# Brief for Respondent — United States v. Ruzicka > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386450_0143%3A5 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for Respondent - **Published:** January 1, 1946 - **Citation:** 329 U.S. 287 ## Text ‘arroaee Laer & - | TL “id ry a. e ‘ bs e AG - ‘ee ar ae GY > YAR j c ry - } NG 1 5 . a ream it EOS Seo ey a SP SS > —e = ane “ 4 @ pak HE * _ Supreme Court of the Octroper Term, 1946. py ore Ne B45” . UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Negi Py ‘tiftoner, Us. ' a! “JOSEPH RUZICKA axn CHARLES RUZICKA, 101 . VIDUALLY, AND AS CO-PARTNERS, ‘Prapinc as SEELEY . :- DAIRY, | | , . aie , ay ; . Respondents, » Lh — ON WRIT OF CERTIORARL TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAIS FOR THE SEVENTH CIROUIT, bs -BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS. roth ¥ sc -, f | | — Ze Wintuiam Parker Warp, a ‘ po * Attorney for Respondents, Novcmbed, 1946. . ‘ a = —_ | , ree ermogp SAOOEs $0 ut we LOMPemT, B47 WES! LACHROe Cw COGe Opinion below * ciaweeb udduasdadbaas 6saddeanesaees MEN cdehes0%dc4ctnedaees aban heeebisecens Question presented ..,...............005. watedeians en GOO GUEST BIVGIUOE. 65.0. cccceccccccccscede SIE Gi MOM inc nd cits cccdcpcabatedestscoces Argument: L. The handlers riimedice are by the terms of the Be GUIS 6 5. « kdneccandcccecs's: asee TI. The invocation of the equitable remedies was _ improper in view of established equitable prac- cluded a summary disposition .............. ie CrraTions. ; Cases. ) : American. Power & Light Co. v. S. E.-C., 325 U. s. 385: > ide Addison v. _Holly-Hill;. SE a ee ‘eeke. ae Beal y. Misevuri Pac. R. he. Corp, 312 U.S. 45. — | Bridges v..Wixon, 144 F. 2d 927, reversed 326 U.S. 135 23 - Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 18 errr: Seer Ere ae : Columbia Broadeasting Co. v. U.S, 316 U.S. 407....-° 22° Chicago v: Fielderest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168... | _ Estep v. U. S., 327 U. 8. 114..... Wn RKGw diate as esepecs, ae Falbo v. U. 8, Nin eect eres ranklin v. Alabama State Mills: iene Sicaed 232 © ae Ala. 637, 169 So. 295............ Wert pes Hens * 20 Geldatein v. Groesbeck, 42 F.. bari 19, rev. on other ; nds, | 23 U. 8. 737:. 13 Hecht, Campane’ v. ioer 321 U. 8. 321...... Sako’ : 25 ~H. P. Hood & Sons v. U.S, 07 U.S. 588 Ree ‘sees (12 S — ‘Commerce Commission v. Jersey City, 329 | eR Pe ening Oe. SOE es Pere deste % " INinois Commerce Conimission | v. Thommen, 318 U.S. ME Uae Bhar da Cawas Vl Mecha kAwbA kd Aouad bikie 22 Locketly v. Phillips, 49 F opie. 513, affirnied 319... '* a | ee Ss teens wb scave bie iseeuantee + eis 13 3 Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corporation, 55 F. Supp. 234, affirmed in | part, reversed in part, 146 ws Se BR en eR gf in Coney er ee aera nCee 17, 26 Leonardo v. Leonardo, 145 F. 2d 849, McClellan v. Cruland, 217 U. 8. 268. . ‘ o ‘ a ae! 7, | ~ Moore v. Ill. Central R. Co., 312 U.S 8.680... 64%.. leer” Muller Dairies v. Baldwin, 274 N.Y. 8. 975, 242 App. Div. 296 02... sere cece cece eee ese deen ees SS 20 Myers v. Bethlehem Corporation, 303 U. 8. 4 hav Natural Gas Pipeling Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. 8. 300. vou Oe People ‘v. ‘Bruner, 343 Tl. 146... .;., inde nateceeness ee Queensboro Farms Products v. ‘Wickard att F. 2d 969. 18 Reconstruction Finance Corp. -v. Morley, 125 F. 2d PEST e A pe Pee Fats RAN 7 Ream v, €allaghan, 42 F. Supp. 951, affirmed 136° F. Auge Ror eu hives rer crise Pe ena. ee . Southern Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U. Genes aq Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. f henliatiaicpaer agers 18” Seligmans v. U.S., 30 F. Supp. pe Ak ae EE EE Sparf and Hansen v. U. S.,'156 U. S. +) Eee 19, 20 State v: Wright, 53 Mé. 328 ......00..0 0 .ccbece cues - 19 Stelle v. L. & N.-B. Co. 323 U. 8. 192...........44- «a2 Sunshine-Coal Co. ¥. Adkins, 310 U. S. railing St. Joseph's Stock Yards Co. v: U. S., 298 U, Ss. 38” PRA. Trustege of Village. of Sar: oga Springs earings eee Gas, Electric Light, and Power Co.,/191 N. Y¥. 123, — -83.N. E. 693, 18 L. R. A. (N.-S.) 713, 14 Ang, Can. ey A SEE ee Be EO PE LET OY ELT Poet CET 20 ‘Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S. 210. rant’ ver ae U..8.’v. Sugst, 243 Wed. 498. Petitioner has by footnote (Petitioner’s Brief, p. 12) set. forth — matters which are not properly-a part of the record nor matters for judicial notice. Reviewing court sits in teview of record of | _court below. MeClellan v. Carland, 217 U. 8. 268; Southern Ry. Cov. Walters, 284 US. 190. F ‘ - SUMMARY OF. ARGUMENT. e i i ‘ |- d . es _adversely affected by an order. Ui Sg . 7 _ Sa (6) The several. district courts of the United ° States are hereby vested with jurisdiction specifically . to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person from violating any order, regulation, or agreement, heretofore or hereafter made or-issued pursuant to this chapter, in any proceeding now pending or here- _ after brought in said courts. ; 2. ‘The next ‘provision chronologically, as if in clarifica- tion of possible doubt of a theory of exclusiveness of the a. prior section, states that the remedies provided are cumu- lative and are in addition to such jurisdiction as would exist under the judicial code: 8a (8) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to, and not exclusive of, any. of ~ the remedies or pénalticg provided for elsewhere in this chapter or now or thereafter existing at law or in equity. - It will be noted. that the sicmndsibies ‘remedies section . does not limit or direct the relief tobe obtained to any one party or class. .The Government, the producers, the handlers, and all others are thereby confirmed in their. judicial remedies ‘‘ provided for elsewhere in this chapter or now or thereafter existing at law or in equity.” 97 U. §. C. 608a (8). Congress thereby expressly reaffirmed the . rights of litigants to a judicial determination of ,their. con- trdversies even as to present and future additional juris- diction of courts both at law and in equity. 3. The third section with certain — sections italicized is as follows: : 8e (15) (A). Any handler subject to an ole may file a written petition with the Secretary of Agricul- ture, stating that any such order or any provision of any such order or any obligation imposed in. connee- tion therewith is not in accordance with law and pray- ing for a modification thereof or to be exempted there- from. He shal! thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with . regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition whieh shall-be final, if in ace ordance with law. ~ 8c (15) (B). The District Courts of the United , States (including the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) in any district in whieh such handler is an inhabitant, or has his . 11 ptineipal place 4f business, are hereby vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such rulings, provided - » bill in equity for that purpose is filed with}n twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. .Serv- ice of process in such proceedings may be ‘had upofi - the Secretary by delivering to him a copy of the bill of complaint. If the court determines that such ruling is ‘not im accordance with law, it shall remand such: proceedings to the Secretary with directions either. (1).to make such ruling as the court shall.determine to be in accordance with law, or’ (2) to take such fur- ther proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. The pendency of proceedings instituted pursuant to ~ this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from. obtaining relief pursuant to section 8a (6) of this’ title. . Any proceedings brought pursuant to section 8a (6) of this title (except where brought by, way of counter- claim in praceedings inStituted pursuant to this sub- section (15) ) shall abate whenever @ final decree has been rendered m proceedings hetween the same par- | ties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15). Bor es Zit Oe Manifestly, the foregoing provisions must be construed eithér as (1) containing an exclusive remedy which every aggrieved handler ‘musf pursue in the first instance to obtain relief, or (2) as granting a cumulative remedy which and aggrieved handler may ignore if he desires relief -in the jndicial forum. prise / This Court in an interpretation of these provisions held that the District Courts are not divested of jurisdiction of : controversies between handlers and the gove rnment. U. 8. = v. Rock-Royal Co-op., 307 U. 8. 533. In the Rock-Royal case” which, like the instant: case, was an enforcement action by the Government against — “handlers, this court in its initial consideration, of the Act - recognized the jurisdiction of the courts for a judicial — determination of a controversy. “3 12 _ ‘‘The Government makes the point that none of the '- defendants, all handlers, can object to thesé terms of_ _ the order.* * * Although three of the defendants can- * . not complain of the benefits. conferred-upon coopera- _ tives, for they. are cooperatives, the defendant Jetter Dairy Company has standing to raiseYhe issue of want of statutory authority.to except cooperative han- idlers from payment of the uniform price.’’ U. S. vy. Rock-Royal Co., 307 U. S. 533, 560. _ (Italies supplied.) At the same time ‘this Court recognized the rights . of handlers to raise anf issue in the judicial form, and to defend an enforcement action such as involved in the-in- stant case. A judij@al determination of ‘the issue resulted ‘in the enforcement action. ‘The defendants * * * contend that the bills include in their computation milk plainly excluded’ by the terms of the Order ® * * — ; eee _ “*As the action of the handlers forms the ground for the initiation of regulation under the Act and’ for _ Classification, reports, caleulatien and payment under ‘the Order, we conclude that the milk -received. by handlers for use in the area is the proper basis of _.computation.’’ H. ?. Hood & Sons y. U. S., 307 U.S. _ 588, 560. (Italies supplied.) ; In Stark v, Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, this court upheld the ‘right of producers to enjoin unauthorized action by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Court gave support to the argument that the absence of any restriction as to parties under the comulative remedies section did not operate * to divest a party of his right to a judicial determination of a controversy under the Act. The Court has granted judicial relief to a producer complaining of the operations of an Order. The Court said: i gi a Chuept ‘‘The Act bears on its face the intent. to submit many - questions arising under its administration to judicial. - «review. Sees. 8a (6), 8e (15), (A) and (B). It specifi- cally states that the remedies specifically provided in See. 8a are to be in’addition to any remedies now ex- , er ol “tating at law or equity. Sec. 8a (8). This Court has heretofore construed the Act to grant handlers judi- cial relief in addition to the statutory review specif- ‘jeally provided by See. Se 1), ooo “*With this recognition ongress of the. applica- “ bility of judicial review in ‘this fieid, it is not to be lightly assumed that the silence: of a statute bars from _ ’ the courts an otherwise’ justiciable issue.’ San v. | Wickard, 321 U. 8. 288, 303, 309. % ~ To hold now that in a particular kind of controversy, “as here involved, the jurisdiction of the District Courts has been removed would be to contradict the express work- ing: of the Act. The cumulative reniedies section of the Act makes no exceptions as to particular kinds or class of con; troversies or parties. to. controversies. As: Congress has power to grant or withdraw jurisdiction of a particular con- troversy in the absence of an express. limitation the courts will be presumed to have. full. jurisdiction given under the Judicial Code. Lockerty v. Phillips, 49 F. Supp. 513, af- firmed 319 U. 8. 182. Jurisdiction being purely detutory, it is from the very essence of our three- branch govern- ment, to be jealously guarded against encroachments and limitations. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 42 F. Supp. 419, rev. on other grounds 142 F: 2d 422, cert. den:, 323 U. S. 787. Where Congress. by special act has removed jurisdiction, such a limitation will be respected. / “The determination of the Commissioner of In-, “ternal Revenue with respect to any refund under this section shall be final and no court shall hav¢ juris- diction to review such determination.’ Seligmans v. U. S., 30 F. Supp. 895. | In the instant ease. the record reveals that yo prior ad- ministrative action occurred. No determination of viola- tion ‘or ‘indebtedness was made under the. administrative process. The District Court was the initial forum. 14 : : The administrative remedy provided by ‘Congress _ broadens the right of handlers and affords by the very - wording of the section an election of remedies. “*Any handier subject to an order may file|a written - petition with the Secretary of Agriculture * i ae (15) (A). ( Italies supplied.) : = Congress. 7 | pat One, In.U. 8. v, Ranes, 48 F. 2d 582 (C. C. A. 9) the Court stated: as | on Ute tay 4 ‘See. 66 11 8¢ supra provides that ‘the. applicant — may apply to the district court % * for. a review of such order or decision of..the commission.’ ‘May’ jn its ordinary. sense, means that which is permissive . ' not mandatory.” ’ SFE ~The wording has recently been the subject of litiga- tion in this Court under practically the same point of ex- haustion of administrative remedies. In Moore v. Lil, Central R. Co., 3120. S. 630, this Court: "In considering the failure to exhaust administrative rem: edies under the Railway Labor Act. 45 U. S. C. 151 et seq. said: ee — | ware ““* * * But we find nothing in that Act which pur- ports to take away from the courts the jurisdiction to determine a controversy. over a wrongful discharge or to make ‘an -administrative finding a prerequisite to filing a suit in court * * * It is to be notéd that the Section pointed, out, See. 153(i), as amended in 1934, provides no more than that disputes ‘may be referred *-** to the-* * * Adjustment Board * * *’- Tt is signif- icant that the comparable section of the 1926 Railway Labor Act (44 Stat.-577, 578) had, before the 1934 _ amendment, provided that upon failure of the parties _ to reach an adjustment a ‘dispute shall be referred to y 15 the designated: Adjustment Board by the parties, or by either party *-* ** This difference in language sub- stituting ‘ may’ for ‘shall,’ was not, we think, an indi- . . cation of a change of policy, but was instead a clarifi- - eation of the. law’s original purpose. For neither the -. original 1926 Act, nor the Act as amended in 1934 in- dicates that the machinery provided for settling ‘dis- putes was based on a philoséphy of legal compulsion. On the contrary, the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act shows a consistent purpose on the part of : Congress to establish and maintain, a sysiem for peace- . . ful adjustment and mediation voluntary i in its nature. The District Court. and the Circuit Court of Appeals properly decided that petitioner was not: required by the Railway Labor Act ‘to seek adjustment of his con- troversy with the railroad as a-prerequisite to suit for wrongful discharge. thas : ss ~ In the Moore case the naite: sethine the aid of the Fed- eral Court under the election of remedies theory was the moving party, seeking initial relief: In the instant case the government as moving party made its election of the judicial forum and ‘now seeks to further elect or choose for the handlers their forum re relief over the same con- — troversy. : The argument that if ‘‘shall’’ had been used, a handler would perforce have to adjudicate all matters in the admin- istrative ‘forum even though no controversy existed falls, for if Congress had chosen’‘‘shall’’ the addition of ‘‘if the handler feels eeritssiteall would have corrected the possible confusion. a 9-9) 2 ee ties which i is now mieaht to be read into the grant by Congress * * * is not se complicated nor is English speech: so poor that. words were not easily available to express the idea or at least to suggest it: — After all, legislation when not expressed in technica! terms is addressed_to the common run of men and is therefore to be understood aceording to the sense of | { wee. ar oe 16 the thing as an ordinary man has a right to. rely on ordinary words addressed to -him.’’ Addison v. Holly, Hill, 322 U.S. 60%, 617, 618. Other sections of the Act nullify the vat ‘saaieted by the Government. ‘The provision that the decree in the enforcement action ‘‘shall abate whenever a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted” pursuant ” to this subsection (15),” 6 ¢ 15 (B);invites other incon- sistencies and wrongs under the government’s suggéstion. _ Abatement generally means a temporary cessation | sub- pect to: revival. Story Kq. Pl. See. 304, 3 Bia. Comm. 301. The cessation being complete, not partial, would hardly be urged to apply for a mandatory injunction for monies - allegedly due. The decree would never be final if the See- -retary had: for example determined administratively that no funds were due ‘fr om the handler although the original decr ce in the enforcement proceeding mandatorily en- joined non-payment of a substantial sum for no. judicial review under 15 (B) ‘would follow the Secretary’ S. de- ; termination. \ Further, nowhere in the Act is any. restriction ‘placed ‘upon the government’ to prevent an enforcement of the . mandatory: injunction such as granted in various District Court cases and in ond Cireuit Court of Appeals case, U.S. v. Adler’s Creamery,.110 F. 2d 482, for the payment of monies allegedly due but denied, by the handler. Assuming - a market ‘administrator contended a sizable sum of money was duc from a handler he could. proceed to full collection, under the government’ 8 theory, \ before - a determination rT be made through th adminjstratiy e hearing on ap- _And the Act not ahi permits but apy au- ori ram collection of the detrees. i pendepey:« of proceedings instituted pur- 4 = ER AS ~guant to this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agri- eulture ***”’ 8 (c) (15) (B). (Italics supplied.) es To justify such a theory would disregard principles Ot equity such as abhorrence of ‘forfeiture, and, balance of. equities, as well as taking of property without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth ‘Amendment to. the Constitution. . Spies ne Further, a claim of a sizable amount of monies would, — as a practical’ business proposition, be ruinous to business: standing and. credit, as well as cloud all real estate of a . handler.' It is not for the courts to assume that litigant, government or private, would yield ‘some . of its- rights especially in serious contests where‘ as here the govern-, ment contends a handler has not even ‘his day {in court. ise No comparable stay of a collection of a decree or re- straint of entry of a decree for money rests in the Act — to give comfort to the theory of the Government. The mere fact of the issuance of an injunction of, any sort: - stigmatizes and injures the defendant: as having done or threatened to do somé illegal or inequitable act of such unusual nature as to justify the extraordinary relief of injunction. “Lenroot. v. Interstate Bakeries Corporation, 55 F. Supp. 234, affirmed in part—reversed in part, 146. F. 2d 325; Leonardo v. Leonardo, 145 F. 2d 849. A further incongruous situation under the.Government’s -theory will result in that even the enforcement decree does s 860. ae ; : P \ to an administrative agency to the exclusion of the courts, except on appeal.” YS ie ae | Ue _ The Act continues “* * * after such a hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such ‘petition. which shall be final, if in accordance with law.” | The Secretary is delegated thereby the task .of deciding pure questions of law, The review section to correct actions of the Secretary only exists to affirm or reverse ‘the legal ruling in ain appellate tapacity. Such procedure *’ clearly is repugnant to the constitution. — ra | In the case of People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, the consti- tutionality of a statate enacted iti 1827 was attacked This - * the: historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish | *'* © We'do not believe that such a major. de- parture frovs that leng tradition as is here- proposed shod be lightly iniplied.*’ Hecht Company v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329. In the foregoing casé an injunction under the Emer- ‘gency Price Control Act was denied the government. The irstant case presents no express authorization from ‘Con- vress for punitive action of an equity decree for colleetioni ‘of a debt. Since there is ‘no recourse by way of damages _ against the United States in favor of a handler who, under the government's interpretation of the Act, is subjected to the deeree ‘in an enforceinent, proceedings while he 26 establishes the lack of a debt, all caution should be’ exer- ¢ised i in entry of a mandatory injunction. US. Vv. Taystee Baking C 0., 55 F. Supp. 490, Lenroot v.- Interstate Bakeries Corporation, 55.F. Supp. 234, affirmed in part and revered in part, 146 F. 2d 325. Odi he The fundamental doctrines of eqaity, irreparable in. jury, balance of equities, he who seeks. equity must do equity, equity. abhors a forfeiture and adequate * remedy at law, all prevail for consideration by the chancellor as strongly when the government seeks relief as a a party. U.S... Belt, 47 F. rg th 239, vacated 319 U. _ 521, affirmed 142 F.2d 761, UV. S. v. Detroit T. & L- a 200 U. 8. 321. | The only actual relief sought by the government is the collection of a disputed debt. Upon this theory the gov- ernment coritends that the order, Order 41, was violated | and extraordinary relief beyond all relief available to it in courts. of law should be granted. An analysis of the order involved indicates that some sixteen different oper- ations or tasks are required of the handlers whereas the only actual ‘‘violation’’ here involved ‘was the failure to pay an additional amount to the pool beyond that which the records of the dairy indicated was die and was paid. The express wording of the order does not require pay- ment within five days for. errors disélosed by certification: of reports but only disclosed i in payments made. “941.8(g) * * * Whenever verification by the market administrator of reports or payments of any . handler discloses errors made in.jayments to the pro-- ducer-settlement fund * * *.’’ (Italics supplied.) Verification’ of both i is “provided but payment for errors is limited. There is. nothing i in the Act to vest in the market adminis. trator a presumption of correctness in his and his aids” *” 27° duties. Congress has not so changed the ruies of evidence as to imbue the audit of the market administrator with even: a rebuttable presumption of correctness and the defendants in their answer affirmatively alleged the audit was er- roneous, improper, incomplete, and inaccurate. (R. 71). So strongly has Congress established the principle sof withdrawal of equitable relief if an adequate remedy ‘at law exists, the inherent principle has been, codified. “Suits in equity shall not be maintained in any . court of the United States in any case where a plain, —. adequate and complete ‘remedy may be had: at law.”’ . 28 U.S. C. 384. ‘Judicial Code 267. _ Chancery should not have been appealed to in tht instant case until the government as an alleged creditor had ex- -hausted all its remedies at law. An action of debt would - suffice. Sound discretion of the chancellor in a controversy of this type would have denied extraordinary relief. U.S. v: Morgan, 307 U: S.. 183; Chicago v. Fieldcrést Dairies, 316: U. S. 168. No ease under the Agriculturat Marketing Agreement . Act has been decided on the issue of adequacy of the > legal remedy for the collection of a disputed debt. In the first Adler’s Creamery case; U. S. v. Adler's Creamery, 107 F. - 2d 987 in the Circuit Court of Appeals the court reiterates the rule that usual equitable problems are still to be con- sidered even under the enforcement section of the Act. The second Adler’s Creamery case, U’. S. v. Adler’s Cream- ery, 110 F. 2d 482, disposed of the contention that equity could not be used to collect a debt past due. Where money. alone is sought, equity jurisdiction is expressly removed by the judicial code in favor of jurisdiction at law.’ The instant case reveals that a jury demand as to the trial of the material issue of indebtedness remained unheeded (R. 115). The harm to a handler is unwarranted. Nien SASTALL t euby kes - 28 III. The Material Issues of Fact Raised by the Pleadings Pre- ° gluded the Sum Disposition of the Case by Use of Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings. Indebtedness being the gist of the controversy in. the ‘District Court the issue theréof required a trial according to customary rules of procedure. - Complaints alleging , indebtedness and answers denying indebtedness ail verified raised such a, triable issue of fact that the government’ 8 motion for judgment’ on the pleadings was improper. The _ denials of the answers will be taken as true. Beal v. | Missouri Pac. R. R. Corp.; 322 U. 8.45. U. S.v. Alpha Portland Cement Co., 242 Fed. 978. ; A mere denial sufficient will not be inquired - into: Extraneous facts cannot be considered. Ream v. Callahan, 42 F. Supp. 951, affirmed 136 F. 2d 194. ‘The handier for the reasons stated should have been granted a trial on the issues with opportunity for evidence to be presented by the government and the handlers. .The respondents respectfully submit that for the reasons stated the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Wriuuiam Parker Warp, er : Attorney for Respondents. ” November, 1946.0 , pe ". We brought this case here, 327 U. S. 776, because it ‘raises questions of importance in the administration ~ - Act and its operation have been before us.in aj series of cases. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., on 1 go ta: -! SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ‘No. 54.—Ocroser TERM, 1946. United:States of America, — | ' Petitioner, ie ’ Bs ee Qn Writ of Certiorar: to : ime | the United States Cir- Joseph Ruzicka and Charles}. oyit Court of Appeals Ruzicka, ‘Individually, and) for the Seventh Circuit. as Co-Partners, Trading 2s Fae : Seeley Dairy. - ieee UNS le oe | Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. Sr A of the Agricultural Marketing, Act of 1937. - 0 Stat. 246, 7 U.S. C. § 601 et seq. The general scheme of the ° U.S. 533: United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 3 U. S. 110: Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288. Our immediate con- cern is with the provisions of the Act that distribute enforc- ing authority between the courts and the Secretary of “Agriculture. These become relevant to the enforéement * of Milk Order No. 41, an “Order Regulating the Handling ‘ ‘of Milk in the Chicago, Illinois, Marketing Area”, and | more particularly the portion of that. elaborate, Order - which defines the rights and obligations of “handlers” of milk. Section 941.1 (5): The Order was issued under the ‘powers delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture . to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Section 8¢ of the Act. 5 ; aE, Order No. 41 classifies milk received into the Chicago area according to its uses. “To milk in each of the four. ‘ : ¢ we ‘ ~ \ \ a Pe tee ee MN eRe AP eS: classes the market administrator assigns a uniform ve value.” All handlers dre required to report tothe market administrator the quantity of milk purchased and put tats @lassified uses. On the-basis of these reports the adminis- | - trator, taking into account the total quantity of milk pro- diced and the amount devoted to each classification, as) well.as the balance in the Producer-settlement Fund, and - “making authorized adjustments, announces monthly a uni- form luinimum. price to be paid by handlers to produc-— ers. Since a handler’s receipts from the re-sale of milk, or the sale of milk products, vary with the amount of the _ milk distributed in each class, the uniform price paid: by handlers will create inequities unless adjustment is made, based.on the comparative use value of the milk distributed . bya particular handler.’ The mechanism for adjustment is‘ the Producer-settlement Fund., Handlers are required to contribute to this F und whenever the use value of the milk handled by them during the month is greater than. the norm on which the uniform price is based. . Conversely, handlers whose milk distribution ts of low use value and whose fixed minimum costs are therefore out of line with their receipts, aré recompensed from this Fund. Ef- — fective enforcement of such a marketing scheme rests on ‘proper accounting, reliable reports and’ alert inspection. At best, however, errors are inevitable, which may call for — payments by handlers into,the Fund. The reliance of the industry. upon that Fund makes prompt payments into” it imperative.” An order for payment into the F und ‘and its résistanes led to this litigation. The Ruzickas, handlers of milk, filed with the market administrator required reports and received from him a transcript of their account with the: ~ Fund for the period i in controversy. Deficiencies were dis- closed which the Ruzickas refused to pay, in disregard of. § 941.8 (e) aad. (g) of Order 41 requiring a handler to pay — : within five days™the amount so billed”. Under § 8a (6) ; ° 8 gu ° . | pte ods { UNITED'STATES v. RUZICKA’ soebuas ] s UNITED ST: ATES v. RUZIC KA. 3 3, _ of the Agricultural Markéting Agreement Act this suit was begun in the Northern District of Illinois for enforcement. The Government prayed for a mandatory injunction commanding compliance with Order 41 by payment of the sums alleged to be due to the Fund. If it be relevant, it was not alleged that there was danger of irreparable loss because of insolvency of the Fund. By their answer the Riuzickas’ justified‘ ‘their failure to pay, chiefly on the ground that the démand. was based upon faulty i inspec- tion of their accounts and improper tests of their milk and ‘milk products. The District Court ruled that “the defend- ants having failed to avail themselves of the administra- tive remedy provided by said Act, may not raise such issues © ‘of fact before this “Court”. - On the issue in the suit thus limited, the District Court granted the Government's mo- - tron for judgment on. the pleadings. The Circuit Court of - Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court, ruling that the validity of the demand by the Secretary of Agriculture may be contested i rm enforcement proceeding under § 8a (6). 152 F. : d 167. : ? Thus the question before us is whether ‘a rinses may aati a claim against him by the Secretary of Agriculture, made according to the procedure defined in the Act, with- out previously having sought to chiallenge the claim in a preceeding, also defined in the Act, before the Secretary of Agriculture, The answer is found on a fair reading of the ’. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act in-the context of ' its purposes and of the scheme fesigned by Congress for their realization. { The sections of the statutedirectly siavuat to our pirob: ‘ lem are.set out in the margin.’ / Briefly, the district courts of the United Stale are “? rested with jurisdiction specifi- 1 “Ss (6) The several district courts.of the United States are hereby. _ vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and ° gi i¥ my "UNITED STATES v, RUZICKA: cally toy enforce” - orders issued pursuant. to ‘the Act? The ActZ authorizes a handler, to challenge before the® _ Secretary of Agriculture his ordét “or any ‘obligation i im- - ic posed in connettion therewith”, as “not in, accordance with 3 restrain any person from violating any order, reisletion, or “agree-. ment, herétofore or hereafter made or issued pursuant to this title, ‘in any p ding now pending or hereafter brought i in said courts. Se (15) (A) »Any handier subject to an order may file a written peti- . : ton with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that’ any sueh order or ay provision of any such‘ order or any obligaticn imnposed in. connec- tion therewith is not in accordance with law and praying for a modifi- cation thereof or to be exempted therefrom. He shall thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in ac¢ordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with, the pproval of the President. After such hetring, -the Secretary shall’ make a'rulfag upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if. ‘in accordance with law. 8e (15) (B) The District Courts of the United States (including the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) in any district in which such handler-.is an inhabitant, or has his prin- _ cipal place of business, are hereby vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed * within twenty days from the date of the entry. of such ruling. Serv- ice of process in such proceedings may be had upon the Secretary by ~— _, deli rad is to him @ copy of, the bili of complaint. If the court deter- that such ruling is not in accordance: with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the Secretary with directions either (1) to make | such ruling aa the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the “law requires. The pendency of procecdings instituted pursuant to . this sub-section (15) ll not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture froni obtaining’ relief pursuant: .to- section 8a (6) of this title. Any proceedings brought pursuant .to section Sa (6) of this title (except where brought by way of — counterclaim in proceedings instituted pursuant to. this subsection’ (15)) shall abate whenever'a final decree has been rendered in pro- ceedings between the same parties, anil covering the sathe subject’ matter, instituted pursuant’ to this’ subsection (15).” * Section Sa, (S) is also invoked by petitioner. But that section adds . to the Government’ 8 remedies. It impliés no judicial review in favor of handlers. ¥ “|. UNETED STATES’. RUZICKA. 8 law”, and to ask to have it modified or to be exempted: from it, When the order is so challenged, the determina- K tion of the Secretary of Agriculture, after hearing, is final \ hut only “if in accordance with law”. Section Se (15) (A). To test whether such ruling is “in accordance with law” the handler may bring the Secretary’s action for review before | the appropriate district court. - Section 8c (15) (B).. But | the very subsection, (15), which gives the handler access - “to the Secretary. of Agriculture for administrative relief ‘ and opportunity for judicial review 6f his determination, provides that tha pendency of the proceedings before the Secretary, or in the district court to. review the Secretary's . ruling, “shall not impede, hinder, OF delay. the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining re- . lief”. under § 8a (6). It is only when “a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the. same parties, and covering the same. subject matter, instituted pursu- ant to this subsection (15).” that proceedings brought for enforcement under § 8a (6), “shall abate”. Section. 8c (15) (B). 3 GALE ig To be sure, Congress did not say in words that, in a pro- ceeding under § 8a (6) to enforce an order, a handler may .- . _ “not question an obligation which flows from it. But mean- ing, though not explicitly stated in words, may be imbed- ~ ~ ded ‘in-a coherent’ scheme. And such we find to be the provisions taken in their entirety, as a means for attaining the purposes of the Act while at the same time protecting adequately the interests of individual handlers. "aggrieved handler an appropriate opportunity for the cor- - reetion of errors or-abuses by the agency charged with the The procedure devised by Congress explicitly gave to an fs intricate business of milk control. In addition, if the - Seottery fails to make.amends called for by law the han- dle r may challenge the legality of the Secretary's ruling. in court. ‘Handlers are thus assured opportunity to estab- lish claims of grievances while steps for the protection & @ 6 UNITED STATES v. RUZICKA. © of the industry as a whole may go forward, Sections 8a (6) and 8c (15) thus form a complementary procedural scheme. Contrariwise, it would make for disharmony to extrapolate from these provisions of the statute the right to consider independently, in a proceeding by the Govern- ment for the enforcement of the Secretary's order, ques- tions for which Congress explicitly furnished the handJer an expert_forum for contest with ultimate review by a district court. The situation before us indicates how disruptive it would be to allow issues that may properly come before a - district court in a proceeding under § 8c (15) to be open for _ independent adjudication in a suit for enforcement under .§8a (6). After a presumably careful study by those tech- nically equipped, a program was devised for the dairy farmers in one of the large areas of the country. The suc- cess of the operation of such Congressionally authorized milk control must depend on. the efficiency of its adminis- tration. Promptness of compliance by those subject to - the scheme is the presupposition of Order No. 41. Thus, definite monthly deadlines are fixed by the Order for every step in the program. In measure, the success of this scheme revolves around @ “producers” fund which is eclvent and to which all confribute in accordance with a formula equitably deteriningt and of uniform applicabil-. ity. Failure by handlerstto meet their obligations promptly-would threaten the whole scheme. Even .tem- porary defaults by some handlers may work unfairness to others, encourage wider non-compliance, and engender . those subtle forces of doubt and distrust which so readily disincate delicate economic arrangements. To make the vitality of the whole arrangement depend on the con- tingencies and inevitable delays of litigation, no matter how alertly pursued, is not a result to be attributed to Congress. unless support for it is much more manifest ~than we here find. -That Congress avoided such hazards UNITED STATES ». RUZICKA. 7 for its policy is persuasively indicated by the procedure it devised for the careful administrative and judicial con- sideration of a handler’s grievance. It. thereby. safe- ~guarded individual as well as collective interests. In the case before us, administrative proceedings were instituted before the Secretary of Agriculture and, apparently, are awaiting his action. Presumably the Secretary of Agri- culture will give the respondents the rights to which Con- greas said they were entitled. If they are dissatisfied with his ruling. they may question it in a district court. The interests of the entire industry need not be disturbed in order to de justice to an individual case.* . It is suggested that Congress did not authorize a dis- trict court to enforce an order not “in accordance with law”. The short answer {o this rather dialectic point is that whether such an order is or is not in accordance with law is not a question that brings its own immediate answer, or even an answer which it is the familiar, everyday. busi- ness of courts to find. Congress has provided.a special procedure for ascertaining whether such an order is or is not in aecordance with law. The questions are not, or may not be, abstract. questions of-law. Even when they are formulated in constitutional terms, they are questions of law arising out of, or entwined with, factors that call for understanding of the milk industry. And so Congress has *“During the period while any such petition is pending before the Secretary and until notice of the Secretary's ruling is given to the . petitioner, the penalties imposed by the att for violation of an order cannot be imposed upon the petitioner if the court finds that the . petition was filed in good faith and not for delay. The Secretary. may, nevertheless, during this period proceed to obtain an injunction against the petitioner pursuant to section 8a (6) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act... . It is believed that these provisions establish an equitable and expeditious procedure for testing the validity of ordere without hampering the Government’s power to enforce com- _ © plisinee with their terms.” S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., ist Sess., p. 14. ~~ Sacaheacee UNITED STATES v. RUZICKA. seovided that the- remedy in the first instance must be. sought from the Secretary of Agriculture. It is on the basis of his ruling, and of the elucidation which he would presumably give to his ruling, that resort may, be had to the courts. Congress seems to have emphasized the differ- ent functions in the enforcement of the Act that § 8a and § 8c serve by explicitly directing that the proceedings for | relief instituted by a handler under § 8c shall not “impede, _ hinder, or delay” enfércement proceedings by the United States under § 8a. We are dealing here solely with the rights of handlers... . .. This is not Stark v, Wickard, 321 U.S. 288. In that case it was concluded that since Congress had provided no ad- ‘ ministrative remedy for a producer to review the legality of an order against him, presumably the courts were not closed to him. But by § 8c (15) Congress has made precisely such provisions for handlers. As to them the . procedural scheme is complete. . The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is one. of many enactments by which Congress in regulating eco-: nomic enterprise has divided the duty of enforcement be- tween courts and administrative agencies. But there i is the’ _ greatest variety in the manner in which Congress has dis- tributed this responsibility. Those who are entitled to speak tell us that *’ . development of the natural sciences _ has often suffercu from premature generalization. Cer- tainly the recent growth of administrative law counsels against generalizations regarding what is compendiously called judicial review of administrative action. And so we deem it desirable, in a case like this, to hug the shore of the precise problem before us in relation to the provisions of the particular Act immediately relevant. . One general observation, may, however, be permitted. Both courts and administrative bodies are law-enforcing agencies, utilized by Congress as such. In construing the enforcement provisions of legislation like the Marketing UNITED STATES °. RU ZICKA. 9 Act, it. is important to remember that courts sad adminis- trative agencies are collaborative “instrumentalities of justice”, and not business rivals. See United States v. Morgan, 307 J). S. 183, 191; Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting —'o., 309 U.S. 134, - 144 et seq. Aid so we are net called upon to decide what powers inhere in a court ef equity, exercising due judicial ~ \ diseretion, even in a suit such as was here brought by the United States for the enforcement of an order under § 8a. We say this because it appears.that at a stage in the pro- ceedings in the district court a motion for a stay, pending disposition of the petition by the Ruzickas before the Sec- retary of Agriculture; was made by the respondents. With the court's leave, this motion was subsequently _ withdrawn. The power of the district court to have acted on it is therefore not before’ us. Compare Scripps How- © ard Radio v. Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. 8. 321. at Judgment Reversed. Mk. Justice DovGLas concurs in the result. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386450_0143%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.