# Respondents Brief in Opposition — Annunziato v. United States (No. 404)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1961

## Text

Uffice-Supreme Court, uU.s.

FILED
LosRArey
SUPREME COURT. y OCT 12 1%61
JAMES R. BROWNING. CLERK

No. 404

& the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER Trrm, 1961

SALVATORE ANNUNZIATO, PETITIONER
Vv. ;

Unrrep STaTes oF AMERICA

ON PBTITION FOR 4 WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
BTATRS COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND OIROUIT

‘BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

~ Attorney,
Department of Justice,
‘ * Washington 25, D.O.

,

INDEX

Opinion below. - i i
Jurisdiction... __- ee =
Questions presented.

Statutes involved

Stutement— — -

Argument. -— - -

Conclusion

CITATIONS
Causes:
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308... -
Bailey v. United States, 53 F. 2d 982. __. - _- -
Beatiy v. United States, 27 ¥. 8d 328. -.- 2 __-
Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. @7_...........-..
Brown v. United States, 150 U.S. 93... .__-
Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85_. __.

Connelly v. United States, 249 F. 2d 576, cer-'

tiorari denied, 356 U.S. 921... _ _.
Costello v. United States, 255 F. 2d 389, cer-

tiorari denied, 358 U.S. 830____.. __- es
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359_-_- . _.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60_- :
Hitchman Coal «& Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245

Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245... an
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657... eS oe
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339__._____-
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263. ._____-
Mulloney v. United States, 79 F. 2d 566, cer-

tiorari denied, 296 U.S. 658_.__.___.____-
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145

614744—61——1 (1)

II

Cases—Continued
O’Connell v. United States, 40 F'. 2d 201, cer-

Page
tiorari dismissed, 296 U.S. 667...._._.__.. 9
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343_____- 16, 17
Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367___- 14
St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134___. 13
Sellers v. United States, 271 F. 2d 475__-__-_- 10
United States v. Benjamin, 120 F. 2d 521-_--- 9
United States v. Cleary, 265 F. 2d 459, cer-
tiorari denied, 360 U.S. 936......_____- 9
United States v. Compagna, 146 F. 2d 524,
certiorari denied, 324 U.S. 867__._.______- 13
United States v. Goodman, 129 F. 2d 1009-__.- 13
United States v. Keenun, 267 F. 2d 118, cer-
tiorari denied, 361 U.S. 863___._.______-_- 9
United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156______- 9
United States v. Klein, 247 F. 2d 908, certiorari
denied, 355 U.S. 924____.._.__..--_-__-- 9
United States v. Parker, 244 F. 2d 943, cer-
tiorari denied, 355 U.S. 836..__.______.-- 9
United States v. Pile, 256 F. 2d 954. _______- 9
United States v. Pugliese, 153 F. 2d 497.____-_- 13
United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113, cer-
tiorari denied, 350 U.S. 897___.___._____- 9, 10
United States v. Thomas, 282 F. 2d 191___-__- 19
Van Riper v. United States, 13 F. 2d 961,
certiorari denied sub nom. Ackerson v. United
SR, Be ee Peo nee chances : 13
Statutes:
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519...............- 3
18 U.S.C. 3500. .....__--- 2, 3, 13, 14, 19, 17, 18, 19
a FE ak we nhdccaced secures 3, 4,12
Miscellaneous:

Morgan, A Suggested Classtfication of Utter-
ances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.
Pee. TP te ss on cow eanebetencen sax 11
6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940), § 1725__- 11

Gn the Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1961

No. 404

SALVATORE ANNUNZIATO, PETITIONER
Vv.
UnitrAp STATES OF AMERICA

GN PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (R.' 149-167;
Pet. App. 3-20) has not yet been reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on July 26, 1961 (R. 168). stat. 519, 55. va

4

session of the United States which relates to
the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified. If the entire contents of any such
statement relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness, the court shall order
it to be delivered directly to the defendant for
his examination and use.

* * * e *

(e) The term “statement’’, as used in sub-

sections (b), (c), and (d) of this section in
_ relation to any witness called by the United
States, means—

(1) a written statement made by said witness
and signed or otherwise-adopted or approved
by him: or

(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other recording, or a transcription thereof,
which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement made by said witness to an agent
of the Government and recorded contempora-
neously with the making of such oral statement.

STATEMENT

Count 1 of a two-count indictment, returned May
25, 1960 in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, charged petitioner with
having received $300 on or about July 3, 1957 from
the Terry Contracting Company (a firm whose em-
ployees he represented), in violation of 29 U.S.C.
186 (b) and (d), supra (R. 1; Pet. App. 4). Count 2,
which charged the receipt to a separate payment, was
dismissed pursuant to a nolle prosequi and is no

5

longer involved.’ Following a trial by jury, petitioner
was found guilty (R. 143). He was sentenced to one
year’s imprisonment and to pay a fine of $2,500 and
the costs of the prosecution (R. 2). The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed (R. 149-168 ;
Pet. App. 3-20).

The evidence adduced by the government may be
summarized as follows:

In 1957 the Terry Contracting Company, a New
York City concern, was engaged in constructing the
Bridgeport Harbor Bridge, part of the Connecticut
Turnpike (R. 3-4, 34, 39-40, 45). Petitioner was
business agent for a local of the International Union
of Operating Engineers, members of which were en-
gaged in work on the site (R. 35-36).

On or about July 3, 1957, at about 11 a.m., peti-
tioner went to the office of the timekeeper for the bridge-
construction project, located in a trailer, and inquired
of the timekeeper, Walter Haas, and the job superin-
tendent, Arthar Van Dommellen, whether ‘‘someone
from New York was there to sce him” (R. 3-4, 7, 34,
37). Van Dommellen told petitioner that no one from
New York was there then, but that he “expect[ed]
Mr. Mayhew later’? (R. 37). William Mayhew, to
whom Van Dommellen referred, was the Terry Com-
pany’s chief engineer, in general charge of all its

* Prior to trial the government filed an information charging
petitioner with the same offense stated in count 2 of the indict-
ment. Without objection, count 2 of the indictment was dis-
missed and count 1 and the information were tried together.
The jury acquitted petitioner of the charge contained in the
information (R. 1; Pet. App. 4-5).

6

construction projects (R. 39-40). Petitioner told
Van Dommellen that he would “wander around”’ and
“he back’’ (ht. 37).

A short while later, Mayhew arrived at the con-
struction site with Philip Wolf, the chief estimator
for the Terry Company (R. 7, 33, 41). Petitioner,
returning to the office, was told by Van Dommellen
that ‘*Mr. Mayhew and Mr. Wolf were in the office, if
he wanted to see them’’ (R. 37). Petitioner entered
the office and introduced himself to Mayhew (R.
41-42). Mayhew “attempted to introduce” petitioner
to Wolf and invited him to a diner for a cup of coffee.
Petitioner declined, saying that he was ‘“‘not interested
in * * * coffee’? and that “This ain’t no_ social
eall’”? (R. 8-9, 42). Mayhew, accordingly, attended
promptly to “the business [he] had with him’ (R.
42)—the delivery of a sealed, three-by-five-inch, ma-
nila envelope which the president of the Terry Com-
pany, Harry Terker, had given to Mayhew in New
York on the previous day with the request that he
deliver it to petitioner (R. 8-9, 42-46, 99). Although
Mayhew had not seen the contents of the envelope, he
could tell from its “bulk” that it had ‘‘something in”’
it, between three-cighths of an inch and half an inch
thick, which could be “flex[ed]’’ (R. 44-45, 47). Pe-
titioner took the envelope and left (R. 43).

Mayhew testified that Harry Terker, who was de-
ceased at the time of the trial (R. 47), gave him the
envelope in the company’s New York offices with the
request that he deliver it to ‘‘the business agent for
the operating engineers” on the Bridgeport project
(R. 45, 99). Terker, in response to Mayhew’s inquiry

wv

7

as to the purpose of the envelope, said that it was ‘‘for
a commitment that [he had] made." Mayhew told
Terker he “prefer[red] not to carry the cnvelope’,
but agreed to do so when Terker persisted in his re-
quest (R. 99). :

Ralph Cohen, comptroller of the Terry Company,
identified a cash voucher for $300, dated June 28,
1957, bearing Mavhew’s name and the notation ‘Job
No. 719, Sundries” (R. 55-56, 59-61). The voucher
was In Cohen's handwriting and was a company rec-
ord, kept in the regular course of business (R. 59).
Cohen identified ‘Job No. 719" as the Bridgeport
Harbor Bridge project (R. 61). The voucher bore
the further notation ‘‘Receipt of the above is hereby
acknowledged’’, followed by Colen’s initials (R. 61).
The document evideneed on its face, Cohen testified,
that $300 in company funds had been given to May
hew to enable Mayhew ‘‘to pay a sundry expense on
the job’, which, to Cohen’s knowledge, meant ‘ta pay-
ment to somebody for some purpose”’’ (R. 61-62, 64).
Cohen did not deliver the money to Mayhew direetly,
Cohen testified, since if he had done so he would have
required Mayhew to sign the voucher, and Mayhew
had not signed it (R. 65). Rather, Cohen testified,
he pul the neeney in an envelope and gave it to Harry
Terker, the president, whom Cohen did not always re-
quire to sign the voucher in such instanees (R. 65,
69). Cohen further testified that Terker had told him
that the purpose of the $3800 was ‘‘[f]Jor Mr. May-
hew’s use to pay somebody * * * on the job”

(R. 71).

614744-- 61——-2

Richard Terker, the secretary-treasurer of the
Terry Company at the time of the offense and the
son of Harry Terker (R. 77), testified to a luncheon
conversation he had with his father in the latter part
of June or the early part of July 1957 in which his
father told him that petitioner had asked him for
money in connection with the Bridgeport Harbor
Bridge project and that he had agreed to send peti-
tioner some (R. 80). The sum mentioned by his
father, Richard testified, was $250 (R. 84).

No evidence was adduced on behalf of the defense.

ARGUMENT ;

1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 7-9) that the trial
court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment on
the ground that when he was called before the grand
jury he was a ‘‘de facto’? defendant, **[mJarked for
prosecution’, but was not so advised. Assuming
arguendo that he was a target of the grand jury in-
quiry, there is no merit to the contention.

As pointed out by the court of appeals (R. 153; Pet.
App. 7), and as petitioner now concedes (Pet. 7),
he was advised of his right to remain silent before
he was taken into the grand jury room on his first ap-
pearance before that body, and on his second and
final appearance he claimed his privilege against self-
ineriminatien witn the first question and repeated the
elaim with every question that could possibly be in-
eriminating. His rights as a witness who was himself
an object of the grand jury's investigation were thus

9

fully protected!) There was no need for the govern-
ment attorney to expand his warning by stating ex-
plicitly that petitioner was under investigation, since
the warning as worded carricd this reasonable impli-
cation. This is net a case, moreover, In whieh the
grand jury testimony of a witness, against whom an
indictment is subsequently returned, ts used or souglit
to be used against him at his trial. Ct. United States
v. Keenan, 207 F. 2d 118, 126 (CoA. 7), certiorari
denied, 361 U.S. 8603; Costello ve United States, 255
KF, 2d 389, 399-400 (CLA. 8), certiorari: demed, 358
U.S. 830; Connelly v. United States, 249 F. 2d 576,
58L (C.A. 8), certiorari demed, 356 U.S. 921. What
petitioner seeks is outright dismissal of the indict-
ment simply beeause of the alleged violation of his
rigits as a grand jury witness who was himself sus-
pect. In no event was he entitled to this. United
States v. Cleary, 265 F. 2d 459 (CLA. 2). certiorari
denied, 360 U.S. 936; United States v. Scully, 225 F.

Cf. United States vo Neenan, 267 F. 2d 118, 126 (C.A, 7).
certiorari denied, 361 U.S. S63; United States vo Clary, 265
F. 2d 459 (CLA. 2), certiorari denied, 360 U.s. 956: United
States v. Pile, 256 F. 2d 954 (CLA, T): Costello ve United
States, 255 F. 2d 889, 399-400 (CLA. 8S), certiorari: denied, 358
U.S. 830: Connelly ve United States, 249 F. 2d S76. 581 (CLA.
&), certiorari denied, 356 U.s. 921: United Ntates ve Nein, 247
F. 2d 908, 920-921 (CLA. 2). certiorari denied, 355 U.S. 924:
United States ve. Parker, 244 F. 2d 9438. 945-949 (CLA, 7),
certiorari denied, 355 U.S. 836: United States ve Neully, 225 F.
2d 113 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 807; United Ntates
v. Benjumin, 120 F. 2d 521, 522 (Cu. 2) 3 Mulloney v. United
States, 79 F. 2d 566, 578-580 (CLA. 1), certiorari denied, 296
U.S. 658: O'Connell v. United States, 40 F. 2d 201, 205 (CLA.
2), certiorari dismissed, 296 U.S. 667; United States v. A inball.
117 Fed. 156 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.).

10

2d 113 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 897. Cf.
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 247-248; Costello
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359; Lawn v. United oe
355 U.S. 339, 349-350.

2. There is likewise no merit in the contention (Pet.
9-11) that it was error for the trial judge to decline
to ask the members of the petit jury panel, upon voir
dire, whether any of them were members of or con-
tributors to any organization having law enforcement
as its object. The trial court has 1 broad discretion
as to the questions to be asked prospective jurors.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310. While
this discretion may, of course, be abused (see td., at
310-315; Sellers v. United States, 271 F. 2d 475
(C.A.D.C.)), there was no abuse here. It is one
thing, as noted by the court of-appeals (R. 154; Pet.
App. 8), for a judge to refuse to inquire whether any
prospective juror belongs to an organization having as
its special object the enforcement of the particular
law under which the accused has been indicted. Cf.
Beatty v. United States, 27 F. 2d 323 (C.A. 6) (pro-
hibition) ; Bailey v. United States, 53 F. 2d 982 (C.A.
5) (same). It is another where the inquiry sought by
the defendant relates to membership in an organiza-
tion devoted to the improvement of law enforcement
generally, which is che responsibility of every citizen.
Petitioner, as the court below properly concluded (R.
154; Pet. App. 8), ‘‘cast his net too wide”.

3. Petitioner contends (Pet. 11-12) that Richard
Terker’s testi ony that his father told him, some time
prior to the alleged unlawful receipt of money by pe-
titioner, that petitioner had asked him fur money and

11

that he had agreed to send petitioner seme Csapra,
p. 8) was hearsay and inadmissible. We submit that
the court of appeals correctly held CR. 155-162: Pet.
App. 9-16) that this testimony was properly admitted
hoth as a “declaration of the father’s intention” and
as a “declaration of a co-conspirator” CR. 155; Pet.
App. 9).
The existence of a design or plan to do an aet is
admissible to show that the aet was probably done as
planned, and, under a well recognized exeeption te
the hearsay rule, the plan or design may be sliewn
by the person's own statements as to its existence,
6 Wigmore, Fridence (8d ed., 1940), 81725; Mutual
Life Insurance Co, Vv. Fillmon, VAS US. 285. 295-296.

* Petitioner's statement that “virtually the ertire case against
[him] was an edifice built of hearsay testimony” (Pet. 1) 12)
is unfounded. The only testimony besides Richard) Terker'-
Whieh has been challenged (see Ro 1st: Pet. App. sy) was 1)
Mayhew’s testimony that Harry Terker asked him to take the
envelope which he received from Terker to Bridgeport so that
Terker might keep a commitment he had made to petitioner
(xuprt, pp. 6-7) and (2) Cohen's testimony that Harry Terker
told him to draw $300 “[ flor Mr. Mayhew’s use to pay some-
Dody oo am toe [ Bridgeport | job” Ty ee 7). The
court below rightly held that these statements “fall so clearly
within Professor Morgan's sixth class [of utterances admissi-
ble as res gestae], ‘Cases in which the utterance is contempora-
neous with a nonverbal act, independently admissible. relating to
that act and throwing some light upon it’ [citing Morgan, 1
Suggested Classification of Utterances Adinvissthle o« Ris Gestac,
31 Yale L. Journ, 229, 236 (1922) ]. * * * that we do net need
here to consider other possible grounds of admissibility” CR.
154-155; Pet. App. 8-9). See Bearer vi Taylor, 1 Wall. 637.
642. Since petitioner “does not intend to press these points
[the admissibility of Mayhew’s and Cohen's testimony] seri-
ously” (Pet. 12), there is no occasion to elaborate the matter
further.

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14

(supra, pp. 3-4). Petitioner contends (Pet. 13-14)
that the judge, although he was not requested to
do so, should have called the agent for. question-
ing as to the circumstances of the preparation of
the report. The court of appeals held that it was
unnecessary to consider whether the judge should
have ealled the agent because in any event the error
was harmless—for the reason that the report (which
the court of appeals examined) had no impeach-
ment value at all (R: 163-165; Pet. App. 16-19).

7As. noted by the court of appeals (R. 164-165; Pet.
App. 18), both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Rosenberg vy. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 371, 375, reject
the view that the harmless error doctrine can never apply
to statements producible under 18 U.S.C. 3500. In that case
the error--failure to require production of a letter written
by the witness-victim to the United States Attorney—was
field harmless because the substance of the letter’s contents
had been otheywise made available to the defense. But there
is no reason ‘to distinguish such a situation from one in
which inspection of an erroneously withheld document shows
that it could not have aided the defense because it was lack-
ing in impeachment value. Application of the harmless
error principle in the latter situation does not, as petitioner
argues (Pet. 13), “[violate] the basic concept behind the
decision in Jencks.” The Jencks decision, 353 U.S. 657, estab-
lished the principle—now confirmed by the “Jencks” Act—
that laying a foundation of inconsistency between a_ wit-
ness’s testimony and the }.‘or statement of the witness is
unnecessary. But this is not to say that the error of with-
holding a producible statement would be necessarily preju-
dicial. If the appellate court’s examination of the withheld
document convinces the court that production could not have _
helped the accused becauss;it was wholly lacking in impeach-
ment value, the ieee doctrine is as applicable as
in any other situation in which error has not been
prejudicial.

The agent’s report is on file with the Clerk of this Court,
should the Court desire to examine it,

,

15

Although we agree with the court that any error
was harmless, we submit that there is no need to
reach the question of harm because the failure of
the judge to take the unsolicited action of calling
the F.P.I. agent was not error. r

Haas was interviewed twice by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation—on September 24, 1958, and = on
October 20, 1960 (R. 12, 13, 15, 23-24). On the
second occasion he signed a three-page statement,
which was delivered to the defense and is not
involved (R. 10, 19). On the day following the first
interview, September 25, 1958, agent Clemente dic-
tated a report of the interview, which Haas never
saw (R. 13, 22). The report, dated September 29,
1958 (evidently the date the agent signed and for-
warded it), consisted of slightly more than three
single-spaced typewritten pages, approximately 800
words (R. 12, 13, 163; Pet. App. 17). The interview
which was the subject of the report lasted approxi-
mately three hours (R. 17-18).

At the trial, the government attqiney, after deliv-
ering to the defense the 1960 statement signed by
the witness (R. 10), advised the court and defense
counsel of the existence of the agent’s report of
the 1958 interview, stated that in the government's
view the report was not producible under 18 U.S.C.
3000 because it was ‘‘merely the agent’s summary
of conversations with the witness’’, and delivered
the report to the court for its inspection (R. 11-
13). The court, noting that the report ‘tappears to
be a statement almost on all fours with the type

16

of statement * * * referred to in the Palermo
case’’ (Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343), ruled
that it was not producible (R. 13).

Counsel for the defense made no request for leave
to examine the agent who prepared the report, nor
did he ask that the prosecutor or the court interrogate
the agent.” The defense attorney’s only request was
that he be permitted to interrogate the witness to
determine whether he had ever *‘adopted”’ the agent's
report (R. 14). This request was granted (R. 15)
and the witness was questioned to this end (R. 15-25).
The defense attorney sought to ascertain whether the
witness had said anything to the interviewing agents
during the 1960 interview which might be construable
as an adoption of anything contained in the 1958 re-
port (R. 16, 17, 18, 23, 24). .He was not successful in
establishing that there had been any such adoption
(tbid.). During this inquiry the witness testified that
he ‘‘believe[d]’’ that the interviewing agent at the
1958 intepriew took notes (R. 15), but defense counsel
made no attempt to ascertain, from the government
or any other source, whether notes in fact were taken
or, if so, how complete they were or whether they
were still in existence. Following counsel’s examina-
tion, the court repeated its ruling that the agent’s 1958
report was not producible (R. 25).

This ruling was correct. The agent’s report sum-
murized in approximately 800 words statements made
by the witness in a three-hour interview. It was
possible, consequently, for the trial court to determine

* Questioning the agent was mentioned by no one during the
proceedings.

17

from inspection that the report evidenced *‘sub-
stantial selection of material’ and for that reason was
not preducible. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343, 352-353. In Palermo, where the report sum-
marized in 600 words statements made by a wftness
at a conference lasting 345 hours (360 U.S. at 355,
note 12), the decision that the document was not pro-
ducible was made solely on the basis of inspection.
The Court, indeed, while acknowledging that. in some
instances extrinsic evidence ‘might be deemed
relevant to assist the court’s determination’’, stated
that ‘‘{i]n most cases the answer will be plain from
the statement itself.’’ 360 U.S. at 355. Here, more-
over, it is undisputed that the report was dictated on
the day following the interview. This fact also served
to remove it from the purview of 18 U.S.C. 3500 (he-
cause of the contemporaneous recordation require-
ment of subsection (e)(2) (supra, p. 4))—unless the
agent took ‘ ‘complete notes’’ during the interview and
incorporated the witness’s language, in substantially
verbatim form, into his report. See 360 U.S. at 353.’

But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that, notwith-
standing these considerations, further pertinent infor-
mation might have been obtained from the agent, we
submit that it was clearly not error for the trial court
to fail to call him. On its face, the report appeared

® As noted supra, p. 16, Haas “believe[d]” that the agent took
notes during the interview, but whether or not the agent in
fact did so—and, if he did, how “complete” the notes were, and
whether, if “complete”, they were fully incorporated in the
agent's report—are matters which were not pursued by defense
counsel and do not appear.

18

bevond the coverage of 18 U.S.C. 3500, and _peti-
tioner’s counsel did not suggest interrogation of the
agent or that anything would be gained by calling
him. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, on.
which petitioner relies (Pet. 13), is distinguish-
able. In that case, not only did defense coun-
sel, unlike defense counsel here, indicate a desire that
the agent be called for questioning, but there was a
reason for calling the agent which was wholly
absent here. The witness had admitted that he had
adopted a statement of the agent, which the govern-
ment had been ordered to produce (but was unable
because it did not have in its possession a state-
ment of the type the witness described), and the prin-
cipal reason for calling the agent was to determine
whether the report in controversy was the statement
referred to by the witness or a copy of it. 365 U.S.
at 87-95. It was, indeed, in all probability, the fact
that this aspect of the Campbell case was absent here
which explains why the defense attorney in this case,
unlike counsel in CampbeH, did not request that the
agent be called. |

5. Petitioner’s final contention—that the trial court
should have ordered the delivery to the defense of an
F.B.I. agent’s report of an interview with Richard
Terker, notwithstanding that the defense did not re-
quest its production (Pet. 14)—is also untenable.
Even if it appeared that the report was of a type pro-

19

ducible under 18 U.S.C. 3500—and it does not '—the
failure of the defense to ask for the report, the ex-
istence of which was acknowledged by the government
(R. 82), is, as the court of appeals held (R. 166; Pet.
App. 20), a complete answer to this contention, 18
U.S.C. 3500(b) (supra, pp. 3-4).

Petitioner’s attempt to excuse the defense’s failure
to ask for the report on the ground that the trial
court, following a ‘“‘heated exchange’? concerning
‘*handwritten notes taken during the interview”
whieh was the subject of the report (see note 10),
‘‘abruptly cut off the subject from inquiry” and
**put an end to defendant’s quest’? (Pet. 14) is
based on an inaccurate representation of the record.
The subject of the “exchange’’ was a proposal by de-
fense counsel to ‘‘claim an inference”? before the jury
from the fact that the agents’ notes, taken during the
interview, were subsequently destroved (Pet. App. B,
p. 22). Government counsel, pointing out that the

10Tt appears that the report was an ordinary memorandum
of interview—-similar to that pertaining to witness Haas
(supra, p 15)—in which the .nterviewing agent or agents
reported statements orally made by the witness. See R. 82.
In this instance the interview lasted from two ‘o two and a
half hours (R. 81). In view of the defense’s failure to request
the production of the report, there is no occasion to consider
whether, if it had been asked for, it would have been produc-
ible as “secondary evidence of the contents of” certain long-
hand notes taken by the interviewing agents—later routinely
destroyed (see Pet. App. B, p. 22)—which the witness testified
he had occasion to “look over” following the interview and
which he said he “imagine[d]” were accurate. See opinion
below at R. 166, Pet. App. 19. Cf. United States v. Thomas,
282 F. 2d 191, 1£..-195 (C.A. 2).

20

notes were destroyed “in the usual course of business
by the F.B.I.,” opposed this proposal (td., pp. 22-23).
The court directed that there be no argument between
counsel in the jury’s presence with respect to ‘“‘what
inferences they can or cannot draw’’ from the de-
struction of the notes (p. 23), and, following further
discussion (pp. 23-25), directed that ‘‘that subject
* * * be dropped”’ (p. 25). No other limitation was
imposed upon counsel. The court, indeed, empha-
sized to counsel their complete liberty of action as to
any aspect of the case (including the calling of wit-
nesses), subject to the foregoing specific limitation

(pp. 23, 24-25).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be denied.

ARCHIBALD Cox,
Solicitor General.
HERBERT J. MILLER, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General.
Purr R. MonaHan,
Attorney.
OcroBER 1961.

¥.S GOVERNGERT PRINTING OFFICE, 1961

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_1245%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
