# Record and brief — The Pewabic Mining Company, Johnson Vivian, Henry Billings, Thomas H. Perkins, Alden B. Buttrick, Daniel L. Demmon, and the Pewabic Copper Company, Defendants and Appellants, vs. Thomas H. Mason, William Hart Smith, and Sullivan Ballou, Complainants

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1889

## Text

Supreme Court of the Cited States.

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

Nos. 240, 168.

THe Pewasic MINING Company, JOHNSON VIVIAN, )°
Henry Birurecs, THoomas H. Perkins, ALDEN
B. Burrrick, Danie, L. DemMMon, and THe Pe-
WABIC CopPpER Company, Defendants and Appel- heen

lants, —

vs.

Tuomas H. Mason, Witt1aAm Hart SMIrH, and
SULLIVAN Bauiou, Complainants and Appellees, J

A. IN D

THomas H. Mason, Wittiam Harr Smita, and )
SULLIVAN Bauiou, Complainants and Appellants.

vs.

THe Pewapic MINING Company, JOHNSON VIVIAN, | Cross-
Henry Biiiuines, THomas H. Perkins, ALDEN { Appeal.
B. Burrrick, DaNtet L. DemMmMon, and THE PE-
WABIC Mintnc Company, Defendants and Appel-
lees.

BRIEF FOR COMPLAINANTS ON APPEAL AND CROSS-
APPEAL. :

DON M. DICKINSON,
ALFRED RUSSELL,

Of Counsel.

JUDD & DETWEILER, PRINTERS.

Seen eereeea saouemmeseanepetie eR * vac . aS Ses iaa Re

Supreme Court of the alnited States.

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

Nos. 240, 168.

t

THE Pewabsic MINING COMPANY, JOHNSON VIVIAN,
Henry Bitnincs, THomas H. Perkins, ALDEN
B. Burrrick, Danie, L. DemMoyn, and THE Pr-
WABIC COPPER Company, Defendants and Appel- \ 4) a)
ants, —

Ss.

Tuomas H. Masox, Witntiam Harr Swirn. and

SULLIVAN BaLLou, Complainants and Appellees,

and

THomas H. Mason, Wittram Hart SMITH, and )

SULLIVAN BaLuovu, Complainants and Appellants.
US.

Tue Pewasic MINING CoMPANY, JOHNSON VIVIAN, | Cross-
Henry Birtrnas, Tuomas H. Perkins, ALDEN { Appeal.
B. Burrrick, Danie. L. DEMMonN, and THE PE-

WABIC MINING Company, Defendants and Appel- |
lees. .

BRIEF FOR COMPLAINANTS ON APPEAL AND CROSS-
APPEAL.

cee ee ee ee ne er ne

The decree below (Record, p. 923) gave substantially all
the relief prayed forin the bill, except that it denied to com-
plainant stockholders the right to a receiver and an ac-
counting from the board of directors of the Pewabic Mining
Company for the funds received by them after the expira-

2 tein A SS

ee ae ata

* leary >? ‘ a } ,?
a t' retary cl il rea ire! clit SE CUCL Fg arg Fe rion Saves Liat
after he discovered the expiration of
‘| cf e+) 31) r° 7 : nductine th , .y a? +? Yr ? re
no change m the mMabner of condaucting the mining opera

- } ] ’ } } ] ana in ;
trons, and that lie proceeded To 1evy aussessmetkts |
‘
*

(Reeord, 1). se fs

POINTS,
We contend—

ree , ae : i : ? > Da” , i .
a That fhe atlempted transte fo thee Pewahi ( Api pred Campany

i
by fhe hoard cil (L2rEC Ors (ji t/ifé ery ue 4 dai Had f CORap lie y EET
. . . -

e: AOS ‘Repeat "y 5 aie oe a
void on two siuffteient grounds—the one that i was ultra vires,
* +

, ’

? ? P ° e J - :
tiie orher that rf fgets Praudwleiil.

rry } , * 7 BERS ? ° age y e : er ° .
Ae Phat all thie acts oF the Hoard of directors in Cai Weill? O8

; } 5 omnes oo 21a 2 . y j th aator oy } >.
the PMI NESS (tte) Lfi¢ erprration fii hie / f*igte ’ Ap imi ir. 18S

- . - ’ >? . a } 7 =e -
are responsible por losses dre Eu pendilures meecurred awd node tn

that business.

t
‘

eee EPS:
2 .

{)

III. That through the acts and conduct of the secretary and

freasu rer, Deimmon, t? whose hands the whole meanagenient of

..* ’ . . ;

the hoard was Sufye red fo ve st, tlie defe ndant aire elors are charge-
. . . 7 . , y* . , ;? }

ahle with bad faith in their dealinas with stockholders, and must

>? .
be held OR that ground foan accounting.

3

“THE ACTION OF THE OLD COMPANY CONVEYING ITS PROP-
ERTY WAS VOID.
Since the decree and appeal in this cause the supreme

eourt of Michigan has construed the laws of that State bear-

to

10)

the term limited for subscribing to stock and in relation to
the quantity of land whieh the corporation shall hold, but
the capital shall not be increased nor the time for existence
of charters extended.”

The Pewabie Mining Company was organized under the
general law permitting the formation of such corporations
by filing articles of association with the secretary of state
and county clerk, and limits the period of existence to thirty
years.

Although the following statute was not complied with by
the defendants in their new organization, and although it
is coinpletely disposed of for the purposes of these corpora-
tions by the decision of the Michigan supreme court above
cited, yet it cut a figure in construction at’.cireuit, and we
cite it to complete the statement of laws possibly affecting
the questions Involved. (Ilow. Comp., § 4904.)

“Seerron 1. The people of the State of Michigan enact
that it shall be lawful for any corporation organized under
the laws of this State for mining or manufacturing pur-
poses, whose corporate existence Is about to terminate by lim-
tation of law, at its annual meeting next preceding or at a
special meeting called for that purpose, to be held within
one year immediately preceding the date of such termina-
tion, by a vote of two-thirds of its capital stock, to direct the
coutinuance of its corporate existence for such further term,
not exceeding thirty years, as may be expressed in a resolu-
tion for that purpose. Upon the adoption of such resolution
by the stockholders it shall be the duty of the president and
secretary to make, sign, and acknowledge duplicate articles
of association (as In the case of a new corporation), to which
shall be appended a copy of the proceedings of such stock-
holders’ meeting, certified by the secretary and verified by
his oath, whieh articles of association shall be filed with the
secretary of state and with the county clerk of the county
where the corporation carries on its business, and be by them
recorded in. their respective othees at the expense of said
corporation, and the coples =O filed, the record there of, Or a
certified copy of either of such reeords, shall be prima faci
evidence of the tacts therein recited.

1]

“Sec. 2. Upon the expiration of the time limited for the
existence of such old corporation a new corporation shall be
deemed to be formed by such articles of association, which
shall at onee succeed to all the property and rights of action
of the old corporation, and shall be li: ible for all of its debts
or other obligations, and the officers of the old corporation
shail sueceed in like offices in the new corporation, and
every stockholder in the old corporation shall be to a like
extent a stockholderin the new ecorporation.’—Acet of 1882.

The scheme attempted to be put through presents these

features :

((.) It proposed to sel] property of the value of S500,000
for 3. 0,000 In the stock of the new company : it forbade com-
petition, and its theory was to prevent realization for liqui-

dation.

(4) [t offered to the dissentient stoekholders who had paid
theirsteck indebtedness, petsenmegemmacsitiede: So0 000
Is to $1,000 000—c. ¢., at $1.25 per share paid by the convey-
ance of property, bat indebted $25.75 per share.

The alternative proposition to dissentient stockholders
was to take their a ratain cash of the arbitrary valuation

of $50,000—/. ¢., $1.25 per share.

(7.) With all the assets conveyed to the new company, it
left the old corporation in liquidation as to ereditors, and

stockhoiders liable for assessments to pay its debts.

(e.) It proposed a convevahce by the direetors who had
managed its affairs for five vears and upwards to themselves,

to be formally executed and to be formally received by them-

seives,

(f) That the charter exnired a vear a ei i Re eS
\ J.) fiat the charte} CxAPIPed a year previousiy, aud this

fact, after it was admittedly known and when it was be-
¥ é

12

lieved that the stockholders were ignorant of it, was kept
from the stockholders until shortly before the meeting at
which the attempt was made (Record, pp. 890, 918; Presi-
dent Perkins, 854), and that the stock voted at the meeting
in favor of it by prexies held by the directors to whom the
property was to be conveyed. (Page 895.)

We submit that the relation of the stockholder in cor-
porations of this nature is in contract. He agrees with his
fellows that he will join the venture, to be carried on for not
longer than thirty years, and that then the assets shall be
sold for the best obtainable price, the debts be paid and net
proceeds divided, and that they shall part company.

There is no case holding that such a stockholder ean be
forced into a new enterprise, or that he can be compelled to
receive anything else than his honest pro rafa as a distrib-
utee of the fair value of the assets In cash. There is no

differenee between his position in this regard and that of a
creditor of a dend man’s estate or of an Insulvent estate of a

partner whose firm is in liquidation. To force him itfto: a
hew company.and a new contract is even bevond legislative
power. No ease ean be found of the enforeed renewal of a
corporation not engaged in business affecting the public in-
terests. |

The law does not fix the term of the corporation. The
corporators alone can do that.

In Utley vs. Donaldson, 94 US, 47, the Court says :

“There can be no contract without the mutual assent of
the parties. This is vital to its existence. ‘There can be
none where itis wanting. [tis as indispensable to the modi-
heation of a contract already made as it was to making it
originally.”

ln Clearwater vs. Meredith, lst Wall, pp. 2, on, 1, 4
where a consolidation of railroad companies autherized |

a
Vv

the statute was attempted against a dissenting stockholder
this Court says:

There was no power to force him to join the new cor-
poration and to receive stock In it.

“If the majerity of stockholders of the corporation of
which he was a member had undertaken to transfer his in-
terest against his wish, they would have been enjoined.

‘But in conferring authority the Legislature never in-
tended to compel a dissenting stockholder to transfer his
Interest because a majority of the stockholders consented to
the consolidation. Even if the Legislature had manifested
an obvious purpose LO do SO, the act u riled have heen NAL gal,
for af would heave Linp rived the abl igi ut ie aT of the contract.’

Morawitz, 1, § 415, correetly states the rule as follows: “On
the winding up of the business of a corporation the proceeds
must be distributed in cash.” The business cannot be dis-
posed of in any other manner except by unanimous consent.
(McCauley vs. Mvers, 44 Pa. St.,555; Black vs. Delaware Co.
24N.J.hq., 455; Re Co. L. R., 4 Eq., 341; Clineh vs. Finan-
cial Co, L. R. 4, 117; Frothingham vs. Barney, 6 Hun.,
306,5. CC. 15 N. Y.; Gregory vs. Patchet, 53 Beaven, 506)

In Tuttle vs. Michigan R. £2.35 Mich., 249, and also a con-
olidation ease, the court says that a stockholder cannot “ be
brought into any other contract relations In any way not
contemplated by the contractitself. * * * Nochangein
the corporation which violated any of the statutory condi-
tions could bind a dissenting stockholder or compel him to
submit to the new order of things against his will.”

In Mowrey vs. RR. Ath Bissel, 1886, the court says, regard-
Ing a consolidation: * Evervbody knows that if several men

enter Into a Valid contract It cannot be fundamentally

altered except by unanimous consent. Why should a differ-

. . } . > a7 ] ‘ : " . *

and I. M. vs. Drinker, 30 Mich., 124; Bradley vs. Tyson, 3:
Mich., 537.)

Aside from the question of power and aside from other
indicia of unfairness, the attempt of defendants was to sell
to themselves. In other words, the vendor, trustee, and
vendee are the same person. It is doubtful if there could
be a stronger case for the application of the principle than
this one, where the sale attempted was for an amount one-
tenth the value as reported by the master. Actual fraud,
however, need not be shown. The defendants were disabled
from promoting or becoming incorporators in the new cor-
poration to take the assets of their beneficiaries.

If the majority sell to themselves they must account for
the fair value. “They cannot bind the minority by fixing
their own price upon the assets.” (Ervin vs. Oregon R’w’y
Navigation Co., 20 F. R., 577.) This was a scheme sub-
stantially like the one under consideration. (Brewer vs.
Boston Theatre, 104, Mass., 578-395; TTodgkinson is. Na-
tional Bank, 26 Beavan, 473; Atwood vs. Merryweather,
L. Rk. 5 kq., 464, note.) In Gregory vs.. Patchett, 55
Beavan, 559, which was a conveyance to directors, the
conveyance was held void and the directors held lable.
(Wardell vs. R. R. (0 103 U. ».. 651 ‘ People rs. Township of
Overysel, 11 Mich., 222; F. and P. M. R. R. Co. vs. Dewey,
14 Mich., 477; 486; G. A. Sem vs. Keifer, £5 Mich., 100;
Great Luxemburg RK. W. vs. Magnay, 25 Beavan, 586;
5. ©.. ZS Beavan, 646. York aud N. MM. RK. KR. Co. va.
Hudson, 16 Beavan, 505; A. G. vs. Nelson, 1 Craig and
Phillips, 271; Benson vs. Hathorn, 1 Young and Collier,
025; Aberdeen R. W. Co. rs. Blakie, 1 MeQueen, 482; M.C.
Ass’n vs. Coleman, L. R., 6 WH. L. 189; Re Madrid Bank, L.
R., 2 Eq.. 216; Kochler vs. Iron Co., 2 Black, 710; James
vs. R. R. Co., 6 Wall., 752; Drury vs. Cross, 7 Wall., 299;
Coal and Jron Co. vs. Sherman, 30 Barb., 553; Abbott vs.
Amer. H. R. Co., 383 Barb., 586; Simmons vs. Vulean Oil

CC — ——————

17

Co., 61 Penn. St., 202; Kimmell vs. Gutney, 2 Grant’s cases,
125; Ashurst’s appeal, 60 Penn. St., 290; 1 Redfield R’y, 5
ed., 605 to 6138; Robinson vs. Smith, 5 Paige, Zea. Colquitt
vs. Howard, 11 Ga., 566; Hodges vs. N. E. Serew Co., 1 R.I.,
312; Port vs. Russell, 36 Ind., 360; Newby vs. OC. R. R.,
1 Sawyer, 63; Michand vs. Girod, 4 How., 503; C. R. vs.
Clough, 49 N. H., 257; Heath vs. Erie R. R., 8 Blatchford
C. C., 347; Wright vs. Orville M. Co., 40 Colo., 20; E. & N.
R. R. vs. Poor, 59 Maine, 277; Paine vs. L. KE. R. R., 33 Ind.;
203; Goodwin vs. Cinn. Canal Co., 18 Ohio, 126; Story Kq.,
§§ 1255 to 1257 and 1265; G. C. & S.R.R.. vs. Kelly, 77 Ill,
426 and 435, cas. eit.;: Butler vs. Watkins, 138 Wallace:
Green’s Brice’s Ultra Vires, chap. VII.)

JURISDICTION TO APPOINT RECEIVER.

Of the jurisdiction and frequent application of the power
of the Court there is no question.

While it is entirely true that the receiver will not be
appointed during the life of a corporation to deprive the
directors of their discretionary powers in respect of the COor-
porate business, vet, as we have seen, they are no longer a
corporate board, but are trustees who have failed in, neg-
lected, and mismanaged their trust. Their duties as trustees
are imperative, and cannot be varied or added to or escaped.
As such they and the funds in their hands are subject to the
control of the court of equity.

Formerly the power in Michigan was statutory. The
court, upon the application of any creditor, stockholder, or
member, might appoint a receiver or trustee to wind up the
business (as in New York; see Bank vs. Alpina, 39 Mich.,
706). A law still stands (2d Howell, see. 8208, 39 Mich.,
107) providing that suits may be proceeded with in the cor-
porate name or in the name of receivers or trustees as sub-
stituted plaintiffs.

Jurisdiction in chancery is also expressly conferred (2d

o
ov)

LL OE Attlee apa at ese tome
CAPAA I Hs A gem

Poe BASIE oh On mime

aetiaiieihsietineaaniamteebeeetee

a

1s

Ifowell, see. $150), and this statutory jurisdiction may be
exercised by United States courts. (Ellis vs. Davis, 109
U.S., 485-498; Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 How., 331-341; Ze-
briskie vs. C. C. & C., 25 How., pp. 381, 595, 400.) It is
sald in the last case, “ but the bill is framed not to obtain
relief from error or fraud in the administration of the pow-
ers of the company by their trustees, but against the exer-
cise of powers that do not belong to the corporation and
which the body could not confirm except by unanimous
consent.”

Now, in such cases all English and American authorities
are to the effeet that a single stockholder may maintain a
bill for an injunetion and receiver even during the existence
of the corporation, and without first requesting the board of
directors to bring the suit. In Heath vs. Erie R. R. Co., §
slatehford, 347-493 down to 407, the cases are exhaustively
analyzed by the learned court.

The eases like Foss vs. Harbottle, 2d Hair, 461, are not now
followed, even in England. (See Gray vs. Linn, L. f., $8 Eq.
Cas., 541; Atwood vs. Merryweather, 5 eq. Cas., 444—a ease
much resembling this one; MeDougal vs. Gladwin, 1 Chan.
Div., 21; Mason vs. Harris, 11 id., 97. See Thompson on
Liability of Directors, 582 to S94 and cas., Perry on Trusts,
sec. 242; 2 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 1232,1252; Peabody vs. Flint,
6 Allen, 52: Mumma ves. P. Co.,8 Pet.,285: Curran vs. State,
15 How., 311; Bacon vs. Robertson, 18 How., 480; Linn vs.
Roberts, 6 Wall., 277; Briggs vs. Penniman, 8 Cow., 387;
MeLaren vs. Pennington, 1 Paige, 111; Heath vs. Barmore,
58 N. Y., 305; Pond vs. Vermont R. R., 12 Blatchford, 280,
287: Foster rs. Essex Bank, 16 Mass., 245.) ;

It being true that courts of equity will interfere in the
internal management of affairs of a corporation at the in-
stance of stockholders, where the matter complained of is
ultra vires, it seems to us clear that after dissolution and after
the ultimate geverning bedy of the stockholders have ceased

to have power to carry on business and nothing remains but

PRE OPTED oN

19

to hold administration upon the assets of the dead corpora-
tion, a court of equity in the circumstances of this case will
lay hold of those who are in actual possession of the assets
and administer them by its own officers, upon the same
principle upon which courts of equity act in administering
assets of a deceased natural person, upon the principle that
it is the duty of the court to enforce the execution of trusts.
While rule 94 in equity, 104 U.S., TX, has no application
to the present case, nor the case of Hawes vs. Oakland, in the
same volume, page 451, the decision (pages 454 down to
459) is valuable upon the general doctrine and its limita-
tions, as cited above, and which is discussed by the learned
court in the 8th Blatchford, 347 to 407, above cited.
Boone on Corporations, sec. 207, cas., note 8; see. 206,
cas., note o.
lield on Corporations, pp. 420-425.

LT.

THE ACTS OF THE BOARD IN THE EXPENDITURE OF THE MONEY
IN CARRYING ON BUSINESS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE
CHARTER @e@ APRIL 4, 1885, WERE BEYOND THEIR POWERS,
AND THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL LOSSES AND EX PENDI-

TURES IN THAT BEHALF.

[rn Gray VS. National SS. y., Lid U. i 116, this Court
says of the steamship company in liquidation: “It could no
more own and manage a steamship than it could own or
manage any other property.”

It being true that the form of the corporation existed only
of liquidation, and that the directors were

for the purpose
purpose, we cannot see why all the liabilities

trustees for that
of trustees are not attached to them.
If a receiver, executor, or insolvent’s assignee should earry

on the former business of the estate being administered, h
would be chargeable with every dollar lost and liable for

eRe Nt AE ti lls senamsnne

attested.

EE PINE gem = ati a alone. shaman aaliieeditea Rl - 7 Oe mer er ce

20)

every dollar made. If a liquidating partner in merchan-
dising should buy goods for sale again and a loss should
accrue, or If he took any venture whatever with the funds
of the firm, he would be chargeable, and this no matter how
good his intention and that his honest object was to In-
crease the fund.

The risks of mining business are in keeping up the equip-
ment when no ore is in sight and in drifting, stoping, and
sinking in such circumstances. In this case it is clear that
about S250900 was expended after the expiration of the
charter in all the risks of the business. Whatever portion
of this was expended in keeping the mine in proper condi-
tion, pumping water or preparing the property for sale,
would be an ultimate charge for the trustees to be de-
ducted; but, conceding their good faith, this can be no
exception to the universal rule of liability for the money
lost. :

Hill on Trustees, Am. notes, p. 030.

It is well settled that officers are hable for losses occurring
by acts ultra vires even during the corporate life.
Thompson on Liability of Officers of Corporations,
) le a .
}). Viv.
Field Corporation, see. 178.
Parrish vs. Wheeler, 22 N. Y., 508.

ven if it were true, ignorance of the expiration of the

charter would be no defense. While the law is different as
to by-laws, there never has been a question that every one
Is conclusively presumed to know the provisions of the
charter or articles of association of the corporation with
which he deals.

Angell and Ames on Corporations, sec. 299.

Green’s Brice’s Ultra Vires, p. 597 et seq.

general rule were otherwise 1t would in the nature

lt the

of things have its limitation before a director, an executive

eo tal

9]
limb of the corporation, could defend himself on the plea of
ignorance of the organle law creating the body. Ignorance
of law does not entitle a party to relief.

Perry on Trusts, see. 18-4.

The place for filing original articles was accessible to all
In public offices at the State capitol and within a short dis-

tance of the mining office.

The business carried on is shown by the statement of the

8, 582, and it appears

superintendent and treasurer, pp. 57
that after the expiration of the charter and after actual
knowledge of the expiration in the board the stockholders
were assessed and paid in over $80,000.00, and, as we have
seen, all the defendants admit the affairs of the concern were
carried on in every respect as during the life of the corpora-
tion.

On this ground alone there should be an accounting and

a recelver.
ITI.

THERE SHOULD BE AN ACCOUNTING AND A RECEIVER BECAUSE
OF THE BAD FAITH OF THE MANAGEMENT WITH WHICH ALL
OF THE DEFENDANTS DIRECTORS ARE CHARGEAB!LE AND BE-
CAUSE A DISCOVERY OF ASSETS IS REQUIRED.

It appears by the evidence that Mr. Demmon was _ per-
titted to have the sole Inanavement of the companys’ affairs,
and that no other of the board charged himself with any
duties or acquired any actual knowledge of the business or
of this inanaging director’s transactions.

President Perkins’ testimony, pp. 880, 882, and cross-

CX., P. $82.

t sufficiently interested to

The other directors were hn

notice or remember any dissent from the action of the meet-
ing which voted the transfer, although it appears by ad-

tne

Sa a et ee

99

mitted minutes (pp. 5, 6, 7, 8,45 to 45) to have been con-
tested vigorously.
Perkins, p. S80; Buttrick, p. 877.

Mr. Demmon held the same office in the Franklin (ad-
joining the Pewabic) as in the Pewabic, and also in several
other copper companies, and was engaged in no other busi-
ness than as such officer of these companies. (DP. 897.)

[lis acts and knowledge must be held to be the acts and
knowledge of the defendants’ board.

We select the following as some of the evidence tending to

show bad faith:

1. The attempted transfer of $500,000 in value of assets
for one-tenth of that sum, as heretofore detailed.

The consideration was less by nearly half than the amount
assessed and collected of stockholders within the past six
months; it was less by $25,000 than the amount of copper
alone shown to be on hand on January 1, 1884, less than
three months before; it was less than the value of the sup-
plies at the mine alone (Record, p. 582). It was less than
one-fifth of what had been paid out in eash of the stock-
holders’ money on one piece of additional land less than
five years before—p. 562.

Notice of the expiration of charter was confessedly with-
held from stockholders, and the majority vote was obtained
on proxies through circulars printing an alarming. state-
ment that the Quiney mine was endeavoring to wrest the
property from the company. (Pp. 909, 910.)

(The president of the Quiney Company was put on the
witness stand by defendants, but neither by his examination
nor by any other evidence was there any effort to show a
eround for this circular or to sustain the averment of the

answer in that regard.)

ica ocentaeedeataaianaemin nee ee ‘ . ee ee eee ee

ate tee oe

OO te li LEE LIL OEE A gy

2. No information had been given as required by law:

Howells Comp., § 4005, requires that annually a report
shall be made and sighed by a majority of the board of di-
rectors, containing, first, the amount of capital paid in ;
second, the amount invested in real estate; third, the amount
of their personal estate; fourth, the amounts of their debts
and credits; fifth, the name of each stockholder and the
number of shares held by hitn at the time of the report,”
and further provides that “ every such report shall be veri-
fied by the oath of the officer signing the same, and shall
be filed in the office of the secretary of state and with the
clerk of the county in which the mine is situated.” It fur-
ther provides for the pains and penalties of perjury for any
false statement. This requirement is preserved in the later
act, section 4107, adding other requirements for the report,
and providing that it shall be filed with the county clerk
and auditor general of the State,and providing that failure
to file it shall be a misdemeanor, as in the prior act.

This is clearly a provision for the benefit of all persons
interested in the corporation as stockholders or creditors, and
itis not a provision merely for the purpose of taxation, there
being a separate and independent provision for the filing
of a statement for that purpose. (Howell, sec. 1189.)

No such report had been filed for five years prior to the
meeting. (Pp. 899, 104).

The supreme court of Michigan terms this a beneficent
provision and one of the conditions of the grant of a cor-
porate franchise by the State. (Vannetten vs. Eaton, 19
Mich., 192.)

There was no equivalent for such a report furnished the
stockholders.

The so-called annual reports show nothing of the where-
abouts of the mine’s product or what is invested of money
derived from it or from assessments.

It is impossible to follow back balances or to get an un-
derstanding of expenditures for real estate, personal prop-

engine

alee apie anda daa ae ee

ibis

24

erty, or what has been received. Take, for instance, the
report for 1885, p. 582. There is no statement of the per-
sonal property beyond the items of “copper on band,” “cash,”
and “supplies.” The last does not include machinery, tools,
horses, cars, wagons, &c., but is a technical term covering
fuse, powder, and the like. Who can tell anything from the
item “cash paid loans” or “ mine agent's drafts?” If the
mine agent’s report of expenditures accompanying the state-
ment agreed. with his “drafts” it would be intelligible, but
there is a difference of $100,000. The balance-sheet of
assets and liabilities includes none of the live mine property.

In the search for information the managing director at
the mine was examined on this report, and certainly he did
not clear up matters. This is his testimony, page 255:

@. You attended the meeting in Boston on the 26th of
March, did you?
JA. TI did.
(J. Was it reported correctly that there was $05,828.42 on a
hand? —
A. T suppose it is correct.
Q. Was it correctly reported that you had in copper on
hand at 14% cents per pound worth $70,066.99 ?
A. I presume so. ;
(). Did it strike vou as correct ?
A. I eould not tell. It was the treasurer's report.
Q. You were there. Did you see the report?
A. I was there.
(). Does he make his figures from your reports—whio sends
the figures ?
A. The clerk.
@. Under whose direction ?
A. Indirectly IT give him

(. Indireetly you are responsible for it?

A. How could I tell whether he haa the copper or not?

Q. Did you have the amount of copper on hand?

A.. I do not know, sir. Nobody ean tell that.

Q. Do you mean to say thet your reports are made to the
board of directors, from which these printed reports are
made, and that the agent knows nothing about it ?

Or

av

A. We know that our figures are correct, but when they
get down there we know nothing about them.

(). Well, now I show you the report of the Pewabie Com-
pany of Jan. Ist, 1884, and ask vou whether or not the item

of copper on hand is correct, at 142 cents per pound,

$75,066.99.
A. I do not know.
@. You say you don’t know.
A. I don’t know.

[n the preceding year there are “mine agent’s drafts ” of
$250,000 and “cash paid loans” $350,000. There are no
assets shown except copper on hand, cash, and bills receiv-
able, making a total of $141,000. (Reeord, p. 571.)

Taking the average of annual copper production from the
evidence, since Mr. Demmon came into the directory, there
has been mined and sold of copper $2,000,000.00. There
has been collected from stockholders a large amount more,
and there is no connected account anywhere that has been
found.

The withholding of the books:

In their answer, the complainants having coinplained of
a refusal to show them and having asked for information as
to the business, defendants set up asa reason for not giving
the information that the answer is sworn to in Michigan,
and that the books containing the desired information are
in Boston.

ad made efforts to see the
,

books prior to the filing of the bi
} -

Demmon, pp. vob, 557.

On March 31, 1884, the bill was filed, and on May 12 fol
lowing - ecburt m: - the order appointing the special ex-
1
values, | Imiting both part 1es as to the time of
|
if”

-aminer as 9
taking testimony, complainants being given twenty-seven
days in chief and six a to rebut. Complainants were
residents of New York and were required to produce compe-

SRG RE ee i

WAR

tent evidence of the amount and description of the prop-
erty.
I’very effort was made to get access to the books and was
rendered futile by Mr. Deminon.
Complainant Smith’s testimony, p. 68.
Mr. Mussy’s testimony, pp. 74, 75.
Dickinson, p. 05S.

The direction of the counsel for defendants in this case
was disregarded.

Grant’s testimony, p. 390,in connection with Dem-

YO,
mon’s, pp. 836 and 332.
After complainants’ ease was closed Mr. Demmon, in his
Boston testimony, p, 879, staicd that in the previous June,
when examined at Hloughton, he had certain books with
him, and that he mentioned the fact in the presence of the
examiner. A reading of his Houghton testimony, p. 330,
discloses no intimation of the kind, although the contention
of the complainants that he had withheld books was pressed
vigorously upon him in his examination. Even in his Bos-
ton testimony he says that he brought no ledgers—nothing
but cash books and day books, which would be practically
useless In a limited examination before a master. |

Under the order of the court to submit testimony as to the
items of property a hearing was fixed at Houghton for June
10. Northrop, a stockholder of the Pewabie Company, p. 171,
Was requested by complainants’ attorney to look over the
personal property at the mine, that he might testify at the
hearing. Ile was refused access to the necessary informa-
tion. (Northrop’s testinony, p. 165 et sev.)

The history of these efforts to obtain testimony after the
order of the court in the premises stamps the conduct of the

directors in charge with bad faith.

L. The diamond-drill exploration of the Pewabie land and
the use made of it as bearing on the question of value :

The defendants’ theory was that the mining land situ-
ated on the Pewabie lode between the Quincey and the
Franklin was practically worthless.

To demonstrate this they had introduced a mass of testi-
mony tending to show extensive explorations by the dia-
mond drill, and in connection therewith putin the sched-
ule showing 23 borings (Record, p. 554), all purporting by
the testimony to have been of recent date, aggregating
1,846 feet. Of course, the value of this testimony as to the
presence or absenec of copper in the land depended upon its
having been lately done, for the reason that the levels and
drifts are soon carried to the point of any discovery made
by the drill; as, for instance, 1f all these borings had been
made one year previously, the report of the mining super-
intendent for 18838, at the close of the year, shows that the
“drifting on different levels for that year had been 2,546
feet.”

After the testimony and this schedule had gone in with
the eonelusion of the mining superintendent from such ex-
ploration that the land was poor, Thomas Whittle, the
mining captain, who had charge of all such work, was put
upon the stand. He had been mining captain for two years.
(Reeord, Pp. 201.)

Having in mind that the bill was filed March 31, 1884,
we beg to submit Whittle’s cross-examination asto how and
when the “explorations ” were made.

During the two previous vears the first of any diamond-
drill explorations had been in March, 1884, and it was
then used for twenty days, doing the last of it on the last

of March. (P. 290.)

Now, at what time did vou cease using it?
”

(). N 7 |
A. The first time ‘
).

.

Yes.

tiene te

MP NRG NR A AE ee.

28

A. The end of March.

Q. Was that when the news came of the commencement
of this suit?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you commence to use the diamond drill
again ?

A. About the 21st of April.

(). What were your instructions when you commenced to
use it aAgall, on the 21st of April t

A. i9 proceed on thie long hole.

QM. What do vou call the long hele ?

A. We were drilling a hole forexploration from our main
workings back east and we ealled it the long hole, and we
ceased working when we had orders. That is the-s2d level.
(). When did you get vour orders to commence again”?
What were your instructions ?

A. ‘To continue our work.

() Whereabouts were you Instructed to continue your

A. At the 82d level.
). In the same long hote ?
A, Yes, sir.

(Q). Did you put the drill in the same place where it had

a: Yes, SH.

). iow tong did vou continue that ?
\. We continued that for two weeks.
). ‘Laen what did you do?

A. We stopped altogether.

». You haven't done anything since?

A. No, sir.

(). Ilow did you come to stop it?

A. According to orders from the agent (Vivian).

Q. [low many holes did you putin between the Ist of

April and the end of the two weeks’?
A. Only that one.
(). In the same old hole
A. Yes, Sir |
(). Llow many feet did you bore”?
A. About 2SO feet.
Q. Now, understand tliat you commenced another boring
after the 21st of April; that is clear?
A. That is clear, sir.

>}

20

(). Did you change the direction of the drill in any way?

A. No, sir.

(Q. Now, vou had been boring some 20 days before ordered
to stop, in Mareh, had you?

A. Yes, SIP.

@. How many holes did you put in during these 20 days?

A. We put in nine holes.

(). In what levels?

A. At the 30th level, north of the shaft, three holes—two
east and one west.

(. How deep?

A. The first hole, 98 feet; the second hole, 59 feet west :
third hole, 63 feet east: fourth hole, south of shaft at the
o0th level, S2 feet east; fourth hole, north of number six
shaft, 96 feet east.

. What level?

A. The 34th level (the lowest level). Fifth hole, 56 feet
west, north of number six shaft: sixth hole, south of num-
ber six shaft, east 91 feet: seventh hole, in the 3lst level,
97 feet; eighth hole, 52d level, east 412 feet, south of the
shaft.

. Do I understand that the drill-hole went across the
levels?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Through to ground that had been worked—where the
levels had been worked before?

A. In the same ground.

(). This long drill-hoie, then, ran or passed all the ground
that had been worked in the levels up to nearly the 19th ?

A. At the 21st level.

(Q). In what general direction lies the Quincy from the
point at which you started your levels ?

A. Here is the Quincy mine here (indicating on the map).

(). Have you at any time put ina drill-hole from the end
of any level or cross-cut towards the Quincy mine?

A. We have put one drill-hole through up here—not a
diamond drill-hole.

(). | am asking about your diamond drill-work ?

A. No, sir.

(). Have vou putin any drill-hole from the end of any
level or cross-cut in the direction of the Franklin mine?

A. Yes, sir—oh, no, sir; only a cross-section. (Pp. 291,
292.)

The explorations before suit, therefore. were made in

« * . 1 “a ; .
NIarch. gnc were wine tlistead olf twentv-three in nimabe o
and thie exploration qite] the bhivestigation as fo vaiue Was

: cap ie hig
commenced Was continueusliy in one hole, through Worthless

: } . . ] | }
ground, and not in the direetion of the contiguous rich lands

of the Quiney and Franklin

. é ; Ps
All the circumstances show the propriety Ol ahh InvVvesti-

, ’ - } ’ } y } :
gation both of the accounts and of the property, and they

certainiv show that the attitude and eonduet of those here
pee PERG TSE! OSes. es Myce eae weet * affairs of this eompan P
toiore In actual ehbarge of the affalrs of this company to-

}

y ‘ . ] s } " * i /? 7 é , sees ] a bo ly as
wards the stockholders are not in acecordanee With their duty

as trustees If these clreumstanees justily the want of eon-

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hMOsSses ANG eNpehnaitures PNCcUurred

‘

Supreme Court of the United States,

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

No. 240.
THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et al., APPELLANTS, |

THOMAS H. MASON et als.

No. 168.

THOMAS H. MASON et al., APPELLANTS,

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et als.

Hrief for the Appellants in 240; for the Appellees in 168.

THOMAS H. TALBOT,

Counsel for Pewabic Mining Company et als.,
Defendants below.

BOSTON:

PRINTED BY NATHAN SAWYER & SON,
No. 70 STATE STREET.

1889.

| ae
) ° “cee
- .

a er

:

[Against the Sale Decreed, and for Ascertainment otherwise of the Velue
of Complainants’ Shares, which the Defendants are ready to pay. |

Supreme Court of the United States,

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

No. 240.

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et al., APPELLANTs.,

THOMAS H. MASON et als.

No. 168.

THOMAS H. MASON et al.. APPELLANTS.

~

. we

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et als.

Hrief for the Appellants in 210; for the Appellees in 168.
HOW THESE CASES CAME HITHER.

The Pewabic Mining Company, the chief defendant in this
case, Was a corporation for mining purposes, chartered under
the laws of the State of Michigan. April 4. 1853, for a period of
thirty years, —that is, to April 4, 1883: its mine being situate
at Hancock, in the County of Houghton in that State, while its
office for general business, allowed by law to be outside the
limits of Michigan. was in the city of Boston, Mass. The pres-
ent management came into its control after the great fire in
Boston of 1872° and the only stockholders’ record, preserved
from that fire, began — apparently as of the origin—in March,

1859,* which commencement would imply a continuance until

1889.

* Record, pp. 333. 549-

9

That the charter period did continue till the last-named vear,
Was the impression of the managing officer. the defendant
Demmon, until November, — say 7. — 1883* (earlier statement
assigning August of that year being plainly incorrect).t Then
the question arose first in the mind of the counsel of the
company located at Houghton (J. H. Chandler, Esq., now of
Chicago), and he ascertained the fact from the county records
at Houghton. |

Up to that time the directors, the individual defendants, had
conducted the affairs of the corporation as though the corpora-
tion were still in full corporate life.

Upon ascertaining this fact of the expiration of the charter.
this counsel appears. to have gone forward of his own motion
towards a re-incorporation. Ife consulted able Michigan coun-
sel to be found at Detroit. The application for advice, and the
advice obtained, and the directions given, are fully stated by the
counsel.§ Meanwhile, in this matter, the directors did “ nothing
at all.” |

Upon the subject ot the renewal of corporate existence, the
then condition of Michigan law was this. in briet: From the be-
ginning it -had been open to such companies to extend their cor-
porate existence by the individual action of the shareholders of
the expiring or even expired corporation. That is, a portion of
them, — three were enough, — by filing the proper papers. could
constitute themselves into a new corporation; and when the
property of the old corporation should be transferred to the new
corporation, the renewal would be practically secured. The
shareholders in the old. of course. would guard their individual
rights in the’ conditions ,of their transfers. [t was a simple
matter: make the number of shares in the new corporation
exactly the same as in the old, and then give to each person
surrendering any number of shares in the old corporation, the
same number in the new: and the thing is accomplished: anew
period of corporate existence obtained for the old shareholders,
each with his old number ot shares: those being still shares in
the same property, real and personal, as betore. An instance
of such renewal is shown in this case, a splendid instance, —

pp. S§O. OFT. OL. t P- 334-

> Pp. ygl2-gig. especially gis. S pp. ygl2-gly. Pp. SYyo.

that of the “ Quincy ‘Mining Company: incorporated by special
charter of the State of Michigan, March 30, 1848: re-organized
under the mining law of the State of Michigan, March 6, 1878."*

It will readily occur to the Court that this method of renewal
—that is, by disintegrating the old corporation, and resorting
again to individual action — was too inconvenient to be the sole
method when corporations should become numerous and involve
large interests. And when the mines of Michigan had drawn
large amounts of capital into her corporations, her Legislature
proceeded to make more liberal provision in this respect. — to
allow corporations, like this defendant. to renew their corporate
existence by corporate action. This privilege was raised by an
Act of March 14, 1882. . , + })- SSI. 54 Pp. 4-

sity of the case, even if the rights of the complainants be as the
Court below regarded them. Thus Case 240 is before the Court.

With this explanation of the presence of these cases in this
Court, other facts important to the discussion may be left for
statement when reached in order in the “Argument upon the
Merits.” to which this brief presently passes.

The whole controversy in these two cases is of the re-organi-
zation of the shareholders of a mining.company,. under the laws
of Michigan, after the expiration of the period of its earlier and
first incorporation. The complainants, as before stated. represent
one-sixteenth and a little more of the stock. . This number can-
not, for the purpose of this hearing, be increased by the state-
ment that other stockholders would have been complainant if
their presence as parties would not have endangered the juris-
diction of the Court below over this suit. The jurisdiction
invoked by this suit can be exercised only over those who have
been made subject to that jurisdiction by the Constitution of the
United States, and. further. only over persons who are actually
parties before the Court in the suit; not at all over those whom
the Constitution has torbidden to become such parties. The
detendants represent all the rest,—two-thirds of the shares by
active concurrence ‘and expressed approval and consent.* and
the rest by tacit assent.

These appellants do not here raise objection to this much of
the opinion which is the basis of the decree appealed from: to
wit, that they cannot “compel disputing stockholders to continue
in the business.” nor “compel all the stockholders to accept
interests in the new enterprise in exchange for their shares in
the old,” nor “impose arbitrary and unfair terms and conditions
upon them for refusing to do so.” +

If there is in the case an appearance of their having done so,
it is appearance merely .— a constructive, not an intentional. want
of equity,— as will immediately be shown, in the very opening
of the

ARGUMENT UPON THE MERITS.
Facts.

For the whole question, which the counsel for the defendants
here proposes to argue, is of the method of relief which is
to be afforded to these complainants. The defendants

? pp. 921, 922.

6

object to so much of the decree as directs the special master to
sell the property and assets of the Pewabic Mining Company
“at public vendue to the highest bidder in one body.” |

They object because (1) such sale is not necessary to the
securing to the defendants all their rights as dissentient share-
holders; (2) such sale will be very injurious to the rights
and interests of the defendants.

They turther object to the direction of a sale of the whole “in
one body.” This matter should be left open tor further consider-
ation by the Court below.

The defendants ask that the usual method ot relief granted to
such dissentient stockholders as these complainants may be
followed in this case: that they themselves being required by

the Court below to secure to the complainants the payment ot

the value of their shares when ascertained by that Court, they
shall, upon the giving of such security, be allowed to complete
the proposed transfer of said property: in other words, the
payment to the complainants of the value of their portion in
money, Which they pray for, being judicially secured to them,
that the control of the rest of the property should be left in its
owners, the defendants.

The complainants mav have their portion of the common
property. They may take the value of their shares. The
defendants ask only that the complainants shall be required to
take that value in the manner least injurious to the defendants.
This is the extent of the defendants’ contention in this Court.

And while nothing will be asked, in behalt of the majority ot
the stockholders, which this Court would not in eguity be
required to allow to them, even if their ofhcers— especially
without the collusion or Knowledge of their constituents — had
in some respects acted in bad faith towards the complainants.
the method of procedure which will be urged upon the Court
in behalf of these detendants and their constituents will tind
re-enforced support in the entire good faith, not only of the
constituents of these defendants. but also of the defendants them-
selves. Accordingly, our /7rst Proposition of tact is this : —

Tue DEFENDANTS ARE IN COURT WITH CLEAN HAnpbs.

The allegations of bad faith and misconduct which the com-
plainants make against the detendants, as directors of the cor-

-=; /u re Niagara Ins. Co.. 1 Paige. 259.

I]

This is the quarter-section designated on the plan as “ New
Pewabic.”* The lode in this parcel was bought by the Pewabic
Mining Company in 1879, at the cost of $275,000.¢ which sum
was paid mainly out of an assessment upon the shares, paid
directly or indirectly by every present shareholder. t ,

The plan shows that the explorations, which went on into
1884, have little more than entered upon this purchase: and,
judging trom the Quincy mine, it would take more than thirty
vears now thoroughly to mine it out. ‘That is, if the work had
gone on from 18583 without interruption, it would have continued
at least to 1913. the whole period of a new charter.

Were not the officers of the corporation in duty bound by this
unanimous action of their stockholders. as soon as they learned
of the expiration of the charter. to take such steps as the laws of
Michigan authorized tor its renewal?

What was undertaken in 1879. must be pushed torward in
1884, unless meanwhile developments have changed the aspect
of the enterprise, making what was hopetul in the former year.
without hope in the latter. Such was not the fact.
yositive that this

The witnesses tor the complainants are !

undertaking to find copper in New Pewabic was full of hope
and encouragement after all the explorations made.

Their testimony goes to establish as follows: The vield per
cubic fathom increases with the increased depth.§ In the
Quincy mine —richest of all the Lake Superior mines, save
the Calumet and Hecla and its nest neighbor, the Tamarack ||-—
the copper “trends north,” “towards the Pewabic property.” 4
So generally is the rich lode from which the Quincy Company
draws its large dividends connected by common reputation with
the Pewabic property. that it is Known as “the Pewabic vein: ”
that “its general name is “the Pewabic lode:”tt “~ generally
known as the Pewabic. lode: "tt and “the Pewabic lode is the
second lode in value on Lake Superior.” §§

This lode, purchased in 1879, cuts “under the Franklin 1.900
feet.” If the Franklin people “live, they will have to have
this property. °%" It makes “ under the Quincy and Franklin,” ***
“under both properties.” *** “The Pewabic cuts out the

? 2m, 20, $52... 7 Deed, p. 873. + Ffooks 2. ». W.-Rwv. Co., 1 Sm. & G. 142 (168

Franklin and Quincy ;”* “ It will cut out both mines; ”t “It 1s
a key to the Franklin in particular, and, say, both mines; “} it
may “be the key to the whole situation.”’§

The Pewabic property, including the Edwards purchase,
is worth, according to the varying testimony of the many
witnesses for the complainants, $200,000, $230,000, $250,000,
$300,000, $400,000. $498,412.24 (reported by the master), and
$652,225.82. |

And the main element in this value 1s the copper reputed and
believed to be in the lode purchased in 1879, as these declara-
tions of those same witnesses show: “There is not a doubt but
that the lode extends through the Pewabic:” "| ~The chances are
as good in the Pewabic as in the Quincy ;”** “"
distant when the Pewabic mine will be the mine of thethree ; “tt

Che time is not tar

"There is just as much certainty of this copper being under the
Pewabic. as of the Quincy haying its existence, or of the Franklin
having its continued existence. ff

The evidence for the defendants contradicts this no farther
than to present the actual market value in 1883, and. including
March 26, 1884, along with the tacts—not disputable at all —
which made that market value what it was.

There is, indeed, no evidence on either. side. no expert.
opinion, to the effect that prudence forbids ‘the continuance of

this corporation tor the prosecution of the large enterprise
opened in 1879. On the other hand, besides the above expres-
sions from the witnesses for the complainants, bearing con-
clusively in that direction, there 1s weighty testimony. in express
terms, to the wisdom of the course which these defendants have
attempted to pursue.

There is evidence, and of a very high character, that the
action recommended by these defendants was wise and prudent.

Samuel L. Smith. sworn on behalf of defendants, qualifies
himself to give an opinion upon this question by stating that he
has ** been interested and occupied in managing copper interests
for twenty years, and | has] been connected with quite a number
of the copper mines of Lake Superior as a stockholder. director,
and general manager: ” that he is ** still so connected: ” that he

“p. 116. tp. 157. + P- 1y3-
S$ pp. 156, 157. pp. S1, 86, go. 110, 122, $21, S20.

@ * > $

ip. 160. Pp. £28. +t p. 114.

,
> + ee

- }?- ls7-

_—~

@

13

Is ** personally acquainted with that portion of the copper region
in which the Pewabic mine is situated;” that ‘the Quincy,
Pewabic, and Franklin are all on the same mineral tormation,
and [he has] been interested in all of them, from first to last,
about twenty years.” *

Ife shows that he has, not a disqualifying, but an impartial
and qualifying, interest in this cause, — that of a shareholder in
the Pewabic Mining Company. t

And thereafter he testifies that its property ‘* can be disposed
of to secure the greatest value to all of its stockholders without
any distinction, in this way: ‘‘in transferring it to a new com-
pany. letting them [the old stockholders] take shares in a new
company, and continue to develop it. with chances of the best
results ;” *‘one share of new to one share of old, practically
taking the same stock;” ** the same interest in the new com-
pany they have in the old.”}

Johnson Vivian, an expert in mining, superintendent of the
Pewabic mine, and of its successful neighbor the Franklin, and
other mines. engaged in mining in England and America about
thirtv-tive years,§ and in copper mining on Lake Superior
twenty-one years,) testifics to the same effect. as follows: + If
I owned the Pewabic mine, with the hope of obtaining some-
thing in the future I should be inclined to continue work and
spend money.” {And to this weighty declaration there is no
opposing testimony. No witness contradicts it.

There is even no counter-allegation in the pleadings. The
complainants nowhere, in their bill of complaint, allege that
the proposed practical renewal of corporate life is not for the
improvement of the corporate property. the promotion of the
original corporate enterprise, and the advancement of the
interest of all corporators as such.

On the contrary, the bill does make an allegation to the
opposite effect. It alleges against these defendants ‘* a system
of discouraging reports” and ‘‘a concealment of the true value
of the assets and condition of the company,” in depreciation of

the propertyv.**

* pp. 418, 419. tT p. 41g. + P- 431.
§ p. 123. Pp. 1246 T P- 259.

o Par 2.5 Pe 9

- = PERE GANS: Dae a a4 ——— oe
woos aon yt has ea oe a ck pp. 7, 5.

pn. S € p. 8, clause 1.

§ pp. 411. goe. p-

15

And in the second ground is, stated the only ‘legal right,
authority, and power ~ which these complainants then and there
did allow to this defendant corporation. That was the power to
sell, and receive ** cash in payment.” And they here again
repeat their protest ‘‘ against any sale” ‘+ otherwise than for
cash.” And. they then ‘*‘ insist and demand that the real and
personal property of said Pewabic Mining Company be sold for
cash.” *

Not one word about inadequate price in all this. On the
other hand, they protest against something else besides price:
they object to a renewalin any manner of corporate life. They
set themselves against the intention of their associates to con-
tinue to hold their own property. They set themselves against
that, without condition or qualification. They declare that they
have the absolute legal right, authority. and power uncondition-

ally to defeat that intent. They ask no equitable imposition of

proper conditions. They demand and insist upon a sale tor
cash.

Later they opposed a still more direct and simple form of
re-incorporation. In 18838, when the Legislature of Michigan
had tendered to these shareholders an extension of their
incorporation, — pure and simple,— clothing with a franchise
all the shareholders, involving not even a nominal sale, they
protested against its acceptance, and finally procured it-to be
vacated, as will later be narrated.

And they seek the same object. and pursue the same line and
the same purpose. here.

Meanwhile, in all this opposition to the continued existence of
this corporation, the complainants have no grounds whatever
which can properly support corporators in such opposition.
And they do not pretend to have any. They do not even allege
that a continuation of the corporate enterprise is unpremising ;
and their own testimony to the opposite effect is unanimous and
overwhelming.

They unblushingly put torward their claim to bring this
enterprise to an untimely and abrupt end, upon their right to
exercise their own caprice in that matter.

The praver of the bill of complaint is, ** that all the assets
and property of said Pewabic Mining Company be sold at

‘'n. S, clause 2.

Re

19

public vendue.” ‘+ to the highest bidder :” and that the proceeds,
after payment of the debts, be distributed +‘ to the stockholders
pro rata, according to the amount ot their respective holdings ;” *
‘¢ that a receiver be appointed,” with all the power of a receiver
in such cases, to wind up the affairs of said Pewabic Mining
Company, and distribute its assets.” ft

This is ofhicious and intermeddlesome, for (1) there are no
creditors in Court asking the Court to see them paid; and (2)
a large majority of the shareholders are here to oppose such
distribution of their portion of the corporate property. The
equity of the complaint is satisfied and exhausted when the
complainants receive the money value of their portion of the
corporate property.

In thus asking for, and insisting upon, a compulsory sale ot
this property, the complainants are going beyond their own
rights for the purpose of making an inequitable demand. They
are making that inequitable demand for an iniquitous purpose:
not for the legitimate object of protecting their interests as
shareholders, but tor the purpose of creating an opportunity to
them. as intending purchasers at such compulsory sale, — an
opportunity to purchase. at less than the actual value.

That they desire to purchase, that they intend to purchase if
the price is low enough, appears in their very bill of complaint.
They place themselves before the Court as willing to take the
property, as would-be bidders for it: and they actually make
their bid. If they can get this property for $75.000, they will
take it.} And that offer, as already shown, is the lowest
bid vet made.

Further, these complainants are shown to be interested in the
Quincy Mining Company :§ one of them is a director thereof; |
another is a son of the president of that company. The map
shows this unexplored lode of the Pewabic Company to under-
lie, in part, the operations of the Quincy Company. The testi-
mony for the complainants shows the copper in the Quincy
mine to trend towards the Pewabic property ; ** that “the chances
are as good in the Pewabic as in the Quincy: ” tt and that “ the
time is not far distant when the Pewabic mine will be the mine

"rar. AYV., Clause 2, p. to. + Id.. p. 11, clause 8.
Cer. Ade, Ps @ § Ans., par. 15, p. 32. p. yo.
7 Ans., par. 1§, p. 32. ee, 228. TT p. 128.

20

of the three.” * This certainly shows it to be a desirable acqui-
sition to the Quincy Company. And the president of that com-
pany, father of the complainant Mason,t called by the defend-
ants, on cross-examination by the complainants, testifies that
for “a period of three or four years,” to use his own words, “I
was waiting for some proposition for which I could purchase
the property.” “About the time the sale was accomplished to
the Pewabic Company.” It was known that “I would like to
buy it.” t

An actual purchase in the Quincy interest, or in the interest
of these complainants, appears in the case. For, after these
defendants were actually and fully, by the expiration of the
charter and knowledge thereof, prevented from raising by
assessment any money for corporate purposes, there was a sale
on execution of real estate of their corporation; and the pur-
chase was by one of the attorneys of the complainants in this
case,§ the Quincy Mining Company furnishing the money to
pay for it.|| (It is not these complainants. but the defendants,
who have redeemed the property from that sale. )

Not only have these complainants endeavored to procure a
compulsory sale of the property, to the end that it may be
purchased to their advantage, but also they have heretofore
endeavored, and are now endeavoring, to diminish competition
ot bidders at such sale.

Of mining land like this. and plant for mining, there can be
no sale except to mining companies: and among such com-
panies the competition will, generally, be confined to those to
which the location of the mine is convenient and favorable.

Looking at the plan of this property.4 it will be seen at once
that there are. or have been. three companies to whom the loca-
tion of this Pewabic mine is convenient,— three companies
whose working shafts, produced, would reach the lode pur-
chased by the Pewabic Company in 1879.

These have been the Quincy, Franklin, and Pewabic Mining
Companies. And ot these three, the most promising competi-
tor — the competitor who would not have allowed the property
to be disposed of at a sacrifice — was the present owner of the
property, the Pewabic corporation: the shareholders who, in

° nm. 384. t Ans., par. 1§. p. 32. ~ pp. 268. 269.

pp. St. ° | p. S§2. q pp. 39. 583.

2I

1879, paid for it out of their private resources. And this cor-
poration is disabled from competing at that sale by the action of
these complainants. Their action in this suit to that end, and
not to any milder measure of obtaining what belongs to them,
need not be again recited here.

But their action against the subsequent attempt of these de-
fendants to re-invigorate their corporation remains to be stated.
That attempt was the acceptance by these stockholders of the
privilege extended to them by the Legislature of Michigan, of
renewing their corporate existence by a two-thirds vote. This
done. it was open to these complainants —if they wanted their
distributive share of the corporate property, and nothing else
to go into a Court of Equity, Federal or State. and ask for that.
Thus, they could have obtained their individual property with-
out annulling the re-incorporation of their associates. But they
would not take that conscientious and equitable proceeding.

They brought guo warrando, at law, that they might have
judgment ousting their associates trom their attempted re-incor-
poration. They alleged the Statute which authorized this
renewal of corporate life to be in violation of the Constitution of
the United States, as impairing the obligation of a contract; and
in violation of the Constitution of the State, as depriving the
relators, these complainants, of their property without due pro-
cess of law. And the Supreme Court of Michigan refused to
sustain either of these allegations.

That Court did, however, find very narrow and technical
ground, and wholly confined to Michigan, on which to give
judgment of ouster against the defendants. The Constitution of
that State provides that, with irrelevant exceptions, “ no corpora-
tion” “shall be created for a longer time than thirty years.” *

And the Court held that that provision prohibited the Legis-
lature from authorizing the renewal of the corporate existence
of any corporations after a corporate existence of thirty years.

This decision, however, does not apply to the creation of a

new corporation out of a portion. or even the whole, of the old
shareholders. It is enough that such corporation should be as
the complainants allege was the fact in this case, — technically
“a new corporation, a new legal entity, a new body politic and

* Art. XV.. Sect. 10.

22

corporate.* If it were the same old corporation that before
owned the property, what would be the meaning of their prayer
against a “transfer” of the property? t

This remains just as constitutional as in 1878, when the Quincy
Company used it,t or when the National Company used it,$ or
when Mr. Pond advised it. |

Thus, upon the action of these complainants — action not at
all necessary to their obtaining all their rights — these detendants
are now before this Court, still disorganized, and unable as a
corporate body, acting through their trusted directors, to appear
at a sale of their own property, should this Court order one.
and, by competing bids, to prevent it from being sold for a song.
And in thus disabling competition at the sale which they are
striving to procure, they further show the indirect object and
bad faith of their complaint.

In their insisting upon a compulsory sale of this property, the
bad faith of ‘these complainants towards these respondents
appears in the time when they became stockholders, if that time
be considered in its proper relations.

They first became stockholders in October, 1882. then buying
fitty shares; and all the rest of their shares were purchased
later. That is, they bought after the corporation had made the
purchase of 1879, towards which purchase, then, all the shares
which they bought had contributed. They came in as success-
ors to corporators, who had-actually pledged themselves to a
continuance of the corporate enterprise until ‘the lode, newly
purchased, should be properly explored: and, if what they
themselves say is true, they came in without notice of the
approaching expiration of the charter.

They came in, then, as to a continuing corporation, with the
intent, and for the purpose, of sharing in the prosecution of the
original enterprise of the company as modified and extended bv
the purchase of 1879. They voluntarily submitted their share
of the corporate property to be continued in the corporate enter-
prise at the pleasure of two-thirds of their associate shareholders.
For such was the law of Michigan as applicable to this corpo-
ration when they purchased their shares: to wit. from the
beginning of October, 1852, to April 4. 1883. If, by the

* Protest, pp. 7, 8: also clauses 1 and 2, p. 8: par. N.. p. g.
7 Par. AV... PP: Ww, tf. = p. go2. $ p. gIS. || Pp. GIy. q pp. 66, 433.

expiration of the charter on this last-named date, they acquired

the legal right to withdraw their shares from the corporate stock
(which the defendants do not here deny), they did not thereby
acquire any right in equity to prevent their associates from going
on in the enterprise with so much ot the corporate property as
belongs to those associates, — that is, with the whole of it, after

4- the complainants are paid for their portion.

Thus, coming into this corporation, acquiring shares which
were, by contribution to the purchase of 1879, pledged to a con-
tinuance of this enterprise. is it in good faith on their part to
seize the first, and press to harsh extremity the second, oppor-

enterprise 7

2. shares on which they brought this bill of complaint.*

continuing in corporate existence.

tunity which the technical rules of law raise for them, to compel,
not merely the withdrawal of their share, but the compulsory
sale of the whole property, and the termination of the corporate

The complainants would have their intent to continue in the
enterprise accompany all their purchases prior to their knowledge
of the expiration of the charter: that is, their purchase of all the

Down,

then, to February 19, 1884. the date of the call for the stock-
holders’ meeting of March 26, 1884, which was to take action
upon the expiration of the charter, these stockholders, as they
themselves say, entered the corporation in contemplation of its

-If they bought with this purpose and intent, and under an
implied pledge to their associates to fulfil it. good faith to those
associates, even under the changed technical conditions, requires
that they should now content themselves with a withdrawal of their

portion of the corporate property in the manner least injurious to

their associates, and that they should not insist, as a s¢ve gua non,

upon a compulsory sale of the whole property, — an arrest of the
corporate enterprise, and an absolute dissolution of the corporation.

Nor have they clean hands here. if. entering the corporation

with honest intent to continue in the enterprise, they now pervert

their unexpected right to withdraw from it, into a scheme to

injure their associates. They have a right, an undoubted right.

to use a compulsory sale of this property in order to enable them

to obtain their share of the corporate property, if it is absolutely

24

necessary to that end. But upon this record, it is submitted that
that is not what they are doing. That is just what they are not
doing. On the other hand, they are using their right to a por-
tion of the property in order to procure such compulsory sale.
Their distributive portion should, in equity, be the end; and the
compulsory sale, if necessary, the means. In fact, their owner-
ship is the means merely, and the compulsory sale the end, ot
all their suit. Anda suit thus prosecuted is not prosecuted in
good faith.

If these complainants, in 1882 and 1883, when the affairs of
the Pewabic Company were putting on their darkest aspect,
became shareholders therein with any other intent than that of
continuing in the prosecution of the enterprise then on foot,
what was that other intent : |

They deny notice *‘of the expiration of said charter, or the.
time that it would expire.” This is hardly a denial of knowl_
edge. ‘ae
Their counsel, in his cross-examination, implies* ‘that it 1s
something out of the common course. that neither the Pewabic
counsel at Houghton nor the resident director — both within
short distance from the court-house — did, from the papers there
to be seen, learn of the time of the period of the charter, — before
November 1, 1883. And how was it with the complainants:

They, as one of them testifies, were ‘* stock-brokers ;” had
known the Pewabic Mining Company “for more than twenty
years: "+ had *+ been accustomed to see their reports from year to
vear.” ** regularly ;” had ‘*always been familiar with” those
reports, and ** with the mining companies ot Michigan.”

And this complainant then produces,{ as previously lying in
the office of his firm, eight annual reports of the operations of
the Pewabic Company. Preserved there for what purpose? Of
course, for the proper purpose of making these stock-brokers
acquainted with those operations and with the financial condition
of the company, to the end that they might intelligently advise
their customers —and themselves, it appears in fact— in the
matter of buying and selling that stock. When, in skilful action
of stock-brokers. were those reports to be consulted? Of course,
before and in view of any large dealing in that stock: that is,

; pp. 67, 68.

* p. Sgog. Tp. 35

oa

to

cst

in this case, before commencing a purchase of as many as
twenty-five hundred shares. And these reports, thus consulted.
would have shown, in six different places,* that the Pewabic
Mining Company was in active operation as a corporation in the
year 1853; and, under the Constitution of Michigan, such cor-
porations may not run beyond thirty years.

And, familiar as these complainants were with mining com-
panies, they knew that at the State capital and the county seat,
the exact period of this corporation was of public record. And
the county seat was as near to the Quincy mine and its counsel
as to the Pewabic. With their view, here maintained. of the
law of corporations, —to wit, that any one shareholder, of any
one share, could absolutely prevent the extension of an expiring
charter, and bring the whole corporate property to the auction
block, — was it the course of wisdom on their part to purchase
twenty-five hundred shares in this corporation, without ascer-
taining when that power would come to every stockholder?

If they learned when that power would come to themselves
by purchase of shares, and purchased with intent to exercise it
when it did arise, what claim have they upon a Court of Equity
for aid in the execution of that iniquitous intent? Legal rights
they may have, which even a Court of Equity. with full
knowledge of their bad faith, must respect and protect. But
this is-all that such a Courtis bound to doin their behalf. They
are not entitled to its favor. They are under its disfavor.

THEY ARE NOT BEFORE THIS COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS ;
THAT IS. WITH THEIR DEMAND FOR A COMPULSORY SALE.

Third.

THE EqQuITyY OF THE COMPLAINANTS DOES NOT REQUIRE
THE SALE PRAYED FOR: AND THE EQUITY OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS FORBIDS IT TO BE ORDERED.

The complainants have made neither allegation nor proof,
that the sale at public vendue, which is the very burden of their
prayer, is necessary in order to enable them to secure all that

* pp. 459. 490, 515, 576. 337, 535.

26

belongs to them, even as they allege their belongings. They
do not show that they cannot obtain to themselves their share of the
corporate property in any other manner than by such sale. They
do not show that that is even the best way in which their equity
may be satisfied. It nowhere in the record appears that ,the
value of the whole property of the expiring detendant corpora-
tion cannot be judicially ascertained. There is neither finding,
evidence, nor even Contention, to that effect in any part of the
case. And this tact ought to appear. before it 1s accepted as a
basis of judicial action. On the other hand, it is apparent that
such value can be judicially ascertained.

The value of the whole being determined. that of the com-
plainants’ share 1s easily obtained. Little more than a division:
of that whole by sixteen ts required.

Still more important. there is no indication, to the mind of
this Court, that this corporate property will bring more, if put
up at a compulsory sale. under judicial decree, than the sum at
which the Court may be led to value it. The complainants base
their positive demand for such a sale, not upon that consideration.
That consideration they do not deem any part of their case, as
petitioners for such sale, to present to the Court. They deem it
suflicient to the support of their praver, that they set out their
absolute. unqualified right to have such a sale. If the com-
plainants are not interested in having this property bring a fair
price when sold, the defendants are. The defendants do not
wish property tor which they paid ten dollars and more per
share exposed to the hazard of a compulsory sale.

Let the Court consider the practical difference between the
two methods of ascertaining the sum due to the complainants:
for a sum in money is all that thev pray for. Let the two
methods be considered as operating upon the desire of the de-
ftendants to retain their own property. Let the same value be
assumed to result in each method: tor instance. the sum thought
Ot by the Court below. $506,000.

Now. upon a valuation at that sum, the detendants may per-
form all the equities set up by the complainants by raising and
paying. as directed by the Court. about one-sixteenth of that
sum, — not a great deal more than $30,000.

This done. they are in unembarrassed control of their own
property. to be used and enjoyed in any manner allowed to them

under the laws ot the sovereign State of Michigan.

tJ

“I

If they wish to accomplish the same purpose under an order
for a compulsory sale for cash, which sale for cash is what the
complainants demand, then a much more laborious and expen-
sive method must be taken to reach the same result to both
parties — the same result precisely ; that is, their share in money
to the complainants, and the rest of the property to its present
owners, the defendants.

Then, the defendants must raise in cash the whole supposed
sum, — half a million dollars, — pay it over to the selling officer,
to lie in his hands till the account of sales can be settled, and
the expenses of sale shall be paid, and then the net proceeds
to be disposed of, how? In round numbers, one-sixteenth to the
complainants and fifteen-sixteenths to the defendants.

The same final result in both methods; the equities of the
case performed, and nothing more.

But what a hardship is laid upon the defendants by the method
insisted upon by the complainants! If this property is worth
that sum, they must contribute per share (the number of shares
has been doubled since 1879) the same amountas in the original
purchase, or double the amount on every share then held. How
can this be done, with no corporate capacity to act?

Meanwhile, let it be noticed that if the present owners are
disabled from purchasing, the best competitor is prevented from
bidding, and the chances of a sale far below the sum just
supposed are increased. |

The plan shows that there have been three mining companies
whose working shatts, produced, would reach the lode purchased
by the Pewabic Company in 1879; to wit, the Quincy, the
Franklin, and the Pewabic. And of these three, the most
earnest competitor must be supposed to be the company that
once showed itself willing to purchase: that is, the Pewabic.
Except [under an absolute necessity, a sale ought not to be
ordered while that company is disabled from bidding: least of
all ought it to be ordered merely on the petition of those who
have disabled the Pewabic Company from taking part in such
competition.

If the complainants have any interests which can be served
by the ordering of a sale under such disadvantageous circum-
stances, those interests must be interests as intending purchasers.
They cannot be interests. pure and simple. of shareholders in

28

the Pewabic Company. of selling owners of the property. On
the other hand, in resisting the order for such a sale, these de-
fendants are asserting merely their legitimate interests as present
owners of the property in question.

Their action shows itself intent upon making the most of the
corporate property, for the benefit of all its owners. It is hardly
possible that it could have other aim. <A large majority of the
shareholders could not well be moved in united action save for
the general good. But a small portion — one-fifth, even —
might easily have schemes for the promotion of their interests,
apart from, and even hostile to, the common good of the common
corporation. | |

No measure could afford a better opportunity for the operation
of such schemes than a compulsory sale for cash of the whole
corporate property. especially where that property consists of
mining plant and mineral lands. It would be very hard indeed
to justify an order for such a sale, on the petition of a small
faction of the shareholders, especially if that faction were
tainted with a strong suspicion of bad faith towards the.common
enterprise, and of a design to make gain out of the wreck ot
the corporation. |

The Court below foresaw the hazard of a sacrifice ot this prop-
erty, through want of competition, at a compulsory sale at public
vendue to the highest bidder. This plainly appears in the con-
dition which was to deteat that sale. which the Court attached
to its order thereot,— its closely attached proviso, to this pur-
port: “that if. at such sale, the bid for the aggregate of the
property and assets of said company should not be in excess of
fifty thousand dollars above the amount of the debts of said com-
pany,’ “then that the arrangement tor the sale, of the property
of said company made at the stockholders’ meeting in Boston on
the twenty-sixth day of March, A.D. 1864, and as set up in the
defendants’ answer, shall be carried out.” *

That is, a minimum limit was to be fixed at the opening of the
auction. And if that limit was not passed, then there was to be
no compulsory sale: but the sale attempted by the defendants,
and thus far enjoined at the suit of the complainants. was to be
relieved from injunction and completed. The real value of the

29

complainants’ shares being thus secured to them, the re-incor-
poration intended by the defendants was to be accomplished
under the direction, and with the resulting protection, of the
Court. The whole equity of the complainants was deemed
satishied when they got the value of their shares.

It is seen at once that this condition of defeasance is not ade-
quate to effect its intended purpose. A bid in trifling excess of
the named minimum would be outside this defeating condition,
and yet not save the property from sacrifice. It is essential to
the protection of the defendants that the decree to be made.
should .be effective to the execution of this equitable intent
towards them, of the Court below, as manifested in the above
inadequate safeguard. This can be done in the manner submit-
ted by the defendants, — the defendants to pay the value of the
complainants’ shares, when ascertained.

Such a decree, the defendants believe, will be a Solomon’s
judgment, ascertaining the real purpose of this complaint. The
defendants will not be required, or even allowed, to pay for a
single share withdrawn. A compulsory sale made hopeless,
there is nothing left that the complainants will sue for. A new
charter made certain, they desire to be under it. A re-incor-
poration assured, they mean to be among the corporators.

IN FINE, NO NECESSITY TO THE COMPLAINANTS APPEARS
FOR SUCH SALE, AND IFS ORDERING WOULD BE HIGHLY IN-
JURIOUS TO THE DEFENDANTS.

THE LAW OF THIS CASE.

[. Neither the Constitution of Michigan or of the United
States, nor the common or statute law of that State. nor the
principles of equity as administered in the United States Courts,
give the complainants an absolute right and title to have ordered
a compulsory sale of the corporate property of the expiring
defendant corporation. Nor has the Court below any direct
duty, or even authority, to make such an order. It has no
express jurisdiction to that end as a substantive right. As
against the attempted proceedings of the defendants an “in-
junction is not of right, but of grace :” * still more an order of sale.

* Sparhawk v7. Union Pass. Rwy. Co., 54 Pa. St. 401 (454).

39

The Court is not bound to decree a dissolution. even when a
majority of the directors and stockholders request it to be done.”

II. The only substantive right of the plaintiffs shown any-
where in this case is their right of property in their distributive
share of the assets of the expiring corporation: and any claim
of theirs to have ordered such compulsory sale must be consid-
ered as incidental to that right of property. and not substantive
at all.

The only jurisdiction which the Court has to order such sale
is as a necessary incident, in equity, to the securing for the
complainants of the value of such distributive share, — the value
of such share in money, and not the portion in kind: for the
complainants’ prayer is not for a set-off in kind, but for a pay-

ment in money.

lil. Such necessity must be shown, and shown clearly.
And if the method of ascertaining the value of their share.

prayed for by them, appears to be injurious to the intérests of

the defendants, then such necessity must be shown to be abso-
lute and exclusive. It must appear that there is no other less
objectionable way in which they can obtain that value. The
complainants, being allowed to withdraw from the corporate
enterprise, must withdraw in the manner least injurious to their

associates.

IV. In the present case the method of compulsory sale is
unnecessary, — entirely unnecessary to the doing of complete
equity to the complainants. The case shows that the Court
below would have found no difficulty in ascertaining the actual
value of the assets of this corporation, had it proceeded to a con-
sideration of that question. | The Court below simply declined
to attempt to ascertain the exact value as a basis of its decree.t
while the case shows that it could have been easily ascertained. ?
Neither party has alleged otherwise. An allegation otherwise
would be absurd. The value of one-sixteenth of the net assets
of this corporation is ascertainable, — easily so.

* Jn re Niagara Ins. Co., 1 Paige, 259. t p. g22. + p. 820

V. On the other hand, such a sale would be very injurious
to these defendants and to the large body of stockholders whom
these detendants include or represent. |

This sale can be to no proper practical purpose, which this
tribunal can promote. save that about one-sixteenth of the net

proceeds be paid over to these complainants.

VI. In this case the value to be ascertained is as of March,
1854, when the defendants attempted to prosecute further the
original enterprise, and were prevented by the bill brought by
the complainants. Anda sale in 1890 would not ascertain value
in 1884.

VII. The property in question — mineral land in large block,
and mining plant, more or less affixed to land —is of a kind
which, in general, ought not to be disposed of at public auction.

VIII. Any competition at such sale on the part of these
director defendants. as authorized representatives of their stock-
holders, having been rendered impracticable by the action of
these complainants, the sale is likely to be a sacrifice for want
of competition. The complainants have even withdrawn their

obligation to bid, as offered in their bill.”

IX. It is a case of a compulsory sale, praved for in behalf
of only about one-sixteenth of the whole property to be sold:
the large residue resisting the application. Such sale not being
necessary to the securing of any right of the complainants (the
only rights asking the protection of the Court). it seems as
though the objection thereto of a large majority of the shares
ought to be controlling and conclusive. “It is strong evidence
that the interests of the stockholders generally” will not be
promoted by the sale prayed ftor.+

In the actual aspects of this case, the opposition of an over-
whelming majority of the owners 1s of itself sufficient for a
decree against such sale. “~The particular interest of the tew
+

must give way to the general interest of the many.” t

«

*y. 6s. + /n re Niagara Ins. Co., 1 Paige. 20y. { /# re Niagara Ins. Co.. supra.

32

Michigan law has a provision * for the dissolution of corpora-
tions, at the suit of stockholders: under conditions, however, not
existing in this case.

But such suit can be brought only on the prayer of the holders
of not less than one-third of all the shares. And the opposition
of two-thirds of the shares is sufficient to prevent a decree ot
dissolution, if made manifest at any time before such decree
‘becomes final.

X. There is no evidence that the continued prosecution otf
the original enterprise aimed at by the defendants is not. so far
as can be judged, for the benefit of the corporate property and
ihe best interests of all the stockholders. On the other hand,
the evidence that such prosecution is in the exercise of a sound
business judgment, is uncontradicted and overwhelming. ‘There
is not even allegation against it. :

In seeking to thwart this aim, the complainants rest their jus-
tification solely on their absolute right to exercise their caprice.

Such caprice is a very meagre and scant support for any
action of a Court of Equity in their behalf. The right of
caprice extends in full only to several property. When one
becomes the owner of property jointly with other owners, he
loses some of his rights of caprice. He comes under obligation
to regard the interests of his co-owners in his handling of the
thing owned. He is bound not to injure their interests in the
mere indulgence of such caprice. This duty to his associates
a Court of Equity should enforce against him, even in his with-
drawal of his share trom the whole joint property.

XI. <Any interest in a compulsory sale which these com-
plainants might have as prospective purchasers at such sale.
either as individuals or as stockholders, or persons interested,
in a rival corporation, is of no weight in favor of an order for
such sale. That is not an interest proper of a corporator, and
‘nothing but the benefit to be received as a corporator” is now
to be considered. t |

“To entitle a stockholder to maintain a suit of this nature,”
the Court must ** feel that he is acting for the benefit. or what
he believes to be the benefit, of the company.”{ The suit must

* April 11, 1877, Sect. 42: H., Sect. 4117.

+ Irvin v7. Susquehanna, etc.. Co., 2 Penrose & Watts (Penn.), 471.

+ Filder v7. Rwy. Co., 1 Hem. XN M. 489: Waterbury 7. Merchants’, etc., Co..,
so Barb. 168: Belmont v. Erie Rwy. Co.. 52 Barb. 662.

9

ere)

have ‘*in view the legitimate purposes of the company,’ — must
‘*be a dona fide one, faithfully, truthfully, sincerely directed to
the benefit and the interests” of stockholders as stockholders.*
The dona fides of the complaint must be ‘* unquestioned, or
capable of vindication it questioned.” ‘* A stockholder is
bound to come with clean hands. with a sincere complaint, free
from all false pretences.” The genuineness of his character
will always be looked to. ‘** The question is whether this is a
stockholders’ bill.” ¢

For, ‘* under the pretence of serving the interests of one
company, the shareholders in a rival company, by purchasing
shares for the purpose of litigation,” cannot make a Court of
Equity ‘*the instrument of defeating or injuring the company
into which they so intrude themselves.” } The object of the
suit must not be ‘‘to establish the interests and benefits of a
rival scheme.” The plaintiff must not be “the puppet of
another company.” § An interest. either direct in a rival cor-
poration, or In any way adverse to the company whose interests
the bill pretends to champion, ‘‘is fatal to the suit.” |) A
bill brought in such adverse interest may even be stricken trom
the files as ‘* an imposition upon the Court.” {

XII. As matter of precedent, the method of compulsory sale
is unusual in analogous cases. Where Courts have interposed
for the protection of the rights of dissentient corporators, against
the organization or action of a majority of their associates which
could not lawfully be imposed upon the dissentients, there the
remedy has not been that of a compulsory sale of the corporate
property or a vacation of the organization. In all the examina-
tion of decisions which all the controversy between these parties
has raised, not a single case of such dissolution or prevention of
the organization has come to the knowledge of this counsel, at
the time of this writing. in America or England.

XIII. The only method in which Courts of Equity do equity
in cases of this character is by. imposing upon the enterprising

* Forrest 7. Manchester, etc.. Rwy. LAK, 4 ets. F.. = 126 (120).
+ Sparhawk v. U. Pass. Rwy. Co., 54 Pa. St. gor (454).
+t Ffooks v. S. W. Rwy. Co., 15m. &X G. 142 (167

§ Forrest 7. Manchester, etc.. Rwy. ee supra.

| Waterbury 7. Merchants’, etc.. Co.. supra
€ Robson wv. Doders. 8 L. R. Eq. 301.

34

majority, terms in favor of the opposing minority. Those who
would go forward are required to secure to the dissentients the
payment of the value of their portion of the corporate property,
payment to be made as soon as value is judicially ascertained.
Upon the furnishing of such security, the majority are allowed —
to go forward with their organization or enterprise. This
method was approved in the cases named below. It is as fully
within the jurisdiction of the Court as any other method of
ascertaining value.*

The case nearest parallel to the present is to be found in
England. A quarry company being in process of liquidation,
with a view to winding up, the holders of a majority of the
paid-up shares conceived the purpose of continuing the com-
pany, and accordingly, by a representative, prayed that “all
further proceedings in relation to the winding up of the com-
pany might be stayed.” One holder of a hundred and fifty
shares, considering the experiments intended by the majority,
and for which he would have to contribute, “ would be fruitless,”
appeared in opposition to the above prayer. being “ desirous that
the liquidation should proceed, and the slate quarry sold in the’
usual way.” He was not allowed to stand in the way of the
wishes of his fellow-shareholders. He was merely allowed
fourteen days “ within which to elect whether he will remain a

se
*

member of the company, or will retire and give up his shares ;
on his election to retire, the value of his interest to be referred
for ascertainment, and thereafter to be paid by the petitioner. t
Let the injunction, is the decree in one case, “be dissolved on
the defendants giving security to the plaintiff in double the
market value of his stock, to pay for said stock when its value

shall be ascertained.” ¢

XIV. The Court below recognized the right of the defend-
ants to go forward to a re-incorporation, provided they gave to
the complainants the equitable value of their shares.§ |

This equitable result, however, aimed at by the Court, could
not be accomplished in the manner arranged by the Court, or
in any way through a sale. |

*Lauman v. The Lebanon V. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42: The State v. Bailey,
16 Ind. 46 (51). ;

+ Jn re South Barrule, etce.. Co., 8 L. R. Eq. 688.

+ Lauman 7. The Lebanon V. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 49.

§$ pp. g22. 923. 924-

. 35
CONCLUSION.

That this equity, along with all the other equities of this case,
may be completely satisfied, the defendants ask that the usual
practice of Chancery Courts in like cases may here be followed:
that the defendants’ may be ordered to secure the payment to
the complainants of the value of their shares when ascertained,
and upon the giving of such security, the injunction upon the
defendants may be dissolved, and the defendants be allowed to
complete the suspended transfer.

THOMAS H. TALBOT,
Counsel for Pewabic Mining Company et als.,

Defendants below.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Aper_scotus_1889_240%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
