# Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much? > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3A98-41 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** January 14, 1998 - **Citation:** 98-41 ## Text 98-41 F CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much? January 14, 1998 (name redacted) National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Military Readiness, Operations Tempo and Personnel Tempo: Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much? Summary Are U.S. forces doing too much? Arguably. Although the armed forces of the United States are meeting mission requirements while maintaining an acceptable level of readiness, indications are that under the current strategy, with existing forces postured and organized for high intensity conflict, the sustainment of both high levels of activity and high readiness will be difficult. Whether or not U.S. forces can continue to sustain the current level of effort is an open question. With either the addition of new global commitments, a reduction in available forces, or a decrease in funding, readiness may be in jeopardy. Under different strategies, readiness could be more sustainable but the level of risk to U.S. interests may increase. Reductions in force structure or funding without commensurate reductions in assigned missions may, regardless of the overall strategy, jeopardize readiness and operations. This issue is in a new context for U.S. forces: peacetime operations are larger, longer, more intense, and more complex than ever; the stockpiled capacity of the global-war-based force is diminished; high levels of activity may no longer equate to high readiness; and the force structure has decreased more than the infrastructure. With the size of current commitments larger than anticipated in the Bottom Up Review, workloads on the smaller force are demonstrably higher. U.S. military power designed to react to threats is now more often a proactive tool of foreign policy. Competition for resources between new missions and standing requirements is heightened by open-ended operations and the needs of regional commanders. It is difficult to assess the stress in this new context as measurements of both activity and readiness need improvement; there is no “Opportunity Cost” evaluation; and no clear picture of what constitutes a sustainable level of effort. Understanding the new demands is the first step toward resolution. Measures are OPTEMPO for the rate of unit activity, and PERSTEMPO for the sum of all individual absences and activity. Tempos are too high/low if they are causing forces to lose their capacity to sustain operations and meet crises. Tempos affect the dynamic relationship of budget, readiness, and force structure decisions and bear attention in these areas: readiness, quality of life, modernization, personnel, and retention. The most significant negative impact of tempos that are too high is the reduction in time and resources for relevant, necessary training, the basis of readiness and long-term effectiveness. Over time, the continual wear on personnel and their families may result in difficulties retaining and recruiting high quality volunteers. Areas of congressional action bearing on readiness concern the National Guard and Reserve, military infrastructure, military end-strength, specialized units and equipment, incentives, increased reporting to Congress by DoD, and the option of ending operations that are not moving toward a predefined “Exit.” Oversight areas include validating employment concepts, considering resources for training while deployed, reviewing and setting minimum training time guidelines, prioritization of, and early determination of, exercise requirements, determining the number and duration of required inspections, and ascertaining and allowing appropriate “down time” for units following deployments. Contents Introduction and Major Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Major Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The nature of operations other than war has changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Forces decreased while requirements increased . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 High activity doesn’t always equal high readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Reductions not commensurate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Current operations are larger and more extensive than expected . . . . . 2 Smaller forces and increased commitments equal higher workloads . . 3 Causes of high levels of military activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Useful assessments of readiness and stress needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Impacts and implications are significant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Modernization Issues are Dynamic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Force Structure: Dangers and dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Quadrennial Defense Review debate may help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Background and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 One Force, Two Strategies: The QDR and Greater Demand . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A peacetime Major Regional Contingency equivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Capacity vs Commitments: A dynamic relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Measuring Commitments and Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Measuring OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Why measure OPTEMPO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Why measure PERSTEMPO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 No single standard for PERSTEMPO exists within DoD . . . . . . . . . 18 Comparing Navy and Air Force approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Navy PERSTEMPO Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Air Force PERSTEMPO Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Measuring Readiness in OPTEMPO Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 NO “Opportunity Cost” evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 PERSTEMPO measures cannot drive unit deployment decisions . . . 24 Readiness and OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Unit Indicators of High Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A New Readiness Paradigm Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Counting Capability: The Best Way to Assess Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 What can we do with the forces we have available? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 What part of our capability is not currently available? . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Battalions, squadrons, and ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Estimating time and effort to extricate and redeploy as C-1 . . . . . . . 29 Why OPTEMPO Is High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Overseas presence down = fewer forces for more tasks . . . . . . . . . . 29 The changing nature of military operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Why High Optempo Is a Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Congressional understanding key to successful innovation . . . . . . . . 36 Maintaining a Viable Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Continuity in Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Bottom Line: Sustaining a high operational tempo difficult . . . . . . . 42 Value of Monitoring OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO and the QDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Current Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 A Conceptual Framework: Decreasing Size vs Increasing Workload . . . . 44 Smaller forces, increased commitments equal higher workloads . . . . 44 What is the percentage of troops involved in current operations? . . . 47 Korea: Compounding the PERSTEMPO problem for individuals . . . 48 An example: What it takes to keep within tolerable limits . . . . . . . . . 48 “It’s NOT war” — Home Station Hurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Trends in retention and reenlistments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Pentagon Efforts: Protecting long-term military effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . 51 An example: Air Force Global Sourcing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 What Do the Facts Mean? Understanding the Implications . . . . . . . . . . . 54 At the individual level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 At the unit level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 At the service level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 At the DoD level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Future Trends in OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Overview: Areas of Congressional Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Understanding the new dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Budget Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Direct and Indirect Affects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Direct Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Indirect Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Summary: Budget, Readiness, Force Structure affect OPTEMPO . . 61 Readiness Implications: “Ready for what?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Prepare, Deploy, Recover — Paying for the cycle with readiness . . . 63 Intangibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Tangibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Summary: Readiness is pervasive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Force Structure Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 The dangers and options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Summary: Maintaining sustainable OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO . . . . . 66 Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Options for Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 National Guard and Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Infrastructure and End-Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Expand and Increase Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Reporting “capacity” in a high OPTEMPO environment . . . . . . . . . . 69 Supplemental Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Congressional Action to End Ongoing Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Some key questions regarding ongoing operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Oversight Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Validating employment concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 “Cop on the Beat” force employment option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Increasing resources for training while deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Reviewing and setting minimum training time guidelines . . . . . . . . . . 73 Congressional action to protect the training base of U.S. forces . . . . 73 Prioritization of exercise requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Reducing the number and duration of required inspections . . . . . . . . 74 Providing “down time” to units following deployments . . . . . . . . . . . 74 For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 List of Figures Figure 1.“Conflict Dynamics” as published in the Bottom Up Review . . . . . . . 12 Figure 2. “Conflict Dynamics” adjusted for operations 1992-1997 . . . . . . . . . 13 Figure 3. Strategy, force structure, readiness dynamic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Figure 4. Comparison of Navy carrier versus an Air Force fighter wing . . . . . . 21 Figure 5. Additional requirements on Naval aviation units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Figure 6. Cyclical readiness levels of a Navy carrier deployment rotation . . . . 23 Figure 7. The number and type of exercises contribute to OPTEMPO . . . . . . . 31 Figure 8: Intensity of USAF operations is increasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Figure 9. Operations involving USAF assets are becoming longer . . . . . . . . . . 34 Figure 10. As operations increase, participation in exercises decreases . . . . . . 35 Figure 11. Decreasing end-strength and increasing deployments . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Figure 12. Increasing commitment to overseas operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Figure 13. Theoretical annual schedule of an Air Force squadron . . . . . . . . . . 40 Figure 14. Unplanned days reduce the number of actual training days . . . . . . . 41 Figure 15. Ship steaming days per quarter 1971-1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Figure 16. Number of crews required to meet requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Figure 17. Increase in crew requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Figure 18. Share of the burden of current operations “Global Sourcing” . . . . . 53 List of Tables Table 1. Service-specific Deployment Definitions and Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Table 2. Indicators of Personnel Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Table 3. Indicators of Equipment Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Table 4. Force Structure Drawdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Table 5. Estimated PERSTEMPO Days Annuallya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Table 6. Costs of U.S. Peacekeeping Commitments FY1992-1996 . . . . . . . . . 58 Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO), and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much? Introduction and Major Findings Introduction In order to meet the challenges confronting the United States, the nation’s leaders seek to strike a balance between (a) the military’s capability, as an instrument of national power, to prepare to meet both large and small-scale challenges to vital interests and (b) its ability to deal with important but lesser interests. With finite resources, peacetime militaries can only sustain a finite level of activity beyond that required to maintain military readiness and effectiveness through training, exercises, and maintenance. In a force that is too busy, the cumulative effects of lost training time, missed exercises, unprogrammed expenditures, and extended deployments can degrade the overall capability of the force. In a force that is not busy enough, however, a lack of training and experience in exercises and actual operations may also be detrimental. In testimony before the Congress, the Joint Chiefs assess that the armed forces of the United States, as currently postured, are meeting mission requirements while maintaining an acceptable level of readiness. This level of effort is not without cost. How long U.S. forces can continue to sustain this level of effort is a question worth asking. Reductions in force structure or funding without commensurate reductions in assigned missions may upset the balance between readiness and current operations. This paper will define the scope and implications of the armed service’s challenge of sustaining the current level of operations, identify the dynamic relationship between congressional action and military activity levels as it relates to budget, readiness, and force structure decisions, and discuss options for Congress. Using information from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the General Accounting Office (GAO), testimony before the Congress, and other sources, this paper will examine the level of military activity, its likely repercussions, and the relationship of this level to options for congressional action. Many CRS and GAO reports provide detailed background information on issues related to the high CRS-2 OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO phenomenon. These reports will be referenced and, where possible, summarized.1 Major Findings The nature of operations other than war has changed. Operations other than war (OOTW) are now larger, longer, more intense, and more complex than their Cold-War predecessors; some are open-ended with no clear exit strategy; varied operations run concurrently and require a broad range of capabilities. The forwarddeployed force dispositions used to support these operations are now smaller, albeit, in most cases, better equipped. Forces decreased while requirements increased. The cumulative effects of the drawdown coupled with a more proactive use of the military in a greater range of international crises has led to a sustained high level of operations. With a much reduced force, the resultant high activity may be hampering DoD’s ability to execute some short and long-range plans, programs, and obligations. High activity doesn’t always equal high readiness. During the Cold War high unit activity generally equated to high readiness. Today’s reality comprises a smaller force structure supporting a wider variety of missions at a time when resources are constrained. With today’s missions, high unit activity may, but does not necessarily, equate to high readiness and may in some cases, be detrimental to readiness for combat. Reductions not commensurate. Operational missions increased 300 percent during the 1989-1997 period that Army and Air Force force structure was reduced by 45 percent each, Navy by 38 percent, and the Marines by 12 percent. During this period, DoD infrastructure, bases for example, was reduced by 21 percent. To increase operationally available manpower and improve efficiencies, many believe further infrastructure cuts are necessary. The extra burdens are not evenly distributed within and across the services. Some units may be more heavily tasked while others remain relatively untasked. Service actions to level the load are underway. Current operations are larger and more extensive than expected. One Major Regional Contingency? The level of effort to support currently ongoing operations is estimated by some senior DoD officials to be equivalent to executing one Major Regional Contingency (MRC).2 This estimate includes forces that have been extensively engaged in ongoing operations for four to five years, including the National Guard and Reserve, whose support is approaching Desert Storm levels. The percentage of deployable combat and combat support forces 1 The House National Security Committee issued a report on April 9, 1997 titled “Military Readiness 1997: Rhetoric and Reality” which addresses issues similar to those in this report. The House report is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.house.gov/nsc/pubs.htm 2 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Louis Finch among others, interview with the author. CRS-3 committed to operations is higher than the percentage of troops deployed publicized by DoD. In its estimates, DoD quotes a percentage of the total force to indicate the current level of effort, which, for example, equals roughly 8 percent for the Air Force. Calculating the Army level of effort from only those eligible to participate shows that up to 45 percent of the “deployable active Army” may be committed to current operations as either deployed, preparing to deploy, or recovering from deployment; excluding soldiers assigned to Korea, the percentage is 36 percent. In contrast, as a percentage of the Army total force of 1.1 million, the percentage of “deployed soldiers” (excluding Korea) is 3 percent and of the active Army, the percentage is 6 percent. The Air Force requires 13 of its 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents to support current operations or 65 percent of the combat fighter force. On an average day, 50 percent of Navy ships are out of homeport of which roughly 30 percent are deployed. Smaller forces and increased commitments equal higher workloads. According to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36 percent while increasing the number of deployed operations by 300 percent. In testimony before the House National Security Committee in March 1997, the Army estimated that its officers and senior non-commissioned officers from deployable units now spend 180-190 days away from home annually, while junior soldiers spend 140-155 days away. Understanding how the Army and the other services absorbed the increased load during the drawdown to reach today’s level of effort is essential to planning for the future. This raises question: What has DoD stopped doing, what is DoD doing less of, is this an increase in efficiency, and do these reductions compromise readiness? Causes of high levels of military activity. Competing strategies. The current National Military Strategy was developed prior to the current National Security Strategy of Engagement. The latter strategy envisioned a more proactive U.S. foreign policy while the former strategy, developed soon after the Persian Gulf War, embraced a more reactive approach with a military force designed to defeat, in conventional combat, the greatest potential threats to U.S. vital interests. The reality of the last five years is that the military is heavily engaged in advancing U.S. interests without conflict while trying to fully prepare to defend them in conflicts. The dual requirements of two strategies are taxing the force. Operations, exercises, and military culture. Regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), tasked with the day-to-day security of U.S. interests, wield great influence in requesting forces to support their exercises and operations. They do not, however, have the fiscal responsibility of supplying these forces or the service responsibility of training them. This disconnect may result in “overspending” the force. “We never met a deployment we didn’t like” is indicative of the can-do attitude that is usually at odds with demanding relief from excessive work. Careerism may inhibit officers from turning down work no matter how valid the complaint. Competition for resources within and between the services can contribute to military “volunteerism”. Useful assessments of readiness and stress needed. Measurements need improvement. Tempos are difficult to assess because current systems were not designed to indicate peacetime activity; reliable indicators CRS-4 of unit and individual activity and stress are only now being developed. Some analysis may be misleading because averages of large groups do not adequately reflect burdens on discrete elements. The current DoD Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), does not measure levels of effort required of units to attain high readiness or the extent to which units are committed to operations; it produces only snapshots of: personnel, training, and supply/equipment. SORTs is not predictive nor does it reflect a unit’s capacity to “turn-up” the level of effort. Measuring both the level of effort and the extent of a unit’s commitments would improve the assessment. No “Opportunity Cost” evaluation. Assuming adequate funding, acceptable readiness levels can be maintained indefinitely at a certain OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO levels. These levels have not yet been identified. There is no “Opportunity Cost” system for evaluating the relative worth of DoD actions. In other words, there is no way to know the price, in non-monetary terms, such as readiness, for current operations. “What didn’t we do because we did Operation X?” is a question that can now be answered only in specific instances, anecdotally and non-quantitatively. Importance of understanding OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO measurements. Measuring OPTEMPO, the rate of unit activity, and PERSTEMPO, an individual’s absences and activity level, and comparing them with other factors like readiness levels, personnel retention statistics, and unit evaluations should indicate what level of activity U.S. forces can sustain. Understanding OPTEMPO or PERSTEMPO does not provide insight into the validity of either the current two-MRC strategy or the policy of pursuing broader military engagement in the world at-large. Understanding OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO should, however, suggest the degree to which U.S. forces are capable of meeting current and proposed obligations and in what areas change and/or innovation may be required. High OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO can be an indicator that U.S. forces may be exceeding designed capabilities in some areas and failing to meet planned objectives in others. On the other hand, low OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO may be an indicator that a unit’s readiness might be at risk due to insufficient training, exercises, manpower, or resources or it could indicate a unit that is capable of contributing more to current operations. Impacts and implications are significant. Training: Time and resources for effective training lacking. There are minimum resources and a minimum time required for basic military preparedness so that units may retain the capabilities required of them. For many units, the minimums established by their services are not currently available. Concerns. The effects on units and personnel with current high levels of activity are of increasing concern to defense officials and senior officers. The major concerns voiced during testimony before the Congress are these: ! Readiness: As activity levels increase, time for realistic combat training is lost, equipment requires more maintenance, supply stocks are diminished, and personnel are displaced. ! Modernization: Time and money spent on operations is not available for other priorities. The man-power intensive maintenance of aging systems, systems CRS-5 which are under increased stress, is increasing the workload and the cost to maintain equipment resulting in even higher activity levels. ! Quality of Life: Commanders are increasingly forced to choose between spending scant resources on either training or “quality of life” improvements such as base support facilities or family-oriented programs. ! Personnel: Fatigue and disillusionment may afflict some as they perceive a future full of family separations, limited opportunities, and reduced benefits. Reenlistments and recruitment: although both remain strong, commanders testify that the dedicated all-volunteer force is growing weary, dampening enthusiasm for military service. Surveys reveal that pilot retention is dropping rapidly due to high OPTEMPO, which decreases individual flying proficiency and increases family separations, and due to a forecast long-term hiring surge by the Airlines. Although most pilots say they prefer military aviation, the pull of family and a stable lifestyle is significant. Internal DoD actions to ease the pace of activity. The Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) is a DoD step toward managing both short-term requirements and the long-term sustainability of U.S. forces. The policy effectively reduced commitments for high demand units to the point where most can now accomplish their required training. The Navy has reoriented the way it does pre-deployment training and reorganized its force to reduce unit activity levels. The Air Force now fills its requirements from organizations world-wide. The reserve component, mostly through volunteers, is carrying part of the load. Such actions demonstrate the ability of DoD to accommodate to new realities without increased spending. Modernization Issues are Dynamic. New weapons systems and technologies may enable DoD to posture fewer, more capable forces. In some cases, new systems can lower the pace and the cost of operations. In theory, this effort would free forces to train for and engage in operations other than war. In a fiscally strained environment however, the resultant force structure may be subject to dollar-driven cuts that could well recreate a condition the modernization sought to relieve: too few people doing too many things. Also, better capability often creates the impression that military forces can now do more than was previously possible. Many new technologies complement rather than supplant older technologies. For example, the Air Force’s new J-STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) does for the ground war what the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) does for the air war. Even these systems need to be supplemented. Due to the effect terrain has on J-STARS in Bosnia, new unmanned aerial vehicles are working with J-STARS to provide a more complete picture. There is no overlap and both systems are in great demand. In operational terms, increasing capability increases mission effectiveness but does not necessarily mean that fewer forces are required to complete a military mission. It does mean that the forces involved can accomplish the mission with lower risk, fewer casualties, or less collateral damage, or that they can do so more expeditiously. Force Structure: Dangers and dynamics. The dangers involved in not balancing force structure with commitments are many. Too few forces prepared for high-intensity combat could result in local defeat, higher casualties, and longer CRS-6 conflicts. Too few forces capable of a wide range of operations results in high OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO for those qualified units, and missed opportunities for the nation. Force structure options under consideration by DoD and the Congress center on practical ways to reduce the forces required for major contingencies; to reduce the time and effort required to prepare for them; to increase the number of units capable of executing multiple types of non-combat operations; and to increase the participation of the reserve components. Force structure actions benefit from taking into account both OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO limits, and budget and readiness considerations. The following relationships are pertinent (assuming demand remains constant or increases): ! As force size decreases, OPTEMPO generally increases. ! As active force size decreases in favor of the reserve components, OPTEMPO tends to increase due to the limitations on the availability of the Guard and Reserve. ! As the number of specialized units increases, OPTEMPO for those types of units decreases; however, with a finite force structure, the increase in such units is at the expense of other types of units. ! New units with missions similar to high OPTEMPO units might reduce the latter’s overall OPTEMPO; however, recent experience with both the Joint Stars ground surveillance aircraft and the Predator UAV suggests that this is not inevitable. ! As new weapons and capabilities that reduce manpower and support requirements come on line, PERSTEMPO decreases. ! As long as very high demand for deployments of military force exists, whether for military or foreign policy purposes, efforts to reduce OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO will be difficult. ! Increasing the size of the National Guard and Reserve at the expense of the active force will generally result in higher tempos, as the reserve components are generally less available than the active force. Many defense observers see support and specialized functions in the reserve components as a key building block in developing the affordable force, operating at acceptable OPTEMPOs, that is required. Some movement in this area is underway. At the same time, there is a widely held perception that the reserve component should “never be viewed as the key building block”3 because its near-term warfighting capability cannot match that of the active force. The Quadrennial Defense Review debate may help. The debate over the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will help clarify the problem and the range of options. Real solutions may be difficult to divine as the specifics of measuring the 3 According to the planning staff of the National Guard Bureau in response to a draft of this report. CRS-7 workload on U.S. forces, the actual costs to the treasury, and the opportunity costs are elusive. Although DoD is aggressively implementing management and procedural solutions, this approach has its limits. DoD has little control over external requirements. The quandary facing QDR planners is how to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces to meet the requirements of both the two-MRC scenario and the unpredictability of other operations in support of national objectives. Given current demands, say military advocates, any decision that reduces funding, manpower, or equipment can have immediate negative repercussions unless commensurate reductions in unit obligations are made. Others are not convinced. Until the demand issue is deliberated, understood, and dealt with, discussion of strategic resource tradeoffs to balance the defense budget under the guise of the QDR may be premature. Because DoD and the Congress are just beginning to understand the implications of operating in the current environment, premature action may be counter productive and may even exacerbate the current situation. To many observers and to some in Congress, the great promise of the QDR lies in the potential to redefine defense requirements. There is little debate in Congress over the current stress on DoD. The debate surrounds the future posture of U.S. forces and the resources that may be available to support them. The strategy of the Bottom-Up review levied certain requirements on the military. If those requirements are viewed differently in the QDR debate, U.S. forces could then be reorganized, repostured, and possibly repositioned in such a way as to extensively mitigate the negative aspects of current and projected demands. Although many in Congress strongly support a “strategy-driven” approach to the QDR, the current fiscal realities may force some “budget-driven” decisions. This latter emphasis is viewed by many as a return to historical patterns of force hollowness following major conflicts. In either case, it is apparent that the QDR must deal effectively with the competing demands of increased military deployments, reduced forces, and constrained budgets to ensure that the force is capable of meeting the nations needs now and into the early 21st century. CRS-8 Background and Analysis There is little disagreement that U.S. forces are very busy. Although assessed levels of readiness are high, there is growing concern that the current pace of operations may not be sustainable. In addition to maintaining a robust warfighting capability, the military is now heavily engaged in executing the National Security Strategy of Engagement. How best to fulfill these dual requirements is the subject of the Quadrennial Defense Review debate. Based on current requirements and commitments, U.S. forces are under some strain; however, should requirements, commitments, or capabilities change significantly after the QDR debate, the force could be in a better position to meet today’s challenges or it could be in a worse position. Congressional interest in either scenario is keen. Many views expressed in Congress are comparable to those of Representative Sisisky and Representative Dellums speaking to the Service Secretaries (House National Security Committee Hearing on the FY 1998 Defense Budget, March 12, 1997). SPENCE: Mr. Sisisky. SISISKY: But let me tell you what the real problem is and why our concern. All we’ve heard, we’ve heard it from the Defense Department, we’ve heard it from you, we’ve heard it from the chiefs of staff, that we’re as ready as we’ve ever been. Readiness, number one priority. And I believe that. But let me tell you, the things that we’ve heard in the last few weeks is that we’re not going to be that ready in 18 months. The morale is low. And then I keep reading these things: two Army divisions may go, two carrier battle groups may go, things like that, some more wings in the Air Force may go. I saw some interesting figures yesterday...The Army across this world had 33,000 people deployed plus 100,000 deployed in regular stations. The 33 were just in Bosnia and other places. As I understand it, only 20 percent of the Army is combat forces. Now that may be a sliding figure. And obviously, the other people are over there, too. But that’s 100,000. You take two divisions out of there, I don’t know where we’d go. And I doubt very seriously whether you’d have an Army that you’d be very proud of. DELLUMS: The reason why I raised the issue of the Quadrennial Review to all of you, is that if indeed the Quadrennial Review is a serious process, all of these distinguished witnesses are an integral part of it. And (if) what is on the table is a total re-look with potential for change, then all of these prognostications about the future, what future are (we) talking about? You can only be extrapolating based on present strategies, present doctrine, present force structure based on present requirements. If the Quadrennial Review changes all of that, then how can you predict something you’ve not figured out as yet? We don’t have the Quadrennial Review before us. So all these alarming statements about readiness shortfalls, modernizations shortfalls, strategy problems, force structure implications, you can’t — you can’t get there from here until we finally have the Quadrennial Review document before us. That will frame the budget for fiscal year 1999. So you cannot extrapolate based on fiscal year 1998 what’s going to happen several years down the road...And I would caution my colleagues that talking CRS-9 about where all these dangers are at this point is not appropriate and not relevant until such time as we determine the Quadrennial Review. If the Quadrennial Review simply underscores the status quo, then maybe everybody’s right. But if it is a substantive point of departure, then everything then has to be framed in that new paradigm, not the old paradigm. The bottom line for Congress is how to fund, under resource-constraints, shortterm demands for military forces, long-term needs to maintain effective forces, and commitments to service personnel. Notwithstanding substantial force cuts, the U.S. military is by far the most capable on earth. There is a perception that threats to the nation are much reduced from those of 1950-1990. There is also a perception that U.S. military force can play a deterrent, decisive or a pacifying role in most conflicts. Both views, whether right or wrong, affect the debate surrounding the Pentagon’s budget. Unfortunately, during the transition from a high threat / low activity to a low threat / high activity military posture, an attempt to satisfy both old and new requirements may have occurred. As a result, some military advocates today hold that any reduction in resources, without a commensurate reduction in commitments, will likely result in increases in OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO that take DoD above “the breaking point”. General Richard E. Hawley, Commander of Air Combat Command, summed up his analysis of the current situation: Then, of course, there is the Quadrennial Defense Review and the potential that it will lead to further reductions in our already heavily committed force structure. As a primary provider of air combat forces to our joint warfighters, I advise caution as we contemplate this course. Our nation’s strategy of global engagement is a sound one. But it is one that is imposing heavy strains on our already much-reduced force structure. Many of the men and women whom I meet as I travel around Air Combat Command are tired. We are testing their commitment to “service before self” and, so far, they have not been found wanting. But there are limits on how much we can ask these wonderful people to give. It is my sense that we are close to that limit. Once we cross that fine line, the exodus will be devastating and difficult to reverse. We must find a way to keep our force structure and our commitments in balance. I believe we can do that.4 General Hawley has taken action within his command to significantly reduce the strain on his force through internal management practices and he has done so without increases in either funding or resources. Time will tell if these changes are sufficient. In any case, innovation in a time of resource constraints may prove to be the most useful approach as DoD learns to operate in a high demand environment. One Force, Two Strategies: The QDR and Greater Demand The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mandated by the 104th Congress reviewed the structure and mission of the nation’s armed forces. The report, out in May 1997, will, if implemented, replace the last review conducted in 1993. Then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s Bottom-Up Review established the requirement to fight two nearly-simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC) as the overarching 4 From a speech to the Air Force Association Symposium, January 30, 1997, in Orlando, Florida. Accessible on the World Wide Web at http://www.aef.org/ol7.html CRS-10 requirement for the National Military Strategy. In statements before leaving office, former Secretary of Defense Perry clearly restated the two MRC scenario as the primary consideration for posturing the nation’s defense. In establishing a base-line force structure capable of engaging in a two-MRC conflict, defense planners in 1993 assumed a peacetime activity level for U.S. forces that would enable the vast majority of combat and combat-support units to quickly swing into action. The intervening years have seen a dramatic increase in the activity of U.S. forces in non-MRC operations while at the same time the size of the armed forces has decreased significantly. These smaller forces are now engaging in military operations that are larger, longer, more intense, and more complex than those anticipated in 1993. The result is that some combat forces earmarked to transition to MRC duty in the BottomUp Review (BUR) may not be available as predicted. Further, the high activity levels are straining some military budgets, curtailing training opportunities for deployed units, increasing wear and tear on some equipment, and depleting some wartime stockpiles. The task facing defense planners is how to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces to meet the requirements of both the two-MRC scenario and the unpredictability of other operations in support of national objectives. With no apparent threat, the QDR debate will not necessarily reemphasize the two-MRC scenario as the guiding principle of the National Military Strategy because defense planners now contend with a non-Cold War National Security Strategy in which military forces play a significant peacetime role. The BUR was completed prior to the administration’s announcement of the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement; therefore, the BUR force structure focused primarily on the requirements of high-intensity combat and did not anticipate the additional requirements which would be levied on U.S. forces (See figures 1 and 2 below). Although its main purpose remains the defense of the nation, the military’s role as an element of national power is expanding. Maintaining the equilibrium between an expanded peacetime role, which may prevent conflict, and the required wartime role, which is to win conflict quickly, is the key challenge. A peacetime Major Regional Contingency equivalent. Figure 1, from the Bottom Up Review, displays the anticipated “Conflict Dynamics” upon which the current force structure was based. According to DoD officials who worked on this analysis, the requirements for Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement and Humanitarian Operations were, in retrospect, understated.5 These same officials characterize DoD’s current level of effort as equivalent to one major regional contingency (MRC). Figure 2 adjusts the original “Conflict Dynamics” based on this assessment. The original plan was for U.S. forces to quickly win the first MRC in order to prepare for the possibility of a second MRC occurring nearly simultaneously. The effects on U.S. forces of a prolonged first MRC and the associated risk that would follow in the second were a major concern. Sustained operations over the last five years, assessed as equivalent to one MRC, are therefore, cause for concern. These same DoD officials have testified before Congress that we may be going through an exceptional time and that the current level of effort will probably subside. Without clear strategies for withdrawing from operations in Northern and Southern Iraq, Macedonia, Bosnia and 5 According to Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Louis C. Finch who worked on the BUR proposals. Interview with the author. CRS-11 elsewhere, and with the ever-present dangers of potential flash points like Rwanda, Zaire, the assertion of an “exceptional time” comes into question. For example, the final withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Bosnia is not certain now and will remain so if the prospects for renewed civil war are not reduced.6 Understanding the current and projected demand on U.S. forces is an important early step in developing a National Military Strategy and a force structure capable of meeting these compelling obligations. Key measures of that demand are the pace or tempo of military operations and the demands for duty away from home that such operations place on individual service members. It is important to measure and understand these demands in order to make appropriate strategy, force structure, and readiness decisions. 6 For more on the future debate over the withdrawal from Bosnia, see NATO and Bosnia: A Looming Transatlantic Debate. CRS Report 97-480 F by (name redacted) (April 22, 1997). Figure 1. Anticipated nature of military requirements or “Conflict Dynamics” as published in the Bottom Up CRS-12 Review. Column one indicates the anticipated level of peacetime activity; column two, the level of activity associated with one MRC. CRS-13 Figure 2. Bottom Up Review analysis of “Conflict Dynamics” adjusted for actual operations from 19921997 which may equate to 1 MRC. The “Exercises” added to each column indicate the effort required to prepare for the missions depicted. CRS-14 Capacity vs Commitments: A dynamic relationship The assessment of current and projected demands enables planners to understand the capability available for any new National Military Strategy. The strategy, once derived, will determine the force structure required. Force structure decisions influence readiness determinations. To preclude surprise and to react quickly to aggression, a certain amount of the force must be in a high state of readiness. The remaining readiness decisions are based on the projected requirements of military plans written to implement the National Military Strategy (e.g. Days available prior to deployment). The required readiness levels of units determine their training, equipment, and personnel needs and priorities. It is in these areas, training, equipment, and personnel, that high demands create the most turbulence. Therefore, in understanding the turbulence created within the force by higher than planned levels of activity, one can understand the impact on readiness and the efforts required to maintain that readiness; the impact of readiness requirements on force structure decisions; and the impact of force structure decisions on the ability of the military to meet the requirements of the strategy. In summary, planning to execute the strategy must account for current and projected demands on the force in order to posture a viable military to meet the nation’s needs. The left side of figure 3 below illustrates this sequence. The strategy, devised to meet the challenges to national interests, is the framework for force structure decisions; based on the force structure, readiness levels are determined that ensure the forces can execute the strategy. This static process is typical of peacetime planning. As long as forces maintain their required readiness levels, execution of the strategy is assured. In a dynamic environment characterized by high demands on portions of the force, readiness levels and a unit’s capacity to operate are constantly in flux because units are preparing for, engaging in, and recovering from operations. In this case, the relationship is circular in that changing readiness levels, which should indicate a unit’s capacity to engage in operations, affect the military’s ability to execute the strategy. To understand the extent to which the military’s ability to execute the strategy is affected, it is important to not only know the capability of the unit but also the unit’s capacity to engage in and sustain operations. Current readiness measurements show a snapshot of capability. Clearer assessments of capacity are required in a fast paced environment because, with the surplus capacity of the Cold-War force diminished, the ability of U.S. forces to quickly “surge” up to a high intensity level and/or their ability to sustain operations over an extended period are important considerations. Issues surrounding readiness levels and the combat role of the Army National Guard are key aspects of this debate. “How busy are U.S. forces?” and “Can they do more?” or “Should they do less?” are pertinent questions framing the current debate over the role of U.S. forces in the world today. To answer these questions requires an understanding of the relationship between capacity and commitments. Although capacity is beginning to stabilize following the drawdown of U.S. forces, commitments are anticipated to fluctuate at high levels. As commitments increase and run concurrently, there theoretically comes a point where capacity is degraded. Finding this point in order to achieve balance between the requirements of the National Military Strategy and the new missions inherent in the National Security Strategy is the challenge confronting defense planners. Further force structure cuts to combat and combat CRS-15 Figure 3. Strategy, force structure, readiness dynamic for planning or “peacetime” and operations or “wartime” CRS-16 support forces engaged in current operations should be closely analyzed to ensure the United States retains the capacity to meet probable threats and obligations. Measuring Commitments and Capacity. The current DoD system, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), measures training, personnel, and supplies and includes a commander’s assessment. SORTS does not measure the level of effort required of the unit to attain high ratings or the extent to which the unit is committed to operations. It does, however, use a “Commander’s Assessment” to gauge the overall readiness of the unit. According to DoD officials testifying before Congress, this assessment was used in 10 percent of SORTS reporting to increase the readiness rating of units and it was used in a fraction of one percent of the reporting to lower a unit’s readiness rating.7 This system, long the subject of congressional and GAO scrutiny, reflects a snapshot of capability based on objective standards. It is not predictive nor does it reflect a unit’s capacity to “turn-up” the level of effort. Measurement of both the ongoing level of effort, indicated by hours and days worked for example, and the extent of a units commitments away from home station would improve the assessment of a unit’s capacity for increased activity. The measurements available to indicate the activity of U.S. forces are OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) is the rate of U.S. forces involvement in all military activities. OPTEMPO in this report refers to this general meaning of the term. The services also use OPTEMPO as a programming/budgeting term that indicates, for example, steaming hours for the Navy and combat vehicle usage for the Army. The Air Force’s flying hour program is one gauge of the “OPTEMPO” of its combat units. Further, OPTEMPO is often used to describe only the pace of contingency deployments excluding other unit activities such as exercises and training deployments. Units are affected in varying degrees by all these activities and so, for OPTEMPO to be a meaningful measurement of unit operations it should include all unit activities. Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) is a subset of OPTEMPO and is the amount of time spent away from home, usually measured in the number of nights service members spend away combined with all activities in which a service member is engaged. The post-Cold War drawdown of the U.S. armed forces coupled with increased use of the military has led to a much higher than planned rate of activity, OPTEMPO, for many military units and significantly increased the time spent away from home, PERSTEMPO, for the military personnel involved. Measuring OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO In order to discuss policy options and implications, the general terms OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO will be used in this report as defined above. Service definitions may vary; therefore, where important differences exist, they will be noted. 7 Gebicke, Mark, Director, Military Operations and Capabilities, General Accounting Office. Testimony before the Military Readiness Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee March 11, 1997. CRS-17 Since measuring OPTEMPO indicates actual unit activity levels, which encompass everything the unit does, with the purpose of gauging unit capacity to accomplish proposed missions, the sum of all endeavors, regardless of purpose, provides the most accurate assessment. All the services use a variety of OPTEMPO categories to measure specific activities. These “OPTEMPO” measures do not clearly indicate the overall pace of the unit. Naval OPTEMPO measurements provide the clearest picture of unit activity because the ship is not only the weapon system, it also defines the unit and provides the platform for conducting operations, training, and exercises. Steaming hours in the Naval definition generally equates to a surface unit’s rate of activity; however, in port activities and temporary duties away from home port also contribute to the rate of activity and are not reflected in ship OPTEMPO. Similarly, embarked Marine Corps units can define part of their OPTEMPO in Naval terms. The Army and Air Force OPTEMPO considerations are less clear-cut and therefore harder to measure. The Army refers to vehicle mileage, in budgetary terms, as OPTEMPO. Again, this is a sub-category of a units activity, not a complete measurement. The scope of tempo-related problems is difficult to measure as data collection by the services was not designed to indicate the impact of OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO; consequently, reliable indicators of unit and individual repercussions are only now being developed. In addition, some data analysis may be misleading because averages of large groups do not adequately reflect the burdens on discrete elements. Why measure OPTEMPO? OPTEMPO measurements are important because they aid planners in predicting requirements and managing commitments. Understanding current and projected demands enables the military to sustain readiness by quantifying the obligations to engage in operations, train and exercise the force, develop personnel, and maintain and acquire the requisite equipment to do so. In today’s resource-limited defense environment, such an understanding should contribute to maximizing efficiency and avoiding wasteful, redundant, or potentially damaging practices. Why measure PERSTEMPO? In general, personnel tempo or PERSTEMPO is the amount of time spent away from home for DoD personnel. PERSTEMPO, which is different for each person, indicates the time spent in all professional activities and reflects the remaining time available for personal and professional development activities. Service members can have a high PERSTEMPO while never leaving their home base due to, for example, extended shifts over long periods. Individual tempos may differ from those of the unit because individuals may have official travel, professional education, or change-of-station requirements above those required by their unit obligations. Even so, the primary factor contributing to the significant recent increases in PERSTEMPO is unit deployments for operations and exercises.8 8 For a thorough discussion of PERSTEMPO issues including recent data, effects on readiness, and DoD actions to mitigate the impact of high PERSTEMPO, see U.S. General Accounting Office. Military Readiness: A Clear Policy is Needed to Guide Management of Frequently Deployed Units. Report Nos B-271135 and GAO/NSIAD-96-105. April 8, 1996. CRS-18 No single standard for PERSTEMPO exists within DoD. Difficulties arise in evaluating PERSTEMPO measurements because each service defines levels of unit and individual activity differently and they each have a different definition of what constitutes high activity. Deployments are also defined differently by each service; for example, training rotations to the National Training Center do not figure in the Army’s measurement of deployments yet they are clearly an activity that contributes to PERSTEMPO. According to a 1996 GAO report Military Readiness: A Clear Policy is Needed to Guide Management of Frequently Deployed Units: It is difficult for DoD to determine the actual time that either military personnel or their units are deployed. This information is important to planning and managing contingency operations. Although all services now have systems to measure PERSTEMPO, each service has different (1) definitions of what constitutes a deployment, (2) policies or guidance for the length of time units or personnel should be deployed, and (3) systems for tracking deployments.9 (See Table 1 below) GAO, and others, have recommended a single formula for measuring time away from home: one day away equals one day deployed. DoD has not established a comprehensive definition and DoD’s management of PERSTEMPO-related issues will continue to be difficult. Service cultures, mission characteristics, deployment timelines, and sustainment requirements account for most of the differences in service definitions and hamper efforts at establishing a universal definition. Even so, the Joint Staff, at the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is working toward a common definition and an accurate measurement system. Table 1. Service-specific Deployment Definitions and Policies Measurement Army Navy Air Force Definition of Deployment 7 days or more 56 days or more 1 day or more 10 days or more away from home station Policy or regulation limiting deployments No policy, but goal of no single deployment over 179 days Yes, policy limits deployments to 180 days/6 months No policy, but maximum desired level of 120 days per year No policy, but goal of no single deployment over 6 months System tracking capabilities Unit and individual Unit only Major weapon systems and individual Unit only Source: GAO10 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. Marine Corps CRS-19 Comparing Navy and Air Force approaches. Each service necessarily tailors its respective forces and deployment guidelines to the requirements of the missions it performs and the levels of readiness required of its forces. The Navy, which rotates forces forward to overcome the lagtime involved in deploying forces to a fastbreaking crisis by sea, keeps forward-stationed forces at high readiness while units in home-port are in varying states of readiness. The Air Force, whose forces deploy into combat within 48 hours of notification maintains high levels of readiness across the force. These differing requirements are reflected in the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of each service. Navy PERSTEMPO Rules. The Navy has stringent rules regarding PERSTEMPO but an individual measurement system is not employed. There are three tenets of the Navy policy: ! Deployments will be no more than six months from the time they depart homeport until the time they return to homeport. ! The turn-around ratio, that is, the number of days at home compared to the number of days on a deployment, will not exceed 2.0/1. (Note: the Navy defines a deployment as 56 days or more at sea.) ! 50% of a sailor’s time over the past three years must have been spent in homeport. Waivers to this policy require approval of the Chief of Naval Operations. In 1996, according to the Navy staff, there were only 5 waivers granted Navy-wide and these were to take ships for required maintenance to facilities away from homeport. In 1997, there has only been one waiver, again for maintenance. According to Navy officials who track PERSTEMPO, the Navy’s turn-around ratio that is, the time between deployments must more than double the time spent on the last deployment averages between 2.4-2.6 to 1 although some aviation units may be closer to the 2.0 limit. While it is true that the turn-around ratio has diminished in recent years, it still remains well-above the Navy goal for most units. Individual sailors may, at times, experience higher PERSTEMPO if reassignments occur between deployments. A sailor coming off a deployment that is reassigned to a ship preparing for a deployment is likely to be hard pressed. The Navy does not track individual PERSTEMPO, but, based on the rules for unit deployments, the maximum three-year average for most sailors should be around 180 days. Air Force PERSTEMPO Policy. The Air Force has no specific rule regarding PERSTEMPO. Air Force policy is that, as a goal, individual PERSTEMPO should not exceed 120 days per year. This policy is consistent with the Navy’s more stringent 2.0:1 turnaround ratio in that 120 days away plus 240 days at home roughly equals one calendar year (See figure 4 below). The Navy uses deployments, any continuous sea duty that exceeds 56 days away, to measure the 2.0:1 ratio. Figure 5 shows the effect of additional activities away from home station on Navy PERSTEMPO. The Navy policy of 50 percent of one’s time spent at home over the three preceding years ensures that additional activities don’t take sailors beyond a CRS-20 PERSTEMPO of 182-183 days per year. The Air Force policy of 120 days per year, one-third lower than the Navy requirement, is based on readiness requirements. Deployed naval forces maintain a high state of readiness while stationed in potential hot spots. Non-deployed naval forces, their missions covered by deployed naval forces, cycle through stages of refurbishment and retraining as they prepare for their next deployment. Periods of unreadiness are planned into this cycle as Naval personnel and equipment “standdown” from deployed operations. Figure 6 shows this cycle. Air Force units, on the other hand, maintain high levels of readiness at all times because of the potential need to deploy worldwide on short notice. This continually higher state of readiness, compared to non-deployed naval forces, requires more dedicated training time at home station to maintain. Therefore, the Air Force 120 day policy affords units the time to train in order to maintain continually high readiness ratings. The policies of both services are designed to support the nature of their unique contributions to joint operations and are tailored to their specific needs. CRS-21 Figure 4. Theoretical comparison of the OPTEMPO of a Navy carrier air wing versus an Air Force fighter wing showing an equal “deployment” load. Compares a three-year Navy deployment cycle with the Air Force policy of 120 days away per year. In both cases, the PERSTEMPO burden appears to be 360 days in 3 years as depicted in the center. Source Air Combat Command CRS-22 Figure 5. Many Naval aviation units also train at Fallon NAS, NV beyond 6-month deployments at sea. In this case, the depicted aviation unit's three-year PERSTEMPO is 460 days vice 360 days. Source Air Combat Command. CRS-23 Figure 6. Cyclical readiness levels of a Navy carrier deployment rotation. During the 460-day Navy PERSTEMPO period in this example, readiness levels are reduced while preparing for the next deployment. The Air Force, with a more rapid response commitment from homestation, maintains readiness at C-1/C-2 for all units. Source Air Combat Command CRS-24 Measuring Readiness in OPTEMPO Terms NO “Opportunity Cost” evaluation. Theoretically, assuming adequate funding, acceptable readiness levels can be maintained indefinitely at certain OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO levels. These levels have not yet been identified making it difficult to assess how long readiness can be sustained under certain conditions. Further, there is no “Opportunity Cost” system for evaluating the relative worth of DoD actions. In other words, there is no way to know the price, in nonmonetary terms, such as readiness, for current operations thereby making quantitative assessments difficult. “What didn’t we do because we did Operation X?” is a question that can now be answered only in specific instances, anecdotally and nonquantitatively. Future readiness measurements should be able to predict, based on OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, how long the current level of effort can be prudently sustained. An effective system for estimating an acceptable OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO limit would be unit-specific, would be tied closely to the unit’s training program, and would depend on several factors including personnel experience, equipment capabilities, weapon system age, and mission type. PERSTEMPO measures cannot drive unit deployment decisions. Any system of measurement should account for continuous personnel rotations between units that can exacerbate the PERSTEMPO problem. A units OPTEMPO is the major portion of an individual’s PERSTEMPO. When individuals are reassigned, their PERSTEMPO includes the previous unit’s deployed time. Were they to stay in the original unit, service management practices would ensure they were given a break. After they move, the breaks accrued by the former unit do not carry over with them. Often times, individuals returning from a deployment will transfer to a unit preparing to go on a deployment. Assignments to remote locations, where the PERSTEMPO is 365 days a year, that precede or follow an assignment to a unit with a high OPTEMPO strain individuals the most. This drain on individual readiness should be a key concern of an effective management system. Certainly, the reverse also happens where individuals miss deployments due to reassignments. The number of units currently involved in operations and exercises makes the former problem more common than the latter condition. Although it is important to identify high PERSTEMPO individuals, units must be able to deploy with all their assigned personnel in order to maintain the unit integrity and cohesion that are essential to successful operations. Leaving soldiers behind because they have exceeded a PERSTEMPO ceiling is not considered a workable alternative. Readiness and OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. The important aspect of OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO analysis is in the indication of capacity. As noted, SORTS reporting does not indicate capacity. Highly stressed units and individuals cannot perform as well, or for as long, as well-rested ones. Under SORTS, a commander assesses the unit’s ability to “go to war” today not its ability to sustain or to increase a high level of activity. Capacity, whether a unit or an individual “probably” can do more or whether they should rest and/or reconstitute, needs to be a part of the overall readiness evaluation of U.S. forces because of the combination of smaller forces and higher workloads. The current situation for many units approaches comparison to CRS-25 combat where fresh units are rotated to the front allowing forward units the opportunity to rest and to reconstitute. The services are working to develop new ways to measure stress on units. Air Force Studies and Analysis (AFSAA), working closely with highly stressed units in the Air Force, developed the following list of personnel and equipment indicators in order to evaluate the stress effects of sustained high workloads. Unit Indicators of High Stress (Acronyms are defined at the bottom of the list) Table 2. Indicators of Personnel Stress Level of Stress Produced Low Medium High Avg Ops TDY days per year <90 90-120 >120 Highest TDY AFSCs in Ops <90 90-120 >120 Avg duty week for Ops* 40-45hrs 45-55hrs > 55hrs Avg Mx TDY days per year <90 90-120 >120 Highest TDY AFSCs in Mx <90 90-120 >120 Avg duty week for Mx* 40-45hrs 45-55hrs > 55hrs Aircrew flying time waivers 0 <5% >5% * Includes work done at home such as answering emails, reading reports, etc. Level of Stress Produced Low Medium High Statics/Demos/Capabilities per 1 PAA <2/yr 2-5/yr >5/yr Major exercises participation per year 2-3 1 0 Number of personnel NMR <10% 10-20% >20% Aircrew/personnel training waivers 0 <5% >5% Delays in upgrade training/qual. 0 <10% >10% Avg Specialty experience: officers >4 yr 4-1 yr. <1 yr Avg Specialty experience: Ops enlisted >4 yr 4-1 yrs <1 yr Avg Specialty experience: Mx enlisted >4 yr 4-1 yrs <1 yr Manning of critical Ops AFSC’s 105-95% 95-85% <85% Manning of critical Mx AFSC’s 105-95% 95-85% <85% CRS-26 Balance of field grade officers assigned* 5-15% 15-25% 5<>25% Officer Separation rates <10% 10-20% >20% Enlisted Separation rates <10% 10-20% >20% 1st Term Reenlistment rates >75% 75-50% <50% * In addition to unit leadership. This may not apply to non-flying units Level of Stress Produced Low Medium High Career broadening assignments * >50% 50-30% <30% Selection Rates for SOS >70% 70-40% <40% Pursuing college degrees: enlisted ** >35% 35-25% <25% Pursuing advance degrees: officers *** >50% 50-30% <30% Disenrollment from course work <10% 10-25% >25% Field conditions &/or min per diem TDYs No One Both * For senior Captains & Majors. Career broadening as defined by Unit leadership. That is, doing a job in other than one’s specialty. ** Include E-4's and higher *** % of Promotable O-3's thru O-4's w/o master’s degrees Level of Stress Produced Low Medium High Accrued leave exceeding 60 days 0 1-25% > 25% Fathers missing child’s birth due to TDY 0 1-3 >3 TDY within 30 days of child’s birth 0 1-3 >3 Taking leave at a desired time period/yr * 100% 99-60% < 60% Working Thanksgiving or Christmas ** <20%/1 >20%/1 20%/>2 Family Maltreatment Incidents 0 1-2% > 2% * Given 3 “1 week” choices of leave/year, could the member take leave during one of these choices ** Includes New Years. Avg per person for an average tour length of 3 years CRS-27 Table 3. Indicators of Equipment Stress Level of Stress Produced Low Medium High Fix Rate (Code 3 breaks)* >75% 75-70% <70% Avg Delayed Discrepancies per A/C <30 30-35 >35 Repeat Reoccurrence Rate <2% 2-4% >4% Cannibalization Rate <8% 8-12% >12% NMC due to Supply <15% 15-20% >20% NMC due to Maintenance <10% 10-15% >15% Availability of Depot Support <1 mos 1-2 mos >2 mos Delay of Major Upgrades <3 mos 3-6 mos >6mos Delayed Scheduled Inspections 0 1-5 >5 Delayed Depot Inputs 0 1 A/C >2 A/C Spare Engines per Mobility Package >2 1 0 * Code 3 means an aircraft is not fully mission capable Notes: “Ops” refers to individuals who operate or support the operation of aircraft. “Mx” refers to maintenance personnel who prepare, repair, and maintain aircraft. “TDY” refers to “Temporary Duty” or days away from home. “AFSC,” Air Force Specialty Code, refers to one’s career field. “Statics/Demos” are requirements to take airplanes to airshows and open houses “PAA” is “primary aircraft assigned,” so that 24 PAA means that a unit owns 24 mission aircraft. “NMR” and “NMC” stand for “Non-Mission Ready” for individuals and “NonMission Capable” for aircraft (A/C) respectively, and indicate those not available for combat operations. “SOS” is “Squadron Officer’s School;” the career-enhancing professional military education for Air Force Captains. A New Readiness Paradigm Emerging For most units, high levels of OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO are currently brought about by the combination of the military drawdown and the unanticipated rise in peacetime obligations. A DoD-wide system for measuring OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO was never previously undertaken. The strategic focus of the Cold War worked to minimize the current problem. The military capacity of the Cold War era, which was usually large enough to minimize detrimental impacts of unit operations and repetitive personnel deployments, obviated the need to measure OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. In addition, units with high deployment rates spent a significant portion of their time away from home training and exercising their primary capabilities. The resulting CRS-28 common understanding that high unit activity equated to high readiness reflected the reality of the time. Today’s emerging reality reflects fewer forces engaged in a wider variety of missions at a time when resources are constrained. With today’s missions, high unit activity does not necessarily equate to high readiness and may, some assert, be detrimental to readiness for combat. As understanding of current experience increases, measurements of OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and their effects, while not yet sufficient, are improving rapidly. Counting Capability: The Best Way to Assess Capacity What can we do with the forces we have available? And What part of our capability is not currently available? These are difficult questions to answer under the current approach to understanding OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and readiness. By counting only the number of personnel deployed, and by making distinctions between deployments, operations, exercises, and other duties, the total effect on U.S. forces is not apparent. Any activity that takes service members away from their units affects, to some degree, that unit’s capability. Any sub-unit removed from a larger unit, has a significant impact on the larger unit’s capability to execute its assigned mission. It is important to capture the ebb and flow of U.S. capacity to execute warplans and to sustain military strategies; a system that indicates current U.S. capacity to perform military assignments, which is dynamic, is needed. The current system indicates only the readiness of forces postured for static warplans and not whether those forces can effectively sustain the planned operations. To do this, some senior military officers interviewed for this study suggest referring to any activity that takes a unit away from home station as an “Operation.” Since the effort that goes into planning, executing, and returning from these events is akin to that for operations, and since the unit is “not available” while off station, classifying activities in this way yields meaningful data. The smallest unit that should be assessed in this way is also the building block of military capability; the unit that can operate as an independent entity. Battalions, squadrons, and ships. These officers suggest counting Army battalions and Air Force squadrons deployed to “operations” as the measure of commitment and the indicator of capacity. The “building block” units would report as preparing to deploy, deployed, recovering from deployment, ready, or non-mission capable. Since the services have a finite number of battalions and squadrons, this is a quick indicator of the “Status of the Army” or the “Status of the Air Force” and is akin to the Navy’s daily reporting on ships. In addition, “cannabalized” units, that is, units that were required to provide assets to another deploying unit might be listed as “non-mission capable.” Estimating time and effort to extricate and redeploy as C-1. One of the key assumptions of the Bottom Up Review was that units involved in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and exercises could be quickly extricated and redeployed to combat. The experience of the last five years, coupled with known limitations of strategic lift assets, indicate that taking a unit out of Bosnia, for example, and directly inserting it into a combat environment is not as simple as previously suggested. The CRS-29 degradation of combat skills is the most significant limiting factor in this approach. The time required to regain high combat status prior to re-engaging in operations should be a key consideration in estimating U.S. capacity to execute warplans. Therefore, counting forces off-station in terms of the smallest effective independent combat element, that is, battalion, squadron, or ship, and realistically evaluating the time required to return the unit to combat-ready status following its redeployment, assuming it can be objectively and soundly done, is considered to be an improvement over simply reporting a “snapshot” of personnel, supplies, and training under SORTS. This approach, similar to the Navy’s, takes into account the vagaries and uncertainties involved in fast-paced operations. Why OPTEMPO Is High The causes of high OPTEMPO are numerous. The drawdown of U.S. forces and the necessary demands of maintaining a force ready to fight two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC), which includes a demanding exercise schedule, are significant challenges but were foreseen by defense planners. The increased length, size, intensity, and complexity of recent military operations other than war (OOTW), and the military’s expanded role in carrying out the National Security Strategy were unforeseen at the time of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and have combined to drive OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO well beyond envisioned levels. Overseas presence down = fewer forces for more tasks. The reduction of overseas presence requires fewer forward-based forces to perform more tasks thereby raising both the workloads on the forces and the costs of the operations. CONUSbased forces must travel farther and longer to reach deployment areas. Of the 674 Army facilities closed world-wide since 1989, 593 were overseas. U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) reduced from 16 main and 37 minor operating bases to 6 and 14 bases respectively. Nine USAFE fighter wings totaling 636 aircraft were reduced to 3 wings with 168 fighters total. Commensurate personnel reductions from 62,000 down to 27,000 were made while the U.S. Army now counts only 125,000 soldiers in Europe, Panama, and the Pacific combined. Naval and Marine Corps contributions to ongoing operations are usually included as part of pre-planned deployments. Here too, PERSTEMPO complications arise when forces returning from duty are quickly returned to deployed-status for new operations. Specifically, concurrent complex operations continue to challenge the Pentagon; among them are operations in Bosnia, extended 18 months to June 1998 and perhaps longer, northern and southern Iraq, and counter-drug operations. At the same time, the increased use of military forces in support of the Clinton Administration’s National Security Policy of Engagement has contributed significantly to the increase. For example, Partnership for Peace (PFP), the engagement of the countries of central and eastern Europe along with those of the former Soviet Union, has entailed a significant increase in commitments of U.S. forces to bilateral and multilateral exercises and international events. PFP builds closer relations and the ability to work together with NATO by committing military forces to combined exercises, military exchanges, and international training. Events are held as far east as Kazakstan in Central Asia to Norway in the north and Spain in the south. USAFE’s participation in PFP in 1996 totaled over 400 such instances, up from only 65 in 1993. Army CRS-30 forces in Europe face an even tougher PFP challenge as ground participation requires more coordination and a greater commitment of resources. In addition, dividing units for these small “exercises” interrupts their training schedules. Exercises, as illustrated in Figure 7, are a key aspect of the military readiness program and therefore, consume a large amount of time and resources. At the end of the Cold War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained a comprehensive five-year exercise plan which, during the drawdown years, was not appreciably altered to account for the reductions in available forces. This schedule, planned to exercise a global-war-based force, contributed to high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. Recently, DoD has taken significant steps to lessen the strain of exercise demands by reducing the number of exercises, combining similar exercises, and eliminating some redundancies. Work still needs to be done on managing the force requirements of regional Commanders-In-Chief as they plan their annual readiness exercises in order to balance these demands with the requirements of an expanded foreign policy. While exercises are a large part of current operations, they are within the control of DoD; many real world operations are less so. CRS-31 Figure 7. Combat Air Force (CAF) training exercises in the U.S. and the decreasing number of FighterWing Equivalents (FWE) on the same chart. (COPE THUNDER is held in Alaska) The number and type of exercises contribute to OPTEMPO. Source: Air Combat Command. CRS-32 Some critics of the President attribute the Clinton Administration’s willingness to use military forces in an ever-widening range of operations to a combination of available military competence and White House inexperience (the experience of Secretaries Perry and Christopher notwithstanding). This view holds that the new administration, beset by international crises and determined to pursue a domestic agenda, “discovered” that the military was a highly efficient and very successful organization that would “carry out orders.” Despite a “professed aversion” to the military, the pace of international events, coupled with a general disinterest in them, led to quick action to “send in the troops.” Initial successes led to even more use of U.S. forces as the administration learned the political value of “keeping a lid on events.” Others see the increased use of military units in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations as the natural outgrowth of victory in the Cold War. This view holds that intervening to prevent or contain conflict is wiser than waiting for conflict to grow and that the moral imperatives of preventing starvation and genocide outweigh the actual costs. While still others see a U.S. military force that is supported more substantially with resources than any other in the world, that does not face a large critical threat, and see no reason to protect it from useful proactive employment. Regardless of perspective, the military itself is also responsible for the increases. Military culture and military imperatives are contributing factors in high levels of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO.11 The statement “We never met a deployment we didn’t like” is indicative of the military’s willingness to “fight any foe, bear any burden”. The can-do attitude of the military culture prevents many in the services from demanding relief from excessive tasking. Further, careerism, especially in the command structure, may inhibit ambitious officers from turning down additional work no matter how valid the complaint. Competition for resources within and between the services can contribute to military “volunteerism”. The business adage, “you get what you reward” holds true in the military and the military rewards operational success. The need for decisive victory is an oft re-learned military lesson that compels commanders to maintain the best capability against potential adversaries and to engage with the most forces possible. The military culture contributes to high OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. Given direction, the military culture can work to lower it. The changing nature of military operations. Increased use of the military in the post-Cold War era entails more than just the number of major operations involving U.S. forces. The nature of post-Cold War operations has changed as these efforts tend to be larger, more intense, more complex, and of longer duration (See figures 8 through 12) In addition, many of these large, complex operations are running concurrently in widespread locations creating new challenges for all aspects of military operations. An internal Air Force study describes the context of the new environment: The increase in demand for USAF assets and personnel has come at a time when USAF inventory, personnel, operating locations, and budgets have experienced 11 GAO Report Nos B-271135 and GAO/NSIAD-96-105. April 8, 1996. page 11 CRS-33 dramatic downsizing. The USAF aircraft inventory has declined 31 percent during the past five years. USAF active uniformed personnel have also steadily declined since 1990, from 535,233 to 400,409 in 1995, while personnel permanently based overseas have decreased at a faster pace, almost 40 percent since 1990 - most of these reductions from forces based in Europe, which have fallen from 63,000 to 27,000 in the last six years. Even with DoD wide resources falling nearly 13 percent since 1989, USAF budgets have declined nearly 22 percent over the same period. Taken in sum, this increase in operational tempo against the backdrop of declining inventory reveals a three-fold increase in the intensity of USAF operations since 1989.12 Figure 8: Intensity of USAF operations is increasing due to increased commitments and a reduced number of aircraft.. 12 Final draft of “Today’s Air Force: The Use of Air and Space Power Across the Spectrum of Peace and Conflict” prepared by DFI International, January 1997. Includes Figures 8, 9, and 10. CRS-34 While the intensity and duration of events are increasing, Figures 8 and 9, the total number of overseas events is decreasing, Figure 10, due to the inability of forces engaged in operations to conduct large-scale exercises. This makes sense as more forces are tied up in operations for longer periods, less time and fewer resources are available for training exercises. Figures 11 and 12 show specific examples of these trends. Figure 9. Operations involving USAF assets are becoming longer CRS-35 Figure 10. As commitments to operations increase and lengthen, total number of events and participation in exercises decrease Why High Optempo Is a Problem The cumulative effects of the post-Cold War drawdown coupled with an increased use of the military in a greater range of international crises has led to a sustained high level of operations for many units and critical personnel. In the past, large military forces provided the capacity for the U.S. to engage in operations other than war with little degradation to readiness or effectiveness. Minor commitments were met using a large pool of resources so that most units did not suffer the effects of repetitive deployments or continuous interruptions to their training cycles. Now with the capacity of the global-war-based force diminished, the continuing use of forces dedicated to the National Military Strategy in operations other than war (OOTW), that is, in operations other than those for which they are organized, trained, and equipped, may be hampering DoD’s ability to execute its short and long-range plans and programs in support of its many fixed obligations. However important operations other than war may be to U.S. security in the post-Cold War world, a sustained high tempo of military operations may have detrimental affects on short-term readiness and long-term military effectiveness. For CRS-36 example, temporary reductions in readiness, temporary loss of finely-honed combat skills, increased depreciation rates of some military hardware, and delays in modernization and acquisition programs can all be tied to a higher than planned rate of activity. Units returning from deployments often require extensive periods to recover their pre-deployment level of readiness. The 1st Armored Division, upon completing its Implementation Force (IFOR) duties in Bosnia was put on a 100-day recovery program by its commander.13 In this case, the ability to maneuver as a complete unit and to coordinate its maneuvers with other large ground forces, was the essential task in which it was the least proficient. Air Force pilots attending Red Flag exercises following long peacekeeping deployments are showing reduced abilities compared to their “stateside” counterparts. After each deployment, Marine maintenance units are working significantly harder and longer to maintain their aging equipment. This higher than planned rate of activity has interrupted and may continue to interrupt the funding streams for other DoD programs as the Pentagon is forced to pay for unplanned operations from existing accounts. As the capacity to absorb these unforeseen operations is reduced, competition for resources within DoD and within the federal budget will increase. There is concern that long-term, the cumulative stress associated with open-ended operations may lead to chronic and insidious problems such as declines in morale and retention. These declines would increase costs as replacements must be recruited and trained. For example, to replace a combat-ready pilot with 8 years experience, costs, on average, $4.3 million and takes several years. Other problems are reductions in overall proficiency and experience levels, delays in routine and depot maintenance, depleted or dislocated logistics, and premature fatigue in some weapon systems. Replacing weapon systems sooner than planned can lead to major disruptions in longterm acquisition strategies. Congressional understanding key to successful innovation. Congress is keenly interested in the readiness of U.S. forces, in the quality of life of U.S. military personnel, the size and shape of the military’s forces, and in the annual review of the defense budget. OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO issues facing all the services have significant implications in these areas. Congressional action on key military issues can either positively or negatively affect the armed forces’ capacity to sustain its current pace. A clear understanding of the new dynamics of operating the Department of Defense with smaller forces and budgets and increasing demands is a key focus for Congress and the debate on the Quadrennial Defense Review.14 13 From a speech by Major General Nash, commander of IFOR and the 1st Armored Division to the NATO-Russia IFOR Lessons Learned Conference, April, 1997. 14 For a further discussion of these issues, see Goldich, Robert L. and (name redacted), Defense Policy: Threats, Force Structure, and Budget Issues. CRS Report 96-729 F, Updated September 9, 1996. CRS-37 Figure 11. Decreasing end-strength and increasing deployments by personnel. Source: Air Combat Command CRS-38 Figure 12. Increasing commitment to overseas operations by Air Combat Command Forces. Source: Air Combat Command CRS-39 Maintaining a Viable Force Continuity in Training. A key to the long-term well being of U.S. forces is continuity of training. Too high OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO has implications for military effectiveness in that it interrupts individual and unit training cycles. In order to maintain a force capable of meeting the demands of high-intensity combat, the individual military services develop short and long-term training and exercise plans for their forces. At the same time, they blend these requirements with their peacetime commitments around the world. The services budget to pay for these ongoing training and exercise activities as well as to develop and acquire modern equipment to replace existing systems. All of these requirements are planned for and programmed into the Defense Budget. Forces not engaged in required training, exercises, or ongoing commitments are available and can engage in other activities with little detrimental impact on their readiness. Unplanned operations or other activities that repeatedly interrupt the training cycles or that reduce the time available to maintain combat readiness, can have adverse effects. In other words, there are minimum resources and a minimum time required for basic military preparedness so that units may retain the capabilities required of them. For many units, the minimums established by their services are not currently available. A comparison of Figures 13 and 14 (below), provided by the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC), shows the effect of high activity levels on unit training time. Figure 13 shows the planned 160 days for readiness training while currently, there may be only 80-120 days available. Figure 14 shows the effect of unplanned additional contingency days and exercise days. These additional contingency and exercise days violated the Air Force’s own 120-day limit resulting in 136 days “off station”. Figure 14 shows the added burden of inspections and local exercises which reduces the actual training days available number to 80-120 days. “Surge days” are those days when a unit flies almost double its daily flying load in order to “catch-up” to either its flying-hour requirements, its training requirements, or to make up for flying lost due to inclement weather. These days are an extra burden on maintenance crews and minimize the time pilots have for thorough preparation and post-mission analysis and therefore are not suitable for in-depth combat training. “Productivity days” are days off accorded by the commander for meeting flying goals. These down days are an important part of a unit’s rest/recovery cycle and are used as a positive motivator by operational commanders. CRS-40 Figure 13. Theoretical annual schedule of an Air Force F-15 squadron given a deployment commitment of 120 days per year. A comparison of figures 13 and 14, provided by the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC), shows high activity levels reducing available unit training time. CRS-41 Figure 14. Unplanned additional contingency, exercise, inspection, and local exercise days reduce the number of actual training days available to 80-120 days indicating that both external and internal factors contribute to high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. Source: Air Combat Command CRS-42 Bottom Line: Sustaining a high operational tempo difficult. In theory, peacetime militaries can only sustain a finite level of activity beyond that required to maintain military readiness and effectiveness through training, exercises, and maintenance. High activity beyond this sustainment level can be “surged” for short periods with little detrimental affect; however, engaging in lengthy activities not related to preparing themselves for their primary missions diminishes the involved units’ capacity to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. Over time, the cumulative affects of lost training time, missed exercises, unprogrammed expenditures, and extended deployments degrade the overall capability of the force. In practice, U.S. military forces, with innovation and dedication, have risen to meet these near-term challenges; yet, there is growing concern that long-term problems may result if today’s obstacles are a result of a fundamental mismatch of resources and requirements. Value of Monitoring OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO High OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO then, may provide some indication that U.S. forces may be exceeding their designed capabilities in some areas and failing to meet their planned objectives in others. Understanding OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO does not provide insight into the validity of either the current two-MRC strategy or the policy of pursuing broader military engagement in the world at-large. Understanding OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO may, however, indicate whether or not U.S. forces are reasonably capable of meeting current and proposed obligations and in what areas change and/or innovation may be required. OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO and the QDR. The key OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO-related questions in the debate on the Quadrennial Defense Review are a) whether or not the armed forces of the United States are sufficiently structured and prepared to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy, b) whether or not the current requirements levied on the armed forces are too high, resulting in substantial implications for what the military strategy should be. Measuring OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO and comparing those measurements with other factors like readiness levels, personnel retention statistics, and unit evaluations will give some indication of what level of activity U.S. forces, as currently postured and engaged, are capable of sustaining. CRS-43 Current Trends15 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili gave the following testimony before the House National Security Committee in February of 1997: One of the strategic consequences of the post Cold War period is that the U.S. has been able to reduce military force levels. Since 1989, the active all-volunteer force has been reduced by 700,000 people — about a third of the active force. The Army has gone from 18 active divisions to 10, a 45 percent reduction; the Navy from 566 ships to 352, a 38 percent decline; and the Air Force, from 36 to 20 fighter wings, down 45 percent. These are the lowest force levels since before the Korean War. The Defense Budget has also been cut by about 40 percent since 1985. In FY98, it will represent only 3.0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, the lowest since before World War II.16 In addition, Marine Corps end-strength was reduced by 12 percent. Table 4 below summarizes the drawdown. The armed forces are much smaller but are more operationally active than their Cold War predecessors. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, America has committed forces to nearly 40 crises. Operational deployments increased 300 percent over Cold War levels. At the same time, the size of the military has been reduced to pre-World War II levels. On average, the last ten years have seen a more than onethird reduction in the size of U.S. forces. Since 1986, the Air Force alone downsized 36 percent and reduced overseas presence by 40 percent. The combined result of smaller size and increased activity is illustrated by the following: in 1993, the Air Force deployed 28,900 of its 441,533 personnel; by 1996, the figures rose to 63,000 of 385,000, a 118 percent increase. While this number reflects a small percentage of the total force, it is a significant percentage of those forces capable of deploying. Unfortunately, statistics indicating the number of deployed individuals as a percentage of those available to deploy are not tracked by DoD. However, on any given day, the Army estimates 35,000 soldiers are deployed up from 21,500 in 1996. Other military obligations contribute to higher PERSTEMPOs. While the average number of 15 Some have drawn an analogy between the current situation facing the U.S. military and a major league baseball team battling in the playoffs. The games are very close, most are extending into extra innings, some, well into the night, and the players, stressed by the travel, the interrupted schedules and the intensity of the competition, are getting tired and may be losing focus. Now, not knowing if they’ll be in the World Series or not, the manager is using starting pitchers in relief on two days and even one day rest because nobody remembers who comes in second. Should the team make it to the World Series, no one knows if they’ll be ready...but, what’s the point of having an expensive team if you’re not going to use it? The challenge facing QDR planners is how to rest the team, practice fundamentals, retain enough good players to be a contender, and play a 162 game season, when revenues are down, when free agency is tugging at the best players, when the season has been compressed, and overseas franchises have been added to the league. 16 Statement of General John M. Shalikashvili before the House National Security Committee, February 12, 1997. CRS-44 steaming days per quarter has shown only a slight increase in the Navy, this result was achieved through aggressive management and reduction of training days at sea. Although these days are projected to remain stable, the Navy budget projects exceeding deployed OPTEMPO limits through FY 1999 based on projections in support of current contingencies (See Figure 15). The likely trends for all services are upward (See “Future Trends in OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO on page 53). Table 4. Force Structure Drawdown Army Navy Air Force Marines Cold War 18 Divisions 566 Ships 36 Ftr Wings 3 Divisions 1997 10 Divisions 352 Ships 20 Ftr Wings 3 Divisions Change -8 Divisions -214 Ships -16 Ftr Wings -0 Divisions 45% 38% 45% 12% % Decrease Note: Marine Corps reductions occurred in manpower not in force structure. Current pressures may be creating trends toward innovation thereby helping DoD come to grips with the new realities of the post Cold War era. In many cases, the pressures involved in doing more with less have led to innovations and “new thinking” in the deployment of forces and in planning for modernization. Increased use of reserve component forces, new training methods and priorities, cross leveling requirements in order to “share the load” within and between the services are all enabling DoD to meet current demands. The Air Force’s creation of an Air Expeditionary Force and its development of a doctrine for its use are born out of the necessity of the day. Some observers suggest that the necessity of meeting today’s demand has accelerated reform with DoD and the military departments. Coupled with budget-constraints, the push toward innovation in all areas may be, in the end, of tremendous benefit to the country. A Conceptual Framework: Decreasing Size vs Increasing Workload Smaller forces, increased commitments equal higher workloads. Conceptually, reducing the workforce while increasing the commitments, even with the addition of management efficiencies, will result in higher per capita workloads. At the point that higher workload would begin to diminish returns is generally considered the point of maximum efficiency. According to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36 percent while increasing deployed operations by 300 percent. In this case, the combination of personnel reductions and mission increases results in a purely mathematical 625 percent increase in workload. The reduction of personnel alone, without an increase in the workload, nets a per capita increase of 156 percent. The reduction of force structure by 45 percent, without an increase in the workload, in both the Army and the Air Force equals a 185 percent increase. These theoretical increases alone would require substantial commitments to reform, restructuring, and innovation. The addition of a significant and sustained level of operational deployments and international exercises without additional resources compounds the dilemma. Gone CRS-45 unchecked, such increases would be unsustainable. The difference between the mathematically increased workload and the actual workload can be attributed to management efficiencies, reorganizations, increasing the workload on individuals and units, depleting surplus accounts, and other actions that ensure the services can accomplish their requirements with the forces they have. One indication of the actual increase in workload is PERSTEMPO. In testimony before the Congress, the Army estimates that its officers and senior non-commissioned officers from deployable units spend 180-190 days away from home annually, while junior soldiers spend 140-155 days away. Understanding how the Army and the other services absorbed the increased load during the drawdown to reach today’s level of effort is essential to planning for the future. This analysis raises the question: What has DoD stopped doing, what is DoD doing less of, and does doing less compromise readiness? Table 5. Estimated PERSTEMPO Days Annuallya Army Deployments Only Operational Units: 140-155 Jr Enlisted 180-190 Sr NCO/Officer Target Avg 146b 365 120-150 Air Force Marines <120 days By policy, not more than 182183 days All duty Korea Navy except U-2 (148), RC-135RJ (148), A/OA-10 (146), F-16L (136), F-16GP (135), HC -130 (121), HH-60G (120) 177 Atlantic 159 Pacific 181 Cbt Spt By policy, not more than 120 days TDY 365 50% over past 3 years at home 120 Deployments should not exceed 6 months a This table was compiled from data presented in testimony to the House National Security Committee during hearings from February to March 1997 and from data provided by the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, United States Air Force. b Based on an average turn-around ratio of 2.6-2.4:1 reported by the Navy staff CRS-46 Figure 15. Ship steaming days per quarter deployed and non-deployed 1971-1999. Fluctuations from the goals reflect real world operations, FY 1996-FY 1999 levels for known contingencies. Source: FY 1998/FY 1999 Department of the Navy Budget. CRS-47 What is the percentage of troops involved in current operations? The percentage of deployable combat and combat support forces committed to operations may be higher than estimated by DoD. These are the forces whose readiness is measured and reported. Many DoD officials and outside observers, however, continue to define the size of current commitments as a percentage of DoD endstrength. To get an accurate picture of the impact on U.S. capabilities, it is important to exclude the portion of DoD that is not eligible or qualified to engage in current or combat operations when gauging the importance to U.S. defense interests of current obligations. According to GAO, quoting Army officials, only 63 percent of 495,000 Active Army soldiers are in combat or combat support units and therefore are eligible to deploy17. Also, calculation of this percentage should be based on the explanation of Army operations and readiness officials who estimate that for every unit deployed, one more is preparing to deploy, and one is recovering from deployment. In addition, one more unit is used to provide personnel and resources to the deploying unit. The result is that, at times, as much as a 4-1 ratio of units/soldiers can be involved or affected by deployments. In May 1997, the Army estimated 35,800 soldiers deployed (not including those on assignment without their families to Korea) of which, 7,500 were from the reserve components. Therefore, 63 percent of 495,000 divided into 4 x 28,300 = 36.3 percent of the Active “deployable” Army was committed to and/or affected by deployed operations. The addition of the 27,500 soldiers deployed to Korea to the 4 x 28,300 nets a 45.1 percent of the active “deployable Army” currently engaged in supporting operational deployments. Whereas, 35,800 divided by the total FY98 authorized “Total Force” end-strength of 1.1 million nets a mere 3 percent and it is 6 percent of the active Army of 495,000. Bosnia and Korea are sizable operations for the Army. U.S. Army Europe maintains two active Army divisions. The SFOR commitment in Bosnia requires one complete division staff and almost 8,000 soldiers. To keep this commitment, the Army must obligate key elements of 3 divisions to the effort; more than is available in the two stationed in Europe. As stated, when the 1st Armored Division was on a 100-day recovery program, the 1st Infantry Division was in Bosnia, and the follow-on forces for the troops currently in Bosnia were beginning to prepare. Rotations to Korea, in PERSTEMPO terms, that is, to keep individual PERSTEMPOs manageable, affects enough soldiers to man 3 divisions (See “Korea” below). These two commitments can involve a significant portion of the Army’s 10 divisions. Regional exercises also require a significant commitment. The Army at certain times can find itself long on commitments and short on forces. The other services are also significantly affected by current operations. Air Force readiness officials estimated that as of May 1996, 13 of 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents were required to support current operations. Therefore, 65 percent of the combat fighter force was committed in some way to ongoing missions. The Navy and Marine Corps routinely have 30 percent of their forces “deployed” at sea with another 20 percent of the Navy “underway” at sea which means that on any given day, 50 percent of the Navy’s ships are at sea. These rough estimates support the assertion of some DoD officials that the level of effort for all ongoing contingencies is 17 GAO Report NSIAD-97-66. “Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet TwoConflict Strategy With Some Risks.” February 28, 1997. p. 19. CRS-48 equivalent to fighting one major regional contingency. Forces permanently stationed overseas can, as in the case of Korea, be considered as involved in current operations. The large number of forces involved is both problem and solution. Reducing the number of fighter wings involved in operations would probably raise the OPTEMPO above their 120-day ceiling, lower the readiness, and increase the time required to recover. The services are balancing the load across the entire force which means more forces are used to keep OPTEMPO within reasonable limits. The expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps, which support current operations with their forward deployed forces (e.g. in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea), were designed to keep OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO within limits; however, increased activity and reduced resources are affecting their forces too. Korea: Compounding the PERSTEMPO problem for individuals. For the 36,000 Americans serving in Korea, roughly 95 percent do so without their families. Assignment to Korea, with a minimum tour-length of one year, guarantees a service member a statistical PERSTEMPO of 365 days. Selection for Korea duty is without regard for one’s previous PERSTEMPO level. A soldier coming off the annual Army operational average of 140-150 days per year away from home ends up with a twoyear average of 255 days away from home when returning from Korea. Assuming that the same soldier is reassigned to an operational unit following Korea, the threeyear average would equal 218 days per year. For officers and senior NCOs, the twoyear average would be 275 and the three-year average, 245. By comparison, the Navy policy of 50 percent of one’s time spent at home over three years results in a 182 day maximum annual average. An example: What it takes to keep within tolerable limits. The figures below illustrate the requirements of a high OPTEMPO environment. The Air Force’s “Rivet Joint” electronic surveillance aircraft, which is a “Low Density/High Demand” (LD/HD) asset, that is, an aircraft of which there are few but for which there is great demand, has significantly increased its workload since Desert Storm. As illustrated in the following charts, in order for the Air Force to meet its stated requirement to keep PERSTEMPO below 120 days per year, it must increase the ratio of aircrews to aircraft. Figure 16 shows that prior to Desert Storm, mission requirements meant that 19 crews would keep the tempo below the threshold. At that time, the unit had 22 crews. Following Desert Storm, the increase in mission requirements raised the number of aircrews required to maintain the PERSTEMPO threshold at or below 120 days to 26 fully-trained, mission-ready aircrews. This 27% increase in assigned aircrews would require the Air Force to take aviators from another resource or to train more aviators causing either a potential shortfall for the losing units in the first case, or a reduction in aircrew experience levels in the second; either way, the move would increase costs. In addition to adding aircrews, maintenance and support personnel would need to be added to assist in managing the extra flying load on the unit. This example of a unit in extremely high demand shows both the dramatic increase in mission requirements and the significant actions required, in this instance, to bring the workload back within tolerable levels. CRS-49 Figure 16. Number of airborne surveillance crews required to meet requirements prior to Desert Storm. Source, Air Force Studies and Analysis CRS-50 Figure 17. Increase in crew requirements required to keep airborne surveillance PERSTEMPO below the Air Force goal. Source, Air Force Studies and Analysis CRS-51 “It’s NOT war” — Home Station Hurt. The higher than anticipated use of U.S. forces and the associated effects are not limited to deployed units. The forces involved in operations are not the only ones experiencing higher than normal activity levels. Headquarters staffs are pressed, in some cases severely, by the combination of ongoing operations and other international obligations. Headquarters personnel deploy to many locations in support of operations leaving their colleagues undermanned at a time when work requirements are highest. This is an example of “home-station hurt,” a phenomenon whereby the depleted manpower at home is forced to accomplish 100 percent of the routine tasks in addition to the ongoing support tasks required by the deployments. This phenomenon is not limited to headquarters and other small staffs. Bases from which troops deploy, and any units which send personnel suffer some level of “home-station hurt.” In these cases, the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of the non-deployed personnel increases as well. The increase, measured in longer work hours and other indicators of personnel stress, may also have detrimental affects on unit morale and individual and unit effectiveness. The non-deployed forces do not receive the additional pay, medals, and positive reinforcement as their deployed counterparts yet work extended hours in support of the same commitments and more. Further, when it’s time for those affected by “home-station hurt” to deploy, many do so in a degraded capacity due to their already high activity levels. This aspect of high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO can be a significant factor in morale and should be considered in policy decisions affecting OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. Trends in retention and reenlistments. The trend toward greater use of military forces has sharpened the focus on readiness and retention. Former Secretary of Defense Perry made readiness and quality of life issues his priorities during his tenure in order to avoid the pitfalls of a hollow force. While concerted action has ensured at least short-term stability and an acceptable level of readiness, many analysts point to signs of cracks at the fringes of effectiveness. In testimony before Congress, service personnel chiefs continue to warn of impending problems with retention and re-enlistments. Statistics show no immediate declines; still personnel officials, who base their views on surveys of and discussions with military members, anticipate future declines because current statistics are historical, not predictive. Air Force pilot retention and pilot willingness to accept bonuses for continued aviation service are both dropping. In FY97, only 32 percent of eligible Air Force aviators accepted a pilot bonus to continue their service. Army recruiters are seeing evidence of the public’s perception of too numerous deployments. Pentagon Efforts: Protecting long-term military effectiveness The Pentagon is aggressively tackling OPTEMPO issues within its purview. The Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) established a mechanism to provide relief to overworked units. Under this policy, Commanders-In-Chief cannot, without the Chairman’s adjudication and the Secretary’s concurrence, use forces that have already exceeded their time allocated to non-readiness related activities. This policy is designed to give “Low Density/High Demand” units a break from near-continuous operations. Although this policy has had success, it has limited application. The policy does begin to address DoD’s chief challenge in managing OPTEMPO: How does the Pentagon “Just Say No”? CRS-52 An example: Air Force Global Sourcing. To reduce the excessive burden on heavily tasked units, European-based forces for example, the Air Force uses a “Global Sourcing” policy that fills operational requirements from organizations world-wide. The graphs in figure 17 below show the effect of “sharing the load;” spreading requirements over geographically-diverse units. Both the Global Military Force Policy and the Air Force’s Global Sourcing are examples of crisis-driven innovation in which the Pentagon finds low-cost solutions while managing an acceptable level of risk. As high OPTEMPO levels continue, the necessary prioritization of requirements may lead to other such innovations as senior decision makers are forced to make choices. Monitoring the burden on units and individuals should be an important activity while DoD undergoes these transitions. CRS-53 TDY loads while U.S.-based and Pacific-based Figure 18. European-based USAFE aircraft have reduced aircraft have increased their share of the burden of current operations through “Global Sourcing.” Source: CRS from DoD data. CRS-54 What Do the Facts Mean? Understanding the Implications This section explains the effects of high activity levels within the echelons of the Department of Defense. The cause and effect relationships described below provide an explanation of the potentially deleterious effects of excessive OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. High OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO manifests itself in different ways depending upon the area of focus. Individuals and units face different challenges in meeting current demands, while the services and DoD have their own unique sets of problems and responsibilities. Increases in OPTEMPO and/or PERSTEMPO affect each level differently as do changes in policies and procedures. At the individual level. High PERSTEMPO means people, while generally satisfied engaging in military operations, are not able to meet other demands and goals such as Professional Military Education (PME), specialized training that will enable them to advance in their careers, and important family obligations. When individuals believe their goals and aspirations are at risk due to higher than anticipated military requirements, their willingness to continue in military service diminishes. A sense of satisfaction comes from being highly proficient at one’s chosen and assigned duties. Pilots, for example, lose proficiency and motivation, when their combat skills erode because they were engaging in peacekeeping operations. The high number of Training Waivers, that is, authorizations to fly without completing requisite training, granted to pilots by the Air Force is indicative of this decline in capability. In addition, predictability in their lives is a key factor in maintaining morale regardless of the pace of operations. Equal consideration should be given to individuals remaining behind as their PERSTEMPO increases in order to cover the dutie [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3A98-41. Public record. Not legal advice.