# Terrorism at Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3A95-1050 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** September 24, 2001 - **Citation:** 95-1050 ## Text Order Code 95-1050 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Terrorism at Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws Updated September 24, 2001 -name redactedSenior Specialist American Law Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Terrorism at Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws Summary Terrorists’ attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Murrah building in Oklahoma City and the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have stimulated demands that the terrorists responsible and those like them be brought to justice. American criminal law already proscribes many of these acts of terrorism and there have been proposals to expand that coverage. This is a brief overview of the state and federal laws which now prohibit terrorism in this country and abroad. Since terrorism is a creature of motive in whose name almost any wrong might be committed, the interests of time and space require a more limited focus. For purposes of this report, terrorism is conduct, committed or foregone, which instills a fear of physical injury or of property damage or which is intended to do so. Although ordinarily crime is proscribed by the law of the place where it occurs, more than a few American criminal laws apply to terrorism committed outside the United States. The power to enact such laws flows from the Constitution and is usually limited by little more than due process notice. Reticence to offend another sovereign, however, has traditionally limited American exercise of such authority to instance where there is a discernible nexus to the United States. In the United States, the conduct we most often associate with terrorism – bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnapping, threats – are generally outlawed by both federal and state law. The federal approach builds upon individual national interests: the protection of federal officers, ensuring the safety of foreign diplomatic officials, guaranteeing the safety and integrity of the mails and the channels of interstate and foreign commerce, and honoring our international obligations. Consequently international terrorism is first and foremost a matter of federal law. Crime within the United States, however, has traditionally been the domain of state law. It is therefore not surprising that the reach of state criminal law, concerning terrorism as well as other matters, is more comprehensive than that of the federal laws which supplement it. Where federal law condemns presidential assassination, state law prohibits murdering anyone. Until recently, the seemingly boundless reach of the Commerce Clause suggested state primacy may have begun to erode. In a shrinking nation, few saw any activities that could not arguable be characterized as affecting commerce, the threshold for federal legislative authority. In at least two areas central to control of terrorism, firearms and explosives, those assumptions may now be open to question as a result of recent court interpretations. Contents INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TERRORISM COMMITTED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES . . . . . . . 3 Constitutional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Commerce Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Specific Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Bombings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Murder and Armed Assaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Kidnapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Poison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 General Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 TERRORISM COMMITTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Constitutional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Limits on Legislative Authority: Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Bill of Attainder & Ex Post Facto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Statutory Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Present Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Federal Anti-Terrorist Criminal Laws Which Apply Within the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Assaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Kidnapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Bombing & Property Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Piggyback Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Federal Anti-Terrorist Criminal Laws With Apparent Extraterritorial Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Piggyback Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Assaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Kidnapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Bombing & Property Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Piggyback Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Model Penal Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Restatement of the Law, Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Terrorism at Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws INTRODUCTION Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon, and the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania raised questions about the adequacy of the law’s condemnation of terrorism. American criminal law clear proscribes terrorism in this country and reaches a surprising number of terrorist incidents overseas. This report is a brief overview of when American criminal law outlaws terrorism, whether committed within the United States or beyond our borders. It examines the constitutional power of Congress and of state legislatures to enact anti-terrorist legislation and the extent to which they have done so.1 Definition The definition of terrorism for purposes of American criminal law involves two very different concepts both prominent in federal law – one violent and the other threatening violence. The first, usually considered international but now too well known in the United States, has a political stripe and consequently has proven particularly resistant to consensus definition. It is the stuff of bombings, assassinations, and air piracy, committed for political purposes.2 1 Other recent CRS terrorism-related products include Terrorism Briefing Book: Legislative Issues, available at www.congress.gov/brbk; Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, CRS ISSUE BRIEF IB95112 (updated regularly); Krouse & Perl, Automated Lookout systems and Border Security Options and Issues, CRS REP.NO. RL31019 (June 18, 2001); and Brake, Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS REP.NO. RL30938 (April 18, 2001). 2 One of the difficulties in formulating a uniformly acceptable definition is that terrorism is a term of opprobrium with adverse legal consequences; many are therefore reluctant to endorse any definition which might apply the term to those they admire or support; “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International Law: The Yunis Decision as a Model for Prosecution of Terrorists in U.S. Courts, 22 LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 409, 410 (1991), quoting MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 3 (1989). Terrorism is described as: [1] “activity, directed against United States persons, which – (A) is committed by an individual who is not a national or permanent resident alien of the United States; (B) involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life which would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States; and (C) is intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping,” 18 U.S.C. CRS-2 The second brand of terrorism, the more distinctly American cousin, although at times violent and politically motivated or a harbinger of more serious misconduct, need be no more than a threat designed to engender fear;3 it is blackmail or extortion without their mercenary elements; it is at the heart of our contemporary stalking laws.4 At various points the two share common ground,5 but the difficulty is to mark 921(22); [2] “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,” 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2); [3] “an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any state; and appears to be intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed. 1990), citing, 18 U.S.C.A. §3077; [4] “the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.” WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM 16 (1982); [5] “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Alexander, Maritime Terrorism and Legal Responses, 19 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 529 (1991); [6] “a strategy of violence designed to inspire terror within a particular segment of a given society.” Bassiouni, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals, 72 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1981); and as [7] “the systematic use of terror as a means of coercion” or “an atmosphere of threat or violence.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED, 2361 (1986). 3 E.g., Haw.Rev.Stat. §707-715 (“a person commits the offense of terroristic threatening if he threatens, by word or conduct, to cause bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another or to commit a felony; (1) with the intent to terrorize, or in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing, another person, or. . .” ); MODEL PENAL CODE §211.3 (1985) (“a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence [committed] with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience”). 4 E.g., Cal.Penal Code §646.9(a)(“any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a creditable threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking. . .”). 5 Terrorism is “public, impersonal, repetitive violence or threats of violence that inspire fear in people who have not yet been, but could be, victims . . . . [and includes] pathological terrorism (solo psychotics and serial killers); hedonistic terrorism (motorcycle gangs tattooed with the slogan ‘born to raise hell’ and ruffians who bully subway riders for fun and profit); larcenous terrorism (‘enforcers’ for crime syndicates); . . . official terrorism (Hitler had his Gestapo in Nazi Germany, ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier had his Ton Ton Macoutes in Haiti) . . . [and] transnational terrorism, whose advocates hope to achieve sociopolitical objectives by creating such fear and suffering in targeted countries that senior officials find concessions CRS-3 the ground occupied by either. If motive alone, whether to instill fear or to instill fear for a political purpose, defines terrorism, only those crimes which defy such motivation are excludable. Few crimes could escape the definition. Yet to define terrorism more narrowly risks exclusion of misconduct which American criminal law embodies within its concept of terrorism. Consequently for purposes of this report terrorism is conduct calculated to instill a fear of physical injury or property destruction.6 TERRORISM COMMITTED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Constitutional Considerations Federal law is a creature of the Constitution. Congress may enact only those laws that the Constitution authorizes and none that it prohibits. The authority to enact criminal laws ordinarily lies with the states, because the Constitution vests no general criminal power in the federal government. The Constitution, however, does grant Congress general powers over other areas, powers of sufficient breadth to accommodate a fairly wide range of implementing criminal laws. Commerce Clause The Commerce Clause, U.S.Const. Art.I, §8, cl.3,7 provides the foundation for much of contemporary federal criminal law, terrorism and otherwise. Until fairly recently its bequest was considered virtually boundless. It’s outer limits, defined in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and confirmed in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), although not beyond reach, remain fairly remote. While Congress may not “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce,”8 it may pass laws preferable to continued chaos.” Collins, Transnational Terrorism and Counteractions: A Primer, CRS REP.NO. 93-328S (March 18, 1993). 6 Consequently, commercial terrorism, cyberterrorism, and other variants as they are most expansively understood are beyond the scope of this report. For a discussion of the federal law proscribing various form of computer-related crime see, Doyle, Computer Fraud and Abuse: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws, CRS REP.NO. 97-1025 (Feb. 22, 2001). 7 “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 8 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 516, citing, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568. So, it may not outlaw schoolyard possession of a firearm in the name of regulating interstate commerce simply because such possession may result in violent crime which may have an economic impact, which may feed an unwillingness to travel interstate, and which may produce an adverse education environment with substantial future economic costs, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-69. Nor may it proscribe gender motivated violence simply because such violence may have some attenuated impact interstate commerce “by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, form engaging in employment in interstate business, CRS-4 to protect the channels of interstate commerce, or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the activities which affect interstate commerce.9 Criminal statutes which either touch upon some economic activity or contain a jurisdiction element anchored to interstate commerce tend to exemplify the valid regulation of activities which affect interstate commerce.10 Of course, where a statute has such a jurisdictional element, it must be satisfied. The federal statute which proscribes bombing buildings “used in an activity affecting interstate commerce” covers a building used as commercial property, Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985), but not one used by its owner as a private residence rather than for commercial purposes, Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856-59 (2000). and from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products,” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 9 “First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. See, e.g., . . . Heart of Atlanta [Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)](‘The authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question’). . . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. See e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)(upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate commerce); Perez [v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)](‘For example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. §32), or . . . thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. §659)’). Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (some internal citations omitted); accord, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. 10 “[W]e have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation of intrastate coal mining; intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, and production and consumption of homegrown wheat. . . .” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (some internal citations omitted); accord, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. The presence of a “jurisdictional element which [ensures], through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce,” also greatly enhances the claim that a criminal statute lies within Congress’ power under the commerce clause, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.at 561; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12. CRS-5 First Amendment Prosecution of terrorists occasionally implicates the right to free speech,11 but the First Amendment does not protect the use of violence as a form of expression.12 Threats, incitement, or instruction to violence pose only a slightly more serious question. Historically, the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Smith Act, which proscribes incitement to overthrow the government,13 and of the Presidential assassination statute,14 together with lower court approval of the federal law which prohibits instruction in explosives with an eye to furthering civil unrest, 15 supply the basic concepts vital to understanding the permissible reach of anti-terrorist legislation. Although R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), teaches that even antiterrorist legislation, there a city ordinance against cross-burning, must nevertheless be content neutral to survive a higher level of scrutiny which only the most compelling governmental interest may overcome, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 11 For instance, one of the defendants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing claimed unsuccessfully that seizure of sundry printed material including his “terrorist kit;” documents entitled, “Rapid Destruction and Demolition” and “Facing the Enemies of God;” as well as material which “bristled with strong anti-American sentiment and advocated violence against targets in the United States,” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir. 1998). Another unsuccessful argued that prosecution under the statute which outlawed advocacy of violent overthrow of the government violated his free speech rights, United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114-16 (2d Cir. 1999) . 12 “[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. ‘[V]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection.’” Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993), citing, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984), and quoting, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). 13 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Noto v. United States; cf., Brandenbury v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The thrust of these cases is that the federal and state government, consistent with the demands of the First Amendment, may outlaw speech which urges the violent overthrow of the government in an environment where there is a reasonable expectation that seed will bloom. See also, United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 116-17 (2d Cir. 1999)(“freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes”). 14 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) overturned the conviction of a teenager who in the midst of a speech at a protest rally on the Washington Monument grounds said “if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is [then President] L.B.J.” While it found the statement protected as rough political hyperbole, it upheld the general constitutionality of the Presidential assassination statute. Contemporary lower courts cases have upheld application of the statute frequently distinguishing the “public rally” context of Watts, see e.g., United States v. Barris, 46 F.3d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1995); cf., United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1995)(distinguishing Watts in context of threats against various state and federal judges in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876). 15 United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1122-123 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 852-54 (5th Cir. 1991). CRS-6 And the lower federal appellate courts attest to the continued vitality of the traditional tests: for “time, place or manner restrictions;”16 for over breadth and vagueness;17 and the O’Brien test for the validity of statutes which regulate conduct with both speech and nonspeech components.18 Statutory Provisions Specific Crimes More than a few federal criminal laws reach the politically motivated acts of physical violence and property destruction that are the part and parcel of international terrorism.19 Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, was charged with and pled guilty to 16 Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1553 (8th Cir. 1995)(“[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information, Ward [v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 U.S. 781 (1989)]; Turner Broadcasting [Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994)]”). 17 Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994), quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 445 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)(“[i]n a facial challenge to the over breadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the over breadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissible vague in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others”); United States v. Wunsch, 54 F.3d 579,586 (9th Cir. 1995)(“[a] statute is void for vagueness when it does not sufficiently identify the conduct that is prohibited. When the statute has a potentially inhibiting effect on speech, this standard is ore strictly applied. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). . . . Laws that are insufficiently clear are void for three reasons: (1) To avoid punishing people for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations by government officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 (1972)”). 18 American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir. 1995), quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)(“a statute passes constitutional muster ‘if it [1] furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if [2] the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if [3] the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest’”). The law may condemn threats which promise to inflict physical injuries upon another communicated under circumstances which would place a reasonable person in apprehension that the threat will be carried out. 19 Bombings and fire bombings, armed assaults, assassinations, sabotage and property destruction, product contamination, kidnapping, hostage taking, and hijacking have been trademarks of international terrorism. SIMON, THE TERRORIST TRAP: AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM 348 (1994); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, 1993 (1994), reprinted in, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A CRS-7 violations of federal explosives laws.20 As a result of bombing the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were indicted and convicted under federal laws outlawing the murder of federal law enforcement officers, bombing federal buildings, and the use of weapons of mass destruction.21 Charges against the terrorists involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center included violations of federal laws outlawing the interstate transportation of explosives for unlawful use; bombing motor vehicles used in interstate commerce, property used in an activity affecting interstate commerce, and federal property; possession of a bomb during the commission of a federal crime of violence; assault on federal officers; foreign travel in furtherance of a crime of violence; and conspiracy.22 At the state level, terrorism has traditionally been thought of as akin to state crimes of harassment or menacing, a low grade form of assault. The law in some states continues to reflect this view,23 but it has been recently augmented by scattered COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS: REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 553, 615 (Comm. Print)(1994). 20 Kaczynski was indicted for and pled guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. 844(d)(interstate transportation of an explosive device), 1716 (mailing an explosive device), and 924(c) using an explosive device in relation to a federal crime of violence, United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 18 U.S.C. 1114, 844(f), 2332a, United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 1998). 22 18 U.S.C. 844(d), 33, 844(i), 844(f), 924(c), 111, 1952, and 371, United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 152 (2d Cir. 1998). There were also charges and convictions for seditious conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 2384, possession of forged passports, 18 U.S.C. 1546, conspiracy to assassinate and solicitation to assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak during his visit to this country, 18 U.S.C. 1116, 1117, murder of Meir Kahane in order to maintain a position in a racketeering enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1959, United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111, 118, 125, 126 (2d Cir. 1999). 23 Ala.Code §13A-10-15 (terrorist threat); Alaska Stat. §11.56.810 (terroristic threatening, i.e., false report of a dangerous condition that causes fear in another, evacuation of a building or public inconvenience); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-3110 (use of a simulated explosive device to terrify, intimidate or threaten), 13-2308.01(terrorism: as any unlawful act including any completed or preparatory offense involving the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or the intentional or knowing infliction of physical injury or criminal damage to property, and involving extortion, kidnapping or riot committed for political or financial gain); Ark.Code Ann. §§5-13-301 (terroristic threatening: threat of physical injury or property damage in order to terrorize), 5-13-310 (terroristic act is sniping); Cal.Penal Code §422 (terrorist threat to injure resulting in reasonable fear), 11413 (use of explosives against designated public buildings to cause fear), 11411 (using signs or symbols to terrorize a property owner); Colo.Rev.Stat. §18-9-120 (terrorist training); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §53a-62 (threat of physical injury); Del.Code Ann. tit.11 §621 (terroristic threat: threat to inflict injure or damage or false alarm causing an evacuation, serious inconvenience or terror); Ga.Code Ann. §16-11-37 (terroristic threats to injure or damage property in order to terrorize, cause evacuation, or cause serious public inconvenience); Hawaii Rev.Stat. §§707-715 to 707-717 (threaten to cause physical injury or property damage with the intent terrorize); Idaho Code §§18-6710, 18-6711 (telephone threats or terrorizing); Iowa Code Ann. §708.6 (terrorism: threats to fire, launch, or discharge a dangerous weapon in order to provoke fear); CRS-8 provisions directed against paramilitary groups or street gangs and other more severe Kan.Stat.Ann. §21-3419 (threat to commit violence with intent to terrorize); Ky.Rev.Stat. §508.080 (terroristic threatening includes both threats to inflict injury or damage and false alarms causing evacuation); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §14:40.1 (terrorizing: false alarm to cause fear of injury, evacuation, or serious public disruption); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.tit.17-A §210 (terrorizing: threaten to cause fear or evacuation of a building or facility); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§750.205a, (placement of explosive or incendiary to terrorize), 750.209(possession of a bomb in public with intent to terrorize); Minn.Stat.Ann. §609.713 (terroristic threats: threaten to violently injury or damage in order to terrorize); Miss.Code Ann. §97-3-85(threat with intent to terrorize); Mo.Ann.Stat. 574.115 (terroristic threats); Mont.Code Ann. §45-5221(civil rights related terrorist threats); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §631:4(threat with intent to terrorize); N.J.Stat.Ann. §2C:12-3 (terroristic threats: threat of violence to terrorize, cause evacuation of a building or facility or otherwise cause serious public inconvenience); N.D.Cent.Code §12.1-17-04 (terrorizing: threat of violence in order to frighten, to cause the evacuation of a building or to cause serious public inconvenience); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §2706 (terroristic threats: threat to commit a crime of violence to terrorize or cause evacuation of a building or facility or cause serious public inconvenience); S.D.Cod.Laws §22-14A-6 (possession of explosives with the intent to terrify or intimidate another); Tex.Penal Code §22.07 (terroristic threat made with intent to create fear of injury, or cause evacuation of the a build or facility); Wyo.Stat. §6-2-505 (terrorist threats: threaten to commit a violent felony in order to cause evacuation of a building or facility or cause serious public inconvenience); but see, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-2308.01 (outlawing as terrorism the unlawful use of a dangerous weapon or the infliction of property damage or personal injury, committed for political reasons with the intent to coerce a governmental entity or disturb public service); Ind.Code Ann. §35-47-12-1 (outlawing as terrorism disseminating or detonating a weapon of mass destruction). CRS-9 brands of terrorism.24 Of course, state law outlaws murder, assault, bombings, kidnappings, and threats whether politically motivated or otherwise. Bombings No comprehensive federal explosive statute exists, but the weave of federal law covering bombing is so extensive that most terrorist use of explosives will fall under at least one and sometimes more than one federal law; many of which carrying escalated penalties if death or serious bodily injury results. The proscriptions come in three stripes: those that deal with the interstate transportation of explosives;25 those 24 Ala.Code §31-2-125 (unlawful military congregation); Alaska Stat. §§12.55.155(29), 12.55.137 (crimes committed in connection with a criminal street gang are more severely punished); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-2308 (street gang participation); Ark.Code Ann. §§5-71301, 5-71-302 (instruction in firearms, explosives, or incendiaries); Cal.Penal Code §§11460 (same), 186.20-186.28 (street terrorism); Colo.Rev.Stat. §18-9-120 (terrorist training); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §53-206b (unlawful training in firearms, explosives, or incendiaries); Fla.Stat.Ann. §§874.01 to 874.09 (street terrorism), 790.29 (training in explosives, firearms or incendiaries); Ga.Code Ann. §§16-11-150 to 16-11-152 (antiterrorists training), 16-15-1 to 16-15-8 (street gang terrorism); Idaho Code §§18-8101 to 8104 (terrorist control); Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. ch. 720, §570/405.2 (street gang criminal drug conspiracies), ch.20, §1805/94a; Ind.Code Ann. §§35-45-9-1 to 35-45-9-4 (criminal gangs); Iowa Code Ann. §§723A.1 - 723A.2 (criminal street gang with terrorism as one of predicate offenses); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§14:117.1 (paramilitary organizations), 15:1401 to 15:1407 (criminal street gangs); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §750.528a (training in explosives, firearms or incendiaries);Minn.Stat.Ann. §609.229 (crime committed for benefit of a gang); Miss.Code Ann. §§97-43-15 to 97-43-17 (street gangs); Mo.Ann.Code §§45-8-401 to 45-8-408 (criminal street gang), 45-8-109 (training in firearms, explosives or incendiaries); Neb.Rev.Stat. §§281480 to 28-1402 (paramilitary training); N.J.Stat.Ann. §2C:39-14 (training in firearms, explosives, or incendiaries); N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-20A-1 to 30-20A-4 (antiterrorism: training others in use explosives); N.C.Gen.Stat. §14-288.20 (training explosives, firearms, or incendiaries); N.D.Cent.Code §§12.1-06.2-01 to 12.1-06.2-04 (criminal street gangs); Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.21, §1320.10 (training in explosives, firearms, or incendiaries); Ore.Rev.Stat. §166.660 (paramilitary training); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §5515 (same); R.I.Gen.Laws §§11-55-1 to 11-55-3 (same); S.C.Code §16-8-20 (training in unlawful use of explosives or incendiaries); S.D.Cod.Laws §§22-10-14 to 22-10-16 (street gang); Tenn.Code Ann. §39-17-314 (training in explosives, firearms, or incendiaries); Tex.Penal Code §§71.01 to 71.022 (criminal street gang); Va.Code §§18.2-46.1 to 18.2-46.3(street gang), 18.2-433.1 to 18.2-433.3(paramilitary activity); Wis.Stat.Ann. §§939.625(penalty increases for street gang offenses), 939.648 (penalty increases for terrorist offenses). 25 The transportation offenses include: (1) transportation of stolen explosives, 18 U.S.C. 842(h); (2) shipment of explosives to juveniles, indicted or convicted felons, drug abusers, or mental defectives, 18 U.S.C. 842 (i); (3) interstate transportation or receipt of explosives with the knowledge of an intent to use them to kill, injure, intimidate or to damage property, 18 U.S.C. 844(d); (4) interstate shipment to or possess by – a juvenile, an indicted or convicted felon, drug abuser, a mental defective, an individual under a domestic relations restraining order or dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, an alien, or a former American who has renounced his citizenship – of a destructive device, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); (5) interstate transportation of a stolen destructive device, 18 U.S.C. 922(i); (6) interstate transportation of a destructive device with the intent to commit a felony, 18 U.S.C. 924(b); (7) interstate transportation of a destructive device to be used to commit a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. CRS-10 that outlaw the use of explosives for purposes of intimidation,26 and those that proscribe bombing certain types of property – federal property,27 commercial motor vehicles and their facilities,28 railroad property,29 aircraft or aircraft facilities,30 924(h); (8) smuggling a destructive device to facilitate a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(j); (9) transportation of an explosive or incendiary device in furtherance of a civil disorder, 18 U.S.C. 231(2); (10) the transportation (or use) of a biological weapon, 18 U.S.C. 175; (11) transfer (or use) of a chemical weapon, 18 U.S.C. 229; (12) transfer (or use) of nuclear material, 18 U.S.C. 831. 26 18 U.S.C. 242 (“Whoever, under color of any law . . . willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . .shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and . . . if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of . . . explosives . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include . . . an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death”); see also, 18 U.S.C. 245 (use of explosives to interfere with federally protected rights). 27 “Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property in whole or in part owned or possessed, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both.” 18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1); see also, 18 U.S.C. 1864 (booby traps on federal lands); 18 U.S.C. 81 (property destruction by fire (presumably including incendiary devices like molotov cocktails) in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States); 18 U.S.C. 2332a (use of weapons of mass destruction (including bombs) against an individual which affects interstate or foreign commerce). 28 “Whoever willfully, with intent to endanger the safety of any person on board or anyone who he believes will board the same, or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, damages, disables, destroys, tampers with, or places or causes to be placed any explosive or other destructive substance in, upon, or in proximity to, any motor vehicle which is used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce, or its cargo or material used or intended to be used in connection with its operation; or “Whoever willfully, with like intent, damages, disables, destroys, sets fire to, tampers with, or places or causes to be placed any explosive or other destructive substance in, upon, or in proximity to any garage, terminal, structure, supply, or facility used in operation of, or in support of the operation of, motor vehicles engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise makes or causes such property to be made unworkable, unusable, or hazardous to work or use; or . . . “Whoever willfully attempts to do any of the aforesaid acts – shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. 33; if death results the offense is a capital one,” 18 U.S.C. 34. 29 “Whoever willfully derails, disables, or wrecks any train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce by any railroad; or Whoever willfully sets fire to or places any explosive substance on or near, or undermines any tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track, signal, station, depot, warehouse, terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or appurtenance used in the operation of any such railroad in interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise makes any such tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track, signal, station, depot, warehouse, terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or CRS-11 property being exported,31 and particularly, property used in, or used in activities affecting, interstate or foreign commerce.32 appurtenance unworkable or unusable or hazardous to work or use, with the intent to derail, disable, or wreck a train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce, or Whoever willful attempts to do any of the aforementioned acts or things – Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. Whoever is convicted of any such crime, which has resulted in the death of any person, shall be subject also to the death penalty or to imprisonment for life. 18 U.S.C. 1992; see also, 18 U.S.C. 2275 (relating to placing a bomb aboard a vessel in U.S. waters) and 18 U.S.C. 2277 (relating to unlawful possession of explosives aboard a ship of U.S. registry). 30 “Whoever willfully – (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States (i.e. in flight over the United States, 49 U.S.C. 46501(2)) or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; “(2) places or causes to be placed a destructive device or substance in, upon, or in proximity to, or otherwise makes or causes to be made unworkable or unusable or hazardous to work or use, any such aircraft, or any part or other materials used or intended to be used in connection with the operation of such aircraft, if such placing or cause to be placed or such mailing or causing to be made is likely to endanger the safety of any such aircraft; “(3) sets fire to, damages, destroys, or disables any air navigation facility, or interferes by force or violence with the operation of such facility, if such fire, damaging, destroying, disabling, or interfering is likely to endanger the safety of such aircraft in flight; or “(4) with intent to damage, destroy, or disable any such aircraft, sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or places a destructive device or substance in, upon, or in proximity to any appliance or structure, ramp,, landing area, property, machine, or apparatus, any facility or other material used, or intended to be used, in connection with the operation, maintenance, loading, unloading or storage of any such aircraft or any cargo carried or intended to be carried on any such aircraft; . . . or “(7) attempts to do anything prohibited under paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than twenty years or both.” 18 U.S.C. 32. If death results, violations are capital offenses, 18 U.S.C. 34; 18 U.S.C. 37 outlaws acts of violence at international airports. 31 “Whoever, with intent to prevent, interfere with, or obstruct, or attempt to prevent, interfere with, or obstruct the exportation to foreign countries of articles form the United States, injures or destroys, by fire or explosives, such articles or the places where they may be while in such foreign commerce, shall be fined . . . imprisoned not more than twenty years or both,” 18 U.S.C. 1364. 32 “Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, but means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both; and if personal injury results in any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be imprisoned for not less than 7 years and not more than 40 years . . . and if death results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall also be subject to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. 844(i); see also, 18 U.S.C. 2332a (use of a weapon of mass destruction (including a bomb) against an individual in the United States which affects interstate or foreign commerce). CRS-12 A terrorist bombing may also breach federal laws that condemn property destruction without regard the destructive means employed, for instance: • causing more than $10,000 in damage to an animal enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 43 • destruction of certain religious property, 18 U.S.C. 247 • damaging abortion clinic property, 18 U.S.C. 248 • damaging federal property or property constructed or manufactured under federal contract, 18 U.S.C. 1361 • damaging communications lines or systems operated or controlled by the United States, 18 U.S.C. 1362 • destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 1363 • causing more than $5000 in damage to energy facility property, 18 U.S.C. 1366 • injury to a federal police dog or horse, 18 U.S.C. 1368 • commit an act of violence against the building or grounds of one under Secret Service protection, 18 U.S.C. 1752 • destruction of harbor defenses, 18 U.S.C. 2152 • destruction of war material, 18 U.S.C. 2153 • destruction of defense material, 18 U.S.C. 2155 • destruction of maritime navigation facilities, 18 U.S.C. 2280 • destruction of maritime fixed platforms, 18 U.S.C. 2281 • use of weapons of mass destruction against an individual with an impact on interstate commerce or against federal property, 18 U.S.C. 2332a • destruction of property during the course of acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, 18 U.S.C. 2332b. Bombings and fire bombings are crimes under the laws of every state in the Union, usually under the state’s arson statutes. At common law setting fire to someone else’s house constituted arson.33 Although a few states still limit their arson statutes to destruction by fire34 and punish explosives offenses separately,35 most – in order to accommodate destruction 33 IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 220 (1769) (“Arson . . . is the malicious and wilful burning of the house or outhouses of another man”); PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 273-88 (1982). 34 “A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property. . . .” Cal.Penal Code §§450-457.1; see also, Md.Ann.Code art.27 §6-11; Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.266 §§1-13A; Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§750.71 to 750.80; Miss.Code Ann. §§97-17-1 to 97-17-13; Nev.Rev.Stat. §§205.005-205.055; N.C.Gen. Stat. §§14-58 to 14-69.2; S.D.Cod.Laws §§22-33-1 to 22-33-10; Vt.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §§501-509; W.Va.Code §§61-3-1 to 61-3-6. 35 “Whoever wilfully, intentionally and without right, by the explosion of gunpowder or of any other explosive, unlawfully damages or destroys property or injures a person, shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .” Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.266, §101; see also, Cal.Penal Code §§12301 -12312 (unlawful possession, possession of ingredients, use of destructive devices; arson does not include destruction by explosives generally), 453 (possession of CRS-13 by devices that are both explosive and incendiary – have redrawn their arson laws to reach property destruction accomplished by either fire or explosives.36 explosives or firebomb); Md.Ann.Code art.27 §§139A to 139D (make or possess a Molotov cocktail, destructive or incendiary devices), 11 (attempt to bomb); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266 §§101 (maliciously causing injury or damage by explosion), 102(wilful throwing or placing of explosives or possession with such intent), 102B (possession of Molotov cocktail), 5A (placing flammable or explosive material, substance or device proximate to property in order damage); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§750.77 (wilfully and maliciously place or distributing inflammable or explosive material near to a building), 750.200 - 750.212 (making, possessing or transporting explosives); Miss.Code Ann. §§97-37-21 to 97-37-25; Nev.Rev.Stat. §§202.750 - 202.830 (unlawful possession, transportation, or use), 202.260270 (same); N.C.Gen.Stat. §§14-49 to 14-50.1; S.D.Cod.Laws §§22-14A-4 to 22-14A-22 (unlawful possession or use of explosives); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §§1601-1612 (unlawful possession or use of explosives); W.Va. Code §§61-3E-1 & 61-3E-13 (unlawful possession and use of explosives). 36 “Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages: (1) any dwelling, whether occupied or not; or (2) any structure, whether occupied or not, in which persons are normally present, including without limitation: jails, prisons or detention centers; hospitals, nursing homes or other health care facilities; department stores, office buildings, business establishments, churches or educational institutions, or other similar structures; or (3) any other structure which the actor has reasonable grounds to believe is occupied by a human being; or (4) any other real or personal property, whether the property of the actor or another, with the intent to deceive or harm any insurer or any person with a legal or financial interest in the property, or obtain any financial gain for the actor or another; is guilty of arson in the first degree . . . .” Idaho Code §18-802. Many jurisdictions also have explosive specific laws: Ala. Code §§13A-7-40 to 13A-7-43 (arson), 13A-7-44 (criminal possession of explosives with the intent to use to commit a violent crime); Alaska Stat. §§11.46.400 to 11.46.430 (arson), 11.61.240 (possession of explosives for a criminal purpose), 11.61.250 (knowing furnishing explosives for a criminal purpose); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-3103 (improper storage of explosives), 13-3104 (placing explosives on, in or near a vehicle, building or humanly frequented place), 13-1701 to 13-1705 (arson); Ark.Code Ann. §§5-73104 (commission of a crime using a bomb or other implement for inflicting serious physical injury), 5-73-108 (possession of explosives for commission of a crime), 5-38-301, 5-38-302 (arson), 5-71-211 (threatening a fire or bombing), 5-71-302 (teaching or demonstrating construction or use of explosives in furtherance of a civil disorder); Colo.Rev. Stat. §§18-4101 to 18-4-105 (arson); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §§53a-111 to 53a-114 (arson); Del.Code Ann. tit.11 §§1338 (possession or transportation of explosives with intent to injure or damage), 801-804 (arson); Fla.Stat. Ann. §§790.161 (making, possessing, throwing, placing or discharging a destructive device), 806.01-806.111 (arson); Ga.Code Ann. §§16-7-60 to 16-762 (arson), 16-7-80 & 16-7-88 (possession of explosives for criminal purposes); Hawaii Rev.Stat. §§708-820 to 824 (property destruction statutes apply regardless of the agent of destruction); Idaho Code §§18-801 to 18-805 (arson); Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. ch.720 §§5/20-1, 5/20-1.1 (arson), 5/20-2 (possession of explosives or incendiary devices for criminal use); Ind.Stats.Ann. §35-47-5-8, 35-47-5-9 (possession of or hurling a bomb), 35-43-1-1 (arson); Iowa Code Ann. §§712.1-712.5 (arson), 712.6 (possession of explosives for criminal use); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§21-3718 to 21-3720 (arson), 21-3731 (possession of explosives for criminal purposes); Ky.Rev.Stat. §§513.010-513.040 (arson); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§14:51-14:54 (arson), 14:54.2 (manufacture and possession of delayed action incendiary devices), 14:54.3 (manufacture and possession of a bomb); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit.17-A §§1001 (criminal use or possession of explosives), 1002 (criminal use or possession of disabling chemicals), 802 (arson); Minn.Stat.Ann. §§609.561-609.564 (arson); Mo.Ann.Stat. §§569.040-569.065 CRS-14 In addition, at least sixteen states have supplemented their explosives provisions with laws that address catastrophic use of fire, explosives or other destructive forces.37 (arson); Mont.Code Ann. §§45-6-102 & 45-6-103 (arson), 45-8-332 to 45-8-335 (unlawful use or possession of destructive devices); Neb.Rev.Stat. §§28-1213 to 28-1239 (explosive regulation, unlawful making, possession, transportation, and use), 28-501 to 28-504 (arson); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§634:1 (arson), 158:34 (malicious explosions), 158:35 (possession of destructive devices (“infernal machines”)), 158:36 (throwing or placing explosives), 158:37 (use of Molotov cocktails); N.J.Stat.Ann. §§2C:17-1 & 2C:17-2 (arson), 2C:39-4 (unlawful possession of explosives or destructive devices); N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-7-5 (dangerous use of explosives), 30-7-7 (unlawful possession of explosives), 30-5-16 (unlawful possession of destructive devices), 30-5-18 to 30-7-19.1 (possession of explosives for unlawful purposes), 30-17-5 & 30-17-6 (arson); N.Y.Penal Law §§150.00-150.20 (arson), 145.12 (property damage by explosive); N.D.Cent.Code §§12.1-21-01 to 12.1-21-04 (arson); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§2909.01 - 2909.11 (arson); Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.21 §§1401-1405 (arson); Ore.Rev.Stat. §§164.315 to 164.335 (arson), 166.382 & 166.384 (making or possessing a destructive device); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §3301 (arson); R.I.Gen.Laws §§11-4-2 to 11-4-6 (arson); S.C.Code §§16-11-110 (arson), 16-11-200 (placement of explosives or combustibles on the property of another), 16-11-540 (property damage by explosive or incendiary); Tenn.Code Ann. §§39-14-301 to 39-14-303 (arson), 39-14-702 (unlawful possession of explosive); Tex.Penal Code §28.02 (arson); Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-101 to 76-6-104 (arson); Va.Code §§18.2-77 to 18.2-82 (arson), 18.2-83 to 18.2-87.1 (unlawful possession or use of explosives); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. §§9A.48.010 to 9A.48.060 (arson), 70.74.272 to 70.74.285 (malicious use of explosives); Wis.Stat.Ann. §§943.02 to 943.07 (arson ), 941.31 (possession of explosives in furtherance of a crime); Wyo.Stat. §§6-3-101 to 6-3-104 (arson), 6-3-111 (possession, transportation or sale of explosive or incendiary device). 37 Ark.Code Ann. §5-38-202 (causing a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, building collapse, distribution of poison, radioactive material, bacteria, virus, or other dangerous and difficult to confine force or substance); Alaska Stat. §§11.46.480, 11.46.490 (criminal mischief in the first degree: causing property damage in excess of $100,000 by use of widely dangerous means); Cal.Penal Code §§11418 possession, transfer or use of weapons of mass destruction), 11419 (possession of restricted biological weapons); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §53-117 (causing property damage by fire, explosives, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, poison gas or radioactive material); Fla.Stat.Ann. §790.116 (manufacture, sale, possession or use of weapons of mass destruction); Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. ch.720 §5/20.5-5 (causing a catastrophe by explosion; fire; flood; collapse of a building; or release of poison, radioactive material, bacteria, virus or other dangerous substance); Ind.Stats.Ann. §35047-12-1 (dissemination or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit.17-A §803 (recklessly causing catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of a structure, release of poison, radioactive material, bacteria, virus or other dangerous and difficult to confine force or substance); Mo.Ann.Stat. §569.070 (causing a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, collapse of a building, release of poison, radioactive material, bacteria, virus or other dangerous or difficult to confine force or substance); N.J.Stat.Ann. §2C:17-2 (causing or risking widespread injury or damage by explosion, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive substance); N.C.Gen.Stat. §14-288.8 (manufacture, assembly, possession, storage, transportation, sale, purchase, delivery or acquisition of a weapon of mass destruction); N.D.Cent.Code §12.1-21-04 (release of destructive forces); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §2909.06 (create a substantial risk of injure or damage by fire, explosion, flood, poison gas, poison, radioactive material, caustic or corrosive material or other inherently dangerous agency or substance); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §§3302 & 3303 (causing a catastrophe by CRS-15 Murder and Armed Assaults Although many federal bombing statutes carrying increased penalties when the bombs are used to commit a murder or assault, many others condemn homicide or the infliction of physical injury regardless of the means used. The assassination of a visiting foreign dignitary violates federal law whether it is accomplished with a car bomb or a rifle. A list of some of the federal homicide and assault statutes which, under the proper conditions, would reach a terrorist bombing or other terrorist attack appears below: • death or injury resulting from the destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 32, 34 • death or injury resulting from destruction of interstate motor carriers or their facilities, 18 U.S.C. 33, 34 • death or injury resulting from violence at an international airport, 18 U.S.C. 37 • death or injury result from animal enterprise terrorism involving interstate or foreign travel or use of the mail or the facilities of interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 43 • assault upon a federal officer, employee, or member of the U.S. armed forces during or because of the performance of their duties, 18 U.S.C. 111 • assault upon foreign dignitaries, 18 U.S.C. 112 • assault within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 18 U.S.C. 113, 114 • murder or assault committed to influence, impede or retaliate against a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 115 • death or injury resulting from chemical weapons offenses, 18 U.S.C. 229, 229A • death or injury resulting from conspiracies to violate civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 241 • death or injury resulting from interference with federally protected civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 245 • death or injury resulting from certain obstruction of the free exercise of religion by others, 18 U.S.C. 247 • death or injury resulting from interference with access to abortion clinics, 18 U.S.C. 248 • murder or assault upon a Member of Congress, the Supreme Court or the Cabinet, 18 U.S.C. 351 • death resulting from nuclear material offenses, 18 U.S.C. 831 • death or injury resulting from the interstate transportation of explosives for criminal use, 18 U.S.C. 844(d) • death or injury resulting from the bombing of federal property, 18 U.S.C. 844(f) • death or injury resulting from bombing property used in, or used in an activity affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 844(i) explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive force or substance); S.C.Code §§16-23-710,16-23720 (possession of weapons of mass destruction); Utah Code Ann. §76-6-105 (causing widespread injury or damage by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, release of poison gas, radioactive material, or other harmful or destructive force or substance). CRS-16 • homicide committed while in possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon within a federal building, 18 U.S.C. 930 • murder within U.S. special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. 1111 • manslaughter within U.S. special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. 1112 • killing a federal officer, employee, or member of the U.S. armed forces during or because of the performance of their duties, 18 U.S.C. 1114 • killing foreign dignitaries, 18 U.S.C. 1116 • death resulting from a kidnapping in which the victim is transported in interstate commerce; is a foreign dignitary; is a federal official, employee or member of the U.S. armed forces; or which occurs in U.S. special maritime, special aircraft, or territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. 1201 • death resulting from a hostage taking committed to compel federal governmental action or abstention or in which the victim or offender is a foreign national, 18 U.S.C. 1203 • death or injury resulting from tampering with consumer products, 18 U.S.C. 1365 • murder or assault committed against witness in federal proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 1512, 1513 • death or injury resulting from mailing letter bombs or other injurious articles, 18 U.S.C. 1716 • murder or assault upon the President, one in the line of Presidential succession, or a senior White House official, 18 U.S.C. 1751 • death resulting from wrecking a train used in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1992 • death or injury resulting from stalking which occurs within the U.S. special maritime or territorial jurisdiction or which involves travel in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2261A • death resulting from acts of violence committed against maritime navigation facilities, 18 U.S.C. 2280 • death resulting from acts of violence committed against fixed maritime platforms, 18 U.S.C. 2281 • death resulting from the use of weapons of mass destruction against federal property or which affects interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2332a • death or injury resulting from acts of international terrorism transcending national boundaries which involves the use of the mails or facilities in interstate or foreign commerce; which affects interstate or foreign commerce; which is committed against a federal officer or employer or member of the U.S. armed forces; which is committed against federal property or within U.S. special maritime or territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. 2332b • death or injury resulting from air piracy or attempted air piracy committed within U.S. special aircraft jurisdiction, 49 U.S.C. 46502 Federal statutes describing explosives and firearms offenses overlap somewhat because for purposes of the general restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 921 to 930, “destructive devices” are defined as firearms.38 Consequently, the laws such as those which ban “As used in this chapter . . . (3) The term