# Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR40567

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** December 23, 2009
- **Citation:** R40567

## Text

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and
Appropriations
(name redacted),
Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
December 23, 2009

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R40567

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Summary
For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8
billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion for the so-called “base
budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations—and $130.0 billion for “overseas
contingency operations,” including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration also
requested $75.9 billion in supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2009 to cover war costs. The
Administration’s DOD request, made public May 7, 2009, incorporated Defense Secretary Robert
Gates’s April 6 recommendations to curtail funding for several major weapons programs focused
on conventional warfare.
The FY2010 national defense authorization bills drafted by the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees generally supported this shift in policy, which the Obama Administration’s budget
request reflected. However, both committees added to their respective bills authorization to
continue production of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter and to continue development of an alternative
engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Obama Administration warned that a bill that
continued either program would be vetoed. On June 25, the House passed by a vote of 389-22 its
version of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647, which would authorize a
total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base budget and $129.3 billion for war costs. The bill also
would authorize $16.5 billion for defense-related nuclear activities of the Department of Energy,
which was $83.3 million more than requested. On July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee
reported its version of the authorization bill, S. 1390, which would authorize $534.6 billion for
the DOD base budget, $129.3 billion for war costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department.
The Senate passed the bill on July 23 by a vote of 87-7 after adopting several amendments,
including two that would, in effect, end production of the F-22 and terminate the F-35 alternate
engine programs, as the Administration had requested.
The conference report on the authorization bill authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military
activities of DOD and defense-related activities of other federal agencies, which is $14.9 million
more than the Obama Administration requested. The conference report, which terminates the F-22
but continues the alternate engine program, was adopted by the House on October 8 by a vote of
281-146. The Senate adopted the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and President
Obama signed the bill (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.
The House passed its version of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) on July 30,
by a vote of 400-30. The bill would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget (covering
all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported September 10 an amended version of H.R. 3326
which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war
costs. The Senate passed the bill October 6 by a vote of 93-7.
In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate
negotiators agreed on an amendment to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3326 that would
appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs.
The House passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 (395-34); the Senate passed
it December 19 (88-10). The President signed the bill December 19 (P.L. 111-118).

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Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
Defense Authorization Conference............................................................................................ 2
Compromise Version of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326) ........................................... 3
Temporary Extensions of Non-Defense Programs .............................................................. 4
Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request ........................................................................ 5
Status of Legislation ........................................................................................................................ 6
War Costs and Issues ....................................................................................................................... 7
Debate About Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan ........................................................... 8
Basis and Status of War Cost Request in Pending Legislation ................................................ 10
Authorization Action on War Funding (H.R. 2647. P.L. 111-84) ............................................ 14
Changes to DOD’s Request ............................................................................................... 14
Extensions and Additional Reporting Requirements......................................................... 15
Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118) .......................................................... 17
Assessing Uncertainties In Operations Funding ............................................................... 18
Funding for Force Protection Vehicles .............................................................................. 18
Transfers from Funding in the Base Budget...................................................................... 18
Commanders Emergency Response Program Funding ..................................................... 19
Funding for Training Afghan Security Forces and for Guantanamo Bay ......................... 19
Base Budget: Comparison and Context ......................................................................................... 19
Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy ........................................................................................ 23
Background: Strategic Direction ............................................................................................. 24
Strategic Processes .................................................................................................................. 25
Issues for Congress: Secretary Gates’s Proposals .......................................................................... 26
Quality of Life Issues .............................................................................................................. 26
End-Strength Increase ....................................................................................................... 27
Health Care and Family Support ....................................................................................... 27
Preparing for “The Wars We’re In” ......................................................................................... 29
Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) ...................................................... 29
Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206) .................................................................... 30
Army Brigade Combat Teams ........................................................................................... 31
Special Operations Forces ................................................................................................. 32
Helicopter Crew Training .................................................................................................. 32
Shipbuilding—Request............................................................................................................ 32
Aircraft Carriers ................................................................................................................ 33
DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers ................................................................................. 34
CG(X) Cruiser ................................................................................................................... 34
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) .............................................................................................. 35
LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) ........... 35
Aircraft—Request.................................................................................................................... 36
Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18) ................................................................. 36
F-22 Raptor ....................................................................................................................... 37
Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17) ............................................................................................... 38
Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)............................................................................ 39
Missile Defense—Request ...................................................................................................... 40
Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis) ....................................................................... 40

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Ground-Based National Missile Defense .......................................................................... 41
Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI) ............................................................. 41
Congressional Perspectives ............................................................................................... 42
Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—Request .............................................................. 42
Congressional Perspectives ............................................................................................... 43
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date ................................................................. 44
FY2010 Congressional Budget Resolution ............................................................................. 44
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S. 1390) ..................................................... 44
Ballistic Missile Defense—Authorization......................................................................... 45
Shipbuilding—Authorization ............................................................................................ 47
Combat Aircraft—Authorization....................................................................................... 49
Ground Combat Systems—Authorization......................................................................... 52
Military Personnel Policy: End-Strength, Pay Raise......................................................... 53
DOD Civilian Employees: NSPS, A-76 ............................................................................ 53
Concurrent Receipt............................................................................................................ 54
Military Commissions, Detainees and Guantanamo Bay .................................................. 54
Hate Crimes (Title XLVII) ................................................................................................ 56
Economic Development Conveyance of Surplus Real Property (BRAC) ........................ 57
Guam Realignment ............................................................................................................ 57
Other Senate Provisions .................................................................................................... 58
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326) .................................................................. 60
Ballistic Missile Defense—Appropriation ........................................................................ 62
Shipbuilding—Appropriation............................................................................................ 64
Aircraft—Appropriation.................................................................................................... 65
Ground Combat Systems—Appropriation ........................................................................ 69
Other Provisions ................................................................................................................ 70

Tables
Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010 .................... 5
Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390 .................................. 7
Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills (H.R. 3326) ............................................ 7
Table 4. Congressional Action on DOD’s War FY2010 Budget Request ...................................... 13
Table 5. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with 4% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) ............................................................................................................................ 20
Table 6. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009 ................................................ 21
Table 7. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, House and Senate Action by Title,
H.R. 2647, S. 1390 ..................................................................................................................... 59
Table 8. FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118) Summary by
Title ............................................................................................................................................. 71
Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Authorization ............... 72
Table A-2. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Appropriations ............. 76
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs:
Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 80

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Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps
Programs: Appropriations ........................................................................................................... 84
Table A-5. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:
Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 88
Table A-6. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:
Appropriations ............................................................................................................................ 90
Table A-7. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
Aircraft Programs: Authorization ............................................................................................... 92
Table A-8. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force Aircraft Programs: Appropriations ................................................................................... 97
Table A-9. Congressional Action on FY2010 DOD War Funding Request (Defense
Appropriations and Military Construction Appropriations Bills) ............................................. 103

Appendixes
Appendix. Program Funding Tables .............................................................................................. 72

Contacts
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 108
Key Policy Staff ........................................................................................................................... 108

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Most Recent Developments
The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 2647), as well as a compromise version of the FY2010 defense
appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) that was agreed to by House and Senate negotiators in lieu of a
conference report, largely support proposals by the Obama Administration to terminate some
major weapons programs that were designed for traditional combat—such as the Air Force’s F-22
fighter. The rationale for these cuts, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, was to allow
DOD to focus more resources on equipment better suited to the type of operations underway in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
The House approved the authorization conference report on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The
Senate approved the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and the President signed the
bill into law (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.
In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate
negotiators agreed on a compromise amendment to the Senate-passed version of the bill, which
would appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget (covering all accounts except military
construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs.1 The House passed that compromise
version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. The Senate approved it on December 18 by
a vote of 88-10. The President signed the bill on December 19 (P.L. 111-118).
Neither the FY2010 defense authorization act nor the companion defense appropriations bill
covered funds that will pay for President Obama’s decision, announced December 1, to increase
by 30,000 the number of U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan. The bills do cover funds to pay for
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that already were underway prior to the December 1
announcement that additional forces would be deployed. (See “War Costs and Issues,” below.)
The enacted versions of both the authorization and appropriations bills fund continued
development of an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) had warned in its official Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on each
of the defense bills that the President might veto any bill that continued the alternate engine
program. Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed that warning in an October 13 letter to the
chairman and ranking minority member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
The Administration’s veto threats concerning the alternate engine program were more ambiguous
than the flat, unqualified declaration by President Obama earlier in the year that he would veto
any bill that funded continued production of the F-22. In the case of the alternate engine program,
both OMB and Secretary Gates said that the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto
of any bill that would “seriously disrupt” the F-35 program, which, Administration officials
contend, the alternate engine program might do. For details on the alternate engine issue, see
“Defense Authorization Conference,” below.
The Administration had taken a less adamant stance in its opposition to provisions of the defense
appropriations bill which would continue production of the C-17, a wide-body cargo jet. Like
1
An additional $1.4 billion in war-related military construction is funded in the FY2010 Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill which was enacted as Part E of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3288).

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OMB, Secretary Gates said that he “strongly objects” to the Senate bill’s addition of $1.5 billion
for 10 C-17s and to the House bill’s addition of $674 million for three of the planes. Neither
OMB’s Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) nor Secretary Gates’s letter contained any
explicit warning that President Obama might veto the defense bill over that issue. The
compromise final version of H.R. 3326 would add to the budget request $1.5 billion for 10 C-17s.
On the other hand, both OMB and Secretary Gates warned that the President’s senior advisers
would recommend that he veto the DOD appropriations bill if it included funds to continue
procurement of VH-71 helicopters, which were intended to transport the President and other
senior officials. The Administration cancelled the project because of cost overruns, but the House
version of the appropriations bill added $400 million to complete work on five of the aircraft that
already are under construction. The compromise final version of the appropriations bill added
$100 million to the VH-71 program. For details on the C-17 and VH-71 issues, see “Compromise
Version of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326),” below.

Defense Authorization Conference
The conference report on H.R. 2647 authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military activities of
DOD and defense-related activities of other federal agencies. The total authorization, which is
$14.9 million higher than the Obama Administration requested, includes $550.2 billion for the socalled “base budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—
and $130.0 billion for “overseas contingency operations,” including operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees each had added to the versions of the
authorization bill they reported to their respective chambers authorization to continue production
of the F-22 and to continue development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
In a July 13 letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, President Obama
said he would veto any defense bill that continued F-22 procurement.2 But regarding other
programs that one or both chambers of Congress acted to fund over the Administration’s
objections, the Administration stated its objections in terms that were less unequivocal.
For example, in the SAPs regarding versions of the defense authorization bill drafted by the
House Armed Services Committee3 and by the Senate Armed Services Committee4, OMB said the
President’s senior advisors would recommend that he veto any bill that would “seriously disrupt”
the F-35 program.
The version of H.R. 2647 passed June 25 by the House authorized both procurement of additional
F-22s and development of the alternative F-35 engine. The Senate dropped both authorizations
before passing its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 23. The conference report on the
authorization bill would terminate the F-22 but would allow the alternate engine program to
continue.
2

Letter from President Barack Obama to Senator Carl Levin, July 13, 2009, accessed at http://insidedefense.com/
secure/data_extra/pdf8/dplus2009_1826.pdf.
3
OMB Statement of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2647, June 24, 2009, accessed at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_111/saphr2647h_20090624.pdf.
4
OMB Statement of Administration Policy regarding S. 1390, July 15, 2009, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/assets/sap_111/saps1390s_20090715.pdf

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The defense authorization conference report also incorporated, with some modifications, Senatepassed provisions that broaden federal jurisdiction over “hate crimes” to include crimes motivated
by the victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation or gender identity. Previously,
federal jurisdiction over hate crimes extended to crimes motivated by the victim’s real or
perceived race, color, national origin, or disability. For additional information, see “Hate Crimes
(Title XLVII),” below.
The conference report also included, with modifications, several provisions relating to the
treatment of detainees, including those currently held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. Among
these were provisions relating to the operation of military commissions established to adjudicate
the cases of detainees. For additional information, see “Military Commissions, Detainees and
Guantanamo Bay,” below.
(For additional highlights of H.R. 2647, see “National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S.
1390),” below.)

Compromise Version of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), House and
Senate negotiators agreed on a compromise version of the bill, which they drafted as an
amendment to the version of the bill that the Senate had passed October 6. The compromise
version—which is, in effect, the equivalent of a conference report version—would appropriate
$497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. The House
passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. The Senate passed
it on December 19 by a vote of 88-10 and the President signed the bill later that day (P.L. 111118).
The compromise version of H.R. 3326 includes $350 million to cover the cost of providing a
3.4% pay raise for military personnel in FY2010, as authorized, rather than the 2.9% raise
included in the Administration’s budget request.
The compromise bill, like the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 3326, concurred
with most of the Obama Administration’s proposals to terminate or reduce funding for several
high-profile weapons programs, including production of the F-22 fighter and of the CSAR-X
search and rescue helicopter. However, the compromise version also included $465 million to
continue development of the alternate engine for the F-35 fighter and $1.5 billion to purchase 10
C-17 cargo jets, two additions to the budget request which the Administration had opposed.
The compromise bill also added $100 million to the amount requested for the effort to develop
the VH-71 helicopter, intended as a transport for the President and other senior officials. The
Administration had cancelled the program because of cost overruns, requesting in the FY2010
budget only funds to terminate the program. The House version of H.R. 3326 included $400
million to complete the manufacture of the first five VH-71s, an addition to which the
Administration objected. The compromise version of the bill would add $100 million to the
amount requested to close down the VH-71 project, with the additional funds to be used to
salvage for future use some of the technologies developed for the cancelled program.
The compromise bill would cut $900 million from the $7.46 billion requested to support the
training and equipping of Afghanistan’s army and police force while adding $900 million to the

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$5.46 billion requested for the purchase of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
(For additional highlights of H.R. 3326, see “FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill,” below.)

Temporary Extensions of Non-Defense Programs
The compromise version of H.R. 3326 included provisions temporarily extending—in most cases
through February 28, 2010—current policies or expiring provisions of law relating to 10 nonDOD federal programs or activities:
•

Two temporary changes in Small Business Administration loan guarantee
programs intended to make loans more attractive to borrowers and lenders;5

•

The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56);6

•

the National Flood Insurance Program;7

•

Medicare physicians payments (to defer, through February 28, 2010, a scheduled
21.2% reduction);8

•

Surface Transportation Authorization relating to highway, mass transit, highway
safety and motor carrier safety programs of the Department of Transportation;9

•

Unemployment insurance;10

•

COBRA health insurance premium subsidy;11

•

Satellite television copyright license;12

•

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP);13

•

Poverty guidelines of the Department of Health and Human Services that
determine eligibility for certain means-tested assistance programs, including
Medicaid.14

5

For additional information, see CRS Report R40985, Small Business: Access to Capital and Job Creation, by (name r
edacted) and (name redacted).
6
For additional information, see CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
Set to Expire February 28, 2010, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
7
For additional information, see CRS Report R40650, National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges,
and Financial Status , by (name redacted).
8
For additional information, see CRS Report R40907, Medicare Physician Payment Updates and the Sustainable
Growth Rate (SGR) System, by (name redacted).
9
For additional information, see CRS Report R40780, Surface Transportation Reauthorization Legislation in the 111th
Congress: Summary of Selected Major Provisions, coordinated by (name redacted).
10
For additional information, see CRS Report RS22915, Temporary Extension of Unemployment Benefits: Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
11
For additional information, see CRS Report R40142, Health Insurance Continuation Coverage Under COBRA, by
(name redacted) and Meredith Peterson.
12
For additional information, see CRS Report R40624, Reauthorizing the Satellite Home Viewing Provisions in the
Communications Act and the Copyright Act: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
13
For additional information, see CRS Report R40721, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations,
coordinated by (name redacted).
14
For additional information, see Department of Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml.

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Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request
The President’s FY2010 request of $533.7 billion for the DOD base budget is $20.4 billion higher
than the total of $513.3 billion the Obama Administration cites as the total appropriated for the
DOD base budget in the regular FY2009 appropriations process.15 In an April 6 press conference,
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said this nominal increase of 4% would amount to an increase
in real purchasing power of 2%, taking into account the cost of inflation.16 (See Table 1.)
Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request
Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009Enacted
(Excluding War
Funds)

FY2010 Requested
(Excluding War
Funds)

Percentage
Change

Military Personnel

124.9

136.0

+8.9%

Operations and Maintenance

179.1

185.7

+3.7%

Procurement

101.7

107.4

+5.6%

Research and Development

79.5

78.6

-1.1%

Military Construction

21.9

21.0

-4.1%

Family Housing

3.2

2.0

-38.0%

Other

3.2

3.1

-1.1%

Total

513.5

533.8

+4.0%

Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Budget Briefing, p. 16,
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_BudgetBriefing.pdf

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, P.L. 111-5), also known
as the “economic stimulus” package, provided an additional $7.5 billion in DOD appropriations
for FY2009, bringing the FY2009 discretionary appropriations for the Pentagon to a total of
$520.7 billion. Compared with this amount, the FY2010 request would amount to an increase of
$13.0 billion, a nominal increase of 2.5% (not adjusted for inflation).
Comparison of the FY2010 DOD base budget request with the corresponding appropriation for
FY2009 is complicated by the fact that the Administration is funding in the FY2010 base budget
several activities that were covered by war cost supplemental appropriations bills in FY2009 and
prior years. In an April 7 conference call with Internet defense reporters, Secretary Gates said the
total amount of funding shifted into the base budget was about $13 billion, which included
15

Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, Feb. 26, 2009, Table
S-7, “Funding Levels for Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 130. Based on data published by the
House Appropriations Committee summarizing amounts appropriated for FY2009 (Congressional Record, September
24, 2008, Part I, pp.H291-94) the total discretionary appropriation for DOD in FY2009 was $512.7 billion. The Obama
Administration’s February 26 FY2010 budget document, which provided only gross funding totals for Cabinet
agencies, did not contain sufficient information to account for the fact that the Administration’s total for the FY2009
DOD base budget is higher by some $600 million.
16
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Budget Briefing , April 6, 2009 http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

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ongoing costs of expanding the Army and Marine Corps, increased funding for medical research
and quality-of-life improvements for military personnel.17 However, in testimony before the
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on June 9, after the Administration’s detailed
budget request had been released, Secretary Gates said the amount of funding shifted into the
base budget was $8 billion, rather than the $13 billion he had cited earlier.
Setting aside those funds allocated to costs that were not included in the FY2009 DOD base
budget (for the sake of an apples-to-apples comparison), President Obama’s FY2010 request for
the DOD base budget includes about $520.7 billion, which is roughly $7.4 billion more than was
appropriated for DOD in the regular appropriations process. If the $7.4 billion provided to DOD
in FY2009 by the economic stimulus package is added to the regular FY2009 appropriations, the
FY2009 appropriation and the FY2010 request are roughly the same.
Comparison of President Obama’s FY2010 DOD base budget request with the FY2010 budget
projected by the Bush Administration is uncertain because the budget outline made public on
February 26 listed only an aggregate total for the DOD base budget, without specifying whether
or not that sum included each of several elements of DOD funding that might or might not
reasonably be included and which could affect the total by several billions of dollars. In his April
7 conference call with reporters, Secretary Gates said that the comparable Bush Administration
projection of the FY2010 DOD base was $524 billion. By that standard, President Obama’s
FY2010 request is nearly $10 billion higher. However, since the Obama request includes about $8
billion for programs that the Bush Administration did not fund in the DOD base budget, the
Obama request is about $2 billion higher than the Bush projection, on an apples-to-apples basis.
In the fall of 2008, DOD reportedly drew up a projected FY2010 base budget request that was
$57 billion higher than the request the Bush Administration had projected in February 2008.18
That larger request, details of which were not published, was not subjected to the regular budget
review process within the executive branch.

Status of Legislation
Although the Administration’s detailed budget request was not transmitted to Congress until May
7, 2009, Congress began acting on the annual defense authorization bill only about a month later
than it typically does.
The House Armed Services Committee reported its version of the bill (H.R. 2647) on June 18,
2009 and it was passed by the House on June 25. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported
its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 2 and the Senate passed the bill July 23. The conference
report on H.R. 2647 was filed October 7 and the House adopted it on October 8 by a vote of 281146.

17

Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with
Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398.
18
Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon Seeks $57 Billion More in 2010, says Jonas,” Bloomberg.com, October 2, 2008.

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Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390
Conference
Report
Approval

Committee Markup
House

Senate

6/17/09

6/25/09

House
Report

House
Passage

Senate
Report

Senate
Passage

Conf.
Report

House

H.Rept.
111-166

6/25/09
389-22

S.Rept.
111-35

7/23/09
87-7

H.Rept.
111-288

10/8/09 10/22/09
281-146
68-29

Senate

Public
Law
111-84

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee reported its version of the FY2010 defense
appropriations bill on July 16. The House Appropriations Committee reported the bill H.R. 3326
on July 24 and House passed it on July 30.The Senate Appropriations committee reported its
amended version of the bill on September 10 and the Senate passed the bill September 6 by a vote
of 93-7.
In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate
negotiators agreed on an amendment to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3326 that would
appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs.
The House passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. The
Senate passed it December 19 by a vote of 88-10 and the President signed the bill later on
December 19 (P.L. 111-118).
Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills (H.R. 3326)
Subcommittee
Markup
House

Senate

7/16/09

9/9/09

Conference Report
Approval
House
Report

House
Passage

Senate
Report

Senate
Passage

Conf.
Report

H.Rept.
111-230

7/30/09
400-30

S.Rept.
111-74

10/6/09
93-7

Cong. Record
pp. H15042H15370

House

Senate

Public
Law

12/16/09
395-34

12/19/09
88-10

P.L. 111118

War Costs and Issues19
The Obama Administration’s request for $130 billion for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
during FY2010 was submitted to Congress with the FY2010 base budget request on May 7, 2009
and has been considered as part of DOD’s overall request for the year. That request reflected the
Administration’s review of U.S. strategy for both wars that was completed in March 2009, but not
the new debate about President Obama’s December 1, 2009 announcement that he intended to
deploy about 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in the first half of 2010.
Although President Obama said in his December 1 speech that the additional deployments are
“likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year,” some press reports have
19

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.

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suggested the cost could run as high as $35 billion.20 DOD is in the process of developing its
supplemental request to cover additional costs in FY2010 according to testimony by Secretary of
Defense Gates.21 While there was some speculation that the Administration would propose that
additional war funding be included in the still-pending FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act, both
Congressman Murtha and Senator Inouye, chairs of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committee, respectively, reportedly objected. The Administration is likely to submit a FY2010
Supplemental to Congress in early February 2010 along with DOD’s regular and war requests for
FY2011.22
It is not clear whether DOD will assume in its war funding request for FY2011 any decrease in
the number of troops in Afghanistan. The President said in his December 1 speech that the United
States would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011” as part of
handing over responsibility to Afghan forces but did not specify any timeline, which may be
decided after the Administration conducts a full-scale evaluation in December 2010.23

Debate About Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan
The current debate about potential increases in troop levels in Afghanistan began with the
appointment of General Stanley McChrystal to the position of overall U.S. and NATO
Commander in Afghanistan on June 15, 2009 after the dismissal of his predecessor General David
McKiernan, reportedly because of concerns about rising levels of violence in Afghanistan.
Tasked to re-assess U.S. military strategy, General McChrystal submitted his report to Secretary
of Defense Gates on August 31, 2009, which Secretary Gates passed along to the President.
Citing worse-than-anticipated conditions in Afghanistan, the report said that additional resources
would be necessary to carry out a full-fledged counterinsurgency strategy focusing on population
protection. In addition, the report argued that the “eventual success” of this proposed new strategy
would require “capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces.”24 At the direction of
the Secretary of Defense, this assessment did not include a specific request for additional
resources.
In response to the McChrystal report, the White House began its own wide-ranging strategy
review, which reportedly included not only General McChrystal’s approach but may have also
included a counter-terrorism approach focusing more on Pakistan where most al Qaeda are
located, along with training of more Afghan Security Forces, an option that Vice President Biden
20
The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” p. 7; delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. For the $35 billion cost estimate, see, for example,
Reuters, “Q+A: Understanding Obama’s Afghan Strategy,” by Phil Stewart, December 8, 2009, accessed at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B70QE20091208.
21
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Transcript, “Hearing on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” December 2, 2009, p. 15.
22
The Hill, “House Likely to Move Defense Bill; Senate plans less clear,” by Roxanna Tiron, December 8, 2009, pp.
22, 26.
23
Ibid, p.5; Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “ Hearing on Afghanistan Assessment,” p. December 2,
2009, p. 24.
24
Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan,
“Commander’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009, p. 2-3 to 2-4. Available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

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was said to favor.25 According to White House National Security Advisor, General Jim Jones, the
maximum al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan is “less than 100 operating in the country. No bases,
no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies,” with the problem being “sanctuaries across
the border” in Pakistan.26 According to Afghan government and U.S. military estimates, there are
some 10,000 to 15,000 Taliban in Afghanistan plus an additional 2,000 Afghan insurgents from
other factions.27
On October 8, 2009, Secretary Gates passed along to the President General McChrystal’s troop
request, a document separate from the earlier strategy assessment. According to press reports, the
White House ultimately considered several options for Afghanistan ranging from a low option of
10,000 to 15,000 to train Afghan forces and possibly conduct more counter-terrorism operations
on the border to 40,000 to conduct counter-insurgency in the southern and eastern parts of the
country to a high option of 80,000 to conduct counter-insurgency operations throughout the
country.28 In all cases, high priority was placed on training and assisting Afghan Security Forces.
An October report by a UN monitoring commission found widespread fraudulent voting affecting
as much as one-third of the votes during the August 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan
which raised concerns about the legitimacy of the Karzai government. This played an important
part in the While House policy debate over the last three and a half months. White House Chief of
Staff Rahm Emanuel said that the main question is not “how many troops you send, but do you
have a credible Afghan partner.”29
On October 21, under heavy U.S. pressure, President Karzai agreed to a runoff election with his
chief rival Abdullah Abdullah to be conducted on November 7, 2009. The runoff was scheduled
for November 7, 2009, but asserting that fraud was likely in the runoff, Abdullah dropped out of
the race on November 1, and Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission declared Karzai
the winner on November 2, 2009. Appearing to welcome a resolution of the issue, the United
States congratulated Karzai and praised Abdullah for diplomatic restraint. Karzai was inaugurated
on November 19, 2009 with Secretary of State Clinton in attendance.30
On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced his intention to deploy an additional 30,000
troops to Afghanistan in addition to the 68,000 already approved, almost all of which were incountry as of late November.31 In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the President
had given him flexibility to deploy 10% more troops or a total of 33,000 to Afghanistan to
25

Wall Street Journal, “Gates Doubts U.S.’ Afghan Strategy,” October 1, 2009.
New York Times, “Afghan War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al Qaeda,” October 8, 2009.CNN, “State of the
Union with John King,” Interview with General Jones, Senators Kyl and Barbara Boxer,” October 4, 2009, p. 2.
27
See Table 5 in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name re
dacted).
28
New York Times, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” December 6, 2009; New York Times,
“Obama Hears General’s Request for Afghanistan,” October 10, 2009. According to one expert, a strictly counterterrorism option focusing on border operations could allow the United States to reduce troop levels to about 13,000
over several years; see Foreign Policy, “What a CT mission in Afghanistan would actually look like,” by Austin Long;
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/13/what_a_ct_mission_in_afghanistan_would_actually_look_like.
29
Reuters, “U.S. Decision Can’t Wait for Afghan Legitimacy: Gates,” October 20, 2009.
30
Wall Street Journal, “Security Fears Revive Ahead of Afghan Runoff,” October 22, 2009; Washington Post, “Karzai
Voiced Doubts About Runoff until Last Moment,” October 21, 2009.
31
DOD, “News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” November 24, 2009, p. 6.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4498.
26

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provide “enablers,” such as engineers, medevac, and road clearance teams.32 This could bring
total U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 101,000.
In addition, NATO announced a commitment to deploy an additional 5,000 to 7,000 troops to
Afghanistan, which could bring the total close to General McChrystal’s 40,000 request.33 As of
late October, 2009, NATO allies had about 36,000 troops in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has
about 89,000 troops.34 That would bring the total number of troops in Afghanistan from the U.S.,
NATO allies, and the Afghan army to more than 190,000.
If 30,000 more U.S. troops are approved, plus NATO contributes an additional 5,000, that would
bring the total to almost 230,000 Afghan and foreign troops in-country, with an additional 81,000
in the Afghan police forces also contributing to security.
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about deploying additional troops, and recent
public opinion polls suggest that a bare majority approve the President’s new plan with
Americans divided almost evenly about whether the buildup is too high or about right.35

Basis and Status of War Cost Request in Pending Legislation
The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act enacted on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84) and
the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act signed by President Obama on December 19 (P.L. 111-118)
deal only with the $130 billion war cost estimate36 that was based on the Administration’s strategy
review in the spring of 2009 and was included in the FY2010 budget request sent to Congress on
May 7.
That request was based on the Administration’s adoption, last spring, of a withdrawal plan for
Iraq under which the number of troops in-country would be reduced from about 140,000 in
February 2009 to between 35,000 and 50,000 by August 31, 2010. Under that plan, all U.S. troops
are slated to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011, to comply with the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009.
At the same time, President Obama decided to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by
21,000 above the total already approved by former President Bush before he left office. (Before
leaving office, President Bush approved an increase of about 13,000 troops in Afghanistan on top

32

Washington Post, Obama to Let Pentagon Deploy Even More Troops But Number Remains Murky,” December 3,
2009; New York Daily News, “ Make it 33,000 Troops – Gates,” December 4, 2009.
33
The 7,000 figures appears to include 2,000 troops expected to go home. New York Times, “NATO Pledges 7,000
troops but avoids details,” December 5, 2009.
34
For latest U.S. troop levels, see DOD, “News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,”
October 14, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4498. For Afghan troop levels,
see DOD, Report to Congress, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Section 1230, P.L. 110-181
Report to Congress, June 2009, p. 26; http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/1230_June-2009Final.pdf. For non-U.S.
NATO troops, see International Security and Assistance Force, “Troop Contributing Nations, at http://www.nato.int/
isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
35

Washington Post, “U.S. Deeply Split On Troop Increase For Afghan War,” October 21, 2009.
The $130 billion total includes $1.4 billion for war-related construction that was funded in the Military Construction,
Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill, which was enacted as Part E of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3288).
36

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of the 33,000 in country as of September 2008.)37 With President Obama’s increase, the number
of troops in Afghanistan is slated to average 68,000 during FY2010, which represents a 68%
increase above the previous year.38
The $130 billion currently requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in FY2010 is $15.8
billion or 11% lower than the amount appropriated for FY2009 primarily because average troop
strength for both wars was expected to be about 19% lower than the previous year; the reduction
of troops deployed in Iraq was expected to more than offset the original plan to maintain troop
strength in Afghanistan at 68,000.39 War costs make up 21% of the $629.7 billion requested for
DOD, a share that is slightly lower than in FY2009.40
On August 13, 2009, the Administration submitted an amended war funding request that
reallocated $1 billion within the original $130 billion request to cover the cost of “temporarily”
adding 22,000 Army military personnel in FY2010 and FY2011.41 According to the
Administration, the additional troops were intended to “increase the number of troops available
to deploy while also helping the Army to end the practice of retaining soldiers beyond their
period of obligated service,” a practice often referred to as “stop-loss.”42
This budget amendment did not change the Administration’s plans for troop deployment levels to
Afghanistan or Iraq. To cover the cost of the additional personnel, the budget amendment reallocated $1 billion from procurement funds to military personnel and operation and maintenance
accounts. Of the additional 22,000 troops, 15,000 would be deployed in FY2010, and the
remaining 7,000 the following year.
House and Senate authorization action on H.R. 2647 and S. 1390, respectively, and House
appropriations action on H.R. 3326 were completed before this August 13 budget amendment was
submitted and therefore reflect the original request. The Senate’s version of the DOD
Appropriations Act did, however, reflect the amended request, and the conference is likely to do
so as well.

37
In a DOD press conference, spokesman Geoff Morrell cited an increase of 6,000 approved by President Bush before
leaving office who deployed in February 2009; see Transcript, “Briefing with Geoff Morrell at the Pentagon,” October
14, 2009; in addition, President Bush also approved an additional 7,000 troops for Afghanistan in the fall of 2009,
which deployed before he left office and brought the number in-country from 33,000 in October 2008 to 38,000 by
February 2009.
38
See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by (name redacted).
39
Ibid., Table 1.
40
In FY2009, war costs made up 24% of DOD’s total appropriations; CRS calculations based on S.Rept. 111-74, p. 1.
4141
OMB, FY2010 Budget Amendment, “Estimate No. 6, Overseas Contingency Operations,” August 13, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_08_13_09.pdf.
42
The White House, “Letter Transmitting Department of Defense Budget Amendment,” August 13, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-from-the-President-to-the-Speaker-of-the-House/. Under the
Administration’s proposal, the cost of these additional Army personnel was offset by reducing by a total of $1 billion
the amounts requested for procurement of certain items including High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, or
HMMWVs, Hellfire missiles, and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, the requirements for which are being
reassessed. See DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO), Summary and Explanation of Changes, Exhibits for FY2010, Amended Justification Material,
August 2009, p. 3-5; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_oco.pdf.

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According to DOD, its request included $60.8 billion for Operation Iraqi Freedom and $65.4
billion for Afghanistan or Operation Enduring Freedom, and $3.9 billion for non-DOD classified
activities. DOD funding would be allocated 48% for Iraq and 51% for Afghanistan in FY2010,
compared to a split in FY2009 of 65% for Iraq and 35% for Afghanistan.43
In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that this war funding request did not include
about $8 billion for activities that are expected to persist beyond the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
but which had been included in earlier war-funding bills. According to the Secretary, DOD shifted
funding to the base budget for activities considered likely to persist, such as monies for increased
strength levels in the Army, recruiting and retention, more funds for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, countering threats from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), longer-term
medical care such as Traumatic Brain Injury and psychological health, and “Global Train and
Equip” funds for countries facing terrorist threats.44
If Secretary Gates had not transferred this $8 billion into the base budget in FY2010, on an
“apples-to-apples” basis, with no other changes, the FY2010 war request would be $8 billion
lower than in FY2009. In addition, CRS estimates that reductions in average monthly troop
strength from 186,000 in FY2009 to 152,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan could reduce war costs by
an additional $7.7 billion. Taking these two factors into account, CRS estimates that DOD’s
FY2010 request of $130 billion could be reduced by some $15.7 billion.45
In the FY2010 war funding request, total military personnel funding declined from the FY2009
level since planned decreases in troop strength for Iraq are expected to more than offset planned
increases in troop levels in Afghanistan. Operation and maintenance (O&M) funding, however,
remained at the same level in FY2010 as in FY2009 and FY2008 despite the planned decline in
overall troop levels in the coming year.
After remaining about the same in FY2008 and FY2009, overall troop strength for Iraq and
Afghanistan was expected to fall by almost 20% in FY2010. According to DOD’s final FY2009
war cost report, O&M average monthly obligations averaged $11.4 billion a month for both
operations in FY2009 compared to 13.4 billion in FY2008, a 15% overall decline. Average
monthly obligations for Iraq decrease by 30% from $10.9 billion to $7.5 billion while those for
Afghanistan increase by 44% from $2.7 billion to $3.9 billion.46
In the last month (September) of FY2009, DOD obligations spiked to $11.9 billion, substantially
above the $6.7 billion average for the rest of the year, a pattern similar to last year when DOD
obligated its remaining funds at the end of the fiscal year.47 Despite the fact that average monthly
43
See Table 5-9 in Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf.
44
Senate Appropriations Committee, ”Statement by Secretary of Defense,” Robert M. Gates, June 9, 2009, p. 2. In an
earlier speech at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Secretary Gates stated that $13 billion had been
transferred; see Transcript, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa,”
April 16, 2009, pp. 2-3; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404.
45
See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by (name redacted), Table 3 and p. 18-p. 19. Average monthly troop strength takes into account increases and
decreases each month in the number of deployed troops. This figure compares the request with the adjusted amounts.
46
DOD, “Cost of War Card,” September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2009.
47
DOD, “Summary Cost of War Obligations by Component, Appropriations and Operation,” in FY2009 Cost of War
for FY2009 Appropriations as of September 30, 2009; monthly obligations in September 2008 were $12.9 billion
compared to an average for the rest of the year of $6.5 billion; see DOD, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution
(continued...)

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troop strength for both operations was slated to decrease by 20%, DOD requested almost identical
amounts for military personnel and operation and maintenance in FY2010.
The decline in FY2010 primarily reflects a lower DOD request for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles that cost $16.8 billion in FY2009 to purchase the full requirement.
Instead, DOD is funding a lighter, cheaper version of the MRAP—an all-terrain fighting
vehicle—expected to be more effective in Afghanistan. Lower procurement spending also reflects
a decision by DOD to return to its traditional definition of reconstitution, repairing equipment and
funding as war costs only the replacement of equipment lost in combat rather than using war
funds to upgrade equipment.48
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the Administration’s FY2010 war funding request.
For congressional action at the account level, see the Appendix.
Table 4. Congressional Action on DOD’s War FY2010 Budget Request
(in billions of dollars)
FY2010
Revised
Requesta

Housepassed
Authorization
H.R. 2647

Senatepassed
Authorization
S. 1390

Authorization
Conference
H.R. 2647

Title

Housepassed
Approps
Bill,
H.R. 3326
and H.R.
3082

SenateReported
Approps
Bill,
H.R. 3326
and S. 1407

Final
Approps.
H.R. 3326
Title IX and
H.R. 3288
Part E
J

Military Personnel

14.1

13.6

13.6

14.1

16.2

14.1

15.0

Operation and Maintenanceb

81.0

80.7

80.1

80.8

80.5

80.3

79.5

Procurementc

21.4

23.0

22.3

21.8

20.4

22.2

23.1

Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation

.3

.4

.3

.3

.2

.3

.3

Revolving and Management
Funds

.4

.4

.4

.4

.4

.4

.4

Other Department of
Defense Programsd

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.6

1.4

1.9

1.6

Special Fundse

9.8

9.0

9.7

9.6

9.0

8.6

8.3

Military Construction

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

General Provisions and
Rescissions

0

0

0

0

0

.3

0.0

Cap on Transfer Authorityf

[4.0]

[4.0]

[4.5]

[4.0]

[3.0]

[4.0]

[4.0]

Total, Department of
Defense

130.0

130.0

129.3

130.0

129.6

129.6

129.6

(...continued)
Report As of September 30, 2008.
48
Ibid.

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Sources: Revised request from DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY 2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO), August 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/
fy2010_oco.pdf. Congressional action from H.R. 2647 as passed by the House, S. 1390 as passed by the Senate,
H.Rept. 111-166, S.Rept. 111-35, H.Rept. 111-230, H.R. 3326 as passed by the House and the Senate
Appropriations Committee, H.Rept. 111-230, S.Rept. 111-74; and for FY2009, House Appropriations Committee
Table, Congressional Record, June 16, 2009, p. H6871.
a.

Reflects amended budget request for war funding to cover adding 22,000 military personnel to the Army
temporarily in order to reduce stress on the force from deployments that is to be financed by shifting $800
million from procurement to military personnel and operation and maintenance within the $130 billion
original request. Authorization action and House appropriation action took place before this amendment,
and Senate appropriation action after the change.

b.

Operations and Maintenance total excludes the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund,
and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which are included under Special Funds.

c.

Procurement total includes Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Transfer Fund, and excludes Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Fund, which is included under Special Funds.

d.

Other Defense Department Programs includes Defense Health Program, Drug Interdiction, and the Office
of the Special Inspector General.

e.

Special Funds includes Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund.

f.

Congress sets annual caps or ceilings on the amounts that DOD can transfer between accounts after
enactment.

Authorization Action on War Funding (H.R. 2647. P.L. 111-84)
The conference report on the FY2010 Authorization request (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) largely
supports DOD’s funding request as did both the House and Senate authorizing committees. (See
Table 7.)

Changes to DOD’s Request
Significant instances in which the conference report on the authorization bill changed DOD’s
funding request include:
•

reducing funding in procurement accounts by $625 million from the original
request to provide for the temporary 22,000 increase in Army end-strength
requested in a budget amendment;

•

reducing DOD’s $1.5 billion request for the Commanders’ Emergency Response
Program to $1.3 billion, following the Senate recommendation;

•

adding $600 million to DOD’s request for $5.5 billion (thus authorizing $6.1
billion) in funding for a new lighter-weight Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Program (MRAP) vehicles for Afghanistan to meet DOD’s revised requirement;
together with an additional $600 million in DOD’s base budget, these funds
would purchase the requirement of 6,466 vehicles; and

•

funding almost all of the $1.4 billion in military construction for Afghanistan but
adding funds for several projects at Bagram Air Force Base the cost of which was
offset by reduced funding for troop or contingency housing at various bases in
Afghanistan.

Significant policy changes made in the authorization conference report include:

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•

deleting DOD funding requested for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability
Fund, but allowing transfers from funds appropriated to the State Department;

•

transferring the $600 million requested in DOD’s base budget for the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund from DOD’s base budget, considered
to be an “enduring” requirement, to Title XV war funding, because the
authorizers consider the organization to be a temporary one; and

•

not providing $115 million for Guantanamo Bay detainee relocation because of
lack of a plan, which was the position taken by both the House and the Senate.

Extensions of Special War-Related Authorities
The authorization conference report also extends several war-related authorities and associated
reporting requirements created since the 9/11 attacks, including:
•

a one-year extension of the Commanders’ Emergency Response Progam
requiring 15-day advance notifications for expenditures, setting a $1.3 billion cap
on the program, and allowing funds to be used to reintegrate individuals
renouncing violence into Afghan society in section 1222 (a program similar to
the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens groups in Iraq);

•

a one-year extension (and a $1.6 billion cap) on coalition support funds with an
expansion in the types of logistical support that can be provided to nations aiding
U.S. military operations to include specialized training, supplies, and equipment
as requested by the Administration; Section 1223 of the conference report
continues to require 15-day advance notifications of specific expenditures and
quarterly reports on the program; this authority appears similar to that in the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund;49

•

an expansion and modification of reporting requirements in Section 1202 for
DOD support for special operations support to foreign nations;

•

an extension in Section 1203 of reporting requirement for foreign-assistance
related programs carried out by DOD;

•

a requirement in Section 1204 for a report by March 1, 2010 on the relationship
between DOD authorities to train, equip and build the capacity of foreign nations
compared to Foreign Assistance Act authorities; and

•

a limitation in Section 1206 of funds that can be used to build the capacity of
foreign military forces to $75 million in FY2010 and $75 million in FY2011.

Extensions and Additional Reporting Requirements
Based on recommendations of both chambers, the authorization conference report extends and
adds various reporting requirements for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan as described below.

49

Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Appendix, p. 350; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/Appendix/.

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New Pakistan Reporting Requirements
The conference report on H.R. 2647 includes new reporting requirements (or extends current
requirements) relating to Pakistan including the following:
•

Section 1232 requires a new DOD report assessing Pakistan’s progress toward
long-term security and stability, including timelines for Pakistan to demonstrate
effectiveness in defeating, eliminating safe havens for, and preventing the return
of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The report is to be submitted every 180 days
concurrently with the Afghanistan security report (originally required under
Section 1217, P.L. 110-417 and under Section 1230, P.L. 110-181, that was most
recently submitted in June 2009);

•

Section 1231 requires that DOD and State Department assess alternatives to
reimbursements to Pakistan for logistical, military and other support that would
encourage Pakistan to focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations. The report is due 180 days after enactment; and

•

Section 1224 requires a quarterly report listing individual projects using funds
transferred to DOD from the State Department’s new Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund (which the Administration and both chambers agreed would be
appropriated to the State Department rather than DOD beginning in FY2010), as
well as an assessment by DOD of whether Pakistan is making “concerted efforts”
to confront the Al Qaeda, Taliban and insurgent threats.50

New Reports and Extensions of Reporting Requirements Regarding Afghanistan
The conference report on H.R. 2647 adds or extends existing requirements for the following
reports relating to Afghanistan:

50

•

Section 1236 expands and extends to FY2011 the semi-annual report, “Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” and expands the scope of that
report to include new sections relating to NATO and non-NATO countries that
participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Those new
sections of the report are to cover (1) agreements or commitments by ISAF
participants on goals, strategies, resource and force requirements and pledges of
troops and resources, (2) progress in ending the ability of the insurgency to
establish safe havens in Afghanistan, and (3) coordination of reconstruction and
development activities;

•

Section 1235 requires that DOD contract for a study of force levels needed to
secure the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan;

•

Section 1225 requires that DOD certify that it has established a program to
register and monitor the end use of defense articles and services transferred to
Afghanistan and Pakistan before making transfers although the requirement can
be waived for 120 days by the Secretary of Defense for vital U.S. interests; and

S.Rept. 111-35, p. 191 and 210 and H.Rept. 111-166, p. 415ff.

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•

Section 1228 requires an assessment and report on the scope, character, and DOD
funding of “community-based security programs” in Afghanistan within 120 days
of enactment.

New Reports and Extensions of Reporting Requirements Regarding Iraq
The conference report on H.R. 2647 requires the following reports on Iraq:
•

Section 1227 requires a report within 90 days of enactment or by December 31,
2009 that estimates within the following 90 days: personnel levels in Iraq, DOD
equipment remaining in the country, and the likelihood of completing transfer or
removal of equipment by the December 31, 2011 deadline, along with an
assessment of U.S. detainee operations, and a listing of factors used by DOD to
assess risks associated with the drawdown and any decisions to modify the pace;
and

•

Section 1230 requires a report within 180 days of enactment on the feasibility
and desirability of establishing uniform procedures to provide monetary
assistance to civilian foreign nationals for losses, injuries, or death related to U.S.
combat activities, as well as the types of guidelines that could be established and
the total amount disbursed thus far.

Reports on Both Wars
The enacted authorization ( P.L. 111-84) also requires the following reports concerning Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan:
•

Section 1226 requires within 180 days of enactment a report by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) assessing DOD’s campaign plans, which is to be
updated periodically through December 2011 for Iraq and through September 30,
2012 for Afghanistan; and

•

Section 1234 requires notification 15 days in advance of transferring U.S.
equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and a quarterly report describing the
equipment, requirement, and any potential impact on U.S. forces; the section also
limits to $750 million the total value of the equipment that can be transferred.

Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118)
In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), House and
Senate negotiators agreed on a compromise version of the bill which was drafted as an
amendment to version passed by the Senate. The compromise version of the bill, like the House
and Senate versions, would provide $128.2 billion for the war in FY2010, some $400 million less
than DOD requested.
In addition to war funds in H.R. 3326, the Administration requested an additional $1.4 billion for
war-related construction in the FY2010 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related
Agencies appropriations bill. That request was approved in the versions of the bill passed by the
House (H.R. 3082) and the Senate (S. 1407) and in the conference report on the bill, which was
enacted as Part E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3288).

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Assessing Uncertainties In Operations Funding
Concerned that the services “cannot accurately budget for Operations Enduring Freedom and
Operations Iraqi Freedom,” in light of the fact that the nature of military operations is likely to
change significantly,51 the House-passed version of H.R. 3326 put aside some $14.6 billion or
20% of DOD’s requested Operation and Maintenance funds in the Overseas Contingency
Operations Transfer Fund and required that DOD inform the four congressional defense
committees 15 days in advance of any transfers from the fund.52 The Senate version of H.R. 3326
does not transfer any funds to this account.
The compromise version would put $5 billion of the requested O&M funds into the transfer fund.

Funding for Force Protection Vehicles
The House and the Senate versions of H.R. 3326 also differed in their treatment of funding for
vehicles designed to improve force protection. The House cut $1.9 billion from DOD’s $5.44
billion request for a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund arguing that the FY2009
Supplemental included advance funding for MRAP vehicles. In the Senate version of H.R. 3326,
an additional $1.2 billion was added to the MRAP request to cover purchase of additional MRAP
All-Terrain vehicles (M-ATV) for use in Afghanistan based on a recently identified “urgent
unfunded need.”53 The compromise version of the bill would provide a total of $6.28 billion,
including an additional $825 million for M-ATVs.

Transfers from Funding in the Base Budget
Both the House and Senate versions of the bill would have transferred funds from the base budget
to Title IX’s war funding. In the case of the House, there was a largely undistributed transfer of
$2.6 billion from military personnel funding in DOD’s base budget to Title IX’s war funding to
reflect the “significant Military Personnel costs of U.S. Overseas Contingency Operations.”54
The Senate version, on the other hand, would have transferred about $250 million in O&M funds
from activities for supporting soldiers and their families (e.g., Wounded Warrior, childcare
centers, family services) and from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund (JIEDDF) into
Title IX, which would reverse DOD’s proposal to transfer funds to the base budget for activities
expected to continue for the long-term.
The compromise bill transferred $850 million in military personnel funding from the base budget
to Title IX, while rejecting the Senate’s proposal to transfer certain O&M funds from the base
budget to Title IX.

51

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 327; House Rules Committee, http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/
111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.
52
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, H.R. 3326 as reported; House Rules Committee,
http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.
53
S.Rept. 111-74, p.253, p. 264.
54
H.Rept. 111-230, p. 328; House Rules Committee, http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/
111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.

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Commanders Emergency Response Program Funding
Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports cited concerns about management
and oversight of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), from which
commanding officers can distribute funds for small reconstruction projects. Both versions of the
bill cut DOD’s $1.5 billion CERP request. The House cut the request by $200 million and the
Senate by $300 million. The compromise version of the bill would provide $1.2 billion for CERP
and would required DOD to submit to Congress additional reports on the use of the funds.55
Like the defense authorizing committees, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees did
not provide in their FY2010 defense funding bill funds for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund, assuming this program would be funded in the State Department.

Funding for Training Afghan Security Forces and for Guantanamo Bay
While the House version of H.R. 3326 approved the Administration’s request for an additional
$7.5 billion to train Afghan Security Forces, the Senate version cut that request by $900 million,
transferring the funds to purchase additional MRAP All Terrain vehicles. The Senate argued that
these funds are not needed now because they would not be spent in FY2010.56 The compromise
version of the bill incorporated the Senate bill’s reduction to the request.
Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees had denied the request for funding to
transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay on the grounds that the Administration has not
identified a plan for the future of the detention facility. DOD had included these funds in the Iraq
Freedom Fund.57
War Funding
For congressional action on the Administration’s FY2009 supplemental appropriations request for war costs, see CRS
Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations, coordinated by (name re
dacted) and (name redacted). Congressional action on authorization of the FY2009 supplemental funds and on both
authorization and appropriation of the FY2010 war cost request is covered in this report. For an analysis of the
relationship between war costs and troop levels, see CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by (name redacted). For further information on war costs, see CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted).

Base Budget: Comparison and Context58
In recent years, some senior military officers59, as well as research groups and advocacy
organizations, have argued that defense spending needs to be substantially higher in the next few
55

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 348 and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 244.
H.Rept. 111-230, p. 346, and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 252.
57
H.Rept. 111-230, p. 349 and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 251.
58
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.
59
During a Pentagon press briefing on November 17, 2008, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen
said he thought that spending 4% of GDP on defense was, “about right.” See DOD News Transcript, “Department of
Defense News Briefing with Admiral Michael Mullen at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA,” November 17, 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4318.
56

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years to avoid drastic cuts in major weapons programs or in the size of the force. Many have
called for a baseline defense budget, not including war-related costs, pegged to about 4% of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—an amount that would be anywhere from $62 to $169 billion
per year higher over the next few years than the Administration plan.
Table 5. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with
4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

actual/projected DOD base
budget

513.3

533.7

541.8

550.7

561.1

574.5

Gross Domestic Product

14,291

14,902

15,728

16,731

17,739

18,588

DOD base budget as
percentage of GDP

3.59%

3.58%

3.44%

3.29%

3.16%

3.09%

4% of GDP

571.6

596.1

629.1

669.2

709.6

743.5

amount by which 4% of GDP
exceeds actual/projected
DOD base budget

58,3

62.4

87.3

118.5

148.5

169.0

Source: Actual/projected DOD base budget figures from Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of
Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, February 26, 2009, Table S-7. “Funding Levels for Appropriated
(‘Discretionary’) Programs by Agency,” p. 130; Gross Domestic Product estimates from Ibid., Table S-8,
“Comparison of Economic Assumptions,” p. 132.

Senator James M. Inhofe and Representative Trent Franks—members, respectively, of the Senate
and House Armed Services committees—summarized the case for such an increase in identical
joint resolutions (S.J.Res. 10 and H.J.Res. 3) introduced on Feb. 12, 2009 which call for a base
defense budget equal to at least 4% of GDP. The fundamental case for meeting the 4% target is
that, since the end of the Cold War, DOD’s budget and force structure have declined significantly
while the tempo of operations has increased—to include sustained combat operations—and the
geographic scope of operations has broadened.60
These arguments for a substantial increase in the defense budget, however, come at a time when,
by historical standards, military spending seems very robust. Between FY1998, when the postCold War decline in defense spending hit bottom, and FY2009, the baseline Department of
Defense budget, not including war costs, increased by almost 40% above inflation (see Table 5).
Adjusting for inflation, the FY2009 baseline DOD budget was more than $100 billion, or about
20%, greater than the average during the Cold War (measured from the end of the Korean War in
FY1954 through FY1990). Funding for weapons acquisition (procurement plus R&D) in FY2009
was more than $45 billion—or about one-third—higher than the annual Cold War average.

60

Senator Inhofe elaborated on this argument in a Senate floor speech on February 12, 2009. See Congressional
Record, February 12, 2009, pp. S-2246-48.

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Table 6. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009
(amounts in billions of current year and constant FY2009 dollars)
Constant FY2009 Dollars

Current Year Dollars
Total DOD

Base DOD

Supplemental

Total DOD

Base DOD

Supplemental

FY1998

260

257

3

359

355

4

FY1999

275

266

9

370

358

12

FY2000

287

279

9

377

366

11

FY2001

316

297

19

403

379

24

FY2002

345

328

17

428

407

21

FY2003

437

365

72

526

439

87

FY2004

468

377

91

544

438

106

FY2005

479

400

79

535

447

88

FY2006

535

411

124

579

445

134

FY2007

601

432

169

633

455

178

FY2008

667

480

187

683

491

191

FY2009

662

510

152

662

510

152

Source: FY2001-FY2009 current year dollar figures from Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental
Request: Summary Justification, April 2009, Figure 1, p. 1. FY1998-FY2000 total DOD from Office of Management,
Budget Public Budget Database, supplemental amounts by CRS. Deflators from Department of Defense, National
Defense Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2009, March 2008; Data thru FY2007 are actual amounts. Figures for FY2009
include requested additional FY2009 supplemental appropriations and rescissions.

The apparent disconnect between the size of the budget and the appeals for more money appears
even more striking when amounts that have been appropriated for war costs are added to the
equation. On top of a baseline DOD budget that grew from $255 billion in FY1998, in FY2009
prices not adjusted for inflation, to $528 billion in FY2009, supplemental appropriations for warrelated costs climbed from $19.4 billion in FY2001, as an initial response to the 9/11 attacks, to
$63 billion in FY2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, to an estimated $189 billion in FY2008.
While large portions of the supplementals have been consumed by war-related operating costs,
substantial amounts have also been devoted to buying new equipment, particularly for the Army
and the Marine Corps. Although the bulk of this acquisition has been for force protection,
communications, and transportation, the effect has been to modernize much of the basic
equipment stock of both services, in effect augmenting their baseline budgets. The fact that so
large a level of spending appears to the military services to be so inadequate has several
explanations—and the policy implications are, accordingly, matters of varying interpretation.
Following are some of the contributing factors.61

61

These issues were discussed in testimony before the House Budget Committee by Stephen A. Daggett, CRS
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, on February 4, 2009. See prepared testimony on the House Budget
Committee website at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_Testimony.pdf with supporting
charts at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_charts.pdf. Daggett’s analysis was summarized in
the April 2009 edition of Air Force magazine, “The Cost of the Force,” Air Force, April 2009, pp. 37-39,
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/April%202009/0409cost.pdf.

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•

Future baseline budgets are widely expected to decline: The Administration plan
to cut the deficit in half by the end of President Obama’s first term includes limits
on defense as well as non-defense spending. White House budget projections
accommodate an increase of about 5% above inflation in the FY2009 DOD
budget, but project a cumulative decline of about 3% between FY2009 and
FY2012. Many unofficial projections of the deficit situation are less sanguine
than the Administration’s, so many analysts expect, at best, a flat baseline
defense budget for the foreseeable future. Increased costs in part of the budget,
therefore, will necessarily come at the expense of resources available in other
areas.

•

Supplemental appropriations are expected to decline: Although plans to withdraw
from Iraq are uncertain, the military services expect that supplemental
appropriations will come down within a few years. Costs for training and
equipment maintenance that have been covered in supplementals would, then,
migrate back into the baseline budget at the expense of other programs, and
money to further upgrade ground forces would have to be found elsewhere.

•

Costs of military personnel have grown dramatically in recent years: Since the
end of the 1990s, Congress has approved substantial increases in military pay and
benefits, including pay increases of ½ percent above civilian pay indices in seven
of the past eight years, three rounds of “pay table reform” that gave larger raises
to personnel in the middle grades, increased housing allowances to eliminate on
base and off-base disparities, DOD-provided health insurance for Medicareeligible military retirees (known as Tricare for Life), concurrent receipt of
military retired pay and veterans disability benefits that had earlier been offset,
elimination of a reduction in retiree survivor benefits that had occurred at age 62,
and large increases in enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and special pays.
Although bonuses and some other payments may decline in the future, most of
the past increases in pay and benefits have been built into the basic cost of
personnel. CRS calculates that uniformed personnel now cost 40% more, per
capita, after adjusting for inflation, than in FY1999.

•

Operating costs continue to grow above base inflation: Historically, military
operation and maintenance budgets, which pay for everything from personnel
training, to weapons repairs, to facility operations, to health care, have increased
relative to the size of the force by about 2.7% per year above inflation. These
increases are not as large as in some areas of the civilian economy, such as health
care, but they do not reflect gains in productivity that are common in other
sectors of the economy. Continued growth in operating costs, which is now
widely seen as a fact of life in defense planning, erodes the availability of
resources for weapons modernization and other priorities.

•

Increasing generational cost growth in major weapons programs: It is generally
expected that new generations of weapons will be more expensive than the
systems they replace as weapons technology advances. The rate of generational
cost growth, however, is becoming a matter of increasing concern within the
Defense Department. New stealthy aircraft, multi-mission ships, advanced space
systems, and networked missiles, guns, and vehicles appear to be getting more
expensive than their predecessors at a greater rate than in the past. Unless
budgets increase more rapidly than costs, trade-offs between the costs of new
weapons and the size of the force may be required.

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•

Poor cost estimates: The difficulties engendered by accelerating intergenerational
weapons cost growth are exacerbated by poor cost estimation. The Government
Accountability Office has documented frequent, substantial increases in costs of
major defense systems compared to original development estimates. A side-effect
of inaccurate cost projections is an increased instability in the overall defense
budget, which entails inefficient production rates for major weapons programs
and increased costs due to changing production plans.62

•

New requirements based on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: The wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan have led to very large increases in equipment requirements for
ground forces, particularly for force protection, communications, and
transportation. National Guard combat units that earlier were equipped with older
systems cascaded from active units are now seen as part of the rotation base that
require equally modern equipment. Full sets of current equipment are expected to
be available not only for next-to-deploy units, but also for units as they begin to
reset from overseas rotations. A key lesson of the war is that what used to be
called “minor procurement” for ground forces was substantially undercapitalized.

•

A broader range of national security challenges: A common presumption before
9/11 was that forces trained and equipped for traditional conflicts between
national armies would be able to cope with what were seen as less demanding
other challenges such as stability operations. Now Secretary Gates and other
prominent defense leaders maintain that forces must be designed not only for
traditional conflicts, but for insurgencies and other irregular wars, support of
allies, threats of catastrophic attacks by non-state actors with weapons of mass
destruction, and entirely new kinds of disruptive attacks on specific U.S. and
allied vulnerabilities. The effect has been to broaden requirements without,
necessarily, an attendant offsetting reduction in older force goals. When these
factors are taken as a whole, it is not so surprising that military planners discover
some shortfalls.

For Congress, it may not be so certain that the principal answer to all these problems is to provide
more money for defense. More money is one alternative. Other alternatives may include backing
away from plans to add 92,000 active duty troops to the Army and Marine Corps; shifting
resources among the military services to reflect new challenges rather than allocating them
roughly the same proportions every year; reviewing requirements for expensive new technologies
in view of the presence or absence of technologically peer or near peer competitors; and shifting
resources from military responses to global threats toward non-military means of prevention.

Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy
Secretary Gates stated that the budget decisions that he announced on April 6, 2009, were
intended to “reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment.”63 Those decisions
focused almost exclusively on “means,” rather than on desired “ends” based on policy decisions,
62

For GAO’s more recent annual overview of defense acquisition cost growth, see U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP, March 30, 2009.
63
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

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or “ways” designed to utilize given means to achieve desired ends. That emphasis on resources,
together with the relatively broad scope of the announced programmatic decisions, raises key
questions about the relative weight of strategy and budget in driving defense priorities.

Background: Strategic Direction
Secretary Gates stressed that the April 6 announcement reflected a line of strategic thinking
dating back 18 months, and captured in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, other
Department of Defense official documents, and speeches and statements.64 This continuum of
strategic thought appears to be based on several major premises:
•

The “wars we’re in”—Iraq and Afghanistan—are broadly indicative of the kinds
of challenges that the United States is most likely to face in the future. Those
challenges include preparing for “hybrid warfare,” in which both state and nonstate actors blend cutting-edge technologies (usually associated with state-based
militaries) with irregular approaches and/or non-conventional approaches usually
associated with guerrilla groups. Recent examples of hybrid warfare cited by
DOD officials include Hezbollah’s operations against Israel in 2006 and the use
of sophisticated Explosively-Formed Penetrators by insurgents in Iraq.65

•

DOD should enhance and better institutionalize the capabilities required to meet
these sorts of challenges by adjusting investments and by rebalancing the force
accordingly.66

•

While conventional challenges persist, the nation’s current and projected
advantages allow room for assuming greater risk in that area. On April 6,
Secretary Gates echoed the 2008 National Defense Strategy: “Although U.S.
predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for
the medium term given current trends.”67

64

See for example Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James
Cartwright with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398. Key sources include Department of Defense, National
Defense Strategy, June 2008; Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW),” December 1, 2008;
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech at Kansas State University, “Landon Lecture,” November 26, 2007,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199; Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates, remarks to U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262; Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced
Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January 2009, pp. 28-40.
65
See for example Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399. On “hybrid warfare,” see for example Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st
Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007.
66
For example, see Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,
2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=134: “We must rebalance this
department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the
scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead…”
67
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341; and DoD, National Defense
Strategy, June 2008, p.21.

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•

DOD is operating in a resource-constrained environment, in which “running up
the score” in one area—maintaining unnecessary redundancy—requires a
decision not to do something else.

•

Partnerships—with other U.S. Government agencies and with international
friends and allies—will play an increasingly important role in the preparation for,
and execution of, future operations.

Strategic Processes
The decisions Secretary Gates announced April 6, timed to inform the FY 2010 budget request,
were somewhat off cycle with Congressionally-mandated defense strategic review processes. This
lack of synchronization raises some questions about the extent to which the decisions were
strategically informed.
In theory, national security strategy issued by the White House sets the parameters for the
national defense strategy issued by DOD as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
process, and defense strategy in turn shapes budget choices. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
established the permanent requirement for the President to submit a national security strategy
report to Congress annually. That report is ordinarily due on the date the President submits the
budget for the following fiscal year, but in the first year of a new Administration, it is due 150
days after the President takes office.68 The due date this year fell on June 19, 2009. In turn,
legislation requires that DOD conduct a QDR during the first year of every Administration, with a
requirement to submit a report based on that review to Congress in the year following the year in
which the review is conducted, but not later than the President submits the budget for the next
fiscal year.69 The due date for this QDR would fall in early February 2010. The QDR is intended
to be a rigorous, inclusive review process that weighs assessments of the strategic environment,
requirements, and gaps and overlaps in current capabilities. Further, by law, the QDR report must
include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States.” That
defense strategy, in turn, is required to be “consistent with the most recent national security
strategy.”70
In practice, the Obama Administration appears to be broadly on track with the prescribed strategy
cycle. However, that cycle may not be well-adapted for informing budget priorities in the first
year of a new Administration. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) was issued by the
Bush Administration in March 2006. Senior Administration officials have noted that the Obama
Administration is unlikely to publish a new NSS in time to help shape the 2010 QDR. However,
officials have indicated that an ongoing national security review process—led by the National
Security Council and intended to establish priorities and produce classified, internal guidance to
departments and agencies—would likely set parameters for the QDR process.71 DOD issued the
68

See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, §603.
The permanent requirement to conduct a QDR was introduced by the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000, October 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, which amended Title 10 of U.S. Code. See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part
I, Chapter 2, §118. Subsequent legislation amended parts of the mandate, see the NDAA for FY2002, December 28,
2001, P.L. 107-107, §921; and the Bob Stump NDAA for FY2003, December 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, §922 and 923.
70
See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1).
71
See Christopher J. Castelli, “Senior Official: QDR Will Take Cues from NSC Review,” Inside Defense, April 23,
2009; and Christopher J. Castelli, “NSC Crafting Classified, National Security Planning Guidance, Inside Defense,
March 19, 2009.
69

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most recent National Defense Strategy in June 2008, under the signature of Secretary Gates, as a
stand-alone document, separately from a QDR process.72 Secretary Gates has stressed repeatedly
that the 2008 NDS will undergird the 2010 QDR process, the findings of which would be used to
inform budget decision-making for FY2011.73
DOD officials have stated that, despite the absence of a concurrent QDR or NDS process, the
budget decisions announced on April 6 were developed over the course of three months, in a
rigorous, inclusive way that included “not only the chiefs and secretaries of the Services, but also
the [Combatant] Commanders.”74 DOD has reportedly continued the practice launched under the
previous Administration, following the 2006 QDR, of holding frequent, inclusive sessions with
senior DOD civilian and military leaders, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider strategic priorities, specific programs and
initiatives, and Departmental processes.
Senior DOD leaders have also stated that the scope of the April 6 decisions was not
comprehensive, and that several categories of issues were deferred to the forthcoming QDR
process. Secretary Gates indicated that he had deferred consideration of some specific issues—
including amphibious capabilities, a follow-on bomber, and strategic (nuclear) requirements—for
which sufficient “analysis and understanding” had not yet been available. Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright added that some broader and more fundamental
issues had also been deferred to the QDR—including “how to shift and manage risk,” including,
for example, how to think about potential trade-offs between very different sets of capabilities.”75

Issues for Congress: Secretary Gates’s Proposals
On April 6, 2009, roughly a month before the details of the FY2010 budget were released,
Secretary Gates announced several key recommendations all of which were incorporated into the
Administration’s FY2010 budget request released May 7. Gates said this “unorthodox” procedure
was warranted by the scope and significance of the decisions and by his desire to publicize them
as elements of his effort to change DOD’s strategic direction.

Quality of Life Issues
To improve the quality of life for military personnel and their families, Gates announced four
recommendations which, in sum, required $13 billion in the FY2010 base budget for activities
that previously had been funded in supplemental appropriations bills.
72

DOD had established a precedent for such separation by issuing the previous NDS in 2005, at the beginning of the
QDR process that yielded the February 2006 QDR Report.
73
Christopher J. Castelli, “Gates Poised to Sign Key Guidance for QDR, NPR,” Inside Defense, April 23, 2009.
74
See Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright
with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4398; Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4399; and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,
2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
75
See Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4399.

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End-Strength Increase76
Secretary Gates recommended that the FY2010 budget complete the ongoing expansion of the
Army and Marine Corps, halt further personnel reductions in the Air Force and Navy (possibly at
end-strength levels of 330,000 and 329,000 respectively), and fund these end strength levels at a
cost of $11 billion.
Until recently, the Army had a permanent active component end strength of 482,400 while the
active component Marine Corps had a permanent end strength of 175,000. As recently as the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DOD maintained that these strengths were adequate.
However, the reality of fighting a multi-front war for more than five years with an all volunteer
force eventually compelled the administration to reexamine its end strength position. Having
resisted previous congressional calls to permanently increase the end strength for the Army and
the Marine Corps, on January 19, 2007 DOD announced that it would seek approval to increase
the permanent end strength of both services.
As reflected in both the FY2008 President’s budget request and the FY2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), the Army’s revised authorization cap is 547,400 by 2012, an increase
of 65,000 over the previous baseline of 482,400. The Marine Corps’ revised authorization cap is
202,000 by 2011, an increase of 27,000 over the previous baseline of 175,000. It was anticipated
that both services might achieve their higher authorization levels by the end of FY2009, three
years earlier than required for the Army and two years earlier than required for the Marine Corps.
The Air Force has been drawing down personnel for the past several years to fund equipment
modernization programs. At the end of FY2004, the Air Force had a personnel strength of
376,600 with a plan to reduce by 60,000 personnel and achieve an end strength of 316,600 by the
end of FY2009. However, on June 8, 2008, the Secretary of Defense announced the end of the Air
Force drawdown. While the FY2009 NDAA authorized and funded the Air Force at 317,050,
DOD is committed to stabilizing the Service at a strength of approximately 330,000.77
The Navy, on the other hand, has been downsizing by 8,000 to 10,000 personnel a year for the
past six to seven years, attempting to reach a goal of 329,000, the number required to sustain 313
ships and approximately 3,800 aircraft. The Navy ended FY2008 with a personnel strength of
332,228 and projects achieving the goal of 329,000 by the end of FY2009.78

Health Care and Family Support79
Secretary Gates stated his intention to provide increased funding for troops and their families by
requesting increases of:
•

$400 million above the FY2009 level for medical research and development;

76

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
Lt. Gen. Richard Y. Newton, III, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, United States Air Force,
“Presentation to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, United States House of
Representatives,” March 3, 2009.
78
Gary J. Gilmore, “Navy Stabilizes Force as it Nears End-Strength Goal,” Armed Forces Press Service, March 20,
2009.
79
Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Military Health Care Policy.
77

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•

$300 million above the FY2009 level for programs addressing the wounded, ill
and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health; and

•

$200 million above the FY2009 level for improvements in child care, spousal
support, lodging, and education.

Existing programs that previously had been funded through supplementals would be funded in the
base defense budget in FY2010. Secretary Gates stated that the department would spend over $47
billion on healthcare in FY2010.
In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates did not mention any proposals to include cost saving
proposals in the FY10 budget submission. The earlier pre-decisional budget document released
by the White House on March 6, 2009 did not reference any such proposal either. However, in an
April 7 press conference, Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Health Program request would
be fully funded in the FY2010 budget request, unlike previous years in which legislative
proposals for cost savings had been included in the budget as offsets to budgetary needs.
Secretary Gates further stated his intention to work with Congress to enact legislation to better
control health care spending.
In its FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 budget submissions, the DOD proposed increases in Tricare
enrollment fees, deductibles, and pharmacy co-payments for retired beneficiaries not yet eligible
for Medicare. These actions were justified by DOD as necessary to constrain the growth of health
care spending as an increasing proportion of the overall defense budget in the next decade.
Congress has passed legislation each year to prohibit the proposed fee increases.80

Study Groups Recommend Various Benefit Reforms
Congress sought advice on how to constrain military health care cost growth in crafting the FY
2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act. The FY2007 national defense
authorization81 required the establishment of a DOD Task Force on the Future of Military Health
Care, composed of military and civilian officials with experience in health-care budget issues, to
examine and report on efforts to improve and sustain defense health care over the long term
including the “beneficiary and Government cost sharing structure required to sustain military
health benefits.” Another provision of the same act (section 713) required the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in cooperation with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to
prepare an audit of the costs of health care to both DOD and beneficiaries between 1995 and
2005.
The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care submitted its final report in December
2007.82 It found that existing cost-sharing provisions jeopardize long-term taxpayer support and
recommended phased-in changes in enrollment fees and deductibles that would restore costsharing relationships that existed when Tricare was created. For instance, this would mean that

80

For additional information, see CRS Report RS 22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for
Congress, by (name redacted).
81
Section 711 of P.L. 109-364.
82
Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care Final Report, December 2007 (available at http://www.health.mil/
dhb/downloads/103-06-2-Home-Task_Force_FINAL_REPORT_122007.pdf).

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average enrollment fees for the average under-65 retiree family would gradually rise from $460
per year to $1,100 per year.
In July, 2008, the Presidentially directed Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
(QRMC) issued its report on deferred and noncash compensation for members of the uniformed
services. The QRMC recommended that Tricare Prime83 premiums for single retirees under age
65 be set at 40% of Medicare Part B premiums (which vary by the enrollee’s adjusted gross
income). Tricare Standard/Extra84 premiums for single retirees would be set at 15% of Part B
premiums. Family rates would be set at twice the single rate regardless of family size. Tricare
deductibles would be linked to Medicare rates with copayments waived for preventative care and
prescription drug payments limited to no more than two thirds of the average copayment faced by
civilians at retail pharmacies. In addition, the QRMC recommended that health care for retirees
under age 65 be financed through accrual accounting in order to illuminate how current staffing
decisions will affect future costs.
In January, 2009, DOD’s Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) issued a
report responding to the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health
Care. The SOC response rejected some of the Task Force’s specific cost-sharing
recommendations, but did state that “DOD will continue to ask for congressional authority to
charge fees and copays in an effort to maintain both a generous health care benefit and a fair and
reasonable cost-sharing arrangement between beneficiaries and DOD.”85 If the Obama
Administration decides to pursue this option, details might be included in the official budget
submission expected in May or in the DOD’s national defense authorization legislative package.

Preparing for “The Wars We’re In”
Asserting that DOD is culturally conditioned to focus on preparation for conventional combat
against forces similar to those fielded by the United States, Secretary Gates said a second set of
his recommendations were intended to institutionalize within the defense establishment
capabilities that are vital to waging irregular warfare, as U.S. forces currently are doing in Iraq
and Afghanistan.

Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR)86
Secretary Gates, himself a former Director of Central Intelligence, has indicated his intention to
increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the warfighter by some $2
billion within the base budget. This initiative reflects the expanding use of ISR systems,
especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in Iraq and Afghanistan to locate targets that can be
attacked with minimal damage to innocent civilians or property. DOD notes that “the number of
deployed UAS [unmanned aerial systems] has increased from approximately 167 aircraft in 2002

83

Tricare Prime is DOD’s HMO-like health plan option.
Tricare Standard and Tricare Extra are DOD’s fee-for-service and preferred provider type health plan options.
85
Department of Defense Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee, “Response to the Recommendations of
the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care,” January 2009, p. 103.
86
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense, (name redacted), Specialist in Military
Aviation, and (name redacted), National Defense Fellow.
84

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to over 6,000 in 2008, while defense investment in UAS capabilities has dramatically grown from
$284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2008.”87
Gates recommended funding to field and sustain 50 continuous orbits of Predator-class and the
more capable Reaper-class UAVs, along with manned ISR platforms, such as the turbo-prop
aircraft used by Army brigade-level commanders in Iraq (as part of Task Force Odin), to provide
situational awareness—locating adversaries and even IEDs. The Gates initiative is designed to
include the acquisition of key tactical ISR systems in the base budget rather than in
supplementals. Reliance on supplemental funding is seen as resulting in insufficient ISR
resources to meet ongoing operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Gates also announced plans for more extensive R&D on ISR systems, with emphasis on systems
that provide links between warfighters and national systems. No details were provided.
The day after Gates set forth his ISR recommendations, the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), Dennis Blair, announced that his office and DOD have agreed on a plan to deploy new
imagery satellites whose design will evolve from current satellites and increase the use of
commercially available imagery. Current satellites are approaching the end of their operational
lifespan; a previous replacement approach (known as Future Imagery Architecture) was cancelled
in 2005 as a result of technical difficulties and cost-overruns and thus new systems are required.
Media reports indicate, however, that some Members favor an alternative approach to the one
approved by the DNI, one based on new systems that the Administration currently judges to be
technologically immature. Although Blair’s announcement did not mention the cost of the
satellite program (which will be funded in the classified National Intelligence Program (NIP)),
some media accounts suggest that costs of the new systems will approach $10 billion.88

Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206)89
In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates said he was recommending an increase of $500 million
“to boost global capacity efforts.... training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter
terrorism and stability operations.” Such an increase in funding for building global partnership
capacity under “Section 1206” of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L.
109-163, as amended, would require Congress to once again raise the authorized limit. The
current authorized amount is $350 million. Some expect that DOD may also propose extending
Section 1206 authority to allow support of a wider array of partner nation security forces than
currently is permitted.
Both the proposed increase in the Section 1206 authorized funding level and an expansion of the
types of foreign security personnel eligible for Section 1206 assistance would be consistent with
DOD’s original proposal for building global partnership capacity legislation in 2005. At that time,
DOD requested authority, beginning in FY2006, to spend up to $750 million per fiscal year to
assist foreign military and security forces, including armies, guard, border security, civil defense,
infrastructure protection, and police forces.
87

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009, p. 25.

88

Andy Pasztor and Siobhan Gorman, “Satellite Proposals Gain Traction After North Korea’s Launch,” Wall Street
Journal, April 5, 2009.
89
Prepared by Nina Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs.

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From the start, Section 1206 authority has been highly controversial, with some policymakers
judging that the Secretary of State should retain authority over foreign military and security force
training. As a result of disagreements over bestowing a new, global “train and equip” authority on
DOD, Congress substantially scaled back DOD’s request in 2005 action. As originally enacted in
P.L. 109-163, Section 1206 spending authority was limited to $200 million per year and only
foreign military forces were eligible for assistance. The new Section 1206 authority also
contained several restrictions, making it subject to existing human rights and other restrictions
elsewhere in law.
Congress has amended Section 1206 authority twice. In the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364),
Congress raised the authorized spending limit to $300 million. P.L. 109-364 also amended
Section 1206 to require the concurrence of the Secretary of State for all expenditures.90 In action
on the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417), Congress
extended Section 1206 authority through FY2011, raised the spending limit to $350 million, and
made those funds available across fiscal years, and included maritime security forces among
those eligible to receive assistance. It rejected the Bush Administration’s proposal to make
Section 1206 authority permanent, to extend eligibility to broad array of foreign police and other
security forces, and to increase the funding cap to $750 million.91

Army Brigade Combat Teams92
Secretary Gates proposed reducing from 48 to 45 the number of active duty Brigade Combat
Teams the Army will create as it reorganizes its combat force from 10 divisions (each numbering
between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers) to a larger number of brigades, each comprising between
3,000 and 5,000 troops. Unlike older brigades, which typically have to borrow various specialists
from other units in order to deploy overseas, the new Brigade Combat Teams are intended to be
organizationally independent, including on their rosters all the personnel they would need for
deployment. By reorganizing its force into a larger number of smaller units, the Army hoped to
give soldiers more time at the

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR40567. Public record. Not legal advice.