# Bomber Options for Replacing B52s

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AIB81107

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** June 17, 1981
- **Citation:** IB81107

## Text

B O M B E R O P T I O N S F O R R E P L A C I N G B-52s

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB81107

AUTHOR:
M i t c h e l l , D o u g l a s D.
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

T H E L I B R A R Y OF C O N G R E S S
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR I S S U E S S Y S T E M

'

D A T E O R I G I N A T E D 06/17/81
D A T E U P D A T E D 05/03/82

F O R A D D I T I O N A L I N F O R M A T I O N C A L L 287-5700
0528

CRS- 1

ISSUE DEFINITION
To deter a nuclear attack against this country and its allies, the United
States maintains a strategic force of
land-based
missiles
(ICBMs),
submarine-based missiles (SLBMs), and bombers.
The bomber leg of this
"triad" primarily
consists of about 343 B-52 bombers operated by the
Strategic Air Command
(SAC).
Many believe that by 1990, the B-52's
vulnerability to improving Soviet air defenses will imperil its effectiveness
as a penetrating bomber. There is strong sentiment in Congress and in the
Department of Defense to replace the B-52s before that time.
The FY81 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342) directed the Secretary of
Defense to develop a "multi-role bomber" for initial deployment by 1987.
Candidate aircraft were to include the B-1, a derivative of the B-1, the
FB-111B/C, and a n advanced technology aircraft, which would incorporate
"Stealth.'' Months before the choice of aircraft was announced, the new
Reagan Administration added $2.4 billion to the FY82 defense budget, to
called
initiate a bomber procurement and research and development program
Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA).
In a long-awaited announcement on Oct.
2, 1981, President
Reagan
designated a modified B-1 -- also known as the B-1B -- a s the aircraft to be
built for LRCA.
This decision reverses the policy
of
the
Carter
Administration, which was to forego the B-1, initially in favor
of
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), and then, during the 1980 campaign, i n
favor of a "Stealthw bomber in the future.
The Congress had a specific role in approving or disapproving President
Reagan's decision:
the bill that authorized funding for LRCA
(S. 8 1 5 , the
FY82 Defense Authorization bill) provided that money could not be obligated
for the B-1 until Nov. 1 8 , 1981.
If both Houses had agreed to resolutions sf
disapproval before that date, LRCA funding would have been blocked.
Technology
Opposition to the B-1 centers around support for an Advanced
Bomber (ATB) incorporating llStealth'ltechnologies more completely than the
modified B-1, and offering greater potential a s a penetrating bomber over the
long term.
However, the Reagan decision includes continued development of an
ATB "for the 1 9 9 0 s I W leaving a s primary issues the questions of affordability
and the need for both elements of the "two-bomber" program.
Even though the
funding questions for 1982 specifically have been resolved, these issues will
continue to underlie future debate over B-1 costs and its priority in
successive defense budgets.

CRS- 2

EXPLANATION OF TERMS
The following distinctions in terminology used i n this issue brief may
helpful :

be

Multi-Role Bomber (MRB) -- This term was used in P.L.
96-342.
The Act
authorized $300 million for development of a multi-role
bomber, and the
program
in FY81 bore the same title.
That
resulting Air Force R&D
identification does not appear in the FY82 budget, however, having been
replaced by LRCA.

--

Long-Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA)
Conceptually, MRB and LRCA envision
an aircraft t o perform the same range of conventional and strategic missions.
The Air Force prefers the latter term, and the Reagan Administration's FY82
budget request includes both procurement and R&D for the next bomber under
this term.
Rockwell International has used the term synonymously with their
B-1, even before their candidate had definitely been chosen for the LRCA
program.
B-1 -- Rockwell International's LRCA variant of the B-1 has basically
the
same design a s the earlier aircraft whose production was halted in 1977. B-1
herein refers to an aircraft of that basic design in any configuration being
considered today, recognizing that important questions may remain over what
configuration to choose.
While the House Armed Services Committee has
recommended a design with minimal changes, any B-1 derivative that meets the
criterion for timely deployment i s authorized a s a B-1, according to the
House version of S. 815, the DOD Authorization bill.

--

Highly classifies defense research projects have led to a
Stealth
technological advance formally announced on Aug. 22, 1980, called Stealth.
Advances reportedly have application to aircraft design, materials and
electronics, with the objective of drastically reducing the detectability of
future aircraft, manned and unmanned.
Accordingly, a "Stealth bombern is a
future bomber of unspecified
design, but presumed
to incorporate those
advances collectively known a s Stealth.
Some Stealth-related innovations may
be used in other aircraft before a n all-new Stealth fighter or bomber is
finally produced.

--

The Air Force uses this term to refer
Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB)
to an aircraft incorporating technological innovations that are not mature
enough to be exploited in current
production.
So-called
"Stealthw
of
such
technologies would presumably
constitute a large proportion
innovations.
Accordingly,
"Stealth
aircraftm
and
"ATB"
are
used
interchangeably.
An advanced technology bomber was one of the Multi-Role
Bomber candidates specified by P.L. 96-342; y e t the provision for an IOC by
1987 was widely perceived as effectively excluding an ATB a s a serious
Accordingly, ATB presently refers to a
candidate for MRB o r , likewise, LRCA.
longer-term R&D program.

CRS- 3

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

BOMBER ROLES
SAC now operates 3 4 3 B-52 long range strategic bombers,
(along with
66
medium-range FB-111A bombers).
Of that number, 168 " G W models and 96 " H w
models are used in the alert force for strategic retaliation. Models G and H
are the most modern B-52s produced, having entered service between 1 9 5 8 and
1962.
Another
79 " D m models are considered available primarily
for
non-strategic missions; D models are somewhat older.
Penetration Role
The United States nuclear deterrent force began with intercontinental
range bombers, and they have remained a prime delivery system.
Today,
alongside the other "legs" of the U.S.
strategic triad
(ICBMs and SLBMs),
bombers a r e allocated a share of nuclear weapons that accounts for about half
the destructive power (in megatonnage) of the total U.S. inventory.
Although some question the continued viability of manned aircraft in
high-threat environments of the future, others believe that penetrating
bombers will continue to offer unique attributes of value for strategic
deterrence:
(1) Bombers may be withheld from a n initial nuclear
exchange without added risk to their survival,
permitting their selective use to influence
enemy and allied actions in the post-strike
environment.

(2) Bombers can be recalled after dispatch,
contributing to strategic flexibility and
crisis stability.
(3) Bombers can engage mobile targets and destroy
them even if hardened.
(4)

Several other claims made for bombers seem
valid only under certain conditions:

-- Crews can conduct reliable and immediate
damage assessment (doubtful with nuclear
weapons) .
-- Bombers can attack a series of targets or
engage targets of opportunity (doubtful in
heavily defended areas).
These attributes alone may not justify the requirement for bombers, but
the capability of U.S.
bombers to penetrate Soviet defenses remains a
strategic requirement in current U.S. defense policy.

CRS- 4

Cruise Missile Role
Beginning in 1982, B-52s will assume a second, less demanding, strategic
role a s cruise missile launchers. All G models gradually will be withdrawn a s
Itpenetrating bombers" so that they will constitute strictly a stand-off force
by 1990. Currently, G models entering scheduled overhaul are being equipped
with internal and external carriage assemblies and new offensive avionics
systems to command the 1 2 or 20 ALCMs that will be carried on each aircraft.
H models are being equipped with the same offensive avionics systems, but the
necessary structural changes for carrying ALCMs await a future decision over
whether or when to withdraw H models from service a s penetrators.
Current plans call for deploying about 3000 ALCMs by 1990.
If the B-52s
carry nothing but ALCMs (at the maximum of 2 0 each), about 150 aircraft would
suffice. By choosing to use the entire inventory of G models and perhaps H
models, however, the Air Force can achieve the ALCM
force objective while
permitting ALCMs to be loaded in combination with bombs and Short-Range
Attack Missiles (SRAM).
On that basis, the Air Force will be able to use
converted B-52s in a "shoot and penetrate" role during the 1980's transition
period to an "all stand-off" role.
General-Purpose Role
A third role for B-52s i s conventional bombing, most recently exemplified
in operations during the Vietnam war.
SAC'S 7 9 D model B-52s are outfitted
for a maximum payload of non-nuclear gravity bombs (108, compared with 27 for
other models), and are considered available primarily
for general-purpose
use, such as wcounter-interventionw to defend U.S.
interests against armed
aggression i n Southwest Asia or Europe, for example.
Other possible missions for bombers add to the B-52s'
general-purpose
rationale.
They may be used in support of naval operations; mine-laying
has
been an accepted mission for B-52s in the past, as in the closing of Haiphong
Harbor.
Bomber advocates note several additional maritime roles that B-52s
or their successors should be able to perform in conventional warfare, e.g.,
attacking hostile surface ships and contributing to U.S.
fleet air defense
against Backfire bombers.
Need for Bombers i n Non-Strategic Roles
The need for bombers in conventional wartime roles follows from certain
assumptions about U.S. and Soviet strategies and force structures to be used
i n meeting possible contingencies.
In the case of a NATO contingency,
tactical air forces constitute the primary strike force for blunting a Warsaw
Pact advance, and U.S.
forward-based systems such a s F-111s pose the threat
of deeper interdiction and tactical nuclear strikes a s a n added deterrent t o
Soviet aggression.
The contribution of conventionally-armed bombers within
If
NATO's
"flexible responsem doctrine may be
open
to
question.
justification for bombers in this role is in terms of nsupplementing" the
tactical strike force, Congress might ask why supplements a r e needed, and how
responsibility for carrying out those missions is being shared, if both
SAC
and other commands are involved.
The scenario most mentioned to substantiate the need

for

a

conventional

CRS- 5

IB81107

UPDATE-05/03/82

bomber force i s further Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia.
If vital U.S.
interests in the Persian Gulf region were threatened, it is argued,
long-range strike forces would be needed to slow the advance of Soviet or
proxy forces until U.S.
ground forces could be brought to bear in sufficient
number.
Bomber advocates note that the border area between the USSR and
Iran, for example, would be beyond the range of carrier-based interdiction
aircraft unless carriers exposed themselves dangerously by entering the
Persian Gulf.
B-52s and follow-on bombers would offer
the
desired
combination of range and payload for attacking distant and extended targets,
according to this view.
Strategic Projection Force
The FY82 budget request for the Strategic Projection Force (SPF) responds
to the Persian Gulf scenario, among others.
This program would upgrade
long-distance interdiction bombing capability a s a complement to Rapid
Deployment Forces (RDF). The SPF program would take 35 H model B-52s and
configure them for improved general purpose use, including an expanded
capacity for 500-lb bombs.
According to Air Force spokesmen, the plan to
convert H models instead of using D models, which already carry the maximum
conventional payload, is based on the greater range and reliability of the
newer aircraft.

REASONS ADVANCED FOR REPLACING B-52s
The Air Force's Long Range Combat Aircraft
(LRCA) concept for a new
strategic bomber responds to desires for an aircraft well-suited to a range
of conventional uses also.
Likewise, the "Multi-Role Bomberw concept
mandated by the 96th Congress envisions general-purpose missions as well a s
strategic potential.
Despite the great significance that non-nuclear power
projection roles have been given in the marketing and promotion
of certain
candidate aircraft, these arguments relate generally to why bombers are
useful, and not to why the U.S. needs new ones.
By contrast, most arguments
for replacing the B-52s are expressed in terms of the U.S.-Soviet
strategic
competition, and particularly
the U.S.
objective of penetrating future
strategic defenses being developed by the Soviet Union.
Serviceability of the B-52s
A commonly-heard complaint about B-52s is that they
will soon be older
than the pilots flying them.
While the B-52 represents a product of 1950's
technology, modifications to G and H models have helped adapt them to new
operating environments. Nevertheless, age imposes limits on the Suture
service that B-52s can reliably offer, and, hence, on the readiness of the
bomber force.

As strategic bombers, B-52s would fly the following mission profile in a
general war:
Take off from their dispersed bases before the impact of
attacking warheads, fly at high altitude intercontinentally toward assigned
targets, drop to low altitude to evade and defeat enemy air defenses, survive
to reach and destroy their objectives, and then escape to recovery bases.
Flight at low altitudes keeps a n aircraft hidden from defending ground radars
a s long a s possible, combines with speed to limit the engagement time of air

CRS- 6

IB81107

UPDATE-05/03/82

defense weapons, and conceals an aircraft from non-discriminating
airborne
radar systems by mixing its radar image with other signals, known as "ground
clutter," reflected from the earth's surface.
Low flight combines with deception to permit penetration.
Accordingly,
B-52s rely on electronic countermeasures
(ECM) to suppress, distort, or
otherwise "jam" the radar echo that a hostile fire control system receives.
ECM masks the presence of attacking aircraft or deceives the defending
weapons about the number, size, location, speed, or other aspects of the
target, once detected.
ECM systems draw considerable amounts of power from
their aircraft, however, imposing limits on the capability an aircraft can
support.
The flight profile of an emergency take-off and a penetration mission
places considerable stress on an airframe and demands on avionics.
Although
the ability of an aircraft to withstand such use declines with age, recent
studies have confirmed that the B-52 airframe is still reliable; and by using
B-52s as cruise missile platforms, the Air Force expects the system to be
serviceable almost until 2000.
As the aircraft grows older, however,
incidents of failure may be expected to increase, lowering
aircraft
availability rates and adding to the costs of operating them.
Vulnerability to Soviet Air Defenses
Although the future reliability and maintainability
of B-52s are of
concern, the more critical reason for a new bomber, in the Air Force view, is
improving Soviet air defenses.
The Soviet Union already has deployed over
6,000 ground radars, 12,800 surface-to-air
missile launchers, and 2,550
interceptor aircraft.
General Ellis, Commander-in-Chief
of SAC, estimates
that 75% of an attacking B-52 force would be expected to survive Soviet
defenses around 1985.
The Soviet Union is constantly improving those
defenses, however, leading the Air Force to conclude that B-52s would be
highly vulnerable as a penetrating bomber force by 1990. Their utility until
then depends on the rate of Soviet progress in the following areas:

-- Deployment of a Soviet Union AWACS (Airborne
Warning and Control System) aircraft (termed
SUAWACS) that provides radar surveillance and
coordinates interceptors1 fire control over
extended ranges, similar to the U.S. AWACS.
With sophisticated "look-downw radar, i t will
be able to distinguish low-flying aircraft
from ground clutter.

- - Deployment of a new generation of
fighter/interceptor aircraft whose improved
radar and air-to-air missiles will provide
a "look down-shoot downw (LDSD) capability
similar to U.S. F-15s.
Although the Air Force is concerned about improved Soviet capabilities
represented in the new SA-10 air defense missiles and in a n integrated
communications and electonic warfare system a s well, it is the look-down
shoot-down (LDSD) prospect particularly that threatens to eliminate the
protection now afforded U.S.
aircraft by low-level flight.
The B-52's chances of survival might

be

extended

beyond

the

1980s

by

CRS- 7

IB81107

UPDATE-05/03/82

adding new systems of defensive avionics.
Sentiment in the Congress,
however, favors a new bomber for the penetrating mission.
There i s concern
that the effectiveness of advanced "active defensesw like
electronic
countermeasures (ECM) cannot fully compensate for the limitations of the
B-52's less advanced "passive defenses," related to size, propulsion
system
and fabrication materials.
Such inherent characteristics largely determine
which
refers
to
the
an aircraft's
"radar cross
section"
(RCS) ,
identifiability of the radar image an aircraft reflects back.
Thus, the
requirement for a new bomber aircraft is widely discussed in terms of
improved design features to present a significantly lower RCS than existing
aircraft, thus reducing susceptibility to radar aetection and tracking.
Diversifying and Modernizing
Another major reason given for replacing B-52s a s penetrators is that they
have already been scheduled to retire from that role and t o serve as cruise
missile carriers.
By terms of the current rationale, cruise missiles carried
and launched by SAC aircraft would not alter the doctrinal "triad" of U.S.
strategic weapons.
Rather, i t i s held that ALCMs will preserve the viability
of the "air-breathing" leg more effectively than bombers alone, because
"diversification" of this leg compels Soviet air defenses to contend with two
kinds of attacking systems. Thus, the objectives of deploying ALCMs and
simultaneously replacing B-52s a s penetrators serve the goal of diversifying
and modernizing bomber forces. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
Research and Development, General Kelly Burke, argues that any investment in
a new bomber i s worthwhile if i t successfully induces the Soviet Union t o
spend a disproportionately greater amount of its resources in preparing
defenses against it.
Pursuing two objectives simultaneously concentrates the costs in a f e w
years, and critics of this approach argue that deployment of new ALCMs makes
it unnecessary to keep a large number of penetrating bombers.
They feel that
H model B-52s a1on.e would constitute a n adequate force of penetrators over
the period while ALCMs are being phased in on G models.
By deferring bomber
modernization until around 1990, however, such a solution would have to
cruise missile
provide not only a new penetrator, but a second-generation
carrier a s well, since B-52s in any capacity will be retired before 2000;
(Air Force spokesmen estimate between 1993 and 1998).
Thus, the two elements
of diversification must be confronted simultaneously, whether now or later,
because of the finite service life of the B-52s.

CONGRESSIONAL POSITIONS
Congressional viewpoints on the bomber issue a r e reflected in current
versions of the FY82 Defense Authorization Bill and in provisions of last
year's Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 96-342).
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981 (P.L. 96-342)
Section 204(a) directs the Secretary of Defense to develop "a strategic
multi-role bomber which maximizes range, payload, and ability to perform
the
missions of conventional bomber, cruise missile launch platform, and nuclear
weapons delivery system in both the tactical and strategic role."
This law

CRS- 8

IB81107

UPDATE-05/03/82

reflects Congressional intent to provide a replacement for the B-52 in each
of its roles.
Air Force plans for LRCA now make it clear, however, that the
aircraft will assume its cruise missile-launching role only around the middle
of its service life, when its effectiveness a s a penetrator will have
declined; 1995 i s the suggested date.
The "multi-role bomber," therefore,
capability beyond that
will not be used to provide a strategic penetration
time.
P.L.
96-342 directed the Secretary of Defense to consider several
candidates for the new multi-role bomber, t o include the B-1, the FB-111B/C,
and an "advanced technology bomberw (ATB), which would exploit innovations in
a variety of emerging technologies, collectively known. a s "Stealth."
Another
provision states that development of the bomber must be guided by an Initial
Operating Capability (IOC-the deployment of the first squadron of aircraft)
not later than 1987. Realistically, an ATB candidate could not meet that
requirement, although some supporters of that language may have thought
otherwise a t the time.
House of Representatives
Reporting the FY82 Defense Authorization bill (H.Rept. 97-71) , the House
Armed Services Committee affirmed the 1987 deadline for a multi-role bomber,
specifying July 1 , 1987. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the Air
Force procure B-1s in a configuration a s near as possible to the prototype
B-1s
purchased
before President Carter's 1977 decision
to
terminate
production.
This recommendation i s apparently based on desires to deploy the
aircraft in a s short a time and with a s little unnecessary expense as
A selection on that basis
would probably provide a relatively
possible.
high-performance variant, including a supersonic capability.
As reported and subsequently passed, the bill also authorizes Research,
Development, Test and Evaluption (RDTFiE). funding for a n advanced technology
aircraft. This authorization supports the Air Force's position that a B-1
should be acquired in the near-term as a multi-role
bomber, and a more
advanced penetrator should be acquired over the longer-term.
Thus, the House
(LRCA),
bill supports a "two-bomber programw of a Long Range Combat Aircraft
and a future advanced technology bomber (ATB).
Senate
Defense bills passed by the Senate in the 96th Congress were not
supportive of a revived B-1 program.
T h e llmulti-role bomberH language passed
in P.L. 96-342 represented a compromise between a stretched F/FB-111, favored
by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a B-1 derivative Strategic
Weapons Launcher (SWL), regarded by some a s a first step toward a full B-1
program.
By its adoption in conference, the Senate's language not only
averted a SWL program, but it also undercut a competing strategy to produce a
compromise in conference that would
settle on a B-1.
Thus, while the
"multi-rolew terminology has been perceived a s favoring the B-1, i t actually
dampened the B-1's
immediate prospects in 1980.
The prevalent Senate
position in the 96th Congress sought to leave open the options presented
by
emerging technologies.
If a two-bomber approach were to be necessary, the
Senate favored the FB-111B/C
a s an "interim bomberw; that program was
originally approved in the Senate version of the FY81 Defense Authorization
bill.

CRS- 9
The FY82 Defense Authorization Bill
(S. 8151, reported by the Armed
Services Committee (S.Rept. 97-58), and passed May 1 4 , 1 9 8 1 , approves the
Administration's request for bomber funding. The Senate version does not
specify a choice, but it makes the obligation of funds contingent upon a
recommendation by the President, and open t o a concurrent resolution of
disapproval by Congress.
The Armed Services committee noted that a new
bomber is needed not only for the strategic role, but for demanding
conventional missions a s well, and that a follow-on cruise missile carrier
would hedge against degraded reliability o r pre-launch survivability of B-52
carriers.
From this language, it appears that Senate support for a B-l
program may have grown in the 97th Congress; but Senator Tower, Chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, has expressed reservations about the
affordability of B-1s with an ATB.

OPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS
The Need for a "Two-Bomberw Program
While sharing the ultimate objective of deploying an ATB, many bomber
advocates would prefer to precede it with a n aircraft of more predictable
capability, cost, and availability.
This group believes that Stealth
technology can be applied to future aircraft more completely and more
effectively if development i s not rushed. Accordingly, many have concluded
that a "two-bomber programw i s needed, o n the assumption that Soviet air
defenses effectively will have "closed the doorw on B-52 penetrators by 1990,
and that ALCMs alone should not be relied upon to maintain the strategic
balance in the interim between generations of penetrators.
The issues which
follow from these conclusions are:
(1) How much of an investment to make,
(2) how much capability to build, and ( 3 ) how many years' use t o expect in an
aircraft short of an ATB.
These questions will remain relevant a s Congress
monitors the progress of the LRCA program.
The B-1 Alternative:

"Near-Termw or Long-Term?

financially
B-1 proponents view the ATB a s a high risk alternative, both
and technically.
Past experience with previous programs to replace the B-52
(AMSA, B-70, B-1) leads many to fear the same fate for Stealth; and they
discourage waiting for Stealth because that would commit the country to
developing an all-new aircraft by around 1990, whatever the cost.
That could
place the Department of Defense in a less favorable bargaining position for
dealing with aircraft manufacturers, some assert, whereas a B-1 program and
an ATB program would introduce competition and offer the Air Force more
flexibility.
While some B-1 backers foresee its long-term role a s a penetrator, the Air
Force requested 100 B-1s as "near-term1' penetrators, preferring an ATB a s the
ultimate replacement for the B-52 in that role.
Illustrative plans would
phase the B-1 in as a penetrator from 1987 to 1990, then phase i t in a s a
cruise missile carrier beginning around 1995.
Its place as a penetrator
would then be taken by an ATB, (of which the Air Force hopes to build 132).
Given fiscal constraints, some B-l backers suspect that LRCA, once begun,
Will be the only new bomber program
for the remainder of this century.
Accordingly, they feel the B-1 should be acquired in the full number needed

t o replace the B-52s a s they retire from service in all roles.
B-1 advocates
note that the synergistic effects of its new design features with its ALQ-161
ECM system should reduce its previous RCS by a factor of 1 0 , and assure its
effectiveness as a penetrator "well into the 1990s."
They suggest that if
technological advances offer increased advantages for penetrating aircraft,
they can be added t o the B-1 LRCA.
For example, development of laser
defenses against surface-to-air
missiles
would
permit
high-altitude
penetration, as suggested by former Air Force Secretary Hans Mark.
This difference of approach among those who support a B-1 alternative
leads to disagreement over how to configure the aircraft, now that i t has
been chosen for the LRCA program.
For example, should the B-1s be
constructed initially with the features needed only later to carry cruise
missiles?
And should a supersonic dash capability be included? Neither was
initially provided for within the funding requested by
the Administration,
but October budget revisions added about $800 million in modifications for
cruise missile carriage.
The "Baseline Variant"
The precise configuration of the new B-1 for LRCA has not been publicized,
but it builds on the "core aircraft" Which would be common to any variant,
reportedly keeping 85% of the design features from the original B-1.
Any
number of combinations could be conceived to constitute many different
variants, both for adding to the capability of the original and for
economizing somewhat.
Much of the Work over recent months by both the Air
Force Bomber Office and the O S D Bomber Study Group has involved defining
competing configurations and developing cost estimates for each, then
conducting cost-effectiveness analyses for each variant i n relation to each
other and to notional advanced technology candidates.
International would be
The baseline variant being promoted by Rockwell
designed to fly farther than the original B-1, and would have a n increased
payload.
The requirement for a multi-role configuration a s well a s for
penetrating improved defenses calls for other changes, andb the added costs
which result are to be offset in part by reductions in the maximum speed and
altitude attainable by the aircraft
(from 70,000 feet to 42,000 feet).
Accordingly, the following modifications to the earlier aircraft may be
expected in the B-1 LRCA:

-- Reduction in supersonic performance from Mach
1.6 to Mach 1.2 (attainable only a t high
altitudes).
Low-level supersonic "dashw capability will
be abandoned.

-- Changes in the engine nacelles to reduce radar
cross section.

-- Redesign of the weapons bay to include a movable
forward bulkhead for a larger number of ordnance
(and fuel) loading options, including cruise
missiles.

-- Provisions for external stores (fuel or weapons)
under the fuselage.

-- Use of the new offensive avionics syst.em being
installed in B-52s.

-- Improvements in defensive avionics capabilities
(ECM)

.

The resulting aircraft, powered by four General Electric FlOl engines,
could take off weighing as much as 477,000 l b ,
(compared to 395,000 lb
previously) with a maximum ordnance load of 38 nuclear gravity bombs and
SRAMs or, in later years, 3 0 cruise missiles.
The maximum
range a t that
payload has not been publicized, but Air Force spokesmen claim that in
unrefueled operational flight profiles, the B-1 variant could out-distance a
B-52 H by a couple of percentage points.
Rockwell International adds that,
without refueling, the LRCA should be able t o perform the strategic mission
that the original B-1 could accomplish with one refueling.
Schedule
Air Force Systems Division has issued a n estimate of the B-1 variant's
By adjusting that
availability, based on a go-ahead around July 1 , 1981.
starting date to Nov. 1 , the first delivery would be made in June 1985 and
the last delivery in October 1988; IOC would occur in December 1986.
I n B u s t r y q s estimates tend to be more optimistic than the Air Force's, because
of different assumptions about the work force's learning curve.
Costs
Procurement costs for B-1 derivative aircraft depend on the variant
chosen; accordingly, reports of findings by the Bomber Study Group a s high a s
$24.6 billion contrast with the initial Air Force estimate of $19.7
billion
(in FY81 terms).
Based on current Administration projections of inflation
over the years of a LRCA procurement program, the "baseline9' cost goal of
$20.5 billion will actually amount to $27.9 billion by the time of program
completion.
Critics of the B-1 proposal argue that even an equivalent projection based
on more realistic inflation factors would still underestimate the total cost
of LRCA aquisition. While Air Force spokesmen insist their estimates are
firm, especially with the prospect of multi-year contracting for much of the
program, doubters point to the absence of contracts a t present, and note that
the baseline cost estimate excludes likely expenses for a simulator program
($300 million), a second inertial guidance system
($220 million),
or a
"permissive action Pink" to provide for disarming nuclear weapons a s a safety
measure ($50 million).
In October, the Air Force's $19.7 billion target was
revised to $20.5
billion in FY81
terms,
reflecting
primarily
the
Administration's decision t o proceed a t the outset with provisions for cruise
missile carriage, both internally and externally.
The
$800
million
difference also includes a new radio system. Some other costs for complete
cruise missile integration may be expected a t the
time
operational
C O n V e r s i O n ~ of LRCAs are actually made (in the 1990s); but in FY82 terms, the
program to acquire the 100 aircraft with a n IOC of late 1986 i s estimated to
cost $22 billion.
A draft GAO critique of the B-1 estimates, reported in the Washington Post
(Oct. 29, 1981), found false economies in the omission of likely program
expenses; one example was the requirement to match planned avionics systems
t o new Air Force specifications, perhaps costing an added $86 million, and
The Air Force and DOD
delaying the schedule of production by 6 t o 1 2 months.
had not been given their customary opportunity to review or comment on the

A CBO estimate, based on their inflation figures and the assumptions
draft.
of the GAO study, projected a "then-year" cost of almost $40 billion.
The opportunity for the U.S. to redeem much of the $5 to $6 billion in
research and development costs already invested in the original B-1 program,
and for industries to regain work that was lost a s a result of the 1977
decision, has remained an important consideration, economically as well a s
politically, in support for the B-1.
Affordability of the "Two-Bomber" Program
Among those committed to deploying a new bomber, the greatest concern with
the B-1 has been expressed by William Perry: "Spending billions on the B-1
Although outlays in the current
would rule out a Stealth follow-on."
five-year plan would be higher in the case of a two-bomber ( B - ~ / A T B ) program
than for an all-Stealth program, the few cost estimates for total program
costs have been in the same broad range both for 250 ATBs and for a mix of
B-1s and ATBs totalling the same number. Thus, the case has not been made
for the argument that the two-bomber approach per se is more costly. Rather,
the primary argument i s that sufficient funding will not be provided over the
period needed to complete a $40-$60 billion program, regardless of what kind.
The bomber's ultimate share of defense resources, in other words, i s expected
to be considerably less, but with different consequences for the two
approaches: An all-ATB program would be slowed or reduced somewhat; in the
case of a two-bomber program, however, the near-term B-1 would be deployed,
and the longer-term ATB might not.
Stealth proponents decry that prospect,
insisting that an ATB can be available soon enough to alleviate the need for
another aircraft, and that a B-1 could not
satisfy
the
long-term
requirements.
Early in the 97th Congress, prospects for a "two-bomber" approach were
enhanced by perceptions that new support for defense spending would make such
a choice politically more attractive than in the past.
The durability of
that support is coming into question, however; a n d , a s defense spending
levels are held short of the Administration's
initial projections, the
two-bomber approach may prove particularly vulnerable to future budget cuts.
Strategic initiatives for a new bomber and the MX were specifically insulated
FY82
from the $2 billion in defense cuts made during the Administration's
budget revisions in October, however.
Once the B-1 program has started, cuts could not easily be made there,
especially since that could appear to duplicate the Carter Administration's
controversial decision in 1977.
Thus, for
Stealth
proponents,
the
significance of the President's choice, while endorsing the goal of a n ATB,
i s that the Stealth program has been placed a t some greater risk, since i t
becomes hostage to the fortunes of the Reagan economic program a s a whole and
the level of Support for defense spending.
Defense officials concede, in any
event, that funding for the development of a n ATB will be less now than if
the decision had been made to proceed directly with a Stealth bomber.

Replacing B-52s Directly With a Stealth Penetrator
On Aug. 22, 1980, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown revealed that
the United States had been developing so-called "Stealthw technology
"which
alters the military balance significantly."
It is widely believed that only

an ATB with Stealth technology could penetrate Soviet air defenses throughout
the 1990s and possibly for sometime thereafter.
Some even argue that Soviet
defenses have already incorporated advances that responded specifically to
the prospect of a B-1 threat. Consequently, Stealth supporters argue that
the B-52 should be replaced with nothing short of an ATB.
Illustrative plans
for an all-ATB replacement program envision about 250 new aircraft.
Since ATB proponents see a multi-role B-1 as the primary threat to early
Stealth deployment, they argue that perceptions of the B-1 inevitably have
been tainted by its previous cancellation, and that selection now of a
previous "losern would not serve the goals of the Congress or the new
Administration.
Proponents argue that H model B-52s will retain sufficient
penetrating capability over the time of transition, and that ALCMs should be
fully deployed by 1990, while MX deployment will have strengthened the ICBM
force, thus compensating for a reduced number of penetrating
bombers during
the ATB building period.
A particularly strong argument in closing weeks of the debate was the
assertion -- a t one point supported by Secretary Weinberger, but then
that B-1s would fail a s penetrators by 1990.
retracted

--

Stealth technologies combine aircraft design features and defensive
countermeasures t o reduce the radar reflection (radar cross section or RCS)
and mask energy emissions of aircraft, thus improving their abilities to
elude Soviet defenses.
Innovations for this purpose reported in the past
have involved reducing the weight of the aircraft, and the size of the tail
section in particular, using non-metallic
and radar absorbing materials,
keeping flat or angular surfaces and "resonantw cavities to a minimum,
limiting the number of engines, modifying the shape and placement of engine
air intakes, reducing engine exhaust temperatures, and treating fuels to
reduce infrared emissions in the spectral bands used by Soviet detectors.
Since Secretary Brown's announcement, however, little has been said about the
program in open sources to identify the specifics of current Stealth research
and development.
Schedule
Because of uncertainties about how far Stealth technology has evolved and
how much it will cost in application t o a bomber, a deployment schedule for
an ATB cannot be specified. These unknowns form a part of the debate over
options for replacing the B-52s.
General Ellis, former SAC Commander,
estimated that a prototype ATB could be flown in 1985 and a n IOC, achieved by
1990. This prediction appears to rest on fully funding a one-bomber
program
for an ATB, however.
The views of former Undersecretary of Defense
for
Research
and
Engineering, William Perry, reflect the difficulties in judging the potential
of Stealth:
he testified last year that he has "unbounded confidencen in
Stealth technology, but that "it has not yet reached a state of maturity
for
application to bombers in the near future."
Nevertheless, testifying this
year, he stated his opposition to an interim program, based on his estimate
that production of a Stealth aircraft could begin as early a s 1988. The Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board has concluded that 1992 would be the earliest
possible IOC for a n ATB.
Even if the early projections of Stealth availability are not realized,
the need for an interim penetrator is not accepted by hold-outs for a n ATB.

They argue that H model B-52s will retain sufficient penetrating capability
over the time of transition, and that ALCMs should be fully deployed by 1990,
while MX deployment will have strengthened the ICBM force, thus compensating
for a reduced number of penetrating bombers during the ATB building period.
It is widely assumed that the ATB would
serve solely a s a penetrator,
since its size and design would be optimized for that mission.
If an all-ATB
program were chosen on that basis, some other aircraft would be needed to
replace cruise missile-carrying B-52s.
On the other hand, if plans exist to
adapt the Stealth bomber for Cruise missile carriage, that would alleviate
the requirement not only for a follow-on cruise missile platform for the long
term, but also for the LRCA a s a cruise missile carrier in the 1990s.
costs
The Northrop Corporation has been chosen a s the prime contractor to
develop a Stealth bomber, but until a definite aircraft design can be
evaluated, cost estimates for an ATB will have limited reliability.
Also, in
weighing cost estimates, the distinction must be made between an all-ATB
replacement program (about 250 aircraft) and a wfollow-onw program to produce
100 to 150 Stealth bombers after LRCA have been acquired.
In the case of an
all-ATB approach, the Stealth program would be directed toward the earliest
achievable IOC, and some argue that R&D
costs would be minimized
if the
program were fully funded on that basis.
An added drawback to the smaller
program, some point out, i s that the price per aircraft would be higher,
since R & D costs would be recouped over a lesser number of aircraft.
Regardless of whether a n all-ATB program a follow-on program were chosen,
there will probably be little difference in outlays for Stealth during the
next five years, since procurement cannot begin in any event until the
Accordingly, the cost difference between
necessary R&D has been completed.
(FYDP)
is
the two over the period of the current Five-Year Defense Plan
essentially the amount of the B-1 program.
Estimates reported t o date for a program of 250 ATB range from $41 billion
to $56 billion.
Estimates for the Stealth portion of a two-bomber program
range from $22 billion to $35 billion.
By adding the cost of the B-1 program
to the latter set of figures, rough estimates thus suggest a n equivalent cost
over the acquisition of either an all-ATB program or a two-bomber
program.
On that basis, the primary cost advantage of a n all-stealth program i s that
i t defers the major expenditures for bomber modernization for several years.
This may also represent a vulverability, however, in that the program could
be affected by intervening changes before production finally begins.
Finally, some Stealth proponents argue that an all-ATB program would cost
less than a mix o f B-1s and Stealth totalling the same number; this implies
that Stealth bombers per unit may cost less than B-1s.
Cost estimates have
not yet been published to substantiate that claim; and at this point, they
would be viewed with skepticism anyway.
In addition, i t i s not clear that
B-1s and ATBs should be treated as equivalent capabilities, one for one.
Thus, the primary cost argument in favor of the Stealth bomber
remains the
claim that B-1s can be dispensed with.
The Air Force counters that claim by its estimates that i t would cost less
to buy B-1s in the interim than to modernize the B-52s
and FB-111s
a
sufficiently to continue relying on them.
The specifics of such
modification program have not been discussed; but even excluding normal
operations and maintenance expenses, extending the life of B-52s and today's
FB-111s a s strategic penetrators reportedly could cost $20 to $28 billion.

It is unclear how much of that expense, if any, would be incurred anyway
modifying the B-52s for cruise missile carriage in the 1980s and 1990s.

in

The Evolving Role of the Bomber
Preferences in how to modernize the bomber force follow from assumptions
about the future role of bombers and about how the candidate aircraft will
serve those roles. To date, the Stealth bomber has been discussed almost
exclusively a s a strategic penetrator.
The LRCA by contrast, has been
justified largely in terms of its capacity for collateral a s well as
strategic missions.
There is concern that an aircraft chosen on that basis
with the
may not serve in the strategic role -- or i n any single role
greatest effectiveness. Conceptually, the B-1 LRCA is said to be suited to
the following conventional or tactical nuclear missions; others may be added:

--

(1) Counter-intervention force in western Europe,
supplementing other strike forces;
(2) power projection and counter-intervention
force in Southwest Asia;
( 3 ) mining operations to protect the sea lines of
communication;

(4) maritime support in the form of anti-surface
ship operations;

(5) fleet air defense, using air-to-air missiles
against Soviet naval Backfire bombers.
The list of collateral missions for Which the LRCA might prove useful,
although arguably essential, was capped by retiring Air Force General Alton
Slay, when he added, "dropping hay to stranded yaks in Katmandu."
For many, past events in the Persian Gulf region have underlined the need
for the United States to have a power projection capability that can be
brought to bear world-wide.
While long-range bombers may offer a unique
combination of range and payload needed for some cases, existing naval and
amphibious forces, sea-based aviation, or land-based tactical air forces may
adequately meet the needs of other non-strategic circumstances.
Although Congress has endorsed the need for a new bomber with a
penetrating capability, some continue to regard the manned bomber a s an
obsolescent weapon system. Accordingly, they are opposed even t o an ATB,
arguing that resources will be better spent on more cost-effective cruise
missiles and future unmanned delivery vehicles.
They note that Stealth is
equally applicable to those systems, and could be used more effectively with
ALCMs.
Former CIA Director Turner has expressed the view that manned
aircraft in general will be overtaken not just by Soviet defenses, but by the
march of technology on all sides.
In his view, the United States will not
have the chance to receive back the deterrent value of its investment in any
new bomber.
Ultimately, improvements in air defenses may force a decline in the use of
costly aircraft against strategic targets.
Part of the five-point
strategic
program announced by President Reagan along with bomber modernization was the
plan to deploy nuclear cruise missiles aboard U.S.
attack submarines.
The

development of long-range sea-based cruise missiles for use against targets
ashore could soon overtake many advantages now perceived in manned aircraft,
including bombers.

BOMBER COMPARISONS
B-52

B-1B

Stealth

350

132-250
1990s
2000+
N/A
N/A

Actual or planned inventory
IOC as penetrator
End of use a s penetrator
IOC as cruise missile platform
End of use a s ALCM platform

1990
1982
2000

100
1986
1995
1995
2000+

Procurement/modernization
program costs
( $ billions, FY 81)

20-28

20.5-22

-

Maximum loading per aircraft
Nuclear gravity bombs/SRAMs
12
20
ALCMs
Conventional bombs
27/108

38
22/30
128

Radar cross section (sq m)
Penetration speed (Mach)
Primary ECM system

1
.85
ALQ-161

90-100
.55
ALQ-122

22-35/
41-56
?

N/A
N/A
?
?
?

Note:
All candidate aircraft must meet SAC specifications for
dispersability to multiple airfields, safe escape time on
notice of attack, and protection ("hardness") against the
secondary effects of nuclear explosions, including
electromagnetic pulse (EMP)

.

LEGISLATION
P.L. 97-86, S. 8 1 5
Department of Defense Authorization Bill, 1982. Both bills provide $302
million for LRCA RDT&EI as requested by the Administration, and $1942 million
for procurement, also a s requested.
The Senate version includes $179 million
requested for procurement of spares; the House version does not.
Therefore,
H.R. 3519 approves $2.244 billion; S. 815 approves $2.423 billion
for LRCA.
The House version, reported by the Armed Services Committee on May 1 5 , 1981
(H.Rept. 97-71), approves procurement funding based on the choice of a B-1
LRCA, with the provision that the obligation of funds for a n advanced
technology bomber instead, if recommended in the national interest by
President Reagan, would require affirmative action by both houses within 60
days of that recommendation.
The Committee Report recommends a supersonic
B-1 with minimal changes to the original program.
The Senate version,
reported by the Armed Services Committee on May 6 , 1981 (S.Rept. 97-58), and

passed by a vote of 9 2 to 1 on May 1 4 , does not specify an alternative, but
makes the obligation of funds contingent upon a recommendation by the
President, and open to re solutions of disapproval in both Houses of Congress.
S. 815 passed the House, amended, July 1 6 , in lieu of H.R. 3519. Conferences
held.
Agreement by House and Senate conferees were announced Oct. 3 0 , 1981.
The conference report (H. Rept. 97-311), dated Nov. 3, 1981, recommends $2.1
billion in authorizations for development and procurement of the Long Range
Combat Aircraft in FY82. Authorizations will be available for obligation to
the B-1 bomber beginning Nov. 1 8 , 1981. The Senate agreed to the conference
report Nov. 5 ; the House agreed Nov. 17.
The bill was presented
to the
President Nov. 1 9 , and si.gned into law on Dec. 1 , 1981 (P.L. 97-86).
P.L. 97-114, H.R. 4995
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1982.
As reported by the
Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 97-933) on Nov.
1 6 , and subsequently
passed on Nov. 1 8 , 1981, $2,092.9 million is recommended for the LRCA
program, including $1,574 million for procurement, $227 million for advance
The total is about $330 million
procurement, and $291.9 million for RDT&E.
less than requested by the Administration; comparison with the Administration
request is complicated, however, by the Oct. 2 revision to the March 1981
budget request.
In both requests, funding for the LRCA totalled $2.423
billion; the Oct. 2 revision, however, redistributed that amount among the
Several activities:
procurement was increased slightly,
and
advance
procurement was increased slightly.
The request for initial spares
(which
had been deleted entirely i n the House version of the Defense authorization
bill) was reduced from $179 million to $51 million; the difference was then
made up in the requested increase to RDT&E from $302 million to $471 million.
(See chart below).
The House committee reported the bill with
cuts in
procurement spending and initial spares to match authorized levels that were
agreed to in conference after the Administration's revisions had been
submitted. On its own initiative, the committee also cut $179.1 million from
the revised RDT&E request, explaining that the amount was found to be
unobligated from FY81.
Appropriations to modernize B-52 aircraft were
increased over requested levels to a recommended $500.5 million.
About $62
~
million of the $162.1 million increase is directed for D-model B - 5 2 ~ which
the Administration has scheduled for early retirement.
In disagreeing with
that part of the President's strategic program, the Appropriations Committee
added about $18 million in Operations and Maintenance funds a s well, to keep
B-52Ds flying in FY82.
The House passed the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill
on Nov. 1 8 , 1981, having first rejected amendments to delete funding for B-1
production and to revive the FB-111B/C
alternative for the LRCA program.
Conferences held.
Conference report was filed Dec. 1 5 , 1981 and passed
in
both Houses, 334-84, and 93-4, respectively.
House-passed
level
($2092.9
million total, including $1,801 million f o r procurement and $291.9 million
for RDT&E); and adoption of Senate-passed language (Nunn amendment) intended
to facilitate congressional monitoring of B-1 costs.
T h e bill was signed
into law (P.L. 97-114) on Dec. 29, 1981.
S. 1857 (Hatfield)
Department of Defense Appropriation
Bill, 1982.
As
Committee on Appropriations (S.Rept. 9 7-273) on Nov.
17,
passed on Dec. 4 , 1981, $2,439 million is recommended for th
including $1,724.2 million for procur ement, $233.8
milli
The total reflects
procurement, and $471 million for RDT&E
By disa
procurement funding in anticipation of cost growth.
spare parts, however, the Senate recomm endation exceeds the
request (discussed above for H.R. 4995) by only $16 million.

.

eported by the
nd sub sequently
LRCA program ,
n for advanced
a 3% a.dd-on to
lowing money for
Administ r a t i o n ' s
The Committee

recommended about $350 million more for LRCA than the House
reported the previous day. The Senate bill, as reported out
made no change to the Administration's request for B-52
including provisions for the early retirement of D-model
funding for Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), however, was
the $69 million requested t o $104 million.

Committee had
of Committee,
modernization,
B-52s.
RDT&E
increased from

During extensive floor debate on the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill, the
Senate adopted several amendments of significance for strategic bomber
modernization.
The first (offered by Mr. Nunn)
requires the President to
certify the costs of 100 B-1B aircraft before procurement funds will be made
available, and further requires quarterly DOD program
cost estimates to
include the LRCA program, based strictly on production of 1 0 0 aircraft.
The
second
(offered by Mr. Jackson) prohibits
the diversion of funds a s
appropriated for the advanced technology
bomber program, whose level of
funding remains classified.
A third (offered by Mr. Levin) adds $62 million
for continued modernization of D-model B-52s, consistent with House-passed
provisions. All were adopted by voice vote.
The Senate rejected several
amendments related to bomber programs:
Mr. Hollings, to delete B-1 funding
and increase funding accordingly for selected readiness-related
items
(28-66); Mr. Proxmire, to eliminate a 3% cost growth allowance for the B-1
and MX programs (46-47); Mr. Levin, to restore $220 million for 4 KC-1OA
aerial refueling tankers, cut in October budget revisions from 8 (38-55); and
Mr. R. Byrd, t o increase funding for Stealth RDT&E by $250 million
(tabled,
51-40).
The last two amendments, offered Dec. 1 , 1981, were characterized by
the Republican leadership a s efforts in a Democratic strategy to pre-empt
funding for the B-1.
The Senate version was passed on Dec.
4 , 1981, 84-5.
(S. 1857 was
indefinitely postponed on Dec. 8 , 1981.)
Conferees were appointed, and H.R.
4995 was passed on Dec. 15, 1981 (see above).

Procurement

Advance
Procurement

Initial
Spares RDT&E

1632

310

179

302

2423

House Authorization

1632

310

0

302

2244

Senate Authorization

1632

310

179

302

2423

Reagan Revisions (OCT)

1674

227

51

471

2423

Authorization Conference

1574

227

0

302

2103

Total

Carter Request
Reagan Request

(March)

House Appropriation

1574

Senate Appropriation

1724.2

Appropriation Conference

1574

[see Defense Budget

-- FY83 for further legislation.]

HEARINGS
U.S.

Congress.
House. Committee on Appropriations.
Department
of Defense appropriations for 1982. Hearings, 97th Congress,
1st session.
Part 6. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981.
p. 1081-1135.

U.S.

Congress. House.
Committee on Appropriations.
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense. Department of Defense
appropriations for FY82. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session.
Part 2. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981.
p. 138-144, 1 4 7 , 256-260, 266-219.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1982. Congressional
record [daily ed.] Nov. 1 8 , 1981: H8462-H8501; Dec. 1 , 1981:
S14158-S14175; Dec. 3 , 1981: S14357;S14359;, S14370-S14444,
S14450-S14453; Dec. 4 , 1981: S94499-S14514.
Department of Defense Authorization, 1981. Congressional record
[daily ed.], July 1 , 1980:
S9097-9104, S9107-9121.
U.S.

Congress.
House.
Conference Committee, 1981. Department
of Defense Authorization Act, 1982; report to accompany
S. 815.
Nov. 3 , 1981.
(97th Congress, 1st session) Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 135 p.

U.S.

Congress.
House. Conference committee, 1981: Department of
Defense Appropriations, 1982; conference report on H.R. 4995.
Dec. 1 5 , 1981.
(97th Congress, 1st session) Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1981.

U.S.

Congress.
House. Committee on Appropria,tions. Department
of Defense appropriation bill, 1982; report to accompany
H.R. 4995. Nov. 1 6 , 1981.
(97th Congress, 1st session)
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 315 p.

U.S.

Congress.
House. Committee on Armed
Services.
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982;
report to accompany H.R. 3519.
May 1 9 , 1981.
(97th
Congress, 1st session) Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1981.
228 P.

U.S.

Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Appropriations.
Department
of Defense appropriation bill, 1982; report to accompany
S. 1857. Nov. 1 7 , 1981.
(97th Congress, 1st session)
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 137 p.

U.S.

Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Armed Services.
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1982; report to accompany S. 815. May 6,
1981.
(97th Congress, 1st session) Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 1 9 7 p.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
01/25/82

-- Pursuant to P.L. 97-114, the FY82 Department of
Defense Appropriation Act, President Reagan
transmitted to Congress his certification of B-1
cost estimates (H.Doc. no. 97-127), stating that
acquisition of 100 B-1B aircraft i s feasible within
the $20.5 billion budget estimate by 1986. This
appears to correspond t o the Department of Defense
cost estimate in terms of FY81 constant dollars.

12/15/81

-- The conference report (H.Rept. 97-410) for Department of
Defense Appropriations, 1982 (H.R. 4995) was submitted and
passed in both Houses, providing LRCA funding of $2092.9
million.
According to a provision introduced in the Senate
version (an amendment by Mr. Nunn) and retained i n the final
bill, funds for B-1 procurement will not be made available
until the President certifies t o Congress the costs of the 1 0 0
B-1 aircraft.
To facilitate congressional monitoring of the
LRCA program, the Department of Defense is also required to
include B-1 cost estimates i n its quarterly reports to
Congress.
The bill provides that such reports must be
based on 1 0 0 aircraft, reflecting congressional concern
that the size of the program might later be cut if overly
optimistic cost goals were accepted now and enforced.

12/04/81

-- The Senate passed the 1 9 8 2 Defense Appropriation Bill (H.R.
4995), 84-5, after adopting a n amendment by Mr. Levin,
consistent with a House-passed provision, to add $62 million
for continued modernization of D-model B-52s, which the
Administration proposed to retire.
(The bill already
contained $18 million t o continue B-52D operations.)

12/03/81

-- Senate consideration of the 1 9 8 2 Defense Appropriation Bill
(H.R. 4995) was dominated on this date by debate over the
Administration's request for 1 0 0 B-1B aircraft.
Mr. Hollings'
proposed amendment to delete all B-1B funding and add
accordingly to other programs was defeated, 28-66.
The
Senate rejected a n amendment by Mr. Proxmire t o eliminate
a 3% cost growth allowance for the B-1 and MX programs,
46-47.
An amendment by Mr. Nunn, requiring the President
to certify B-1 costs now, and requiring quarterly DOD cost
estimates for the LRCA program of 1 0 0 B-ls, was passed
by voice vote.
Also passed by voice vote was a n amendment
by Mr. Jackson prohibiting the diversion of funds a s
appropriated for the advanced technology bomber.

12/01/81

-- During consideration of the 1982 Defense Appropriation
Bill (H.R. 4995), the Senate rejected two amendments
characterized by the Republican leadership as preliminary
moves to delete B-1 funding: Mr. Levin proposed to add
4 KC-1OA refueling tankers, restoring the Adminstrationls
October cut from 8 to 4 such tankers; Mr. R. Byrd proposed
an increase to Stealth RDT&E of $250 million.
Both were
understood to require offsetting reductions elsewhere in
the legislation, as opposed to lladd-ons.ll (The overall
level of funding for Stealth-related programs remains
classified.)

-- The President signed into law the 1982 Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations Act, P.L 97-86.
11/18/81

-- The House passed the FY82 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act (H.R. 4995) after rejecting
(142-263) an amendment by Mr. Addabbo to delete
funding for B-1 production, and rejecting (99-307)
an amendment by Mr. Murtha which would have had the
effect of substituting the FB-111B/C for the LRCA
program.
The bill passed by the House provides about
$12 billion less in new obligational authority than
the bill reported by the Senate Appropriations
Committee (S. 1857).

11/17/81

-- T h e Senate Committee on Appropriations voted 21-7
to recommend the FY82 Defense appropriations bill
(S. 1857), containing about $2.4 billion in funding
for the LRCA program, including about $2 billion for
production of B-1 aircraft and over $400 million for
research and development (S.Rept. 97-273).
Unlike
the House, the Senate Committee recommended the full
amount requested for RDT&E (raised in October
revisions to $471 million).
In addition, the Senate
Committee applied a 3% cost growth allowance t o raise
procurement funds slightly over requested levels.
Consequently, the Senate version provides about $350
million more for LRCA than the House bill (H.R. 4995).

11/16/81

-- The House Committee on Appropriations reported the
FY82 Defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4995),
containing about $2.1 billion in funding for the
LRCA program:
about $1.8 billion for production
of B-1B aircraft, and $300 million for research
In a departure from
and development (H.Rept. 97-933).
the President's strategic program, the Appropriations
Committee disapproved early retirement of D-model
B-52s, and restored about $60 million for their
continued modernization, a s well a s $19 million for
operations and maintenance in FY82. Total funding
for modernization of all B-52s was increased over the
Administration's request by $162 million, amounting
to about $500 million.

11/05/81

-- A resolution disapproving the President's announced
decision to build B-1 aircraft for the LRCA program,

S.Res.
10/30/81

240, was introduced by Sen. Levin.

-- The results of the conference on the FY82 Defense
Authorization bill (S. 815) were announced by
Senator Tower.
Conferees had agreed to LRCA funding
for F Y 8 2 in the amount of $2.1 billion, representing
cuts of $320 million in RDT&E, initial spares, and
procurement.
According to language adopted by the
conference, money authorized for LRCA will be
available for obligation to the B-1 bomber
beginning Nov. 1 8 , 1981, unless both Houses have
agreed t o resolutions of disapproval over LRCA
before that date.

10/29/81

-- In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Burke explained that the
Air Force's official estimate of $19.7 billion for
LRCA acquisition costs did not include full cruise
missile integration. The Administration's decision to
provide from the outset for internal and external
cruise missile carriage (and to include a new
new radio system) resulted in the revised estimate of
$20.5 billion (FY81 dollars) or $22 billion (FY82 dollars),
according to General Burke.

-- T h e Washington Post reported findings of a draft GAO
report that false economies may have been made t o
substantiate initially low estimates of LRCA
acquisition costs.
The Post article reports that
expenses added later could include $220 million for
a second inertial navigation system, $50 million
for a Classified "nuclear feature," presumed to be a
safety device for disarming weapons, and $65 million
t o match planned avionics systems with new Air Force
specifications. The draft GAO report, not yet
circulated to DOD for comments a s customary, maintains
that "questionable reductionsn were made to lower the
basic cost goal from $22 billion (in FY81 dollars).
10/28/81

-- By a vote of 7 t o 5 , the Defense Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations agreed to recommend
appropriations i n FY82 for the LRCA program as requested
by the Administration.
The Defense Authorization Bill,
a s passed by the two Houses, was still being considered
in conference as of this date, with some differences over
strategic programs reported.

10/26/81

-- As the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense
began its consideration of the FY82 Defense Appropriations
Bill, Subcommittee Chairman Addabbo proposed elimination
of the B-1 program a s part of a n $11.2 billion reduction
from spending levels requested by the Administration.

10/16/81

-- T h e Air Force announced, without further comment, that
Northrop has been selected a s the prime contractor "to
proceed with initial research and development on
advanced bomber concepts."

10/12/81

-- Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reported that
a Stealth bomber, as developed by Northrop, is
scheduled to fly for the first time in late 1984.
The advanced technology bomber program will cost
$21.9 billion, according to this report.

10/02/81

-- As part of a 5-point program to revitalize U.S.
strategic deterrent posture, President Reagan announced
his decision to build 100 long-range combat aircraft
(LRCA), based on the B-1 bomber, while continuing
the planned deployment of air-launched cruise
missiles on B-52s.
President Reagan pledged
to pursue development as well of an Advanced
Technology Bomber (ATB) "for the 1990s."

07/16/81

-- The House passed S. 815, the FY82 Defense Authorization
bill, in lieu of H.R. 3519.
The bill, a s amended,
incorporates the same provisions with respect to the
funding of strategic bomber programs as reported by the
Armed Services Committee.

07/09/81

-- In considering the FY82 Defense Authorization bill
(H.R. 3519), the House rejected two amendments
that would have weakened the Armed Services Committee's
pro-B-1 language. The first amendment, by Fowler
(153-254), sought to remove restrictions on bomber funding
The second amendment,
that specify the choice of B-1s.
by Harkin, would have adopted Senate language on
congressional approval or disapproval of the President's
choice.

05/21/81

-- Secretary of the Air Force Orr formally recommended to
Secretary of Defense Weinberger the procurement of 100
B-1 variants (estimated a t $19.7 billion), to be followed
by 110 Stealth bombers (estimated a t $30 billion).

05/14/81

-- By a vote of 9 2 to 1 , the Senate passed its
version of the FY82 DOD Authorization Bill
(S. 815), providing $2.4 billion for development
and procurement of a LRCA yet to be specified.
The measure includes the provision for
disapproving the President's choice by a majority
vote in both houses.

05/06/81

-- The House Armed Services Committee approved the
FY82 DOD Authorization Bill (H.R. 2970) after
adopting an amendment that specifies a B-1
derivative for LRCA development ($302 million)
and procurement ($1.9 billion) and affirms an IOC
not later than July 1 , 1987.
If the President
declares procurement of a n advanced technology
bomber instead to be in the greater national
interest, the obligation of funds requires
congressional approval within 60 days of that
recommendation.

04/28/81

-- In approving the FY82 DOD Authorization Bill

(s. 815), the Senate Armed Services Committee

provided $1.9 billion for procurement and $302
million for development of LRCA. Obligation of
funds for procurement was made contingent upon the
President's recommendation to Congress concerning
the aircraft selected.
In addition the bill
provides that, if both Houses pass resolutions of
disapproval, the obligation of funds for buying
LRCA a s recommended by the President would be
blocked.
04/07/81

-- The Armed Services Committees received a status
report on selection of a new manned bomber from
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, pending a full
recommendation from the Secretary of Defense,
originally due March 15.
In addition to assessing
the capabilities of the three main candidates, i t
reviews the rationale for a new bomber.
AF Gen.
Burke cited low confidence in contractorsf cost
figures a s a reason for the delay.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES
Boeing B-52.
D M S market intelligence report, military
aircraft, July 1980. p. 1-6.
Burke, Kelly H., Lt. Gen., USAF.
Future of the manned
bomber.
Aerospace, Spring 1980: 3-4.
Carroll, Robert.
Facing the manned bomber dilemma.
electronics, May 1981: 100-104.

Defense

Cockburn, Andrew.
Cruise: the missile that does not work.
statesman, Aug. 22, 1980: 10-11.

New

Corddry, Charles W.
Defense officials are considering
replacing B-52s With 2 aircraft.
Baltimore sun,
Nov. 18, 1980: 1.

-----

Sub, missile uncertainties giving boost to B-1 bomber.
Baltimore sun, Nov. 28, 1980: 1.

Harvey, David S.
Bomber: flying with S A C 1 s 20-year-old deterrent.
Defense and foreign affairs, Paris a i r show edition, 1981:
9-13, 42-43.
Lambert, Mark.

Why the manned bomber?

Interavia, April 1981: 297-301.

Edsall, Thomas B.
Bomber question looms a s major weapons
issue of Reagan term. Baltimore sun, Nov. 1 8 , 1980:
1F-2F.
General Dynamics F-111.
DMS market intelligence report,
military aircraft, June 1980. p. 1-5.
Gen. Ellis makes case for "two-bomber program."
daily, Feb. 1 9 , 1981: 250-251.

Aerospace

McCarthy, Mary.
The manned bomber:
a mystique in search of a mission.
In the Pentagon watchers, Leonard S. Rodberg and Devek Shearer,
eds.
New York, Doubleday, 1970:
267-288.
Polmar, Norman, ed.
Strategic Air Command. Annapolis, Nautical and
Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979. 226 p .
Robinson, Clarence A., Jr.
Multipurpose bomber advances.
Aviation week & space technology, Aug. 4 , 1980: 16-18.

-----

-----

USAF recommends new combat aircraft.
space technology, May 1 1 , 1981: 18-20.

Aviation week

Bomber program choices near. Aviation week
technology, June 1 , 1981: 18-22.

&

&

space

DMS market intelligence report,
Rockwell International B - 1 .
military aircraft, October 1980.
p. 1-5.
Stratford P. Sherman. How Rockwell kept the B-1 alive.
Fortune, Nov. 2, 1981:
106-112.
U.S.

Department of Defense.
Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force.
Air Force policy letter for
commanders -- long-range combat aircraft (LRCA).
Feb. 1 , 1981. p. 1.

U.S.

General Accounting Office. Countervailing strategy
force acquisition plans.
Report to the Congress from the
Comptroller General, (MASAD-81-35.
Aug. 5 , 1981. Washington,
1981. 5 4 p .

U.S.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
The B-1 bomber and manned strategic bomber options, by Douglas
Mitchell.
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.
[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ]1981.
Apr. 3 , 1981.
CRS Issue Brief IB80100

---------

-----

B-1 strategic bomber program, by Richard D. Cronin and Michael
J.E. Dixon. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.
Aug. 1 8 , 1980.
[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ]1980.
CRS Issue Brief IB75040
Strategic nuclear delivery systems:
How many? What
combinations? by John M. Collins.
Oct. 7 , 1974.
[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ]1974. 123 p.
CRS Report 74-177F
U.S. strategic nuclear force options, by John M. Collins and
Elizabeth Ann Severns.
[Washington] 1981. Regularly updated.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AIB81107. Public record. Not legal advice.