# Brief Amicus Curiae — Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief Amicus Curiae
- **Published:** January 1, 1946
- **Citation:** 328 U.S. 680

## Text

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INDEX

‘I. Time spent in performing necessary preliminary activity
constitutes working time. --_-_-------- @------------
—_ edias Kheneen secon cance tenn pee

@Peewww ewe eee ew eee ee ete we ee ee ee ee ew ee ee ee ee ee eee

ce “Albert ¥. Vite, $0 Latior Con., par. 62, 809_......__- =
- Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. 8. 126....0.---.-.----
_ Belt vy, Hodgesg4 Wage Hour Rept. _— RGREASERERS re
_ Cintron v. Bull Insular Lines, 7 Wage Hour Rept. 1062__-
Davies v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 532, 121 Pac. 987 __.._-
——e v. . Williams-Baver “Corp. 8 Wage Hour Rept.

Bastiat Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. 8. 359.

Epps v. Weathers, ee
» Pleming v. North Georgia Mfg. Co., 33 F, Supp. 1005, - - - -
' Gale v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 116 F. (2d) 27____- ip
- George Lawley & Son Corp. v. South, 140 F. (2d) 439... .

‘Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio.R. R.:Co., 169 U. 8. 26__.-.°.-
a dn Interstate Magatine Hauling Corp., 55 F. Supp. 880- -
Beer Co. v. Redfern, 124 F. (2d) 172..-..--..-----

Workers of America, 325 U. 8. 161. ......,--.--.------
% - Johnson v, Dierks Lumber & Coal Co.,-130 F. (2d) 115...

LaYena v. J.B. Kaufman Co., 7 Wage Hour Rept. 700. ....

iK. & T: Ry. Co. v. United Steten, 251 U. 8.112...
-¥, Connecticut Ry. Co., 311 U. 8. 544. --------- 12,
Mipett v. Standard Oil Co., 53 F. Supp..833_-

Pedro, L. A. & 8. L. R - R. Co. v. United States; 213

F idiwe Gabdugn Corp. 309 U.S. 390... _.. aie
Btary Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282. U..8. 555----- ¥.
mane Iron & R. R. Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321

Edmondgon v: Yellow Truck & Coach Co., 8 Wage Hour .
SE

_Griewold v. Rosenstock, 8 Wage Hour Rept. 00........- “et

- Foeel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine :

Meter v. White Plains Pub. on, 58 N. E. (2d) 52p'Peversed,

‘eats 14
6

II

Cases—Continued Page
mee Oi, Goh, GS Fs BO, Goon on cccccassccccasdcce: 6
Ulle v. Diamond Alkali Co., 8.Wage Hour Kept 1042. __- 6
United States v. Chicego M. ‘& P. S. Ry. Co., 195 Fed. 783 7
United States v. Denver & R. G. R. R. Co., 197 Fed. 629.. 6
United States v. IHlinoie Central R. R. Co., 180 Fed. 7

. Wagner v. American Service Co., 58 F. Supp. 32 17
Walling v. Allied Messenger Service, 47 F. Suppahs.. 6
Wailing v. Blue Mt. Logging Co., 6 Labor Cas., par. 61, 466... 5

. Walling v. ~oneeen trominare Lumber Co.,.7 Wage Hour

St, Mb Cushs cagiiaevnnigaink ¢dneaegscn'edanc sae 6
Walling v. Dunbar Transfer & Storage, 1 Inc., 6 dope Hour

Oe a ees 6
Walling v. Frank, 62 F. Supp. 261 ee ee kn =. an 5.
Walling v. Sun Publishing Co., 47 F. Supp. 180. __ -- - 6
Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U. 8. 540. - : *
Whigham v. Tucker Oil Co., 4 Wage flour Rept. 74... 17
Wilkinson v. Noland Co., 40 F. Supp. 1009-- ‘ 16,17
Woolworth, F. W., Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,

121 F. (2d) 658. ......- USE REG gt Hee Pe ; i4

‘Federal Statutes:

Act of 1938, e. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. 8. C., sec. 201 (Fair
-Labor Standards Act): ; a
Sn AIRE Ls OES OEMS OE OE 4

° ts RC IRENE UG RPA ae ae A a Pe 9

Miscellaneous :

* Federal Rules of Civil Prscaiben’ ae 37 (b) (2)). 15
Press Release R-1448.... - sab dasdudennabiitak« ‘
Press Release R-1789_. . or 7
43 Columbia Law Review 355 RG OLE | I HeaT 15, 16, 17

¢
~~ .

. Sate seprome onl eid Ss

OcTOBER TERM, 1945

No. 342

Steve ANDERSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Mr. CLEMENS Pottery CoMPANY

4

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. -

BRIEF FOR L. METCALFE WALLING, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AS AMICUS CURJAE .

. bs “pees a
This brief is primarily concerned? with the fol-
lowing issues raiséd by the petition: (1)- whether
time spent in certain preliminary duties: prepara-
tory to productive work constitutes employment
or working time compensable under the Fair

Labor Standards Act ; and (2) whether the master

and the cireuit court of appeals. applied: a correct

standard of proof in ruling that petitioners had
not sustained their burden of proof of the amount
of overtime worked:

(1)

, 2
It is the Administrator’s view (1) that the time
spent in preliminary duties, including both duties
characterized by the’ master as ‘‘personal’’ and
those characterized - ‘as “non-personal,” constitute
employment within the meaning of the Act; and
(2) that the standard of proof applied by, the
-. master and by the court of appeals requires a
ne gh of certainty not justified by the nature of
the problem and inconsistent with the objectives
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the efficacy —
of the remedy provided by Sestion, 16° (b) of
the Act.’ The amount of time involved per day
“in activities sueh as are here involved is, of
course, small, and_seldom accurately ‘recorded.
But this is not a reason for excusing the employer
from paying for services performed on his behalf.

I

TIME SPENT IN PERFORMING NECESSARY PRELIMINARY _
_ SERVICES CONSTITUTES WORKING TIME —
‘There seems to be no disagreement between —
the master and the district court that some pre-
liminary work was performed by employees prior
to the established starting time.” .The master
’ found that the employees “‘were instructed to be,
and generally were,’in their departments, ready

+ Tinsofar as the determination of the case turns upon an |
evaluation of the factual evidence in the record, no issue of |

oui on oe is presented, and therefore no opinion
expressed on the’ question whether or not the district

m9 courts’ judgment is supported by the evidence.

1

3
‘to work and with personal prelimirary duties
performed, by the established starting time’?
(Fdg. 5, R: 215). The master distinguished be-
tween ‘‘personal’’ and ‘‘non-personal’’ duties, :
characterizing as ‘“‘personal’’ duties “putting on |
-( aprons or overalls, removing shirts, taping or
greasing arms, putting on finger cots,’’ and char- .
acterizing as “non-personal”? duties ‘preparation
of equipment for commencement of production.
work, such as turning of switches for lights and
- machinery, opening windows and. assembling ‘and
_ sharpening tools” (R. 169). Apparently, the-
master made this distinction on the supposition —
. that the so-called ‘‘personal’’ duties. were not
compensable employment. In any event, he made
~. no conclusion of law that such duties were com-
pensable, and made no finding of fact as to the
_* -mount of time consumed in performing them.
Although the master appears to have assumed -
that time spent in. ‘‘non-personal’”’ duties was
eompensable, he made no affirmative finding with
‘respect’ to. the performance of ‘non-personal”’
duties during the time in question. As indicated
below, he decided it was unnecessary to make a
. finding beeause of his conclusion that the em- _
+ plloyees had. not tained their burden of proof:
~ Yof the extent of such . See infra, Point II..

“personal,” and “‘non-personal’? duties constitute

ex eam compensable under. the Act, and
; a that there should be. a clear decision on this

It is the Administrator’s view that both the °

4 ;

saith for future purposes igiiiiead of the right
or extent: of recovery: allowed petitioners on the .

basis of the proof in this record. | (

The preliminary duties, both ‘“‘personal’’ and

“non-personal,” bear all the indicia of ‘‘work’’
or ‘“employment”” declared to be the “basic ele-

ments” of work covered. by the Act in Tennessee -
Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. ~Muscoda Local, 321 —
U: 8. 590, 597; and Jewell. Ridge Coal.Corp. v.

Local'No.. 67, United Mine Workers of America,
,-825.U{ 8. 161 They involve “physical. or mental

exertion_(w ethér burdensome or not) controlled

_ or required by the employer and pursued neces- ~

sarily and primarily for the benefit of the em-
ployer and his business” (321 U. 8S. at 598). The
duties are performed on the employer’s premises”

and are performed ‘‘only because [they are] a

necessary prerequisite’ to productive work. ‘Se e
Jewell Ridge opinion, p. 166.
The master apparently recognized, “ his char-

acterization as ‘‘non-personal,’’*that the prepara:
‘tion of equipment for productive operations, the

gathering and sharpening of. tools, the turning
on of switches are not undertaken primarily for
the cc... nience of the employees and that they
bear no relation to. employees’ personal needs.
The work which the master characterized as ‘‘per-
sonal’’—putting on aprons or overalls,- removing

shirts, taping or greasing arms, putting on finger

cots (R, 169)—which was concededly done before

- &
“ ‘

‘

v
‘ the starting time (R. 174, 191;.Fdg. 5, R. 215),
-was no less ‘‘primarily for the benefit of the
» employer and his business,”

: Although this Court has not had occasion to
rile explicitly on the question whether prelimi-
nary or ‘‘make-ready”’ duties are compensable:
under the Act, the lower court decisions, w vith the
single exception of that of the Fifth Circuit in
the Tennessee Coal & Iron case,’ have uniformly
held that time spent in such duties is. working
time within the scope of the Act. Thus, - em-
ployees engaged in such necessary preparatory
activities as cleaning and oiling machines (JVal-
ling v. Frank, 62 F. Supp. 261 (W, D. Ky.) ; Wal-
ling v. Blue Mt. Logging Co., 6 Labor Cas., par

| 61,466. (W. D.,Wash., 11942)), changing clothes —

* 135 F. 2d 320, 323, where time spent by employees in pro-
euring and returning tools, lamps and ca rbide at the surf ace
of the mine was heid not to be working time. While the Ad-
ministrator Considered this ruling erroneous, and so Stated in

s his brief in this Court (No. 409, October Term, 1943, br., p.
40), no cross petition was ‘filed because the issue was not
deemed of sufficient importance as compared with the travel
time issue in that case.- The district court held that such
activities “are obviously work” pointing out that: “They are
performed on the premises of the employer, in the further- |
ance of the employer’s business, with no benefit to the em-
ployees (except to aid him in the performance of work for
the employer), under conditions created and controlled by

“th ag tee and they involve responsibility tothe employer. _

exertion, even though not burdensome, on the —

on of the employee. No characteristic of work is lacking.

This time must be included in the workweek of the employees
represented by the defendants” (40 F. Supp. 4, at 9).

- at the beginning of -a shift (Ulle v. Diamond
Alkali Co., 8 Wage Hour Rept. 1042 (N. D. Ohio,

, 1945) ; Albert vy. Porter, 10 Labor Cas., par. 62,809 ©
-* (N. D. IIL, 1945)), receiving instructions, orders,
and assignments and preparation therefor (Kd: ;
mondson v. Yellow Truck 4: Coach Co., 8 Wage
Hour Rept. 187 (E. D. Mich., 1945)), have been
held to be engaged in work compensable under.the _
Act. See also Walling v. Bonifas-Gorman Lum- ©
* ber Co., 7 Wage Hour Rept. 1039 (W. D. Mich.,
1944) ‘and Philpott v. Standard Oil-Co., 53_F.
_ Supp. 833 (N. D. Ohio), holding that. tinte spent —
. by employees of an oil company-engaged as “still .
cleaners’’ in-preliminary ‘activities prior to time
the employees were checked in by the paymaster
_ constituted working time within the meaing of
the Act.’ The decisions of the courts interpreting
other statutes also have been uniform in holding.
time spent in comparable ‘‘make-ready”’ activities
is working time. Davies vy. City of Seattle, 67
Wash. 532, 121 Pac. 987; United States v. Denver

*In addition to the preparatory activities of tlie nature

or travel, which are necessary and incident to the employ-
wma Ricks be ae ee =

, Ree
_& RB. G'R. R. Co., 197 Fed. 629 (D. N. Mex.);

' United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 180 Fed.

630 (N. D. Iowa) ; San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. R.
Co, v.. United States, 213 ‘Fed. 326, 329 (C. C. A.

_ 8); United States v. Chicago M..& P. S. Ry. Co, —

195 Fed. 783 .(W. D. Wash.).

' The: Administrator has consistently taken the
position that time spent in make-ready work per-.
formed on‘the employer’s premises is working
time compensable under the Act, and has ‘so ad-

-’ vised numérous employer associations and labor .

unions in various. industries where the question

has arisen.‘ ‘This view has been expressed not ~

only with respect. to activities of the kind .char-

acterized by the master as “‘non-personal,” but —
. _ also with respect to so-called ‘‘personal” duties,

‘such. as. changing of .clothes (Press Release R-
1739). . . 3
‘In preparing themselves and their machines,
équipment, and tools for the work of the shift, the
employees do more than ‘‘stand and wait.”” Mis- .

‘sown K: & T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S.°
7 * Representative letters ae printed in the Appendix, infra,
-'* However, because of the practical difficulty of determin- - .

ee a thts comomned in changing clothes,
the Administrator has announced that he would not seek to

oS enforce payment for clothes changing time if not more than -

five minutes was involved (Pregs Release R-1739).. Where

; te a te cenye inty eal oh of his work

‘clothes at home, time spent in changing clothes is not re-
en ey ee Reainateater: (Ibid.).
\

- -gorpdaeee. ty

per

"112, 119; “These preparations are just as much

part of their employment, and just-as necessary,
ta the business of their employer; as: ia the. under-
. ground travel time of iron and ‘coal miners (7'en-

-‘neasee Coal, Iron & RoR. Go. and Jewell Ridge

‘cases, supra), and the “waiting time’’.of fire —
guards subject to eall on their eraployer’s premises >
- (Avmeur & Co. v. Wanépek, 323 U. 8. 126), and
_ ‘the duties of a night Watchman when the plants
ate closed . (Walton v.. Southern Package: Corp.,
320 U. 8. 540). As ah essential and integral part
of the employment, the preliminary duties here
- Tauist, under the'statute; be included in the em-
= paren benentoneall
| “ a
® THE BEANDARD OF PROUP.

‘While ordinarily the question of ees of |

ie 4 prpof ina particular employee suit would have no ©

$Me pethionses that they were also entitled to 7
recovery for m punching the time clock and walk-
mates ir work benches. 'The district court
agreed with the master that the time so spent should not be
included as working time. In view of the special problems

moe Berne Pacinccs po oar mg pape oa

is . : P pen
ee pas ‘Ses ‘Release R-1448.) There -

has besa wo announcement by the Administrator with reapect —
Towacememaareinces re oman ds cemmreed ie

. ¥
\:

nr
7 6

general significance in the administration ‘of the

; posed on the émployees, and. which the circuit
court of appeals’ confirmed, may. so substantially
- impair the efficacy of the Section 16 (b) remedy
- ‘as seriously. to affect the administration and en-
' forcement of the Act generally. We submit that
the strict standard of proof applied by the master
and the cireuit court of appeals should not be
The petitioners claim (R. 10) that all of the
_ time shown on their time cards was working time
compensable under the Act, and that they received
no credit for time worked in advance of or after
the company’s official starting and ending time.
Respondent’s contention is that petitioners did -
~ not begin work until the established starting time
and that none of its exiployees were permitted
to work prior to sugh time or after the established
“working periods. (R. 108-109): The district
. -eourt, with the consent of all the parties, referred
_ the cause to a special master to take testimony
> With ‘respect thereto and to report his findings
_ . Of fact and conclusions of law thereon, to the
court (R. 139-140).
. Although the master found that atleast some —
preliminary work was. performed in advance of
. the offcia! sterting tims. he was apparently of
the view that the evidence was not sufficiently -
"Procine one peapest, to the amoant of time peti-

i ‘ Aet, the standard of proof which the master im- =

-* on this record be speculative,” said the master.
' sinee the employees ‘‘kept-no record of ‘their

10
tinévs spent in: wach. duties to sstain: plaintjfts 3
"burden of proof. - In appraising'the evidence, the
master assumed that the: employees’ “‘claim de-‘

pends upon a finding that the employees were

required to go to their departments prior to the’
established-jstarting time and to start to work at

‘onee, spénding all of such advance time in work
for >the company * *'*’ (R. 179; italics
' added). In: order to sustain their burden of
- proof, apcording to ‘the master, petitioners were
required to. prove “that all the time between the
punched entries on the clock was spent in work-
ing and that conversely none of the time in ad-
vance of the starting time spent by employees
‘arriving early was. their own time” (R. 191;
italics added). ‘A computation of overtime on
the .basis of a finding that the employees worked
more than the time credited to them but less than
the time shown by the entries on the cards, would

‘time, and * * * admitted that apart from
the time clock cards they could not tell ‘on any
“particular day when they arrived at their depart-
_ ments or commenced preliminary work’’ (R. 201).
Disagreeing with the master’s conception of the
| burden of proof and with his conclusion as to the
sufficiency of the evidence, the district court
found that the proof adduced sufficiently est»b-
lished that emplayees liad — all of the time

Meatt ce 5. Ju
alten on their-time cards with the exception of
time it took the crew to punch the time clock and to
walk from the clock to their work benches. The
district court concluded that a reasonably accurate
estimate of the time spent in preliminary duties
and productive work.could be made on the basis
of the time cards, together with the eyidence on
“the nature of the operations and 6n the pattern
of behavior of the company foremen, without ne-
‘ceasity of specific proof of .the precise time so
spent by individual employees on particular days
_ (BR. .2415244).- It, ordered that computation of
_™ the time worked be-made on the basis of the time
| punched on the ‘individual time cards, less seven
. Minutes at the begmning of work in the morning’
and five minutes after the lunch period’ (Fdg. 3,
_ « BR. 272-273; Judgment, par. 2, R. 297-298).
* . The circuit court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court on the ground that the district court —
- was.obliged to‘accept the master’s findings of fact
unless clearly erroneous, that the findings of fact -
_ Were all supported by .substantial evidence and
; were not. clearly erroneous, and that the master
. eorrectly. held that the employees had-not sus-
_ tained the burden of proof “to show by evi-
dence, not resting upon conjecture, the extent of —
oyertime worked’”’ (R: 4594-1596).
‘The court of appeals seems to have been of!
the opinion. that the district court, sitting as .
reviewing court, had no authority to review the

?

gheete Sencha issn: We iguibdenay ol tin
proof. As we view the trial court’s action, it
4id not reverse ‘or disregard the master’s find-
ings insofar as the findings were restricted to
the facts. The trial court’s disagreement with

the master related to ‘the requisite standard of

proaf, and to the question ‘‘whethet the quantum |
are nes Le ereen ene for a.
‘ reasoned judgment.” . ib | Palmer v. Connecticut ‘oe
Ry. Co., 311 U. 8S. . 558. This question, it
' geems, is appropriately one for determination by
the trial court in -its neeety as a reviewing
Fourt (ibid.). |
‘Whether or not the particular tiation ‘sdopted
by the district court can be sustained, we submit ©
that the trial court ccrrectly concluded that the
standard of proof imposed by the master-was:too _
strict and would:only encoufage employers to.
evade the Act and deny employees ‘the: protec-
. , Even in cales where the public interest in re
covery is not as great as that involved in. legisla- :
tion. designed to raise substandard wages, the
standard of proof required has been much less

’ wtringent than that which the master. and the’

court of appeals here wo -impose. \ As this

Court stated in connection witlf somewhat. com-

: parable.problem of ‘proof, in the case’ of Palmer
on v. Connectiont Ry. Co., supra, at 560-561) : oe
The injured party is not 6 be barred:
from a fair Pee by i — re: :

P 13
quirements. The wrongdoer should not be
muicted, neither should he be permitted
_. to eseape un er cover of a demand for non-
. , existent cerfainty. :
--~ Certainty in-the fact of damage is essen-
tial. Certainty as to the amount goes no |
.. farther than to require a basis for a Fee
Boned conclusion. * * . .
"The master ‘and the circuit. court of appeals | |
appear to have .elt that the same degree of ~-
certainty of proof was required with respect to*
- the amount of damages as of the fact of damages.
. : But “there is a clear distinction between the
measure of proof, necessary to establish the fact
_ Rhat petitioner had sustained some damage, and
the of proof necessary to enable-the jury
_. to fix the amount.” See Story Parchment Co. v-~
Paterson Co., 282 U. 8. 555, 562. “Difficulty of
savertainment is no longer confused with right of
‘Tecovery’? (ibid., p. 566,. quoting from Straus v. 7
7 Victor Talking Machine Co., 297. Fed. 791, 802
(0.0.4.2). |
_ In other situations where ‘aati are diffi-
“in of proof and ‘‘to require. proof * *-. ae
_ approaching mathematical certitude would bar a
-_ Tecovery for an actual i injury suffered” (Palmer v. .
Connecticut Ry: Co., supra, at 559), this Court
has ‘agreed thai: “Damages are. not rendered un-
"certain because they. cannot be calculated with
absolate exactness. It is:sufficient if a reason-
. ale’ basis of computation is. afforded,’ ‘although
the remutt bes ee. — supplied].

Pa)

=
‘

14

; “6 ¢
See Hastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co.,
273 U. 8. 359, 379; Palmer v. Connectiont Ry. Co.,
' $11 U. 8. 544, 560. “What is required is not
‘mathematical exactness but. only a reasonable |
’ approximation”. (Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Corp. 308 U. 8. 390, 408; Palmer v. Connecticut
. Ry. Co., supra, at 561). - | m
While the above cited deeisfons deal with dam.
"age claims where the evidence is necessarily spec-
ulative, considerations of public poliey would
seem to justify application of the same standards
of proof in employee suits under Section 16 (b).
There is particular reason for not requiring too
‘exacting a standard of proof in actions where the
_ «e* Responsibility for the deficiencies in the evidence
is attributable to defendant’s unlawful conduct.- —
See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., supra, _
at 562; Heteel-v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 169
U. 8. 26, 39. See also F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 121 F. (2d)
. 658, 663 (C. C. A. 2). Such is the situation here.
# 11 (c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
| upon the employer the duty of keeping
_ aeurate records of the hours worked by his em-
.. ployees. This duty obviously is fundamental to
the enforcement of the Act. Where the employer * |
has not complied with this duty, “the risk of the
_- > uneertainty should be thrown’ upon? the wrong-
,doer instead of upon the injured party.” Bee
Story Parchment decision at 563. ‘It would be
Serene ch eyes pene of fort

&

"The Q ’
15 \

_ te deny all relief to the injured persong and there-
- by relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend
for his acts. In such case, while the damages may _
not be determined _by mere speculation or guess,
~ “it will be enough if the evidence show the extent
of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inference, although the result be only approxi-

- mate.” Ibid. =

°° Phere is indeed sound basis for the view that
_ the burden of proof should be shifted to the em-
ployer in these employee suita, once the employee
has established the fact that he performed some
work for which his employer did not credit or pay
him. See Note, 43 Col. L. Rev. 355, commenting
on the difficulty of proof i in actions under Section

~ 6 (b). Pointing out that “there is little possi-

bility of dispute about the facts where the em-

. ployer has performed [his statutory] duty” to

keep adequate records (id. at 355-356), the Co-
| lambia Law Review note suggests that ‘‘the prob-
lems would be largely eliminated and the policy
@f the Fair Labor Standards Act furthered, if
‘the courts used their inherent equitable powers
; to draw from the refusal to keep records, conse-
@@enees similar to those explicitly drawn, by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from the re-
ise fusal to sproduce “them. [Rule 37 (b) ‘(2)].
~ the employer either the burden of proof or the
of coming forward with the. evidence.” .

é

fi

0 16

43 Col. L. Rev. at 358. As the note observes,-
“Where the employer has complied with Section
11 (¢), this shift would not inconvenience. him,
while if he has not complied, he cannot be heard
_ to.complain siyce, having failed to conférm to his
statutory duty, he is responsible for the unsatis-
factory Avett of his proof”’ (id. at 359).

Even if it be assumed that the emplover’s
failure to comply with his statutory duty does
not shift the burden of proof (see Wilkinson v. .
Noland Co., 40. F. Supp. 1009 (E. D. Va.) ; Ia~
Vann v. J. B. Kaufman. Co.; 7 Wage Hour Rept.
790 (E. D. N. Y., 1944) ; Cintron v. Bull Insidar
_ Lines, 7 Wage Hour Rept.-1062 (D. P. R., 1944)),
at least the “‘lack of records [should] not preclude
them [employees] from obtaining the protection
-Whiech the statute affords to employees.” De-
Pasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 8 Wage Hour
Rept. 1104, 1105 (C. C. A. 2, 1945). And, where
dt is established that some overtime was worked,
“‘plaintiff’s testimony should not be labeled in-
definite and uncertgin for the reason only that
' it supports a claim for more than the preponde:- _
ance of the evidence may show him to be entitled .
to recover.” See Johnson v. Dierks Lumber € .
Coal Co., 130 F..(2d) 115, 119 (C. C. A.8)..

* While the Second and Eighth Circuits in the DePasquale
and Dierks cases seem to adopt a rather flexible standard of .

proof for. the protection of the employee, most of the deci-
sions of the lower courts under the Fair Labor Standards
Act show considerable confusion on the question of: proof,
' and have gone far toward rendefing the Section 16 (b) rem- ,

- We believe that. the exacting standard of proof
applied by the. master_and the circuit court of

appals offends the purposes of the Act and per- -.

_ edy ineffectual. See 43 Col. L. Rev. 355; Jax Beer Co.
Redfern, 124 F. (2d) 172 (C,.C. A. 5); Galev. Union Bag &
* Paper Corp., 116 F. (2d) 27 (C.C. A.5). -See also Wilkinson
v. Noland Co., 40 F. Supp. 1009 (E. D. Va.), where the court
stated that it was convinced that the plaintiff performed some
overtime work for which he was not paid, but denied recovery.
because of his failure to prove how much time was so spent;
Epps v. Weathers, 49 F. Supp. 2 (S. D. Ga.), where the court
said that even if the employer conceded that the plaintiffs
worked an average of 45 to 50 hours a week, the court could
- not consider this as evidence because the circuit court.of ap-
peals, in the Jaz Beer case, supra, had rejected the “average
hours” basis; Mayes v. Sewell Hats, Ltd., 46°F. Supp. 338
(N. D: Ga.), upholding a charge to the jury that no recovery
- could be allowed, “unless you determine ‘from the evidence
thet in- each every week of the period of time for which
‘ ver-time compensation is claimed by each of the plaintiffs,
such plaintiff worked at least the minimum number of hours
contended fon * * *.” See also /n re Interstate Maga:
tine Hauling Corp., 55 ¥. Supp. 880 (S. D. N. Y.): Gris-
wold v. Rosenstock, 8 Wage Hours Rept. 1039 (S. D.N: Y,,

1945) ; Belt v. Hodges, 4 Wage Hour Rept. 423 (N. D. Tex.,

1941).

For decisions under the Act applying a somew what less
stringent: standard of proof, see Joseph v. Ray, 139 F.. (2d)
409 (C. C. A. 10), and George Lawley & Son Corp. v. South,
140 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 1), which affirm judgments not

on precise evidence, but like the Eighth Cireuit in the
’ Dierks Lumber case, supra, indicate confusion as to the ap-
poopeigte standard of proof to be applied ; see also Mabee v.

hite Plains Pub.Co., 58.N. E. (2d) 520 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.),
reversed on other grounds, 293 N. Y. 781 (Ct. of App. N. ¥.),
pending No. 57, October Term, 1945; ZaVann v..J. B. Kauf-
man Co.,7 Wage Hour Rept. 790 (E. D.N.Y. , 1944) ; Wagner
v. Avterican Service Co. 58 F. Supp. 32 (S. D. Iowa) ;
Whigham v. Tucker Oil Co., 4 Wage. Hour Rept. 274 (N. D.
Tex., ott}. 3

-

i Se
Bee EA 2 18
{ mits employers to benefit from their own miscon-
duct. To avoid the manifest injustice of per- :
‘ mitting an employer to profit from his failure to
"keep adequate records and. te prevent the Section °
16 (b) remedy from becoming ine etual, what
should be required of the employees in proving |
their claims ‘‘is not mathematics! exactness but
only a reasonable approximation.” See Sheldon
™% v. Metro-Goldwyn Corp., supra, 309 U. S. at 409.
’ ren submitted,
J J. Howarp MeGasrn,
, | .Sohieitar General.
cad Wiuam 8. Trsox,
: J ‘Acting Solicitor.
Bessis Marcoun, -
Assistant Solicitor.

David O. Waurter,
.EuGENE GREEN, Cv.
' - Attorneys, | .
United States Department “j Labor.

JANUARY 1946. .

. to

.
- *

°

ADJGI: ‘AEC

¢

APPENDIX on |
JULY 18, 1941.
Mr.R:D.Macu., | : |
- Glass Container Ind. Labor Comm.,
19 West 44th Street,
New York City, New York.
Dear Mr. MaGit.: This will reply to your letter
of Jurie 10, in which you state that you were noti-
- fied of -a (‘decision rendered by the Wage and

‘Hour Division in which it was decreed that time

spent at fixing up preparatory to the regular work
starting time is considered time worked’’.

This is to advise you that the Wage and Hour |
Scaling em taken the position in recent inspec-
tions of: the glass manufacturing industry that
. “getting - ready” time under the Fair Labor
Standards Act is working time and, therefore,
contributory to —* as is any other wong
"time.

Sincerely yours,
For the Administrator,
By James G. JoHNson,

Assistant to the Administrator.

| June 29, 1940.
Mr. 8. H- Coox, Adios President,
American Flint Glass Workers Union,
-Hardee Building, Corner Huron
‘ Street and Jefferson Avenue, Toledo,
Ohio.
Dean Mr. Coox : It appears. that in the ‘eta
— industry there are certain work-
7 (19)

20 | =

ers known as ‘hot metal’’ workers who. report
about thirty minutes early for a ‘‘get ready’’
period to prepare their materials for thé day’s
work. We are .advised that union agreements

re ‘in. existencé which provide that such period
shall not be considered hours worked. ;

This is to advise you that the Wage and Hour
Division has taken the position in recent inspec-
_ tions of the glass manufacturing industry that
. “get ready”’ time under the Fair Labor Standards —

. Act is working time and, therefore, contributory

to overtime, as is any other working time.

This information is being sent to all the asso- --=

ciations ‘of glass manufacturers and all the unions
whose membership are in the glass industry.
Very truly yours, ;
om Batrp SNYDER,
— Acting Administrator.

In Reply Refer To:
he 3 LE: WEN: EG:
Rosert W.: MaxwiL, Esquire,
354 Stuart Building, Seattle, Washington.

Deak Mr: MaxweLL: This letter is in reference
to the questions which you raised regarding the
effect of the overtime provisions of the Fair
- Labor Standards Act on so-called ‘make ready”’

time practices of employment in ' the: West Coast
Lumber Industry. __.

Under date of February. 13, 1941, we addressed —

& memorandum on this, subject to Miss Dorothy ©

Williams, Begional Attorney for the Wage and
Hour Division at San Francisco, California. The
opinion enpene. in this memorandum confjrms

21
the opinion given you whgn-you conferred with
representatives of this office in Washington. It
is to the effect that where overtime work. within
* the terms of the act results frem the “‘make
ready’? time practices of the industry extra
compensation for such overtime will be due in
order that compliance with the overtime pro-
visions of the act may be effected. * * *
_ . Very truly yours,
‘For the Solicitor,
By Rvurus G. Poote,
Assistant Solicitor,
In Charge of uacual Review.
2

. “4

US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 19466

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 342.—OcToBEr Term, 1945,

Steve Anderson, a al.; Peti- . On Writ of Certiorari to the
tioners, United States Cireuit Court

a) - of Appeals for the Sixth |

Mt. Clemens Pottery Company.| Circuit.
[June 10, 1946.)

‘Mr. Justice Murpay delivered the opinion of the Court.

«

Several important issues are raised by this case concerning the
proper determination of working time for purposes of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
‘The Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, the respondent, employs
‘approximately 1200 persons at its pottery plant at Mt. Clemens,
- Michigan; about 95% of them are compensated upon a piece work

basis. The plant: covers more than éight acres of ground and is -

about a quarter of a mile in length. The employees’ entrance is

‘at the northeast corner. Immediately adjacent to that entrance
‘are cloak and rest rooms where employees may change to their
‘working. clothes and‘ plaee their street clothes in lockers. Dif-

ferent shifts begin at different times during the day, with whistles .
. frequently indicating the starting time for productive work. The - .
whistles which. blow at 6:55 and 7:00 a.m., however, are the most -

commonly used. An interval of 14 niitiutes prier to the scheduled
starting time for each shift permits the employees to punch time
', clocks, waik to their- respective places of work and prepare for

the start of productive work. Approximatély 200 employees use -

each time clock during each 14-minute period and an average of
25 employees can punch the clock per minute. Thus a minimum
. of 8 minutes is necessary for the,employees to get by the time
‘ - @lock. The employees: then walk to their working places along
clean, painted floors. of the brightly illuminated and well ven-
tilated building. They are free to take whatever course through the
, plant they desire and may stop off at any portion of the journey

_ to converse -with other employees and to do whatever else they

may ‘desire. The minimum distances between time clocks and —

‘ working Places, however, vary from 130 feet to 890 feet, the esti-

Ps _ Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.

mated walking time ranging from 30 seconds to 3 minutes. Some
of the estimates as to walking time, however, go as ‘high as 6 to 8
minutes. Upon arriving at their places of work; the employees
_ perform various preliminary duties, such as putting on aprons
and overalls, removing shirts, taping or greasing their arms, put-
ting on finger cots, preparing the equipment for productive work,
turning on switches for lights and machinery, opening windows
. and assembling and sharpening: tools. Such activities, it is claimed,
consume 3 or 4 minutes at the most. ‘The employees are also
allowed a 14-minute period” gt the.-completion of the established
working periods to leave the plant and puneh out at the time clocks. °
' Working time is calculated by respondent on the basis of the
time cards punched by the clocks. Compensable working time
extends from the succeeding even quarter hour after employees
punch in to the quarter hour immediately preceding the tithe
when they punch out. Thus an‘ employee who punches in at,
., 6:46 a.m., punches out at 12:14 p.m., ‘punches in again at 12:46
p.m. and finally punches out at 4:14 p.m. is credited with having
worked the 8 hours betwéen 7 a.m. and 12 noon and. between |
p.m. gnd 4 p.m.—a total of 56 minutes less than ‘the time recorded
by the time clocks.

Seven employees and their local union, on behalf of hinaiees
and others similarly situated, brought this suit under § 16(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that the foregoing method
of computation did not accurately reflect all the time actually
worked and that they were thereby deprived of the proper over-
time compensation guaranteed them by §7(a) of the Act. Thev
claimed inter alia that all employees worked approximately 56
minutes more per day than credited by respondent and that, in
any event, all the time ‘between the hours punched on the time
cards constituted compensable working time. .

The District Court referred the case to a special master. Aftes ,
- hearing testimony and, making findings, the master recommendes
that the case be dismissed since the complaining employees ‘‘have
not established by a fair preponderance of evidence’’ a violation
of the Act by respondent. He found that the employees were not
required to, and did aot, work approximately 56 minutes more
per day_thar credited to them. He further found that the em-
_ Pployees ‘‘have not sustained their burden to prove that all the
time between the punched entries on the clock was spent in work-

~

TA e:

Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. 4.

ing and that conversely none of the time-in advance of the start-

ing time spent by employees arriving early was their own time.”’
Production work, he contluded, ‘‘did not regularly commence
until the established starting time; and, if in some instances it
was gemmenced shortly prior thereto, it was counterbalanced by
occasions when it was started after the hour and by admitted
occasions when it was stopped several minutes before quitting
time.’’ ,

As to the time between the punching of the clocks and the start
of the productive work, the master made the following determina-
tions : | ;

‘(1) The time spent in walking from the time clocks to the
places of work was not compensable working time in view of the
established custom in the industzy and in respondent's plant .to

".. that effect.

(2) The time consumed in preliminary duties after arriving
at the places of work was not compensable here since the em-
ployees had produced no reliable evidence from which the amount
of such work could be determined with reasonable defmttencs.

(3) The time spent in waiting before and after the shift periods

Was not. compensable since - the employees failed to prove that if’

‘they came in early ‘enough to have waiting time they were re.
quired to do so or were not free to spend such time on their own
behalf. ea ¢. ae ‘ 7d S
- The. District Court agreed ‘‘in. the main’ with the master's
findings and conclusions with one exception. It felt that the evi-
dence demonstrated that practically all of the employees had
punched in, walked to their places of work and were ready for

- productive work’ at from 5 to-7 minutes before the scheduled

‘Starting time, ‘‘and it does not seem probable that with compen-

sation set by piece work, and the crew ready, that these employees
didi.'t Start to work immediately.’’ The court accordingly estab-
lished:a formula, applicable to all. employees, for computing this
additional time spent in productive work. Under the formula,
5 minutes were allowed for punching the clock and 2 minutes for
walking from the clock io the place of work—a total of 7 minutes
which were not to be considered as working time. All minutes
over those 7 as shown by the time cards in the morning and all
over 5 ‘at the beginning of the afternoon were to be computed as
part of the hours worked. The court found no evidence of pro-

*

?
4 _ Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.

ductive work after the scheduled quitting time at noon or night.
In other words, working time under this formula extended from
the time punched in the morning, less 7 minutes, to the scheduled
quitting time at noon and from the time purched at the beginning -
‘of the afternoon} less 5 minutes, to the scheduled quitting time
for the day. No reason was given for the 2-minute differential
between the ee and afternoon punch-ins. The use of this
formula led the District Court to enter a judgment against re-
spondent in the“fmount of $2,415.73 plus costs. 60 F. Supp. 146.

Only the respondent appealed. The Sixth Circuit Court of.
Appeals made a careful examination of the master’s findings and
conclusions, holding that ghey were all supported by substantial
evidence and were not clearly erroneous. It. stated that the Dis-
trict Court erred in failing to accept the finding of the master
that productive work did not actually start, until the scheduled
time and that the formula devised ‘for computing additional pro-
ductive work was unsustainable because based upon surmise and .
conjecture. The Circuit Court of Appeals further held that the
burden rested upon: thg-erfiployees to prove by a* preponderance —
of the evidence that they did not receive the wages to which they

were entitled under the Act and to. show by evidence rather than ~

conjecture the extent of overtime worked, it being insufficient for —
them merely to offer an estimated average of overtime worked.
The cause of actiori accordingly was ordered to be dismissed. 149
F. 2d 461.

But we believe that the Circuit Court ot Appeals, as well as the
master, imposed upon the employees an improper standard of
proof, a standard that has the -practical effect of impairing many
of the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act. An employee who
brings suit uuder § 16(b) of the Act for unpaid minimum wages
or unpaid overtime compensation, together with liquidated dam:

ages, has the burden of proving that he performed work for ~

which he was not properly compensated. The remedial nature
of this statute and the great public policy: which it embodies,
however, militate against making that burden an impossible
hurdle for the employee. Due regard must be given to the fact
that it is the employer who has the/duty under §11(c) of the
Act to keep proper records of wages, hours and other conditions
and. practices of employment and who is in position to know and,
to produce the most probative facts concerning the nature and.

Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. 5

amount of work performed. Employees seldom keep such records .
themselves; even if. they do, the records may be and “frequently
are untrustworthy. It is in this setting. that a proper and fair
standard” must be erected for: the employee to meet in carrying
‘out his burden of proof. ’ Ree!
_* ‘When the employer has kept proper and accurate records the
employee may easily discharge his. burden ‘by securing the pro-
duction of. those records. But where the employer’s records are
inaccurafe or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convineing
Substitutes a more difficult problem arises. The solution, how:
ever, is not to penalize-the employee by denying, him any re-
covery on the ground that he is unable to prove the prgcise extent °
- of uncompensated work. Such a result would place a premium
on an employer’s failure to keep proper records in conformity.
with his staPutory duty; it would allow the employer to keep the
benefits of an employee's labors without: paying ‘due compensa-
* tien gs contemplated by the Fair Labor Standards Act. In such
a situation we hold. that an employee has earried out-his burden
if he proves that he has in fact ‘performed work for which he was
improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence
to show the amount and extent of that Work as a matter of just
and reasonable inference. The burden, then shifts to the employer
* to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work per-
formed or with. evidence to negative the reasonableness: of the
inference to be drawn from the employ ee’s evidence. If the em- ©
ployer fails to produce such evidence, the court may then award
damages to the employee, even though the result bé only approxi-
mate.» See Note; 43 Col. L. Rev. 355. | ,. ty
The employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages
lack the exactness and precision of measurement that® would be
possible had he kept. records in accordance with the requirements
of § 11(c) of the Act. And even where the lack of accurate records
“ grows out of a bona fide mistake as to whether certain activities,
or non-activities constitute work, the émployer, having received
the benefits of such work, cannot object to the payment for the
’ work on ‘the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances.
Nor is such a result to be condemned by the rule that precludes
‘the recovery of uncertain and speculative damages. That rule
applies only to situations where the fact of damage is itself un- y,
) J . vA

é

6 st Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. -

certain. But here we are assuming that the employee has proved
that he has performed work and has not been paid in accordance,
with the statute. The damage is therefore certain. The uncer-
tainty ‘lies only in the amount of damages arising from the statu- ~
tory vidlation by the employer. In such a case ‘‘it would be a.
perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief
to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from
making any amend for his acts.’’ Story Parchment Co. v. Pat-
terson Co.,-282 U. 8. 555, 563. It is enough under these circum-
stances if there is a basis for a reasonable, inference as to the
extent of the damages. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Co., 273 U. 8. 359, 377-379; Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. Co., 311
_U. 8. 544, 560-561; Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U. 8. —, — (slip opinion, pp, 9-11).

We therefore turn to the facts of this case to determine what
the petitioning employees have proved and are entitled to in light
of the foregoing considerations :

(1) On the issue as to the extent of the actual productive work
performed, we are constrained to agree with the special master
- that it began and ended, at the scheduled hours. This was purely

a factual issue. The master made his findings in this respect °
through the weighing of conflicting evidence, the judging of the
reliability of witnesses and the consideration of the general con-
' duet of the parties to the suit. The master thereby concluded
that productive work did not begin before the scheduled hours
except in a few instances which were counterbalanced by occa-
gions when work began after the scheduled hours or ended before
the scheduled cessation of productive work. Our examination of
the record leads us to acquiesce in these findings since they are
supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. -
And the court below correctly held that the District Court erred
im failing to secept these.findings and in creating a formula of
compensation based upon a contrary view. Rule 53(e)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tilghman v. Proctor,
“135 U. 8. 136, 149-150; Devis.v. Schwartz, 155 U. 8. 631, 636-637.

(2) The employees did not prove that they were engaged in
work from the*moment when they punched in at'the time clocks
to the moment when they punched out. They were required to
be ready for work at their benches at the scheduled starting times.
They were given 14-minute periods in which to punch the time

Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery a. 7

clocks, walk to the places of work and prepare for productive
labors. But there was no requirement that an employee cheek in
_ or be on the premises at any particular time during that 14-minute
‘interval. As noted by the District Court, there was no evidence
*‘that if the employee didn’t get there by 14 minutes to seven he
was fired and there is much testimony to prove that stragglers —
came in as late as one minute to seven.’’. 60 F. Supp. at 149.
Indeed, it would have been impossible for all members of a
particular shift to be checked in at the same time in view of the
rate at which the time clocks were punched. ‘ The first »erson in
line at the clock would be checked in at least 8 minutés before
the last person. It would be manifestly, unfair to eredit the first
person with 8 minutes more working time than credited to the.

t person due to the fortuitous circumstance of his position ‘in

Moreover, it is generally recognized that time. clocks do not:
necessarily record the actual time worked by employees. Where.
the employee is required to be on the premises or on duty ‘at a
different time or where the payroll records or other facts indicate
that work starts at an earlier or later period the time ‘clock
records are not controlling. Only when they accurately reflect:
the period worked can they be used an as appropriate measure-
ment of the hours worked. In this case, however, the evidence fails
to indicate that the. time clock records did so mirror the working -
time. They did -not show the time during which the employees
were compelled to be on the premises or at any prescribed place
of work. They thus could not form.the sole basis of determining .
- the statutory workweek. , See Interpretative Bulleton No. 13,
- paragraphs 2 and 3, issued by the Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor; Wage and Hour
' Manual, Cumulative Edition, 1944-1945, p. 234.

(3) The employees did. prove, however, that it was necessary
for them to be on the premises for some time prior and subse-
quent to the scheduled working hours. The employer required
them to punch in, walk to their work -benches. and perferm -pre-
liminary duties during the 14-minute periods preceding pro-
ductive work; the same activities in reverse occurred in the 14-
_ minute periods subsequent.to the completion of productive work.
Since the statutory workweek includes all time during which an
employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises,

8 - Anderson ct al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.

on duty or at a prescribed: workplace, the time spent in these
activities must be accorded appropriate compensation. —

No claim is here made, though, as to the time spent in waiting
to punch the time clocks and we need net explore that aspect
of the situation. See Cameron v. Bendiz Aviation Corp.; — F.
Supp. — (6 WH Cases 24.) But the time necessarily spent by the
employees in walking to work on the employer’s premises, fol-
lowing the punching of the tinte clocks, was working time within
the scope of §7(a). Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp., 61 F.
Supp. 996; Ulle v. Diamond Alkali Co., 8 WHR 1042. Such time
was under the complete control of the employer, being dependent
solely upon the physical arrangements which the employer made
in the factory. Those arrangements in this case compelled the
employees to spend an estimated 2 to 12 minutes daily, if not more,
in walking on the premises. Without suca walking on the part of
the employees, the productive aims of the employer could not have
been achieved. The employees’ convenience and necessity, more:
over, bore no relation whatever to this walking time; they walked
on the employer’s premises only because they were compelled to do
so by the necessities of ‘the employer’s business. In that respect
the walking time differed-vitally from the time spent in traveling -
from workers’ homes. to the factory. Dollar v. Caddo River Lum-
ber Co., 43 F. Supp. 822; Walling v: Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co.,
49 F. Supp. 846. Cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U. S. —.
It follows that the time spent in walking to work on the em-
-ployer’s premises, after the time clocks were punched, involved .
‘‘physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) con-"
trolled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business °
Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U. S. 590, 598; Jewell
Ridge Co. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U. S. 161, 164-166. Work of
that character must be included. in the statutory workweek and
compensated ‘accordingly, ene of eee. custom or con-
tract.

_ But under the conditions prevalent i in sinieeiians s plant, com-
pehsable working time was limited to the minimum time neces-
sarily spent in walking at an ordinary rate along the most direct
route from time clock to work bench. Many employees took
roundabout ‘journeys and stopped off en route for purely per-
sonal reasons. It would be unfair and impractical to: compensate

-Anderson et al. vs: Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. a

them for doing that which they were not required to do. Espe-
cially is this so in view of the fact that precise calculation ‘of thé
minimum walking time is easily @tainable in the ordinary situa-
tion.

| We do not, te course, ren application of a de minimis
where the minimum walking time is such as to be negligible.

he workweek contemplated by §7(a) must be computed in light
of the realities of the industrial world. When the matter in issue
concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the sched-
uled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded. Split-
second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working
‘conditions or by’ the ‘policy of the Fair Labor Standards. Act. . It
_ is only when an employee is required to give up’ a substantial
measure of his time and effort that. .gompensable_ working time |
is involved. The de minimis rule can doubtless be applied to
‘much of the walking time involved in-this case, but the precise
~ scope of: that application , can be determined only after the trier
of facts makes more definite findings as to the amount of walking
time in issue.

(4) The employees proved, in addition, that they pursued cer-
tain preliminary activities after arriving at their places of work,
such as putting on aproys and overalls, removing shirts, taping or
greasing arms, putting on finger cots, preparing the equipment
for productive work, turning on‘switches for lights and machinery,
opening windows and assembling and sharpening tools. These
activities are clearly work falling within the definition. enunciated
and applied in the Tennessee Coal and Jewell Ridge cases. ‘They
- involve exertion of a physical nature, controlled or required by
the employer and pursued nevessarily and primarily for the em-
ployer’s benefit. They are performed solely on the employer’s
; Rremises and are a necessary prerequisite to productive work.
There is nothing in such activities that partakes only of the per-
sonal convenience or needs of the employees. Hence they constitute |
work that must be accorded appropriate compensation under the
statute. See Walling v. Frank, 62 F. Supp. 261; Philpott -v.
Standard Oil Co., 53 F. Supp. 833. Here again, however, it is
, appropriate ‘to apply a de minimis doctrine so that insubstantial
and insignificant periods of time spent in preliminary activities .
need not be included in the statutory workweek. .

a.

>

10 Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens: Pottery Co.

The master did not deny that such activities must be included
within the employees’ compensable workweek or that the evidence
demonstrated that the employees did in fact engage in such activi-—__
ties. He denied recovery solely because the amount of time taken
up by the activities and the proportion of it spent in advance of
the established starting time had not been proved by the employees
with any degree of reliability or accuracy. But, as previously
noted, the employees cannot be barred from their statutory rights
on such a basis. Unless the employer can provide accurate esti-
mates, it is the duty of the trier of facts to draw whatever reason-

_ able inferences .can be drawn from the employees’ evidence as to
the atnount of time spent in these activities in excess of the Pro- :
- ductive working time. 8

(5) As to waiting time before and after the shift. periods, the
special master found that the employees had not proved that they
were in fact forced to wait or that they were not free to spend
such time on their own behalf. This was also a question of fact and
the presence of substantial evidence to support ~ master’ s find-
ing precludes any different result. '

Thus we remand the case for the determination of. the amount
of walking time involved and the amount of preliminary activi-
_ties performed, giving due consideration to the de minimis doc-
trine and calculating the resulting damages under the Act. We-
have considered the other pvints. raised by the petitioners but
find no errors. iis

nee toad commanded.

Mr. Justice JAcKSON took no part in.the consideration: or de-
cision of this -case.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 342. —Ocroser TERM, 1945.

Steve Anderson, et al., Peti- ) On Writ of Certiorari to the °

tioners, United States Circuit Court
vs. of Appeals fr the Sixth
Mt. Clemens Pottery Company.} Circuit.

[June 10, 1946.]

Mr. Justice Burton dissenting, with whom Mr. Justice
FRANKFURTER concurs.

. The opinion of the Court in this case has gone far toward

affirming the Circuit Court of Appeals. I believe it should go.
the rest of the way. rie

This Court has agreed ‘largely with the .Court of Appeals in
holding that the District Court was in error in not accepting the
master’s findings of fact.in the face of Rule 53(e) (2) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Ciyil Procedure which requires that: ‘In an action
to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master’s find-
ings of fact unless clearly erroneous.”” 28 U.S. C. following
§ 723(c). ae ven

This Court, accordingly, agrees that the trial court. must ac-
cept as findings of fact. in this case that the productive work
performed by the employees began and ended at the regularly
scheduled hours of work, on the even quarter-hours; that the
time. clocks were not edntrolling in establishing the exact minute
of starting or stepping work; that the time spent in punching
_ time clocks did not constitute compensable. work; and that the
“waiting time,’”. if any, before and after the shift periods was -
not compensable time. ~~

This Court also agrees that the District Court was in error in
creating a formula of compensation: not in accordance with the —
findings of the master. . :

‘The only questions remaining are whether the moments spent
. in walking from the time clucks to the employees’ respective places
of productive work within the plant and the minutes sometimes
spent by some of the employees in- miscellaneous ‘ preliminary
activities’? before the scheduled starting times must be added,

&

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2 Ss: « Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Potte y Cel ws

“3

as a matter of law regarlcks of contrary custom or contract,’

to the compensatory timie of ‘‘the statutory wtek,’’ and, if a

how sygh additional time can be proved. to have, been so used in

order to make it the basis for additional compensation. ae
The master determined that the time spent in walking from the -

time clocks fo the places of work was’ not compensable working

tinic in view of the established custom in the industry and in the

plant. Moreover, the employees were free to take whatever course “a

through the plant they desired and to stop off at any point’ to

talk with other employees or to do whatever else they liked. Some
hr workers came to the time clocks as late as one minute before. the

| <—— time to reach their place of productive work. The so-called ‘‘pre-
a liminary activities’’ are.identified i in this case as those of ‘‘ putting

2 rane and. overalls, removing shirts, taping or. greasing arms, -
putting on -finger eots; preparing the equipment for productive
work, turning on switches for lights and ‘machinery, opening win-
dows and assembling and sharpening tools.’’ _The master found -
.. that the employees had not offered proof of the time used for these -

* purposes, with a sufficient degree of reliability or accuracy for
it to become the basis for" recovery of: overtime compensation.
The employer would have still greater difficulty in keeping an
- accurate record of the time. spent -by each employee in such activi-
ties. These activities are of such a nature that the: knowledge of
them and the time spent in doing them rests particularly with

+ the employees themselves. ‘Such activities are of quite a dif-

ers ferent’ character from those made the basis “of compensable tinie
in.the coal mine portal-to-portal cases.. Tennessee Coal Co. v.

~ ‘Muscoda Local, 321 U. 8. 590; Jewell Ridge Corp. v. Local, 325
U. S. 161. x

‘Some idea of the:shortness of the time and the smallness of the
compensation involved i in the «preliminary activities,’’ in compari- °

_ son with the cumbersomeness of any system for ,accurately record- -

- ing the time spent in. doing them, is is apparent from the formula~
to which the District Court resorted in attempting to reach its solu-
tion of the difficulty. Under that formula, for example; the District —
Court found no basis for compensation for such activities after.
‘the scheduled quitting time, ‘Compensable time spent in such
activities was limited to a short period before the scheduled .
hours of beginning productive work in tle morning and again
on: resuming work after lunch. - Employees were allowed, or en-

>

Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Oe. °-** 9

¢ t

. couraged, to come to the plant 14 minutes ahead of the quarter

hour at -which their scheduled productive work .began. | The . ©

District Court estimated that on an average seven minutes should :

‘be allewed, each morning, ‘for punehing: ‘a. time clock and walking

from it to the employee’s place of productive work. As to the

ue ‘‘walking time’’ the court said, ‘‘the preparation even after punch-

ing the clock wouldn’t take@mor re than one or. one and a half

minutes and to the farthest bY in the plant from the time

deft a, maximum of seven minutes, plus

clock wouldn’t- take more than 2 minutes.’’ ,60 F. Supp. 146, 149.
If an employee came to the plant 14.minufes ahead of time, this
‘‘walking time;’* as the
basis for a compensatory claim. The-compensatary time in many
cases’ would be much less. - Similarly, under the District Court

* fermula, employees returning to work after lunch were estimated

to consume five. minutés in punching the clock and walking to
‘their: places of productive work. This would leave a maximum
of nine minutes, plus ‘‘walking time.’’ At that hour of the day
‘the workers, already would be in their work clothes and there
rarely would be more than a minute or’ two required for the pre-

. liminary activities for which compénsation. was claimed.

The amounts at issue, therefore, might not average as much as

‘ five to ten minutes a day a person and would not. apply at all to =
_ Many of the employees. -None of this time would have been spent .

at productive work. The futility of requiring an employer te
record these minutes and the unfairness of pewalizing’ him, , for
failure to do a futile thing, by imposiny arbitrary allowances for
“‘overtime’’ and liquidated damages is appaient. :
‘While conditions vary widely and there mayghe cases where
time records of ‘‘preliminary activities’’ or ‘9

é

walking time’’ may _
be appropriate, yet here we have a ease where the. obvious, long

: established and simple , way to compensate an employee. for such
_ activities is to recognize those activities in the rate of wae the the

particular job. These items are oe fox consideration in
collective bargaining. ;

oe To sustain the position of the ‘Court in. requiring these addi-

tional moments to be recorded and cémputed as overtime, it is -

tiecessary to hold that Congress, in using the word ‘‘workweek,’’

* mearit to give that word a statutory meaning different from its

commonly: understood reference. to the workfng .hourS~between . :

‘‘starting’’. and ‘‘quitting’’ time—or from ‘‘ whistle to whistle.”’

4

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“< : “Anderson et al. vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.

_. There is no pare that ongress meant to redefine this common
. term and to set aside long. established contravts ar customs which.
had absorbed in the. rate of pay of the respective jobs revognition .
of whatever preliminary. activities. might be’ required of the worker
' by that particular job. For example, if the plant be one located at
an inconvenient place, or if thie workers have: to change into work: ~
’ ing-clothes at the plant,.or have to grease or tape their arms before ;
going to work, these are items ‘peculiar to the job, and compen.
sation for them easily. can be made i in the rate of pay per hour, per
-week or Per. piece, and all special ‘op-Wateh recording of theni ~
eliminated. . e.
-In interpreting “ ‘workweek? ” as applied to the industries of
- America, it ‘is important to ‘consider ‘the term as applicable not
merely ,to large and organized industries where activities may be’
formalized and easily measured on a. split-second basis. The term:
must be: applied equally to the hundreds of thousands of small
husinegs@. and small plants employing less than 200,’ and. often —
less than 50 workers, where the recording of occasional minutes
of preliminary activities and walking time would be highly im-
* practical and the penalties of liquidated damages for‘a neglect
to do so would be unreasonable,, Such a universal requirement of
- recording would lead to innumerable unnecessary minor contro-
“, Versies between employers and. employees. ‘‘Workweek’* is a
simple term used by* Congress in aécordance with the common
. understanding of it. For this Court to include in it items that
have been customarily and generally absorbed in the rate of pay |
but excluded from measured working time is not justified in the
absénce of affirmative legislative action. .
‘For these reasons, I believe that the judgment of the Court of
* Appeals should be affirmed. -

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386450_0122%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
