# The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR40602 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** March 19, 2010 - **Citation:** R40602 ## Text The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism March 19, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R40602 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Summary The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, the Department) is to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States.” Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Following a major reorganization of the DHS (called the Second Stage Review or “2SR”) in July 2005, former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private sector partners. Today, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) consists of I&A, two headquarters elements supported by I&A, and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department’s intelligence component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. On February 11, 2010, the Senate confirmed President Obama’s selection of Caryn Wagner to serve as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. As she assumes responsibility for the DHS IE, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Department’s intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHS IE produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. In February, DHS produced its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive assessment outlining its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Department’s programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The next step in the Department’s QHSR process is to conduct a “bottom-up review” to systematically link strategy to program to budget. The results of that review will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for DHS. This report provides an overview of the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHS IE is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues. This report may be updated. Congressional Research Service The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) ...................................................................................4 The Homeland Security Intelligence Mission ........................................................................4 I&A Customers .....................................................................................................................5 Integrating the DHS IE..........................................................................................................6 Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) .............................................................7 Budget ............................................................................................................................7 I&A Organization..................................................................................................................8 The Analysis Mission......................................................................................................8 I&A Intelligence Products .........................................................................................9 Intelligence Support To State, Local, Tribal Officials, and the Private Sector ................. 11 State and Local Fusion Center Program................................................................... 11 Intelligence Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) .......................... 12 Mission Integration ....................................................................................................... 14 Integrated Border Intelligence Program (IBIP) ........................................................ 15 National Applications Office (NAO). ...................................................................... 15 Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) ................................. 16 Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate (OPS)—Intelligence Division................ 18 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Intelligence Element .............................................. 20 CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC) ........................................ 21 CBP Intelligence Support to DHS and CBP Missions. ......................................................... 21 At Ports of Entry........................................................................................................... 22 National Targeting Center (NTC) ............................................................................ 24 NTC—Passenger (NTCP) ....................................................................................... 24 NTC—Cargo (NTCC)............................................................................................. 24 Between POE’s. ............................................................................................................ 25 Border Field Intelligence Center (BORFIC) .................................................................. 26 Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC).................................................................. 27 Intelligence Driven Special Operations (IDSO) ............................................................. 27 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Intelligence Element .......................................... 28 Office of Intelligence .......................................................................................................... 29 Intelligence Programs Division ..................................................................................... 30 Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) ............................................................... 30 Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) .................................................. 31 Armas Cruzadas...................................................................................................... 31 Operation Firewall .................................................................................................. 31 Collection Management and Requirements Division...................................................... 32 Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) .................................................................................... 32 Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) ............................................................. 33 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Intelligence Element................................. 34 The USCIS Intelligence Branch .......................................................................................... 35 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Intelligence Element .......................................... 36 TSA Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) .................................................................................. 37 TSA-OI Analysis .......................................................................................................... 37 Field Intelligence Officer Program ................................................................................ 38 Congressional Research Service The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise TSA-OI Support to TSA Security Activities ........................................................................ 39 Airline Passenger Pre-Screening ................................................................................... 39 No Fly and Selectee Lists........................................................................................ 39 Secure Flight........................................................................................................... 41 Support to the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)...................................................... 42 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Intelligence Element ................................................................. 43 Maritime Domain Awareness............................................................................................... 43 Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations.......................................................... 44 Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations.................................... 45 USCG Cryptologic Program.......................................................................................... 45 Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS)........................................................ 46 Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS)..................................................................... 46 Other Key USCG Intelligence Organizations....................................................................... 46 The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) .............................................. 46 COASTWATCH ........................................................................................................... 47 Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFC) ............................................................... 47 Area and District Intelligence Staffs .............................................................................. 47 Sector Intelligence Staffs (SIS)...................................................................................... 48 U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division ............................ 48 USSS Organizational Structure............................................................................................ 49 Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID)........................................................ 49 National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC)........................................................................ 50 Oversight Challenges and Options for Congress ........................................................................ 51 Support to State and Local Fusion Centers .......................................................................... 52 Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFC PMO)....................................... 52 Sustainment Funding..................................................................................................... 52 Information Technology Infrastructure .......................................................................... 53 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) ............................................................... 53 Evolving Risks.................................................................................................................... 54 Figures Figure 1. Current Department of Homeland Security Organization ..............................................2 Figure 2. Office of Intelligence and Analysis Organizational Chart ..............................................9 Figure 3. Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)......................... 17 Figure 4. Directorate of Operations Coordination and Planning Organization ............................ 19 Contacts Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 57 Congressional Research Service The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Introduction A primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, Department) is to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States.1 The current organization of the Department is displayed at Figure 1. To support this mission, DHS has had an intelligence component since its inception in 2003. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, assigned the original DHS intelligence component—the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—with responsibility to receive, analyze, and integrate law enforcement and intelligence information in order to— “(A) identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; (B) detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and (C) understand such threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.”2 Congress also made information sharing a top priority of the new DHS intelligence organization, requiring it “to disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal government with responsibilities related to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local government and private sector entities, with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.”3 Following the release of the 9/11 Commission Report in 2004, which identified a breakdown in information sharing as a key factor contributing to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001 attacks,4 Congress underscored the importance it attached to information sharing at all levels of government. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20045 required the President to “create an information sharing environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties,”6 and “to designate an individual as the program manager responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government.”7 In July 2005, following “a systematic evaluation of the Department’s operations, policies and structures”8 (commonly called the Second Stage Review or “2SR”), former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, initiated a major reorganization of DHS. In his remarks describing the reorganization, he noted that “…intelligence lies at the heart of everything that we 1 P.L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002, §101b(1), 116 STAT. 2142. Ibid., §201d(9), 116 STAT. 2147. 3 Ibid., §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146. 4 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, pp. 353-356 and 416-418. http://www.9-11commission.gov. Hereafter: 9/11 Commission Report. 5 P.L. 108-458, Dec. 17, 2004. 6 Ibid, §1016b(1), 118 STAT. 3665. 2 7 Ibid, §1016f(1), 118 STAT. 3667. The Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), is functionally aligned within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 8 DHS, “Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. DHS Second Stage Review Remarks,” press release, July 13, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0255.shtm. Hereafter: Chertoff, “DHS Second Stage Review Remarks.” Congressional Research Service 1 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise do.”9 In an effort to improve how DHS manages its intelligence and information sharing responsibilities, he established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the Intelligence Community (IC) as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private sector partners. 10 Figure 1. Current Department of Homeland Security Organization Source: DHS, July 18, 2008. In testimony to a House of Representatives hearing shortly after his selection, the first DHS CINT, stated that “[m]y goal and my role as chief intelligence officer is to see that Homeland Security intelligence, a blend of traditional and nontraditional intelligence that produces unique and actionable insights, takes its place along the other kinds of intelligence as an indispensable tool for securing the nation. 11 9 Ibid. Ibid. 11 U.S. Congress, Joint Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “DHS Second Stage Review: The Role of the Chief Intelligence Officer,” Testimony of Charles Allen, DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., October 19, 2005. Hereafter: Allen Testimony, Oct. 19, 2005. 10 Congressional Research Service 2 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise He also set five priorities: Improving the quality of intelligence analysis across the department; integrating the DHS IE; strengthening support to state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector; ensuring that DHS IE takes its place in the IC; and solidifying the relationship with the Congress; and improving transparency and responsiveness.12 Since the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements on DHS through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007:13 • Integrate information and standardize the format of intelligence products produced within DHS and its components.14 • Establish department-wide procedures for review and analysis of information provided by state, local, tribal, and private sector elements; integrate that information into DHS intelligence products, and disseminate to Federal partners within the Intelligence Community.15 • Evaluate how DHS components are utilizing homeland security information and participating in the Information Sharing Environment. 16 • Establish a comprehensive information technology network architecture to connect various DHS elements and promote information sharing. 17 • Establish a DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative to establish partnerships with state, local, and regional fusion centers.18 • Coordinate and oversee the creation of an Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group that will bring state, local, and tribal law enforcement and intelligence analysts “to work in the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)19 with Federal intelligence analysts for the purpose of integrating, analyzing and assisting in the dissemination of federally-coordinated information….”20 The DHS IE consists of those elements within DHS that have an intelligence mission. These include I&A, the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, and the Intelligence Division of the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (all located at the DHS headquarters), and the intelligence elements of six operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast 12 Ibid. P.L. 110-53, Aug. 3, 2007. 14 Ibid, §204a, 121 STAT. 307. 15 Ibid, §204(c)(1)A, 121 STAT. 307. 16 Ibid, §204(d)(2)A, 121 STAT. 308. 17 Ibid, §205a, 121 STAT. 308. 18 Ibid, §511, 121 STAT. 317-18. 13 19 NCTC was established by Executive Order (E.O.) 13354 in Aug. 2004, and codified in Section 1021 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It is the primary U.S. Government organization for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism). Through its Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, it is also the executive branch lead for counterterrorism planning. See NCTC, About the National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/ about_nctc.html 20 P.L. 110-53, §521, 121 STAT. 328. Congressional Research Service 3 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). The Department and USCG are statutory members of the IC. 21 On February 11, 2010, the Senate confirmed President Obama’s selection of Caryn Wagner to serve as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. As she assumes responsibility for the DHS IE, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Department’s intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHS IE produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. Also in February, DHS published its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR),22 a comprehensive assessment outlining its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Department’s programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The next step in the Department’s QHSR process is to conduct a “bottom-up review” to systematically link strategy to program to budget. The results of that review will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for DHS. Some have argued that there is a broad homeland security intelligence enterprise that encompasses not only the DHS IE, but other organizations at the Federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector levels that collect and analyze homeland security information and disseminate intelligence products. This report will focus on the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components; how it is organized; and how it supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning, border security, critical infrastructure protection, and support to and the sharing of information with state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It will also discuss oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) The Homeland Security Intelligence Mission According to its December 2009 Strategy, the mission of I&A is “To strengthen DHS and its partners’ ability to perform homeland security functions by accessing, integrating, analyzing, and sharing timely and relevant intelligence and information, while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the people I&A serves.23 It accomplishes this by ensuring that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in the Department, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector, and in the IC.”24 The Under Secretary for I&A is the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department and is responsible to lead I&A and the entire DHS IE. The Under Secretary is also 21 There are 16 statutory members of the IC: the Departments of Energy, Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Homeland Security, State, and Treasury; the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency; and the intelligence components of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard. See 50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(k). 22 DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf. Hereafter: DHS QHSR Report. 23 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Strategy, Dec. 2009. Hereafter: I&A Strategy, Dec. 2009. 24 DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis. http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm. Congressional Research Service 4 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise the Department’s chief information sharing officer and is responsible for implementing the objectives of the PM-ISE within DHS.25 To accomplish its mission, I&A participates in all aspects of the intelligence cycle“ – the process by which information is acquired, converted into finished intelligence, and made available to policymakers. Generally the cycle comprises five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis, and production and dissemination.”26 It is an iterative process in which collection requirements based on national security threats are developed, and intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to a broad range of consumers. DHS does not generally engage in traditional foreign intelligence collection activities such as imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, measurement and signatures intelligence, and foreign open source intelligence. 27 But, as former Secretary Chertoff has noted: Intelligence, as you know, is not only about spies and satellites. Intelligence is about the thousands and thousands of routine, everyday observations and activities. Surveillance, interactions—each of which may be taken in isolation as not a particularly meaningful piece of information, but when fused together, gives us a sense of the patterns and the flow that really is at the core of what intelligence analysis is all about....28 I&A combines the unique information collected by DHS components as part of their operational activities (e.g., at airports, seaports, and the border) with foreign intelligence from the IC; law enforcement information from Federal, state, local, and tribal sources; private sector data about critical infrastructure and key resources; and information from domestic open sources to develop homeland security intelligence. 29 This encompasses a broad range of homeland security threats. It includes border security information to counter human smuggling and trafficking, cargo data to prevent the introduction of dangerous items, information to protect critical infrastructure against all hazards, information about infectious diseases, and demographic data and other research about ‘violent radicalization.’30 I&A Customers The DHS I&A Strategy identifies its core customers as the President; Secretary of Homeland Security; DHS Components; State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Partners (through State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers); the IC; and Federal Interagency Partners.31 In short, I&A’s 25 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2010, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), p. 507. Hereafter: OMB: USG FY10 Budget. 26 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 5th ed, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), pp. 3-4. Hereafter: Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community. 27 For a detailed description of each of these collection disciplines, see Ibid, chapters 7-12. 28 Chertoff, “DHS Second Stage Review Remarks.” 29 For a discussion of the concept of homeland security intelligence, see CRS Report RL33616, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, by (name redacted). 30 Congress has defined ‘violent radicalization’ as “the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.” H.R. 1955, Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, §899(a)(2). 31 I&A Strategy, Dec. 2009. Congressional Research Service 5 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise customers range from the Chief Executive all the way to individual border patrol agents, Coast Guard seamen, and airport screeners. According to Under Secretary Wagner, “A primary role of I&A is to share intelligence and information with our partners at the state, local, tribal, and private sector levels. It is our job to meaningfully convert what may appear to be bits of unrelated information into a product that helps protect our communities.”32 State, local, and tribal law enforcement are “first preventers” of terrorism and require timely and actionable intelligence to respond to threats. They also need intelligence about the latest terrorist tactics and techniques so that they know what to look for and what to do when they encounter suspicious behavior or dangerous items. In addition, I&A supports the operators of the nation’s publicly and privately-owned critical infrastructure with threat information and other intelligence that supports their risk management decision making. Former Under Secretary Charles Allen noted that “virtually any terrorist attack on the homeland that one can imagine must exploit a border crossing, a port of entry, a critical infrastructure, or one of the other domains that the department has an obligation to secure. DHS Intelligence must learn and adapt faster than the enemy, so that our department with all its partners in the federal, state, and local levels of government and the private sector have the information edge they need to secure our nation.”33 I&A is a full partner within the IC and represents DHS on several IC committees. The Under Secretary, for example, is a member of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)34 Executive Committee. I&A contributes analytic staff to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The office also contributes items to the President’s Daily Brief35 providing a unique homeland security perspective on terrorism and other threats to the United States to the nation’s leaders. Integrating the DHS IE Among the many challenges for DHS since its founding has been the integration of 22 legacy and newly-created agencies. This also includes the integration of intelligence activities of the Department’s operational components whose intelligence organizations predate the establishment of DHS. These intelligence elements were created to support the operational missions of their respective components and were tailored accordingly. One of the objectives of the Department’s 2005 2SR reorganization was to enhance integration to include its intelligence effort. The Under Secretary for I&A is also the Chief Intelligence Officer for the entire Department. Congress also made the Under Secretary responsible to “establish the 32 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, DHS Intelligence Programs and the Effectiveness of State and Local Fusion Centers, Statement of Caryn Wagner, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar. 4, 2010, p. 3. Hereafter: Wagner Testimony, Mar. 4, 2010. 33 Allen Testimony, Oct. 19, 2005. 34 The DNI serves as the head of the IC and is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security. The position was created by Congress in Section 1011 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The DNI Executive Committee consists of the heads of the IC member agencies. 35 The PDB compiles the IC’s highest level intelligence analysis targeted at the key national security issues and concerns of the President. It is given only to the President, the Vice President, and a very select group of Cabinet-level officials designated by the President. See CIA, “Directorate of Intelligence Products.” https://www.cia.gov/offices-ofcia/intelligence-analysis/products.html Congressional Research Service 6 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination priorities, policies, processes, standards, guidelines, and procedures for the intelligence components of the Department.”36 Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) The heads of the DHS intelligence components do not report to the Under Secretary, but to their respective component chiefs. However, pursuant to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, they are required to advise and coordinate closely with the Under Secretary on their activities in support of the intelligence mission of the Department. 37 The HSIC was established to serve as the mechanism to provide senior-level direction for Department-wide intelligence activities and to promote integration efforts. It is chaired by the Under Secretary and is comprised of the key intelligence officials in applicable DHS components. In March 2010 testimony, Under Secretary Wagner, stated that the HSIC “... now reflects a broader range of DHS activities that require intelligence support” and ... is focused on governance-level, enterprise-wide objectives, such as collaboratively defining intelligence activities for the Department’s Bottom Up Review; and developing new tools for conducting DHS Intelligence Enterprise program reviews. The HSIC oversaw the completion of the first coordinated, Enterprise-wide analytic production plan, which builds on the expertise of the operational components to produce products in their areas, deconflicts competing efforts, and helps focus analytic efforts on QHSR priorities.38 Budget I&A is funded through the classified National Intelligence Program (NIP), formerly known as the National Foreign Intelligence Program. For budgetary purposes, intelligence spending is divided between the NIP; and the Military Intelligence Program that supports the Secretary of Defense’s intelligence- and counterintelligence-related responsibilities. 39 The DNI does not publicly disclose details about the intelligence budget,40 but consistent with Section 601 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), the DNI reported that the aggregate amount appropriated to the NIP for FY2009 was $49.8 billion. 41 As part of its responsibility to integrate Department intelligence activities, the Under Secretary for I&A is responsible for presenting a consolidated intelligence budget to the Secretary. DHS operational component intelligence activities are generally not part of the NIP—therefore they are not classified—with the exception of the activities of the Coast Guard’s National Intelligence 36 P.L. 110-53, August 3, 2007, §531, 121 STAT. 3332-3. Amends §201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding paragraphs 18 and 19. 37 Ibid, §503, 121 STAT. 311-2. Amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §207. 38 Wagner Testimony, Mar. 4, 2010, p. 5. 39 DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14_R, June 2007, p. 16-2. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ finman.pdf. 40 The bulk of overall intelligence spending is contained within the DOD budget. Spending for most intelligence programs is described in classified annexes to intelligence and national defense authorization and appropriations legislation. All Members of Congress have access to these annexes, but must make special arrangements to read them. See DNI, The Intelligence Budget Process. http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business_nfip.shtml 41 Office of the DNI News Release No. 33-09, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2009 National Intelligence Program,” Oct. 30, 2009. Congressional Research Service 7 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Element.42 Those budgets are listed within each component’s appropriation, however they are generally co-mingled with other operational activities.43 Within the FY2009 homeland security appropriation, the total I&A budget figure (classified) is combined with the budget figure for operational activities (unclassified) within the Analysis and Operations category.44 I&A Organization I&A is led by an Under Secretary, a position subject to Senate confirmation. The Under Secretary also serves as the department’s Chief Intelligence Officer. Caryn Wagner assumed this position on February 11, 2010. The Under Secretary is supported by a Principal Deputy Under Secretary, currently Mr. Bart R. Johnson, who served as Acting Under Secretary from May 2009-February 2010. The current I&A organization is at Figure 2. However to support the strategic goals of its December 2009 Strategy and the homeland security missions described in the Department’s QHSR report, I&A intends to realign organizationally in 2010. The Analysis Mission I&A is focused on five “analytic thrusts” aligned with the principal threats to the Homeland:45 border security, including narcotics trafficking, alien and human smuggling, and money laundering; radicalization and extremism; particular groups entering the United States that could be exploited by terrorists or criminals; critical infrastructure and key resources; and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and health threats. Following a 2009 comprehensive evaluation of its analytic capabilities and functions, I&A has informed Congress that its analysis and production resources have been prioritized to: • Realign analytic resources to improve and expand support to [the] state, local, and tribal consumer base. • Develop an analytic capability and methodology for assessing Suspicious Activity Reporting data. • Create a centralized analysis group to meet the intelligence and information needs of the Secretary and Department components, including improved coordination and information sharing. • Augment [the] border security analytic capability. • Strengthen our collaboration and consultation with other producers of intelligence and information products.46 42 For a discussion of the USCG National Intelligence Element, see the USCG section of this report. See CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, coordinated by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 44 Ibid, Table 6, p. 10. 45 DHS I&A, “Homeland Security Analytic Priorities.” http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm 46 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, I&A Reconceived: Defining a Homeland Security Intelligence Role, Statement of Bart. R. (continued...) 43 Congressional Research Service 8 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Figure 2. Office of Intelligence and Analysis Organizational Chart Source: DHS I&A, March 2009. I&A Intelligence Products I&A produces numerous products for its customers. In 2008, there was a realignment and standardization of the I&A finished intelligence product line which now include: • Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HSTA). This is an annual threat assessment that represents the analytical judgments of DHS and assesses the major threats to the homeland for which the nation must prepare and respond. This includes the actions, capabilities, and intentions of domestic and foreign terrorists and extremists and the possible occurrence of systemic threats. It focuses on domestic extremists, international terrorists operating in the homeland or directing attacks against it, and systemic threats such as pandemics and transnational criminal organizations.47 The HSTA is produced in classified and “Unclassified/For Official Use Only” versions. • Intelligence Warning. Contains urgent intelligence. • Intelligence Note. Contains timely information or analysis on a current topic. • Homeland Security Assessment. Consists of in-depth analysis on a topic. • Homeland Security Monitors. These are produced monthly in collaboration with the components and may be classified or unclassified. Examples include: • Border Security Monitor (...continued) Johnson, Acting Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Sep. 24, 2009, pp. 7-8. Hereafter: Johnson Testimony, Sep. 24, 2009. 47 DHS, Homeland Security Threat Assessment, Executive Summary, Aug 2007, p. 1. Congressional Research Service 9 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise • Cyber Security Monitor • Cuba-Gram • Reference Aids. These are less analytical and more descriptive. For example, they might describe what an anthrax lab looks like or the latest on improvised explosive devices (IED) and fuses. They contain photos and diagrams and inform law enforcement and first responders what to look for and what actions to take if they are encountered. • Perspective. These are longer term analytic pieces. • Joint Homeland Security Assessment/FBI Intelligence Bulletin. These are joint reports done in conjunction with the FBI. I&A also produces Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIR) which contain information that has yet to be fully evaluated. These are similar to the Intelligence Information Report (IIR)48 produced by other IC agencies. An HIR could contain information related to border encounters, information shared by a state or local fusion center, or other information of homeland security interest. There are also Homeland Security Intelligence Reports (HSIR) that are produced by the DHS component agencies. HSIR’s, however, do contain some analysis. I&A makes the products of its analysis available to state and local officials through classified and unclassified intelligence networks:49 The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a secured, web-based platform that facilitates Sensitive But Unclassified information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and international partners. It is managed by the DHS Directorate of Operations Coordination and Planning. The HSIN platform was created to interface with existing information sharing networks to support the diverse communities of interest engaged in preventing, protecting from, responding to, and recovering from all threats, hazards and incidents under the jurisdiction of DHS.50 It provides real-time, interactive connectivity between states and major urban areas and the National Operations Center (NOC).51 There are five community of interest portals on HSIN: Emergency Management, Critical Sectors, Law Enforcement, Multi-Mission Agencies, and Intelligence and Analysis (HSIN-Intelligence). The latter portal provides state, local, and tribal authorities access to unclassified intelligence products. The Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) is a nationwide, virtual community of intelligence analysts that operates on a special portal on the HSIN network. The system contains collaborative tools such as discussion thread, chat tool, and secure messaging through which analysts collaborate. HS-SLIC has members from 45 states, the 48 An IIR is the primary vehicle used to provide human intelligence information to the consumer. It utilizes a message format structure that supports automated data entry into intelligence community databases. See JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Apr. 12, 2001, (as amended Oct. 17, 2008), p. 271. http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/jel/doddict/. Hereafter: DOD Dictionary. 49 Allen Testimony, Sep. 24, 2008. 50 See DHS, HSIN, Feb. 10, 2009. http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm 51 The NOC, located at the DHS Headquarters in Washington, D.C., operates on a 24/7 basis as the primary nationallevel hub for domestic incident management, operations coordination, and situational awareness. It is staffed by numerous Federal, state, and local agencies and fuses law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response and private sector reporting. The NOC also has an Intelligence Watch and Warning (IWW) cell staffed with analysts from I&A. See OMB: USG FY10 Budget, p. 507. Congressional Research Service 10 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise District of Columbia, and seven Federal agencies. The Under Secretary has established a governance board for HS-SLIC with strong participation by state and local officials. The Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) provides access to collateral Secret-level terrorismrelated information. This includes NCTC Online, a classified repository that serves as the counterterrorism community’s library of terrorism information. 52 I&A has deployed HSDN terminals to 33 state and local fusion centers and intends to install terminals in all of the fusion centers as soon as security requirements are met.53 Intelligence Support To State, Local, Tribal Officials, and the Private Sector A longstanding challenge for the department is the focus of I&A analysis and the relevance of its products to state, local, tribal, and private sector customers.54 For example, at a homeland security forum in early 2008, some state and local participants expressed unhappiness with the flow of intelligence from DHS. According to the forum’s findings, published in the journal Homeland Security Affairs, “[t]he Department had become ‘irrelevant’ to states and localities as a source of intelligence, because that intelligence lacks timeliness and adds so little value to local terrorism efforts. Another participant noted that ‘the stream of intelligence from DHS is useless ... ’”55 Among efforts to address the issue, former Under Secretary Allen established a State and Local Fusion Center (SLFC) Pilot Project Team in 2006 to work with six fusion centers56 in five states to enhance DHS support. State and Local Fusion Center Program In an effort to strengthen intelligence and information sharing and analysis capabilities following the 9/11 attacks, states and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers.57 Congress has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”58 At the end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) fusion centers.59 52 NCTC, NCTC and Information Sharing, September 2006. http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:7wjkyv3tA0J:www.nctc.gov/docs/report_card_final.pdf+NCTC+Online&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 53 Wagner Testimony, Mar. 4, 2010. p. 3. 54 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has ongoing work regarding I&A’s efforts to support information sharing with state, local, and tribal government agencies. GAO expects to report on the results of this work later in 2010. 55 Paul Stockton and Patrick S. Roberts, “Findings from the Forum on Homeland Security After the Bush Administration: Next Steps in Building Unity of Effort,” Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 2,, June 2008, p.6. 56 Pilot sites were the Boston Regional Intelligence Center and the Commonwealth Fusion Center in Massachusetts, the Florida Fusion Center, the New York State Intelligence Center, the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center in Illinois, and the Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Center in Sacramento, California. 57 For a full discussion of fusion centers, see CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, by John Rollins. For an informative discussion of one of the earliest efforts at local law enforcement collaboration and intelligence fusion and analysis, see John Sullivan and Alain Bauer, Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group, published by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2008. 58 P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 322. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(j). 59 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center; Tallahassee, Florida; Nov. 4, 2009. Congressional Research Service 11 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.60 Through the DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, I&A supports these centers by providing operational, analytic, reporting, and management advice and assistance; training; information technology systems and connectivity; and intelligence officers and analysts to participating fusion centers to the maximum extent practicable.61 I&A intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers are responsible for providing intelligence support, including briefings to state and local officials; reviewing and analyzing suspicious activity reports and writing HIRs based on state and local information; supporting the development of state and local intelligence products; posting material on the HSDN and the HSSLIC portal; and reaching back to I&A for intelligence products and IT resources. As of March 2010, there are 57 officers deployed to fusion centers and Under Secretary Wagner has stated that DHS plans to deploy a total of 76 officers (there would be more than one officer at some fusion centers) by the end of FY2010.62 In interviews of several fusion center directors for this report, those that had I&A officers assigned to their centers were pleased with the contributions they were making. The directors who did not have an officer assigned were anxious to get one. 63 Intelligence Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Another program intended to improve the focus, relevance, and accessibility of federal intelligence products for state, local, and tribal officials is the ITACG. In 2007, Congress amended the Homeland Security Act by directing the establishment of the ITACG at NCTC to “improve information sharing within the scope of the Information Sharing Environment ...with state, local, tribal, and private sector officials.”64 Among the objectives of the ITACG is to provide a formal mechanism to inject a state, local, tribal and private sector perspective about the types of intelligence products they need and how these products should be produced and disseminated in order to be of greatest value for these officials. The ITACG consists of two elements, an ITACG Advisory Council to set policy and develop processes for the integration, analysis and dissemination of federally-coordinated information; and an ITACG Detail comprised of state, local, and tribal homeland security and law enforcement officers and intelligence analysts detailed to work at NCTC with federal intelligence analysts.65 The Under Secretary for I&A, as the Secretary’s designee, was directed to establish and maintain the ITACG Detail and assign a senior intelligence officer from the department, who would report directly to the Director of NCTC and manage the Detail on a day-to-day basis.66 60 P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 318. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(a). Ibid. 121 STAT. 319. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(b) and (c). 62 Wagner Testimony, Mar. 4, 2010. p. 3. 63 Comments to CRS by state and local officials, 2008. 64 P.L. 110-53, §521, 121 STAT. 328. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210D(a). 65 Ibid. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210D(b). 66 Ibid, 121 STAT. 330. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210E. 61 Congressional Research Service 12 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise One historical barrier to the sharing of intelligence information with state, local, and tribal officials has been the need to protect the sources and methods used to obtain the intelligence information. The requirement for security clearances and “the need to know” principle have been cited as impediments to access by these officials. But, as one observer has pointed out, “The local deputy or officer is not interested in the sources of the information nor the means that were utilized to obtain it. The deputy or officer does need the tactic, technique, procedure, method, or resource being reported on to ensure he or she recognizes precursors of an attack when encountered on the streets.”67 The ITACG Detail is intended to educate and advise NCTC analysts about state, local, tribal, and private sector requirements, and then assist those analysts in the preparation of versions of the products at the lowest possible level of classification to make them accessible to those customers. As of November 2009, the Detail consists of five state and local law enforcement officers and a fire services officer. The Detail and the Advisory Council have agreed on the need for increased representation, specifically in the areas of tribal operations; homeland security planning and operations at the State and local level; health and human services; and State and local intelligence analysis. The intent is to grow the ITACG Detail to a full complement of ten SLT representatives.68 The ITACG Detail has been operational since late January 2008, so it may be too early to judge how effective it has been in influencing the IC’s production and dissemination of intelligence products at a level of classification useful for state, local, tribal, and private sector consumers. In its November 2009 report to Congress on the ITACG, the PM-ISE reported the following achievements of the ITACG detail:69 • Informs and helps shape IC products for state and local agencies by reviewing, and when appropriate, providing comments during the drafting phase of the process. Since its inception, the Detail has participated in the production of 214 intelligence products. • Created the Roll Call Release (RCR), a collaborative For Official Use Only (FOUO) product produced by DHS, FBI, and the Detail. The product is written specifically for state, local, and tribal (SLT) “street-level” first responders and focuses on terrorist tactics, techniques, procedures, terrorism trends, and indicators of suspicious activity. The success of this product can be measured by its incorporation into SLT-created publications and from the interest the product has also drawn from international law enforcement partners. Since the product line was created in December 2008, 26 RCRs have been published. • Works closely with NCTC’s Operations Center in the preparation of the Terrorism Summary (TERRSUM). The TERRSUM is a daily, SECRET- level digest of intelligence deemed to be of potential interest to SLT entities. Since its inception in June 2008, over 350 TERRSUM products have been published. 67 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing, Testimony of Lee Baca, Sheriff, Los Angeles County, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 2008, p. 3. 68 Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment; Report on the ITACG, Second Report for the Congress of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, Nov. 2009, pp. 6-7. http://www.ise.gov/docs/ITACG_Status_Report_PM_ISE_FINAL_24Nov09.pdf 69 Ibid, pp. 10-11. Congressional Research Service 13 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Approximately 45 percent of the articles included in the TERRSUMs have been suggested by the ITACG Detail. • The ITACG Intelligence Guide for First Responders was developed by SLT and federal members of the ITACG to assist SLT first responders in accessing and understanding federal intelligence reporting. The guide helps first responders understand IC jargon and acronyms, provides awareness of what information is available to them, how to access this information, and to help them understand threat reporting. The guide has been posted to several Internet websites and official unclassified portals. In addition, the guide has been mailed to over 16,000 police departments and 32,000 fire departments across the United States, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. A senior police official at a major police department commented that “the ITACG is a good step forward, but the problem is that the IC still has a ‘Cold War’ mindset. The culture needs to change.” He did, however, acknowledge being told by a law enforcement member of the ITACG Detail that “when he [the Detail member] reviews products and highlights things, ‘the light bulbs are coming on at NCTC.’ It is beginning to manifest itself in how the product is written, focusing on the right priorities.”70 However, one senior police official is concerned that “the ITACG is limited to editing intelligence and returning those products to originating agencies where the information may or may not reach state and local law enforcement personnel.”71 This police official recommends that the ITACG “be authorized as an approved dissemination point for state and local fusion centers nationwide. ITACG liaison personnel are necessary to maintain a flow of current intelligence and must have authority to release information to state and local agencies.”72 Mission Integration This Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Mission Integration (DU/S-M) is responsible for DHS IE integration activities; policies governing enterprise-wide production and standardization of reports; the I&A Strategic Plan; training, and the implementation of a comprehensive information systems architecture.73 As part of its integration responsibilities, the DU/S-M is responsible for program review, department-level analysis, and cross-cutting intelligence initiatives. The DU/S-M also chairs the Intelligence Career Management Board that reports to the HSIC and is responsible for developing core competencies for the intelligence cadre of the Department. It does this through a document called the Learning Road Map that describes the tasks intelligence professionals perform, lists the training courses and other opportunities to learn the tasks, and provides measures to assess performance.74 70 Interview with CRS, Aug. 6, 2008. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, The Future of Fusion Centers: Potential Problems and Dangers, Testimony of Leroy D. Baca; Sheriff, Los Angeles County, 111th Cong., 1st sess., April 1, 2009, p. 3. 72 Ibid, p. 4. 71 73 A progress report on the department’s efforts to establish a comprehensive information technology network architecture was submitted to Congress last year. See DHS I&A, Homeland Security Information Technology Network Architecture Progress Report, April 15, 2008. 74 DHS I&A, Learning Road Map for Intelligence Professionals – Analytics. p. 3. Congressional Research Service 14 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise The DU/S-M organization also manages I&A responsibilities for the Department’s Counterintelligence (CI) Program and the Integrated Border Intelligence Program. Integrated Border Intelligence Program (IBIP) I&A established the IBIP to enhance its support to border security activities. Under the program, additional personnel and support infrastructure have been committed to support all of the Department’s border security operations. The program is designed to link DHS intelligence resources, and those of state and local partners, with the IC in order to deliver actionable intelligence to front-line operators and to fuse national intelligence with law enforcement information. An important initiative within the IBIP is the Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST). The first HIST team was deployed in 2007 to El Paso, Texas. It consists of intelligence officers from I&A whose mission is to coordinate and facilitate the delivery of national intelligence and enhance information fusion to support DHS operational missions at the border. In this regard it serves as a bridge between the national and field levels and between I&A and the component intelligence staffs at the border. It can also push/pull information from state and local law enforcement officials. The HIST also helps provide context to I&A analysts on topics such as border violence. Its focus areas are alien smuggling, border violence, weapons trafficking, illicit finance, drug trafficking, and the nexus between crime and terrorism. Its location at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)75 gives the HIST staff immediate access to each of the DHS operational components plus 15 other Federal, state, and local agencies. I&A has also increased staffing of the “Borders Branch” within I&A’s analytic element. One senior I&A official cited this as an example of an evolving focus away from purely terrorism issues to enhanced support for specific departmental concerns. In 2005, there were only three analysts working border issues. By mid-2008, there were 20 on the border team. In the same three years, I&A increased the production of HIR’s from 600, of which 3% were related to the border, to 3,563 in FY2008,76 of which 22% were border related.77 National Applications Office (NAO). For more than 30 years, the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) has facilitated requests by civil agencies to make use of space-based imaging and remote sensing capabilities in support of traditional mapping applications, as well as a broad range of resource management, 75 EPIC was established in 1974 as an intelligence center to collect and disseminate information relating to drug, alien, and weapon smuggling in support of field enforcement entities throughout the region. Following 9/11, counterterrorism also became part of its mission. In response to increased multiagency needs, EPIC has developed into a fully coordinated, tactical intelligence center supported by databases and resources from member agencies. It is jointly operated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and CBP. Other agencies represented at EPIC include ICE; USCG; USSS; DOD, Department of the Interior; FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; U.S. Marshals Service; Federal Aviation Administration; National Drug Intelligence Center; Internal Revenue Service; National Geospatial–Intelligence Agency; Joint Task Force–North; Joint Interagency Task Force–South; Texas Department of Public Safety; Texas Air National Guard; and the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office. See DEA, El Paso Intelligence Center. http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/epic.htm 76 DHS, DHS Annual Performance Report, FY2008-10, p. 99. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cfo_apr_fy2008.pdf 77 Interview with I&A senior manager, June 19, 2008. Congressional Research Service 15 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise environmental climate natural disaster, and remote sensing applications.78 In its September 2005 report, a DNI study group unanimously recommended that the scope of the CAC be expanded beyond civil applications to include homeland security and law enforcement applications. In May 2007, the DNI designated DHS to be executive agent and functional manager of the NAO whose mission is to facilitate the use of IC technological assets for those purposes. 79 I&A placed this office within the DU/S-M organization. The establishment of this office, however, has been controversial.80 In 2008, Congress prohibited the use of funds “to commence or continue operations of the NAO until the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies in FY2009 that NAO programs comply with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards and that clear definitions of all proposed domains are established and auditable.”81 Congress also required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the certification and report to Congress.82 After the Obama Administration took office, DHS revisited the need for an NAO program. On June 23, 2009, after a five-month review, which the department stated was conducted in coordination with its law enforcement, emergency management, and intelligence partners, Secretary Napolitano announced her decision to end the NAO program.83 The CAC will continue to foster information sharing for the civil community and will seek to provide CAC members access to the skills and information necessary to protect and maximize the use of assets; facilitate relationships between the Civil and the Intelligence communities to identify and document their requirements; and expand a monthly inter-community forum for technology and information exchange to a much broader audience. 84 Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) HITRAC is the Department’s infrastructure-intelligence fusion center. It is not a formal part of I&A, but is jointly resourced and managed by I&A and the Office of Infrastructure Protection, an office within the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate. HITRAC’s mission is to produce and disseminate timely and meaningful threat- and risk-informed analytic products that can effectively influence the development of infrastructure protection strategies. 85 Its use of 78 U.S. Department of the Interior, Budget Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal Year 2011, pp. I-17-18. http://www.doi.gov//budget/2011/data/greenbook/FY2011_USGS_Greenbook.pdf . Hereafter: DOI, Budget Justification, FY2011. 79 DHS, Fact Sheet: National Applications Office, Aug. 15, 2007. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/ pr_1187188414685.shtm 80 For further background on the controversy surrounding the NAO, see CRS Report RL34421, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 81 P.L. 110-329, Sep. 30, 2008, §518(a)2.c. 82 An initial certification review was completed by GAO in 2008. See GAO memo to Congressional Committees, Nov. 6, 2008. 83 DHS Press Release, “Secretary Napolitano Announces Decision to End National Applications Office,” June 23, 2009. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1245785980174.shtm 84 DOI, Budget Justification, FY2011, p. I-18. 85 DHS, HITRAC Briefing for CRS on programs and services. Congressional Research Service 16 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise intelligence and infrastructure expertise to support risk management decision making is illustrated at Figure 3. Figure 3. Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) Source: DHS HITRAC, Dec. 29, 2008. HITRAC is organized into two divisions responsible for the Center’s principal functions.86 The Risk Analysis Division performs infrastructure risk analysis and prioritization to support decision making. The division manages Congressionally-mandated and priority initiatives, including the Tier 1 and Tier 2 Program87 and the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI).88 The Threat Analysis Division provides three services: critical infrastructure threat analysis, cyber threat 86 Ibid. 87 The Tier 1/Tier 2 Program is intended to identify the Nation’s most critical, highly consequential assets and systems. The over 3,000 Tier 1/Tier2 assets and systems are those that, if disrupted, could create a combination of significant casualties, major economic loss, and/or widespread disruptions in governance and nationally critical missions. The Tier 1/Tier 2 Lists are the key components of the Urban Areas Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Grant Programs’ infrastructure index, as well as other key infrastructure protection programs. See DHS, National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program, Tier 1 and Tier 2 Program Overview. http://www.nonaiswa.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2009/03/national.ppt 88 CFDI identifies important foreign infrastructure that if attacked or destroyed would critically impact the U.S. The prioritized National Critical Foreign Dependencies List (NCFDL) currently contains over 300 assets and systems in over 50 countries. See DHS, Fact Sheet: Critical Infrastructure and Homeland Security Protection Accomplishments, Sep. 5, 2008. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1220878057557.shtm Congressional Research Service 17 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise analysis, and regional threat analysis including threat assessments to support the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).89 HITRAC products90 include State Threat Assessments that support the State Homeland Security Grant Program; Regional Infrastructure Assessments; Strategic Sector Assessment that provide an overall assessment of potential terrorist threats to critical infrastructure and key resources; Quarterly Suspicious Activity Analysis of suspicious incident reports to identify signs or patterns of activity that might pose a threat; Infrastructure Intelligence Notes that provides the private sector with a timely perspective on events, activities, or information of importance to support their specific sector-level security planning; and Homeland Security Assessments and Joint Homeland Security Assessments that communicate intelligence information that impacts the security of U.S. persons and infrastructure. Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate (OPS)— Intelligence Division In an effort “to improve its operations coordination and planning capability for non-routine, multi-Component operations to protect, prevent, respond to, and recover from significant threats and hazards,91 former Secretary Chertoff in 2008 directed the enhancement of an already extant DHS organization—OPS—which was built on the foundation of the former Office of Operations Coordination. I&A provides staff to the OPS Intelligence Division, including its director. A persistent challenge for the Department since its founding has been the integration of 22 legacy and newly-created agencies. Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most operational responsibilities to DHS, many of these components derive their authorities from earlier legislation. 92 The execution of these authorities and responsibilities provides them with nominal operational independence. The Department has sought to develop a robust, departmentwide operations planning and coordination capability to support DHS integration. But, when operational activities involve only one or two components or routine operations, the need and incentive for “department-level” planning and coordination is diminished. 89 CFIUS is an interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury that reviews transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States. The DHS Directorate of Policy reviews each case and makes a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the DHS position on the case. HITRAC prepares risk assessments to support the Directorate of Policy’s review. See Department of the Treasury, Office of Investment Security, CFIUS, Feb. 20, 2009. 90 DHS, HITRAC Information Briefing to CRS, Dec. 12, 2008. 91 DHS, Memorandum from Secretary Chertoff to DHS Components, “Enhancement of DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Capability,” May 22, 2008, p. 1. Hereafter: Chertoff Memo, May 22, 2008. 92 For example, the statutory authority for most Federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 100-707, Nov. 23, 1988. Authority for immigration enforcement and administration is the Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1952 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1101); Customs authorities are generally derived from the Tariff Act of 1930, June 17, 1930 (see 19 U.S.C. §§1461, 1467, 1496, 1581, and 1582). Section 114(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, P.L. 107-71, Nov. 19, 2001, (now codified as 49 U.S.C. §114), assigned TSA responsibility for security of all modes of transportation. The USCG derives authority for its 11 mission programs from many statutes. The authority, for example, to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and U.S. territorial waters is 14 U.S.C. §89. Congressional Research Service 18 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise A further imperative for department-wide operational planning and coordination is to support crisis and contingency planning and operations to support the Secretary of Homeland Security in his/her HSPD-5 role as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management.93 That role not only involves coordinating activities within DHS and its components, but also all “Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”94 The Intelligence Division at OPS is staffed by selected I&A personnel who provide timely, tailored intelligence products and services to support Departmental and interagency plans and operational coordination efforts. The division reaches back to, coordinates with, and leverages I&A parent elements, I&A representatives at state and local fusion centers, component intelligence organizations, and IC agencies as required, for threat-related intelligence, analysis, and other support.95 How the division is integrated into the OPS structure is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4. Directorate of Operations Coordination and Planning Organization Source: DHS OPS, June 22, 2008. 93 According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 2003: “To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management....The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management.” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html 94 HSPD-5, paragraph 4. 95 Chertoff Memo, May 22, 2008, p. 2. Congressional Research Service 19 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise In short, the key function of the OPS Intelligence Division is the application of intelligence research and analysis to conditions on the ground that must be considered for effective planning and operations and the development of a Common Intelligence Picture (CIP). Former Secretary Chertoff provided insight into what a Common Intelligence Picture for DHS should look like: Understanding the enemy’s intent and capabilities affects how we operate at our borders, how we assess risk in protecting infrastructure, how we discern the kind of threats for which we must be prepared to respond…. We need to have a common picture across this Department, of the intelligence that we generate and the intelligence that we require. We need to fuse that information and combine it with information from other members of the intelligence community, as well as information from our state and local and international partners.96 Contributing to the development of a Common Intelligence Picture for the department as a whole is one of the important roles for the OPS Intelligence Division. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Intelligence Element CBP is the agency responsible for securing the nation’s borders at and between ports of entry (POE).97 It was established in 2003, as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, consolidating the inspection and patrol functions of the legacy U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Border Patrol (BP), and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).98 CBP’s primary mission is to prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism into the United States. But it also has responsibility to prevent illegal immigration; regulate and facilitate international trade; collect import duties; enforce U.S. trade and drug laws; and protect Americans and U.S. agricultural and economic interests by preventing the importation of harmful pests, diseases, and contaminated, diseased, infested, or adulterated agricultural and food products. CBP accomplishes its various missions by inspecting persons and goods to determine if they are authorized to enter the United States. CBP officers and Border Patrol agents intercept illegal narcotics, firearms, counterfeit merchandise, and other types of contraband. They also interdict unauthorized aliens and enforce more than 400 laws and regulations at the border. 96 Chertoff, “DHS Second Stage Review Remarks.” 97 A “Port of Entry” or POE, is an officially designated location (seaports, airports, and or land border locations) where CBP officers or employees are assigned to accept entries of merchandise, clear passengers, collect duties, and enforce the various provisions of CBP and related laws. Ports also perform agriculture inspections to protect the United States from potential carriers of animal and plant pests or diseases that could cause serious damage to America’s crops, livestock, pets, and the environment. See CBP, “Ports of Entry and User Fee Airports.” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ trade/trade_outreach/ports.xml. 98 P.L. 107-296, Subtitles C and D. Congressional Research Service 20 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC) In October 2007, CBP reorganized its intelligence and anti-terrorism functions by establishing the OIOC headed by an Assistant Commissioner. It provides intelligence support to CBP’s effort to detect, identify, target, and interdict terrorists, terrorist threats, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal aliens and alien smuggling groups, narcotics traffickers, and other criminals attempting to penetrate or use the borders of the United States to facilitate their illegal activities.99 The Assistant Commissioner for OIOC is also responsible for managing the coordination of field operations among and beyond CBP elements and for CBP’s continuity of operations program.100 The OIOC also functions as the situational awareness hub for CBP providing timely and relevant information and actionable intelligence to operators and decision-makers. The OIOC is divided into four divisions, Incident Management, Field Coordination, Analysis and Targeting, and Intelligence and Situational Awareness. OIOC analysts are stationed at its headquarters and are posted to other agencies in a liaison capacity, such as NCTC, the NJTTF, and the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). CBP Intelligence Support to DHS and CBP Missions. CBP intelligence operations are designed to support the full range of CBP missions, particularly its primary mission of preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism. To that end, the CBP OIOC is engaged in the entire intelligence cycle, including planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination of “all source” information and intelligence to support CBP’s operational elements, as well as their partners within DHS and other government agencies.101 Although CBP does not engage in traditional foreign intelligence collection activities, it receives information from DHS I&A, the IC, and law enforcement agencies. In addition, CBP gathers and analyzes large amounts of data concerning persons and cargo inbound to the U.S. as well as information derived from the apprehensions of illegal aliens, drug seizures, and other border enforcement activities. For example, CBP collects advance passenger information (API)102 for all air and ship passengers and crew traveling to or from the United States. During its border inspection activities, CBP officers may also examine documents, books, and other printed material, as well as computers disks, hard drives, and other electronic or digital storage devices. 103 All of this data is a unique source of operational intelligence that is potentially very 99 CBP, “OIOC Organizational Information.” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/organization/assist_comm_off/ Ibid. 101 CBP, “Commissioner’s Message – New Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination,” July 23, 2007. 100 102 API data consists of the information on the biographical page of the person’s passport, plus additional information on the flight or voyage generated by the airline or shipping line. API includes the traveler’s surname, first name, and any middle names; date of birth; gender; citizenship; and type of travel document used for identification, document number, and place of issue. API also includes departure point and time, arrival point and time, and air carrier and flight number. 103 A CBP officer’s border search authority is derived from federal statutes and regulations, including 19 C.F.R. 162.6, which states that, “All persons, baggage and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States from places outside thereof are liable to inspection by a CBP officer.” Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all persons entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subject to examination and search by CBP officers. Source: CBP, “CBP Authority to Search,” June 12, 2008. Hereafter: “CBP Authority to Search.” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ travel/admissibility/authority_to_search.xml Congressional Research Service 21 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise useful to other Federal agencies with national security missions. The border environments in which the CBP offices operate illustrate how intelligence supports DHS and CBP mission activities. At Ports of Entry CBP officers conduct screening activities to determine the admissibility of persons and goods and interdict dangerous people, dangerous items, and contraband. Given the volume of people and goods seeking entry into the U.S. every year, it is impractical for CBP to physically inspect every person or shipment that arrives at a U.S. port.104 Therefore, CBP analyzes trade data and cargo, crew, and passenger manifest information to ‘target’ its inspection resources towards those persons or cargo shipments that potentially pose the highest risk. Intelligence from other Federal agencies, in the form of ‘lookouts,’ and other law enforcement and intelligence reporting, is also reviewed. The targeting mechanism used by CBP is the Automated Targeting System (ATS). ATS is composed of six modules that focus on exports, imports, passengers and crew (airline passenger and crew on international flights, passengers and crew on sea carriers), private vehicles crossing at land borders, and import trends over time. These modules employ weighted rule sets105 to identify high-risk passengers and cargo shipments. In the cargo environment, ATS employs these rule sets to assign scores based on factors associated with risk. Above a certain threshold risk score, cargo is subject to further inspection.106 A variety of data107 is used within ATS to perform risk analysis. For cargo, ATS uses data from the Automated Commercial System (ACS), Automated Broker Interface (ABI), Automated Manifest System (AMS), and the new Automated Commercial Environment. 108 104 In FY2009, at 327 ports of entry, CBP inspected over 361 million travelers; 109 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft; encountered 224,000 inadmissible aliens; seized more than 1.5 million pounds of illegal narcotics; and seized over 1.5 million prohibited meat, plant materials or animal products, including 166,727 agricultural pests. Source: CBP, Securing America’s Borders – CBP 2009 Fiscal Year in Review, November 24, 2009. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2009_news_releases/nov_09/11242009_5.xml 105 These rules are developed using sophisticated concepts of business activity intended to identify suspicious or unusual behavior. See DHS Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) CBP ATS, November 22, 2006., p. 3. Hereafter: DHS Privacy Impact Assessment on ATS. 106 National targeting thresholds are set by the National Targeting Center and are evaluated and adjusted in response to intelligence and analysis. 107 Data include electronically filed bills, entries, and entry summaries for cargo imports; shippers’ export declarations and transportation bookings and bills for cargo exports; manifests for arriving and departing passengers; land border crossing and referral records for vehicles crossing the border, airline reservation data; non-immigrant entry records; and records from secondary referrals, incident logs, suspect and violator indices, and seizures. A full list of data by module can be found at DHS Privacy Impact Assessment on ATS, Appendix A, pp. 25-27. 108 ACS is the legacy system used by CBP to track, control, and process all commercial goods imported into the United States. ABI is the part of ACS that permits qualified participants to file import data electronically. AMS is used by carriers to file advance declarations of their international containers and cargo contents. ACE is CBP’s new import and export cargo manifest processing system intended to facilitate trade and strengthen border security. Deployed in phases, ACE will be expanded to provide cargo processing capabilities across all modes of transportation and replace existing systems with a single, multi-modal manifest system for land, air, rail and sea cargo in a secure, paper-free, web-enabled environment. See CBP, “ACE At a Glance Fact Sheet,” Oct. 7, 2009. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/ fact_sheets/trade/ace_factsheets/ace_glance_sheet.xml Congressional Research Service 22 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise The passenger component of ATS (ATS-P) processes traveler information against other information available to ATS, and applies threat-based scenarios comprised of risk-based rules to assist CBP officers in identifying individuals who require additional screening or in determining whether individuals should be allowed or denied entry into the United States. The risk-based rules are derived from discrete data elements, including criteria that pertain to specific operational/tactical objectives or local enforcement efforts. Unlike in the cargo environment, ATS-P does not use a score to determine an individual’s risk level. Instead, it compares Passenger Name Record (PNR) 109 and information in the following databases against lookouts and patterns of suspicious activity identified by analysts based upon past investigations and intelligence. • Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS)110 • Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)111 • Non Immigrant Information System (NIIS)112 • Suspect and Violator Indices (SAVI)113 • Department of State visa databases114 • Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems This risk assessment is an analysis of the threat-based scenario(s) that a traveler matched when traveling on a given flight. These scenarios are drawn from previous and current law enforcement and intelligence information. This analysis is done in advance of a traveler’s arrival to or 109 PNR is the information contained within the computerized reservation systems of air and sea carriers. PNR data include, but are not limited to full itinerary; co-travelers; contact information; travel agency, form of payment; seat assignment; bag tag numbers, and changes to the reservation. A full list of PNR data fields is at DHS Privacy Impact Assessment on ATS, Appendix B, p. 28. 110 TECS is a computerized information system designed to identify individuals and businesses suspected of, or involved in violation of Federal law. Resident on TECS at the CBP Data Center is the Interagency Border Information System (IBIS) which tracks information on suspected individuals, businesses, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels and includes terrorist and other law enforcement lookouts, and visa, immigration, and border crossing data. TECS also provides access to the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunication Systems (NLETS), the latter of which provides direct access to state motor vehicle departments. See “CBP Authority to Search;” and Department of Treasury, “System of Records Notice,” 66 Federal Register 53029, Oct. 18, 2001. 111 APIS is the electronic data interchange system for air carrier transmission to CBP of electronic passenger, crew member, and non-crew member manifest data. See DHS, “Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels; Final Rule,” 72 Federal Register 48320, Aug. 23, 2007. Hereafter referred to as DHS Advance Electronic Transmission of Manifests Final Rule, Aug. 23, 2007. 112 The NIIS is a repository of records tracking persons arriving in or departing from the United States as nonimmigrant visitors. See USCIS, System Notice for Non Immigrant Information System. http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/ uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid= f63fd0676988d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel= 34139c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&survey=1 113 SAVI consists of records of individuals suspected of or who have violated Customs laws. See Department of Treasury, “System of Records Notice,” 66 Federal Register 53025 and 53031, Oct. 18, 2001. 114 These include the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), used by State Department to house information about people who have violated the terms of their visas; and the Consolidated Consular Database (CCD), which integrates State Department information used by foreign visa officers. Congressional Research Service 23 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise departure from the United States and becomes one tool available to DHS officers in identifying illegal activity. 115 It was through application of the ATS-P that CBP officers at the National Targeting Center selected Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate an explosive device on board Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, for further questioning upon his arrival at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport POE.116 National Targeting Center (NTC) The operational organization that utilizes the ATS to support CBP officers at POE’s is the NTC. It is not an intelligence organization, it is part of the CBP Office of Field Operations. But it is a significant consumer of intelligence information, upon which it conducts analysis and bases recommendations for security actions. It is also a major source of information about passenger and cargo movements that can be exploited for intelligence purposes. The NTC grew out of efforts by the legacy U.S. Customs Service to develop targeting techniques at the port level to detect drug smuggling and currency violations in both the passenger and cargo environments. Post-9/11, Customs began adapting these targeting practices towards anti-terrorist and other national security concerns. In November of 2001, following the 9/11 attacks, the NTC began operations on a 24/7 basis. In March 2007, the NTC was divided into two elements, NTC–Passenger and NTC–Cargo. NTC—Passenger (NTCP) The NTCP works closely with the OIOC and other intelligence and law enforcement organizations to develop targeting rule sets for ATS-P. They then work with analytical units located at POE’s to provide targeting information and real-time response to requests from CBP officers in the field for information on potentially high-risk passengers seeking entry into the United States.117 One of the most important sources of information analyzed by NTCP is API data which commercial carriers are required to submit to CBP on all air and ship passengers and crew traveling to the United States.118 The data is examined to determine possible matches with various inspection systems and watchlists that include lookouts on known and suspected terrorists or other persons of interest to U.S. law enforcement agencies. NTC—Cargo (NTCC) The NTCC supports efforts to detect and prevent dangerous cargo from entering the United States. It examines advance electronic manifest information that CBP requires to be submitted for all modes of transportation.119 It then uses advanced, computerized risk-assessment techniques 115 DHS System of Records Notice for the ATS, p. 6. Sebastian Rotella, “U.S. Learned Intelligence on Airline Attack Suspect While He Was Enroute.” Los Angeles Times.com, Jan. 7, 2010. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/07/nation/la-na-airline-terror7-....jan07 117 CBP, Performance and Accountability Report, FY2007, Nov. 13, 2007, p. 17. 116 118 Effective Feb. 18, 2008, carriers must provide CBP with API data in advance of passenger boarding of aircraft or vessels. See DHS Advance Electronic Transmission of Manifests Final Rule, Aug. 23, 2007. 119 Twenty-four hours in advance of lading for cargo loaded on US-bound vessels; four hours or wheels-up for (continued...) Congressional Research Service 24 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise within ATS to sort the information according to more than 100 variables. Citing security concerns, federal officials refused to list those variables, but some officials said that the port of origin, the nature of the cargo, and the track records of the exporter and importer were among the criteria.120 In addition, the NTCC provides significant support to Cargo Security Initiative ports where CBP has stationed targeting teams to identity containers for inspection prior to their being loaded on U.S.-bound vessels. The NTCC works closely with OIOC to develop targeting rule sets for the cargo component of ATS. They also collaborate with NTCP who notifies NTCC of any passenger matches to terroristrelated or other law enforcement lookouts. NTCC will then run those matches against various databases to determine if those individuals are involved with any cargo businesses or specific cargo shipments. The NTCC focuses particular attention on types of cargo that could be ingredients for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), weapons of mass effect, chemical precursors of illegal drugs, and conventional weapons and explosives. Sweeps based on specified targeting parameters are conducted daily to target suspect chemical, biological, radiological, conventional weapons, explosives, and ammonium nitrate shipments.121 In early 2008, working with ICE and DEA, this targeting identified suspicious bills of lading, which led to the seizure of chemicals associated with the manufacture of methamphetamines.122 In late 2007, targeting and analysis within NTCC led to the intercept and seizure of over $3 million worth of assault rifles and small arms destined for Central America.123 Between POE’s. While CBP officers work primarily at POE’s, Border Patrol agents patrol vast areas along the northern and southern international land borders of the United States that lie in between the POE’s, as well as the coasts of Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Office of Air and Marine (A&M ) supports this mission through its operations within the air and maritime environments. Two centers that provide intelligence support to these operations are the Border Field Intelligence Center (BORFIC) and the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC). In addition, the Border Patrol has placed intelligence units within each of its 20 Border Patrol Sectors.124 OIOC supports BP and A&M with real-time intelligence and strategic analyses about the conveyances, routes, and other methods that undocumented aliens, human smugglers, drug (...continued) international air cargo; four hours in advance of arrival for inbound rail cargo; and one hour in advance of arrival for cargo on inbound trucks (30 minutes in advance of arrival for FAST shipments). 120 Seth Schiesel, “Their Mission: Intercepting Deadly Cargo,” New York Times, Mar. 20, 2003. 121 CBP, “NTCC,” a briefing provided to CRS on July 21, 2008. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 The Border Patrol Sectors (listed alphabetically): Blaine, Washington; Buffalo, New York; Del Rio, Texas; Detroit (Selfridge Air National Guard Base), Michigan; El Centro, California; El Paso, Texas; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Havre, Montana; Houlton, Maine; Laredo, Texas; Marfa, Texas; Miami, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Ramey, (Aguadilla), Puerto Rico; Rio Grande Valley, Texas; San Diego, California; Spokane, Washington; Swanton, Vermont; Tucson, Arizona; and Yuma, Arizona. Congressional Research Service 25 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise traffickers, and other criminals use to enter or smuggle persons or contraband into the United States. An example of this strategic intelligence analysis was an April 2006 report125 co-produced by CBP and the NCTC. The report, which surveyed the arrest records of “special interest aliens” (SIA)126 caught at the U.S. southern border, revealed how these individuals entered the U.S. and how terrorists could exploit such vulnerabilities. In response to this information, DHS developed and implemented a multi-pronged plan to address those vulnerabilities. The plan included targeted training and other efforts to eliminate the proliferation and use of false passports from one African country; and training to build the detection capabilities of several Western Hemisphere countries that were noted to be used by SIA’s with false or altered passports in transit to the United States. Border Field Intelligence Center (BORFIC) Originally established as the Border Patrol Field Intelligence Center in 2004 in El Paso, Texas, BORFIC conducts all-source intelligence activities to support the border security mission of the BP and other DHS and CBP elements to predict, detect, deter, and interdict terrorists, terrorist weapons, and human traffickers and contraband smugglers entering the United States.127 In October 2007, the organization was fully integrated into the CBP OIOC and its name changed to the Border Field Intelligence Center. BORFIC is responsible for supporting security efforts on both the northern and southern borders. It exchanges intelligence and law enforcement information with numerous Federal, state, local, and tribal organizations agencies and actively participates in several interagency and bilateral groups. These include the El Paso Interagency Intelligence Working Group which includes EPIC, DOD’s Joint Task Force-North, and the FBI; the Bilateral Interdiction Working Group with Mexico, the Integrated Border Intelligence Teams (IBETS)128 with Canada, and the Caribbean Border Interagency Group. BORFIC shares law enforcement intelligence information with state and local fusion centers through the HS-SLIC portal. In addition, BORFIC has four personnel assigned to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) who work in tandem with I&A’s Homeland Intelligence Support Team also located there. 125 NCTC, SIA Trends Reveal Vulnerabilities Along Route to U.S., Apr. 6, 2006. The term Special Interest Alien (SIA) covers individuals traveling illegally to the United States and originating in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Gaza, and the West Bank. See Ibid., p. 1. Countries and territories are presumed to be included on the SIA list due to the connections of some of their citizens to international terrorism. 127 CBP BORFIC, Briefing for CRS, Dec. 3, 2008. 128 The IBETS are a joint effort of U.S. and Canadian law enforcement and security agencies to combine and coordinate their intelligence and law enforcement expertise to identify and stop the high-risk movement of people and goods between the ports of entry on the Canada - United States border. On the Canadian side, IBETS are co-managed by the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. U.S. participating agencies are CBP, ICE, and the USCG. There are IBETs operating in 15 regions along the border. Source: CBSA, Canada-U.S. IBETS. http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/ibet-eipf-eng.html#mission 126 Congressional Research Service 26 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) Located in Riverside, California, the AMOC is a 24/7, multi-agency coordination center that detects, sorts, and monitors air and marine tracks of interest129 across the nation’s borders and maritime approaches. A subordinate center located in Puerto Rico performs the same mission for the Caribbean region. The AMOC also serves as host activity for the central operations of CBP’s long-range unmanned aircraft systems and is the CBP focal point for the coordination of unmanned aircraft system maritime operations with the USCG. The AMOC is staffed with intelligence operations specialists who provide connectivity to the OIOC, DHS, and the IC. It also has liaison officers assigned from the USCG, FAA, DOD National Guard Bureau, and the Government of Mexico. 130 The AMOC produces a comprehensive air surveillance radar picture through its Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS). Fusing input from up to 450 sensors, including an extensive network of military and civilian radars across the United States and Canada, the AMOSS can process up to 24,000 fused tracks every 12 seconds and input up to 1,000 flight plans per minute. 131 This allows the AMOC to provide real-time data on suspicious or noncooperative aircraft and marine vessels to A&M, BP, and the USCG to support interdiction operations as well as to other DHS intelligence and operations centers. In addition to aircraft and vessel location data, Detection Systems Specialists at the AMOC have access to numerous law enforcement and other databases that allow them to provide operational units with information regarding the flight plans, history, ownership, and registration of aircraft and vessels and criminal background information on pilots and vessel crew. In addition to its land and maritime border security mission, the AMOC also supports the multiagency effort to provide airspace security for the National Capital Region. As a participating agency within the National Capital Region Coordination Center, the AMOC provides its comprehensive radar picture and law enforcement sorting, detection, and investigative capabilities to assist in identifying and determining the threat posed by aircraft that are not compliant with the flight rules in effect for the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area Air Defense Identification Zone (DC ADIZ). 132 Intelligence Driven Special Operations (IDSO) OIOC collaborates with CBP Office of Field Operations to develop IDSO’s based on threat information. IDSO’s not only address immediate threat concerns, but also serve to counter predictability in CBP inspection operations. They are enforcement actions that are based upon 129 Among the reasons for an aircraft or vessel to be considered a track of interest is that it is unidentified, uncooperative (i.e., not responding to air traffic control or law enforcement direction), or otherwise behaving suspiciously. 130 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies, 07-89, Oct. 2006, pp. 13-14. 131 Spanky Kirsch, “Multifunction Phased Array Radar’s Contribution to Secure Skies and Borders,” DHS Science and Technology Directorate, slide presentation, Oct. 11, 2007, slide 24. 132 The DC ADIZ is that area of airspace in which the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft is required in the interests of national security. Specifically, it is that airspace from the surface to 18,000 feet within a 30-mile radius of the Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). See Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 7/0206, effective Aug. 30, 2007. Congressional Research Service 27 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise specific intelligence or current trends and are vetted through the DHS CINT.133 For example, if an increase in aliens entering the United States illegally from or through a particular country were documented, CBP could develop an IDSO to intensify inspection activity on persons and routes from that country. An IDSO based on specific intelligence was conducted following the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. CBP analysis revealed an increase in aliens attempting to enter the U.S. illegally using freight and passenger railcars along the northern border. In response, CBP assigned officers and resources to targeted POE’s to intensify inspections of railcars; NTC intensified its screening of persons and cargo, the BP assisted in capturing and detaining illegal aliens; and CBP intelligence intensified its checks of foreign nationals through the IC.134 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Intelligence Element ICE is the largest investigative organization within DHS. It was established in 2003 and incorporated into DHS by consolidating the investigative elements of the former U.S. Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and by transferring the Federal Protective Service from the General Services Administration (GSA). ICE’s mission is to enforce trade and immigration laws through the investigation of activities, persons and events that may pose a threat to the safety or security of the United States and its people. OI also investigates illegal trafficking in weapons (including weapons of mass destruction), the smuggling of narcotics and other contraband, human smuggling and trafficking, money laundering and other financial crimes, fraudulent trade practices, identity and benefit fraud, child pornography, child sex tourism, and health and public safety dangers.135 It has four operational divisions: • Office of Investigations (OI). OI is responsible for investigating a range of issues that may threaten national security. OI uses its legal authority to investigate issues such as immigration crime, human rights violations, and human smuggling; narcotics, weapons and other types of smuggling; and financial crimes, cybercrime, and export enforcement issues. 136 Of note, ICE Special Agents are the largest non-FBI component of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).137 133 Written Testimony of CBP Director of the Office of Intelligence, L. Thomas Bortmes, in U.S. Congress, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the House Committee on Homeland Security, “DHS Intelligence and Border Security: Delivering Operational Intelligence.” 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 28, 2006, (Washington: U.S. GPO, 2007). 134 CBP briefing to CRS, May 25, 2004. 135 ICE, FY2010 Enacted Budget Fact Sheet, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/ 136 ICE, ICE Programs, Office of Investigations. http://www.ice.gov/investigations/index.htm 137 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are investigative units consisting of law enforcement and other specialists from dozens of U.S. Federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They are led by DOJ and the FBI. The National JTTF was established in July 2002. Forty agencies are represented in the NJTTF, which has become a focal point for information sharing and the management of large-scale projects that involve multiple agencies. See DOJ, Joint Terrorism Task Force. http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf/ Congressional Research Service 28 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise • Detention and Removal Operations (DRO). DRO is the primary enforcement arm within ICE for the identification, apprehension and removal of illegal aliens from the United States.138 • Office of International Affairs (OIA). With 63 offices in 44 countries, OIA develops partnerships with foreign governments to advance the homeland security mission. 139 • Office of Intelligence, discussed below. Office of Intelligence ICE’s intelligence activities are coordinated and managed within the Office of Intelligence. The office is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating strategic and tactical intelligence for use by the operational elements of ICE and DHS. ICE intelligence activities focus on information related to the movement of people, money and materials into, within and out of the United States. Its objective is to provide timely, accurate, and useful intelligence to support a range of investigative activities by identifying patterns, trends, routes, and methods of criminal activity; predicting emerging and future threats; and identifying potential systemic vulnerabilities and methods to mitigate those vulnerabilities. 140 Although ICE is not a member of the IC, the Office of Intelligence participates in all aspects of the intelligence cycle. In support of the agency’s mission, the office collects and analyzes information from a variety of sources including the IC, other federal agencies, other components of DHS, state, local, tribal, and foreign agencies. It also analyzes the considerable information derived from ICE operational activity, such as investigations, document exploitation, and interviews of detainees. Information sources include classified intelligence reporting, law enforcement sensitive information, and open source material such as commercial and trade data. Consumers of ICE intelligence products are ICE investigators; DRO and FPS officials; the ICE and DHS leadership; DHS partners, particularly CBP; the Department of State; FBI; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The Office of Intelligence is led by a Director and consists of six divisions and 26 Field Intelligence Groups.141 The Intelligence Operations Division coordinates and provides intelligence support to ICE field components, including the ICE Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) offices, DRO field offices, and FPS regions. The Intelligence Programs Division analyzes information obtained from intelligence, law enforcement, and open sources and produces finished intelligence products to support ICE, DHS, and other intelligence and law enforcement consumers. 138 ICE, ICE Programs, Detention and Removal Operations. http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/index.htm ICE, About the ICE Office of International Affairs. http://www.ice.gov/international-affairs/presence.htm 140 ICE Office of Intelligence, Mission Overview and Guide to Products and Services, June 2008, p. 1. 141 The missions of these divisions are described in detail in Ibid, pp. 2-5. 139 Congressional Research Service 29 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Intelligence Programs Division The Intelligence Programs Division has the following specialized units: Counter Proliferation Intelligence, Human Smuggling and Public Safety (HSPSU), Contraband, Illicit Finance/Trade Fraud, and International Intelligence, and the Tactical Intelligence Center located in Bay Saint Louis, Mississippi, which works with the National Security Agency and other intelligence units to integrate and analyze signals intelligence, human intelligence, and law enforcement information to identify new criminal organization targets for ICE investigations, assist NSA in SIGINT targeting, and support other Office of Intelligence units in performing strategic level intelligence analysis. The International and Border Support unit focuses production on two primary areas. The first is support rendered to the ICE Attachés of the Office of International Affairs through the International Intelligence Unit. The second is through another cell that provides support to Southwest Border operations that target criminal organizations operating in that region, especially those that contribute to escalating violence along the border. Southwest Border is focused on four operations: the Border Violence Intelligence Cell, Support the Border Enforcement Security Taskforces, Operation Armas Cruzdas, and Operation Firewall. Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) The BVIC was established in January 2008 in order to provide intelligence support for ICE weapons smuggling investigations and government-wide efforts to combat violence along the United States-Mexico border.142 It is located at EPIC within the Crime-Terror Nexus Unit. The BVIC works closely with I&A’s Homeland Intelligence Support Team, and other partners at EPIC. As the level of violence along the U.S.- Mexican border intensified in the past two years, ICE has partnered with Mexican and other U.S. law enforcement agencies on three initiatives described below to enhance border security, disrupt transnational criminal organizations, and stop the illegal flow of firearms from the United States into Mexico. These are the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST), Armas Cruzadas, and Operation Firewall. The BVIC supports all three programs. At the BVIC, all-source intelligence is analyzed and operational leads are provided to the BEST task forces and ICE attaché offices. The BVIC also analyzes data from arrests and seizures by the BEST task forces and exchange intelligence with Mexican law enforcement agencies. In November 2008, the BVIC, in collaboration with CBP and DHS I&A, produced an Intelligence Report, United States Southbound Weapons Smuggling Assessment, which examined U.S. southbound weapon smuggling trends. This report was designed to support the BEST’s and other operational components in planning and conducting outbound firearms smuggling operations. In December 2008, the BVIC also co-authored a strategic-level analysis for the ICE and DHS leadership on the same issue. 142 ICE, BVIC Fact Sheet, June 2008. Congressional Research Service 30 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) The BEST initiative143 consists of a series of multi-agency investigative task forces, of which ICE is the lead agency. They seek to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing significant threats to border security. Other agency participants include CBP, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), FBI, USCG, and the U.S. Attorney’s offices, and state and local law enforcement. The Mexican law enforcement agency Secretaria de Seguridad Publica is a partner along the southern border. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canadian Border Services Agency are partners on the northern border. There are currently BEST task forces on both the northern and southwestern borders with ten on the southwest border. Each BEST concentrates on the prevalent threat in their area. On the southern border, this entails cross-border violence; weapons smuggling and trafficking; illegal drug and other contraband smuggling; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; and human smuggling and trafficking. The Office of Intelligence maintains 28 analysts within the Southwest Border BESTs to ensure responsive intelligence support and appropriate information sharing with other federal, Government of Mexico, state, tribal and local law enforcement partners.144 Armas Cruzadas Armas Cruzadas is a partnership between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies. 145 Its objective is to synchronize bilateral law enforcement and intelligence sharing operations in order to identify, disrupt, and dismantle trans-border weapons smuggling networks. Among the activities under Armas Cruzadas, ICE Border Liaisons are deployed to the border to strengthen bilateral communication. There is also a Weapons Virtual Task Force, a virtual online community where U.S. and Mexican investigators can share intelligence and communicate in a secure environment.146 For the United States, ICE is a major participant agency in Armas Cruzadas because of its authority as the Federal agency responsible for investigating cases involving weapons being smuggled out of the United States. ATF participates as a result of its authority over weapons being illegally sold and transported within the United States. CBP is also a participating agency due to its border security responsibilities. Operation Firewall Operation Firewall is an initiative to combat bulk cash smuggling, one of the methods that transnational criminal organizations use to move the proceeds from their criminal activities to fund future operations. ICE has found that as successful enforcement has made the transfer of illicit funds between banks and other financial institutions more difficult, criminal organizations 143 ICE, BEST Fact Sheet, Dec. 3, 2008. ICE Briefing for CRS, Jan. 21, 2010. 145 ICE, Armas Cruzadas Fact Sheet, Nov. 12, 2008. 144 146 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, Law Enforcement Responses to Mexican Drug Cartels, Statement of Kumar C. Kibble, Deputy Director, ICE Office of Investigations, 111th Cong., Mar. 17, 2009. Congressional Research Service 31 The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise are increasing their use of bulk cash smuggling. 147 Operation Firewall is a joint effort with CBP to target the full array of methods used to smuggle bulk cash, including commercial and private passenger vehicles, commercial airline shipments and passengers, and pedestrians crossing U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada. 148 Collection Management and Requirements Division The Collection Management and Requirements Division coordinates the intelligence collection and reports efforts within ICE. In this regard, it works closely with other DHS and IC elements to articulate ICE intelligence requirements to collection elements within the IC to ensure the flow of needed information to ICE. This division also manages the ICE Joint Intelligence Operations Center. The Office of Intelligence also has two divisions which provide support activities, the Business Management Division and the Executive Information and Technology Division. Business Management provides support to daily operations throughout the homeland and overseas through executing procurement, budget, logistics, and training functions. The Executive Information and Technology Division provides information technology services that support day to day operations, processing large quantities of information, and managing secure communications s [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR40602. Public record. Not legal advice.