# Record and brief — Perdue v. Kenny A.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 559 U.S. 542

## Text

Se es eee ee pase Oro

No. O8-970
lithe:

Docketed:
Lower CL
Case Nos.:

Decision Date:

Sonny Perdue. Governor of Georgia. ct al., Petitioners
\.

Kenny A... By His Next Friend Linda Winn. et al.
February 2, 2009

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
(06-15514. 06-15874)

July 3. 2008

Rehearing Denied: November 5, 2008
Questions Presented

Date - -
Jan 29 2009
Mar 4 2009
Mar 18 2009
Apr 6 2009

Apr 16 2009
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Aug 3 2009

Aug 3 2009
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Aug 21 2009
\ug 28 2009
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Aug 28 2009
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http: origm.www supremecourtus. gov docket UX-970 htm

Proceedings and Orders - yee
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due Mareh 4. 2009)
Bnef of respondents Kenny A.. By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al. in opposition filed.
DISTRIBUTED tor Conference of April 3, 2009.
Petition GRANTED limited to Question 1 presentud by the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
The time within which to file the joint appen rie Vv
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI......... 1
TTT EE ee 5 RE es Re a 1
EE Oe Oe eae 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................eceseceeeeeees 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..... 9

A. An Enhancement to the Lodestar Based on
Quality of Representation and Results
Obtained, Particularly When the Lodestar
Is Reduced for Excessive Hours Claimed,
Has Not Been Favored in Prior Decisions
Sg. RRR LE RPL eee SLA CIs eset) SARC 10

B. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To
Determine Whether a Reasonable Attorney’s
Fee Award Can Be Enhanced for Results
Obtained or Quality of Performance and, If
So, Whether Such an Enhancement Would
Still Be Unauthorized When the Lodestar
Is Reduced for Excessive Hours Billed ....... 15

INT schaieinctennttiiieninncentenbinceaniensaneesindinntves 30

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
Page
APPENDIX A (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed
EE TT cnséiincuitheibinnihinneinondidontiniaaniantiin App. 1

APPENDIX B (Order of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia,
filed Oct. 3, 2006)................. ilaalnaimeauaiel App. 94

APPENDIX C (Opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed
I TEs Hie thise-siacaninititinincsnmaconierusccmmniin App. 173

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
SCRE, GSS Cs DOO (ESTOS cvicvensevcoscosssccnconsescsysecses LO

Americans United for Separation of Church &
State v. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids, 717
F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ............ cece cece eee ee 23

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass’n v. County of Albany, 484 F.3d 162 (2d

II EET P cawsiconicnccninonnennsisesneeiianimaiiandmmaaanmaaa 26
Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 687 F. Supp.

Fe aI Sec: So tnisiisssthsnivssnneniensenansspiesainaoondemiatel 23
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)......... 11, 26
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)..........0..... passim
Campbell v. Kansas State Univ., 804 F. Supp.

IG MI, IID os ikeciesindncscrcesimoscenpiewectnesalanumdsials 22

Cary v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 87 C 6998,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6176 (N.D. Tll. Apr.

TEI: TIIIIED va. cnan-odedsesosenantatusnudaneienaeaseaainmbansesiaaaeaennle 22
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557

CRIED ssexcencnigsdcascerinivsdesssennevineiniedeniakiaiaaiaeaae passim
Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C.

bi. SERRE SE eer ema DmEU Rr eh Soe aa 27
Forshee ». Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527

GE Te TI vv cckn cn cacocecicataccccedncscieesaemnaeeenieca 21

Geter v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2004) ...... 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page

Grable v. Gregory J. Barro, PLC, 1:05-CV-3133-
JEC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19709 (N.D. Ga.
sii sacs naeiniunnbeinieirgaeadeddinacnnsendene 17

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) .... 11, 12, 23, 26
Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999) .............. 21

In re Burlington Northern, Inc. Employment
Practices Litig., 810 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986)....21, 22

Johnson v. City of Tulsa, No. 94-CV-39-H(M),
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26377 (N.D. Okla.

a nertanindicheniensiiensseniinasenes 25
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
RE Fe GEE GS BOPP ccccccccccccccccccccscsesssscceces passim
Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258
cis line cassie snianiinbeitiedoweeinstiasorsens 21
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D.
CT nek aie eelicteend sagas deniienserens passim
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.
Titi th tiialil dads adhdined natnonedennieseudedediccuevenwned passim
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 547 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir.
tiene haainiiipnibtlondeceesanensbenesidenisqoserectocs passim
Liberles v. Daniel, 619 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. TI.
alicia spnbtoccocenaanscbeccsants 25

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, No. 06-CV-
00225-LTB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62862 (D.
i sna cc cctsenansbbagesiniennacenes 22

Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C.

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
NAACP v. Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir.
BT Psi sacinwcsiiihiscntnmeuieinhiiiidddaaliebigliad biti tie giultl 6, 7
Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. NTDEC, 822 F. Supp.
I, CIID cits iscisiccecosnsstinbinestepiesonanesitenadiahaesossubiis 22
Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery,
836 F.2d 1292 (1lth Cir. 1988).........................0006- 6, 7
Norwood v. Charlotte Mem'l Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
720 F. Supp. 543 (W.D.N.C. 1989)... eee 26

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)..... passim

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)............ 14
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).................. 26
Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 (2d

I PIII cccinscctiecilecdediuiehenctepiaelatakicitedtted Giada tailed ace l 21

Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983)....24, 25

Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort,
Inc., 124 F.34 1221 (10th Cir. 1907) ....................... 21

Shakman v. City of Chicago, No. 69 C 2145,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431 (N.D. Ill. Mar.

IIIT sccesdsincins.cii-dincicerutacctuneh bsabiencsondeicaaiiialioa ambien iniiiiins 22
Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.
SRE eer otra e PE ONE ATES AS ING he Pe 21

Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214
Ee es Ce TG ND citdekccadsncctcinihitesidenscctonasendaten 21

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
STATUTES
| Ea a eee eer money RARER ENON D 2
ee IED ccttiscicncciinncaniusinoniseetnesetniegnimiieninammeidian 2
Re I iisttecditeevnctsninasicdnusmentes 2, 3, 10, 11, 12
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558 (1976)......................ccssseees 10, 11
Bs es Pe SEE 0 IIIT crteirecciitiinesceniccncesescenasis 10, 11
RULES
I GATE, TID BRE Pi rcicccenicsscccceccesccssiccnsscunsesemnend 8

Supreme Court Rules 13.1 & 13.3 ............. eee eeeee 2

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Governor Sonny Perdue and the other Petitioners
respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review
the opimon and judgment of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit.

¢

OPINIONS BELOW

The panel opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, dated July 3, 2008, is offi-
cially reported at 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008) and
is reproduced at Appendix A, at App. 1-93.

The fees opinion and order of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, dated
October 3, 2006, is officially reported at 454 F. Supp.
2d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2006) and is reproduced at Appen-
dix B, at App. 94-172.

The en banc opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, denying further review and
the dissents thereto, dated November 5, 2008, is
officially reported at 547 F.3d 1319 (1lth Cir. 2008)
and is reproduced at Appendix C, at App. 173-223.

e

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit sought to be reviewed was entered
on July 3, 2008. The order denying rehearing en banc
was entered on November 5, 2008. The petition is

2

timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2102(c) and Supreme Court
Rules 13.1 & 13.3 because it is being filed within 90
days after the denial of a timely petition for rehear-
ing. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judg-
ment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant statutory provision involved is 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b), which states as follows:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a pro-
vision of sections 1981, 198la, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title [IX of Public
Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or section
13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney’s
fee as part of the costs, except that in any ac-
tion brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer’s judi-
cial capacity such officer shall not be held li-
able for any costs, including attorncy’s fees,
unless such action was clearly in excess of
such officer’s jurisdiction.

«

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 6, 2002, a class action complaint was
filed on behalf of 3,000 foster children against nu-
merous State of Georgia officials alleging both consti-
tutional and _ statutory violations and_ seeking
injunctive relief to alter the State’s administration of
the foster care system in two metropolitan Atlanta
counties. After a period of initial discovery, the denial
of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction after
a hearing, the denial of Defendants’ motion to dis-
miss, and both lay and expert discovery, the District
Court referred the parties to mediation. The media-
tion lasted four months and resulted in a consent
decree approved by the District Court on October 27,
2005, which contained a comprehensive agreement on
all pending issues except the amount of attorney’s
fees and expenses to award to Plaintiffs as prevailing
parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

On December 9, 2005, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed
their application for award of attorney’s fees and
expenses, claiming that they expended nearly 30,000
hours on the case resulting in a_ lodestar of
$7,171,434.30, but seeking an enhancement of twice
the purported lodestar, or a total fee award of
$14,342,868.60. Defendants opposed the application,
asserting in part that the lodestar should be reduced
due to excessive hours and that the enhancement was
not authorized based on the existing precedent of this
Court.

4

The District Court, after finding that many of
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s entries were “vague,” “noncom-
pensable,” “excessive,” and “unreasonable,” reduced
Plaintiffs’ lodestar through a fifteen percent reduction
in hours claimed, resulting in a monetary reduction of
over $1,000,000 in the lodestar amount to $6,102,802.90.
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1274-77,
1279-81, 1283, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2006). However, even
after recognizing that “most of the factors relevant to
calculating a reasonable fee are already reflected in
the lodestar amount” and should not serve as grounds
for increasing the lodestar, the District Court never-
theless adjusted the lodestar upward by a 1.75 multi-
plier, for a total fee award of $10,522,4°2.08. Id. at
1288, 1290.

The District Court justified its enhancement to
the lodestar for three reasons. First, the District
Court concluded that the quality of service was “far
superior to what consumers of legal services in the
legal marketplace in Atlanta could reasonably expect
to receive for the rates used in the lodestar calcula-
tion,” which ranged from $215 to $425 per hour. /d. at
1287-88. This conclusion was supported, according to
the District Court, because: (1) class counsel were
required to advance case expenses of $1.7 million over
a three-year period, (2) class counsel were not paid on
an ongoing basis while the work was being per-
formed, and (3) class counsel's ability to recover fees
was contingent on the outcome of the case. Id. at
1288.

5

Second, the District Court found that the “superb
quality” of class counsel’s representation “far ex-
ceeded what could reasonably be expected for the
standard hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar.”
Id. at 1288-89. In the District Court’s view, Plaintiffs’
counsel “brought a higher degree of skill, commit-
ment, dedication, and professionalism” to the litiga-
tion than the District Court had observed by any
other lawyers “in any other case during its 27 years
on the bench.” Jd. at 1289.

Third, the District Court viewed Plaintiffs’ suc-
cess, achieved only by Defendants’ agreement to a
consent decree after court-ordered mediation, as
“truly exceptional” and providing “sweeping relief to
the plaintiff class.” Jd. The District Court observed
that “la}fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and
federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other case
in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favor-

able result on such a comprehensive scale.” Jd. at
1290.

A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the District Court. Kenvry A.
v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008). In recogniz-
ing this Court’s decisions “that bend|] decidedly
against enhancements” of the lodestar,’ one of the
panel members concluded that “(t]he district court’s

See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992): Pa.
t. Del. Valley Citizens’ Counciu for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)
“Delaware Valley I’). Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).

6

$4.5 million enhancement to the $6 million lodestar
in the present case cannot be squared with the Su-
preme Court decisions we have discussed.” Jd. at
1221, 1225 (Carnes, J., concurring). According to
Judge Carnes, none of the factors relied upon by the
District Court (quality of service, contingency, and
results obtained) justified the boosting of the award.
Id. at 1225-31.

Nevertheless, the panel as a whole concluded
that they were “not free to decide the enhancement
issue” based upon the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier
decisions in NAACP v. Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th
Cir. 1987), and Norman v. Housing Authority of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988), both of
which “were issued after the Supreme Court last
spoke on the subject of enhancements for quality of
representation and superior results, which was in the
Delaware Valley I case.” Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1236-
37. In NAACP and Norman, the Eleventh Circuit
vacated district court orders denying enhancements
for superior results and issued remand instructions
which left open the possibility that superior results
coupled with superior performance could serve as the
basis for an enhancement to the lodestar. See
NAACP, 812 F.2d at 1336-37; Norman, 836 F.2d at
1302, 1306. As a later panel, Judge Carnes concluded
that the panel was bound to follow NAACP and
Norman based on the prior panel precedent rule,
notwithstanding his conclusion that those holdings
were wrong and conflicted with this Court’s relevant

7

precedents. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1238 (Carnes, J.,
concurring). Judge Carnes concluded by stating:

Of course, this Court sitting en banc, or the
Supreme Court, can overrule any prior deci-
sions of this Court. Unless and until this
Court does overrule NAACP and Norman, we
are constrained to let stand the $4,500,000
enhancement to the lodestar amount that is
included in the district court’s judgment in
this. case.

Td. at 1242.

The subsequent petition for rehearing en banc
was denied by a 9-3 vote. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 547
F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008). Judge Carnes, joined by
Judges Tjoflat and Dubina, authored a dissent from
the denial of rehearing en banc for “the first time
in sixteen years on the bench,” opining that this was
“an important question of federal law that has not
been, but should be, settled by [the Supreme] Court.”
Id. at 1331 (Carnes, J., dissenting from the denial of

* Judge Wilson agreed that the panel was bound by the
prior panel precedents of NAACP and Norman, but believed that
those precedents correctly held that enhancements of the
lodestar amount should be permitted for quality of representa-
tion and the results obtained. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1242
(Wilson, J.. concurring). Judge Hill also agreed that they were
bound by these prior panel precedents, and expressed his view
that the opinions of Judges Carnes and Wilson were scholarly
and “will be of interest to jurists who might wish to pursue the
matter in further proceedings, should any arise.” 7d. at 1251
(Hill, J.. concurring).

8

rehearing en banc) (citing Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)). Judge
Carnes stated that the question of “whether a district
court can [|] increase the award beyond that reason-
able amount [reflected in the lodestar] based on its
finding that the attorney’s performance was of supe-
rior quality and the results achieved were excep-
tional” is one that affects “at least one hundred
federal fee-shifting statutes that allow the prevailing
party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the
losing party.” Jd. at 1331-32, 1337-39. Judge Carnes
summed up the critical importance of this appeal as
follows:

The record in this case and the facts and
findings drawn from it present this impor-
tant, unresolved issue as well as any case
will and better than almost any other case
can. It presents an opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to reach the issue it could not
reach in Blum and Delaware Valley: Under
the federal fee-shifting statutes can a rea-
sonable attorney’s fee be enhanced based on
extraordinary effort or results where some
evidence and findings support the enhance-
ment, or are all of the factors that lead to the
quality of the performance and the results
obtained already covered in the lodestar cal-
culation, as the opinions in Delaware Valley
and Dague imply?

Id. at 1337.

Judge Tjoflat authored a separate dissent from
the denial of rehearing en banc, reasoning in part
that “it can never be appropriate to enhance the

9

attorneys fees in a case seeking injunctive relief on
the basis of ‘exceptional’ or ‘superior’ results.” Jd. at
1330 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehear-
ing en banc). Judge Tjoflat concluded that, “I believe
that a lodestar hourly rate that is already at the top
of the relevant market is simply ineligible for an
additional enhancement.” /d. at 1330-31.

¢

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In affirming the District Court’s enhancement of
a lodestar amount based on superior results, quality
of representation, and the contingent nature of the
case, factors that are normally subsumed within the
lodestar calculation, the Eleventh Circuit has decided
an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with this Court’s decisions regarding the application
of federal fee-shifting statutes.

To the extent that the decisions of this Court
have been interpreted by United States Courts of
Appeals to permit an increase of an award of attor-
neys fees beyond the lodestar amount based or
superior quality of representation and exceptional
results, this is a question of federal law that has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court in order to
provide definitive and final guidance on this issue.

This Court should grant certiorari to address an
issue affecting over one hundred federal fee-shifting
statutes to enable uniform application with respect to

10

the manner in which petitions for enhancements to
lodestar amounts are considered by trial courts.

A. An Enhancement to the Lodestar Based on
Quality of Representation and Results Ob-
tained, Particularly When the Lodestar Is
Reduced for Excessive Hours Claimed, Has

Not Been Favored in Prior Decisions of
This Court.

Under the “American Rule,” the prevailing
litigant ordinarily is not entitled to collect a reason-
able attorney’s fee from the losing party unless there
is an exception to the rule, such as a specific statu-
tory authorization to the contrary. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270
(1975). Following this Court’s decision in Alyeska,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to authorize
courts to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a
prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action. See H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p.
4 (1976). In determining the factors that should be
considered in determining a reasonable fee, the
legislative history of this enactment referred to the
twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),° which

The Johnson factors are as follows:
(1) time and labor required;
(2) novelty and difficulty of the questions;

‘Continued on following page)

11

included factors such as “the skill requisite to per-
form the legal service properly,” “whether the fee is
fixed or contingent,” and “the amount involved and the
results obtained.” Jd. at 718; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1558, p. 8 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976).

This Court first established the framework and
methodology for calculating a reasonable attorney's
fee award to a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
The “starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate.” Jd. at 433. The product of this calcula-
tion is commonly referred to as the “lodestar.” Penn-
sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Counsel for

(3) skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(4) preclusion of other employment by the attorney due
to acceptance of the case;

(5) customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circum-
stances;
(8) amount involved and the results obtarned;
(9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys:
(10) “undesirability” of the case;
(ll) nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases.
Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 5th
Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87, 91-94 (1989).

12

Clean Air (“Delaware Valley I”), 478 U.S. 546, 563
(1986). In Hensley, this Court indicated that the
lodestar calculation “does not end the inquiry” and
that there were other considerations “that may lead
the district court to adjust the fee upward or down-
ward, including the important factor of the ‘results
obtained,’” although it was also noted that many of
the Johnson factors “usually are subsumed within the
initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a
reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 &
n.9. This Court concluded the discussion of the issue
of potential enhancements to the lodestar by stating
that an enhanced award may be justified “in some
cases of exceptional success.” Jd. at 435.

The issue of a potential enhanced award of
attorney's fees next appeared in Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886 (1984), where a fee applicant was awarded a
50 percent upward adjustment over the lodestar to
compensate for the complexity of the case, the novelty
of the issues, and the “great benefit” achieved. Jd. at
891. This Court held that these reasons did not
support the increase to the lodestar, concluding that
factors such as “complexity of the issues,” “quality of
representation,” and “results obtained” are “nor-
mally” or “generally” reflected in either the number of
billable hours or the hourly rates charged and should
not usually provide an independent hasis for increas-
ing the fee award. /d. at 898-900. While the Court
rejected the argument “that an upward adjustment to
an attorney's fee is never appropriate under § 1988,”
it held that the evidence in Blum failed to establish

13

that an enhancement was needed to provide reason-
able compensation for services rendered. /d. at 901.

This Court next considered the propriety of an
enhancement of an award of attorney’s fees in a fee-
shifting statute in Delaware Valley I. Prior to consid-
ering the plaintiffs’ request for “multipliers” to adjust
the lodestar amount upward, the district court there
in fact eliminated a significant number of hours
claimed because they were not documented in suffi-
cient detail or were excessive. 478 U.S. at 554. The
district court nevertheless applied a multiplier of two
to raise the lodestar based upon the contingent na-
ture of the case and the superior quality of represen-
tation, which was affirmed by the Third Circuit. /d.
at 555-56. This Court reversed. First, this Court held
that it was error to increase the fee award based upon
the “superior quality” of the attorneys’ performance
“|bjecause consideraticns concerning the quality of a
prevailing party’s counsel's representation normally
are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate,” and the
overall quality of a lawyer’s performance “ordinarily
should not be used to adjust the lodestar.” /d. at 566.
Importantly for the case at hand, this Court stated
that “|t|he District Court’s elimination of a large
number of hours on the grounds that they were
unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive is not
supportive of the court’s later conclusion that the
remaining hours represented work of ‘superior qual-
ity.”” Id. at 566-67. As there were no detailed findings
of why the lodestar amount did not reflect the quality
of representation or why the results were so superior,

14

this Court found no reason to increase the fee award
for quality of representation. Jd. at 568. This Court
then withheld a decision as to whether an upward
adjustment to the lodestar could be made based on
the risk of loss and scheduled reargument. /d.

The question of whether an enhancement based
upon the contingent nature of a fee is appropriate
was initially left unresolved in Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711 (1987) (“Delaware Valley IT’), but then was defini-
tively resolved in City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557 (1992). This Court again stated that there is
a “strong presumption” that the lodestar represents a
reasonable fee and that the burden was on the fee
applicant to establish that an upward adjustment “is
necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee.”
Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added) (citing
Delaware Valley I and Blum). The Court found that
the difficulty of establishing the merits of a case, one
of the factors to consider for risk of loss, is normally
subsumed in the lodestar “either in the higher num-
ber of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in
the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and
experienced enough to do so.” /d. The Court also
found that the relative merits of the claim, the other
factor in a contingent fee determination, should play
no part in the calculation of a fee award. Id. at 563-
65. “|Wje hold that enhancement for contingency is
not permitted under the |federal! fee-shifting statutes
at issue.” Id. at 567.

15

Consequently, this Court has held that an en-
hancement to a lodestar amount for the contingent
nature of the case is absolutely prohibited and that
upward adjustment based upon supcrior performance
and the results obtained should not usually be
awarded, because these factors are normally sub-
sumed within the lodestar calculation of the product
of hours claimed multiplied by the hourly rate. Al-
though it remains undefined what exceptional cir-
cumstances would justify an enhancement to the
lodestar based upon superior performance and suc-
cess obtained, it appears that the reduction of the
hours claimed based upon vague, duplicative, and
excessive entries would belie any contention that an
upward adjustment based upon superior performance
should be permitted.

B. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To
Determine Whether a Reasonable Attor-
ney’s Fee Award Can Be Enhanced for Re-
sults Obtained or Quality of Performance
and, If So, Whether Such an Enhancement
Would Still Be Unauthorized When the
Lodestar Is Reduced for Excessive Hours
Billed.

The record in this case presents a clear opportu-
nity to resolve the issue which this Court could not
reach in Blum and Delaware Valley 1: Can a reason-
able attorney’s fee award be enhanced for results
obtained or quality of performance, or are those factors
already subsumed into the lodestar, as Delaware

16

Valley 1 and Dague appear to indicate? See Dague,
505 U.S. at 562-63 (stating that the difficulty of
establishing the merits of the claim “is ordinarily
reflected in the lodestar — either in the higher num-
ber of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in
the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and
experienced enough to do so” and cautioning that
“[tlaking account of it again through lodestar en-
hancement amounts to double counting”); Delaware
Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565-66 (citing Blum for the
proposition that “the ‘quality of representation,’ and
the ‘results obtained’ from the litigation are presuma-
bly fully reflected in the lodestar amount” and ex-
plaining that “[cjalculating the fee award in a manner
that accounts for these factors, either in determining
the reasonable number of hours expended on the
litigation or in setting the reasonable hourly rate,
thus adequately compensates the attorney, and leaves
very little room for enhancing the award based on his
post-engagement performance”); see also Kenny A.,
547 F.3d at 1337 (Carnes, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (“|This case] presents an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to reach the issue
it could not reach in Blum and Delaware Valley:
Under the federal fee-shifting statutes can a reason-
able attorney’s fee be enhanced based on extraordi-
nary effort or results where some evidence and
findings support the enhancement, or are all of the
factors that lead to the quality of the performance
and the results obtained already covered in the
lodestar calculation, as the opinions in Delaware
Valley and Dague imply?”).

17

Petitioners respectfully contend that this issue
has caused confusion in its application by district
courts and review by the Courts of Appeals, and this
case presents the best opportunity to resolve it. As
Judge Carnes explained in his dissent from the denial
of rehearing en banc, joined by Judges Tjoflat and
Dubina, “(t]he record in this case and the facts and
findings drawn from it present this important, unre-
solved issue as well as any case will and better than
almost any other case can.” Kenny A., 547 F.3d at
1337 (Carnes, J., dissenting from the denial of re-
hearing en banc) (emphasis added).

The record shows that the District Court in this
case itself reduced Plaintiffs’ purported lodestar by
more than $1 million for the excessive hours billed in
order to arrive at a reasonable lodestar of $6 million,
but the District Court then immediately turned
around and enhanced its own reasonable lodestar
determination by a 1.75 multiplier for a total fee
award (not including expenses) of $10.5 million.
Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1266, 1286, 1290. The
District Court based its enhancement on contingency
and delay of payment (in contravention of Dague’),

* The District Court interpreted this Court’s decision in
Dague as holding merely that “a lodestar enhancement cannot
be based on contingency alone.” Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at
1288 n&, cited in Grable v Gregory J. Barro, PLC, 1:05-CV-
3133-JEC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19709, at *14 n.8 (N_D. Ga.
Mar. 19, 2007) (refusing, in contrast to Kenny A., to grant an
enhancement and stating that “in this case the reasoning of the
Supreme Court for not enhancing an award applies”).

18

the results obtained, and the superior quality of
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s legal performance. /d. at 1288-89.
The current state of the law is confusing to the
Courts of Appeals and district courts as to whether an
enhancement is ever appropriate based on results
obtained or the quality of the performance, but it
certainly makes no sense that an enhancement for
results obtained or superior performance should be
awarded when the district court itself determines the
fee applicant’s purported lodestar should be reduced,
as the District Court in this case explained through-
out its decision:

Billing Judgment Generally: “The Court has
reviewed the entries cited by State Defen-
dants and agrees that many of the entries
are too vague to permit the Court to deter-
mine whether the time was reasonably ex-
pended. Many of the entries also reflect
purely administrative tasks that are non-
compensable.”

Complaint and Mandatory Disclosures:
“(Blased on its experience in other complex
class actions, 1,648.41 hours is excessive for
pre-suit investigation and drafting the com-
plaint and mandatory disclosures.”

Document Production and Analysis: “|T)he
Court finds that more than 7,100 hours ex-
pended on document review and analysis
over the two-and-one-half years between the
filing of the complaint and the commence-
ment of the mediation is unreasonable. That
is the equivalent of more than one full-time

19

employee reviewing and analyzing docu-
ments continuously for that entire period.”

Discovery Motions: “It was clearly unneces-
sary to have spent in excess of 60 hours pre-
paring this response. The Court also agrees
with State Defendants that an unreasonable
number of plaintiffs’ attorneys attended
many of the discovery and status conferences
conducted by the Court.”

Intra- and Inter-Office Conferences and Cor-
respondence: “(T]he Court believes that the
very large number of attorneys and parale-
gals who worked on this case inevitably re-
sulted in some duplication of effort. This is
reflected by the fact that more than 8% of all
the time expended on the case was devoted
to communications among counsel. While
some of this time was undoubtedly reason-
able and necessary, the Court finds this per-
centage somewhat high even for a complex
class action such as this.”

Expert Witnesses and Reports: “|Sjome time
entries by attorneys reflect time spent draft-
ing and revising expert reports, work which
should have been done by the experts them-
selves. Likewise, many of the paralegals’ time
entries reflect that the work performed was
administrative and secretarial in nature.”

Motion for Summary Judgment: “(T!he num-
ber of hours expended was unreasonable.
One need only consider the fact that 1,720
hours is the equivalent of one attorney work-
ing full time for nearly an entire vear to

20

conclude that no response to a motion for
summary judgment justifies such an expen-
diture of time.”

Trial Preparation: “(Tjhe Court cannot agree
that it was reasonable to spend more than
2,000 hours on this task [for a trial which
never occurred |.”

Id. at 1274-75, 1277, 1279-81, 1283."

A review of cases from the Courts of Appeals and
various district courts shows the confusion that exists
in this area. Judge Wilson in his concurring opinion
in the denial of rehearing en banc maintains that
there is no Circuit split on this issue. See Kenny A.,
547 F.3d at 1321 (Wilson, J., concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc) (citing Kenny A., 532 F.3d 1209,

* This case also demonstrates vividly the penalty that an
enhancement can impose on a government agency that settles a
case. The District Court indicated that “if plaintiffs had pre-
vailed in a trial of this case, it is doubtful that they would have
obtained relief ‘as intricately detailed and comprehensive’ as
that contained in the Consent Deeree.” Kenny A., 454 F. Supp.
2d at 1289-90. It only was through the efforts of Plaintiffs’
counsel and Petitioners that this settlement was ever reached.

The District Court’s enhancement of the lodestar effectively
results in a penalty upon the State of Georgia and its officials for
settling this case. If the District Court's award of attorney's fees
and expenses is allowed to stand, the message to governments
which have to defend similar class action claims will be clear:
settlement of claims could result in the government getting
assessed with a larger award of attorney's fees than if the case
goes to trial and a “lesser” result is mandated. This will result in
fewer consent agreements and more tnals on the merits.

21

1242 (11th Cir. 2008); Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d
784, 794-95 (6th Cir. 2004); Van Gerwen v. Guarantee
Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000);
Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir.
1999): Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527,
531-32 (8th Cir. 1999); Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188,
192 (4th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Con-
ference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1233 n.8 (10th Cir.
1997); Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 320 (5th
Cir. 1993)).

However, unlike the cases cited by Judge Wilson
where circuit courts have interpreted this Court’s
decisions as permitting an enhancement to the lode-
star based upon quality of performance and results
obtained, other circuit and district courts have con-
cluded otherwise. See, e.g., Jordan v. Multnomah
County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Among the Johnson factors that cannot serve as
independent bases for adjusting fee awards are: (1)
the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the
special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality
of representation, and (4) the results obtained.”)
(citing Blum and Delaware Valley 1); In re Burlington
Northern, Inc. Employment Practices Litig., 810 F.2d
601, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Finally, one can question
whether enhancement for exceptional success is ever
appropriate. ‘The lodestar figure includes most, if not
all, of the relevant factors comprising a “reasonable”
attorney's fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance the
fee for superior performance in order to serve the
statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure

22

legal assistance.’”) (quoting Delaware Valley I) (em-
phasis added); Shakman v. City of Chicago, No. 69 C
2145, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431, at *20-21 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 18, 2008) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has ques-
tioned whether ‘an enhancement for exceptional cir-
cumstance is ever appropriate’ in fee-shifting cases.”)
(citing Burlington Northern); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Engida, No. 06-CV-00225-LTB, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62862, at *9 (D. Colo. July 30, 2008) (stating
that novelty, difficulty, and result achieved are “pre-
sumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount, and
thus cannot serve as independent bases for increasing
the basic fee award”) (quoting Delaware Valley I);
Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. NTDEC, 822 F. Supp. 1462,
1467 (D. Ariz. 1993) (“Specifically, the subsumed
factors are: the novelty and complexity of the issues,
the special! skill and experience of counsel, the quality
of the representation, the results obtained and the
superior performance of counsel.”); Campbell ov.
Kansas State Univ., 804 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (D. Kan.
1992) (“The novelty and complexity of the issues, the
special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of
representation, and the results obtained from the
litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lode-
star amount, and thus cannot serve as independent
reasons for increasing the fee award.”); Cary v. Chi-
cago Hous. Auth., No. 87 C 6998, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6176, at “19-22 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1992) (refus-
ing enhancement on one hand because “the Supreme
Court found in |Delaware Valley I| that upward
adjustments of the lodestar for the ‘superior quality’
of counsel’s performance were redundant to factors in

23

the lodestar calculation, and impermissible,” but then
granting enhancement on grounds that “the Delaware
Valley I court did hold out the possibility that an
upward adjustment to the lodestar may be obtained
in cases of ‘exceptional’ results”); Americans United
for Separation of Church & State v. Sch. Dist. of
Grand Rapids, 717 F.Supp. 488, 502 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (“Blum states explicitly that the results ob-
tained do not justify enhancing an otherwise reason-
able fee.”); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 687
F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (“From a reading
of |Hensley, Blum, and Delaware Valley I), the John-
son factors 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9 are clearly subsumed
within the initial calculations of hours reasonably
expended at a reasonable hours rate.”).

In Judge Carnes’ opinion, there are two contra-
dictory ways to read Delaware Valley I, and he re-
spectfully encourages that the correct reading should
be made clear by this Court. One way to read Dela-
ware Valley I is holding that “an enhancement for
superior representation and exceptional results is
never permitted; and even if it were, there was insuffi-
cient evidence or findings of anything special in that
case.” Kenny A., 547 F.3d at 1334 (Carnes, J., dissent-
ing from the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis
added). The other way to read the decision is that
such enhancements are allowed, but only with “spe-
cific evidence and findings to support the conclusion
that the quality of representation and results ob-
tained were truly special.” /d. (emphasis added).

24

Whichever method is correct, the fact remains
that attempts by the Courts of Appeals to provide
guidance have only further confused rather than
clarified the issue for district courts. As just one
example, in Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir.
1983), the Tenth Circuit tried to define with particu-
larity what can constitute superior performance
worthy of a lodestar enhancement:

[W]e think that this genius factor diminishes
and eventually disappears as the number of
hours expended on the case increases. A brii-
liant idea may shortcut one aspect of the
case and save many hours, but in protracted
litigation a lawyer is also likely to pursue
blind alleys and expend many unproductive
hours. In a case such as the one at bar, in
which more than 9000 hours were reported,
we do not believe that any adjustment for ex-
traordinary performance could be warranted.
We also believe that tne greater the number
of attorneys involved on a side, the less likely
it is that an extraordinary performance bo-
nus is appropriate. Here the plaintiffs util-
ized 12 attorneys, 5 of whom expended more
than 200 hours. In such a case it is unlikely
that the genius of one lawyer will so affect
the case that a bonus would be warranted.
Furthermore, in awarding a genius bonus
the district court should take care not to du-
plicate the skill reflected in the attorney's
billing rate. Thus, we believe that bonuses or
multipliers of the normal fee because of the
extraordinary skill of counsel should be
rarely awarded, and should be confined to

25

cases in which the bulk of the work was done
by a single attorney who exhibits extraordi-
narv skill or to cases in which the work was
done well in a relatively short time given the
complexity of the task.

Id. at 557.° Highlighting the confusion in this area
and the various applications of this Court’s instruc-
tions, this aspect of the Ramos decision has both been
questioned by at least one district court from another
Circuit in light of subsequent Supreme Court prece-
dent, and more recently, it has been followed by a
district court in the same Circuit.”

* In this case, “(t]he time records submitted in support of
plaintiffs’ fee application show that plaintiffs’ [thirty-eight]
attorneys, paralegais, and legal interns devoted a total of
29,908.73 hours to this litigation,” far more than the number of
timekeepers and hours for which fee recovery was sought in
Ramos. Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74.

' See Liberles v. Daniel, 619 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. IIL.
1985) (“Ramos was decided a year before Blum, and its explana-
tion of ‘exceptional success’ has been limited to some extent by
the Supreme Court. In particular, the Supreme Court rejected
(in most cases) one of the two primary reasons offered by the
Tenth Circuit for enhancing a fee: the results achieved in the
case.”).

* See Johnson v. City of Tulsa, No. 94-CV-39-H(M)}, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26377, at *34-35 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2003)
(“Like Ramos, this case is protracted litigation involving thou-
sands of attorney hours. The case did not establish new law or
result in a total victory. It instead resulted in a compromise that
achieved excellent results for Plaintiffs’ clients and the City of
Tulsa as a whole. Although Plaintiffs did have to battle larger
law films and endured a period of significant discovery disputes,
these disputes were of a kind to be anticipated in such litigation

‘Continued on following page)

26

As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained
in a 2007 decision, with former Justice O’Connor
sitting by designation, “Jolur fee-setting jurispru-
dence has become needlessly confused,” and it re-
spectfully laid some of the responsibility with this
Court for never fully resoiving the interplay between
the lodestar method and the Johnson factors:

And the Supreme Court has not yet fully re-
solved the relationship between the two
methods. In cases decided after Hensley and
Blum, it has both (1) suggested that district
courts should use the Johnson factors to ad-
just the lodestar, see, e.g., Blanchard, 489
U.S. at 94 (stating that the district court
should arrive at an initial estimate and then
“adjust this lodestar calculation by other
factors”); see also id. (“The Johnson factors
may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar
amount... .”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 582-83 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(suggesting that factors might exist “that
would justify an enhancement of the lode-
star”), and (2) reiterated its holding in
Hensley and Blum that “many of the Johnson
factors ‘are subsumed within the initial cal-
culation.’” Del. Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564.

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v.
County of Albany, 484 F.3d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2007);
see also Norwood v. Charlotte Mem'l Hosp. & Med.

and Plaintiffs’ counsel is being fully compensated for that
time.”).

27

Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 5438, 547 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (stating
that the difficulties courts experience in applying the
“instructions” for attorney’s fee awards result from
misunderstanding regarding proper application of the
Johnson factors).

As recently as this summer, Judge Lamberth of
the District Court for the District of Columbia at-
tempted to divine this area of the law and ultimately
concluded that “the lodestar, calculated using coun-
sel’s established billing rates, adequately reflects
this superior quality of representation.” Miller v.
Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 54 (D.D.C. 2008). The
court noted that the District of Columbia Circuit had
years ago lamented in Donnell v. United States, 682
F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982): “district courts’ increasing
predilection for ‘adjust{ing] the lodestar upward to
reflect what the courts [subjectively] view as a high

. quality of representation,’ ... ‘should stop.’ It
stops here.” Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting
Donnell, 682 F.2d at 254) (brackets in original).
Moreover, specifically citing this case, Judge Lam-
berth “agree|d] with Judge Carnes of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals that ‘bad and excessive
billing is inconsistent with superb lawyering’” and
emphasized that “[{a]nalogously, routinely devoting
excessive manpower to tasks is inconsistent with
efficient case management” and should prohibit any
enhancement of the lodestar. Jd. at 49 n.76 (quoting
Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1229).

This case starkly shows the confusion and incon-
sistent application of this Court’s existing attorney's

28

fee precedent. The District Court’s award lays bare
the substantial costs that can be imposed on a gov-
ernment defendant when misapplication occurs,
especially when the district court concludes on the
one hand that the purported lodestar is excessive and
reduces it, but then nevertheless with the other hand
provides a fee enhancement. See Kenny A., 547 F.3d
at 1335 (“The bottom line for certiorari review pur-
poses, however, is that the law of the Eleventh Circuit
permits this kind of enhancement, and that law was
applied to permit a $4.5 million enhancement of the
lodestar amount in this case.”) (Carnes, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis
added).

The important unresolved question presented by
this case is whether “no evidence or findings can ever
justify an enhancement on performance and results
grounds because the lodestar already takes into
account all of the factors that go into how well an
attorney performs and the result obtained.” Jd. at
1336. Certainly, some federal judges believe that
“Itlhe decisions in Dague and Delaware Valley imply
as much.” /d. If so, as the Court of Appeals and Dis-
trict Court decisions in this case show, “the Supreme
Court needs to tell those ... on the lower courts
because that point has not gotten across.” Id.

Given the confusion over the proper application
of results obtained and superior performance in
calculating attorney’s fee awards pursuant to federal
fee-shifting statutes, Petitioner respectfully requests
that this Court grant certiorari to resolve finally

29

whether results obtained or quality of performance
can provide an appropriate basis for enhancing the
lodestar, or whether these factors are always sub-
sumed in the lodestar such that providing an en-
hancement based on these factors is impermissible.
See Blum, 465 U.S. at 899 (stating that “the District
Court’s rationale for providing an upward adjustment
for quality of representation is a clear example of
double counting”). Even if this Court concludes that
enhancement for results obtained and quality of
representation is still possible, this Court should
further decide whether such enhancement is ever
appropriate if the lodestar has been reduced due to
excessive hours billed.

30

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MaArRK H. COHEN*
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
Bank of America Plaza
Suite 5200

600 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
(404) 885-3597

*Counsel of Record

THURBERT E. BAKER
Attorney General of Georgia
DENNIS R. DUNN
Deputy Attorney General
SHALEN S. NELSON
Senior Assistant

Attorney General
ELIZABETH M. WILLIAMSON
Assistant Attorney General
STATE LAW DEPARTMENT
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-3377

Attornevs for Petitioners

5

jn The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

¢

SONNY PERDUE, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Georgia, et al.,

Petitioners,
Vv.

KENNY A., by his next friend Linda Winn, et a/.,
Respondents.

*

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit

¢

APPENDIX TO THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed
PT sciniicisieraihtaitabidtignnitigindsanmeineuenn App. l

APPENDIX B (Order of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia,
RE PMs Gy BTID cn ncccecncessccsccescoencccssceees App. 94

APPENDIX C (Opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed
| _—_—_EEEE EN nD DD Ere App. 173

App. l

APPENDIX A
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 06-15514 & 06-15874

D. C. Docket No. 02-01686-CV-MHS-1

KENNY A., by his next friend Linda Winn,
KARA B., by her next friend Linda Pace,

MAYA C., by her next friend Linda Pace,
PHELICIA D., by her next friend Theresa Roth,
SABRINA E., by her next friend Rebecca Silvey,
KORRINA E., by her next friend Rebecca Silvey,
TANYA F., by her next friend Carol Huff,
PRISCILLA G., by her next friend Roslyn M. Satchel,
BRIANA H., by her next friend Linda Pace,

on their own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees-
Cross-Appellants,

versus

SONNY PERDUE, in his official capacity as
Governcr of the State of Georgia,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

JAMES MARTIN, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Department of

Human Resources of the State of Georgia,

DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,
Fulton County,

App. 2

BEVERLY JONES, in her official capacity as
Director of the Fulton County Department of
Family and Children Services,

DEKALB COUNTY DFCS,

WAYNE DRUMMOND, in his official capacity as
Director of the DeKalb County Department of
Family and Children Services,

Defendants-Appellants-
Cross-Appellees,

FULTON COUNTY,
DEKALB COUNTY,

Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

(July 3, 2008)
Before CARNES, WILSON and HILL, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:

When asked how much money would be enough
for him, John D. Rockefeller reportedly said: “Just a
little bit more.” The attorneys for the plaintiff class
in this case want more than just a little bit more.
They want a lot more money than they would receive
from multiplying the number of hours they worked on
this case by the hourly rate they charge. And the

Robert M. Sharp, The Lore and Legends of Wall Street 233
(1989)

App. 3

district court gave them a lot more — $4,500,000 more
— out of the pockets of the taxpayers of Georgia.

Not caught up in the district court’s spirit of
generosity with their money, the Georgia taxpayers
(through their governor and other officials who are
defendants) have appealed the attorneys’ fees award
because of that multi-million dollar enhancement and
for other reasons. The plaintiffs’ attorneys, convinced
that the district court was not generous enough, have
cross-appealed (through the class they represent),
insisting that they deserve even more than the
$10,500,000 total fees that the court awarded them.

I.

Kenny A. and eight other named plaintiffs in this
lawsuit are foster children in the custody of the
Georgia Department of Human Resources. Kenny A.
ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (Kenny A. III). In June 2002, on
behalf of a class of all foster children in Fulton and
DeKalb Counties and a subclass of African American
foster children, the plaintiffs sued the governor, DHR,
its commissioner, Fulton and DeKalb Counties, each
county's department of family and children services,
and the director of each of those departments. /d. at
1266-67. The complaint alleged systemic deficiencies
in the counties’ foster care systems. /d. at 1267. These
deficiencies, according to the complaint, included:

(1) assigning excessive numbers of cases to
inadequately trained and poorly supervised

App. 4

caseworkers; (2) not developing a sufficient
number of foster homes properly screened to
ensure the plaintiff children’s safety; (3) not
identifying adult relatives who could care for
the plaintiff children as an alternative to
strangers or impersonal institutions; (4) fail-
ing to provide relevant information and sup-
port services to foster parents in order to
prevent foster placements from being dis-
rupted; (5) failing to develop administrative
controls such as an information management
system that ensures plaintiff children are
expeditiously placed in a foster home
matched to meet the children’s specific
needs; (6) failing to provide timely and ap-
propriate permanency planning, including
failing to provide services that would enable
plaintiffs te achieve their permanency plan-
ning goals; (7) placing plaintiffs in danger-
ous, unsanitary, inappropriate shelters and
other placements; (8) failing to provide ap-
propriate and necessary mental health,
medical, and education services to children
in their custody; and (9) separating teenage
mothers in foster care from their own chil-
dren and separating siblings in foster care
from each other without providing visitation.

ld.

The complaint asserted fifteen causes of action
under federal and state law. Kenny A. ex rel. Winv v.
Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 283 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (Kenny
A. 1). The federal law claims included alleged viola-
tions, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, of the class

App. 5

members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to substan-
tive and procedural due process and their First,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty,
privacy, and association. Jd. The complaint also
alleged violations of the class members’ statutory
rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, the Multiethnic Placement Act of
1994, as well as violations of the early and periodic
screening, diagnosis, and treatment program of the
Medicaid Act. /d. The state law claims asserted
included violations of the class members’ substantive
due process and equal protection rights under the
Georgia Constitution, violations of various Georgia
statutes, and claims of nuisance, breach of contract,
and inadequate and ineffective legal representation.
Id. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and expenses. /d. at
283 n.1.

The district court denied the defendants’ motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment. Kenny A. III,
454 F. Supp. 2d at 1269; Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(Kenny A. II); Kenny A. I, 218 F.R.D. at 305. It certi-
fied the class of all foster children in the Fulton and
DeKalb County foster care systems, and the subgroup
of African American foster children “who have had, or
are subject to the risk of having, their adoption
delayed or denied on the basis of their race or color,”
Kenny A. I, 218 F.R.D. at 305, and set the case for
trial, Kenny A. IIT, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1268-69.

App. 6

At the same time, the district court referred the
case to mediation. Jd. at 1269. As that court would
later describe it, “over the next four months the par-
ties attended eighteen separate mediation sessions
where they spent more than 110 hours trying to
hammer out a settlement agreement.” Jd. They were
eventually successful. /d.

In May 2006 the district court gave final ap-
proval to the settlement between the plaintiff class
and Fulton and DeKalb Counties; the parties agreed
to an attorneys’ fees award in that part of the case;
the district court entered that award, and it has not
been appealed. This appeal arises from the settle-
ment involving the rest of the defendants, which was
approved by the district court in October 2005. /d.
The court summarized that settlement this way:

Its centerpiece is a series of thirty-one out-
come measures that State Defendants have
agreed to meet and sustain for at least three
consecutive six-month reporting periods.

The outcome measures, many of them
requiring phased-in results over a two-year
period, seek to improve performance in the
following areas: timely commencement and
thorough completion of investigations of re-
ported abuse or neglect; regular visits of fos-
ter children by case workers; approval and
licensure of foster homes and other place-
ments; the percentage of children who are
the victims of substantiated maltreatment
while in foster care; the percentage of chil-
dren in foster homes that exceed their

App. 7

licensed capacity; the percentage of children
who have experienced multiple moves while
in foster care; and periodic judicial reviews of
the safety and status of foster children.

In addition, the Consent Decree requires
comprehensive and periodic delivery of medi-
cal, dental, and mental health services to fos-
ter children; a detailed process for improved
goal-setting, case planning and periodic re-
views of children’s status while in foster care;
limits on the placement of children in emer-
gency shelters and group homes and institu-
tions, and protections against overcrowding
in foster homes; and the establishment of re-
imbursement rates to adequately compen-
sate providers for caring for foster children.

Moreover, State Defendants commit to
reduced caseloads for all case managers and
supervisors; a fully implemented single
statewide automated child welfare informa-
tion system; and maintaining or establishing
placements and related services identified in
a “needs assessment” to be conducted by a
neutral expert. The settlement also includes
processes for the supervision of private con-
tract agencies that provide homes and ser-
vices for foster children; improvements in
foster parent screening, licensing and train-
ing, as well as foster parent support and
cormmunication; improvements in case man-
ager training; improvements in processes for
addressing suspected abuse or neglect and
suspected corporal punishment of children in

App. 8

foster care; and improvements in efforts to
maximize available federal funding.

Finally, the settlement provides that two
child welfare specialists will serve as the
Court’s independent accountability agents
charged with the responsibility of measuring
and reporting publicly on the State Defen-
dants’ compliance with these and other un-
dertakings as_ specified in the Consent
Decree.

Id. at 1289.

The 2005 settlement agreement further acknowl-
edged that “Plaintiff Class is entitled to recover its
expenses of litigation, including reasonable attorneys’
fees and nontaxable costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).” The agreement said
that the parties would “attempt without court inter-
vention to resolve the proper amount of Class Coun-
sel’s fees and expenses of litigation.” If the parties
could not reach an agreement, then “|t|/he amount of
any award shall be determined by the Court in accor-
dance with the requirements of applicable law and
procedures.”

That is what happened. Because the parties
could not agree on the amount of fees, the class filed a
motion for the court to make a determination and
award. Id. at 1269-70. It was accompanied by 2,500
pages of billing records, by affidavits from the two
lead counsel for the class, and by affidavits from five
Atlanta area attorneys who were not involved in the

~

case. Id. at 1270, 1290. The motion sought a total of

App. 9

$14,342.860 in fees. Jd. Half of that amount,
$7,171,434.30, was to compensate the attorneys and
their paralegals for the 29,908.73 hours they claimed
to have worked at rates they sought; those rates
ranged from $75 to $495. Id. The other $7,171,434.30
they sought was to be an enhancement of the fee
award for a job well done. Jd.

The defendants objected to some of the hourly
rates requested and to the number of hours claimed.
Id. They broke down the 2,500 pages of submitted
billing records into fifteen categories of hours repre-
senting different stages of the case, and argued that
in fourteen of those categories the plaintiffs’ attorneys
had expended more hours than was reasonably
necessary to effectively represent the class. Jd. at
1273-74 & n.5. The defendants also argued that many
of the entries on the billing records were too vague to
support a claim for compensation. /d. at 1274.

As for the request that the fee award be doubled
by means of a $7 million enhancement, the defen-
dants objected, arguing that this was not one of the
rare cases in which an enhancement would be appro-
priate. They argued that enhancing the fee based on
the results obtained would be improper because the
skill of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in litigating the case
would already have been taken into account in set-
ting their hourly rates. Double counting the skill
factor would be inappropriate, the defendants argued.

The district court overruled all of the defendants’
objections to the hourly rates sought by the plaintiffs’

App. 10

attorneys. Jd. at 1285. It granted in full each hourly
rate requested, ranging from $215 to $495 for plain-
tiffs’ attorneys, depending on their relative skill and
experience. /d. at 1284-85. The court did not reduce
the requested rates at all even though some of them
were New York rates instead of Atlanta rates, and
even though some of the attorneys (for example,
Marcia Robinson Lowry, one of the two lead attor-
neys) recently had been awarded a smaller hourly
rate for work on another case of exactly the same
type. Jd. at 1284-86. Likewise, the court approved in
full the requested hourly rates of $75 to $150 for
paralegal work. Jd. at 1285.

The district court did partially sustain the defen-
dants’ objection to the number of hours that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys claimed to have worked on the
case. /d. at 1274. The court agreed with the defen-
dants that some of the entries on counsel’s billing
records were vague and that the hours claimed for
eight of the fifteen billing categories were excessive.
Those eight excessively billed categories were: (1)
preparing the complaint and mandatory disclosures;
(2) litigating the preliminary injunction motion; (3)
producing and analyzing documents; (3) [sic] litigat-
ing discovery motions; (4) [sic] conferencing with each
other; (5) |sic] preparing expert witness reports;
(6) [sic] responding to the summary judgment motion;
(7) [sic] preparing for trial; and (8) [sic] travel. /d. at
1274-84, 1286.

The court dealt with the vague and excessive
billing two ways, one for the non-travel hours and the

App. 11

other for travel hours. It made “an across-the-board
15% reduction in the number of non-travel related
hours claimed by plaintiffs’ counsel.” Jd. at 1286. This
15 percent reduction amounted to 4,371.22 hours
being sliced off the 29,141.46 total number of non-
travel hours for which the attorneys had requested
compensation. In dollar terms, that amounted to a
reduction of $1,040,176.92 in non-travel related
attorneys’ fees. To remedy the vagueness and exces-
sive billing problem as it related to travel hours, the
court halved the hourly rate, thereby effectively
halving the number of travel hours that were com-
pensated from 767.27 to 383.64, which amounted to a
reduction of $118,460.75. When travel and non-travel
fees are considered together, the court reduced the
overall $7,171,434.30 fee request by $1,158,631.40,
which amounted to an overall reduction of 16 percent.
After the reductions, the total award was $6,012,802.90
before enhancement. /d.

On the applicability of an enhancement to the fee
request, the court overruled the defendants’ objec-
tions. Id. at 1288. The court found that the plaintiffs’
attorneys were entitled to an enhancement because
their hourly rate did “not take into account (1) the
fact that class counsel were required to advance case
expenses of $1.7 million over a three-year period with
no ongoing reimbursement, (2) the fact that class
counsel were not paid on an on-going basis as
the work was being performed, and (3) the fact that
class counsel's ability to recover a fee and expense

App. 12

reimbursement were completely contingent on the
outcome of the case.” Jd. (footnote omitted).

The district court also found that “the superb
quality of |counsel’s] representation far exceeded
what could reasonably be expected for the standard
hourly rates used to calculate the [fee].” Jd. at
1288-89. The court commented that “[qluite simply,
plaintiffs’ counsel brought a higher degree of skill,
commitment, dedication, and professionalism to this
litigation than the Court has seen displayed by the
attorneys in any other case during its 27 years on the
bench.” /d. at 1289. Finally, the court said that an
enhancement was appropriate because “the evidence
establishes that plaintiffs’ success in this case was
truly exceptional.” Jd.

For these reasons, and based on the affidavits of
some Atlanta area attorneys urging the court to
enhance the fee award (even more than it did), the
court multiplied the $6,012,802.90 fee award by 1.75,
thereby enhancing it by 75 percent or $4,509,602.00.
Id. at 1290. That enhancement boosted the total fee
award to $10,522,405.08. Id.

II.

In reviewing the decisions of the district court
raised in this appeal and cross-appeal, we look at
questions of law anew but we review the court's
findings of fact only for clear error. Adanta Journal &
Constitution ov. City of Atlanta Dep't of Aviation,
442 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2006). The abuse of

App. 13

discretion standard applies to the district court’s
determination of the number of compensable billable
hours, the hourly rate at which plaintiffs’ counsel is
compensated, the award of costs and expenses, and
the enhancement decision. See Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 439 (11th Cir.
1999); Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d
1240, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 1991). In applying the abuse
of discretion standard, we keep in mind that “[w]hen
a district court has discretion, there are usually a
range of choices it may make and still be affirmed;
there is not only one right choice for the court to
make.” Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N.
Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002);
McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1128 (11th Cir.
2001) (same). This is true “even though we would
have gone the other way had it been our call.” Ras-
bury v. Internal Revenue Serv., 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th
Cir. 1994).

Of course, “|a] district court by definition abuses
its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047
(1996); accord Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 333, 115
S. Ct. 851, 870 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is
a paradigmatic abuse of discretion for a court to base
its judgment on an erroneous view of the law.”). We
may also find an abuse of discretion if the district
court failed to follow proper procedures in making its
determination, based an award upon findings of fact
that are clearly erroneous, or committed a clear error
of judgment. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1326

App. 14

(llth Cir. 2002); SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life As-
surance Co. of Can., 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir.
1996); BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber,
Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir. 1994).

iil.

In their cross-appeal the plaintiffs contend that
the district court abused its discretion in two re-
spects: (1) by not applying the common fund and
common benefit doctrines, which would have resulted
in a fee award substantially higher than the one they
received; and (2) by not compensating them for the
$801,864.40 they spent on expert witness expenses.
The district court resolved each of those two issues
correctly, and we affirm its decision of them on the

basis of the reasoning contained in its opinion. Kenny
A. ITI, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-72, 1291-92.

IV.

The defendants conceded in the _ settlement
agreement that the class had prevailed in the litiga-
tion and was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That section provides in
relevant part that in any action, like this one, where
the plaintiffs seek to enforce their constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988tb).

App. 15

In their appeal the defendants contend that the
district court abused its discretion in three ways.
Their first contention is that the district court should
not have awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys all of the
photocopying expenses they claimed. See Kenny A.
III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95. Although we probably
would not award the full amount of the claimed
expenses if we were deciding the matter in the first
instance, we cannot say that the district court abused
its discretion in doing so.

V.

We turn now to the defendants’ other conten-
tions, starting with their argument that the district
court erred in calculating the lodestar amount. “The
most useful starting point for determining the
amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983). The
product of this formula is the “lodestar,” Loranger v.
Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam), which is “the guiding light of our fee-shifting
jurisprudence,” City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S.
557, 562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1992).

Although the defendants no longer contest the
hourly rate component of the district court’s lodestar

App. 16

calculation, they do contend that the district court
compensated the plaintiffs’ attorneys for an unrea-
sonable number of hours. As we have already
explained, the court essentially cut the total number
of hours submitted by 16 percent because of vague
entries and excessive billing. See supra at 10-11. We
have held that where the billing records are volumi-
nous, as they are here, a district court may make a
reasonable across the board reduction in hours in-
stead of engaging in the pick and shovel work neces-
sary to make a more precise determination. See
Loranger, 10 F.3d at 783. Even so, the defendants
argue, the district court’s cut was unreasonably
shallow — it should have cut much deeper.

The district court’s reduction of only 16 percent
in the submitted hours does appear charitable, maybe
even excessively so, in favor of the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys, but we are not quite convinced that it was a
clear error of judgment, which is what we would have
to conclude in order to find an abuse of discretion. See
Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1326; SunAmerica Corp., 77
F.3d at 1333; BankAtlantic, 12 F.3d at 1048. Even
though we would have cut the billable hours more if
we were deciding the matter in the first instance, we
cannot say that the result the district court reached

’ The defendants did object in the district court that the
hourly rates requested were too high, but they have not raised
that as an issue on appeal. Accordingly, we have no occasion to
pass on that matter. but we do not mean to imply approval of
those hourly rates, which appear to be on the generous side.

App. 17

was outside the range of permissible choices on this
record. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of
Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103-1104 (11th
Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 711-
12 (11th Cir. 2004); Rasbury, 24 F.3d at 168.

VI.’

The defendants’ final contention is that the
district court should not have granted plaintiffs’
attorneys a $4.5 million enhancement to the $6
million lodestar amount. That contention can claim
the favor of a presumption, and not a weak one either.
The Supreme Court has instructed us that there is a
“strong presumption” that the lodestar figure, with-
out any adjustment, is the reasonable fee award.
Dague, 505 U.S. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641; Pennsyl-
vania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean A\tr,
478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986)
(Delaware Valley 1). That strong presumption can be
rebutted only in “rare” and “exceptional” cases, Dela-
ware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S.Ct. at 3098,
where the fee applicant has shown that without an

’ The views expressed in Parts I-V and Part VII of this
opinion represent the views of a majority of the Court, consisting
of Judges Carnes and Iiill. The views expressed in this part,
Part VI, of this opinion represent the views of the author of this
opinion alone. The views of Judge Hill on the question addressed
in this part are expressed in his separate concurring opinion.
The views of Judge Wilson are expressed in his separate concur-
ring opimion

App. 18

upward adjustment of the lodestar amount the fee
would be unreasonable, Dague, 505 U.S. at 562, 112
S. Ct. at 2641. Even in the rare and exceptional case
where an enhancement is permissible, it must be
“supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record
and detailed findings by the lower court.” Delaware
Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098.

A.

In order to appreciate just how rare and excep-
tional a case must be for an enhancement of the
lodestar amount to be permissible these days, a
review of the evolution of Supreme Court thinking in
this area is necessary. The history of the issue is one
of early, tentative statements indicating more recep-
tiveness to enhancements than the statements and
holdings of later decisions actually permit. Sugges-
tion has been followed by retrenchment, resulting in
a decisional arc that bends decidedly against en-
hancements.

Hensley, a 1983 decision, was the Court's first
stab at interpreting what Congress meant by a “rea-
sonable fee” under $1988 and similar fee-shifting
statutes. In that case the Court adopted the lodestar
method for calculating fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-
34, 103 S. Ct. at 1939-40. In doing so, the Court said
that “|t}he most useful starting point for determining
the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.” /d. at 433, 103 S. Ct. at 1939.

App. 19

It added, however, that this “does not end the in-
quiry,” because “(|t]here remain other ccasiderations
that may lead the district court to adjust the fee
upward or downward, including the important factor
of the ‘results obtained.’” Jd. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at
1940. The context in which that statement was made,
however, was not one of upward enhancement.

Instead, the actual adjustment issue decided in
Hensley was whether the lodestar figure should be
reduced for plaintiffs who have achieved only partial
or limited success. See id. at 426, 103 S. Ct. at 1935-
36 (“The issue in this case is whether a partially
prevailing plaintiff may recover an attorney’s fee for
legal services on unsuccessful claims.”); see also id. at
434-37, 103 S. Ct. at 1940-41. The Court decided that
the fees should be reduced by the amount spent on
claims that do not succeed. Jd. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at
1943 (“Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a
claim that is distinct in all respects from his success-
ful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim
should be excluded in considering the amount of a
reasonable fee.”); see also id. (“[W]here the plaintiff
achieved only limited success, the district court
should award only that amount of fees that is reason-
able in relation to the results obtained.”). Even
though the issue of enhancements was not presented
in Hensley, the opinion does contain this dicta:
“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his
attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.
Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably
expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases

App. 20

of exceptional success an enhanced award may be
justified.” Jd. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940. The use of
“may be” instead of “will be” was a harbinger of
decisions to come.

The next term the Supreme Court decided Blum
uv. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984),
which, unlike Hensley, was a case in which the
district court had actually awarded an enhancement.
Jd. at 891, 104S. Ct. at 1545. The court had enhanced
the lodestar figure by 50 percent “because of the
quality of representation, the complexity of the is-
sues, the riskiness of success, and the great benefit to
the large class that was achieved.” Jd. (quotation
omitted). Unimpressed with that reasoning, the
Supreme Court held that awarding the enhancement
was an abuse of discretion. Jd. at 896-902, 104 S. Ct.
at 1547-50.

While repeating the Hensley opinion’s statement
that “in some cases of exceptional success an en-
hanced award may be justified,” id. at 897, 104 S. Ct.
at 1548 (quotation omitted), the Blum Court qualified
that possibility with the statement that the lodestar
amount “is presumed to be the reasonable fee con-
templated by § 1988,” td. The Court then considered
and rejected each of the district court’s four justifica-
tions for the enhancement. It began:

The novelty and complexity of the issues pre-
sumably were fully reflected in the number
of billable hours recorded by counsel and
thus do not warrant an upward adjustment
in a fee based on the number of billable

App. 21

hours times reasonable hourly rates. There
may be cases, of course, where the experi-
ence and special skill of the attorney will re-
quire the expenditure of fewer hours than
counsel normally would be expected to spend
on a particularly novel or complex issue. In
those cases, the special skill and experience
of counsel should be reflected in the reason-
ableness of the hourly rates. Neither com-
plexity nor novelty of the issues, therefore,
is an appropriate factor in determining
whether to increase the basic fee award.

Id. at 898-99, 104 S. Ct. at 1549.

The Blum Court then moved on to the next
factor:

The “quality of representation” ... generally
is reflected in the reasonable hourly rate. It,
therefore, may [note the use, again, of the
word “may” instead of “will”] justify an up-
ward adjustment only in the rare case where
the fee applicant offers specific evidence to
show that the quality of service rendered
was superior to that one reasonably should
expect in light of the hourly rates charged
and that the success was “exceptional.”

Id. at $99, 104 S.Ct. at 1549 (words in brackets
added). Otherwise, the Court said, “an upward ad-
justment for quality of representation is a clear
example of double counting.” Jd. The Court found
the district court’s opinion that “[t]he quality of
work performed by counsel throughout this case was
high,” without any specific evidence to support it,

App. 22

insufficient to justify the enhancement. Jd. at 899-90,
104 S. Ct. at 1549 (quotation omitted).

Regarding the results obtained factor, the Court
reasoned that successful results are to be considered
when calculating counsel’s hourly rate. Jd. at 900, 104
S. Ct. at 1549-50. “Because acknowledgment of the
‘results obtained’ generally will be subsumed within
other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, it
normally should not provide an independent basis for
increasing the fee award.” Jd. (footnote omitted).

The Blum Court left for another day the question
of whether the risk borne by the plaintiffs’ counsel in
taking the case on a contingency basis could ever
justify an enhancement of the lodestar. Jd. at 901
n.17, 104 S. Ct. at 1550 n.17. Assuming that it could,
however, the Court said that the record did not iden-
tify any specific risks to counsel in that case. /d. at
901, 104 S.Ct. at 1550. Accordingly, the Court va-
cated the portion of the district court’s order enhanc-
ing the plaintiffs’ fees award. /d. at 901-02, 104 S. Ct.
at 1550.

The Court's next “reasonable fee” case was Dela-
ware Valley I.‘ The district court had enhanced the

* In Delaware Valley I, the Court reviewed an attorneys’ fees
award that was ordered pursuant to the Clean Air Act § 304(d),
42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 557, 106
S. Ct. at 3094. The Court held that “!gliven the common purpose
of both § 304(d) and § 1988 to promote citizen enforcement of
important federal policies, we find no reason not to interpret
both provisions governing attorney's fees in the same manner.”

(Continued on following page)

App. 23

plaintiffs’ lodestar calculation in that case because of
the contingent nature of the fee and the quality of
counsel’s work “which culminated in an outstanding
result.” Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 555, 106 S. Ct.
at 3093 (quotation omitted). As it had done in Blum,
the Delaware Valley I Court reviewed the district
court’s reasons for enhancing the fee award and found
all of them wanting. This time the Court did not just
say that there’s a presumption, but emphasized that
there is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar
figure represents the reasonable fee. Jd. at 565, 106
S. Ct. at 3098. The Court explained the basis for that
strong presumption:

A strong presumption that the lodestar
figure — the product of reasonable hours
times a reasonable rate — represents a “rea-
sonable” fee is wholly consistent with the ra-
tionale behind the usual fee-shifting statute,
including the one in the present case. These
statutes were not designed as a form of eco-
nomic relief to improve the financial lot of at-
torneys, nor were they intended to replicate
exactly the fee an attorney could earn
through a private fee arrangement with his
client. Instead, the aim of such statutes was
to enable private parties to obtain legal help
in seeking redress for injuries resulting from

Id. at 560, 106 S. Ct. at 3096. Delaware Valley ] has been applied
to § 1988 cases by this Court, as well. See, e.g., Norman v.
Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (11th Cir.
1988)

Id.

App. 24

the actual or threatened violation of specific
federal laws. Hence, if plaintiffs, such as
Delaware Valley, find it possible to engage a
lawyer based on the statutory assurance that
he will be paid a “reasonable fee,” the pur-
pose behind the fee-shifting statute has been
satisfied.

The Court in Delaware Valley I closed some doors
for enhancements that it had left ajar in earlier cases.
It held that the strong presumption that the lodestar
figure is the amount to be awarded — the presumption
against enhancements — cannot be overcome by the
special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of
representation, or the results obtained. Jd. Those
factors, the Court reasoned, “are presumably fully
reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot
serve as independent bases for increasing the basic

fee award.” /d. This is the Court’s reasoning:

[Wjhen an attorney first accepts a case and
agrees to represent the client, he obligates
himself to perform to the best of his ability
and to produce the best possible results
commensurate with his skill and his client's
interests. Calculating the fee award in a
manner that accounts for these factors, ei-
ther in determining the reasonable number
of hours expended on the litigation or in set-
ting the reasonable hourly rate, thus ade-
quately compensates the attorney, and leaves
very little room for enhancing the award
based on his post-engagement performance.

App. 25

In short, the lodestar figure includes most, if
not all, of the relevant factors constituting a
“reasonable” attorney’s fee, and it is unnec-
essary to enhance the fee for superior per-
formance in order to serve the statutory
purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal
assistance.

Id. at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. Not using the over-
all quality of performance to enhance the fee removes
“any danger of ‘double counting.” /d. at 566, 106
S. Ct. at 3099.

The Delaware Valley I Court reversed the en-
hancement part of the fee award insofar as the en-
hancement was based on the quality of the attorney’s
work and the outstanding result obtained. Jd. at 568,
106 S. Ct. at 3099-100. It left undecided the question
of whether the enhancement was proper insofar as it
was based on the contingency nature of the fee — the
risk that the attorneys would lose the case and re-
ceive no fees. That issue was to be reargued in the
same case the next term, 7d., 106 S. Ct. at 3100, but
that attempt to decide it misfired when the Court
fractured, with no opinion garnering a majority vote,
see Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for
Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987) (Dela-
ware Valley 11).

It was not until five years later, after the mem-
bership of the Court had changed, that the contin-
gency issue was definitively resolved. In Dague the
Court squarely rejected the proposition that a court
“may enhance the fee award above the ‘lodestar’

App. 26

amount in order to reflect the fact that the party’s
attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee basis and
thus assumed the risk of receiving no payment at all
for their services.” Dague, 505 U.S. at 559, 112 S. Ct.
at 2639.° The Court reasoned that an enhancement
for contingency would duplicate in substantial part
factors that had already been considered in arriving
at the lodestar. It explained that “[tJhe risk of loss in
a particular case (and, therefore, the attorney’s
contingent risk) is the product of two factors: (1) the
legal and factual merits of the claim, and (2) the
difficulty of establishing those merits.” /d. at 562, 112
S. Ct. at 2641.

The second factor, the Court said, is “ordinarily
reflected in the lodestar — either in the higher num-
ber of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in
the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and
experienced enough to do so.” /d. “Taking account of it
again through lodestar enhancement amounts to
double counting.” Jd. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.

The Court recognized that, unlike the second
contingency factor, the first one — the relative merits

* The fees in Dague were awarded pursuant to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act § 7002(e), 422 U.S.C. § 6972(e), and the Clean
Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). Dague, 505 U.S. at 559,
112 S Ct. at 2639. As it had in Delaware Valley 1, the Dague
Court held that the language of these attorneys’ fees statutes
are “similar to that of many other federal fee-shifting statutes;
our case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies
uniformly to all of them.” Jd. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 ‘citing 42
U.S.C. § 1988).

App. 27

of the claim — is not taken into consideration in
determining the lodestar figure. That is no problem,
the Court decided, because the relative merits of the
claim “should play no part in the calculation of the
award.” Jd. For one thing, there is always a risk that
a case will be lost — “no claim has a 100% chance of
success.” Id. As a result, permitting adjustments
based on risk would mean that the “computation of
the lodestar would never end the court’s inquiry in
contingent-fee cases.” Jd. That would contradict the
Court’s repeated instruction that there is a strong
presumption that the lodestar is the fee to be
awarded and adjustments to it are to be the rare
exception, not the general rule.

Not only that, the Court said, but awarding
enhancements based on the financial risk in taking
the case would also “provide attorneys with the same
incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as
relatively meritorious ones.” Jd. The “social cost of
indiscriminately encouraging nonmeritorious claims”
would be too high, and encouraging attorneys to take
less meritorious cases is “an unlikely objective of the
‘reasonable fees’ provisions.” Jd. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at
2642. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a contin-
gency enhancement is “not consistent with our gen-
eral rejection of the contingent-fee model for fee
awards, nor is it necessary to the determination of a
reasonable fee.” Jd. at 566, 112 S. Ct. at 2643. The
Court in Dague did not merely reverse the application
of a contingency or risk enhancement in that case,
but also ruled out one in any case, “concluding that

App. 28

no contingency enhancement whatever is compatible
with the fee-shifting statutes at issue.” Jd. at 565, 112
S. Ct. at 2643.

The Dague decision is the last word we have from
the Supreme Court on the issue of whether, and if so
when, the lodestar amount may be enhanced in
calculating the attorneys’ fees under one of the fed-
eral fee-shifting statutes.

B.

The district court’s $4.5 million enhancement to
the $6 million lodestar figure in the present case
cannot be squared with the Supreme Court decisions
we have discussed. The district court did not explic-
itly mention, much less give full effect to, the strong
presumption that the lodestar amount is a reasonable
fee and therefore the fee to be awarded. See Dague,
505 U.S. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 (“We have esiab-
lished a strong presumption that the lodestar repre-
sents the reasonable fee, and have placed upon the
fee applicant who seeks more than that the burden of
showing that such an adjustment is necessary to the
determination of a reasonable fee.” (quotation and
citation omitted)); Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565,
106 S. Ct. at 3098 (“A strong presumption that the
lodestar figure — the product of reasonable hours
times a reasonable rate — represents a ‘reasonable’ fee
is wholly consistent with the rationale behind the
usual fee-shifting statute, including the one in the
present case.”).

App. 29

The district court relied on several factors in
granting the multi-million dollar enhancement to the
lodestar figure, most of which are cited in the follow-
ing passage from its opinion:

First, the evidence establishes that the
quality of service rendered by class counsel,
including their extraordinary commitment of
capital resources, was far superior to what
consumers of legal services in the legal mar-
ketplace in Atlanta could reasonably expect
to receive for the rates used in the lodestar
calculation. Specifically, the evidence shows
that the hourly rates used in the lodestar
calculation do not take into account (1) the
fact that class counsel were required to ad-
vance case expenses of $1.7 million over a
three-year period with no ongoing reim-
bursement, (2) the fact that class counsel
were not paid on an on-going basis as the
work was being performed, ard (3) the fact
that c’ iss counsel’s ability to recover a fee
and expense reimbursement were completely
contingent on the outcome of the case.FN8
(Chandler Decl. 49 5-8; Fellows Decl. 94 5-8;
Knowles Decl. GQ 7-12; Rawls Decl. 9 5-8;
Lowry Decl. 4 25; Bramlett Decl. 7] 7(a) &
10, 13-14.)

FN8. A lodestar enhancen.i can-
not be based on contingency alone.
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). In
this case, however, the risk of non-
recovery is only one of several fac-
tors which, taken together, establish

App. 30

a level of service well beyond what
could reasonably be expected for the
rates claimed.

Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (citations omitted).
None of the three factors the district court relied on
in that passage to justify boosting the award is a
proper basis for doing so.

1.

Starting from the end of the list, the district
court’s reliance on the quality of service and superior
performance, which are essentially the same thing,
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s teachings that
those considerations are adequately accounted for
“either in determining the reasonable number of
hours expended on the litigation or in setting the
reasonable hourly rates,” and that it is “unnecessary
to enhance the fee for superior performance in order
to serve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to
secure legal assistance.” Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S.
at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 3098; see also id. at 565, 106
S. Ct. at 3098 (“Hence, if plaintiffs ... find it possible
to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance
that he will be paid a ‘reasonable fee,’ the purpose
behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied.”).
In this case, the district court specifically considered
“the stellar performance of plaintiffs’ counsel
throughout this long and difficult case” in approving
their hourly rates, which reached $450 and $495 for
lead counsel. Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1284,
1286. Having already been used to increase the

App. 31

lodestar amount, the quality of the services rendered
and superior performance could not also be used to
enhance the lodestar amount that had been calcu-
lated using those higher rates. See Delaware Valley 1,
478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. Double counting
simply is not allowed.

It was after the successful settlement had been
achieved, after they knew how well they had per-
formed, after they knew the degree of difficulty
involved, and after they knew how much capital
resources and legal effort had been required that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys asked for hourly rates they
thought that they deserved. Over the objections of the
defendants, the district court gave them those rates
in full. It did not reduce a single hourly rate for any
attorney or paralegal by so much as a penny.”

In requesting their hourly rates, the lead counsel
for the plaintiffs represented that those rates were
adequate, subject to considerations they specified, to
compensate them. Marcia Robinson Lowry, one of the
two lead counsel, testified by affidavit that:

The standard hourly rates reflected in
Exhibit 2 are fair, reasonable, and consistent
with hourly rates in the Atlanta market
for the price of legal services of comparable

* The district court did cut the hourly rates for travel time
in half, but not in order to lower the rates. Instead, the reduc-
tion was the court’s way of correcting for the attorneys’ excessive
billing of time Kenny A. JI], 454 F Supp. 2d at 1284.

App. 32

quality rendered in cases demanding similar
skill, judgment and performance. These
standard hourly rates do not, however, take
into account the fact that class counsel was
required in this case to advance the entire
$1.7 million expense of prosecuting this case
for the benefit of the class, or the fact that
class counsel’s compensation was totally con-
tingent upon prevailing in this action.

Jeffrey O. Bramlett, the other lead counsel,
testified by affidavit that: “The hourly rates set forth
in Exhibit 1 correctly reflect the hourly rates my law
firm currently charges and collects from clients who
hire us to perform legal services on a Standard
Hourly Rate basis.” However, he further testified:

Standard Hourly Rates are predicated
on the assumptions that the client will pay
in full on a 30-60 day cycle, that counsel is
not required to shoulder any significant fi-
nancial risk of unreimbursed case expense,
and that counsel will be paid currently re-
gardless of the result ultimately achieved.
Here, Class Counsel was forced to advance
case expenses approaching $1.7 million to
protect the Class’ interests, largely because
State Defendants refused Plaintiffs’ sugges-
tion of a neutral case record review that
would have saved both sides (and ultimately
the State) duplicative cost. Here, Class
Counsel was forced to personally advance
Plaintiffs’ portion of that cost in the face of
State Defendants’ vigorous assertion that it
would not and could not be recovered. Here,

App. 33

Class Counsel’s recovery of any cost, let
alone fee, was utterly dependent upon the
contingency of a successful result. Here,
Class Counsel was forced to invest more
than $8.85 million of professional time and
out-of-pocket expense over a three-and-one-
half year period with no assurance of any re-
covery.

There is no indication that Mr. Bramlett’s firm’s
regular hourly rates are anywhere near the low side
of the Atlanta legal market or even the midpoint.

The position that the two lead counsel took in
their affidavits is that the hourly rates used to calcu-
late the lodestar figure were the saine rates paying
clients would have been charged. They each repre-
sented that those rates would fully compensate them
except for three facts that the district court listed in
its opinion: “(1) the fact that class counsel were
required to advance case expenses of $1.7 million over
a three-year period with no ongoing reimbursement,
(2) the fact that class counsel were not paid on an on-
going basis as the work was being performed, and (3)
the fact that class counsel’s ability to recover a fee
and expense reimbursement were completely contin-
gent on the outcome of the case.” Kenny A. Ill, 454
F. Supp. 2d at 1288.

y
a.

The first two of those three considerations are
delayed payment factors, and if they were permissible
bases for enhancing a fee award, an enhancement

App. 34

would be required in virtually every class action
covered by one of the traditional federal fee-shifting
statutes. It is a rare § 1983 action where those whose
rights have been violated finance the cost of the
litigation. Attorneys for the plaintiffs in these types of
cases almost always have to advance the cost of the
litigation and do not receive any payment for their
time until the case is completed. That is simply the
nature of the beast. If the delays in reimbursement
for costs and payment for services that these cases
inevitably entail justified enhancement, there would
be an enhancement in almost every case. We know
that cannot be, because the Supreme Court has
instructed us that we must employ a strong presump-
tion against enhancements and confine them to the
rare and exceptional case. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562,
112 S. Ct. at 2641; Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565,
106 S. Ct. at 3098.

Particularly instructive on this point is some of
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in concluding that
there could be no enhancement for the contingency
nature of a case — for the risk that the plaintiffs
would not be paid at all for the costs they advanced
and the time they expended. See Dague, 505 U.S. at
563, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. Because there is always a risk
that a case will be lost, permitting enhancements
based on the degree of risk would mean that calcula-
tion of the lodestar would never end the ir.gquiry ina
contingent-fee case, and that, the Court decided,
would be unacceptable. /d. Likewise, permitting
enhancements for the delay in compensation for

f

App. 35

expenses incurred and services rendered would mean
that calculation of the lodestar would be merely the
first step, not the presumptive last step in the proc-
ess. That would be unacceptable.

Finally, we have said that any delay in payment
for professional services rendered is offset by the fact
that the hourly rates used are those that prevail at
the completion of the case instead of the usually
lower rates that were in effect at the time the earlier
work was done. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302
(“{Wjhere there is a delay the court should take into
account the time value of money and the effects of
inflation and generally award compensation at cur-
rent rates rather than at historic rates.”). In this
case, as in most, the hourly rates used were those in
effect after the case had been completed. (See
R32:495-Ex.C:]6) (“The hourly rates set forth in
Exhibit 1 correctly reflect the hourly rates my firm
currently charges and collects from clients who hire
us to perform legal services on a Standard Hourly
Rate basis.”). That covers two of the three factors the
district court relied on in determining that the hourly
rates were underinclusive and an enhancement was
warranted. Kenny A. I/1, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.

3.

The third factor was the contingent nature of the
case. Enhancing a lodestar based on contingency is
flatly forbidden by the Dague decision. The district
court wes under the mistaken impression that the

App. 36

Dague rule forbids only an enhancement based on
contingency alone. Jd. at 1288 n.8. The rule is not so
limited. The Supreme Court’s description of the
scope of its holding leaves no wiggle room. The Court
stated that it was “concluding that no contingency
enhancement whatever is compatible with the fee-
shifting statutes at issue.” Dague, 505 U.S. at 565,
112 S. Ct. at 2643. In case anyone missed the point of
that, the Court unequivocally stated in the penulti-
mate sentence of its opinion: “[Wle hold that en-
hancement for contingency is not permitted under the
fee-shifting statutes at issue.” /d. at 567, 112 S. Ct. at
2643-44. Period.

Even if we were to go beyond that clear language
of the Supreme Court’s command, the reasons it gave
for concluding that contingency enhancements are
incompatible with the fee-shifting statutes apply with
equal force to using contingency as one of severai
reasons for an enhancement. For example, taking the
risk of loss into account both in the lodestar and in an
enhancement amounts to double counting the diffi-
culty of the case, id. at 562-63, 112 S.Ct. at 2641,
regardless of whether contingency is the sole en-
hancement factor. No double counting means no
double counting. Allowing contingency to figure into
an enhancement to any extent would also provide
attorneys with an incentive to bring relatively merit-
less claims. See id. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at 2642; see also
id. at 566, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (“Contingency enhance-
ment would make the setting of fees more complex
and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence

App. 37

more litigable.”). That, the Court reasoned, would be
bad. Dague, 505 U.S. at 566, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.

In summary, none of the three factors that the
district court enumerated as a basis for determining
that the professional services rendered by plaintiffs’
counsel were “far superior to what consumers of legal
services in the legal marketplace in Atlanta could
reasonably expect to receive for the rates used in the
lodestar calculation,” Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at
1288, is a permissible basis for enhancing the lode-
star amount. An enhancement based on them is
inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court deci-
sions.

4.

Making a further attempt to justify the en-
hancement, the district court also stated that:

In addition, based on its personal obser-
vation of plaintiffs’ counsel's performance
throughout this litigation, the Court finds
that the superb quality of their representa-
tion far exceeded what could reasonably be
expected for the standard hourly rates used
to calculate the lodestar. Quite simply, plain-
tiffs’ counsel brought a higher degree of skill,
commitment, dedication, and professionalism
to this litigation than the Court has seen
displayed by the attorneys in any other case
during its 27 years on the bench. The foster
children of Fulton and DeKalb Counties were
indeed fortunate to have such unparalleled

App. 38

legal representation, and the Court would be
remiss if it failed to compensate counsel for
this extraordinary level of service to their
clients.

Id. at 1288-89. This rationale is little more than a
restatement of the district court’s position that the
lodestar amount should be enhanced because of the
quality of the representation. Two points about that.

First, the district court itself found that plaintiffs’
attorneys had submitted vague records and overbilled
in eight of fifteen categories, forcing the court to cut
more than 4,700 hours off those they claimed,
amounting to a reduction of more than $1 million of
billable time. See supra at 10-11. And, as we have
indicated, if anything, the district court was too kind
to plaintiffs’ attorneys in that respect. See supra at
15-17. Any kindness aside, in Delaware Valley J the
Supreme Court held that the “elimination of a large
number of hours on the grounds that they were
unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive is not
supportive of the court’s later conclusion that the
remaining hours represented work of ‘superior qual-
ity."” Delaware Valley 1, 478 U.S. at 567, 106 S. Ct. at
3099; see generally id. at 554 n.2, 106 S. Ct. at 3093
n.2. The holding reflects the common sense idea that
bad and excessive billing is inconsistent with superb
lawyering. The district court failed to consider that
inconsistency in its findings.

The second, and more fundamental, point about
the district court’s reliance on the quality of the

App. 39

representation as a ground for enhancing the lodestar
amount is that it amounts to double counting and is
contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware
Valley I. As we have already explained, in that deci-
sion the Court reversed an enhancement for superior
performance, holding that “the special skill and
experience of counsel” and “the quality of representa-
tion” are “presumably fully reflected in the lodestar
amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases
for increasing the basic fee award.” Delaware Valley I,
478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098 (quotation and
citation omitted); see also id. at 566, 106 S.Ct. at
3098 (“In short, the lodestar figure includes most, if
not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reason-
able’ attorney’s fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance
the fee for superior performance in order to serve the
statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal
assistance.” (emphasis added)).'

' The Court in Delaware Valley I also said that “[bJlecause
considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s
counsel's representation normally are reflected in the reasonable
hourly rate, the overall quality of performance ordinarily should
not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing any danger of
‘double counting.” Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 566, 106 S. Ct.
at 3099. Judge Wilson’s concurring opinion reads the words
“normally” and “ordinarily” to eviscerate the Court’s clear
instruction that “it is unnecessary to enhance the fee for supe
rior performance in order to serve the statutory purpose of
enabling plaintiffs to secure legal assistance.” Jd. That reading,
which infers too much from two words, would license courts to
award enhancements for superior performance or results in any
case where the performance or result was anything better than
“ordinary” or “normal,” thereby contradicting the Court's clear

(Continued on following page)

App. 40

The final reason the district court gave for the
$4.5 million enhancement was that “plaintiffs’ success
in this case was truly exceptional.” Kenny A. III, 454
F. Supp. 2d at 1289. The result was so good, the court
said, that: “After 58 years as a practicing attorney
and federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other
case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a
favorable result on such a comprehensive scale.” /d.
at 1290. Not only that, but the district court also said
that “even if the plaintiffs had prevailed in a trial of
this case, it is doubtful that they would have obtained
relief as ‘intricately detailed and comprehensive’ as
that contained in the Consent Decree.” Jd. at 1289-90.

To the extent that the district court rewarded
plaintiffs’ counsel with an enhancement for obtaining
better results than the class would have received had
the case been resolved on the merits, that is plainly
wrong. The purpose of the fee-shifting statutes, as the
Supreme Court explained in Delaware Valley I, is “to
enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking
redress for injuries resulting from the actual or
threatened violation of specific federal laws.” Dela-
ware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. The
statutes are designed to ensure that civil rights

instruction that there is a strong presumption against an
enhancement for any reason and that they should rarely be
granted for any reason. 7d. at 565, 106 S.Ct. at 3098. That
reading would also be inconsistent with much of what the Court
has said on the subject, contradicting, for example, the clear
implication of the Court’s later teachings in the Dayue case. See
infra at 40-42

App. 41

plaintifls are adequately represented by counsel. See
Hensley. 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 (“The
purpose of § 1988 is to ensure ‘effective access to the
judicial process’ for persons with civil rights griev-
ances.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976))).
For that reason, a fee award should “result| } in fees
which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but
which do not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Blum,
465 U.S. at 893-94, 104 S.Ct. at 1546 (quoting S.
Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.A.A.N. [sic] 5908, 5913).

Stated from the other direction, the fee-shifting
statutes are not designed to provide representation
that will win plaintiffs more than a correct applica-
tion of substantive and remedial law entitles them to
receive. Their purpose is not to provide representa-
tion that will secure settlement relief that is more
“intricately detailed and comprehensive,” Kenny A.
III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-90, than the plaintiffs
would have received if their claims had been litigated
to final judgment. The purpose of the statutes, most
assuredly, is not to provide plaintiffs with representa-
tion that dazzles or bedazzles the district court judge.
Fee awards should be calculated in a way that fur-
thers the purpose of the fee-shifting statutes; they
should not be used to encourage or reward results
that go bevond that purpose. See Blum, 465 U.S at
893-95, 104 S. Ct. at 1546-47.

Some of the discussion in the Dagwe opinion is
useful in understanding why enhancements should
not he given for merits-exceeding results. As we have

App. 42

recounted, in that case the Supreme Court rejected
the idea of enhancements for contingency or risk of
loss in part because permitting them would provide
attorneys with some incentive to bring relatively
meritless claims. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at
2641-42. The social cost of encouraging attorneys to
press claims of dubious merit would be too high, the
Court reasoned, and providing attorneys with incen-
tives to bring them is “an unlikely objective of the
‘reasonable fees’ provision.” 7d. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at
2643.

A result that obtains more or better relief than
plaintiffs are entitled to receive under the law is, to
the extent it exceeds their entitlement on the merits,
analogous to relief on a meritless claim. Just as
Dague instructs us that fee awards should not un-
derwrite efforts to obtain relief where none is due
under the law, neither should they underwrite efforts
to receive more or better relief than that due under
the law. Just as the societal costs for fee awards for
non-meritorious claims are too high, so also are they
too high for results that exceed what the law allows.
Just as encouraging non-meritorious claims cannot
have been an objective of the fee-shifting provisions,
neither can encouraging results that go beyond what
the law allows have been an objective.

To put it in an either-or manner, superb results
are either what a fair application of the law produces,
which means that they are not truly “su erb,” or they
are results that exceed what the law allows and for
that reason are beyond the purpose of the fee shifting

App. 43

statutes. Those statutes are designed to provide a
reasonable fee for a reasonable result, not an ex-
traordinary fee for a result that gocs beyond what the
law would provide if the claims were litigated to their
correct conclusion on the merits.

Look at it this way. A merits-exceeding result for
plaintiffs must be the product of one, or some combi-
nation, of the following factors: superior lawyering by
plaintiffs’ counsel, bad lawyering by defendants’
counsel, poor decision making by the court, or dumb
luck. The Supreme Court held in Delaware Valley J
that superior lawyering by the plaintiffs’ counsel is
not a proper basis for an enhancement. Delaware
Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565-68, 106 S. Ct. at 3098-100.
So, the first possible cause of results that go beyond
the merits cannot be used to justify an enhancement.
Nor can it plausibly be argued that plaintiffs’ attor-
neys ought to reap a windfall, and defendants ought
to have to pay more in fees than they otherwise
should, because of bad lawvyering on the defense side.
Surely a defendant suffers enough from the addi-
tional relief granted against it because of inferior
representation without making the defendant pay a
surcharge to the other side for the privilege of having
been the victim of bad lawyering. Nor can it be ar-
gued, with tongue out of cheek, that fees should be
increaseo to reward plaintiffs’ attorneys for being on
the side that happens to benefit from bad judging or
good luck. That exhausts the possible explanations
for excessively favorable results, and none supports
awarding an enhancement.

App. 44

5.

The district court relied to some extent on four of
the five affidavits that the plaintiffs’ attorneys in this
case obtained from their friends who do similar work.
Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290." The district
court found that the affiants were “disinterested
Atlanta attorneys.” Jd. That finding is clearly errone-
ous. At oral argument, one of the two lead counsel for
the plaintiffs conceded that he not only had recruited
these attorneys to provide the affidavits but that in
the past he had also supplied some cf them with
similar affidavits to help boost their own fee awards.”

" It is unclear why, in its discussion of the affidavits, the
district court omitted any discussion of the one signed by Ralph
Goldberg. See Kenny A. Ill, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. For the
sake of completeness, we will include it in our discussion.

Four of the five affidavits indicate that they are from
attorneys who practice regularly as plaintiffs’ lawyers depending
on attorneys’ fee awards. The lone exception is John Chandler,
whose affidavit indicates that although most of his work has
been on the defense side he has also served as counse! for some
plaintiffs’ classes.

* Court: Who selected those lawyers who served as
experts?
Bramlett: I sought those witnesses out. I mean the
Court didn’t say -
Court: 1 would be shocked if you told me you had

never filed an affidavit for one of them

Bramlett: You would be shocked and that would be in-
correct. But, but the fact is that all four of
these lawyers are highly experienced, highly
competent, have practiced law in the Atlanta
market -

(Continued on following page)

App. 45

Aside from the need to support those who support
them, the lawyers who signed the affidavits have a
financial interest in keeping the fee award in this
case and every case like it as high as possible. The
higher this fee award is the more useful it will be as
precedent for the lawyer signing the affidavit when
he seeks a high fee award in his own cases. The
affiants are anything but “disinterested.”"’

The lodestar amount will never suffice for attor-
neys who practice in this area. They will always
believe, in all sincerity, that they deserve more and
that the justice system will function better if they are
paid more. Lawyers who handle these kinds of cases
cannot be disinterested witnesses because they are
financially interested. To state this is not to slam
lawyers in general or plaintiffs’ lawyers in particular.
It simply recognizes that because self-interest is
hard-wired into human circuitry, no group is disinter-
ested when it comes to the question of what members

Court: And highly interested in keeping the rates up
and the multipliers as high as possible -
Bramlett: Ah.

* The concurring opinion states that “lilt cannot be rea-
sonably contended that the able and experienced district judge
in this case never considered the possibility that the affiants .. .
could derive an indirect benefit from the precedential value of a
high fee award.” See infra at &3-84 (Wilson, J., concurring
specially). Actually, the able and experienced district court judge
himself explicitly found that the affilant attorneys were “disin-
terested.” That finding, which underlay any credit the court
gave to the affidavits, is clearly erroneous. It just is not true.

App. 46

of the group are to be paid. Cf. H.L. Mencken, A Little
Book in C Major 22 (John Lane Co. 1916) (“It is hard
to believe that a man is telling the truth when you
know that you would lie if you were in his place.”).

Aside from the obvious self-interest of the affi-
ants, the contents of the affidavits that were filed in
this case are also flawed in other ways. For example,
in each of them the affiant solemnly swore that the
amount of compensable time claimed in this case was
“reasonable,” was “reasonable, fair, and fully com-
pensable,”” or was “fair, reasonable, and fully deserv-
ing of adequate and full compensation.” Yet, we
know those assertions are not true. As we have al-
ready noted, the district court found that plaintiffs
had inflated the number of hours for which they were
due compensation in most of the fifteen billing cate-
gories and by a substantial amount. Kenny A. III, 454
F. Supp. 2d at 1274-84, 1286; supra at 10-11. The
court’s finding, which is being affirmed by this Court,
that the hours submitted were not reasonable contra-
dicts a key premise in every one of the lawyer affiants.

All five of the affidavits urged the district court
to enhance the fee award based on the fact that

(R32:495:Ex.F:4 (affidavit of John Chandler):
(R32:495:Ex.G:4) (affidavit of Henry D. Fellows, Jr.):
(R32:495:Ex.H:4) (affidavit of James C. Rawls).

* (R32:495:Ex.E:4-5) (affidavit of Ralph Goldberg).

" (R32:495:Ex.D:

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA43085015_0443%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
