# Desert Shield and Desert Storm Implications for Future U.S. Force Requirements

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## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** April 19, 1991
- **Citation:** 91-361RCO

## Text

91-361 RCO

Desert Shield and Desert Storm
Implications for Future U.S. Force Requirements

John M. Collins
Senior Specialist in National Defense
Office of Senior Specialists

April 19, 1991

Congressionall Reseadh Sierviign one JLilogary of Coingressiigs

oil wa ee ee Se ee ——

The Congressional Research Service works exclusively for the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and providing information at the request of committees,
Members, and their staffs.

The Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in many forms
including studies, reports, compilations, digests, and background briefings. Upon
request, CRS assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals and issues, and in
assessing the possible effects of these proposals and their alternatives. The Service’s
senior specialists and subject analysts are also available for personal consultations in
their respective fields of expertise.
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS

SUMMARY

Desert Shield and Desert Storm were spectacular successes by almost

any standards. Postmortem specialists who attempt to extract “lessons learned"
from that experience nevertheless would be well advised to proceed cautiously,
because campaigns against Iraq unfolded under conditions that may not again

pertain.

This preliminary assessment summarizes U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps performance during the recent war, then relates it to past experience
and potential threats in ways that might help decisionmakers determine the most
suitable characteristics of U.S, armed forces for the rest of this decade. Significant
findings include:

Force reductions now under review should preserve sufficient flexibility
to cope well with a wide range of realistic contingencies, because levels
that cause potential adversaries to question U.S. capabilities could
degrade deterrence and involve the United States in otherwise
preventable wars.

Needs for airlift and sealift forces that can function well under less
favorable conditions in primitive areas seem more pressing than
requirements for larger numbers.

Strategic and tactical intelligence failures can be traced directly to the
shortage of well-qualified, area-oriented human intelligence (HUMINT)
specialists.

Continued needs for division-sized parachute and amphibious assault
capabilities are debatable, because neither has been employed since
World War II.

The rapid proliferation of ballistic missile delivery systems, some with
nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities, indicates the probable need
for expeditious development and deployment of tactical anti-ballistic
missile (TABM) weaponry much superior to Patriot.

The U.S. Navy may no longer be configured to deal best with the most
likely threats, because it still emphasizes abilities to defeat Soviet rivals.

Expeditious programs to develop and deploy advanced tactical aircraft
may be difficult to justify during the impending period of budgetary
constraint, because present models performed magnificently during
Desert Storm.

Redefinition of Army and Marine Corps roles and functions should be
a high priority task, because it would fundamentally affect the future
size, configuration, and capabilities of both Services.

Finally, the study is skeptical of contentions that Desert Shield and Desert
Storm "proved" the permanent ascendancy of any strategy, tactics, or armed
service. Requisite forces and formulas might be quite different at future times
and in dissimilar places.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE ..... ccc cece cece cere ees 1
COMBAT FORCE AVAILABILITY 1... .. ccc ccs cere e ete tence eeans 2
ACTIVE FORCE LEVELS ..... 0 ccc cece cece tee eect n ene ees 2
RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS ......... ccs eee e eres 6
LONG-HAUL TRANSPORTATION ......cccececcceseeeanevecenes 7
AIRLIFT oo. ec cece ence eee e tenet ete eee neene 9
r) O70) 0 ra 10
PREPOSITIONING ... ccc ce cece eee eee e ete eenreeeecene 10
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 20... ccc ccc c cece eect eee e eee eeenee 11
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 2... cece cece cece eee enn e eee 12
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE .... 0. cece cece cee c cere eer eennes 12
FUSION AND FUTURE NEEDS .......:ceccueeeenceeeeceee 14
FORCIBLE ENTRY FORCES ..... cc ccc cee e ence centre eee tennes 14
PARACHUTE ASSAULT ..... ccc cee cece eee erent eee eenane 15
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT .... ccc cece ete erect e ees 16
FIRST LINE DEFENSES 2... . ccc cee e cece eee reece cere neenees 17
AIR DEFENSES oo... cece cece ee eee eet eee nee e en eees 17
TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES ........0ceeeeees 17
ARMY DIVISIONS 2... . ccc cece reece eee teen enter ene ee tees 20
HEAVY DIVISIONS 2.0... ccc ccc cece cee cece teen eens 20
LIGHT DIVISIONS 2.0... ccc cece eect ee een eee e tena eens 20
MIDDLEWEIGHT DIVISIONS ..... 0. cece cece cece teen eens 21
NAVAL COMBAT CAPABILITIES wo cc cece sec e eect e rece eee e anes 22
TACTICAL AIR COMBAT FORCES ....... cc cece eee e teeter eeenes 23
AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION ... cece cece eee e rere ete eenees 24
AIRCRAFT-CRUISE MISSILE MIX 1... ccc eee eee cent eens 25
MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS ......cececeee eee eecnes 26
SPECIAL OPERATIONS ..... ccc cece eect c een eee nee teeter nees 27
QUESTIONABLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES .......e. ee eees 28
MISSED PSYOP OPPORTUNITIES ..... cece reer ee eeeeenees 29
INTERCONNECTING COMMENTARY . 0... 0c cece eee e teen eens 30
Figure 1 U.S. ACTIVE FORCES FOR DESERT STORM ......eeeeees 4
Figure 2 THE LARGEST FOREIGN ARMED FORCES ..........005. 5
Figure 3 ARMY DIVISION ROUNDOUT OPTIONS ........ 0. ee eeees 8

Figure 4 TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION ......... 19
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS

BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE

Armies are more often ruined by dogmas springing from their
former successes than by the skill of their opponents.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller
"The Tactics of Penetration"
RUSI Journal

November 1914

Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated military strategies, operations,
tactics, and logistics that were brilliantly planned and smoothly implemented.
Armed combat culminated in quick victory with incredibly few U.S. and allied
casualties. Displays of air power and technological proficiency were especially
impressive.!

Postmortem specialists who attempt to extract “lessons learned" from that
experience nevertheless would be well advised to proceed cautiously, because
Desert Shield and Desert Storm unfolded under conditions that may prove to be
exceptions rather than rules. War with Iraq was a classic set piece. Both sides
took 5 1/2 months to prepare for that particular conflict, beginning on August
2, 1990 when Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait. Then President Bush said, "Go!"
It was conventional combat, for which U.S. armed forces are best organized,
trained, and equipped. Technologically inferior opponents occupied static defensive
positions, falsely anticipating frontal assaults similar to those they defeated during
the eight-year war with Iran.? Most were in known locations, exposed to allied
air and missile bombardment. Most remained passive, except for antiaircraft
batteries. Allied airmobile and armored forces, aided by satellite intelligence, thus
were able to maneuver at will on flat, featureless terrain to outflank foes
entrenched in Kuwait. One Marine Corps pilot summarized the situation perfectly
when he quipped, it was "like being in the Super Bowl, but the other team didn’t
show up."®

1¥or a brief discussion of concepts and operations, see "Schwarzkopf: Strategy .
Behind Desert Storm," and "The Persian Gulf War: Schwarzkopf Answers to
Reporters’ Questions," Washington Post, February 28, 1991, p. 35-36.

2Cordesman, Anthony H., The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87:
Strategic Implications and Policy Options, NY, Jane’s, 1987, 185 p.

‘Stray Voltage," Armed Forces Journal, March 1991, p. 58.
CRS-2

Future U.S. conflicts, perhaps in mountains, jungles, or swamps, may call
for quite different qualifications than Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The
twofold purpose of this report therefore is to provide some perspectives that might
help Congress to:

¢ Appraise Desert Shield and Desert Storm experience
¢ Correlate results with future U.S. force requirements

This preliminary assessment relates performance throughout the recent war
(August 1990-February 1991) with past U.S. conflicts and potential future threats
to put U.S. force requirements in perspective. It impartially questions proposed
reductions in some categories and proposed increases in others, with particular
attention to the continued value of assets that saw little action, remained unused,
or appeared to be malemployed. The report also speculates about abilities of the
US. military establishment to cope successfully with problems if situations had
developed less advantageously. What if Iraqi forces had overrun Saudi Arabian
ports and airfields before the U.S. vanguard arrived? What if a contingency had
erupted in Korea during Desert Storm? What if Iraqi SCUDs had struck in salvos
instead of single shots? Presentations cover overarching subjects first, followed
by service-specific topics, but treatment throughout emphasizes
interrelationships. 4

COMBAT FORCE AVAILABILITY

The peacetime configuration of U.S. armed services strongly influenced
options open to the United States and its allies during the confrontation with
Iraq. The total inventory determined how many active combat forces of what
type theoretically could assist Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Middle East,
given competing commitments elsewhere. Readiness determined how rapidly
reserve component forces could supplement the active establishment.

ACTIVE FORCE LEVELS
The active U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, which total slightly

more than 2 million uniformed personnel, comprised the world’s third largest
military establishment just before Iraq seized Kuwait. Desert Shield and Desert

4This document is designed to compliment two other CRS reports: Collins,
John M., New Directions for National Defense, July 6, 1990, 29 p. and O’Rourke,
Ronald, et al, Persian Gulf War: Defense Policy Implications for Congress,
forthcoming.

5Only the Soviet Union and China maintain larger active military
establishments than the United States (about 4.5 million and 3 million
respectively, includinginternal security troops). The Military Balance, 1990-1991,
London, Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn
CRS-3

Storm nevertheless absorbed 40 percent or more of key U.S. combat forces (Figure
1), including an armored corps and seven air wings assigned to U.S, European
Command. U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets furnished six carrier battle groups
and two battleship groups. The Department of Defense (DOD) could not establish
unit rotation policies for U.S, elements in the Middle East, because U.S.-based
replacements with comparable capabilities were too few.® Abilities to cope with
a second sizable contingency that adversely affected U.S. security interests, such
as conflict in Korea, were much abridged beginning in August 1990, and remained
so for several months after Desert Storm subsided.

Several retrenchment proposals are open for deliberation.’ The Secretary
of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, have presented
Congress a "six-year package that ... reduces U.S, military capability and force
structure by very, very significant amounts." Defense spending, according to their
plan, would contract to 3.6 percent of the U.S. gross national product by 1995-96.
The DOD budget thereafter would fund an active force of 521,000 fewer military
personnel (a 25 percent cut), 12 Army divisions vice 18, 26 tactical fighter
squadrons instead of 36, and 150 fewer battle force ships rather than the 600
once envisaged.®

The residue must possess deterrent and defense capabilities that correlate
well with present and projected threats to compelling U.S. interests. The Secretary
of Defense and U.S. commanders-in-chief around the world identify few serious
threats, but some indicators nevertheless may bear additional scrutiny before force
level decisions become final. Five countries with large armed forces, listed on
Figure 2, are long-time U.S, adversaries who still make neighboring U.S. friends
nervous (North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Iran, plus Syria, an unanticipated U.S.
ally during Desert Storm). The Soviet Union and China are question marks that
likewise cause some queasiness.

1990, 245 p.

8Maze, Rick, "How Long Can Troops Hang on in the Desert?", Army Times,
December 17, 1990, p. 16; Willis, Grant, "New Call-up Kills Troop Rotations," Army
Times, November 26, 1990, p.6.

‘Meeting New National Security Needs: Options for U.S, Military Forces in
the 1990s, Washington, Congressional Budget Office, February 1990, 50 p.;
Kaufman, William W., Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending,
Washington, Brookings Institution, 1990, 85 p.; Restructuring the U.S. Military:
Defense Needs in the 21st Century, A report by Defense Budget Task Force of the
Committee for National Security and the Defense Budget Project, Washington,
March 1990, 27 p.

8Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen Colin
Powell Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington,
Reuters Transcript, February 7, 1991, p. 6, 8, 10.
CRS-4

Figure 1
U.S. ACTIVE FORCES FOR DESERT STORM
Total Desert Storm Percent
Inventory! Deployments? of Total

Army

Divisions 18 8 44%

Separate Brigades 25%

Separate Regiments 2 66%
Navy

Carrier Battle Groups® 14 6 43%

Carrier Aircraft 375 51%

Fleet Air Defense* (22) 260
Attack*® (41) 466

Battleship Groups® 4 50%

Attack Submarines 99 71%

Mine Warfare’ 12 2 18%
Air Force

Bombers** (18) 189 (8) 23%

Fighter/attack‘ (65) 1594 (82) 40%
Marine Corps

Divisions 3 2 66%

Air Wings** (3) 355 (2) 66%
Total Personnel 2,020,000 540,000 27%

1 Collins, John M. and Dianne E, Rennack, U.S./Soviet Military Balance; Statistical Trends,

oe fr nN DO mh &

1980-1989 (As of January 1, 1990), Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 6,
1990.

Bowman, Steven R., Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces, Washington,
Congressional Research Service, February 11, 1991.

One aircraft carrier per group, plus escorts.

Numbers in parentheses indicate squadrons.

Total inventory includes 176 dual-purpose FA-18 Hornets.

One battleship per group, plus escorts.

Five MSO and MCM, 7 MSC. Two more reserve MSCs deployed.
Fifty-six F-111 (1 squadron) and 26 B-52G (2 squadrons) deployed.
Total inventory includes 156 dual-purpose FA-18 Hornets.
CRS-5

Figure 2
THE LARGEST FOREIGN ARMED FORCES
1 million 500 Thousand 250 Thousand
or more or more or more
Soviet 4.5 | S, Korea 750 | Egypt 450
Union
China 3.0 | Pakistan 550 | Ethiopia 438
India 13 | Iran 504 | Syria 404
N. Korea 1.1 | Iraq 500? | Taiwan 370
Vietnam 1.0 Brazil 324
Indonesia 2838
Thailand 283
Japan 249
Source: The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, Brassey’s for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1990.

Not many potential predators, large or small, seem eager to risk retaliation
like that against Iraq. Kim Il Sung, for example, may never find a more propitious
time to invade the Republic of Korea, but took no advantage of U.S. preoccupation
with Persian Gulf operations. Appearances, however, may be deceptive. Two
of the last three major wars erupted abruptly and unpredictably (Korea, 1950;
Iraq, 1990). U.S. military involvement in Vietnam expanded on short notice after
mid-1965. Future U.S, force requirements may be equally unforeseen. Aggressors,
moreover, may increasingly instigate small, exceedingly complex wars that avoid
risks associated with mid- and high-intensity conflicts, yet achieve important
objectives that undermine American interests. The U.S. record in such imbroglios
is unimpressive.®

No one can calculate future needs exactly, but they are not infinitely
adjustable. Force reductions now under review therefore should preserve sufficient
flexibility to cope well with a wide range of realistic contingencies, because levels
that cause potential adversaries to question U.S. capabilities could degrade
deterrence and involve the United States in otherwise preventable wars that would
be costly to win.

°U.S, Congress, House, U.S, Low-Intensity Conflicts, 1899-1990, a study
prepared for the Readiness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
101st Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, September 10, 1990, 284

Pp.
CRS-6

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Battalions, squadrons, and smaller reserve component combat forces
performed well for the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps during Desert
Storm. Separate Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades did not. So-called "round
out" programs, in effect since 1974, presently affiliate six of them with active duty
divisions that lack one brigade apiece, largely for budgetary reasons. The concept
calls for each designated ARNG brigade to receive arms and equipment compatible
with that of the parent division, train regularly with that division, and be ready
to deploy with it on identical schedules.'° The gap between principle and
practice, however, proved unbridgeable.

DOD called no ARNG brigades during early stages of the crisis, because the
Secretary of Defense and his advisors believed they required considerable postmobilization training to reach an acceptable state of combat readiness.'! The
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) therefore departed for Saudi Arabia in August
1990 with a separate active brigade from Fort Benning, rather than its Georgia
National Guard roundout. A brigade from the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood,
Texas replaced a Mississippi National Guard roundout before the 1st Cavalry
Division sailed somewhat later.”

Those substitutions seemed reasonable after the aforementioned ARNG
brigades entered active service about December 1, 1990, along with one from
Louisiana which was affiliated with the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at
Fort Carson, Colorado. Two-day training sessions per month plus a two-week
summer camp were sufficient for platoons, companies, and probably battalions,
but brigade requirements were too complex. Hardware shortages and mismatched
skills made it impossible to take best advantage of the meager time available.
Radios, for example, were in short supply. Officers and men often filled slots for
which they were ill prepared. Vehicle maintenance, performed mainly by active
forces or civilian contractors in peacetime, became a post-mobilization problem.
Some critical ARNG items, such as computers, were incompatible with those of
parent divisions. Personnel and logistic systems suffered in consequence.’ Most

Annual Defense Department Report, James R. Schlesinger, FY 1975, March
4, 1974, p. 99, 100 and FY 1976, FY 197T, February 5, 1975, p. If-15, 11-43, V-4;
Rumsfield, Donald H., FY 1977, January 27, 1976, p. 131-182.

lINot all agreed at that time. See, for example, Aspin, Les, Beverly Byron,
and G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Jrag, Saudi Arabia, and Reserve Components:
Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure, Washington, U.S. House of
Representatives, October 16, 1990, 5 p.; Goldich, Robert L., Irag-Kuwait Crisis,
U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the ‘Reserves, Issue Brief IB 90144,
Washington, Congressional Research Service, November 19, 1990, p. 10-12.

12 Ibid.

18 "Can Reserves Do the Job?," U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1991,
p. 40-41; Scicchitano, J. Paul, "Total Force Policy Takes a Beating," Army Times,
February 25, 1991, p. 12-13; Naylor, Sean and Tom Donnelly," Guard Deployment
CRS-7

observers accordingly believe that the U.S. Army must devise new policies and
procedures if it expects large ARNG elements to dovetail well with active combat
forces on short notice,

Early mobilization of ARNG divisions to reconstitute a rudimentary Army
rotation base in the United States might merit close scrutiny. That practice could
permit six months to a year or more of predeployment training during protracted
contingencies, depending on DOD rotation polices. ARNG divisions on active
duty also could be committed piecemeal in emergency to facilitate unit
replacements, if casualties dangerously depleted the Regular Army before ARNG
post-mobilization preparations were complete.

At least three roundout options are open, as Figure 3 illustrates. Option
1 would replace one active brigade in designated divisions with an ARNG brigade
in a much higher state of peacetime readiness than presently prevails. Option
2 proposes three active brigades in designated divisions, each with one roundout
battalion, which would simplify training requirements. Option 3 recommends
three active brigades with three active battalions apiece. Each battalion contains
one ARNG maneuver company. All three options furnish every designated active
division with nine roundout companies, which are basic combat elements and least
difficult to prepare for action.

Roundout components, in accord with official concepts, should possess arms,
equipment, and procedures that are fully compatible with those of parent divisions.
Roundouts also should be located nearby to simplify continuous supervision by
the division staff and facilitate frequent training with division troops. The 24th
Infantry Division (Mechanized) and its Georgia National Guard roundout brigade
clearly satisfy that criterion. The 1st Cavalry Division in Texas and its roundout
brigade in Mississippi clearly do not. The 5th Division in Colorado and the 6th
Division in Alaska are separated even farther from roundout brigades in Louisiana
and Minnesota respectively.

LONG-HAUL TRANSPORTATION

Long-haul transportation moved forces farther at a faster pace than ever
before during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Elements involved all pressed
to do their best beginning in early August 1990, because it was not clear whether
Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia after seizing Kuwait, and if so how soon.
CENTCOM put fighter/attack aircraft and a brigade-sized tripwire from the 82nd
Airborne Division in place by August 8. Fully-equipped Marines began to bolster
that vanguard the following week; two expeditionary brigades (each about the
size of an Army division) were ashore early in September. The lead brigade of
the 24th Infantry Division (mechanized) debarked about the same time. The first
great surge, which deployed Desert Shield defensive forces, was complete before
the end of October, A second surge from the United States and Western Europe

Decision Postponed," Army Times, February 4, 1991, p. 3.
CRS-8

Figure 3

ARMY DIVISION ROUNDOUT OPTIONS

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Brigades per Division
Active 2
Roundout
Battalions per Division
Active 6 6
Roundout
Companies per Division
Active 18 18 18
Roundout 9 9 9
Total Roundouts per
Division
Brigades 1 0 0
Battalions
Companies 9 9

NOTE: Comparisons are based on a notional division with three brigades, each
of which comprises three battalions with three maneuver companies apiece.
CRS-9

deposited U.S. reinforcements for Desert Storm during the next three months.
Routine runs sustained operations thereafter," although no U.S. airlift or sealift
was available to handle a second sizable contingency.

Those impressive feats, however, transpired under nearly perfect
circumstances that future U.S. conflicts may seldom duplicate. Ample time was
available to assemble essential aircraft, ships, and crews then shuttle back and
forth, because no enemy action interrupted the flow of U.S. forces and supplies
aloft, ashore, or afloat while the buildup progressed. Modern seaports and air
terminals were secure and plentiful. Prepositioned stocks were conveniently
located. Allies arrived aboard their own or borrowed transports; some assisted
U.S. movement. Saudi Arabia, the host country, was willing and able to furnish
facilities plus substantial supplies, such as petroleum, fresh water, and food,'®
Future U.S. long-haul transportation requirements should be considered in context
with circumstances that may be less lenient.

AIRLIFT

More than 90 percent of all C-5 and C-141 transports in the U.S. inventory,
active and reserve, ferried personnel, equipment, and supplies to the Persian Gulf,
but they were not enough. Thirty-eight aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) hauled two-thirds of the troops and 18 percent of all tonnage during the
first full month (August 7 to September 7, 1990). DOD called more on January
18, 1991. Crew fatigue rather than aircraft availability eventually became the
limiting factor, although extensive, prolonged reliance on CRAF could have caused
problems for some U.S. airlines.'®

No future contingency is likely to require more transoceanic airlift than
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which involved longer flights to and from the
United States than any other conceivable objective area. Few countries, however,
couple the airport capacity of Saudi Arabia with abilities to construct new
terminals quickly and economically on hard, flat, bare surfaces, Continuing needs
consequently exist for highly reliable passenger carriers and cargo aircraft that
can land on and take off easily with heavy loads from short, improvised strips.

M4 "Behind the Front Lines Is an Unprecedented Sealift," Defense Week, January
30, 1991, p. 3; Garner, David, Operation Desert Shield, a briefing, Washington,
Logistics Management Institute, October 4, 1990, unpaginated; Donovan, Francis
R., "Sealift; Rapid Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis," Vital Speeches ofthe Day,
November 1990, p. 66-68.

15 Prina, L Edgar, "T'wo If by Sea ... Are We Ready?," Army, December 1990,
p. 12-13.

18 Hyde, James C., "MAC Flying Nonstop to Support Desert Storm," Armed
Forces Journal, March 1991, p. 12-14; Phillips, Don, “Cheney Orders Airline Alert,"
Washington Post, January 19, 1990, p. 19; "Gen. Hanford Johnson: Moving a
Billion Pounds to the Middle East," Government Executive, October 1990, p. 68;
Garner, David, Operation Desert Storm.
CRS-10

SEALIFT

Ships carried more than 90 percent of all material at an unprecedented clip.
Critics nevertheless question whether “rapid deployment" is a contradiction in
- terms when applied to waterborne transport. Eight fast sealift ships, which steam
at 30 knots or more, took almost a month to deliver the 24th Infantry Division
(Mechanized). The first sailed on August 13, six days after President Bush issued
Desert Shield orders; the last finished unloading on September 10. Most ships,
somewhat slower (15-20 knots) and less well-equipped, took longer. Only 11 of
the first 44 ships requested from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) reported for
duty on time. The 10 tardiest were 11-20 days late. Seventeen roll-on/roll-off
(RO-RO) ships in the RRF were insufficient. Nineteen charters therefore were
required. Ninety-one of 213 dry cargo ships that supported Desert Shield and
Desert Storm (43 percent) flew foreign flags; crews in some cases had to be
replaced, because they refused to enter the Persian Gulf. Fewer might be available
for future wars.!”

Plans that call for mobility forces able to project U.S. military power
expeditiously to far distant places predate the Carter Doctrine (1980) and the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which preceded U.S. Central Command.
Sealift, however, still lags. Essential surge capabilities depend on speedy RO-RO
- and self-sustaining cargo ships that can load quickly and discharge across open
beaches or through primitive ports that lack modern facilities. Eight "fast sealift
ships," the best now available, are converted civilian container carriers. DOD
accordingly might consider spending a larger share of its mobility budget for rapid
deployment sealift. Innovative designs that could double or triple present speeds
would be desirable. Rapid round trips, in turn, would allow fewer ships to
transport requisite loads, and thereby reduce U.S. reliance on the RRF and foreign
flags.

PREPOSITIONING

The initial Desert Shield surge depended heavily on equipment and supplies
prepositioned near the objective area ready for use by U.S. military personnel
delivered by air. Some was ashore in Saudi Arabia and Oman, but most was afloat.
Two maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS) supported U.S. Marines from
locations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Each contained armored vehicles,
artillery, other unit equipment, and supplies to sustain a Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB) for 30 days. The first of five ships from Diego Garcia reached
Saudi Arabia in mid-August, followed by four ships from Guam. Two full MEBs
were ready for action within three more weeks. Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS)

17 Q’Rourke, Ronald, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield, Washington,
Congressional Research Service, September 17, 1990, p. 18-20; Donovan, Francis
R., "Sealift: Rapid Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis,” p. 67; “Behind the Front
Lines is an Unprecedented Sealift," p. 3-4; Prina, L. Edgar, "T'wo If by Sea ...,"
p. 14-16.
CRS-11

at Diego Garcia began to furnish cargo handling equipment, fuel, and other useful
items to early Army and Air Force arrivals.’

Defense Secretary Cheney presently is weighing whether money for more
fast sealift ships "might be better spent buying equipment for a division and
putting it in a key spot."!” Several factors, however, influence such tradeoffs.
Floating warehouses, for example, are susceptible to sabotage, especially by
"frogmen" (techniques and technologies have improved immeasurably since Italian
counterparts of SEALS penetrated British port defenses at Alexandria, Egypt
on December 19, 1941, then planted explosives that put battleships Queen
Elizabeth and Valiant on the harbor bed.)*° Stocks prepositioned ashore may
be tempting missile targets and are worthless if sites selected are remote from
crises that erupt. Modernization and maintenance problems multiply over time,
wherever storage takes place. Not many potential trouble spots offer transport
points as convenient and secure as those in Saudi Arabia, where airlifted personnel
were able to marry quickly with supplies and equipment. The value of
prepositioning, in short, varies considerably with circumstances.”

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Top US. political-military decisionmakers urgently required timely, accurate
strategicintelligence concerning Iraq’s military capabilities and intentions before,
during and after Desert Shield and Desert Storm. U.S. commanders at every level
in all four services required detailed combat intelligence concerning enemy forces
they faced. Collection capabilities limited the amount of information available.
Analytical capabilities limited conclusions drawn therefrom.

18 Q’Rourke, Ronald, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield, p. 16-18; Donovan,
Francis R., "Sealift: Rapid Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis," p. 66-67; Garner,
David, Operation Desert Shield; Prina, L. Edgar, “Two If by Sea ...," p. 20; "Our
Deployment into the Persian Gulf -- Three Views," Army, November 1990, p. 16,
17.

19 Healy, Melissa, "Cheney Would Reduce Reserve Combat Role," Los Angeles
Times, March 14, 1991, p. 1.

20 Piekalkiewicz, Jamusz, Secret Agents, Spies, and Saboteurs, translated by
Francisca Garvey and Nadia Fowler, London, David and Charles, 1969, p. 62-77.

21 Brooke, George M. III and Frederick McCorkle, “Rapid Response Force
Option," Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 1986, p. 34-40; Newsham, Grant,
"Should MPS Be Armed?," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1987, p. 30; Russell,
James A., "Rapid Deployment Force Ammo Found Too Rusty to Use," Navy News
and Undersea Technology, June 5, 1987, p. 1.
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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

The U.S. strategic intelligence community got off to a slow start, largely
because the United States tilted toward Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980-
1988) and Iraq later was a low-priority US. interest.”7 Satellite sensors detected
the Iraqi troop buildup that began along Kuwait’s northern border on July 20,
1990, and signal intercepts probably led CIA to predict the August 2 invasion the
day before it occurred,” but neither told how deeply Iraq would drive or how
hard its forces would fight. Estimates predicated primarily on technological
collection subsequently contained large loopholes concerning the overall strength,
disposition, capabilities, limitations, and intentions of Iraqi armed forces. Debates
about Iraq’s abilities to withstand economic embargoes and naval blockades never
were resolved.

Hindsight, for example, reveals that the vaunted Republican Guard was vastly
overrated. Its will to fight was little better than other Iraqi forces. The original
number of mobile SCUD launchers never was resolved (speculation spread from
18 to more than 200). Most knowledgeable observers believed that Iraq lacked
nuclear weapons, but no one was certain and official debates about chemical
warfare capabilities continued after combat ceased.”

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

The U.S. theater-level combat intelligence apparatus for Desert Shield and
Desert Storm initially comprised a few specialists who accompanied General
Schwarzkopf to Saudi Arabia in August 1990.2 Burgeoning capabilities, coupled
with attacks that "blinded" Iraq, however, soon afforded coalition forces decisive
advantages.

Space-based satellite sensors, employed for the first time in a large-scale
conflict, furnished commanders and staff with unprecedented information, often
in near real time. No mountains or vegetation obscured their view, which was

22 Oberdorfer, Don, “Missed Signals in the Middle East," Washington Post
Magazine, March 17, 1991, p. 20-21; "U.S. Intelligence in the Gulf, and Into the
1990s," Security Intelligence Report, February 25, 1991. p. 2.

28 Oberdorfer, Don, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," p. 37-40.

24 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in television interviews on February 28
and March 28, 1991; Donnelly, Warren H. and Zachary S. Davis, Irag and Nuclear
Weapons. Issue Brief IB90113, Washington, Congressional Research Service,
February 8, 1991, 15 p.; Albright, David and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq and the Bomb:
Were They Even Close?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991, p. 16-26;
Atkinson, Rick, "No Chemical Arms Found on Battlefields," Washington Post,
March 7, 1991, p. 1; Tamayo, Juan O., “Along with Debris War Leaves Questions
About Overestimation of Iraqi Might," Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1991, p. 4.

25 "J.S, Intelligence In the Gulf and Into the 1990s," p.3.
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crystal clear for the first several months. Sunlight during daylight hours cast
strong shadows that were perfect for photo interpreters. Static targets were easy
to identify and prioritize. Global positioning satellites helped allied land and air
force pinpoint their locations and navigate trackless deserts, Other spacecraft
assisted SCUD alerts and meteorological forecasts.27 Two Joint Surveillance
and Target Attack System (JSTARS) aircraft, plucked from development for Desert
Storm employment, complemented Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft. The former monitored enemy ground force movement. The
latter looked for Iraqi air attacks that never materialized. Both acquired targets
for allied elements to engage.”’

Technologically derived intelligence, however, has severe limitations. Satellite
coverage was incomplete, even on clear days, because sensors were not always
overhead. Only Lacrosse, which carries synthetic aperture radar, could see
through clouds that were increasingly worrisome after Desert Storm started.
Reconnaissance aircraft were too few to fill gaps. The distribution system in many
instances was unable to disseminate available data rapidly enough for recipients
to benefit. Post-strike damage assessment thus was far from scientific.” U.S.
and British signal intelligence experts reportedly broke all Iraqi military codes
and routinely monitored radio transmissions, but the dearth of skilled translators
became a bottleneck.” The shortage of Arabic linguists similarly restricted U.S.
abilities to interrogate prisoners of war. Reliance on remotely located Saudi
specialists, who did not always share their findings, was a poor substitute. Special
operations forces had to establish listening posts and patrols deep in hostile
territory, designate targets and collect other useful intelligence, because well
qualified human intelligence (HUMINT) agents were in short supply. They were

28 Smith, Marcia S., Military and Civilian Satellites In Support of Allied Forces
in the Persian Gulf War, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February
27, 1991, 12 p. Presti, Kenneth J., "Desert Storm Tests Warning, Spy Sat
Systems," Washington Technology, February 21, 1991, p. 12; Sawyer, Kathy, "U.S.
Spies in the Sky Focus in on Iraqis," Washington Post, November 25, 1990, p.
A24; Miller, Barry, GPS Proves Its Worth in Operation Desert Storm," Armed
Forces Journal, April 1991, p. 16, 20.

2"Capaccio, Tony, "Air Force’s Eyes in the Sky Alerted Marines at Khafji,
Targeted Convoys," Defense Week, March 18, 1991, p. 7.

28 Broad, William J., "Assessing Damage Can Be Fettered by the Weather and
Pilot Hyperbole," New York Times, January 24, 1991, p. H12; Covault, Craig,
"Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 4, 1991, p. 25; "U.S. Intelligence in the Gulf and Into the
1990s, p. 3; Fulgham, David, "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical
Intelligence," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 11, 1991, p. 8. "U.S.
Struggles to Distribute Satellite Data in Gulf," Defense Daily, November 30, 1990,
p. 339.

29 Adams, James, "SEAL Teams Try to Fill the Intelligence Gap," London
Sunday Times, August 19, 1990, p. 12; "U.S. Intelligence in the Gulf and Into
the 1990s," p. 5.
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especially valuable during foul weather, but results suggest that abilities to locate
mobile SCUD missiles were more or less hit or miss.”

FUSION AND FUTURE NEEDS

Slow starts which typified U.S. strategic and tactical intelligence during the
recent conflict with Iraq were scarcely aberrations. Basic intelligence on the tiny
island of Grenada, for example, can best be described as substandard before
Operation Urgent Fury opened in October 1983, despite warning signs that
exceeded a year (U.S. aircraft bombed a misidentified mental hospital).*' Calls
have continued for high performance reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft
that could complement space satellites ever since SR-71 Blackbirds retired from
the active inventory in 1989.52 The lack of HUMINT professionals able to
furnish otherwise unavailable information from high-priority areas has been
obvious for many years. Not all need be U.S. citizens, if the U.S. intelligence
community develops indigenous networks in appropriate countries during
peacetime.

Above all, strategic and tactical intelligence both would benefit from better
integration. Concerted efforts to fuse electronic, signal, communications, photo,
and human intelligence into an integrated whole greater than the sum ofits parts
almost surely would facilitate in-depth, synoptic coverage beyond current
capabilities.

FORCIBLE ENTRY FORCES

There was no need for U.S. armed forces to seize a foothold on well defended
shores at the onset of Desert Shield, because Saddam Hussein instructed his troops
to stop (perhaps temporarily) in Kuwait. The U.S. buildup and subsequent combat
would have developed quite differently if Iraqi invaders had moved immediately
to occupy principal Saudi ports, airfields, and coastal territory as far south as
Dhahran, then consolidate their hold. The closest friends ready to receive Central

50 Gertz, Bill, "U.S. Commandos Steal into Iraq to Spot Mobile Missiles,"
Washington Times, January 25, 1991, p. B1; Healy, Melissa, "Special Forces: U.S.
‘Eyes’ Deep in Enemy Territory," Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1991, p. 1;
“The Spies in the Sand Far Behind the Enemy’s Lines,” U.S. News & World
Report, March 11, 1991, p. 34.

8lAnderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta, "schwarzkopf: Grenada Invasion
Botched," Washington Post, April 11, 1991, p. 11; Cushman, John H., Jr.,
"Pentagon Study Faults Planning on Grenada," New York Times, July 12, 1986,
p. 14.

82 Gertz, Bill, "House Kills Funds to Upgrade 9 Surviving SR-71 Spy Planes,"
Washington Times, June 12, 1987, p. 1. The last aircraft retired two years later.

§"[J.§, Intelligence in the Gulf and Into the 1990s, p. 3.
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Command (CENTCOM) contingents in such event would have been the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. Israel, far to the West, was politically
inappropriate as well as remote. A survey of U.S. forcible entry capabilities thus
seems advisable.

PARACHUTE ASSAULT

Paratroops are organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct vertical
assaults, establish lodgments, and control critical terrain until forces moving
overland or across beaches relieve them. Early linkups usually are required,
because airborne units are lightly armed and lack much staying power.

The U.S. Army includes a single airborne division, based at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, Whether one would have been enough to secure points of entry in Iraqiheld Arabia is debatable (two were on alert throughout the Cuban missile crisis
in 1962.4) One division in any case requires more C-141 aircraft for parachute
assault than reasonably would have been available, given competition by other
rapid deployment requirements. Lengthy delays would have accompanied any
plan to stage division-size operations from the UAE, relying heavily on C-130
transports from the Air Force Reserve and National Guard.

Desert Shield experience, however, does not automatically indicate needs
for more paratroops and supporting airlift. On the contrary, it extends a 45-yearold pattern, which suggests that less might be enough. The last large parachute
assault for forcible entry purposes occurred in Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944,
when General Eisenhower employed two U.S. and one British airborne divisions.
The final parachute assault by a full airborne division of any nation for any
purpose was the March 24, 1945 leap across the Rhine.® U.S. regimental- and
brigade-scale drops since then have been few and far between: two during the
Korean War; one in Vietnam (largely for show); and one to spearhead Operation
Just Cause in Panama (1990). Two Ranger battalions also participated. General
Schwarzkopf assigned the 82d Airborne Division no assault missions during Desert
Storm.

U.S. defense decisionmakers, bearing that record in mind, should question
whether one or more airborne divisions coupled with adequate airlift are required
to cope well with present and projected threats. The existing airborne-qualified
ranger regiment, perhaps supplemented by a separate brigade, is one possible
alternative.

“House, Jonathan M., "Joint Operational Problems In the Cuban Missile
Crisis," Parameters, Spring 1991, p. 94-98.

85 Devlin, Gerard M., Paratrooper!, N.Y., St. Martin’s Press, 1979, p. 611-637.
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AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

Amphibious assault forces are organized, trained, and equipped to establish
beachheads that facilitate rapid buildups by follow-on formations from sea and
air. Suitable landing sites improve prospects for success and lessen the likelihood
of high casualties.

The U.S. Marine Corps contains three active division-wing teams -- commonly
called Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) -- and one in the Marine Corps Reserve.
Sixty-four amphibious ships dispersed around the world, however, are able to lift
less than one ata time. Assemblage in the Persian Gulf, coupled with preparation
time, probably would have consumed much more than a month (it took a month
for two unopposed brigades to receive prepositioned equipment®), Shallow
gradients and shoals characterized approaches to the 36-mile Iraqi waterfront,
which consists mainly of mud flats. Kuwaiti beaches bristled with mines and other
manmade obstacles. One Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked on 34
amphibious ships within easy striking distance posed a threat that pinned many
Iraqi defenders in place, but General Schwarzkopf never ordered an assault. All
other Marines landed at secure sites.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience may not be typical, but seaborne
assaults have been scarce since World War II. The last multidivision operation
crossed Okinawa’s beaches on April 1, 1945.°” The 1st Marine Division, minus
one regiment, stormed Inchon, Korea in September 1950. All subsequent
landings, like the one in Grenada (1983), have been much smaller. Decisionmakers
who seek to determine the necessary number of MEFs might bear that lengthy
record in mind and recall that army divisions (3 U.S., 2 British, 1 Canadian)
conducted the most ambitious amphibious assault ever seen: D-Day landings in
Normandy.” Soviet doctrine, which assigns assault operations to a few naval
infantry regiments, may also be relevant; tank and motor rifle divisions aboard
merchant ships expand the footholds they seize.“° A thorough review of roles
and missions perhaps should underpin future Marine Corps force structure (see
subsequent section on that subject).

See footnote 15.

87 Garland, George W. and Thurman R. Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations:
History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Washington,
Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1971, p. 502-527.

38 Appleman, Roy E., South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Washington,
Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1961, p. 488-514.

89 Harrison, Gordan A., Cross-channel Attack: United States Army in World
War II, The European Theater of Operations, Washington, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1951, p. 190-193, 300-335.

40The Soviet Naval Infantry, Washington, Defense Intelligence Agency, April
1980, p. 23, 34 and Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, Washington, Defense
Intelligence Agency, 1978, p. 9.
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FIRST LINE DEFENSES

Demands for air and missile defenses to protect U.S. and allied command
posts, forces, ports, airfields, and logistic installations arose as soon as Desert
Shield started. An umbrella over civilian population centers and selected oil
installations also enjoyed a high priority. Interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air
missile units accordingly were among the first arrivals. Reinforcements that
phased in later augmented initial capabilities.

AIR DEFENSES

The Iraqi Air Force, with few exceptions, showed little fight. Allied attacks
immobilized most fighter-bombers before they took flight, by cratering runways
and wrecking revetments. No fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters lasted long in
the air except 130 some that fled safely to Iran. U.S, terminal air defenses thus
were scarcely tested.

Such success may be elusive in future conflicts, because some potential
opponents possess impressive tactical air combat capabilities and existing US.
defenses are not well balanced. Ground-based apparatus ideally should comprise
a complementary array of mobile surface-to-air systems, each with unique
characteristics that make it impossible for enemy aircraft and cruise missiles to
elude the envelope of one weapon without becoming vulnerable to others,
regardless of altitudes and angles from which they elect to attack, day or night,
in favorable or foul weather.*!

U.S. point and area defenses are somewhat less synergistic than that model,
and most systems (even Patriot) incorporate 1960s or 1970s technologies, long
since eclipsed. Studies to ascertain what corrective actions (if any) seem
reasonable should start with threat assessments beyond the scope of this
unclassified study. Progress meanwhile remains imperceptible.

TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

Iraq launched 81 SCUD surface-to-surface missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia,
Israel, and Bahrain during Desert Storm. U.S. Patriot missiles intercepted 42

1Soviet diversity is instructive. See, for example, Zaloga, Steve, "The Soviet
Antidote to NATO Tactical Air," Armed Forces Journal, January 1989, p. 26, 38;
Schneider, Wolfgang "Soviet Army Air Defense: Effectiveness Through Numbers,"
International Defense Review, March 1988, p. 237-241.

421 ussier, Frances M., Army Air Defense for Forward Areas: Strategies and
Costs, Washington, Congressional Budget Office, June 1986, 68 p. Several Current
options and opinions are covered under the rubric "Ground Air Defense" in Defense
News, January 29, 1990, p. 12-14, 16, 18-20, 40.
CRS-18

of them in flight and disregarded others too far off course to do any damage.
Overall performance received high marks.“

Euphoria, however, may be unjustified. Patriot, designed primarily for
terminal defense against aircraft and cruise missiles, displayed only modest antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capabilities.“ The system performed fairly well
against single-warhead, unsophisticated SCUDs, which never were launched in -
salvos that made Patriot engage many targets simultaneously or in rapid
succession (one at a time was the norm, with long intervals between). No SCUD
released decoys to deceive defenders. Twenty-two missed intended marks by large
margins. Nevertheless, intercepts occurred at such short range that debris
sometimes rained down on targets that Patriot tried to protect. Untouched SCUD
warheads seeped through when Patriot hit the missile’s fuel tank instead of its
lethal payload. Patriot never touched the SCUD that killed 28 U.S. military
personnel and wounded 100 in a Dhahran barrack on February 25, 1991.

The rapid proliferation of intermediate-, medium-, and short-range ballistic
missile delivery vehicles and rockets among countries on every populated continent
except Australia suggests that DOD should seriously consider versatile, reliable
ATBM capabilities beyond the capacity of Patriot (Figure 4). Some of those
missiles currently can carry nuclear or chemical warheads. Others may attain
that status in the foreseeable future. Adequate defenses appear quite expensive,
but the value of targets protected should make essential ATBM systems costeffective.*®

48Lenhart, Warren W. and Todd Masse, Persian Gulf War: Iragi SCUD
Ballistic Missile Systems, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February
14, 1991, updated through February 28, p. 10-11; "U.S. Army Patriot Proven in
New Role As Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Weapon,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 18, 1991, p. 49-51.

44Hildreth, Steven A. and Gary Newsome, Persian Gulf War: Patriot Missile,
Washington, Congressional Research Service, forthcoming; "M1M-104 Patriot/T-16
(JTACMS)/ATM," Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, June
1990, 6 p.

46Safire, William, "The Great SCUD-Patriot Mystery,"New York Times, March
7, 1991, p. A25; Lenorovitz, Jeffrey M., "Poor Workmanship Discovered in SCUD
-- Missile Fragments," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 11, 1991, p. 16.

46Nolan, Janne E., Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,
Washington, Brookings Institution, 1991, 209 p.; Shuey, Robert D. et al, Missile
Proliferation Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, Washington, Congressional
Research Service, February 9, 1989, 107 p.; "JDW Interview (with Henry Cooper),"
Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 16, 1991, p. 416.
CRS-19

Figure 4
TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Source: Shuey, Robert, Missile Proliferation:
A Discussion of U.S, Objectives and Policy
Options, Washington, Congressional Research
Service, Feb. 21, 1990, p. 3-6, updated orally as
of April 1991.

“PY

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ARMY DIVISIONS

Debates about the balance between heavy and light Army divisions began
almost a decade ago. Champions of heavy divisions contend that Desert Storm
confirmed the validity of their cause. Other evidence indicates that compromise
positions may be preferable to either pole.

HEAVY DIVISIONS

U.S. armored and mechanized divisions performed admirably during Desert
Storm. Tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles executed precision maneuvers rapidly
on the open plains (8d Armored Division advanced 120 miles in one night), then
easily defeated the Iraqi Republican Guard in battle. Only 4 of 1,956 M1A1 tanks
and 3 of 2,200 Bradley’s were disabled. Operational readiness rates exceeded 90
percent,*”

Armored and mechanized divisions, which are much heavier than predecessors,
nevertheless would have limited value if the next major contingency occurred in
Korea’s mountainous terrain or in jungles and swamps elsewhere. Many bridges,
even in Europe, refuse to bear great weight (M1A1 tanks tip the scales at 67 tons
combat loaded; the recovery vehicle currently under development weighs almost
70 tons, 13 tons more than the present model). Many roads that lack convenient
bypasses are too narrow for heavy tank traffic. U.S. main battle tanks and
armored fighting vehicles also preclude rapid deployment to meet emergencies.
C-5 transports, the only U.S. long-distance cargo aircraft that can carry outsize
loads, normally accommodate just one tank or four Bradleys per sortie. Heavy
divisions consequently must travel largely by sea, a time-consuming process.“

LIGHT DIVISIONS

The U.S. Army’s four light infantry divisions (LID) were conspicuously absent
during Desert Storm, basically because they lacked sufficient firepower, mobility,
and staying power to contribute significantly, unless augmented in many ways.
The 82d Airborne Division, among the first arrivals, was largely relegated to rear
area security roles for similar reasons after the Desert Shield buildup was well
under way.

47Army Weapons Systems Performance in Southwest Asia, Washington, Army
Legislative Liaison Programs Division, March 15, 1991, p. 1-2.

48Segal, David, "Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment?," Armed Forces
Journal, March 1991, p. 39-40. “Armor Against Fire: The Pendulum Slows,"
Army, July 1987, p. 86-37; Roos, John G., "Seven Years After Fielding, Army Still
Can’t Yank Tanks," Armed Forces Journal, October 1989, p. 90, 92.
CRS-21

How many (if any) light infantry divisions should remain if the active Army
total dwindles to twelve, as Defense Secretary Cheney proposes, is a controversial
issue. The original rationale, which persists, postulates rapid deployment
capabilities, plus utility against comparably equipped forces anywhere in the world
or against heavy divisions under favorable conditions.’® Critics from the
beginning, however, have questioned the combat capabilities of light divisions.
Common complaints contend that LIDs likely would be outgunned by most Third
World adversaries, many of whom possess Soviet arms and equipment (one battery
of eight 155mm howitzers comprises the largest LID artillery); that they are poorly
protected (no armored vehicles and scant air defense); that they are mainly footmobile (only one of nine infantry battalions can be heliborne and one more
motorized at any given time); and that scenarios which call for more than one
LIC are unrealistic.”

MIDDLEWEIGHT DIVISIONS

Some observers, bearing in mind the disadvantages of too many heavy or
light divisions, believe the best future mix might combine heavy armored and
mechanized infantry forces with rapidly deployable, agile, and lethal middleweight divisions that feature tanks and fighting vehicles able to fit into tactical
air transport easily, and preferably tolerate parachute delivery.’ Senior
commanders might form expedient light divisions by temporarily stripping selected
accoutrements and personnel from heavy and middleweight formations to handle
low-intensity threats, then reverse that process when needs cease. U.S. Army
divisions in Vietnam, for example, left most vehicles in motor pools for the

4°Hollingsworth, James F., "The Light Division: Light Enough to Get There--
Mobile Enough to Survive -- Lethal Enough to Win -- We Need It Now," Armed
Forces Journal, October 1983, p. 84-85,88,90; Wickham, John A., Jr., “Light
Divisions’ Effectiveness Will Grow From ’Soldier Power’," Army Times, November
16, 1984, p. 10,12; DuPuy, William E., "The Light Infantry: Indispensable Element
of a Balanced Force," Army, June 1985, p. 26-29, 32-33, 36-37, 39-41.

Senior Army officers have declined to criticize light divisions openly unless
protected by pseudonyms. See, for example, Damon, Sam and Ben Krisler, “Army
of Excellence: A Time to Take Stock," Armed Forces Journal, May 1985, p. 86-87,
90, 92, 94. Other views are typified by Segal, David, “Army Light Division: Are
They Fit to Fight?,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1988, p. 82, 84,86,88.

51Mfetamorphoses are described in Mazarr, Michael J., Light Forces and the
Future of U.S. Military Strategy, Washington, Brassey’s, 1990, p. 121-162. See
also Tusa, Francis, "Increased Firepower Weighs Heavily on Light Armor," Armed
Forces Journal, March 1991, p. 42; Adams, Peter, "Tracked, Wheeled Vehicles to
Share Battlefield," Army Times, November 30, 1987, p. 25,28 and Judith Kohn
Brown, “Marines to Take Lead in Light Tank Program," p. 28; Segal, David,
"Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment?," p. 39.
CRS-22

duration of that conflict, but would have been ready for Desert Storm - style
operations if required.

NAVAL COMBAT CAPABILITIES

The 7-ship U.S. Middle East Force based at Bahrain was on the spot when -
Desert Shield started. Naval reinforcements augmented that nucleus rapidly.”
Five carrier battle groups enforced the UN - imposed embargo against Iraq, acting
in loose collaboration with ships from 14 other nations. Aircraft from six carriers
participated in combat operations during Desert Storm from stations in the
Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and eastern Mediterranean. Two battleships and perhaps
seven attack submarines launched Tomahawk cruise missiles.” Battleships and
their escorts also furnished naval gunfire support for allied forces and U.S.
Marines near the Kuwaiti coast. Minesweeping deficiencies predictably provided
the only notable disappointments.™

U.S. naval warfare during Desert Storm conformed to a pattern that has
persisted since World War II. The last "blue water" surface battle took place off
Kyushu on April 6-7, 1945. The last enemy warship sunk by a U.S. submarine
was the Japanese destroyer Nokaze near Saigon on February 19, 1945. The last
victim of a U.S. submarine was a merchant ship in the Sea of Japan the following
August.® All subsequent engagements constitute two categories. Representative
ship-against-shore operations include those connected with the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, the Dominican Republican (1965), Lebanon (1983-84), Grenada
(1983), and Libya (1986). All ship-to-ship encounters, excluding Cuban missile
crisis confrontations, were small scale and close to coasts. The North Korean
seizure of USS Pueblo (1968), the Mayaguez incident off Cambodia (1975),

52Bowman, Steven R., Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S, and Non-U.S.
Forces, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February 11, 1991, p. 5-8.

58Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea
Warfare), in unclassified testimony before The House Armed Services Committee
on March 20, 1991 announced that 13 attack submarines participated in Desert
Storm. Not all were present at one time, however, and some never engaged in
combat, according to amplifying information from his office.

“Schmitt, Eric, "Gulf Is Swept for Mines In The Aftermath of War," New York
Times, March 19, 1991, p. 14; Rumsey, Anne, "Navy Lacks Hunter for Shallow-
Water Mines," Defense Week, March 13, 1989, p. 1,12; Truver, Scott C. and
Jonathan S. Thompson, "Navy Mine Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?," Armed Forces
Journal, April 1987, p. 70,72,74.

55Mforison, Samuel Eliot, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United
States Navy in the Second World War, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1963, p.
509-510, 537-541.
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altercations in the Gulf of Sidra (1981, 1989), and Persian Gulf escort duty (1987-
88) are typical.

America’s maritime strategy until quite recently emphasized abilities to deter
and, if need be, defeat the Soviet Navy. U.S, Naval forces are still configured
to perform those tasks, although most authorities, who include the Secretary of
Defense, JCS Chairman, and the Chief of Naval Operations, believe Soviet threats
are much muted."”? Decisionmakers therefore should determine whether basic
changes in composition should accompany proposed naval force reductions. Fewer
carrier escorts and submarines,” for example, might be appropriate in the new
context, if experience since 1945 remains relevant. More mine warfare ships seem
advisable. Attention to underway replenishment ships could increase, if the US.
Navy loses access to forward bases, such as Subic Bay in the Philippines.

TACTICAL AIR COMBAT FORCES

US. tactical air combat power was spectacular during Desert Storm. Army
Apache helicopters fired the first shots when they destroyed two Iraqi early
warning sites in the wee hours of January 17, 1991. Unarmed EF-111s, which
specialize in electronic warfare, widened the corridor into Iraq when they jammed
antiaircraft radars and fire-direction centers."? Bombers, attack aircraft, and
Tomahawk cruise missiles then began the systematic destruction of commandcontrol-communications facilities, military airfields, and air defenses. Resultant
air supremacy, swiftly achieved, thereafter allowed U.S. aircraft to strike at will
from medium altitudes, almost with impunity. SCUD launchers, missile storage
sites, electrical power plants, nuclear development facilities, and chemical/biological
warfare factories were lucrative targets before coalition air forces turned their

56Watkins, James D., "The Maritime Strategy" and John F. Lehman, Jr., "The
600 - Ship Navy," both in The Maritime Strategy, a supplement to the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, January 1986, p. 2-17, 30-40.

57See Note 4.; also Trost, Carlesle A. H. , "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1990, p. 92-97; Collins, John M. and Dianne
E. Rennack, U.S./Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1980-1989, (As of
January 1, 1990), Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 6, 1990,
p. 90-123.

58] acy, James L., “Attack Submarines: The Case for Negotiated Reductions,
Arms Control Today, p. 8-12; Keller, John, "Submarine Threat Didn’t Vanish With
the Cold War," Military & Aerospace Electronics, February 1991, p. 11.

Grier, Peter, "U.S. Army Opened Way for Air War," Christian Science
Monitor, March 27, 1991, p. 8; Fulghum, David A,, "EF-111s Jammed Radars to
Open Air War Against Iraq," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 4, 1991,
p. 26.
CRS-24

attention toward the Iraqi Army.” Air-to-air encounters were short and
conclusive: the score was 42-to-0 in favor of allied forces. Ground fire downed
32 U.S. aircraft of all types during 43 days of Desert Storm. Other coalition forces
lost 9. Those figures are phenomenally low, considering a combat sortie rate that
averaged more than 1,000 per day (U.S. Army Air Forces lost 60 B-17 bombers,
each with a crew of 10, during the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid of August 17,
1943 oa 19 percent of the force -- and 60 more on a second raid two months
later).

AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION

Tactical air operations against Iraq continue trends in motion for many years.
Official Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps accounts of air war in Korea and
Vietnam concentrate on bombardment. Air-to-air combat received scant attention
in comparison. Subsequent aerial encounters have been confined to minor
altercations with Libya in 1981 and 1989. Carrier aircraft made substantial

contributions, but land-based squadrons predominated.

Current generation U.S. tactical aircraft far outstripped expectations
throughout the war with Iraq. Readiness rates for all types exceeded those
recorded in peacetime, despite accelerated sortie rates and time aloft.
Expeditious programs to develop and deploy advanced tactical fighters and

6"Schwarzkopf Declares Air Supremacy Over Iraq," Aerospace Daily, January
31, 1991, p. 169; Morrocco, John D., "U.S. Tactics Exploit Advances in Avionics,
Air-to-Surface Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 18, 1991,
p. 52-53; Bird, Julie, "Horner: Further AF Role in Gulf Not Needed," Air Force
Times, March 18,1991, p. 8.

81"Allies Shoot Down 42 Iraqi Aircraft, 81 Others Destroyed on Ground,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 11, 1991, p. 22; The Army Air Forces
In World War II, Vol. Two, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to
December 1943, Ed. by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 682-683, 704.

-82See, for example, Futrell, Robert F., The United States Air Forces in Korea,
1950-1953, Rev. Ed., Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1983, 823 p; The
United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, Ed. by Carl Berger,
Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1977, 365 p.

65"TJ.S. Navy Fighters Down 2 Libya Jets," Facts on File Yearbook, 1989, p.
1-2; "U.S. Navy F-14s Down Two Libyan Jet Fighters,” Facts on File Yearbook,
1981, p. 589-591.

6"Tac Mission Capable Rates Up 7% for War, Even As Sorties Doubled,"
Aerospace Daily, April 2, 1991, p. 9.
CRS-25

improved interdiction aircraft, as presently proposed,” therefore may be difficult
to justify during the impending period of budgetary constraint, unless perceived
threats clearly indicate requirements for immediate and major improvements.
Replacements for SR-71 "spy planes" and close air support aircraft able to perform
well at night and in bad weather might deserve higher priorities.

Future U.S. armed conflicts may not always favor Air Force and Marine
aircraft with adequate bases ashore. Carrier air power sometimes might
predominate, Vertical takeoff and landing capabilities could be more in demand
by tactical air combat forces ashore. The current interservice mix therefore merits
review. Navy officials moreover might reconsider the proportion of shipboard
aircraft dedicated to fleet defense, if they wish to contribute more effectively to
land battles.®

AIRCRAFT-CRUISE MISSILE MIX

Decisionmakers concurrently could reconsider tradeoffs between manned
aircraft and land attack cruise missiles. Tomahawks, for example, demolished
heavily-defended hard targets without endangering air crews during Desert Storm.
Featureless plains imposed no obstacles between launch sites and precisely located
targets. Terrain-following computers, however, might not work so well on short
notice in poorly mapped regions that feature rough topography. Computerized
data also are difficult to update rapidly after initial strikes obliterate landmarks.
Some Tomahawks consequently became confused after bombardment levelled tall
buildings in Baghdad.®* Reusable manned aircraft are much more versatile.
Variable payloads can be tailored for particular targets. Crews can maneuver

§Schine, Eric and Russell Mitchell, "The $75 Billion Question: Whose Fighter
Will Win?" Business Week, April 8, 1991, p. 64; Cooper, Bert H., Jr., Advanced
Tactical Fighter (ATF) Aircraft (Weapons Facts), Issue Brief 1B87111, Washington,
Congressional Research Service, March 21, 1991, 9 p. ;

*Morrocco, John A., "Nighttime CAS to Pose Challenge for Air Units Once
Ground War Begins," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 11, 1991, p.
20-21; Heppenheimer, T.A., “Revealed! March 5 Spy Plane," Popular Science,
November 1988, p. 70-73.

8’Reconfiguration may already be in the offing. See Holzer, Robert, "Navy
to Revamp Carrier Wings,” Defense News, February 25, 1991, p. 4.

68Anderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta, " Confused’ Tomahawks Missed Targets,"
Washington Post, March 27, 1991, p. F11. For a more sanguine view, see
“Tomahawk War Effectiveness Reduces A-X Stealth Requirement," Aerospace Daily,
April 15, 1991, p. 85.
CRS-26

to avoid enemy air defenses, assess situations on-the-spot, and adjust
accordingly.’ Some mix of manned aircraft and land attack missiles thus seems

mandatory.

MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS

Two Marine divisions, in concert with other coalition forces, breached Iraqi
barriers on February 24, 1991 and quickly liberated Kuwait. Their performance,
in General Schwarzkopf’s words, was “absolutely superb ... a textbook, and I think
it’ll be studied for many, many years to come as the way to do it." Marine
aviation furnished direct support.

Those admirable actions, however, were remotely related to statutory Marine
Corps roles and missions, which are to organize, train, and equip forces "for service
with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct
of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign." A DOD directive further stipulates that those duties "do not
contemplate the creation of a second land Army." Marines ashore nevertheless
performed tasks that were indistinguishable from those of the U.S. Army, which
prepares "primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to war on land"
(more specifically to "defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend
land areas.")” First, Marine divisions guarded Saudi Arabian oil installations
and port facilities; second, they defeated Iraqi land forces in Kuwait; third,
they remained in Kuwait as a security contingent after the shooting war ceased.

Marine duplication of Army roles and missions is nothing new. Overlaps
started early in the Twentieth Century with lengthy employments in Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. Marine Major General John A. Lejeune
commanded a composite Army-Marine division in France during World War I.
Few Marines in Korea or Vietnam ever smelled salt water after the Inchon

6°Tyadeoffs between cruise missiles and tactical aircraft are contained in
Collins, John M., Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems: How Many? What
Combinations? Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 7, 1974,
p. 52-68.

™Schwarzkopf: Strategy Behind Desert Storm," p. 35.

"Title 10, United States Code, Sections 3062 and 5063; DOD Directive 5100.1:
Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September
25, 1987, p. 18,16.

72Moore, Molly "U.S. Troops Just Starting to Get Feet on Ground," Washington
Post, August 26, 1990, p. A21.
[OCR skipped on page(s) 31-34]

[Read from a scan; the first 30 pages.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3A91-361RCO. Public record. Not legal advice.