# Appendix — Trivette v. New York Life Insurance (No. 103)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1961

## Text

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APPENDIX I

Action No. 505

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Mupprep C. TRIVETTE - - - 7 7 ~ Plaintiff
Vs:
New York Lire INSURANCE COMPANY - Defendant

OPINION OF DISTRICT COURT

(Reporter’s Note—After the introduction of all
the evidence of the plaintiff, the defendant, by counsel,
in the absence of the jury, moved the Court for a di-
rected verdict in its favor. The following is the ruling
of the Court on the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. ) :

The Court: Are you familiar with the case of
Prudential Insurance Company Vs. Tuggle’s Admin-
istrator, 254 Ky. 814, 72 S. W. 2d 440?

Mr. Hinton: Yes, sir.

The Court: How do you distinguish this case from
that one? 7

Mr. Hinton: I don’t remember that case exactly.

The Court: I want to read that case to you. It
was decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1934.
I cannot distinguish that case from this case. If lam
in error, I want you to point it out to me.

oa

“The appellant seeks to reverse a judgment of
#1,000 recovered against it by the appellee upon an
insurance contract for the alleged accidental death of
his intestate.

“Ivan Tuggle: was an employee of the Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Company at the time of his death.
He was a locomotive fireman having been demoted from
engineer, doubtless due to reduction in forces as a ye-
sult of the depression. The railroad company was car-
rying a group insurance policy for the benefit of its
employees. The decedent was protected by this insur-
ance, which provided for the payment of a death ben-
efit of $3,000.00, which has been paid, and provided
further, in the event the death was a result of an acci-
dent, as defined in the policy, for an additional benefit
of $1,000.00.

‘The decedent died instantly from the effect of
a gunshot wound on the 7th day of September, 1931.
This tragedy occurred under the floor of the house
where the decedent lived about 10:30 o'clock a.m. on
that day. The house was built on a steep hillside, and
the natural surface never had been disturbed. Conse-
quently the lower side of the house was considerably
above the ground, and the surface sloped upward at an
angle of about forty-five degrees. The house was sup-
ported by a concrete foundation, and there was a door
leading under the house at the lower side considerably
toward the rear of the house. Coal and kindling were
kept under there, and it was a dark and uninviting
place, The public school in Hazard opened the morn-
ing of the tragedy, and the children of the community
had gone to school. The appellee claims that the trag-
edy was an accident and that the decedent’s death was
the result of accidental means, as defined by the policy,
which appellant denies, and as an additional defense
it alleges that he zommitted suicide.”’

Su

That is the identical position of the pleadings in
this case.

The poliey is not before us, Aemaster policy No.
(71788 was issued, and that, it is alleged, is in the hands
of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Cer-
tifieates were issued to the railroad's various employ-
ees, and to Tuggle there was issued certificate No, 62485
but even that is not here, so we must gather the provi-
sions of this contract from the pleadings. The follow-
ing undenied allegation is copied from appellant’s an-
swer: ‘The defendant says that in and by the terms of
the said group insurance policy it is provided that no
accidental death benefits shall be payable if such death
resulted from suicide—whether the insured should be
sane or insane’.”’

Was that the case here?

Mr. Blackwell: With two of the policies, suicide,
sane or insane. The other two use the words ‘‘self-
destruction.”’

The Court: ‘*That must be taken as the part of the
contract that is determinative of the rights of these
parties, and the issue was whether Tuggle died from
accident as alleged by appellee or committed suicide
as alleged by appellant.

‘There is evidence that the deceased was generally
even tempered and very friendly; that he was a jolly,
friendly fellow, and seldom angry; that ordinarily he
had a smile for everybody; that he had a good position,
and had a family to which he was devoted, and appellee
had much evidence he was happily situated. Even so,
he had been acting queerly. He had lain out some place
all the night before the tragedy. His wife became
alarmed during the night, and about 12:30 or 1 o'clock
made inquiry about him of a neighbor, Mrs. Creola

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Barnett. Mrs. Barnett saw him next morning, a short
time before the tragedy. She asked him, ‘Did you get
your neck broke last night?’ He answered that he had
‘laid out last night’. About ten days before the trag-
edy the witness, Russell Eaton, passed him on the
street, spoke to him and passed the time of day with
him, but he passed on and disregarded the witness.
They were well acquainted, and the deceased seemed
to be ina study or troubled about something. The wit-
ness, Felix Gilbert, operated a restaurant near the
railroad yards. About a week or ten days before the
tragedy the deceased went to the restaurant and or-
dered a dinner. He stated that he was hungry and
stayed at home until dinner was ready and then got
mad and came off without his dinner. These facts are
an indication of the change that had come over the
deceased during a short time before the tragedy. These
facts show a radical change in his disposition. One of
the witnesses who had worked with him stated that he
seldom became angry, but we find him getting so mad
that he left dinner at home and ate at a restaurant.
This was only a week or ten days before the tra -edy.

“The evidence unmistakably shows that the 1 ice
of the tragedy was dark and uninviting. It was so
dark under there that one of the witnesses nearly
stumbled over the body before he discovered it. They
struck matches and used flashlights in finding their
way to where the body was found and in making their
observations. There was in this basement a steel bar-
rel or drum standing on end against the concrete wall
at the lower side and between the door leading under
the house and street. Appellant claims that the de-
ceased became disgusted with things for some reason

and took his gun and went to this basement for the
deliberate purpose of committing suicide. The arms
of the deceased were long enough to permit him to rest

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his gun across this barrel, to place the muzzle of the
gun against the side of his head, and then reach back
and trip off the trigger with his left hand.

“The bullet entered the left side of his head near
his ear and passed through and came out at the top of
his head. There was no powder burn on the side of his
head; the gun was lying across the top of the barrel at
the time it was discharged. A mark on the concrete
wall indicated where, due to the recoil, the gun struck
when it was discharged. The bullet entered the oppo-
site bank in the line with the gun in the position we
have indicated and was recovered in the presence of
several persons. The only explanation we can see of
the fact that the deceased was shot through his head
as we have indicated is that he knelt, squatted, or
hunkered down in front of the gun and deliberately
committed suicide. The evidence shows without con-
tradiction that under such facts there would be uo
powder burns. It seems that where the muzzle of a
gun is held against the flesh and tired, the smoke and
flame follow the ball into the wound. See Epperson v.
Com., 227 Ky. 404, 18 S. W. (2d) 247. There were
blood and brains on the inside of the muzzle of the
barrel due to ‘back suction’ after the gun was (lis-
charged with the muzzle pressed against the side of
the head. This was a Springfield army rifle, a power-
ful gun; a copper-jacketed 30-30 bullet was used. The
gun had a range of over a mile and a half. The effect
of the shot was to completely crush the head and to
cause immediate death. These are most unusual cir-
eumstances to reconcile with the theory of accidental
death. In the first place, there is no apparent reason
why he should have had the gun in such a place. He

did not drop it, for it was carefully placed on ton of the
barrel. He had to be kneeling, squatting, or hunkering
down for the bullet to strike him in the head. If he had

6a

been a little way from the muzzle of the gun, there cer-
tainly would have been no back suction of brains and
blood into the end of the gun barrel, and there prob-
ably would have been powder burn. The most logical
explanation of this strange set of facts is that he took
the gun under there to commit suicide; that, after plae-
ing the gun on the barrel, he placed himself at the
muzzle in a kneeling or squatting position with the end
of the gun barrel against the side of his head. Then,
by stretching in order to reach the trigger, he would
necessarily tilt his head so the bullet would pass
through and out at the top of his head. No other ex-
planation is consistent with the facts.

‘* Appellant insists it was entitled to a directed ver-
dict. In determining that we must take into considera-
tion the presumption against suicide and the fact that
by section 2062a-21 Ky. Stats., the copy of the death
certificate filed is made prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated, and in this ease it is stated Tug-
gle’s death was the result of an accidental gunshot
wound. Conceding but not deciding that it was com-
petent for this certificate to contain such a statement,
then its prima facie evidence effect is nothing more
than a presumption. In this ease, if no other evidence
has been introduced. either of these presumptions
would have heen enough to require the giving of a di-
rected verdict for the appellee, thus each of them has
some weight, but how much? A fieck of eiderdown has
some weight, yet it is so inconsiderable that, just as
soon as almost any material thing is placed upon the
opposing scale pan, the scale is tipped by the first sub-
stantive evidence for the appellant, though the idea is
very prevalent that, when a litigant by evidence puts
himself in a position where by some statute that posi-
tion is said to be prima facie established, his position is

Val

as secure as if it had a stone wall built about it, vet
such is not the case.

A man concealed by an enshrouding fog is just?
as securely protected from enemies by whom he is be-
leagured as the man who has made no more than a
prima facie case. The one’s protection is destroyed
and he is left exposed and helpless when the rays of the
sun or the winds scatter the fog, and the other finds his
prima facie case destroyed by the first breath of sub-
stantive evidence against him.

**Presumptious are indulged in to supply facts,
and do not arise where the facts are known, 22 C. J.,
p. 83, Section 25. Ordinarily, presumptions must give
place when in conflict with clear, distinct, and cCONVINC=
ing proof. 10 R. C. L., p. 868, Section 10. In Jones
on Evidence, (2nd Ed.), Section 32, it is thus stated:
‘Presumptions are only intended to take the place of
facts and cannot be relied upon where the facts are
shown; or that no presumption can stand in the face of
facts. According to such authorities a presumption is
an artificial thing, a mere house of ecards, which one
moment stands with sufficient force to determine an
ixsue, but at the next, by reason of the slightest rebut-
ting evidence, topples utterly out of consideration of
the trier of facts.’

‘This is taken from Brunswick vs. Standard Acci-
dent Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S. W. 45, 50, 7 A.L.R.,
page 1213 (a suicide case) ; ‘Presumptions are the bats
of the law, which the light of evidence frightens and
causes to fly away. Mockowik v. Kansas City, Bt. J.&
C. B. R. Co., 196 Mo. 550, loc. cit. 571, 94S. W. 256.’

‘¢ As to the contents of the death certificate, the rule
is not different, as will appear from this which is tak-
en from Jones on Evidence, (2nd Ed.), Section 509:
‘Prima facie evidence in legal intendment means evi-
dence which if unrebutted or unexplained is sufficient

>

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to maintain the proposition and warrant the conclusion
to support which it has been introduced, but it does not
shift the general burden of proof, and stands only until
the contrary is shown.’

‘*For example, see Federal Fidelity Co. v. Roval
Mortgage & Finance Co., 252 Ky. 716, 68 S. W. 2d 25.
The Federal Fidelity Company had a prima facie case
established by its note with the name of Hoodenpy]
signed thereto, but the moment Hoodenpy! denied that
signature its prima facie case was destroyed, and a
directed verdict against it was affirmed.

‘‘A good illustration is afforded by Section 890,
Ky. Stats., which makes the killing or injury of stock
by an engine or car of a railroad company prima facie
evidence of negligence, yet, if the evidence of no negli-
gence is otherwise uncontradicted, there is no issue to
submit to the Jury. Crawford v. Southern Ry., 150 Ky.
741, 150 S. W. 990; Kentucky Central R. Co. v. Talbot,
78 Ky. 621; MeGhee v. Guyn, 98 Ky. 210, 32 S. W. 615,
17 Ky. Law Rep. 794.

‘With the presumption against suicide and the
statements of this death certiticate out of the way, let
us look at the evidence.

‘‘We have abundant facts proven from which it
can be inferred Tuggle committed suicide, and a con-
clusion rested on an inference is sound. See Kidd v.
Modern Amusement Co., 252 Ky. 386, 67 S. W. (2d)
466. We have no facts from which we can infer this
was an accident. Of course, one may guess this was an
accident by supposing Tuggle had taken his gun into
this basement to kill a rat and discharged it acciden-
taliy, but a supposition has no legitimate support or
habitation in judicial administration. Louisville &
NR. Co. v. Mann’s Adm’r., 227 Ky. 399,13 S. W. (2d)
257; Kidd v. Modern Amusement Co., 252 Ky. 386,
67S. W. (2d) 466.

“We are persuaded that this whieh is taken from
a svilabus written by the court in the case of Agen v.
Metropolitan Lite Ins. Co.. 105 Wis, 215, 80 hy es
1020, 1021, 76 Am. St. Rep. 905 is correct: ‘Where the
reasonable probabilities from the evidence all point to
suicide as the eause of death, so as to establish it. in
the light of reason and common sense, with such cer-
tainty as to leave no room for a reasonable controversy
on the subject, a jury should not be permitted to tind
to the contrary and have such finding stand asa verity
in the ease, but the question should be decided by the
trial court as one of law."

“We will diseuss briefly some of the authorities
cited hy the appellee. One is the case of Curtis v. Lou-
isville City Railway Co., 14 Ky. Law Rep. 272, in wiach
ease the superior court said: *A peremptory instruction
ix not authorized where the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case by his own evidence, no matter how
strong and convincing the court may deem the defen-
dant’s evidence to he.’

“That case came to this court. and this court's opin-
ion may be found in 94 Ky. 5738, 28 8. W. 363, 15 Ky.
Law Rep. 351, 21 L. R. A. 649, and with the opinion of
the superior court before it this court did not adopt
that language or approve it. Appellee cites the case of
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 207
Ky. 654, 269 S. W. 1014. How that case can have any
application to this one we are unable to see. He cites
the case of Brunswick v. Standard Accident Insurance
Co., 978 Mo. 154, 213 S. W. 45, 7 ALL.R. 1218.) But au
examination of that opinion will disclose that neither
the pleadings. upon either side, nor the instruction,
nor the evidence, except the policy, contained the word
‘snicide’. The defense in that ease was not rested upon a
claim that the deceased had committed suicide. Hence
that case is not applicable here. Appellee cites the case

of American Benevolent Association v. Stough, 83S.
W. 126, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1093.) That was an action
Upou a life insurance policy, and of course, the plain-
tiff’s case Was made out as soon as the poliey was put
in evidence, and it Was shown that the insurer had been
furnished with proof that the insured was dead. The
insurer rested its defense upon the alleged suicide of
the deceased and the burden was on it to prove that.
In this case the beneficiary of this policy has alleged
that Tuggle’s death was accidental and in order to re-
cover the beneficiary must sustain the burden of prove
ing that. Appellee cites the case of Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co. v. Bush, 236 Ky. 400, 33S. W.
20351, which he says cannot he distinguished from this
one, But we think it ean. Bush was found dead seated
in his automobile. The motor was running, he had his
pistol in his Jap, and it was on a public road. There
were other circumstances tending to indicate his death
was accidental. Thus we need say nothing about
whether or not we would adhere to that opinion if the
facts were not distinguishable from the facts in this
Case,

“So reserving all other questions, we have con-
cluded the Court erred in overruling appellant’s motion
for a directed verdict.

* Judgment reversed."’

Now, in the case at bar, it seems to me that for the
Court to deny this motion, would be flying in the teeth
of that. We have here a stronger case for the defend-
ant than was had in the case I just read. We have an
eyewitness to the fact that this man showed by his atti-
tude at the dinner table, after he had left the table. the
fact that he took two drinks of whiskey in the imme-
diate presence of a witness, he showed a sullen ill-
tempered attitude, he tore up his clothes, which was not

the usual or normal thing to do. He then left the house

and went and got this pistol and was gone for twenty
minutes. He came back inte the reom. and took the
pistol and put it toe lus head and pulled the trigger,
Now, those conditions are terrifwing and heartrendiag,
T.know, but that’s what happened. What bas the jury
got to decide? You cant say that because a man did a
thing like that. that it was an aeeident. Ttoamay have
heen unnatural something that could tot have resasen-
ably been antieipated, but he deliberately went out. get
his gun. eame back, was gone for a period of about
twenty qinutes, drank seme whiskey. a couple of
times. There is no evidenee that anvene struek dis
arm. There is no evidence that lis arm struck any-
thing. T would certaindy. as would the jury, as stated
by counsel for both sides, have every svinpathy for this
family, but it would serve ne purpose te have this case
decided here. and proceed with it further, have it ape
pealed. and have it brought back or reversed and dis-
mnissed. That is not serving ay purpose Whatsoever,

If there was anything at all omwliech the plamitiff
eould hang the possibility of the man having—oef the
pisto) having been exploded by anything other than
the trigger tinger of the mut who was killed. There i-
noteven an imaginary idea that it happened any other
wav. Tn the first place the pistol is a very large pistol,
unusnally so. and to say that it exploded with io rea-
sonat all exeept that the trigger was pulled would be
to ask fora credulity which this court doesn't possess.

Not only that, but we have in this case the further
proposition that this man had. on prior oeeasions.
While ao witness testifies that he ever threatened te kill
himself. he had on oecasion gotten out this gun. flour-
ished it around, and indieated that he would—actually
—right in this very room, nad shot through the ceiling,
and on another occasion, in Indiana, had gotten out
the gun and gone out on the walk and fired it off. and

tc
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on another occasion had gotten it out and kicked the
furniture around, knocked the lamps off the table and
did considerable damage to the home furnishings. Then
he had gotten the pistol out and directed his wife to
clean up the mess. Then, at this time, coming in and
With no reason at all, except that the steaks were tough,
got ina very surly and black mood. While they don't
use the exact words, it is certainly more than a reason-
able inference to say that his wife and family were
afraid of him. He went through the house and sat
down in front of the television and they could see that
he was not at himself. Then he went out of the
house, stayed for some several minutes and came hack
in the house with, apparently, this large pistol stuck
into his belt. He took it out and put it to his head and
killed himself. What has the jury got to decide? To
say that there is even a suggestion of that bemg an
accident is to call for a basic fact that doesn't exist in
this case when the facts are all to the contrary.

At the time of the case which Mr. Hinton referred
to, which was some twenty-four years before this case
which I read of Prudential Insurance Company v. Tug-
gle’s Administrator, which was decided in 1934, since
that time, in Nugent vs. Nugent's Administrater, 281
Ky. 263, 185 S. W. (2) 877, the scintilla rule has heen
abolished. The scintilla rule was in effect at the time
this Tuggle case was decided, and it has been followed
since that time saying that even though there is A scin-
tilla of evidence that the Court should not decline to
give a directed verdict where the facts show ta the
contrary.

In my opinion, gentlemen, there is no point in pro-
longing something unless there is a basis of law on
which it might rest. In my opinion, in this case it
was conclusively shown that it was not the result of an
accident but it was the result of a deliberate act on the

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part of the deceased, under circumstances under which,
by no stretch of the imagination, could the jury cou-
clude that there was an accident. That will be the
judgment of the court.

The Court: Members of the Jury, under the law,
when the plaintiff has introduced its case and offered
all the evidence it proposes to offer, and there is pre-
sented no issue of fact for the jury te decide, it is the
duty of the presiding judge of the court to direct a
verdiet for the defendant.

The case which you have been trying is one in-
volving the single question of whether or not this de-
ceased, Maurice Trivette, committed suicide or whether
he died as the result of an accident. The issue, as TI
say, is narrow, and under the evidence which has been
offered to vou here, there can be but one conclusion that
ean be reached, and that is that he teok the pistol and
put it to his head and killed himself. So, there is no
issue of fact which the court could submit to you for
your determination.

Where one meets a violent death, or an unnatural
death, as we say, it may become a question as to how
that thing oeceurred, whether it was an accident or
whether it was a deliberate act. There can be no doubt
from the evidence shown in this case, or the reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from it, that this man
did commit suicide. There could not possibly be drawn
an inference or deduction that that gun exploded hy
any accidental means. It was a deliberate act of the
decedent, Maurice Trivette.

So, I am going to direct you to find a verdict for
the defendant. I have prepared here, through the:
Clerk, the following verdict: ‘‘Under direction of the
Court, we the jury find for the defendant.” (See Ap-
pendix, pp. 15a-27a).

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‘ APPENDIX II
No. 13910

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Miuprep C. TRIVETTE - - - Plaintiff-Appellant
V.

NEW York Lire INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-A ppellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky

Decided October 31, 1960 _

OPINION OF CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Before MILLER and Pops, Circuit = and
KENT, District Judge.

Kent, District Judge. This action is based upon
tour policies of insurance issued by the defendant com-
pany prior to the death of the insured, Maurice Tri-
vette, of which the plaintiff widow was the beneficiary.
Under the terms of the policies ‘‘double indemnity”’
was to be paid in the event of accidental death. The
principal amount of the four policies was $30,000,
which was paid by the defendant company. The Dis-
trict Court directed a verdict against the plaintiff
(appellant) at the conclusions of the plaintiff’s proofs.

lda

The issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to double
indemnity for the death of the insured.

During the argument in this Court plaintiff's
counsel conceded that the decedent shot himself. — It
was the theory and claim of the plaintiff that the dece-
dent “might not’ have intended to shoot the gun, that
he “might not’* have intended to kill himself, that he
only intended to ‘scare’ the members of his family.
Admittedly, he put the gun to his forehead in the pres-
ence of the plaintiff and the gun was fired resulting in
the death of the devedent. Plaintiff relies upon Diek v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 427 (and other cases
which need not be discussed), a case decided under the
law of North Dakota in which the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the burden was upon the in-
surer to establish that the death of the insured was due
to suicide. Under Frie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, this Court and the District Court are required
to follow the law of the State of Kentucky. The trial
court had before it the decision of the Court of Appeals
of the State of Kentueky in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tug-
gle’s Admr., 254 Ky. 814, 72 S. W. 2d 440. After that
decision and prior to the argument of the principal
case hefore this Court, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky decided Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hattie Bell Red-
wine, Adm’ of Ewen, 332 8. W. 2d 643 (1959). In
many respects the facts in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Red-
wine, supra, were similar to the facts in the present
ease and as pointed out by the Court at 382 8. W. 2d
643, at page 645—‘It must be remembered that the
plaintiff had the burden on the whole case of proving
death by accident. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Bush, 236 Ky. 400, 33 S. W. 2d 351.”

In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Redwine, supra, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky approved its earlier de-
cision in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tuggle’s Admr., supra.

Ga

The facts in the instant case are such as to require the
same result as that reached by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Redwine, supra.
The District Judge could not submit the principal
ease to the jury for speculation or surmise as to some
cause other than suicide for the death of the decedent.
At the conclusion of the argument on the motion for a
directed verdict Judge Swinford stated in part—

“In my opinion, gentlemen, there is no point
in prolonging something unless there is a basis of
law on which it might rest. In my opinion, in this
ease it was conclusively shown that it was not the
result of an accident but it was the result of a
deliberate act. on the part of the deceased, wader
circumstances under which, by no stretch of the
imagination, could the jury conclude that there
was an accident. That will be the judgment of
the court.”’

For the reasons set forth by Judge Swinford as
the basis for directing a verdict for the defendant, and
on authority of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tuggle’s Admr.,
supra, and Prudential Ins. Co. v. Redwine, supra, the
decision of the District Court must be affirmed.

Pork, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Since I find myself unable to concur in the major-
ity opinion, I think I should state the reasons for my
disagreement. They are several.

The opinion assumes that the rule of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins is to be applied here. As I shall indi-
cate later, I think a more complete statement of the
facts would call for a different result even assuming
the propriety of the Erie Railroad Co. approach. But
if, as I am convinced, this case is not ruled by Erie,

then the reasons for a different result are even
stronger.

lia

I realize that in Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 6
eir., 212 F. 2d 805, this court said that in a diversity
‘ase Whether a plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to take
the case to the jury is a question to be decided accord-
ing to state law. But an examination of that case
shows that it was decided, as the court said, upon prin-
ciples that ‘tare well settled under both state and fed-
eral law."’ It cannot be said that any different result
would have been reached no matter which law, state or
federal, Was apphed. In short, it cannot be said that
the expressed view as to the applicability of the Erie
Railroad case Was necessary to the decision. Our case,
however, is one which might well turn on the question
Whether Lam right in my view that, as put by Profes-
sor Moore?" The sufficiency of certain evidence to raise
a question of fact for the jury... shordld not be con-
trolled by state law.*”

As time goes on it becomes increasingly clear that,
as often stated by the Fifth Circuit, ‘*[t]he kind of
jury trial to which the parties are entitled in Federal
Courts under Rules 38 and 39 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C. A., is that preserved by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, to which
the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. vy. Tompkins, .. . is
of course subservient.’” Pogue v. Great Atlantic & Pa-

eifie Tea Company, 242 F.2d 575, 582."

‘The Lovas case was one in which the physical facts were such
that the,e was “no substantial evidence of probative value to sup-
port the appellant’s charge.”

* Moore’s Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., § 38.10, p. 102.

*T am not suggesting a reexamination by this court, as now con-
stituted. In some circuits with which I am familiar, reexamination
under such circumstances is accomplished after reargument before
the court sitting en banc.

* Other cases to the same effect in the Fifth Circuit are: Reuter v.
Eastern Air Lines, 226 F. 2d 443, 445; Revlon v. Buchanan, 271 F. 2d
795, 800.

lSa

This ix exactly the same principle applied by the
Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356
U. S. 525, 537, where the Court said: ‘“‘An essential
characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in
civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions
between judge and jury and, under the influence—if
not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, assigns
the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.
... The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created
rights and obligations, . .. eannot in every case exact
compliance with a state rule—not bound up with rights
and obligations—which disrupts the federal system of
allocating functions between judge and jury.”’

I am not suggesting that the Byrd case dealt with
the precise question presented in the case now before
us. It is plain that the Supreme Court has not thus
far directly expressed itself upon the question which I
here discuss.* But the clarity with which the Court
there declares the principle which underlies the deci-
sion of the Fifth Circuit in the Pogue case, to my mind
furnishes clear evidence that when it does find occasion
to speak, the Supreme Court will agree with what was
said in the Pogue ease.

In my opinion there are compelling reasons for
regarding the position of the Fifth Circuit as the only
tenable one. Such is also the view of the Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
Duvis Frozen Foods v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co..

* Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464, sometimes mis-
understood, is discussed by Moore, § 38.10 supra, who suggests it
should be regarded as “a novel application of the doctrine of ‘the law
of the case.’” I agree with Judge Magruder that it “had to do with
the application of the doctrine of res judicata, which certainly is a
matter of substantive law.” Schell v. Ford Motor Co., 270 F. 2d 384,
388 (dissenting opinion, cited infra, note 8). The most conclusive indi-
cation that the Supreme Court considers it has not decided this ques-
tion is the fact that in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 437,
445, the Court noted the decisions of the Courts of Appeals without
any reference to any decision of its own.

19a

1953) 4 cir, 204 F. 2d 839, 842; State of Washington v.
United States, (1954) 9 cir, 214 F. 2d 63, 40; Smith v.
Buck, (1957) 245 F. 2d 348, 349, 9 cir.; Allen v. Matson
Navigation Company, (1958) 9 cir., 255 F. 2d 273, 281-
282." Diederich v. American News Co., (1942) 10 cir.,
128 FY. 2d 144; Basham v. City Bus Co., (1955), 10 eir.,
219 F.2d 547; Miller ve Irby, (1955) 10 cir., 227 F. 2d
942.

As noted in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.
S. 437, 445, not all of the courts of appeals have agreed
upon this proposition. An examination of those cases
which have purportedly followed state decisions as to
What constitutes a sufficient case for the Jury convinces
me that in the main they are distinguishable either on
the ground that the court found it unnecessary in the
particular case to pass upon this point, or because the
‘ase really involved a problem of state substantive law
such as the existence of presumptions and the location
of burden of proof.’

For instance, the ‘atest discussion of a similar
question in the Second Circuit is to be found in Presser
Royalty Company Vv. Chase Manhattan Bank, (1959)
272 F.2d 838, 840. There the court said: ‘‘In this di-
versity action brought in the Southern District of New
York and involving only issues of state law the ques-
tion whether the evidence was sufficient to take the
case to the jury is probably to he determined by New
York law."*) (Emphasis mine.) The use of the word

“In this last case the court cited with approval the rule stated by
Moore, supra, and the Pogue case, supra, and noted that the state
court’s decisions indicated that the state court would reach the same
conclusion. See footnote 11, p. 282. Also in that case, although juris-
diction was predicated upon diversity of citizenship, the action was to
recover for a maritime tort. See footnote 5 and accompanying text
commented upon in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U. S. 354, 376 (footnote 44).

7 That these latter are to be regarded as questions of substantive
law was stated in Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., supra, at p.
446.

20a

‘*probably”’ clearly indicates that the court found it
unnecessary for the purposes of the case to decide the
question, and also that it had some reservations upon
the question.

This is further indicated by the fact that the court
called attention to a dissenting opinion of Judge Ma-
gruder expressing an opposite view. (In Pierce Con-
sulting Eng. Co. v. City of Burlington, Vt., (1955), 221
F. 2d 607, which the court cited, the court showed sim-
ilar doubts as to whether state law controlled. citing
Moore and cases from the Fourth and Tenth circuits. )
Interestingly, although the court cited a number of
other cases from the Second Circuit, it failed to cite its
own decision in Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F. 2d 429, 433-
434, where it is said that the *‘hetter view’? would seem
to be that expressed by Moorc and by decisions in the
Ninth and Tenth Cireuits. I am of the opinion that
the question is still an open one in the Second Circuit."

~The question has not I think been presented for decision in the
First Circuit although twice Judge Magruder, dissenting, has posed
the question here discussed; on one occasion reserving judgment on
the point, and on another suggesting that the point he sought to make
would have been a better ground for the court’s conclusion. These
cases are Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, | cir.. 265 F. 2d 173, dissent
at p. 182; and Schell v. Ford Motor Co., 270 F. 2d 384, dissent at 387.
In the Third Circuit, that court purported to follow the local state rule
as to what was required to make a case for the jury. Lennig v. New
York Life Ins. Co., (1941) 122 F. 2d 871; Waldron v. Aetna Casualty
Co., (1944) 141 F. 2d 230. It seems plain they are based upon a mis-
understanding of the Stoner case, cited supra, note 5. In Clay County
Cotton Co. v. Home Life Insurance Co.. 113 F. 2d 856, the Eighth Cir-
cuit appears to recognize the rule stated by Moore that in respect to
the procedural questions a federal court in a diversity case will follow
the federal law. However, in the final paragraph of the court's opin-
ion it held that a motion for a directed verdict raised a question of
substantive law, namely, whether aggravation of a pre-existing dis-
ease through accident constituted accidental injury; accordingly it
followed the state law. In Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 8 cir., 271
F. 2d 1, 3, the court quoted with approval from the Byrd case, supra,
the statement of that Court that “It cannot be gainsaid that there is a
strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the jucge-
jury relationship in the federal courts.”

I am therefore confident that Professor Moore is
hasing his conclusion upon what is the great weight of
authority in the federal courts when he stated in the
section previously referred to that the sufficiency of
certain evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury
should not be controlled by state law but is rather a
question of federal law under the federal system which,
in the language of the Byrd case, supra, ‘distributes
trial function between judge and jury and, under the
influence —if not the command —of the Seventh
Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed ques-
tion of fact to the jury.’

If l am right in that. then, when the full facts in
this case are considered it seems clear to me that the
Judgment should be reversed.

As I read the majority opinion, the facts of this
not too simple case are recited in a single sentence
where it is said decedent ‘tput the gun to his forehead
in the presence of the plaintiff and the gun was fired
resulting in the death of the decedent.’’ This state-
ment is not only inaccurate but very incomplete.

At the time of his death Trivette was 45 vears of
age. He had two children by a former marriage, and
appellant and he were married in 1945. They had four
children born of their marriage, the eldest of whom was
10 and the youngest, 5. These four children and the
voungest of the children by the former marriage lived
With him and the appellant. He was engaged in the
eoul mining business and as an adjunct to it operated
a garage. The business was prosperous; he drew a
salary as executive vice-president and general manager
of $700 per month. His wife and oldest son each drew
a salary or dividend also. He had no business prob-
lems; he was attentive to and affectionate with his wife
and «hildren and within a week preceding his death he

oan
had made plans to install a children’s playground for
his on and the community children on an adjacent lot.
He had no health problems. In short, the evidence neg-
atives any possible motive or reason for suicide.

The evidence does disclose that Trivette was given
to occasional fits of anger in which his aetions were so
fantastic and bizarre as to indieate a serious mental
instability. During these explosive tantrums Trivette
would engage in violent actions usually accompanied
by shooting of the pistol. Some 10 years previous to
his death when the family lived in Indiana, Trivette
hecame ‘quite angry’? when he had had trouble with
some hired hands and ‘the got the gun out,’’ ‘stomped
out the house,”’ fired his pistol and was found outside
sitting on the sidewalk. Some seven years later he be-
came angry because of an interruption of his Saturday
night dinner plans and ‘‘broke up all the things in the
living room’’; ‘‘just started swiping everything off the
tables and wrecking them off, and there was glass all
over the living room and dining room.” He got his
gun out and ‘slung it around just like he was swing-
ing his hands around before and ordered his wife to
clean up the mess.’’ Approximately two years prior to
his death in another similar tantrum he got his pistol
and shot out the light in the center of the ceiling of his
bedroom, the same room in which he was finally shot.
The testimony indicated that after such demonstrations
of anger he would quickly recover and often when they
occurred he had been drinking whiskey.

On the occasion when he was shot he went into a
similar tantrum. He had eaten dinner with his family
and the steaks served had been selected by his brother-
in-law with whom Trivette was out of sorts on account

of the former’s failure to repay a loan owing to Tri-
vette; the steaks proved to be tough and Trivette re-
fused to finish his dinner and became sullen. He con-

23a

tinued sullen and incommunicative and then went to
the garage to get some money and after about twenty
minutes he returned to the house still in an ugly mood.
He went into his bedroom and motioned to his
wife to come in. His wife had bought him a shirt and
a pair of slacks and he was about to pack a bag in
order to spend a night at a motel to avoid night calls
from the garage. be in a nermal
good humor (53a, 179a, 182%-183a).

Maurice remained at the garage until time for
supper. This was on Saturday. He had made up and
distributed the payroll (110a, 179a and 182a).

He then went home about 6:30 p.m. (54a).

The residence was next door to the garage. His
brother, Warren, saw him at the garage about 5:30,
and wanted some Prestone that Maurice told him he
wa: out of, but would order some for him and it would
be there the following Monday. Warren said he was
ina ‘tvery good mood” at that time (100a ).

30a

His wife had run his bath water (55a) and he
cleaned up and changed his clothes at home, and took
two drinks, or nips, from a pint bottle of whiskey. Mrs.
Trivette testified she saw hin take two drinks, or
‘*nips’’ of whiskey that night while he was dressing
(79a), but he was not drunk (80a). The family went
into the dining room for supper somewhere around
7:30. The ste: xs selected by the brother-in-law in
Bristol proved to be tough (55a).

Maurice Trivette was out of sorts with this broth-
er-in-law beeause he had loaned him $7,500.00 some
years prior thereto, which the brother-in-law had made
no effort to repay (56a, 89a-92a). Maurice then be-
came ill-humored and did not finish his steak and re-
mained silent. The children went into the living room
and he and his wife sat at the table for some time and
drank about two cups of coffee. He then went into the
living room and sat staring into space, and was sullen
and incommuniecative. (d6a, 90a).

After a short time he went to the garage to get the
money out of the cash register, as was his custom (57a).
He habritially kept considerable money on hand to eash
checks for customers and employees of the coal com-
pany (57a). He was gone about 20 minutes (91a).
When he returned he was still in an ugly mood. He
went into the bedroom oceupied by him and his wife
and motioned to his wife to come in. He became vio-
lent and tore up a shirt and a pair of socks which his
wife had bought for him (58a, 92a-93a). He had de-
cided to spend the night at a motel in order to get some
rest and to avoid Saturday night calls from late trav-
elers at the garage, as he had done on previous occa-
sions (58a).

He packed toilet articles in a case for this pur-
pose (58a). He had put the money from the garage,
something over $990.00 (107a), in the pocket of a

sla

sports coat that he was wearing (58a). He had also
put five extra cartridges for his pistol in his pocket
(100a-101a, 1J5a, 164a-165a, and 170a).

This was about 10 p.m. (1386a-137a). He was
standing between the wall and the bed about midway
of this wall, with his right side next to the wall (61a),
and his wife was sitting on a bench, or stool, in front
of a dressing table near the corner of the opposite wall
(60a). (See floor exhibit, 48a).

Mr. Trivette complained that the sleeves of the
shirts were too long, and after tearing the shirt and
the slacks, threw them across the room. At this point
Mrs. Trivette started to get up to calm him down, as
she had done on previous occasions (60a), when he sud-
denly jerked a 44-special, Smith & Wesson revolver
(99a). from under his coat and belt, with his right
hand, and all in one motion fired the pistol (64a). The
bullet entered his right temple and ranged upward at a
Sharp angle, described by the undertaker as about a
90-degree angle (1182).

There was powder burn on his right temple, form-
ing a cirele around the hole made at the point of entry
of the bullet about * ths or “ths of an inch in diameter
(120a, 123a). Some of the brain was missing from
the point of exit in the upper part of his head (122a).
The bullet emerged from the top part of the head and
entered the ceiling at a point about 7 inches from the
connecting wall, near the corner opposite where Mrs.
Trivette was standing (70a). The bullet was never
found (72a).

He fell between the bed and the wall, a space of
about 3 feet (63a), with his head away from where his
wife had been sitting (62a).

Mrs. Trivette rushed to him and had his head in
her arms when some of the neighbors eame in and
found them in this position (134a, 146a, 162a). An

St

ambulance was called, and Mrs. Trivette, Troy Chil-
ders, and Jimmy Ellis aecompanied Maurice to the
hospital in Pikeville (168a), but he was dead upon
arrival (67a, 164a).

Mrs. Trivette deseribed the action of her husband
in jerking the pistol from his belt and firing as ‘‘like a
flash’’ (64a, 66a, 186a), and said she thought he struck
the wall with his right elbow. The court sustained ob-
jection to this and instructed the jury not to consider
it. The witness’ testimony on thispoint was as follows:

‘© A, 203. And so far as I can remember—I am
not positive about all this, but he was standing
about like this (indieating), about like so (indicat.
ing), standing close to the wall, and when he
jerked his arm back—like that (indicating )—
about that fast. He was very angry. It isn’t the
same when you are calm. When you puli a gun
out of your pants and put it up to vour head with
certain details, he didn’t do that, with minute de-

tails. It was all ina flash.

*Q. 204. Do you have any opinion as_ to
whether his arm, or elbow, struck the wall ?

“Mr. Blackwell: Object, Your Honor, she
ean't give an opinion.

“The Court: Objection sustained as to the
opinion. Mrs. Trivette, you may state to the best
of your knowledge, whether or not you saw the arm
strike the wall.

‘*A. I didn’t actually see it strike the wall.
I thought that it had because he was standing so
close to the wall. I stood in the same position he
did, and I didn’t see how he could get the gun up
to his head without striking the wall.”’

Mrs. Trivette was heard to say by one of the neigh-
bors that came running into the house within a few
minutes, while holding her husband’s head in her lap,

Oba

and holding her hands over the wound to stop the
blood, that the did not mean it’ (163a-164a ).

Her brother-in-law, Warren Trivette, who came
into the room shortly after the accident, observed Mil-
dred holding her husband, and testified that she said,
‘he didn’t mean to do it’ (113a).

Some two years prior to this time, Maurice Tri-
vette, ina similar fit of anger, had tired this same pistol
in the same bedroom and had broken the ceiling light
in the middle of the room (76a, 84a). On another occa-
sion in Indiana, he had fired a gun while in an angry
mood (77a-83a-84a), and on another occasion at his
home at Virgie on a Saturday night when he had been
‘alled to pull in a wreeked car which interfered with
plans that they had made to dine out, he came back
home angry and broke up the living room furniture and
furnishings, and flourished his gun about, but did not
fire it at that time (77a, 85a). Mrs. Trivette testified
that he had got over these spells almost immediately,
and would be very sorry (78a).

Maurice Trivette left no wilk He left no suicide
note. He made no threats to kill himself. He did not
do or say one single thing that indicated that he had
- any intention of taking his life.

He was not in any kind of financial difficulty or
trouble of any kind, and he was in good health (96a,
97a, 106a, and I11a).

The coroner, Mr. Call, held an inquest on Novem-
her 19, 1957 (68a. 88a, 123a, 127a, 135a, and 136a). An
effort was made to introduce in evidence the cause of
death as shown by the death certificate (39a-40a), and
by the verdict of the coroner’s jury, which showed acei-
dental death by gunshot wound (127a, 136a). The
lower Court refused to permit any questions about the
coroner's verdict and held there was no issue as to the
‘cause of death’ (40a, 136a).

34a

A distinct issue was made of the cause of death by
the answer. Taragraph IV of the answer is as fol-
lows: |

‘‘New York Life specifically denies that the

insured, Maurice Trivette, died on October 19,

1957, from bodily injury effected solely through

external, violent, and accidental means.’’ (11a).

After proofs of death were filed with the defend-
ant’s insuranee company, it paid the face of the poli-
cies, aggregating $30,000.00 to the appellant (38a), but
declined to pay the double indemnity. It was stipu-
lated that the policies were in full force and effect.

Complaint was filed in the Pike Cireuit Court in
March of 1958 seeking recovery under the double in-
demnity clause of each policy. (See complaint, 3a to
6a). Each of the four policies were filed and exhibited
in evidence, and it was admitted and stipulated that
they were in full force and effect at the time of Maurice
Trivette’s death (48a-49a).

The only portions of the policies that are relevant
to the issues upon this appeal are the double indemnity
clauses.

The clause in the first two policies is copied into
the complaint (4a), and the clause contained in the last
two policies is copied into the complaint (5a).

On April 18, 1958, the action was removed to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky on the grounds of diversity of citizenship.

wt

35a
APPENDIX IV

DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE CASE
AT BAR AND THE (KY.) TUGGLE &
REDWINE CASES

(1) Tuggle went underneath his house to a place
Where coal and kindling was stored, described in the
opinion as a ‘tdark and uninviting place.” Trivette
was in his own, well-lighted bedroom at his home which
he and his wife oceupied daily.

(2) There was no one around or close to Tuggle
at the time he shot himself. Trivette’s wife was in the
room with him. The door between the bedroom and the
living room was open, and his small ehildren were
watching television in the adjoining room.

(3) Tuggle had been morose for at least 10 days
hefore the tragedy occurred. He had passed old friends
on the street without speaking to them. Friends said
that he seemed to be in a study, or troubled about some-
thing, for a period of 10 days before the tragedy. Tri-
vette had pursued his customary routine during the
entire day and was in a normal good mood up to a very
short time before the tragedy occurred, and not more
than 2 and 1% or 3 hours at the most.

(4) Inthe Tuggle case, Tuggle had laid his rifle
across a steel barrel, or drum, bracing the gun so as to
place the muzzle against the side of his head, and then
reached back and tripped the trigger. Trivette pulled
the gun from his helt and fired in one quick motion, or
‘flash’? as deseribed by his wife, and without any
aim, preparation, or deliberation of any kind.

(5) In the Tuggle case there were no powder
burns on the side of the head showing that the gun was

ob

placed directly against the side of the head. In the
Trivette ease there were powder burns showing that the
gun was not placed against the head at the time it was
discharged. It is common knowledge that if a person
holds a gun in his hand, and attempts to point it at the
side of his head without aiming or touching the head,
it is impossible to tell where the gun is aimed in this
position.

(6) In the Tuggle case there was blood and
brains on the inside of the muzzle of the barrel, due to
the hack suction after the gun was discharged with the
muzzle pressed against the side of the head. In the
Trivette case, there was no evidence of any blood,
brains, or tissue of any kind on or in the gun that had
been used.

(7) In the Tuggle case it is stated that there was
no apparent reason why Tuggle should have had a gun
in the first place. In the Trivette case it was shown
that Mr. Trivette kept money at his home taken from
the garage each night, and that for vears, he had kept
a gun under the mattress in his bedroom for the pur-
pose of protection.

(8) In the Trivette case it was shown that Tri-
vette had a high temper, and at various times preced-
ing the tragedy, that he would get his gun and shoot
it, after which he usually became calm. In fact, it was
shown that he had fired his gun into the ceiling in this
same bedroom about two years before. The place where
the bullet went through the ceiling had been patched,
but was still visible, and a photograph was presented
of this in the evidence. On two previous occasions he
had flourished the gun around in a fit of temper. No
such antecedent similar circumstances were in evidence
in the Tuggle ease.

37a

(9) In the Tuggle case there was clear-cut evi-
dence of motive for suicide, Le., demotion, In this case,
no motive Whatever was shown. On the contrary, it
was shown by uncontradicted evidence that the de-
ceased had every reason to want to lve—suecessful
business, good health, a good home, a good income,
and a devoted family consisting of a young wife and
five voung children and one grown son, [It seems more
apparent in this case that Trivette intended to do what
he had done before, whitein a rage, that is, pull his
gun and shoot through the -eiling of the bedroom, and
that he either misjudged the aim by not being able to
see where the gun was pointed, or as his wife surmised,
that his elbow hit the wall, causing the gun to deflect
and fire into his head.

A careful study of the Tuggle ease and the facts
of this case reveals that there is no basis for compari-
son. While the facts of the Tuggle case show conelu-
sively that Tuggle intended to commit suicide, the
facts of the Trivette case show more conclusively that
no such act was intended, and that death was acciden-
tal. At least, it must be admitted that the inferenecs
from all the facts and circumstances point to accident,
and not to intentional suicide.

In the Redwine ease, the Kentucky opinion, after
reviewing all of the evidence concludes ‘‘ Clearly, Ewen
intentionally ended his own life.’ (Emphasis ours.)
(352 S. W. (2) 646.)

38a.

APPENDIX V
No. 13.910

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Miuprep (. TRIVETTE - - - - - = Appellant
VS:
NEW York LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY - = Appellee

ORDER DENYING REHEARING
February 28, 1961

This date this eause came on to be heard on the
petition of the appellant, Mildred C. Trivette, for re-
hearing. On authority of Lovas vy. General Motors
Corp., 212 F. 2d 805, (C. A. 6) 1954, the Court is sat-
istied that the conclusion reached in the original deci-
sion is correct. We do not read Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 358 U.S. 427, 79 S. Ct. 921, as requiring a
different result.

Judge Pope adheres to the same position which be
expressed in his dissenting opinion herein.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that
the petition for rehearing be and. it is hereby denied.

/s/ W: WALLACE KENT
District Judge
Sitting by designation

39a

APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF SERVICE

I, O. T. Hinton, one of the attorneys for the Peti-
tioners herein state on oath that [am a member of
tae bar in good standing of all of the State and Fed-
eral Courts within the S'ate of Kentucky, including
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and of the United
States District Court for the 6th Cireuit, and have been
for more than 40 years; that I am a member in good
standing of the Pike County Bar Association, the
Kentucky State Bar Association, and the American
Bar Association, and do hereby certify that on the
aa day of May, 1961, I served copies of the fore-
going petition for writ of certiorari upon the respond-
eut, New York Life Insurance Company, as follows:
By mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope with
first-class postage prepaid to its attorneys of record as
follows: Thomas W. Bullitt, Kentucky Home Life
Building, 7th Floor, Louisville 2, Kentucky, and R. Lee
Blackwell, Kentucky Home Life Building, 7th Floor,
Louisville 2, Kentucky.

(QO. PT. Hinton)

STATE OF KENTUCKY

COUNTY OF PIKE |
Subseribed and sworn to before me by O. T. Hin-

day of May, 1961.

My Commission expires

ton this

Witness my signature and seal of office this ——
dav of . 1961.

Notary Public, Pike Co., Ky.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UMITED STATES

ae
; Leagan

MILDRED C. TRIVETTE, . . ‘ Petitioner,

versas

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, . - - - Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF.

In Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

R. LEE BLACKWELL,
1700 Ky. Home Life Building,
louisville 2, Ky.
THOMAS W. BULLITT,
1700 Ky. Home Life Building,
Louisville 2, Ky.
Counsel for Respondent.

BULLITT, DAWSON & TARRANT,
Of Couneel.

WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO.. INT ORPORATED. LOUISVILLE. KY.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_1142%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
