# The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Policy

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AIB84016

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** October 14, 1987
- **Citation:** IB84016

## Text

Order Code IB84016

NORTHERN RENTUCKY UNlVERSfTI
LIBRARY

T H E I R A N - I R A Q WAR:

I M P L I C A T I O N S F O R U.S.

POLICY

(ARCHIVED--10/14/87)
U P D A T E D 10/14/87

BY
R i c h a r d M.

Preece

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service

1014

CRS- 1

ISSUE DEFINITION
The Iran-Iraq conflict a t its present state has become a war of attrition
with neither side capable of achieving a decisive military victory
over the
other in the short term.
U.S.
policy concerns currently a r e threefold:
first, that Iraq, despite moves to sustain its economic and military
capacities, ultimately might suffer a destabilizing defeat to the detriment
of U.S. interests i n the Persian Gulf region; second, that future instability
in Iran could open opportunities for Soviet exploitation; and third, that the
conflict might expand beyond
its present
confines to threaten friendly
regional states and the availability of their vast petroleum
resources.
As
international efforts at mediation between the combatants continue to
founder, these concerns raise policy questions of marked
interest for the
Congress.
To date, the United States has maintained an official neutral
stance in the war.
Since 1 9 8 3 , the Administration
overtly moved
toward
closer relations with Iraq, thereby
generating debate over the potential
interests i n
effects of a policy "tilt" upon shorter- and longer-tern U.S.
the Gulf.
Congressional inquiries resulting from revelations in November
1986 of secret U.S. arms Sales to Iran, however, suggest that a U.S.
policy
reappraisal toward Iran had begun i n late 1 9 8 4 , thereby
raising questions
regarding U.S. C O n s i ~ t e n C y and credibility i n the region.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

I.

U.S.

Interests and Policy Options

A.
Introduction.
For the United
States, the political, economic and
strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, located half
the globe from
American shores, derives primarily
from the region's petroleum
resources
(more than half the world's proven crude oil reserves).
The region is also
of its major
of importance as a key strategic crossroads, and because
commercial relations with the United States and its allies.

-

Fundamental U.S. interests in the Gulf include: continued assured access
to the region's oil resources for the Western
industrialized
countries and
Japan; maintenance of regional stability and the territorial and politicai
integrity of littoral states; continued use of the region's communications,
land, sea and air routes, and transit
facilities;
maintenance
and
strengthening of economic ties with regional states; and prevention
of the
in particular, the Soviet
establishment by a n external adversary power
of a predominant political or military presence in the region.
An
Union
associated interest, stemming from the U.S.
commitment to Israel's survival,
is seeking support from regional states for a basic American policy goal of
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict which affects virtually
every
issue of
major U.S. concern i n the Middle East.

--

--

B.
Iran. The United States has a continuing interest in the maintenance
of Iran's territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty a s a strategic buffer
between the Soviet Union and the Gulf.
Geographically
and demographically,
Iran retains a natural preeminence in the Gulf
region.
Strategically, the
country dominates the northern approaches to the Middle East.
Iran's s i z e ,
location, vulnerability and common border with
the. Soviet Union
give it
significance in superpower competition.
Direct or indirect extension
of

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Soviet influence or Control over Iran would constitute a major threat to the
security of the Gulf region and its enormous petroleum
resources.
Future
instability i n Iran could lead t o national disintegration, thereby opening
opportunities for an upsurge i n Soviet influence or the establishment of a
pro-Soviet client regime, with even the potential for Soviet invasion.
The United States also has a n interest i n preventing
Iranian Islamic
revolutionary or military expansionism in the Gulf region.
An
Iranian
whegemony'p over the Gulf oil-producing states could decisively
change the
world oil market.
This interest in containing a strengthening of Iran's
regional position i n many respects conflicts with the U.S.
interest i n a n
Iran sufficiently strong to resist Soviet power and control and to oppose,
for its own Islamic revolutionary reasons, the expansion of Soviet power
southwards.
Iranian Islamic expansionism carries
the
potential
for
destabilizing the Gulf
region, jeopardizing oil
supplies,
lines
of
communication and friendly Arab
governments.
These
two,
sometimes
contradictory, interests would suggest, therefore, a careful balance between
Soviet-Iranian and Iranian-Arab problems in U.S. policy decisions.
C.
Iraq. . The preservation of Iraq's sovereignty is currently in the U.S.
interest.
Iraq occupies a strategic position in the region, bordering on
in addition to Iran -- Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
Some
observers consider that Iraq is important to short-term U.S.
interests in
that it protects the vulnerable oil-producing Gulf Arab states from Iranian
military power and coercion and restrains Iranian subversive ambitions..
The
installation o f a Shi'ite revolutionary government i n Baghdad, should Iraq
collapse, would raise the potential for the formation of an Iranian-Syrian
axis which would threaten not only the Gulf region but also Israel, Jordan
and Lebanon and U.S. interests in the Eastern Keaiterranean.

--

D.
Gulf Stability. The United States and its allies possess a n important
interest in stability in the Gulf region.
Successful mediation
efforts
culminating in a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement to the conflict
between Iran and Iraq would appear to be compatible with this interest.
An
escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, whether initiated by either side, raises the
distinct possibility for wider involvement, both regional and external, that
would without doubt affect the region's oil production, prices and exports.
Such a crisis could engender superpower confrontationE.
U.S. Policy Options:
To Tilt or Not To Tilt? From the beginning
of
the conflict, there has been considerable debate over U.S. policy toward Iran
and Iraq.
Some observers have contended that the U.S. course of neutrality
has rendered U.S.
policy on the war impotent.
They reportedly
called
for
options that would
"tilt" the United
States toward
Iraq.
Others have
perceived that, should Iraq seriously damage Iran's oil export capabilities,
Thus,
Iran will likely respond with actions that could widen the conflict.
it is essential, in this view, that regional countries and other interested
to
parties make a concerted effort to bring pressure on the two belligerents
exercise restraint.
Should there be an escalation of
the war, the entire
Gulf could become embroiled with obvious regional and worldwide implications,
including spillover effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western
economies, and the potential for superpower confrontation.
Those favoring a "tilt" in U.S. policy toward Iraq have considered that
the short-term interests of the United States and its allies would be
served
by helping preserve Iraq's sovereignty and preventing the installation of a
Shi'ite revolutionary government in Baghdad.
The United States can assist in
the prevention of an Iraqi economic collapse through the .export of U.S.

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technological expertise and services, and by loans and guarantees, including
the Export-Import Bank.
They argued that Iraq strategically i s important to
these interests i n that i t protects the vulnerable Gulf oil-producing
states
from Iranian military
power and restrains Iranian subversive ambitions.
Others assert the United States should assist Iraq through non-lethal means,
including satellite intelligence data.
Should
Iraq collapse, wider U.S.
interests i n the Middle East would be threatened.
The advocates of a "tilt" toward Iraq have pointed to the prevailing trend
that, over the long term, a war of attrition favors Iran and that Ayatollah
Khomeini will never negotiate a settlement until
Iraq collapses.
They
contend that the United States needs Iraq for leverage against Syria; if Iraq
collapses, and a Syrian-Iranian axis i s formed, Syria will achieve new
regional predominance, thereby increasing Soviet influence.
Iraq, since
1975, has distanced itself from its formerly close relations with the Soviet
Union; despite recent increases in Soviet military
supplies,
Baghdad
maintains its independence from possible Soviet leverage.
With
respect to
U.S. policy goals in the Middle East, Iraq has indicated its acceptance of
Israel's right to exist and has expelled the Abu Nidal faction.
Iran, on the
other hand is lending support to terrorism through training, financing and
equipping various groups, and Tehran is suspected for its complicity in the
bombings in Lebanon and Kuwait and other incidents of terrorism, including
hostage-taking.
The Khomeini regime's human rights record i s atrocious.
The
strangulation a n d , so long as
greatest danger facing Iraq i s economic
Khomeini remains in power, the war of attrition i s likely to be unrelenting.
The United States and its allies should at a l l costs prevent Iranian success.
Restorian of diplomatic ties with Baghdad in November 1984 would seem to have
underscored this determination.
Those critical of a n Iraqi option reportedly have contended that such a
"tilt" toward Iraq serves no useful purpose.
They consider that Iran, in the
longer-term, is of greater strategic importance to U.S.
interests and
outweighs other short-term considerations. While there are few expectations
for any improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations so long a s the current Tehran
longer-term
regime retains power, a "tilt" toward Iraq tends to &iscourage
moderation i n , and future ties with, Iran.
Iran remains the strategic buffer
between the Soviet Union and the Gulf; closer U.S. relations with Iraq would
tend to draw Iran nearer to the Soviet Union and weaken the nonaligned and
anti-Soviet position held by many i n the Tehran regime.
The United States
should make every effort to establish contracts with receptive elements in
the Iranian leadership.
They argue that such elements could influence a
change in the Khomeini regime's continued refusal to negotiate a n end to the
6-year-old conflict.
Links with moderate factions could
serve a s a hedge
against Soviet designs on Irac, particularly
when
the time comes for a
successor to Ayatollah Khomeini.
In this sense, the renewal of 3.S.-Iraqi
relations has served no useful purpose.
Others Contend that there is no apparent visible role for the United
States to play in the conflict; with limited leverage on either
side, the
United States should remain on the sidelines. Direct U.S. aid to Iraq would
only give Iran more reason to prolong the war.
The costs of potential
U.S.
involvement would be high.
In any case, the current military
stalemate,
which drains the energies and resources of both
the Tehran and Baghdad
regimes, serves U.S. interests and prevents either of them
from threatening
the Gulf Arab states through military aggression or subversion.
The Husayn
regime in Baghdad is no better than the Khomeini regime i n Tehran.
On the
one hand, Iraq has used chemical weapons against
Iranian troops.
On
the
other, Iran has sent waves of children
to clear minefields, has refused

CRS- 4
permission o t the International Red Cross to visit
Iraqi prisoners-of-war,
many of whom reportedly have been subjected to psychological
pressure and
execution.
Iran reportedly has used chemical weapons against i t s Kurdish
dissiclents.
U.S.
involvement could jeopardize delicate mediation
efforts
designed to bring the two belligerents to the bargaining
table, and could
lead to escalation of the war.
Since April 1984, the escalation of the air war against shipping i n the
Gulf and U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers has generated debate over U.S.
military involvement in the region.
[See CRS Issue Brief 87145, The Persian
Gulf and the U.S. Naval Presence:
Issues for Congress.]
Some caution that
the mission of U.S.
forces must be clearly defined, together with
the
development of a plan and force structure capable of achieving precisely
determined goals.
In any event, any U.S. intervention will face the risk of
appearing to take one side or another.

The Iran-Iraq Conflict
War of Attrition

-- a static
T o date, the Iran-Iraq war has become a war of attrition
conflict since mid-1982 in which the line of battle has not moved more than a
few miles from the common border.
The pattern of operations in general has
become one of periodic Iranian offensives, launched partly in the hope of
breaking through Iraqi lines and partly to wear
down the Iraqi forces.
Tactically, the Iranians have persisted in attacking, using massed
infantry,
but battles have not been fought to decisive conclusions, in large measure
because the Iranians have lacked the equipment and spare parts, firepower,
and logistical support to achieve effectively their objectives or to exploit
breakthroughs.
Neither side has made optimal use of weapons essential.for a
war of maneuver.
Since June 9 , 1 9 8 5 , Iranian ground operations generally
have taken the
form of rapid, small-scale attacks against the Iraqi lines in all three
sectors of the 780-mile front. Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani stated a t the time
"to achieve victory
with as few casualties as
that Iran's intent was
possible;" and Pasdaran Chief of Staff Ali Reza Afshur asserted on June 23
that Khomeini has issued Ifan overall order for a defensive holy war."
In early February 1 9 8 6 , Iraqi units repulsed
Iranian attacks i n the
marshlands north of Basra.
On Feb. 1 0 , Iranian forces crossed
the Shatt
al-Arab southeast of Basra and succeeded in occupying the Iraqi port of
Al-Faw.
Tehran increased pressure on Iraq by opening an attack on Feb. 24 in
the northern sector, in conjunction with dissident Iraqi Kurds and exiled
Shiite units.
The apparent objective was to tie down
Iraqi forces in the
northern and southern extremi'ties of the front, thereby making
Iraq more
vulnerable to a full-scale offensive north of Basra.
Following a massive
buildup of Iranian troops in the Susangerd a r e a , Baghdad
has
been
anticipating an imminent large-scale attack in the central sector.
On April
3 0 , Iraqi ground forces struck across the Iranian border in the sector in an
effort to disrupt Iranian concentrations.
In May Iraqi forces captured
the
border town of Mehran, only to be driven back after six weeks.
During the
night of Aug.
31, Iranian forces attacked in the H a j Omran area in
mountainous terrain; both sides claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the
other.
On Sept. 1 1 , Iraq reported its forces had
repulsed an
Iranian
Iran launched a
amphibious attack in marshlands in the southern sector.
sizeable attack across the Shatt al-Arab o n Dec. 24 that was thrown back with

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considerable losses after heavy fighting.
On Jan. 6, 1987, Iranian forces conducted a large-scale, 3-pkonged
attack
against Iraqi defense lines protecting the eastern approach'es t o Basra,
advancing up the east side of the Shatt al-Arab to within 6 miles of the
city.
In early February, a series of Iraqi counterattacks appe,ared to have
succeeded in recovering some lost territory.
Casualty
estimates placed
Iranian losses a t 50,000, and Iraqi at about 20,000.
In t h e central sector,
Iran launched a "limited operationw north of Sumar, cla<ming to have
recaptured territory seized by Iraq i n 1980.
Iran renewed i t s attacks near
Basra o n February 23.
In the a i r , the Iraqi air force, with increasing frequency, has struck a t
Iranian economic and industrial targets throughout 1986 and inta 1987.
With
the new round of ground fighting, both sides have resumed a i r , missile, and
artillery attacks on the other's population centers.
Baghdad declared a halt
in air attacks on Iranian cities on February 1 9 , but on February
23,
threatened to renew the raids because of Iranian attacks and
shelling near
Basra.

A feature of the recent Iranian offensives is that the Iranian air force
has been more in evidence, and Iran has improved its air defense systems.
Some observers consider that shipments of U.S.
arms and spare parts
have
contributed to a n improved Iranian performance.
A number of observers consider that the Iranian leadership, armed with the
knowledge that i t cannot lose the war militarily and having
conditioned
its
economy, its people and its foreign policy to the concept of a prolonged
conflict, has decided to continue the war of attrition i n order to bring down
the Iraqi regime of Saddam Husayn.
While the war has impinged strongly on
Iranian national life and casualities have been heavy, fighting has taken
The stepping up of Iraqi air
place a t a distance from the principal cities.
attacks on population centers in early 1 9 8 5 , including Tehran, reportedly had
succeeded in prompting some limited anti-war demonstrations within Iran.

Iran continues to finance its war effort through petroleum
exports which
have ranged between 1.6 million and 2.3 million barrels per
day except for
Iranian
periodic drops a s a result of Iraqi air attacks against tankers and
oil terminals.
Tehran continues to reject a l l attempts a t mediation and
Iraq, on the other hand, has
negotiations for a settlement of the conflict.
faced economic difficulties with its primary oil export terminals having been
destroyed early in the war, its trans-Syrian pipeline
cut off because of
Syria's support for Iran and its hostility toward the Bahgdad regime, and its
remaining pipeline through Turkey facilitating some 1 million
barrels per
day.
Since September 1 9 8 5 , between 300,000 and 500,000 b/d has been exported
through the Saudi port of Yanbu, and some 100,OO.O b/d is trucked to Agaba,
Jordan, and through Turkey.
The current slump in world oil prices has
compounded the problems facing the Iraqi economy, including 1986 repayment
deadlines for deferred debts to overseas creditors.
Some economists estimate
that Baghdad will require $4 billion to $ 8 billion to meet its current
account deficit in 1986.
Such figures do not include the costs of the
conflict (estimated a t $600 million-$1 billion per month)
that are partly
being met by Gulf Arab oil-producing states. With a population
of only a
third of its adversary, Iraq faces greater difficulties than Iran in
sustaining the heavy casualties of a war of attrition, and it has expressed
its willingness to join mediation efforts to end the conflict.
Iraqi President Husayn, on Aug. 3 , 1 9 8 6 , issued an open letter to

Iranian

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leaders calling f o r a mutual withdrawal from occupied territories, a n
agreement not t o interfere in the other's
internal affairs, and a full
Ayatalloh Khomeini rejected the plea,
exchange of prisoners.
On Aug. 7 ,
stating that peace with Iraq now would be "contrary toi Islamw and "compromise
would be worse than war."
At the same time, Iranian news media reported the
movement of the thousands of fresh troops to the f r o n t i n preparation
for a
new offensive.
Khomeini, on Feb. 1 0 , 1987, declared that Iran was engaged i n
"a divine causen which would not cease until final victory.

B. The Air War i n the Gulf. Since Aug. 1 2 , 1982, when Iraqi President
Husayn declared a maritime exclusion zone in the northern Gulf, the Iraqi air
force has been
increasingly active i n
attacking
shipping
and
oil
installations i n that zone.
Iraq's objectives are to prevent or reduce the importation of vital
materials required by Iran for its war effort and to reduce or terminate
Iran's financial means to conduct war through its oil exports.
It should be
noted that until Mar. 2 7 , 1984, Iraq had refrained from striking the Kharg
Island terminal, which handled some 90% of Iran's oil exports.
Iraqi Foreign
Minister Aziz reiterated on May 1 9 his government's intention of continuing
to interdict shipping to and from Kharg Island and
Iran's northern
ports,
emphasizing Iraq's objective of demonstrating to the Tehran regime that "the
elusive war of attrition which they bet on i s not in their interest."
Iraq continued its pattern of periodic attacks on shipping within
the
exclusion z o n e throughout 1 9 8 5 , 1986, and into 1987.
In addition, Iraqi
aircraft made frequent attacks on pumping stations at Gurreh and Ganaveh
supplying Kharq Island.
In July 1985 Baghdad claimed to have carried . o u t
successful raids against Iranian offshore oil fields.
On August 1 5 , several
Iraqi aircraft effectively damaged the T-junction loading pier on the east
side of Kharg Island.
Iraq continued its raids on Kharg into October.
On
Sept. 1 8 , the Sea Island loading pier on the east side of Kharg
sustained
Iran's capabilities to export
heavy damage, thereby temporarily lessening
Oil.
Iran's response since mid-May 1984 has been
to attack
shipping sailing
search
from Saudi and other Arab ports in the Western Gulf and to stop and
shipping entering the Gulf and, in some cases, confiscating cargoes reputedly
bound for Iraq.
The cumulative effects of Iraq's gradually escalating air strategy in the
northern Gulf have been threefold: an inhibition upon
shipowners and oil
traders from sailing to northern waters; a rise in marine
insurance rates;
and increases in spot oil prices.
To offset future suspensions of shipments
from the Kharg Island terminal, the Iranian Oil Ministry
has been
loading
crude from its Lavan Islarid terminal (150,000 b/d capacity) and
supertankers
anchored off Sirri Island, near the Strait of Hormuz, replenished by
shuttle
tankers from Kharg.
In late June 1986, Iran opened new floating terminals
off Hengam and Earak islands at the Strait of Hormuz.
On Aug.
1 2 , 1 9 8 6 , Iraqi Mirage F-1 strike aircraft,
armed
with
laser-guided AS-30 air-to-surface missiles and using in-flight refueling, hit
five tankers off Sirri Island in an attack regarded by some observers a s a
significant escalation of the conflict.
Facilities at Lavan
Island were
attacked on Sept. 5. On Nov. 26, Iraq attacked the Larak island transhipment
terminal.
[For recent developments in the Gulf air war, see C R S Issue Brief
87207, The Persian Gulf and the War Powers Debate:
Issue Summary and Review
of Events.]

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C.
Mediation Efforts.
Since the beginning of the conflict i n September
1980, there have been several mediation efforts designed to achieve an end to
the war o n the part of international and regional organizations a s well a s
individual countries.
All such efforts have failed because o f Iran's
insistence that any resolution to the conflict must contain the following
conditions:
the unconditional withdrawal of a l l Iraqi forces from
Iranian
territory; the convening of a n international tribunal to determine the
aggressor; the payment of war reparations (placed by Ayatollah
Khomeini a t
$150 billion); the return of some 100,000 Shi'ites expelled by Iraq; and the
overthrow of Iraqi President Husayn and his leadership.
Many
observers
consider that a negotiated
settlement is unlikely
so long a s Ayatollah
Khomeini, who continues to insist on Iraqi President Husayn's removal from
office, retains power.
Recent statements by
Iranian leaders, however,
shift by
indicate differences as to the conduct of the war and a possible
some away from earlier maximalist positions.
Iraq has expressed
its
willingness to accept a negotiated settlement under the following conditions:
a return to international borders; a n exchange of prisoners; a non-aggression
pact; and a n agreement not to interfere in each country's internal affairs.
I. Chemical Weapons.
Between May 1981 and March 1 9 8 4 , Iran claimed that
Iraq employed chemical weapons against its forces 49 times.
(The use of
chemical weapons was banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which both
Iran and Iraq a r e signatories.) The U.S. State Department o n Mar.
5, 1984,
asserted the United States had concluded that "available evidence" indicated
"lethal chemical weapons'' had been used by Iraq during the February fighting
that were "inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations."
On Mar. 2 6 , 1984, an investigation by a n international team of medical and
military specialists undertaken in Iran earlier in March a t the request of
U.N.
Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar i n response to Iranian
without suggesting the
charges of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, concluded
that mustard gas ( b i s - ( 2 - ~ h l o r 0 e t h y l ) - s ~ l f i d e )and a nerve agent
origin
known as Tabun (ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate) had been employed.
The extent to which the chemical agents had been used, however, could not be
determined.
No evidence was found of the presence of mycotoxin.

--

--

Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani announced
on Mar.
2 3 , .L984, that Iran was
committed not to use chemical weapons, but he stated that it possessed
the
capability for manufacturing them. On Mar. 2 7 , Iranian Ambassador
to the
United Nations Said Rajai-Khjorassani warned that if the Security Council
took no action against Iraq for its use of such weapons, Iran would
then be
encouraged to resort to chemical warfare in retaliation, "should we find we
have no other means to stop the ememy."
On Mar. 3 0 , the Security
Council
"stronglyn condemned the use of chemical weapons, but did not name
Iraq as
the guilty party.
3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , the
State Department spokesman John Hughes announced on Mar.
imposition of regulations restricting the export of chemicals to both
Iran
and Iraq that could be used in the production of chemical weapons.
On Apr.
9 , 1 9 8 4 five West European nations
-- West Germany, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands -- agreed to restrict the export of
substances to Iran and Iraq that could be used to produce chemical weapons.
In April 1985, U.S. intelligence sources, monitoring world markets
i n the
sale of such substances, reportedly concluded that both Iraq and
Iran were
continuing to purchase the chemicals despite the restrictions.

Tehran again charged that Iraq used lethal chemical

weapons

against

its

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forces during the March 1985 offensive.
Secretary of State Shultz condemned
the use of chemical weapons during a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz
16
o n March 25. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati claimed o n Apr.
that between Mar. 3 and Apr. 9 , there were 33 Iraqi chemical attacks in which
4,000 Iranians were killed or injured.
Velayati was critical over the
failure of the United Nations to take action against Iraq f o r using chemical
weapons, and he asserted that Iran had the capability to retaliate.
The
State Department o n Apr. 2 4 expressed concern that Iran may have developed a n
arsenal of chemical weapons for use against Iraq.
During the February 1986 Iranian offensive in the Al-Faw Peninsula, Tehran
accused Iraq of having used chemical weapons and stated that more than 8 , 0 0 0
of its troops had been affected. The State Department on Feb. 1 9 condemned
Iraq's use of chemical weapons.
U.N. Secretary General d e Cuellar on Mar. 14
released an investigation team's report naming, for the f i r s t time, Iraq's
use of mustard gas and nerve gas, and on Mar. 2 1 , the U.N.
Security Council
condemned the continued use of chemical weapons by Iraq.
On July 1 5 , a
British representative at the Conference on Disarmament in Gen'eva charged
that Iraqi chemical weapons were responsible for about 10,000 casualties and
stated that Iraq appeared to be increasing its capabilities to produce
chemical weapons.
On Jan. 7 , 1 9 8 7 , Iran claimed to have hit a n Iraqi chemical weapons depot
on the western bank of the Shatt al-Arab, during an artillery barage,
releasing a cloud of toxic gas that caused several hundred Iraqi casualties.
The Iranian media also quoted a n Iranian official as stating that Iran can
now produce its own chemical weapons and may use them against Iraq. On Feb.
23, Tehran claimed Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces near
Basra, but chemical warfare units had "neutralized the impact of the toxic
gasses."
111. Future Trends i n the Iran-Iraq'war
Iraqi air attacks on Gulf shipping and Iranian threats to blockade the
Gulf have indicated a large element of psychological warfare between the two
belligerents.
Iraq currently possesses a-quantitative and qualitative edge
over Iran i n modern weapons, particularly i n aircraft, armor, a n C artillery.
But prevailing demographic and economic imbalances ultimately appear to favor
Iran. Iran's stated messianic and expansionist goals indicate the present
Tehran regime's ambitions to play a major role in the region.
A 1985 Economist Intelligence Unit study considered the probability
likelihood of four scenarios for a n end to the conflict:
escalation of
(40%) ;
warfare (10%) ; a continuing war of attrition (40%) ; no war, no peace
and a collapse of Iraq (102). The authors suggested that damage inflicted by
war was such that even a n early settlement would have Iraq needing 10 years
to complete reconstruction, and Iran 2 0 years.
They emphasized that both
combatants will be dependent on oil revenues for some time to come, and the
importance of Iran's "ultimate weapon," its numerically superior population.
They warned against underestimating the motives and forces that produced
the
Iranian revolution and upon which Ayatollah Khomeini can still draw.
The Iraqi economy faces increasing difficulties should the current war of
attrition prevail.
Oil revenues, once in excess of $20 billion per y e a r ,
have fallen between $5.3 and $8 billion.
Iraq is dependent on subsidies from
other Arab oil-producers in order to maintain its war effort.
Baghdad i s
confronted with difficult choices in economic priorities as resources and

CRS- 9

IB84016

UPDATE-10/14/87

manpower are expended i n the conflict.
The capacity of Iraq to prosecute the
war has been severely curtailed by
the fall i n international oil prices
despite its increased export capabilities.
At the beginning
o f 1 9 8 6 , the
Iraqi government appeared to have succeeded i n organizing the economy t o cope
with development priorities, as well a s the war.
By mid-1986,
development
seems to have taken a back seat.
Iraq presently is squeezed more tightly by
acute shortages of foreign exchange, and it continues to request its
suppliers to agree to further debt rescheduling.
Experience gained and lessons learned from the war have improved the
quality and operations of the Iraqi armed forces, and there appears to have
been significant modification i n the command and control structure. With the
acquisition of large quantities of modern military weapons
systems and
equipment, difficulties remain with the technological assimilation in certain
areas and the optimal use of sophisticated systems.
The morale factor i n the
armed forces continues to be of extreme importance.
in October 1985 in
A "massive1' Iranian general mobilization plan began
preparation for a
"final offensive."
Special operations forces
units
reportedly have been deployed along the front, thereby indicating the
possible utilization of new tactics.
Several hundred thousand volunteers and
conscripts, including civil servants and professionals, were added
to the
ranks of the Islamic Republic of Iran Guards Corps (IRIGC -- Pasdaran) and
Basij (militia) units, with large numbers dispatched
to the front.
The
Supreme Defense Council, comprising of senior religious, political and
military leaders, was bolstered and charged with coordinating war policy,
including mobilization and training.
Government departments, nationalized
bazks and industries, and other affiliated organizations were requested i n
l a t e June 1986 to place staffs and resources a t the disposal of the IRIGC.
I n August 1 9 8 6 , Prime Minister Musavi issued guidelines for transforming the
Iranian economy following a cabinet review.
The war effort occupied first
priority i n the official guidelines, with emphasis upon a successful
conclusion of the Iran-Iraq
conflict before March
1987.
Some observers
suggest that Iran needs results quickly.
There have been
reports of
differences within the top levels of Iran's leadership over the conduct of
the war, external mediation efforts, and negotiations for a settlement of the
conflict.
The IRIGC reportedly has been receiving the bulk of new equipment
to the resentment of the regular armed forces.
A large-scale
l'f inai
offensive," possibly through a sequence of attacks along the entire front, i s
expected at any time with the objective of breaking the Iraqi armed forces.
The initial success of Iranian tactics employed i n operations i n late 1986
and early 1 9 8 7 indicate that Tehran has found a key to breaking
through
seemingly impregnable Iraqi barriers.
Amphibious assault appears to have
become something of an Iranian specialty.
Some observers consider a likely Iranian objective to be the isolation or
capture of Basra and the establishment of a revolutionary Shi'ite regime on
Iraqi soil,. Once C O n S ~ l i d a t e d ,Iranian forces would advance to take the
shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala.
Others question
Iranian capabilities,
however, to exploit and sustain an advance in light of
Iran's limited
materiel and logistical resources.
An Iranian attempt to block the Gulf
i s Considered manageable provided
that prompt and effective action is taken to protect shipping and secure the
Strait.
Destruction of oil installations at selected locations in the Gulf
region, on the other hand, carries potentially critical dangers for Western
interests. Western Europe and Japan would be more directly and
immediately
affected. The protection of Gulf oil fields and
installations, because of

their widespread locations and areal extent, would strain available U.S.
allied assets.

and

While a negotiated
settlement appears unlikely i n
the
near-term,
a foregone
indefinite prolongation of the conflict is not necessarily
conclusion.
A number of ongoing factors could combine to undermine the
political will to prosecute the war.
Increased psychological attrition
within the Iraqi political and military leaderships could result i n major
changes.
The effects of the oil price decline on the acquisition of military
equipment and on the domestic economy are increasingly felt by both
sides.
There a r e indications of growing war-weariness i n both Iran and Iraq.
Some
observers suggest that dwindling resources and the war eventually
could
create circumstances for a slowdown in hostilities, a de facto cease-fire,
a n d , eventually, an armistice.

IV. Soviet Interests and Involvement in Iran and Iraq
A leading U.S. policy concern is that the Iran-Iraq conflict will open
opportunities for Soviet exploitation, thereby enabling Moscow to enhance its
position vis-a-vis the United States in the Gulf region.
The nature of the
Soviet threat, however, is subject to wide-ranging
debate and, since the
change of leadership in Moscow, new patterns of Soviet policy a r e emerging.
While Moscow has tended to avoid large risks i n the Middle East during the
recent past, nevertheless it continues to perceive that i t has important and
legitimate interests i n the region.
For the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf lies proximate to its southern
border and Moscow, a s it seeks to increase its influence among regional
countries, cannot remain indifferent to political and military
developments
in the region.
Former Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged that the
Gulf was an area of vital Western interests on Dec. 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , in New Delhi
when he proposed a multilateral agreement for the demilitarization
and
neutralization of the Gulf region.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union
continues
to oppose all U.S.
efforts to defend
those
interests
through
the
establishment of a military presence in the Gulf/Indian Ocean region.
Moscow faces constraints to any policy
initiative aimed a t exploiting
opportunities arising from the Iran-Iraq war.
Because of Iran's
size,
location, population, and common border with the U.S.S.R.,
the Soviets
perceive Iran as strategically more important than Iraq.
Since the Iranian
revolution, Moscow has aimed at normalizing and improving its political
and
economic relations with
Tehran.
But it has avoided any overwhelming
commitment toward supporting Iran lest its ties with Iraq and its standing in
other parts of the Arab world be eroded.
Soviet neutrality in the conflict,
in consequence, has been translated into maintaining a controlled
supply of
arms to both sides.
Soviet relations with Iraq had been good until the mid-1970s when they
began to sour, despite a 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
Iraq
subsequently started to diversify its sources of arms and imported Western -including American -- technology and equipment.
During the first two years
of the Iran-Iraq conflict, Moscow was cool to Iraqi requests for additional
supplies of military equipment and spare parts.
Iraq responded by
executing
or exiling members of the Iraqi Communist Party, and was openly critical of
Soviet interference and actions in the Middle East, particularly its invasion
of Afghanistan.
At the same time, increased trade and other ties between
Iran and the Soviet Union were largely
induced by
Iranian dependence on

Soviet transit routes following the Iraqi capture o f Iran's largest port a t
Khorramshahr.
Iran's considerable economic difficulties led t o barter
arrangements with East European countries and to an influx of large numbers
of Soviet and Eastern bloc exports and. advisers.
Despite the intense anti-Americanism
of the Iranian regime, Soviet
influence does not predominate
i n Tehran.
In fact, the Iranian regime
presently continues to identify the Soviet Union a s another manifestation of
the "satanic f o r c e s w with which its revolution i s struggling in eternal
conflict.
Iran's mistrust of the Soviet Union is bolstered
by historical
experience and by the Tehran regime's policy of nonalignment.
In addition,
Iran opposes the Soviet presence
in Afghanistan
and a i d s the resistance
forces.
the
Relations with Moscow took a turn for the worse in May 1983 with
expulsion of several Soviet diplomats and Tehran's proscription
of the
communist Tudeh Party and two smaller pro-Soviet groups.
The Iraqis were
reinforced with new deliveries of Soviet military
equipment, including
according to newsmedia reports
MIG-25 and MIG-27
aircraft,
Mi-24
helicopter gunships, new supplies of ground-to-ground
missiles, and T-72
tanks.
Iranian President Ali Khamenei warned the Soviet Union on Oct.
7I
1983, against its continuing to supply arms to Iraq.
On Jan.
1 4 , 1984,
Moscow gave notice that Tehran's continued hostility would be certain to harm
Soviet-Iranian trade relations.
Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani on Feb. 26 called
upon the Soviet Union to end its supply of arms and missiles t o Iraq "before
i t i s too late." Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, during his
visit to Japan i n April 1984, stressed the Soviet threat and emphasized
that
H e stated
Iran served a s a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East.
Iran and the
that while faith i n God still formed a common ground between
United States, the Soviet Union, where there was no faith i n G o d , could not
be trusted a t all.
On June 6 , however, the Political Director General of the
Iranian Foreign Ministry, Sayyid Muhammad S a d r , held discussions i n Moscow
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet officials on the war
and economic relations. Moscow
informed visiting
Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Hossein Kazempur-Ardebili in early April 1985 that it desired a
negotiated resolution of the conflict.
This message was repeated to visiting
Iranian officials in July 1986.

--

--

Recent Iranian's efforts to improve ties with Moscow reflect political and
military considerations a s well a s economic needs.
Discussions i n Moscow
between Soviet officials a n 8 Iranian Oil Minister Qolam Reza Aqazadeh-Khol in
August 1986 resulted i n agreement to resume natural gas supplies to the
5 , 1986,
Soviet Union.
Moscow subsequently ha,s agreed to support the Aug.
OPEC agreement and cut its oil exports.
Medium- and long-term economic cooperation
talks between
Iraq and the
7 , the
Soviet
Soviet Union were conducted in March 1984; and on Mar.
Atomenergoexport was appointed by Baghdad to identify a site for a planned
nuclear station.
In April, there were growing indications that Moscow was
stepping up military aid to Iraq against a n anticipated
Iranian offensive.
Iraqi President Husayn in early May characterized
Iraq-Soviet relations as
"good," stating his government was "interested in developing this and so are
the Soviets.w
In late August 1 9 8 6 , Soviet Deputy Foreign Affairs
Minister
Vladimir Petrovsky met with President Husayn in Baghdad and reiterated Soviet
support for Iraq's efforts to end the conflict.
The ability of Moscow to influence a post-Khomeini regime in Iran remains
of considerable concern to U.S. planners in light of t h e absence of U.S.

influence in Tehran and the present lack of alternative political leadership
groups to the Islamic Republican Party.
Reportedly, the Soviets a r e
continuing to supply military equipment t o Iran i n a n apparent move to
maintain their options i n the event of a change of leadership i n Tehran.
Moscow also harbors concern over the Iranian revolution's possible future
influence on Soviet Muslims who number close to 50 million.

Regional Effects of the Conflict
Of particular concern to the United States i s the potential for a widening
of the conflict that could increase prospects for destabilizing
the region
and endanger U.S. interests.
From the beginning, the Iran-Iraq war created.
realignments among Arab states and deepened existing cleavages i n the Arab
world.
Indeed, it almost led to armed confrontation between Syria and Jordan
i n late 1980.
Jordan was the most vociferous Arab state in support of
Iraq and that
support took a number of forms, including political advocacy, the opening of
its port at Aqaba for unloading supplies destined for Iraq, .and volunteers to
serve alongside Iraqi forces.
Syria, i n contrast, has effectively supported Iran because of its
hostility toward the Baghdad regime, reflected i n its condemnation of
Iraqi
military moves against Iran.
Syrian motives were interpreted a s being
another manifestation of the rivalry between the two Ba'athist
regimes in
Damascus and Baghdad over the leadership of the Ba'ath and the Arab world.
In addition, the ruling Alawite elite i n Damascus are members of a minority
sect in Syria that i s a n offshoot of Shi'ism.
In late 1985 and early 1 9 8 6 ,
there were signs of deteriorating relations between Iraq and Syria. Attempts
by Jordanian King Husayn to normalize ties between Baghdad
and Damascus in
1986 have thus far lacked suecess, however.
The reaction of other Arab
states to the conflict fell between
the
Jordanian and Syrian positions.
The Gulf Arab
states have lent financial
Iran
support to Iraq (an estimated $ 3 0 + billion) i n its conduct of the war.
repeatedly has countered with strong warnings in efforts to intimidate Gulf
countries and, i n its Arabic broadcasts, has called for the overthrow of
ruling regimes. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May
1 9 8 1 in large measure was catalyzed by the perceived Iranian threat to the
region.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
and Oman formed the organization a s an economic,
internal
security
cooperation and defense arrangement.
GCC concern for the Iranian threat was
reinforced by an abortive coup in December 1981 in Bahrain organized
by
Iranian-trained and supplied members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of .Bahrain. Reaction by GCC member-states to the coup attempt was a decisive
increase in regional diplomatic and economic Support for Iraq.
For the Gulf
states, the position
of continuing to support
Iraq
economically and diplomatically could invite Iranian retaliation against oil
and military installations.
(Kuwait has charged that, between 1981 and 1 9 8 3 ,
Iranian aircraft have attacked its oil installations on three occasions.
In
1986, sabotage damaged Kuwaiti oil facitilies.) Since May 1 9 8 2 , the GCC has
looked to ways for ending the conflict while
seeking to strengthen its
security arrangements.
At a summit meeting in Qatar in November
1 9 8 3 , the
GCC examined options to bolster security of member states and Gulf sea l a n e s ,
a s well as to find an end to the war.
In March and April
1 9 8 4 , there were
indications of a growing conviction among GCC leaders that the war was on the

verge of becoming a wider conflict threatening regional stability.
Following
Iranian air attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers i n mid-May 1 9 8 4 , Kuwait and
At a n
Saudi Arabia placed their air defenses o n a heightened state of alert.
emergency meeting of G C C foreign ministers i n Riyadh o n May 1 7 , Iran was
condemned for its l1aggressions" against their "vital interests."
T h e GCC
called for a n emergency session of the Arab League on May
2 0 "to adopt a
unified Arab stand," and raised the issue in the U.N.
Security Council.
(Resolution 5 2 2 of June 1 , 1984, reaffirmed the right of free navigation to
all ports and and installations of Gulf states not party to the conflict, and
condemned Iranian
attacks
on
commercial
shipping.)
While
seeking
international support, the GCC will face final decisions o n self defense
GCC interest i n a
should Iranian attacks escalate to a highe'r level.
near-term conclusion to the conflict appears to be motivated by economic and
security concerns.

--

Syria, Libya, Algeria, the People's
The so-called Steadfastness Front
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Palestine Liberation Organization
met on May 24, 1982, in Algiers to proclaim that Iran was a friend
(PLO)
of the Arabs and to urge that no Arab state help
Iraq.
While this group
officially declared support for Iran, the level of support has varied
from
Syria's outright condemnation of Iraq to the more neutral and mediative
efforts of the P L O and Algeria.

--

Arab League foreign ministers (with the exception of Syria and Libya) met
1984 and issued
a
i n a n emergency
session i n Baghdad in mid-March
condemnation of Iran's "continuous aggression and its attempts to cross
international borders and occupy Iraq's territories."
They urged
Iran to
abide by resolutions calling for an end to hostilities and to accept
mediation initiatives to end the conflict.
Despite its isolation resulting from the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty,
Egypt has been considered in some Arab circles a s a counterweight to Iran
because of its size of population and comparative military
strength.
Iraqi
President Husayn in May 1982 invited Egyptian President Muhammad
Mubarak
to
send troops.
Egypt, since 1981, had been contributing arms and ammunition to
Iraq.
Mubarak declined to dispatch Egyptian forces. But relations between
the two countries have drawn closer.
Iraqi military missions have visited
Cairo since 1982.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali stated on Mar.
26, 1 9 8 4 , a t the conclusion of a visit to Baghdad that his government fully
supported Iraq and would not hesitate to offer any military
aid requested.
Iraqi President Husayn on May 3 called for Egypt's return to the Arab league.
President Mubarak visited Baghdad in March 1 9 8 5 a s a gesture of support for
Iraq.
Since mid-1986, Egypt reportedly has stepped up shipments of
spare
parts and military advisers to Iraq.
Turkey has maintained a neutral stance toward the conflict since its
inception.
When Iran launched its offensive a t the border of northern
Iraq
in July 1983, the Turkish government issued a strong warning to Tehran that
no action should be taken that would be
contrary to Turkey's national
interests, and it expressed the hope that its position would
be well
understood by Iran.
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati responded by
stating that Turkey should not be concerned
about the destruction
of the
Kirkuk-Iskenderun oil pipeline, which is a significant source of income for
Turkey.
The Turks have taken
strong security measures to protect
the
pipeline inside their territory.
They also have been concerned over
Iranian
exploitation of dissident Iraqi Kurdish elements.
In May 1983, October 1 9 8 4 ,
and August 1 9 8 6 , Turkish military
forces launched raids against Kurdish
rebels inside Iraqi territory, apparently with
Iraqi acquiescence.
In

November 1 9 8 4 , Turkey announced agreement with Iran over the prevention
of
activities i n each other's territory that would endanger either's
security.
But, on Aug. 27, 1986, Turkish Foreign Minister Vahir Halefoglu reportedly
warned that any Iranian victory resulting in the overthrow of Saddam Husayn
would prompt Turkish seizure of the Mosul and Kirkuk regions i n northern Iraq
which produce a substantial proportion of
Iraqi oil.
H e stated Turkey's
security interests were such that i t could not tolerate a n Iranian satellite
regime as a neighbor that would manipulate the rebellious Kurds.

VI. Evolution of U.S.

Policy toward the Iran-Iraq Conflict.

Until the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Baghdad on Nov. 2 6 ,
Iraq had
1984, official U.S. relations with Iran and Iraq had been limited.
severed diplomatic
relations with
the United States during the
1967
Arab-Israeli war, but both countries had maintained interest sections i n each
other's capitals.
It i s unlikely that renewed official ties will increase
U.S.
leverage over Baghdad.
The United States broke relations with Iran in
April 1980 following the seizure of the American Embassy and its occupants in
Tehran the previous November.
Iran's intense anti-Americanism -- a central
factor in that country's internal political dynamics since its revolution i n
1979
precludes the likelihood of a reestablishment of U.S.Iranian ties so
long as the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) under Ayatollah
Khomeini retains
power.

--

Since mid-1983, U.S. official contacts with Baghdad have increased and led
credence to a n t i l t w toward Iraq in U.S. policy.
On May 2 1 , 1 9 8 4 , the State
main
Department specifically condemned wIranian intransigencew a s the
obstacle to a n end to the Iran-Iraq conflict.
And, on May
3 1 , President
Reagan in a n interview in London noted that Iraq had confined
its attacks
against shipping in the Gulf whereas Iran had attacked
ships belonging
to
neutral nations, and stated that "in time of w a r , the enemy's commerce and
trade is a fair target if you can hurt them economically.
S o , in that sense,
Iraq has not gone beyond bounds, as Iran has done."
Significantly, there continues to exist a n antipathy between Washington
and Tehran as a result of Iranian-inspired Shi'ite terrorist efforts against
U.S.
pers-wnnel and installations in the Middle East.
President Reagan on
July 8 , 1985, denounced Iran a s a terrorist country.
A National Security Council study of October 1983 reportedly had concluded
that U.S. interests would not be served if Iraq were to collapse.
At the
same time, it maintained that there was little the United States could do to
aid I-raq directly.
Iraq's primary needs, in order to sustain its ability to
continue the war, were economic assistance and improvement in the morale of
A s a result of the study, the
Administration
reportedly
its officer corps.
encouraged Gulf Arab states to increase financial support for Iraq and
conducted efforts aimed at limiting the flow of arms from third countries to
Iran.
Iraq was removed from the list of countries supporting international
terrorism in 1982, thereby facilitating sales of certain items of equipment
In December 1 9 8 2 , a sale of
some 6 0 civilian
formerly under restriction.
Hughes helicopters to Baghdad was reported.
Iraq has been granted
credit
guarantees to finance sales of U.S. farm products since December 1982.
Since the hostage cri'sis, Washington has placed
restrictions on trade
ane
between the United States and Iran, with the exception of food products

medical equipment.
Nevertheless, newsmedia reports indicate that trade has
increased, mainly on the basis of American firms trading through their
overseas affiliates with Iranian organizations. But, o n Jan. 23, 1 9 8 4 , the
State Department adaed Iran to the list of countries reportedly supporting
arms
acts of international terrorism. A substantial illegal traffic i n U.S.
reportedly has developed i n which American weapons and spare parts that have
been forwarded to Iran by a variety of routes.
Iraqi officials in 1983 have
claimed that Iran consistently has been receiving large quantities of U.S.
weaponry through non-official sources aond third countries, including South
Korea and Israel, without interference from Washington.
Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Ramadan stated in February 1984 that he welcomed indications of !*a
more positive attitude*! by the United States toward the matter.
T h e State
Department in March 1984 designated Ambassador-at-large Richard Fairbanks to
coordinate U.S. efforts i n limiting arms deliveries to Iran from Western
Europe, Israel and friendly Asian states.
Such efforts reportedly had been
partly successful in reducing the flow of spare parts and equipment.
U.S.
concern in August 1986 that Iran might gain the strategic initiative and
psychological advantage in the Conflict reportedly has heightened Americas
diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing international arms deliveries to Iran.
equipment
Within the United States, shipments of replacement parts for U.S.
destined for Iran from American firms have been seized.
Since 1 9 8 4 , more
than 70 persons have been arrested by U.S. authorities.
Following the Iranian attack on the Al-Faw Peninsula i n early 1 9 8 6 , a
State Department spokesman warned Iran that a n expansion of the conflict
interests,
elsewhere i n the Gulf regions would be a major threat t o U.S.
noting that Iran had openly been conducting a campaign to i n t ~ z i d a t emoderate
8 , 1 9 8 6 , that
Gulf Arab states.
Secretary of State Schultz stated on Aug.
the United States and the Soviet Union, i n prelirr,inary talks for the
forthcoming summit meeting, had begun discussing cooperative action toward
hastening the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict.
With the revelation in November 1986 of secret negotiations between
representatives of the Reagan Administration and the Iranian government,
controversy has arisen over specific and broader policy objectives underlying
the U.S initiative. On Nov. 1 3 , President Reagan acknowledged a n 18-month
effort to establish contacts with "moderatew elements in Iran with the
declared objectives of:
(1) restoring relations with a strategically
significant Gulf State;
(2) seeking a n honorable end to the Iran-Iraq
(4)
conflict; (3) eliminating state-sponsored terrorism in the region; and
securing the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by pro-Iranian
Shi'ite groups.
The initiative reflected a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward
Iran that began i n late 1984 but which received less than whole-hearted
support within the executive branch.
The subsequent covert arms sales to
Iran, in conjunction with Israel and private parties, by elements in the
National Security Council violated the official U.S. position of neutrality
in the Iran-Iraq war and contradicted U.S.
policy toward terrorism.
Many
observers contend that the initiative had damaged severely U.S.
credibility
among allies and friendly regional states.
(See Arms Shipments to Iran [ b y ]
Richard M. Preece.
[washington] (periodically updated).
CRS Issue Brief
87022.)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AIB84016. Public record. Not legal advice.