere.”59
Although DOD has so far accused China only of ex-filtrating information, it has raised concern
about the threat of computer network attacks from China, noting that “the accesses and skills”
required for cyber intrusions are closely related to those needed for attacks.60
For more information about cybersecurity, see “Cyber-Enabled Theft of Commercial
Information” below.

China’s Reaction to U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific
While concerns about cyber security have rapidly emerged as a top concern for the United States
in the U.S.-China relationship, the U.S. strategic rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is among
China’s top concerns. During a trip to the United States in February 2012, shortly after the
rebalancing strategy was officially launched, President Xi Jinping, then China’s Vice President,
responded with the statement, “China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in
promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, we hope the
United States will respect the interests and concerns of China and other countries in this
region.”61 Since then, Chinese officials have repeatedly raised questions about whether the U.S.

58
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, May 7, 2013, p. 36, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf. A
confidential 2013 Defense Science Board document reportedly alleged, however, that 29 DOD system designs,
including the designs for ballistic missile defense systems, and many other defense technologies had been
“compromised via cyber exploitation.” Officials with knowledge of the breaches told The Washington Post, “the vast
majority [of the exploitations] were part of a widening Chinese campaign of espionage against U.S. defense contractors
and government agencies.” Ellen Nakashima, “Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs Compromised
by Chinese Cyberspies,” Washington Post, May 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
confidential-report-lists-us-weapons-system-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/a42c3e1c-c2dd11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html.
59
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s
Regular Press Conference on May 7, 2013,” transcript, May 13, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/
t1038551.shtml.
60
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, May 7, 2013, p. 36, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
61
Vice President Xi Jinping, “Remarks by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping at a Luncheon Co-hosted by the U.S.China Business Council and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,” Federal News Service, February 15,
2012.

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rebalancing is, in fact, contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity, and whether, despite U.S.
assurances to the contrary, it is in fact intended to “contain” China.
July 2012, China’s Vice Foreign Minister with responsibility for the United States, who is now
China’s Ambassador to the United States, co-authored an article with a fellow diplomat raising
questions about the United States’ “true motive” in rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific and demanding
greater reassurance about U.S. intentions. “The United States must face the issue and convince
China, other countries in the region and the international community that there is no gap between
its policy statements on China and its true intentions,” the diplomats wrote. They identified as
particular areas of concern for China the U.S. effort to strengthen the U.S. alliance system in
Asia, U.S. plans to advance ballistic missile defense in the region, the U.S. “air-sea battle
concept”—an effort to increase the joint operating effectiveness of U.S. naval and air units,
particularly in “anti-access” environments, such as those China has allegedly sought to create;
and alleged U.S. intervention in disputes between China and its neighbors.62
That many in China still do not feel reassured was made plain at a security summit in Singapore
in June 2013, when a senior Chinese PLA scholar told Secretary of Defense Hagel that the
rebalance has been interpreted in China as an “attempt to contain China’s rising influence and to
offset the increasing military capabilities of the Chinese PLA.” U.S. government officials “have
on several occasions clarified that the rebalance is not against China,” she noted. “However,
China is not convinced.” The PLA scholar went on to question Hagel on apparent tensions
between the United States’ stated desire to build a more positive relationship with China, and U.S.
plans to step up military deployments in Asia and reassure U.S. allies.63
The most common charge from Chinese critics is that the United States’ higher profile in Asia,
including its deeper engagement with multilateral groupings such as ASEAN and its
strengthening of its military alliances, is destabilizing the region by emboldening countries with
which China has territorial disputes, including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, to press their
claims more assertively. Chinese commentators have been critical, too, of the flagship economic
initiative of the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).64 The TPP has been
characterized in the Chinese media as an initiative that deliberately excludes China, that is
intended to thwart regional economic integration, and that challenges ASEAN’s leadership role in
promoting trade and investment liberalization in the region. Chinese views of the TPP may be
softening, however. At the Obama-Xi summit in June 2013, President Obama agreed to a request
from President Xi for briefings on U.S. progress toward a TPP agreement,65 and at the Strategic
and Economic Dialogue meeting in July, China agreed to move into the “substantive” phase of
62
Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, “China-US Relations in China’s Overall Diplomacy in the New Era—On China and
US Working Together to Build a New-Type Relationship Between Major Countries,” China International Strategy
Review 2012, July 20, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t953682.htm
63
The PLA scholar was Major Gen. Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center for China-America Defense Relations at the
PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences. Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the IISS Asia Security
Summit, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore,” June 1, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
5251.
64
As discussed in other parts of this memorandum, formal U.S. participation in the proposed TPP was initiated under
the Bush Administration. Subsequently, it has become an important part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing
toward the Asia-Pacific.
65
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon,”
transcript, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/09/press-briefing-national-securityadvisor-tom-donilon.

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negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty that would, if the U.S. has its way, mirror the
investment provisions of the TPP.
For more information, see CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, coordinated by (name redacted) and CRS Report
R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, by
(name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).

Maritime Territorial Disputes
China has long placed a high priority on sovereignty and territorial integrity, a priority reflected in
its decades-long effort to bring Taiwan under its control. The same priority has propelled China
into a series of disputes with its neighbors over maritime territory in the South China Sea and
East China Sea. Beijing’s increasing willingness to bring its maritime power and growing
economic clout to bear on those disputes has raised concerns in Asia and among policymakers in
the United States about whether China’s continued rise will be as peaceful as China has long
promised. Two of China’s rival claimants, Japan and the Philippines, are U.S. treaty allies, and the
United States has specifically acknowledged that the U.S. security treaty with Japan covers all
areas under Japanese administration, including islands that are currently at the center of a
territorial dispute between Japan and China.
On July 29, 2013, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 167), reaffirming strong U.S. support for
the peaceful resolution of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific
maritime domains. China formally complained to the U.S. government about the resolution and a
Chinese Foreign Ministry statement denounced it as “unjustifiably blaming China and sending the
wrong message.”66 (For details of the resolution, see Appendix A.)
For more information, see CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia:
Issues for Congress , by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted) and CRS Report
R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

South China Sea
Tensions among rival claimants to territory in the South China Sea (SCS) have emerged as a
major U.S. security concern in the Asia Pacific. China has extensive, though imprecise, claims to
large parts of the SCS, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits as well as fisheries, and
through which a major portion of world’s trade passes. China physically controls the Paracel
Islands and seven reefs among the Spratly Islands.67 Territory claimed by China is also claimed in
part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and in entirety by Taiwan, with the
fiercest territorial disputes being those between China and Vietnam and China and the
Philippines. The SCS is bordered by a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, and is a key strategic
waterway for the U.S. Navy.
66

Ben Blanchard, “China Condemns U.S. Senate over Sea Dispute Resolution,” Reuters, August 1, 2013.
The seven Spratly Islands reefs that China controls are Cuarteron Reef (known in China as Huayang Jiao), Fiery
Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao), Gaven Reef (Nanxun Jiao), Hugh Reef (Dongmen Jiao), Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao),
Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao), and Subi Reef (Zhubi Jiao).
67

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In July 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explicitly declared a U.S. “national interest”
in maintaining freedom of navigation in the SCS. An August 2012 State Department statement
further defined that national interest as being in “the maintenance of peace and stability, respect
for international law, freedom of navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce” in the sea. The
statement noted that United States does not take a position on the competing sovereignty claims,
but believes that, “the nations of the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to
resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats, and without the use of
force.”68 China’s Foreign Minister declared Secretary Clinton’s comments to have been “in effect
an attack on China.”69
The territorial disputes at the heart of the tensions are decades, or even centuries, old, but
observers have noted a sharp uptick in incidents at sea since 2005-2006, from claimants seeking
to assert sovereignty or exploit offshore hydrocarbons and fishery resources. A major incident
occurred in 2012 at Scarborough Shoal, known in China as Huangyan Dao, a set of landmasses
disputed between China and the Philippines. Chinese vessels confronted a Philippine Naval
vessel that had interdicted Chinese fishing boats. After a weeks-long standoff, Philippine vessels
left the area, leaving China in control of an area it had not previously held. This development was
among several that prompted the August 2012 State Department statement opposing coercion,
threats and the use of force. China and the Philippines have been facing off since May 2013 over
a remote coral reef, the Second Thomas Shoal, known in China as Ren’ai Reef.
The United States has supported efforts by China’s rival claimants to place the issue of the
tensions in the South China Sea on the discussion agenda for regional meetings. China, which
argues that the disputes are best handled among the rival claimants alone, has resisted what it
calls U.S. efforts to “internationalize” the disputes. The United States has also publicly urged the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to move forward with long-stalled
negotiations over the text of a binding code of conduct that would govern behavior in the SCS,
and would include specific dispute-resolution mechanisms. ASEAN and China announced on
June 30, 2013 they will begin official consultations on a code of conduct at a meeting in China in
September 2013.70

East China Sea
In the East China Sea, China is involved in a territorial dispute with Japan over the sovereignty of
uninhabited islets known in Japan as the Senkakus and in China as the Diaoyu Dao. The islets are
also claimed by Taiwan, which refers to them as the Diaoyutai. The United States does not take a
position on the sovereignty dispute, but has a strong interest in the issue because the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers areas under Japanese administration, and the
United States government has repeatedly confirmed that such areas include the Senkakus/Diaoyu
Islets.

68

U.S. Department of State, “Patrick Ventrell, Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Office of Press Relations: Statement on
the South China Sea,” August 3, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm.
69
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the
South China Sea Issue, Statement posted on website, July 25, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t719460.htm.
70
“China, ASEAN to Hold Meetings on South China Sea in September,” Xinhua News Service, June 30, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/01/c_124933373.htm.

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Japan-China tensions over the islets have run high since September 11, 2012, when Japan’s
government purchased three of the islands from their private Japanese owners, a move that China
charged was equivalent to “nationalizing” the islands. Since then, China has maintained a nearly
continuous presence near the islets and repeatedly sent its vessels into the 12 nautical mile
territorial waters around them. China has mainly deployed vessels from the two civilian agencies,
China Maritime Surveillance and the Bureau of Fisheries, but it has also sent Navy vessels and
military aircraft into the area near the islands. Japan has responded with stepped-up coast guard
patrols and missions by Japanese Self Defense Force fighter planes.
Chinese officials have indicated that among their immediate goals is to force Japan to
acknowledge that sovereignty of the islets is in dispute, an acknowledgement that Japan has
resisted. Some observers believe that China may also have hoped to undermine the case for
possible U.S. intervention in a conflict over the islets by arguing that the Chinese presence near
the islands proves the islets are no longer administered solely by Japan, and thus may not fall
within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Congress sought to address that line of
argument in Section 1286 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239). The
section stated that it was the sense of Congress that “the unilateral action of a third party”—a
reference to China—“will not affect the United States’ acknowledgement” of Japanese
administration over the islands. The section also reaffirmed the United States commitment to
Japan under Article V of the security treaty. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton adopted the
same position in remarks in January 2013,71 as did Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in remarks
in April 2013.72 A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denounced Clinton’s statement as
“ignorant of facts and indiscriminate of rights and wrongs.”73 After the Obama-Xi summit in June
2013, National Security Advisor Donilon paraphrased President Obama as telling his Chinese
counterpart that the United States does not take a position on the sovereignty of the disputed
islets, but “the parties should seek to de-escalate, not escalate; and the parties should seek to have
conversations about this through diplomatic channels and not through actions out of the East
China Sea.”74
The China-Japan dispute over the Senkakus/Diaoyu previously rose to the level of an
international crisis in September 2010, after a collision between Japanese Coast Guard vessels
and a Chinese fishing trawler near the islands, and the Japanese decision to detain the Chinese
crew and charge the Chinese captain under Japanese law.

71

Clinton stated that, “... although the United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands,
we acknowledge they are under the administration of Japan and we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to
undermine Japanese administration.... ” Department of State, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Remarks with
Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida After Their Meeting,” January 18, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2013/01/203050.htm.
72
Hagel stated that, “... the United States opposes any unilateral or coercive action that seeks to undermine Japan’s
administrative control.... ” He added, “The United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the
islands, but we do recognize they are under the administration of Japan and fall under our security treaty obligations.”
Department of Defense, “Press Conference with Secretary Hagel and Defense Minister Onodera from the Pentagon,”
April 29, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5230.
73
“China Opposes U.S. Comments About Diaoyu Islands: Spokesman,” Xinhua News Agency, January 20, 2013.
74
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon,”
transcript, June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/09/press-briefing-national-securityadvisor-tom-donilon.

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For more information, see CRS Report R42761, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute:
U.S. Treaty Obligations, by (name redacted) and CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations:
Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name redacted).

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
The issue that has for years provided the greatest day-to-day threat of inadvertent military
confrontation between the United States and China is disagreement over whether the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—a treaty to which China but not the
United States is a party—gives coastal states a right to regulate foreign military activities in their
maritime exclusive economic zones (EEZs). A coastal state’s EEZ generally extends from the
edge of its territorial sea (12 nautical miles from its coast) to a distance of 200 nautical miles from
its coast. China’s view, which is shared by a small number of other countries, has been that it has
the legal right under UNCLOS to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ. The U.S. view,
which is shared by most other nations, is that international law as reflected in UNCLOS does not
give coastal states this right.
The United States, acting on its view, has long operated military ships and aircraft in China’s
EEZ, carrying out surveillance missions to monitor China’s military deployments and
capabilities, surveying the ocean floor to facilitate submarine navigation, and engaging in military
exercises with allies such as South Korea and Japan. China, acting on its view, has long protested,
and sometimes physically resisted, these operations. The issue appears to be at the heart of
multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and
airspace, including incidents in March 2001, March 2009, and May 2009 in which Chinese ships
and aircraft confronted and harassed the U.S. naval ships as they were conducting survey and
ocean surveillance operations in China’s EEZ, and an incident on April 1, 2001, in which a U.S.
Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft flying in international airspace about 65 miles
southeast of China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea was intercepted by Chinese fighters.75
In 2010, China reiterated its opposition to foreign military activities in its EEZ in response to the
announcement of joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea in the
Yellow Sea, following provocations by North Korea.76
Revelations in 2013 have raised questions about whether the Chinese position may be changing,
however. DOD’s 2013 report to Congress on military developments involving China noted that
the United States had “observed over the past year several instances of Chinese naval activities in
the EEZ around Guam and Hawaii.” The DOD report observed that the United States considers
such activities to be “lawful,” but noted that “the activity undercuts China’s decades-old position
that similar foreign military activities in China’s EEZ are unlawful.”77 In June 2013, a PLA
75

One of the fighters accidentally collided with and damaged the EP-3, which then made an emergency landing on
Hainan Island. For more on this incident, see CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April
2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, by (name redacted) et al.
76
In July 2010, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that China “firmly
opposes foreign warships and military aircraft entering the Yellow Sea and other coastal waters of China to engage in
activities affecting China’s security and interests.” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Yang Jiechi Meets
with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Canadian Foreign Minister Cannon,” press release, July 23, 2010,
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/t719784.htm. In November 2010, a Foreign Ministry spokesman declared
that “We oppose any party to take any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.” See “China
Opposes Any Military Acts in Exclusive Economic Zone Without Permission,” Xinhua, November 26, 2010.
77
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
(continued...)

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officer attending a security dialogue in Singapore reportedly publicly acknowledged that China
has sent vessels into the United States’ EEZ “a few times.”78
For more information, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Managing North Korea
The United States and China share a common interest in peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula and in verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula. With China serving as North
Korea’s largest supplier of fuel and food supplies and its most powerful diplomatic ally, however,
the United States continues to call on China to do more to leverage its relationship with
Pyongyang to persuade it to avoid provocations and denuclearize. Washington also wants Beijing
to strengthen its implementation of U.N. sanctions against North Korea. “We believe that no
country, including China, should conduct ‘business as usual’ with a North Korea that threatens its
neighbors,” then-National Security Advisor Tom Donilon remarked in a speech on Asia policy in
March 2013.79
Since the death of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the installation
of his son, Kim Jong-un, as North Korea’s supreme leader, Chinese-North Korean relations have
frequently appeared strained. North Korea repeatedly ignored China’s warnings not to carry out
the rocket launches and a nuclear test and in May 2012 North Korea stirred angry populist
passions in China when its Navy boarded a Chinese fishing boat and held the crew for more than
two weeks.80 In January 2013, soon after China’s new leaders took up their Communist Party
posts, China supported U.N. Resolution 2087 condemning North Korea’s December 2012 rocket
launch. In March, China supported Resolution 2094, which strengthened existing sanctions
against North Korea in response to the country’s February 2013 nuclear test.81 In April 2013,
shortly after he took office as China’s state President, Xi Jinping raised eyebrows among
observers of the China-North Korea relations when he warned that, “No one should be allowed to
throw a region or even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.”82 The comment was widely
interpreted to be directed at Pyongyang. In May 2013, a major Chinese state bank, Bank of China,
announced that it had closed the account of North Korea’s primary foreign-exchange bank, the

(...continued)
People’s Republic of China 2013, May 7, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
78
The Chinese military officer was Senior Colonel Zhou Bo. See Jeff M. Smith, China Comes Around?, Pacific
Forum—CSIS, PacNet #41, June 11, 2013, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-41-china-comes-around.Rory Medcalf,
“Maritime Game Changer Revealed at Shangri-la Dialogue,” The Diplomat, June 2, 2013.
79
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the
President: The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks to the Asia Society, March 11, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-presidentunited-states-a.
80
Jane Perlez, “North Korea Tests the Patience of Its Closest Ally,” New York Times, June 24, 2012.
81
United Nations News Service, Security Council Tightens Sanctions on DPR Korea in Wake of Latest Nuclear Blast,
March 7, 2013, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44313&Cr=democratic&Cr1=korea.
82
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the
President: The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks to the Asia Society, March 11, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-presidentunited-states-a.

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Foreign Trade Bank.83 In late June 2013, China snubbed North Korea by hosting a high-profile
visit by the South Korean President Park Geun-hye when it had yet to host the North’s leader. In
his meeting with President Park, President Xi issued what was interpreted as another tough
warning to North Korea. The Xinhua News Agency paraphrased him as stating that, “China’s
stance in working to achieve peninsula denuclearization is firm, and its attitude is serious and
sincere.” It also paraphrased him as saying that China “opposes the action of any party in
wrecking peace and stability,” a statement seen as referring to North Korea.84 North Korea was a
major topic of discussion both at the summit between President Obama and President Xi in June
2013 and at the Fifth Round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2013. After the
S&ED, the State Department announced that the two countries “agreed on the fundamental
importance of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner,” and on “the
importance of working together to ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution
2094 and other relevant resolutions by all UN Member States.”85
China has long been committed to providing material support to the Pyongyang regime because
of fears about the potentially destabilizing consequences of the regime’s collapse, which China
believes could include military hostilities, waves of North Korean refugees flooding into China’s
northeast provinces, and a reunified Korean peninsula allied with the United States. Scholars are
asking whether China’s new leaders may now be moving toward the view that it is the status quo
that has become destabilizing.
In February 2013, the House passed a resolution condemning North Korea for its “flagrant and
repeated violations” of U.N. Security Council resolutions and for other provocations. The
resolution called on China to use its economic leverage to pressure North Korea’s leaders, and
also called on China “to take immediate actions to prevent the transshipment of illicit technology,
military equipment, and dual-use items through its territory, waters, and airspace that could be
used in North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.”
China’s treatment of North Korean refugees has been an issue of concern for Congress. China
considers North Koreans who have fled their homeland to China to be economic migrants, rather
than refugees, and continues to resist allowing the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees access to them. China’s official policy is to repatriate the refugees to North Korea,
where they face prison camp sentences or worse. North Korean refugees continue to trickle out of
China to neighboring countries in North and Southeast Asia, however, and substantial numbers of
North Korean refugees continue to live underground in China.
For more information, see “June 7-8, 2013: The Presidential Summit in Rancho Mirage, CA”
above. See also CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and
Internal Situation, by (name redacted) and (name redacted); CRS Report R40684,
North
Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, coordinated
by (name redacted) and (name redacted); CRS Report RL31555,
China and Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by (name redacted); and CRS Report
83

Heng Xie and Megha Rajagopalan, “Bank of China Closes Account of Key North Korean Bank,” Reuters, May 7,
2013.

习近平同韩国总统朴槿惠会谈时强调 全面推进互利合作推动中韩关系取得更大发展

84
Qian Zhou, “
,” (“In Talks
with ROK President Park Geun-hye, Xi Jinping Emphasizes Comprehensively Promoting Mutually Beneficial
Cooperation, Spurring Still Greater Development of Sino-ROK Relations”), Xinhua News Agency, June 27, 2013.
85
U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,” press
release, July 12, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm.

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RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees: Recent
Legislation and Implementation, by (name redacted).

Curbing Iran’s Nuclear Program
Since 2006, China has been an important player in United States- and European-led multilateral
efforts to rein in Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. As a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council, China has participated in negotiations with Iran over the nuclear program as
part of the P5+1 grouping (permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus
Germany). It has also supported a series of U.N. resolutions imposing limited U.N. sanctions
against Iran, although it has frequently urged the use of dialogue rather than sanctions to address
the nuclear program and joined Russia in pushing for more narrowly targeted sanctions than the
U.S. and European nations sought. In the case of U.N. Resolution 1929, passed in June 2010, for
example, Russia and China successfully insisted that new sanctions not target Iran’s civilian
economy or its population.
China’s policy toward Iran is also of crucial importance to U.S. efforts to pressure the Iranian
regime because China is Iran’s largest trading partner, single largest customer for oil, and a major
investor in the Iranian energy and other sectors. Since passage of U.N. Resolution 1929, the
United States has sought to encourage China to follow the lead of the United States and European
Union countries in imposing bilateral sanctions on Iran’s energy and financial sector that exceed
those mandated in U.N. Security Council resolutions. China has declined to impose its own
bilateral sanctions and has criticized other countries for doing so. It did substantially decrease its
oil imports from Iran in 2012, though, reportedly in part because of disputes with Iran over the
terms of annual purchase contracts.86
The Administration granted China P.L. 112-81 sanctions exemptions on June 28, 2012, December
7, 2012, and June 5, 2013. At the same time, the United States has also sanctioned Chinese
businesses for their involvement in Iran. In July 2012, for example, the Administration sanctioned
the Xinjiang-based Bank of Kunlun, which is affiliated with the China National Petroleum
Corporation, “for knowingly facilitating significant transactions and providing significant
financial services for designated Iranian banks.”87 China angrily protested the move and defended
China’s business ties with Iran. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman insisted that China’s
cooperation with Iran, “has nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear program, is not in violation of any
U.N. Security Council resolutions or other international norms, and does not harm the interests of
any third party.”88
U.S. officials give China credit for not moving to take over contracts given up by other countries,
a behavior that the United States refers to as “backfilling.” In March 2011, Robert Einhorn, then
the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, cited “substantial

86

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Iran, March 28, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ir.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Kunlun Bank in China and Elaf Bank in Iraq for Business
with Designated Iranian Banks,” press release, July 31, 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/tg1661.aspx.
88
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks
on US Sanctions against Bank of Kunlun,” August 1, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/.
87

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evidence that Beijing has taken a cautious, go-slow approach toward its energy cooperation with
Iran.”89
The United States has for many years implicated Chinese firms in sales to Iran of missile
technology. The Central Intelligence Agency’s 2012 report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
covering the 2011 calendar year, stated that, “Chinese entities—primarily private companies and
individuals—continue to supply a variety of missile-related items to multiple customers,
including Iran and Pakistan.”90
For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name redacted); and CRS
Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy
Issues, by (name redacted).

Resolving the Crisis in Syria
The United States has looked to China, a fellow permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council, to play a constructive role in helping to resolve the crisis in Syria. China has
opposed all military intervention in Syria, including proposals for U.N. authorization of use of
force, and has on three occasions joined Russia in blocking U.S.-backed Security Council
resolutions on Syria. In the 112th Congress, S.Res. 379 expressed “strong disappointment” with
both Russia and China for their vetoes of one such resolution, which would have adopted an Arab
League plan outlining a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system.
Repeating a longstanding position, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman stated in early July 2013
that, “We respect the Syrian people’s choice, and appeal to the parties concerned to work together
to promote a ceasefire and end of violence in Syria as soon as possible, and launch a political
dialogue process.”91
For more information, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International
Response, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

Taiwan
The U.S. relationship with the island democracy of Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China,
is one of the most sensitive and complex issues in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship. In 1949,
following a civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
that brought the CCP to power in mainland China, the KMT re-established itself on Taiwan. The
PRC has consistently claimed sovereignty over Taiwan in the six decades since, but has never
controlled it. Unification with Taiwan and its 23 million people remains one of the PRC’s most
cherished national goals, one Beijing has vowed to achieve by force if necessary. Beijing sees the
89

State Department Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn, “The Impact of Sanctions
on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Remarks to Arms Control Association Briefing Series, Washington, DC, March 9, 2011,
http://www.armscontrol.org/events/RoleSanctionsIranNuclear.
90
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December
2011, February 2012, p. 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd-acq2011.pdf.
91
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Transcript of Regular News Conference By PRC
Foreign Ministry on 2 July 2013, hosted by spokesman Hua Chunying,” press release, July 2, 2013.

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United States, which is required by law to “maintain the capacity …to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion” against Taiwan, as a major obstacle to that goal.
Finding language on Taiwan that both the PRC and the United States could accept was a
prerequisite for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979. In
the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the United States declared that it “acknowledges that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a
part of China.” In the 1979 communiqué on the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations,
the United States agreed that it would henceforth have only “unofficial” relations with Taiwan. In
a subsequent 1982 communiqué, the United States said it intended “gradually to reduce its sale of
arms to Taiwan.”
Concerned that the Joint Communiqués did not do enough to protect Taiwan’s interests, Congress
in March 1979 passed the Taiwan Relations Act or TRA (P.L. 96-8). The TRA declared that it is
U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the
people of Taiwan.” The TRA also mandated that the United States would sell Taiwan defense
items “in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.” Washington continues to sell arms to Taiwan, over strenuous PRC objections, and
Washington and Beijing continue to plan for the possibility that they could one day find
themselves involved in a military confrontation over Taiwan’s fate.
Despite reduced cross-strait tensions since 2008, when President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT took
office, the Department of Defense estimates that the PRC deploys more than 1,100 short-range
ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan’s coast. China has also engaged in a program of military
modernization that includes the development or deployment of military capabilities “to coerce
Taiwan or attempt an invasion, if necessary,” according to DOD.92
The United States has repeatedly assured China that it does not support independence for Taiwan,
but it has retained ambiguity about its willingness to defend Taiwan in a conflict with China. That
ambiguity is intended both to deter China from attempting to use force to bring Taiwan under its
control, and to deter Taiwan from moves that might trigger China’s use of force, such as a
declaration of formal independence. As part of a statement known as the “Three No’s,” President
Clinton also in 1998 publicly stated that the United States does not support Taiwan’s membership
in any international organizations for which statehood is a requirement.93

92
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, May 7, 2013, pp. 5, 55, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
93
President Clinton’s statement, made on June 30, 1998, in Shanghai, was: “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan
policy which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or ‘two Chinas,’ or ‘one Taiwan, one China,’ and we
don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”

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The Three Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances
The governments of the United States and China consider three joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1979, and
1982 to underpin their bilateral relationship. The United States considers The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to be a
fourth core document guiding the relationship, although C

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR41108. Public record. Not legal advice.