# Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR40248 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** February 3, 2014 - **Citation:** R40248 ## Text Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Naval Affairs February 3, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R40248 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Summary The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, requested no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the Navy’s plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy’s FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.” The Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities. Congressional Research Service Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force .................................................................................................... 1 Norfolk and Mayport Home Ports ............................................................................................. 2 Norfolk ................................................................................................................................ 2 Mayport ............................................................................................................................... 2 Navy’s Desire to Establish a CVN Home Port at Mayport ....................................................... 3 Navy’s January 2009 Announcement, DOD Review, and QDR Endorsement ................... 3 October 21, 2011, Navy Letters to Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia ...................................................................................................................... 4 Navy’s Planned Timeline Prior to FY2013 Budget ............................................................. 5 Navy Rationale in Brief....................................................................................................... 5 Strategic, Environmental, and Cost Analyses Informing Navy’s Desire ............................. 6 Navy Summary of Its Comparison of Mayport and Norfolk .............................................. 9 Transfer of Amphibious Ships to Mayport .............................................................................. 10 Local Economic Value of Homeporting a CVN ...................................................................... 11 Funding .................................................................................................................................... 12 FY2010 Funding for Dredging .......................................................................................... 12 FY2011 Funding for CVN Home Port .............................................................................. 13 FY2012 Funding for CVN Home Port .............................................................................. 13 FY2013 Budget ................................................................................................................. 14 FY2014 Budget ................................................................................................................. 14 Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 14 Navy’s Basing Decision Process ............................................................................................. 15 Strategic Laydown Analysis .................................................................................................... 16 Nonrecurring and Recurring Costs .......................................................................................... 16 March 2011 GAO Report .................................................................................................. 17 Transit Times ........................................................................................................................... 21 Port Vulnerability .................................................................................................................... 22 Natural Disaster ................................................................................................................. 22 Man-Made Disaster ........................................................................................................... 22 Other Factors That Might Differentiate Norfolk and Mayport ................................................ 25 December 2010 Navy Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms ............................................ 26 March 29, 2011, GAO Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms ........................................... 26 March 3, 2011, GAO Report on Navy’s Traveling Workforce.......................................... 27 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) ....................................................................... 27 Mayport Homeporting Options Other Than Those Studied .................................................... 28 Alternative Uses of Funding .................................................................................................... 28 Legislative Activity for FY2014 .................................................................................................... 28 FY2014 Budget ....................................................................................................................... 28 FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66) .................................. 29 House................................................................................................................................. 29 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 29 Final Version ..................................................................................................................... 29 FY2014 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Division J of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76) .................................................. 29 Congressional Research Service Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport House................................................................................................................................. 29 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 30 Final Version ..................................................................................................................... 30 Figures Figure D-1. Navy Briefing Slide on Relative Hurricane Risk ....................................................... 63 Tables Table 1. Estimated Non-Recurring Cost To Transfer a CVN to Mayport ........................................ 8 Table 2. Navy Table Comparing Mayport and Norfolk ................................................................... 9 Table 3. Transit Times To Key Destinations .................................................................................. 22 Appendixes Appendix A. FY2007-FY2012 Legislative Activity ...................................................................... 31 Appendix B. Additional Background Information from May 2010 GAO Report ......................... 48 Appendix C. Excerpts from January 2009 Navy Record of Decision (ROD) ............................... 56 Appendix D. Navy Data on Hurricane Risk .................................................................................. 62 Appendix E. Examples of Views from Members .......................................................................... 68 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 71 Congressional Research Service Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Introduction This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s desire to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, requested no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the Navy’s plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy’s FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport.1 The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.”2 The Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk, VA, to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Background Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force All of the Navy’s aircraft carriers are nuclear powered. The Navy normally has 11 operational CVNs, but currently is in a temporary situation of having 10. The temporary decrease from 11 operational CVNs to 10 began with the deactivation of the aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in December 2012, and is scheduled to last until late 2015, when the CVN force is to return to 11 operational ships through entry into service of the new CVN Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78).3 As of December 31, 2012, the Navy’s six Pacific Fleet CVNs were homeported at Everett, WA, and Bremerton, WA, which are both located on Puget Sound (two ships each);4 San Diego, CA (one ship);5 and Yokosuka, Japan (one ship).6 The Navy’s four Atlantic fleet CVNs are all 1 Source for statement regarding funding in the FY2013-FY2017 FYDP: Navy briefing for House Armed Services Committee staff on the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, February 14, 2012. At the invitation of the committee, CRS staff attended the briefing. 2 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget, February 2012, p. 6-3. 3 For more on the CVN-78 program and the temporary decline in the CVN force from 11 ships to 10, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name r edacted). 4 Everett and Bremerton are located about 32 nautical miles from one another, on opposite sides of Puget Sound, which leads to the Pacific Ocean. The figure of about 32 nautical miles is the straight-line distance between the two locations, as calculated by the “How Far Is It?” online distance calculator, available at http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist. 5 The three CVNs homeported at San Diego include Carl Vinson (CVN-70), which had been homeported at Newport (continued...) Congressional Research Service 1 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport homeported at Norfolk, VA. (Prior to its deactivation, CVN-65 was also homeported at Norfolk, making for a total of five CVNs homeported there.) The Navy since the 1960s has been replacing its older conventionally powered carriers (CVs) as they have retired with new CVNs. The Navy achieved an all-CVN carrier force on January 31, 2009, with the retirement of its last operational CV, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63). Prior to being decommissioned, the Kitty Hawk operated in the Pacific Fleet and was homeported in Yokosuka. The last operational CV in the Atlantic Fleet was the John F. Kennedy (CV-67), which was decommissioned on August 1, 2007. Prior to being decommissioned, the Kennedy was homeported at Mayport. Norfolk and Mayport Home Ports Norfolk In terms of numbers of ships homeported, Norfolk (known formally as Naval Station [NAVSTA] Norfolk) is the Navy’s largest Atlantic Fleet home port. As of December 31, 2012, about 65 ships of various types—CVNs, attack submarines (SSNs), cruisers (CGs), destroyers, (DDGs), frigates (FFGs), large-deck amphibious assault ships (LHDs),7 and other amphibious ships (LPDs)—were homeported at Norfolk. The home port at Little Creek, VA, is roughly 7 nautical miles to the east of Norfolk (depending on the exact points used to measure the distance),8 on the same side of the Hampton Roads waterway,9 and is sometimes referred to as Norfolk (Little Creek). As of December 31, 2012, six amphibious ships (LSDs) were homeported there. Mayport Mayport is located in northeast Florida, on the Atlantic Coast, near Jacksonville. It is roughly 469 nautical miles south-southwest of Norfolk.10 In terms of numbers of ships homeported, Mayport (known formally as NAVSTA Mayport) is the Navy’s second-largest Atlantic Fleet home port. As (...continued) News, VA, while it underwent a mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul. Following completion of the overhaul, CVN-70 departed Newport News on January 12, 2010, and arrived at San Diego on April 12, 2010. 6 These Pacific Fleet CVN homeporting arrangements reflect a December 9, 2010, Navy announcement that the home port of the carrier Nimitz was being transferred from San Diego to Puget Sound. The Nimitz in December 2010 was moved from San Diego to Bremerton for a year-long overhaul and is scheduled to be permanently homeported at Everett when the overhaul is completed in December 2011. (“Navy Announces USS Nimitz Homeport Change to Everett, Wash.,” Navy News Service, December 9, 2010.) Although the Navy states that the CVN based at Yokosuka is forward deployed to (rather than homeported at) Yokosuka, the ship is commonly referred to as being homeported or forward-homeported there. The Navy includes Yokosuka on lists of Navy home ports, and does not show an alternate U.S. location as the home port of the ship. 7 LHDs resemble medium-sized aircraft carriers and are sometimes referred to as helicopter carriers or (in British parlance) commando carriers. 8 This is the straight-line distance measured from maps. 9 The home ports of Norfolk and Little Creek are separated by the downtown portion of Norfolk itself. 10 This is the straight-line distance between the two locations, as calculated by the “How Far Is It?” online distance calculator, available at http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist. Congressional Research Service 2 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport of December 31, 2012, about 16 CGs, DDGs, and FFGs were homeported at Mayport. The Navy reported to Congress in February 2010 that the service envisages Mayport as the primary Atlantic Fleet homeporting location for the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). (The report identifies Little Creek, VA, as the Navy’s envisaged secondary Atlantic Fleet LCS homeporting location, and Norfolk as the Navy’s envisaged tertiary Atlantic Fleet LCS homeporting location.)11 In addition to homeporting CGs, DDGs, and FFGs, Mayport has also served as a CV home port at various times since the 1950s, and most recently was the home port for the Kennedy, until that ship was decommissioned in 2007. Navy records dating back to 1979 indicate that Mayport served as a home port for two CVs (the Forrestal [CV-59] and the Saratoga [CV-60]) in 19791980, 1985-1987, and 1989-1991. (During the period 1980-1985, first CV-60 and then CV-59 underwent Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) overhauls at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.)12 Homeporting of Navy ships at Mayport reached recent peak of more than 30 ships, including two CVs, in 1987, when the Navy as a whole reached a recent peak of 568 ships, including 15 CVs and CVNs. Although Mayport has previously serviced as a CV homeport, it has not previously served as a CVN home port, and would require certain facility upgrades to be capable of homeporting a CVN, including dredging and the construction of CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities. Navy’s Desire to Establish a CVN Home Port at Mayport Navy’s January 2009 Announcement, DOD Review, and QDR Endorsement The Navy announced that it wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport in a Record of Decision (ROD) document dated January 14, 2009.13 Later that month, following the change in administrations, Obama Administration officials testified that they would review the proposal.14 On April 10, 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that it had decided to delay a final decision on whether to propose transferring a CVN to Mayport until it reviewed the issue as part of its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).15 11 Department of the Navy, Report on Strategic Plan for Homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship, February 2010, p. 5. See also Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Report Outlines Notional Littoral Combat Ship Homeporting Strategy,” Inside the Navy, March 8, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas, “Mayport To Get First East Coast Littoral Ships,” NavyTimes.com, March 10, 2010; and Timothy J. Gibbons, “Mayport Lands Combat Ships,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), March 11, 2010: 1. For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). 12 Source: Navy Listing of U.S. Naval Ship Battle Forces for 1979 to the present. CV-59 underwent SLEP overhaul in 1983-1985; CV-60 did so in 1980-1983. 13 Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, January 14, 2009, pp. 1-2. 14 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified on January 27, 2009, that both he and the new Secretary of the Navy would review the issue; and William J. Lynn III, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, made a similar commitment in testimony at his confirmation hearing on January 15, 2009. (Source: transcripts of hearings.) 15 DOD News Release No. 233-09 of April 10, 2009, entitled “Quadrennial Defense Review To Determine Aircraft Carrier Homeporting In Mayport,” available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12600. Congressional Research Service 3 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport DOD’s final report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 1, 2010, endorsed the Navy’s desire to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport, FL. The report states: “To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida.”16 October 21, 2011, Navy Letters to Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia In October 21, 2011, letters to three Members of Congress from Florida, and in letters of the same date to six Members of Congress from Virginia, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, commented on the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport in the context of the ongoing Department of Defense strategic and budget reviews. In the letters to the three Members of Congress from Florida, Greenert stated the following, with the portions shown here in bold indicating the text that differs from that of the letters to the six Members of Congress from Virginia: Thank you for your letter of October 5, 2011 regarding the decision to homeport a NuclearPowered Aircraft Carrier (CVN) in Mayport. I appreciate your thoughtful and constructive inputs on the strategic dispersal of our CVN Fleet. From a strategic standpoint, the rationale supporting the decision to disperse our East Coast Carrier Fleet remains sound, as validated in the Secretary of Defense-led 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Within the context of the ongoing Department of Defense strategic and budget reviews, the size of the fiscal adjustments compels us to take a comprehensive strategic review, examining every program element, including the timing and impacts of the decision to homeport a CVN in Mayport. You can be assured our strategic review will look to balance the merits of strategic dispersal with the challenges associated with current fiscal realities.17 In the letters to the six Members of Congress from Virginia, Greenert stated the following, with the portions shown here in bold indicating the text that differs from that of the letters to the three Members of Congress from Florida: Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2011 regarding the decision to homeport a Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVN) in Mayport. I appreciate your thoughtful and constructive inputs on the current fiscal challenges in relation to the strategic dispersal of our CVN Fleet. From a strategic standpoint, the rationale supporting the decision to disperse our East Coast Carrier Fleet remains sound, as validated in the Secretary of Defense-led 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Within the context of the ongoing Department of Defense strategic and 16 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 69. The report does not make any other comments about the issue. 17 Source: October 21, 2011, letters from Admiral Jonathan Greenert to Senators Bill Nelson and Marco Rubio and Representative Ander Crenshaw, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), November 4, 2011, and accessed November 7, 2011. The October 5, 2011, letter from Senators Bill Nelson and Marco Rubio and Representative Ander Crenshaw to Admiral Greenert was accessed November 7, 2011, at http://crenshaw.house.gov/? a=Files.Serve&File_id=fca59320-e1c2-4161-8f7f-479f8d7f7fe9. Congressional Research Service 4 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport budget reviews, the size of the fiscal adjustments compels us to take a comprehensive strategic review, examining every program element, including the funding required to homeport a CVN in Mayport. You can be assured I will include your concerns in the Navy’s strategic calculus.18 Navy’s Planned Timeline Prior to FY2013 Budget Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. The Navy originally planned on transferring a CVN to Mayport as early as 2014, but meeting that schedule would have required funding all necessary MilCon projects at Mayport in FY2010.19 Navy Rationale in Brief Then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead summarized the Navy’s rationale for its desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport in early 2010 testimony to Congress on the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget: Hampton Roads [Virginia] is the only nuclear carrier capable port on the East Coast. A catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads Area affecting port facilities, shipping channels, supporting maintenance or training infrastructure, or the surrounding community has the potential to severely limit East Coast Carrier operations, even if the ships themselves are not affected. Consistent with today’s dispersal of West Coast aircraft carriers between California and Washington State, the QDR direction to make Naval Station Mayport a nuclear carriercapable homeport addresses the Navy’s requirement for a capable facility to maintain aircraft carriers in the event that a natural or manmade disaster makes the Hampton Roads area inaccessible. While there is an upfront cost to upgrade Naval Station Mayport to support our nuclear aircraft carriers, Mayport has been a carrier homeport since 1952 and is the most cost-effective means to achieve strategic dispersal on the East Coast. The national security benefits of this additional homeport far outweigh those costs.20 The January 2009 ROD document states: The DON decision to utilize the capacity at NAVSTA Mayport to homeport a CVN is the culmination of a two and a half year process involving environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), identification of the recurring and nonrecurring costs associated with homeporting surface ships at NAVSTA Mayport, and an assessment of strategic concerns.... 18 Source: October 21, 2011, letter from Admiral Jonathan Greenert to Representative J. Randy Forbes, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), November 1, 2011, and accessed November 7, 2011. The letter was also accessed November 2, 2011, at http://forbes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/GreenertMayportResponse.pdf. The letter states: “I have sent a similar letter to the co-signers of the 23 September letter.” The September 23 letter, accessed November 2, 2011, at http://forbes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_Admiral_Greenert.pdf, was signed by Senators Jim Webb and Mark Warner and Representatives J. Randy Forbes, Rob Wittman, Scott Rigell, and Robert C. “Bobby” Scott. 19 Source: April 23, 2010, e-mail to CRS from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs. 20 Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee on February 24, 2010, p. 20. Roughead included similar a similar passage in his testimony to the other defense committees of Congress on the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget. Congressional Research Service 5 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport The decision reached by the DON, as further explained later in this Record of Decision, is based upon the DON’s environmental, operational, and strategic expertise and represents the best military judgment of the DON’s leadership. The need to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in this decision-making process. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the East Coast presents a unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are spread among three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs should a catastrophic event occur. By contrast, NAVSTA Norfolk is homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is the only location in the U.S. capable of CVN construction and refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet CVN trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. There are no strategic options available outside the Hampton Roads area for Atlantic Fleet CVNs should a catastrophic event occur.21 Additional excerpts from the ROD are presented in Appendix C. Strategic, Environmental, and Cost Analyses Informing Navy’s Desire The Navy states that its desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport is informed by three analyses: • a “strategic laydown analysis” that projected the future size and composition of the Navy, and then apportioned that Navy between the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet, • a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on alternatives for homeporting additional surface ships at Mayport, and • an analysis of the nonrecurring and recurring costs of homeporting ships at Mayport.22 Each of these is discussed below. For additional background information on the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport, see Appendix B, which reprints an appendix from a May 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Navy’s basing decision process.23 21 Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, January 14, 2009, pp. 1-2. 22 Navy briefing to CRS, December 5, 2008, on Mayport homeporting. The Navy stated at the briefing that the strategic laydown analysis began with an examination of Navy force structure requirements, meaning the numbers and types of ships that the Navy would need in the future to perform its various missions. The force structure analysis, the Navy stated, was followed by a global maritime posture for the year 2020 that in turn led to the Navy’s current plan for a achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet. The 313-ship fleet, the Navy stated, became the baseline for the strategic laydown The Navy stated that it then examined response times, maritime strategy, and direction from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to determine the apportionment of the fleet between the Atlantic Coast, Pacific Coast, and forward-deployed home ports. 23 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:]Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482, May 2010. 36 pp. Congressional Research Service 6 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Strategic Laydown Analysis The strategic laydown analysis projected a future Navy fleet of 313 ships, including 11 CVNs. (Navy plans since early 2006 have called for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 or more ships, including 11 CVNs.)24 Based on an examination of projected future mission demands and other factors, the Navy assigned 181 of these 313 ships (including 6 CVNs) to the Pacific Fleet, and 132 ships (including 5 CVNs) to the Atlantic Fleet. This apportionment was then used to analyze the amount of homeporting capacity that would be needed in coming years for Atlantic Fleet ships. Homeporting capacity was measured in terms of linear feet of pier space, and expressed in terms of cruiser equivalents (CGEs), with one CVN equaling four CGEs. The analysis concluded that, given the 132 ships to be homeported on the Atlantic Coast and the amount of homeporting capacity available at Norfolk and Little Creek, the Navy in coming years would need 13 CGEs of surface ship homeporting capacity at an Atlantic Fleet location other than Norfolk and Little Creek. The calculation assumed no double-breasting (i.e., side-by-side mooring of two ships at a single pier) at Norfolk and Little Creek, and no construction of additional pier space at Norfolk and Little Creek. Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) Analysis A Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on Mayport homeporting alternatives was released in November 2008. The FEIS examined 12 alternatives for homeporting additional surface ships at Mayport. Four of the 12 alternatives involved homeporting a CVN; another four involved making Mayport capable of homeporting a CVN, but not immediately homeporting a CVN there; and the remaining four did not involve making Mayport capable of homeporting a CVN. Ten of the 12 alternatives also involved transferring additional ships other than a CVN— various combinations of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, large-deck amphibious assault ships (LHDs), and other amphibious ships (LPDs and LSDs)—to Mayport. The FEIS also assessed a 13th alternative of homeporting no additional ships at Mayport. Homeporting a single additional ship—a CVN—was Alternative 4. The FEIS identified Alternative 4 as the Navy’s preferred alternative. The FEIS, like the January 2009 ROD, stated that a key reason for the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport is to hedge against the risk of a catastrophic event that could damage the Navy’s CVN homeporting facilities in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. The FEIS stated: Based on a thorough review of the alternatives, the Department of the Navy has determined Alternative 4 to be its Preferred Alternative. Alternative 4 involves homeporting one CVN, dredging, infrastructure and wharf improvements, and construction of CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities. Factors that influenced selection of Alternative 4 as the Preferred Alternative included impact analysis in the EIS, estimated costs of implementation, including military construction and other operation and sustainment costs, and strategic dispersal considerations. Homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport would enhance distribution of CVN homeport locations to reduce risks to fleet resources in the event of natural disaster, manmade calamity, or attack by foreign nations or terrorists. This includes risks to aircraft carriers, industrial support facilities, and the people that operate and maintain those crucial assets. 24 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 7 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport The aircraft carriers of the United States Navy are vital strategic assets that serve our national interests in both peace and war. The President calls upon them for their unique ability to provide both deterrence and combat support in times of crisis. Of the 11 aircraft carriers currently in service, five are assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. Utilizing the capacity at NAVSTA Mayport to homeport a CVN disperses critical Atlantic Fleet assets to reduce risks, thereby enhancing operational readiness. Operational readiness is fundamental to the Navy’s mission and obligation to the Commander in Chief.25 Nonrecurring and Recurring Costs Analysis The Navy estimated the nonrecurring and recurring costs of each of the 12 options examined in the FEIS for homeporting additional surface ships at Mayport. The Navy in 2008 estimated the nonrecurring (i.e., initial) cost of transferring a CVN to Mayport at $565 million.26 The Navy has since updated this estimate, and as of February 2010 estimates the cost at $589.7 million. Table 1 shows the breakdown of this estimate. The Navy states that the figures shown in the table are rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates that are subject to change. Table 1. Estimated Non-Recurring Cost To Transfer a CVN to Mayport (Millions of dollars, rounded to the nearest tenth; figures may not add due to rounding) Item Estimated cost Military Construction (MilCon) Costs Planning and design (P&D) 30.0 Dredging 46.3 Parking 30.9 Road improvements 15.9 Wharf F improvements 42.1 Controlled Industrial Facility (CIF) 150.7 Ship Maintenance Facility (SMF) 174.8 Subtotal MilCon Costs 490.7 Other One-Time Costs Initial outfitting for CIF and SMF 73.0 Personnel Change of Station (PCS) 26.0 Subtotal Other One-Time Costs 99.0 TOTAL 589.7 25 Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships At Naval Station Mayport, FL, Volume: Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 2008, p. ES-16. 26 This figure included $456 million in MilCon funding, a one-time maintenance cost of $85 million, and $24 million in personnel change of station (PCS) costs. The $456 million in MilCon funding included $30 million for planning and design work, and $426 million for dredging, infrastructure improvements, wharf improvements, and construction of CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities. (Source: Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008.) Congressional Research Service 8 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Source: Navy information paper dated February 25, 2010, provided to CRS by Navy Office of legislative Affairs. Notes: The Navy information paper states that the costs shown “represent Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) [estimates] and will be subsequently amended prior to the annual budget submission” that “costs are subject to change as specific projects get programmed for future execution,” and that “The projected dollars values may adjust based on the timing of execution.” The Navy estimated in late 2008 that, compared to the cost of homeporting a CVN at Norfolk, homeporting a CVN at Mayport would result in an additional recurring (i.e., annual) cost of $25.5 million in constant calendar year 2010 (CY10) dollars. This estimate is a revision of an earlier estimate of $20.4 million in recurring costs that was briefed to congressional offices following the release of the FEIS. The Navy stated that the estimate of $25.5 million in additional recurring costs is based on an approximate yearly recurring cost of Base Operating Support (BOS) and Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) at $8.3M, Operations at $0.8M, travel/per-diem for transitory maintenance labor which occur two of every three 32-month operating cycles but annualized at $12.9M, permanent on-site labor at $5M and bi-annual maintenance dredging to maintain the depth necessary for unrestricted carrier access averaged out to $0.1M per year. It is anticipated that Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) would show an annual savings of $1.6M.27 Navy Summary of Its Comparison of Mayport and Norfolk Table 2 reproduces a November 2008 Navy table that summarizes the Navy’s comparison of Mayport and Norfolk in terms of certain operational characteristics and risk factors. Table 2. Navy Table Comparing Mayport and Norfolk Norfolk Mayport Response times to COCOMs Slight Advantage Slight SOUTHCOM Advantage (HADR/GFS) Transit times to Respective Training Ranges Slight Advantage Hurricane Risk No Advantage No Advantage Man-Made Disaster Risk Physical Force Protection Slight Advantage Slight Advantage Source: Reproduction of Navy briefing slide entitled “Norfolk vs. Mayport,” in Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008. Emboldening as in the original. At the bottom of the briefing slide, below the table, the slide stated: “Bottom Line: Most Compelling Strategic Rationale to Homeport a CVN/LHA in Mayport is as a hedge against a catastrophic event in Norfolk.” Notes: COCOMs means U.S. regional combatant commanders; SOUTHCOM means U.S. Southern Command; HADR/GFS means humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations/Global Fleet Station. A GFS is a Navy formation of one or more forward-deployed Navy ships that operates in an area so as to facilitate peacetime U.S. engagement with one or more countries in that area. Amphibious and high-speed sealift ships have served as the core ships of GFSs. 27 Source: Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008, and provided to CRS on January 6, 2009. Congressional Research Service 9 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Transfer of Amphibious Ships to Mayport On June 15, 2012, the Navy announced that it intended to transfer an amphibious ready group (or ARG—a group of three amphibious ships capable of embarking a Marine Expeditionary Unit) from Norfolk to Mayport in 2013 and 2014. The Navy had originally announced on February 28, 2012, that the ARG, which includes the “large-deck” amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima (LHD-7), would arrive no later than 2015. The Navy’s announcement stated in part: The accelerated timeline ensures continued viability of the Mayport ship repair industrial base and maintains the capabilities of the Jacksonville fleet concentration area, thereby preserving surge capability and reducing risk to fleet resources in the event of natural or man-made contingencies. “I am very pleased that the Navy is able condense the time horizon for the arrival of the Mayport ARG,” stated [Secretary of the Navy Ray] Mabus. “The move underscores just how important Jacksonville and Naval Station Mayport are to our national defense, and how committed we are to strategic dispersal on the east coast.”28 At a June 27, 2012, press briefing at the Pentagon with Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, the following exchange occurred: QUESTION: Admiral, I know you moved some ships down to Mayport recently. And I’m wondering, have you considered or are you considering a future moves of such ships? And would that require any modifications that might pave the way for an eventual carrier move? DM. GREENERT: Well, the—we haven’t moved any—we’ve announced the movement recently of an amphibious ready group, which was part of our strategic (inaudible) that we’ve kind of been talking about since we rolled the budget out. So that—that’s kind of an evolution to now get to the ship level. We have dredged the harbor. Actually, it’s still underway down in Mayport, but we’re about complete there. So that will, if you will, pave the way for these ships’ arrival. And that does make the harbor, if you will, carrier capable. We’re upgrading the pier in Mayport. It will be able to take a carrier visit and be able to do some maintenance there—enable it. And that will obviously pave the way for the amphibious ready group as well. But as we state in our budget, right now we just don’t have the fiscal resources to conduct a carrier move right now. Strategic dispersal remains a key and critical element. Movement of the amphibious ready group satisfies that need for—in amphibious ships to have that, in the case of an amphibious ready group, that strategic dispersal to a couple of ports on the eastern seaboard.29 28 DOD News Release Number 498-12 of June 15, 2012, entitled “Amphibious Ready Group Early Move Announced,” accessed July 2, 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15373. 29 DOD News Transcript, June 27, 2012, entitled “DOD News Briefing with Adm. Greenert from the Pentagon,” accessed July 2, 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5072. Congressional Research Service 10 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Local Economic Value of Homeporting a CVN Serving as the home port for a CVN can generate substantial economic activity in the home port area. This activity includes, among other things, the ship’s crew of more than 3,000 sailors spending its pay at local businesses, the Navy purchasing supplies for the ship from local businesses, and Navy expenditures for performing maintenance on the ship while it is in the home port. Various estimates have been reported of the value of homeporting a CVN to the economy of the home port area. The FEIS estimates that transferring a CVN at Mayport would result in 2,900 more jobs, $220 million more in direct payroll, $208 million more in disposable income, and $10 million more in local tax contributions for the Mayport area.30 An August 2007 press report stated that “some reports put the [earlier] loss of the [aircraft carrier] George Washington at $450 30 The FEIS estimated the socioeconomic impacts of the various homeporting alternatives for Mayport. These impacts were measured in relation to a 2006 baseline situation in which Mayport served as a home port to 22 ships, including the carrier Kennedy. The FEIS assumed that homeporting a CVN at Mayport—Alternative 4—would result in a situation of one CVN and 11 other surface ships being homeported at Mayport in 2014. The FEIS stated that, for the Mayport area: Under Alternative 4, the estimated construction impacts would total approximately $671 million and result in 7,400 jobs. It is anticipated that the percent change for total dependents would be -13 percent [compared to the 2006 baseline], and total school age children would be reduced by 12 percent [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Average annual growth in direct jobs would be -2.1 percent [compared to the 2006 baseline], and total change in employment would be approximately -2,000 jobs [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Direct payroll would be reduced by $150 million [compared to the 2006 baseline], and change in disposable income would be reduced by a total of $141 million [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Estimated local tax contributions would be reduced by approximately $6 million [compared to the 2006 baseline]. [Department of the Navy, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL, Volume I: Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 2008, pp. ES-29.] Under the 13th alternative—the No Action Alternative—no additional ships would be homeported at Mayport, and Mayport in 2014 would serve as the homeport to 11 surface ships, none of them a CVN. The FEIS stated that, for the Mayport area: Under the No Action Alternative, the percent change for total dependents would be -35 percent and total school age children would decline by 32 percent as compared to the 2006 baseline. Average annual growth in direct jobs would be -5.7 percent [compared to the 2006 baseline] and total change in employment would be a loss of approximately 4,900 jobs [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Direct payroll would be reduced by $370 million [compared to the 2006 baseline], and change in disposable income would decline by a total of $349 million [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Estimated local tax contributions would decrease by approximately $16 million [compared to the 2006 baseline]. The NAVSTA Mayport population would decline, resulting in a decline in on- and off-Station housing demand and occupancy rate. [Department of the Navy, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL, Volume I: Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 2008, pp. ES-31.] The difference between Alternative 4 and the No Action Alternative is the presence of the CVN (Alternative 4) or absence of the CVN (No Action Alternative). Compared to the No Action Alternative, under Alternative 4 in the 2014 end state, there would be 2,900 more jobs (the difference between a loss of 2,000 jobs and a loss of 4,900 jobs), $220 million more in direct payroll (the difference between a reduction in direct payroll of $150 million and a reduction in direct payroll of $370 million), $208 million more in disposable income (the difference between a decline in disposable income of $141 million and a decline in disposable income of $349 million.), and $10 million more in local tax contributions (the difference between a reduction in estimated local tax contributions of $6 million and a reduction in estimated local tax contributions of $16 million). Congressional Research Service 11 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport million in payroll and 8,200 military and civilian jobs in Norfolk.”31 A November 2008 press report from a Norfolk newspaper stated that “The regional chamber of commerce estimates a carrier creates 11,000 jobs and $650 million in annual economic activity.”32 Another November 2008 press report states that “Jacksonville mayor John Peyton said the new carrier would bring about 3,190 military jobs and pump about $500 million a year into the north Florida economy in salaries and spending.”33 Another November 2008 press report states that “Virginians calculate that the economic activity related to one carrier can reach $1 billion a year.”34 The Navy estimated that the initial $426 million in military construction work at Mayport would generate a total of $671 million in initial economic activity.35 Funding FY2010 Funding for Dredging The FY2010 budget provided $46.3 million in MilCon funding for channel dredging at Mayport to support the ability of a CVN to enter Mayport on a temporary basis. The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) stated: The conference agreement includes authorization for $46.3 million for channel and turning basin dredging at Naval Station (NS) Mayport, Florida. The Navy requested this project in order to allow a nuclear aircraft carrier to enter Naval Station Mayport on a temporary basis with an embarked air wing, full stores, and under any tidal conditions. The conferees authorize funding for this project based on the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations’ assurances that the dredging is needed for current operational considerations to permit the use of Mayport as a transient dock and is “required irrespective of the final decision on aircraft carrier homeporting at Mayport.” The conferees emphasize that the inclusion of an authorization for dredging at NS Mayport is not an indication of conferee support for the establishment of an additional homeport for 31 Andrew Scutro, “Senators Lobby Mullen for Mayport Flattop,” NavyTimes.com, August 13, 2007. Louis Hansen, “Use of Florida Site Vital to Carrier Safety, Navy Report Says,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 22, 2008. These figures were repeated in Dale Eisman and Louis Hansen, “Va. Senators Try New Tack On Plan To Move Carrier,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 9, 2008; Dale Eisman and Louis Hansen, “Navy Appears To Have Made Decision To Put Carrier In Florida,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 20, 2008; Dale Eisman and Louis Hansen, “Navy Backs Plan To Move A Carrier To Mayport, Florida,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 15, 2009; Dale Eisman, “Next Defense Team To Weigh Carrier’s Florida Move,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 16, 2009. 33 Ron Word, “Fla. Officials: Do Not Delay Carrier Decision,” NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), November 25, 2008. 34 Roxana Tiron, “Nuclear Carrier Rift Expected To Spark Battle Between Dems,” The Hill, November 19, 2008. 35 The Navy states that: The amount of $671M represents the estimated economic benefit to the region resulting from the federal investment of military construction dollars (i.e., the “ripple effect”), not just the budgeted construction costs. The figure is derived from [the] IMPLAN model, a regional economic modeling program. The $671M includes direct impacts ($426M in MILCON), indirect impacts ($91M in related economic sector expenditures), and induced impacts ($154M in additional household spending derived from income gained through direct and indirect effects). (Source: Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from congressional offices, dated December 19, 2008, and provided to CRS on January 6, 2009, question/request 42.) 32 Congressional Research Service 12 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport nuclear aircraft carriers on the east coast, or intended to influence the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, which may include a recommendation on the establishment of a second east coast homeport for nuclear aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the conferees note that this funding is provided solely to permit use of Mayport as a transient port, and that any potential designation of Mayport as a nuclear carrier homeport will require future authorizations from the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Page 870) FY2011 Funding for CVN Home Port Of the $120.05 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2011 for MilCon planning and design activities, about $2 million was requested for the project to establish a CVN home port at Mayport.36 The total amount appropriated for the Navy for FY2011 for MilCon planning and design activities was $119.81 million.37 FY2012 Funding for CVN Home Port The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements project, a roadway construction project that is part of the Navy’s plan for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport. In addition, the Navy stated that of the $84.36 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2012 for MilCon planning and design activities, about $2 million was requested for the project to establish a CVN home port at Mayport.38 The conference report (H.Rept. 112-331 of December 15, 2011) on H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011),39 approved the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 1271) and the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 1283). The conference report (H.Rept. 112-329 of December 12, 2011) on the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) recommended approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 952) and stated: The conferees determined that the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project had merit to support requirements at the Naval Station Mayport, Florida, whether or not a nuclear powered aircraft carrier was home ported there. (Page 757) 36 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on April 1, 2010. See also the spoken testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III at a March 4, 2010, hearing before the House Budget Committee on DOD’s proposed FY2011 budget. 37 Source: Department of the Navy, Supporting Exhibits (M-1, O-1, P-1, R-1 & C-1), Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget, February 2012, pdf pages 174 and 216 of 246. 38 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on May 12, 2011. 39 In final action, H.R. 2055 became a consolidated appropriations act incorporating nine appropriations bills, including the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act itself, which was incorporated as Division H. Congressional Research Service 13 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport FY2013 Budget The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget deferred the Navy’s plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget and the FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport.40 The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.”41 FY2014 Budget The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requested no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. Issues for Congress The Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport has become an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities. For examples of Member views on the issue, see Appendix E. Since a key reason the Navy wants to transfer a CVN to Mayport is to hedge against the risk of a catastrophic event that could damage the Navy’s CVN homeporting facilities in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia, potential questions for Congress to consider include the following: • What is the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities, and how might that risk be altered by homeporting a CVN at Mayport? • If a catastrophic event were to damage Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities, what would be the operational impact on the Navy, and how quickly could the Navy repair the damage and return to normal operations? • Are the costs associated with homeporting a CVN at Mayport worth the benefits in terms of hedging against the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities? 40 Source for statement regarding funding in the FY2013-FY2017 FYDP: Navy briefing for House Armed Services Committee staff on the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, February 14, 2012. At the invitation of the committee, CRS staff attended the briefing. 41 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget, February 2012, p. 6-3. Congressional Research Service 14 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport In assessing these and other questions relating to the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport, Congress may consider several specific issues, including the following: • the Navy’s basing decision process; • the Navy’s strategic laydown analysis; • the Navy’s estimated recurring and nonrecurring costs for homeporting a CVN at Mayport; • transit times from Norfolk and Mayport to key destinations; • the vulnerability of Norfolk and Mayport to natural and man-made catastrophes; • other factors that might differentiate Norfolk and Mayport; • the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on Mayport homeporting options; • potential options for Mayport homeporting other than those studied in the FEIS; and • potential alternative uses of the funding that would be required for homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Each of these specific issues is discussed below. Navy’s Basing Decision Process One issue that Congress may consider is the Navy’s basing decision process. A May 2010 GAO report on the Navy’s basing decision process done in response to direction in the House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009, pages 537-538) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647) states: The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes fully incorporate the key elements, associated factors, and management control standards that GAO identified as necessary in a comprehensive process; however, the Navy needs additional guidance for its process to be complete. GAO found that while the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force each have issued comprehensive guidance for their basing possesses that describes the organizational roles and responsibilities within the service, establishes links among all of the service’s strategic and environmental guidance documents, and identifies the service’s basing criteria, some of the Navy’s guidance documents lacked detailed information about specific actions taken during the process and defined responsibility for completing certain types of analyses. For example, the Navy’s Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart—one of the five guidance documents used to implement the Navy’s process—shows that some types of analyses are conducted to review a range of considerations, such as access to training areas, sailor and family quality of life, and ship size, for a particular basing decision. But the document does not describe in any detail how and by whom these analyses will be conducted. Additionally, Navy guidance does not provide a clear explanation of how its five guidance documents are linked together in implementing the Navy’s overall basing process. Without comprehensive and clear guidance on all aspects of the Navy’s overall basing decision process, the Navy may lack the completeness and management control to ensure that Navy basing decisions can facilitate external stakeholders’ examination and scrutiny or ensure effective implementation of the Navy’s basing process. Congressional Research Service 15 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a clear role for providing management control of the services’ basing decision processes within the United States, and as a consequence may lack reasonable assurance that certain departmentwide initiatives will be fully supported in the services’ basing decisions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials said that OSD is promoting joint sharing of DOD facilities and seeking to ensure that domestic basing decisions support global operations. However, OSD has not fully promoted service consideration of the joint sharing, global operations, and potentially other initiatives because the Secretary of Defense has neither provided a comprehensive policy for, nor clearly assigned an office within OSD to oversee domestic service basing processes. Without OSD guidance and an office to provide effective oversight of military service basing decision processes, the Secretary of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that departmentwide initiatives are adequately considered by the services in their domestic basing decision making.42 Strategic Laydown Analysis A second issue that Congress may consider is the Navy’s strategic laydown analysis. As mentioned earlier, this analysis projected a future fleet of 313 ships (including 11 CVNs), of which 181 ships (including 6 CVNs) would be assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 132 ships (including 5 CVNs) would be assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. On September 1, 2011, it was reported that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, is discussing options for maintaining a fleet with considerably fewer than 300 ships, such as a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a 240-ship fleet that includes 8 aircraft carriers; a fleet with 9 carriers is another reported option.43 Supporters of keeping all Atlantic Fleet CVNs homeported at Norfolk could argue that if the Navy in coming years includes fewer than 313 ships or fewer than 11 CVNs, there will be less need to shift a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport for reasons relating to homeporting capacity. Supporters of homeporting a CVN at Mayport could argue that if the Navy in coming years includes fewer than 313 ships or fewer than 11 CVNs, each ship or each CVN would represent a larger percentage of the Navy’s overall capability, making the need to hedge against a catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area more important. Additional factors that Congress may consider in connection with the strategic laydown analysis include the Navy’s projected apportionment of the fleet between the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts (which reflects, among other things, a Navy judgment about likely potential missions for the Navy), the potential for “breasting” (i.e., side-by-side mooring of two or more ships at a single pier), and the cost of increasing homeporting capacity at Norfolk through construction of additional pier space and other facilities. Nonrecurring and Recurring Costs A third issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has accurately estimated the nonrecurring and recurring costs of homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Other things held equal, if 42 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:]Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482, May 2010, summary page. 43 Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Of Tomorrow Could Have Fewer Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers,” Inside the Pentagon, September 1, 2011. Congressional Research Service 16 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport the Navy has underestimated or overestimated these costs, it might weaken or strengthen, respectively, the argument for homeporting a CVN at Mayport. March 2011 GAO Report A March 2011 GAO report on the Navy’s estimate of nonrecurring and recurring costs of homeporting a CVN at Mayport stated: GAO’s independent cost estimate suggests that the total one-time cost of homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport is expected to be between $258.7 million and $356.0 million, in base year 2010 dollars. The Navy’s estimate of the one-time cost is $537.6 million—also in base year 2010 dollars—which is outside the upper range of GAO’s estimate. Unlike GAO’s estimate, the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis on its one-time costs; as a result, its estimate does not include a range. The largest difference between GAO’s estimate of one-time costs and the Navy’s estimate is the cost of constructing new facilities at Mayport. Based on the historical costs of constructing similar facilities, GAO estimates at the 65 percent confidence level that the cost for constructing the controlled industrial facility will be $70.5 million, and the cost for constructing the ship maintenance support facilities will be $45.6 million. The Navy estimates the construction costs to be much higher at $139.1 million and $157.2 million, respectively. Navy officials told GAO the difference is due to the increased cost involved in protecting the buildings from a potential storm surge associated with a Category 4 hurricane. GAO included a hurricane factor in its estimate to account for this increase, but GAO and the Navy used different estimating methods in developing the estimates for the construction costs. GAO used adjusted actual costs from similar construction projects, while the Navy used a detailed engineering estimate. For recurring costs, GAO’s independent cost estimate suggests that the total is expected to be between $9.0 million and $17.6 million per year. The Navy’s estimate of $15.3 million per year is within GAO’s estimated range. The Navy’s estimate did not fully meet any of the four characteristics—comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible—for producing a high-quality cost estimate. Specifically, although the estimate included almost all of the life-cycle costs related to homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport, it partially met the criteria for being comprehensive because it does not fully describe the cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions. The estimate was only minimally accurate and well documented in that although many elements of the estimate are based on actual experiences from other comparable programs, it is difficult to say if the cost estimates are the most likely costs since the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis. Further, the estimate contains very little step-by-step description of how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could independently replicate it. The Navy had to recreate several portions of the estimate in order to provide GAO with supporting documentation. Further, the Navy’s estimate does not meet the GAO best practice for a credible estimate because it does not include a sensitivity analysis and was not compared by the Navy to an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the Navy. Without fully meeting the characteristics of a high-quality estimate, the Navy’s ability to present a convincing argument of the estimate’s affordability and credibly answer decision makers’ and oversight groups’ questions about the estimate is hampered.44 Regarding nonrecurring costs, the report stated on pages 10-11: 44 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:] Navy Can Improve the Quality of Its Cost Estimate to Homeport an Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-309, March 2011, summary page. Congressional Research Service 17 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Table 2 [of this GAO report] shows a comparison between our estimated range and the Navy’s estimate for one-time costs. Specifically, the table shows our estimated range at an 80 percent confidence interval and whether the Navy’s estimate falls into that range. The low value of the estimate range ($258.7 million) represents a 10 percent chance that the cost will be that amount or less, and the high value of the estimated range ($356.0 million) represents a 90 percent chance that the cost will be that amount or less. The last column in the table identifies whether the Navy’s estimate is within our estimated range. The report also stated on page 12: Table 3 [of this GAO report] shows our 65 percent confidence level estimate in comparison to the Navy’s point estimate. To facilitate comparisons against the Navy’s estimate, the onetime costs are expressed in base year 2010 dollars, which represent amounts based on 2010 prices, with the impact of inflation removed. While useful for comparisons against the Navy’s estimate, base year 2010 dollars should not be used as the basis for budgetary decisions. In order to support a budgetary amount, base year 2010 dollars would need to be converted into then-year dollars. Congressional Research Service 18 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Regarding recurring costs, the report stated on page 14: Table 4 [of this GAO report] shows a comparison between our estimated range and the Navy’s estimate for recurring costs. Specifically, the table shows our estimate range at an 80 percent confidence interval and whether the Navy’s estimate falls into that range. The low value of the estimated range ($9.0 million) represents a 10 percent chance that the cost will be that amount or less, and the high value of the estimated range ($17.6 million) represents a 90 percent chance that the cost will be that amount or less. The last column in the table identifies whether the Navy’s estimate is within our estimated range. As we did with one time costs, we also compared our 65 percent confidence level estimates with the Navy’s point estimates for a direct element-by-element comparison between our estimate and the Navy’s, as shown in table 5. Congressional Research Service 19 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport The report made the following conclusions and recommendations: Conclusions The Navy’s ability to produce a comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible cost estimate for homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport will continue to be hampered until it makes certain fundamental changes to the process it uses to develop, document, and update its overall estimate of Mayport homeporting costs. Specifically, without full documentation of the data sources, assumptions, and calculation methods it uses, the Navy cannot assure that its estimate can be validated or defended or any differences between estimated and actual costs can be explained—an important step in improving and updating the estimate. Additionally, without detailed documentation that describes how the estimate was derived, the Navy can neither present a convincing argument of the estimate’s affordability, nor credibly answer decision makers’ and oversight groups’ questions about specific details in the estimate. Further, without conducting sensitivity and risk and uncertainty analyses on its cost estimate, the Navy is unable to identify and focus on major cost drivers, analyze the potential for cost growth, and quantify the risk and uncertainty associated with the cost estimate. Moreover, without a comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible cost estimate, Congress cannot have reasonable confidence that it has a complete understanding and an accurate and realistic determination of the projected costs to evaluate and make decisions on the Navy’s planned homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimate for the planned homeporting of a nuclearpowered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following three actions to incorporate to a greater extent the best practices identified by GAO for developing a high-quality cost estimate in future revisions of its Mayport nuclear carrier homeporting cost estimate as part of the annual budgetary process or in response to future congressional requests: 1. To improve the comprehensiveness of its cost estimate, the Navy should • include all potential recurring costs, and Congressional Research Service 20 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport • clearly describe the ground rules and assumptions underlying the estimation of each cost element; 2. To improve the quality and transparency of the Navy’s estimate, the Navy should thoroughly document the life-cycle costs associated with homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport. Specifically, documentation should • identify the source data used, their reliability, and how the data were normalized, • describe the steps used in developing the overall estimate so that it can be clearly understood and easily replicated, and • describe in sufficient detail the estimating methodology and calculations performed to derive each element’s cost; and 3. To improve the accuracy and credibility of its cost estimate, the Navy should assign a single office with the responsibility for assembling the overall estimate into a comprehensive and well documented package and for performing a sensitivity and risk and uncertainty analyses on the overall estimate to identify the • major cost drivers, • extent to which estimates could vary due to changes in key cost assumptions, and • level of confidence in the estimate.45 The GAO report stated that “in written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with two and nonconcurred with one of our three recommended actions…. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV [of this GAO report].”46 Transit Times A fourth issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has accurately assessed the relative merits of Norfolk and Mayport in terms of transit times to key overseas operating areas and training ranges, as shown in the first two columns of Table 2. Transit times are a function of transit distance and transit speed. With regard to transit times to key overseas operating areas, one key destination is the Strait of Gibraltar, which is used to support operations in the Mediterranean and (via the Suez canal) the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Other key destinations include the Cape of Good Hope (a longer route to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, but one that avoids the need to transit the Suez canal), and Puerto Rico (which might be considered a representative destination for supporting operations in the Caribbean). Table 3 shows transit times from Norfolk and Mayport to these three destinations at 14 knots (a typical transit speed for routine forward deployments) and 20 knots (an elevated transit speed that might be more likely for responding to a contingency). 45 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:] Navy Can Improve the Quality of Its Cost Estimate to Homeport an Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-309, March 2011, pp. 22-23. 46 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:] Navy Can Improve the Quality of Its Cost Estimate to Homeport an Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-309, March 2011, p. 23. Congressional Research Service 21 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Table 3. Transit Times To Key Destinations In days, as a function of transit speed Transit speed Destination From 14 knots 20 knots Strait of Gibraltar Mayport 11.1 7.6 Norfolk 9.9 7.0 Mayport 34.8 24.4 Norfolk 34.8 24.3 Mayport 6.2 4.3 Norfolk 6.9 4.8 Cape of Good Hope Puerto Rico Source: Navy briefing slide entitled “Average Transit Times East/West,” in Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008; and (for Puerto Rico) Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008, and provided to CRS on January 6, 2009. Port Vulnerability A fifth issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has accurately assessed vulnerability-related factors at Norfolk and Mayport, including the risk of a natural or man-made catastrophic event damaging CVN homeporting facilities, and the Navy’s ability to defend against such an event at either site. The Navy’s summary of its assessments of these factors is shown in the third, fourth, and fifth columns of the Navy slide reproduced in Table 2. In assessing the question of port vulnerability, one factor that might be considered is the current degree of concentration or dispersion of Navy ships other than Atlantic Fleet CVNs. For example, supporters of transferring a CVN to Mayport might observe that the Navy’s Pacific Fleet CVN homeporting facilities are currently located in three widely separated areas (San Diego, the Puget Sound area of Washington State, and Yokosuka, Japan), while supporters of keeping all Atlantic Fleet CVNs homeported at Norfolk might observe that the Navy’s Pacific Fleet and Atlantic Fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)—which, like CVNs, are low-quantity, high-value assets— are homeported at a single site on each coast (Bangor, WA, and Kings Bay, GA, respectively). Natural Disaster As shown in Table 2, hurricanes were the principal type of natural disaster that the Navy analyzed in comparing the relative risk of a natural disaster at Hampton Roads and Mayport. The Navy assesses that, historically, the hurricane risk to Norfolk is similar to the risk to Jacksonville, which is close to Mayport. Information provided by the Navy regarding the risk of hurricanes at Norfolk and Mayport is presented in Appendix D of this report. Man-Made Disaster Potential man-made disasters include but are not limited to shipping accidents, conventional or nuclear military attacks by foreign countries, and terrorist attacks. Congressional Research Service 22 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport During the Cold War, the Navy was concerned about the potential for a conventional military attack on U.S. home ports by Soviet military forces. One possibility was a covert mining of U.S. Navy home ports by Soviet submarines and Warsaw Pact merchant ships prior to the start of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Another possibility was a cruise missile strike by Soviet submarines against Navy port facilities or ships in port. Concern over the potential for a conventional military attack on U.S. home ports by Soviet military forces was the central reason for the Navy’s strategic homeporting program of the 1980s, which dispersed some of the Navy’s ships away from the Navy’s major home ports.47 The end of the Cold War reduced the apparent risk of a conventional military attack on U.S. Navy home ports by a foreign country, and led to a reconsideration of the strategic homeporting program.48 China is modernizing its naval and other military forces,49 but any potential ability China might have in coming years for conducting a conventional attack on U.S. home ports might be more of an issue for Pacific Fleet home ports than for Atlantic Fleet home ports. The terrorist attack of October 12, 2000, on the destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in the port of Aden, Yemen,50 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to increased focus on the potential for terrorist attacks on U.S. port areas. The Navy states that DOD and other U.S. government entities conducted several vulnerability assessments for Norfolk and Mayport between 2006 and 2008.51 The contents of these assessments are generally classified. 47 See CRS Issue Brief IB85193, The Navy’s Strategic Homeporting Program: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. This issue brief is out of print and is available directly from the author. 48 See CRS Issue Brief IB90077, Strategic Homeporting Reconsidered, by Ronald O’Rourke. This issue brief is out of print and is available directly from the author. 49 See CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). 50 For a discussion of this attack, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 51 In response to a question from CRS regarding vulnerability assessments for Norfolk and Mayport, the Navy stated the following (which has been edited for ease of reading): The Joint Staff sponsored a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) on Naval Station Norfolk that was conducted from August 6 to August 11, 2006. The team conducting the assessment was composed of seven specialists from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) conducted a Chief of Naval Operations Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (CNOIVA) for Naval Station Mayport from January 21 to January 26, 2007. Threat assessments conducted by NCIS through the Multiple Threat Alert Center (MTAC) prior to specific events, such as air shows, also serve as threat updates for other Department of the Navy commands located in the geographic area. NCIS also conducts Port Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (PIVA) for ports and facilities that are not USN bases. Additional vulnerability and threat assessments that were completed include the following: a Southeast Virginia Threat Assessment that was conducted from August 27 to October 7, 2008; a Mayport Threat Assessment dated May 30, 2008; a Jacksonville Threat Assessment dated October 1, 2008; an FBI assessment entitled “Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat Assessment” dated March 28, 2008; an update to that assessment entitled “Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat Assessment (Update)” dated April 17, 2008; a Department of Homeland Security assessment entitled “Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008-2013” dated July 18, 2008; a U.S. Coast Guard assessment entitled “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Maritime Domain” dated March 25, 2004; and a Director of National Intelligence assessment entitled “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland” dated July 2007. (Source: Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008 and provided to (continued...) Congressional Research Service 23 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport The Navy states that it used statistics on shipping volumes at the ports of Norfolk and Jacksonville (near Mayport) as one measure of the relative risk of a man-made disaster at Norfolk and Mayport, the idea being that certain elements of the risk of man-made disaster are somewhat proportional to the volume of shipping. The Navy states that in 2006, 2.05 million cargo containers and 16.6 million tons of cargo passed through the port of Norfolk, while 768,200 cargo containers and 8.31 million tons of cargo passed through the port of Jacksonville.52 The Navy further states that the center of the shipping channel in the port of Norfolk is about 500 yards from the carrier piers, and that the channel is separated from the piers by a line of buoys but no fixed obstruction, while the center of the shipping channel in the port of Jacksonville is also about 500 yards from the carrier pier, but is separated from the carrier pier by a 200-yard-wide spit of land.53 A July 2012 GAO report on the Navy’s use of risk management at Mayport and Norfolk states: The Navy follows the five basic guiding principles for managing risk at the strategic, environmental, and operational levels before making decisions about the placement and operation of its force structure—including the placement of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers on the East Coast of the United States. The Navy does not conduct any unique risk assessment for its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at naval installations; rather, nuclearpowered aircraft carriers are high-value assets that are included in the Navy’s overall risk management process. At the strategic level, Office of the Secretary of the Navy and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations headquarters staff have identified and analyzed risks, such as emerging threats from hostile nation-states, which could make demands on homeland defense capabilities. Since 2004, according to Navy officials, the Navy has been using its strategic laydown and dispersal methodology in dividing its force structure and assets between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. In addition, officials stated that there may be adjustments to the Navy’s current split of assets between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets based on direction from the President that is reflected in DOD’s January 2012 defense strategic guidance, which emphasizes rebalancing defense assets in the Pacific region. Furthermore, naval guidance indicates that the Navy seeks to operate around the world in an environmentally responsible manner, both ashore (installations) and afloat (ships), and work with stakeholders to ensure that it follows environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Since the terrorist attacks of 2000 and 2001, the Navy’s risk management at the operational level has included conducting threat assessments for areas surrounding naval installations, as well as the installations themselves, and providing increased protection for high-value assets, such as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In addition, since the terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard has at times been providing escorts to the Navy’s high-value assets. The Coast Guard officials also noted that the communication of threat information among stakeholders in the Hampton Roads Regional Threat Working Group in Virginia has been much improved during this period. The Navy has taken some actions to mitigate risk associated with homeporting nuclearpowered aircraft carriers at two East Coast naval installations. A naval installation and its high-value assets—such as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers—may be susceptible to the (...continued) CRS on January 6, 2009.) 52 The cargo containers were measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), a standard metric for counting cargo containers. 53 Source: Slide entitled “Shipping—Man Made Disaster Risk,” from Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008. Congressional Research Service 24 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport threat of a terrorist attack. The risk of becoming the target of such an attack is affected by vulnerabilities at the installation. As part of its ongoing risk management process to identify and assess vulnerabilities at installations, DOD requires that many of its installations undergo an annual antiterrorism vulnerability assessment. According to security experts who conduct the annual vulnerability assessments, they determine whether the installation is in compliance with DOD’s 32 antiterrorism standards, such as establishing and implementing an antiterrorism program. During our site visits, we found that vulnerability assessments were performed at Naval Stations Mayport, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia, on an annual basis. In addition, we found that the two naval stations had developed mitigation action plans and identified different possible courses of action to eliminate or mitigate the vulnerabilities and reduce the risk to the installations. The installation commander is responsible for protecting the installation and its assets—including nuclear-powered aircraft carriers—and selects the course of action that most effectively mitigates the vulnerability. Finally, as part of their ongoing risk management process, Naval Stations Mayport and Norfolk conduct four integrated training events each year, as directed by Commander, Naval Installations Command guidance. These training exercises focus on enhancing skills in emergency management, fire protection, and force protection conditions.54 Other Factors That Might Differentiate Norfolk and Mayport A sixth issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has overlooked or not given adequate weight to other factors in evaluating the merits of Mayport and Norfolk as Navy home ports. Possibilities might include things such as • the ability of private ship repair firms in Northeast Florida to support the maintenance requirements of a CVN, • the readiness and cost impacts of the aircraft carrier homeporting and maintenance at Mayport on the Navy’s traveling workforce, • the interaction of the base facilities at Mayport or Norfolk with other regional military facilities (such as naval air stations), or • the possible effect of CVN homeporting on Navy recruiting in the area surrounding the home port. 54 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure: The Navy’s Use of Risk Management at Naval Stations Mayport and Norfolk, GAO-12-710R, July 13, 2012, pp. 3-4. The report was prepared in response to a direction on page 241 of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) on the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1253). The direction on page 241 of S.Rept. 112-26 stated: Comptroller General report on aircraft carrier homeporting on the East Coast The committee directs the Comptroller General to conduct an independent analysis of alternatives on the Department of the Navy’s plan to establish a second east coast homeport for a nuclearpowered aircraft carrier. The analysis should assess, at a minimum, the strategic, fiscal, and operational risks, requirements, and constraints the Navy’s plan seeks to address. The committee directs that this report be provided to the congressional defense committees by February 1, 2012. The report will be submitted in an unclassified format, with the provision for a classified annex if necessary. Congressional Research Service 25 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport December 2010 Navy Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms Regarding the first factor above, a December 2010 Navy report stated that Mayport has a large and diverse vendor base that provides services such as maintenance, upkeep, and servicing to fleet units and installations…. [Five] northeast Florida-based ship-repair activities have been evaluated by the Department of the Navy (DON), as having the capabilities required to perform non-nuclear maintenance and modernization on U.S. Navy ships…. Mayport private-sector shipyards have a wide range of capabilities to perform maintenance and modernization on the majority of non-nuclear hull, mechanical, and electrical systems of various ship classes…. Private-sector ship-repair activities in Mayport will perform the same type of work on a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that they currently perform on non-nuclear surface ships. Therefore, no additional specialized capabilities are required from the private-sector in northeast Florida to support nuclear-powered aircraft carrier maintenance. Because the Navy does not require additional capabilities from the private-sector in Mayport, no additional costs to the Navy are expected for the private-sector to develop additional capabilities to support a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier…. The Mayport private-sector has experience supporting large aircraft carrier availabilities of the magnitude of a PIA [i.e., an aircraft carrier Planned Incremental (Maintenance) Availability].55 March 29, 2011, GAO Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms A March 29, 2011, GAO report that assessed the Navy’s December 2010 report stated that Private ship repair firms in northeast Florida will likely be able to support the maintenance requirements of a nuclear aircraft carrier if one is homeported at Naval Station Mayport in 2019 as the Navy plans…. The northeast Florida area is home to three master ship repair firms certified by the Navy to have the capabilities and capacities to support the maintenance requirements of U.S. Navy surface ships, including aircraft carriers. Each of these firms has significant production and administrative facilities either on or near Naval Station Mayport, and officials from these firms told us they will maintain their presence in northeast Florida…. The tasks required of the private ship repair firms to support a nuclear carrier are the same as those performed on conventional carriers in the past and the other types of ships currently homeported at Mayport. Private ship repair firms in northeast Florida have previously demonstrated the ability to support carrier maintenance. In fact, the largest aircraft carrier availability ever performed 55 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Northeast Florida Private Ship Maintenance Industrial Base, December 2010, pp. 4, 6, and 9. Congressional Research Service 26 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport outside of a public shipyard was completed on the USS John F. Kennedy in Mayport in 2003.56 March 3, 2011, GAO Report on Navy’s Traveling Workforce Regarding the second of the factor above, a March 3, 2011, GAO report stated that In 2010, the Navy revised its original (2008) estimate of annualized workforce-related costs from about $18 million to $8.2 million. The Navy revised its estimate as a result of discussing its estimate with us and identifying more correct and complete assumptions than had been used to develop the original estimate. For example, the original estimate used the more expensive travel rates for San Diego instead of [the less expensive travel rates for] Mayport. To assess the validity of the revised estimate, we also developed an independent cost estimate. Our independent, risk-adjusted, annualized estimate for the workforce-related recurring costs is about $10.6 million at the 65 percent confidence interval, which means that there is a 65 percent probability the actual cost will be $10.6 million or less. We also estimated that these risk-adjusted costs could range from $5.5 million to $14.1 million. The difference is attributable in part to our estimate being based on a risk analysis while the Navy’s was not. Our assessment of the Navy’s cost-estimating procedures found that the Navy’s procedures met best practices to various degrees. For example, the Navy’s procedures met the requirements to comprehensively include both types of workforce-related costs (traveling and permanently stationed employees’ costs) involved in the move. However, the Navy’s procedures minimally met the credible criteria because they did not, among other things, include risk and sensitivity analyses or an independent cost estimate. The Navy has not begun to identify or document potential effects on readiness that might occur as a result of the proposed move nor has it identified workforce-related mitigation strategies because the move is years away. However, Navy officials indicated that the U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan outlines strategies that will be used to address potential risks to readiness. Also, they indicated that they will begin to implement these strategies 4 to 5 years before moving the aircraft carrier to Mayport. We found that the Navy has processes to manage the workforce that include depot workers traveling to other locations to perform aircraft carrier maintenance. While the move to Mayport will result in increased travel for the workforce, Navy officials told us that they currently meet workforce travel requirements while staffed almost entirely by workers who voluntarily elect to travel. Navy officials do not anticipate any challenges in identifying a sufficient number of workers with the appropriate skills to perform maintenance work at Mayport. Further, Navy officials have indicated that the performance of the traveling workforce conducting remote aircraft carrier depot maintenance slightly exceeds that of workers requiring no travel.57 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)58 A seventh issue that Congress may consider is the adequacy of the FEIS that the Navy prepared to assess the potential environmental impacts of locating a nuclear carrier at Mayport. The National 56 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure: Ability of Ship Maintenance Industrial Base to Support a Nuclear Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-388R, March 29, 2011, pp. 4-5. 57 Government Accountability Office, Depot Maintenance: Navy Has Revised Its Estimated Workforce Cost for Basing an Aircraft Carrier at Mayport, Florida, GAO-11-257R, March 3, 2011, pp. 2-3. 58 This section was drafted by (name redacted), Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division. Congressional Research Service 27 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires all federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for major actions that would significantly affect the environment. The scope of these statements are broader than the environment per se, as agencies are required to examine not only the potential impacts on the natural environment but also the socioeconomic impacts of a proposed action. Some observers have questioned whether the Navy thoroughly assessed these sets of impacts when it selected Mayport for the location of a CVN.59 Mayport Homeporting Options Other Than Those Studied An eighth issue that Congress may consider are potential options for homeporting additional ships at Mayport that differ from the 12 alternatives studied in the FEIS. One such possibility, which the FEIS mentioned but did not examine in detail, would be to homeport some number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) at Mayport. LCSs, which are just beginning to enter service with the Navy, are somewhat smaller than the Navy’s frigates, and are to have much smaller crews.60 As mentioned earlier, the Navy reported to Congress in February 2010 that the service envisages Mayport is as the primary Atlantic Fleet homeporting location for the Navy’s new LCSs. (The report identifies Little Creek, VA, as the Navy’s envisaged secondary Atlantic Fleet LCS homeporting location, and Norfolk as the Navy’s envisaged tertiary Atlantic Fleet LCS homeporting location.)61 Another possibility would be to homeport two CVNs rather than one CVN at Mayport. As mentioned earlier, Mayport served as a home port for two CVs for several years during the 1980s. Alternative Uses of Funding A ninth issue that Congress may consider are potential alternative uses by the Navy or some other part of DOD of the funding that would be needed for homeporting a CVN at Mayport, and how the benefits of those potential alternative uses would compare to the benefits of homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Legislative Activity for FY2014 FY2014 Budget The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, requested no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the Navy’s plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy’s FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects 59 See, for example, Dale Eisman and Louis, “Va. Senators Try New Tack On Plan To Move Carrier,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 9, 2008. 60 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). 61 Department of the Navy, Report on Strategic Plan for Homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship, February 2010, p. 5. See also Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Report Outlines Notional Littoral Combat Ship Homeporting Strategy,” Inside the Navy, March 8, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas, “Mayport To Get First East Coast Littoral Ships,” NavyTimes.com, March 10, 2010; and Timothy J. Gibbons, “Mayport Lands Combat Ships,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), March 11, 2010: 1. Congressional Research Service 28 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport required to homeport a CVN at Mayport.62 The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.”63 FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66) House The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-102 of June 7, 2013) on the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960), recommended no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a CVN at Mayport (see the list of Navy MilCon projects in Florida on pages 490-491, which shows funding only for projects that are for other purposes). Senate The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-44 of June 20, 2013) on the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197), recommended no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a CVN at Mayport (see the list of Navy MilCon projects in Florida on page 399, which shows funding only for projects that are for other purposes). Final Version The final version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66 of December 26, 2013) recommended no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a CVN at Mayport (see the list of Navy MilCon projects in Florida on pdf page 506 of 532 of the explanatory statement accompanying H.R. 3304, which shows funding only for projects that are for other purposes). FY2014 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Division J of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76) House The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-90 of May 28, 2013) on the FY2014 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2216), recommended no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a 62 Source for statement regarding funding in the FY2013-FY2017 FYDP: Navy briefing for House Armed Services Committee staff on the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, February 14, 2012. At the invitation of the committee, CRS staff attended the briefing. 63 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget, February 2012, p. 6-3. Congressional Research Service 29 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport CVN at Mayport (see the list of Navy MilCon projects in Florida on page 79, which shows funding only for projects that are for other purposes). Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-48 of June 27, 2013) on the FY2014 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2216), recommended no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a CVN at Mayport (see the list of Navy MilCon projects in Florida on pages 76-77, which shows funding only for projects that are for other purposes). Final Version The final version of the FY2014 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Division J of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76 of January 17, 2014) provided no funding for MilCon projects required specifically to homeport a CVN at Mayport (see the list of Navy MilCon projects in Florida on pdf page 15 of 228 of the explanatory statement for Divisions J, K, and L of H.R. 3547, which shows funding only for projects that are for other purposes). Congressional Research Service 30 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport Appendix A. FY2007-FY2012 Legislative Activity FY2012 FY2012 Funding Request The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements project, a roadway construction project that is part of the Navy’s plan for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport. In addition, the Navy states that of the $84.36 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2012 for MilCon planning and design activities, about $2 million is requested for the project to establish a CVN home port at Mayport.64 FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81) House The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011) on H.R. 1540, recommends rejecting the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 471). The committee’s report also recommends reducing by $15 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 472). Although the Navy states that about $2 million of the $84.36 million requested for planning and design activities is for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport, the committee’s recommended reduction of $15 million appears to reflect a committee view that $15 million of the $84.36 million requested for planning and design activities is for work to facilitate the homeporting of a CVN at Mayport. The committee’s report states: The committee recommends reduction or elimination of funding for several projects contained in the budget request for military construction and family housing. These reductions include: (1) $14,998,000 for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements and [2] $15,000,000 in Planning and Design for construction activities at Naval Station Mayport, Florida. The budget request included $14,998,000 to construct road improvements at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, and $15,000,000 to support planning and design efforts to facilitate the homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The committee notes that the Department of the Navy has located a variety of strategic assets at one homeport for many years across the range of Navy assets to include aviation, surface, 64 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on May 12, 2011. Congressional Research Service 31 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport and subsurface combatants. Furthermore, the committee notes that the Department of the Navy has intentionally rejected the notion of strategic homeporting and has closed multiple locations that were deemed strategic homeports through the Base Realignment and Closure process. The committee believes that the Department of the Navy’s assertion that strategic homeporting is required to maintain strategic access is inconsistent with previous naval decisions. As to costs, the onetime construction costs to implement the Department of the Navy’s recommendation exceeds $500.0 million, and the recurring costs include a requirement to temporarily relocate nuclear capable shipyard workers from Norfolk, Virginia, to Mayport, Florida, to complete nuclear maintenance requirements. The committee believes that the overall costs to build a redundant carrier homeport do not appear to be in the Government’s best interest. Accordingly, the committee recommends no funds, a reduction of $29,998,000, for this project. (Pages 277-278) Senate (S. 1867, As Reported) S. 1867, an original measure reported by Senator Levin on November 15, 2011, without written report, in effect supersedes S. 1253 (see below). S. 1867 recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project. (See Section 4501 of the bill. In the printed version of the bill, the relevant table within this section appears on page 667.) The bill recommends reducing by $15 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities. (See Section 4501 of the bill. In the printed version of the bill, the relevant table within this section appears on page 668.) Senate (S. 1867, Floor Consideration) On November 30, 2011, as part of its consideration of S. 1867, the Senate adopted by unanimous consent S.Amdt. 1210, which requires a Navy analysis of the costs and benefits of stationing additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Mayport and a subsequent GAO assessment of the Navy analysis. The text of S.Amdt. 1210 is as follows: At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following: SEC. 1024. ASSESSMENT OF STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL DDG-51 CLASS DESTROYERS AT NAVAL STATION MAYPORT, FLORIDA. (a) Navy Assessment Required.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall conduct an analysis of the costs and benefits of stationing additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Naval Station Mayport, Florida. (2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis required by paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following: (A) Consideration of the negative effects on the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station Mayport caused by the retirement of FFG-7 class frigates and the procurement delays of the Littoral Combat Ship, including, in particular, the increase in costs (which would be passed on to the taxpayer) of reconstituting the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station Mayport following the projected drastic decrease in workload. Congressional Research Service 32 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport (B) Updated consideration of life extensions of FFG-7 class frigates in light of continued delays in deliveries of the Littoral Combat Ship deliveries. (C) Consideration of the possibility of bringing additional surface warships to Naval Station Mayport for maintenance with the consequence of spreading the ship repair workload appropriately amongst the various public and private shipyards and ensuring the long-term health of the shipyard in Mayport. (b) Comptroller General of the United States Assessment.—Not later than 120 days after the submittal of the report required by subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress an assessment by the Comptroller General of the report, including a determination whether or not the report complies with applicable best practices. Senate (S. 1253) S. 1253 has been, in effect, superseded by S. 1867 (see above). S. 1253 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project and Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities. (See Section 4501 of the bill as reported by the committee. In the printed version of the bill as reported by the committee, the relevant table within this section appears on pages 651-652.) The committee’s report states: Comptroller General report on aircraft carrier homeporting on the East Coast The committee directs the Comptroller General to conduct an independent analysis of alternatives on the Department of the Navy’s plan to establish a second east coast homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The analysis should assess, at a minimum, the strategic, fiscal, and operational risks, requirements, and constraints the Navy’s plan seeks to address. The committee directs that this report be provided to the congressional defense committees by February 1, 2012. The report will be submitted in an unclassified format, with the provision for a classified annex if necessary. (Page 241) Conference The conference report (H.Rept. 112-329 of December 12, 2011) on H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011, recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 952) and reducing by $15 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 953). The report states: The conferees determined that the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project had merit to support requirements at the Naval Station Mayport, Florida, whether or not a nuclear powered aircraft carrier was home ported there. (Page 757) Section 1017 of the conference report states: SEC. 1017. ASSESSMENT OF STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL DDG-51 CLASS DESTROYERS AT NAVAL STATION MAYPORT, FLORIDA. Congressional Research Service 33 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport (a) Navy Assessment Required(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall conduct an analysis of the costs and benefits of stationing additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Naval Station Mayport, Florida. (2) ELEMENTS- The analysis required by paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following: (A) Consideration of the negative effects on the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station Mayport caused by the retirement of FFG-7 class frigates and the procurement delays of the Littoral Combat Ship, including, in particular, the increase in costs (which would be passed on to the taxpayer) of reconstituting the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station Mayport following the projected drastic decrease in workload. (B) Updated consideration of life extensions of FFG-7 class frigates in light of continued delays in deliveries of the Littoral Combat Ship deliveries. (C) Consideration of the possibility of bringing additional surface warships to Naval Station Mayport for maintenance with the consequence of spreading the ship repair workload appropriately amongst the various public and private shipyards and ensuring the long-term health of the shipyard in Mayport. (b) Comptroller General of the United States Assessment- Not later than 120 days after the submittal of the report required by subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress an assessment by the Comptroller General of the report, including a determination whether or not the report complies with applicable best practices. FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74) House The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-94 of May 31, 2011) on H.R. 2055, recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 74) and the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 86). Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-29 of June 30, 2011) on H.R. 2055, recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 80) and the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 105). Conference In final action, H.R. 2055 became a consolidated appropriations act incorporating nine appropriations bills, including the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act itself, which was incorporated as Division H. The Congressional Research Service 34 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport conference report (H.Rept. 112-331 of December 15, 2011) on H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011, approves the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 1271) and the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 1283). FY2011 FY2011 Funding Request Of the $120.05 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2011 for MilCon planning and design activities, about $2 million is for the project to establish a CVN home port at Mayport.65 FY2011 DOD and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473) Section 2001 of Title X of Division B of the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473 of the 112th Congress, introduced on April 11, 2011, and passed by the House and Senate on April 14, 2011) provides $3,303.611 million for the Military Construction, Navy and Marine Corps account, or $575.493 million less than the requested figure of $3,879.104 million. The text of H.R. 1473 does not provide line-item funding details for the military construction accounts. FY2011 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5822/S. 3615) House The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-559 of July 22, 2010) on H.R. 5822 of the 111th Congress, recommends $123.75 million—a $3.7-million increase to the Navy’s FY2011 request—for MilCon planning and design activities (page 124). The report does not discuss the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-226 of July 19, 2010) on S. 3615, recommends $124.148 million—a $4.098-million increase to the Navy’s FY2011 request— for MilCon planning and design activities (page 102). The report does not discuss the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport. 65 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on April 1, 2010. See also the spoken testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III at a March 4, 2010, hearing before the House Budget Committee on DOD’s proposed FY2011 budget. Congressional Research Service 35 Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport FY2011 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383) House (H.R. 5136) Section 2201(c)(4) of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136) as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) states: “None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization of appropriations may be used for architectural and engineering services and construction design of any military construction project necessary to establish a homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida.” H.Rept. 111-491 includes report language requiring the Navy and GAO to submit reports concerning the costs and maintenance impacts of homeporting a CVN at Mayport. H.Rept. 111-491 states: East Coast Homeport Cost Assessment The committee is concerned that [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR40248. Public record. Not legal advice.