# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Britton (No. 228) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_1105%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1961 ## Text . ° ? *°(16) The tenn ‘widow’ includes only the decedent's wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justihable cause or by reuson of his desertion at such time. a o ® ad e s See. 921, Review of compensation orders. = oe a o . . es ‘*(b) If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspende| or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making the order, and instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury oceurred (or the United States Dis- trict Court for the District of Columbia if the injury occurred in the District.) ** STATEMENT John P. Morton, an employee of the Market Pharmacy Was Injured in the scope of employment on July 2, 1958, and died as a result of his injuries on July 16, 1998 (infra, App. A, pp. la-2a). Subsequently, Respondent Evelyn Morton made a claim against the emplover for death benefits under the Loneshoremen’s and Harbor Workers*® Compensation Act, supra, as nade applicable in the District of Columbia (infra, App. A, p. I4a), and a hearing was neld at which anong other things, the existence of a marital relationship between Evelyn Morton and the deceased emplovee was 4 contested (infra, App. A, p. 4a). At the hearing there was introduced evidence of cohabitation and reputation as to the existence of a common law marriage (.J.A 90, 104, 107, 108, 115). Evidence aiso was introduced tending to con- trovert such claim and Respondent Evelyn Morton, then claimant, was cross examined and testified directly con- cerning such evidence (JA 91-104). Her own testimony is that she and deceased commenced living together in Char- lottesville, Virginia, in 1941, and that while so doing they entered into a private agreement to consider themselves husband and wife (JA 2-93, 102). In about 1943 or 1944, they moved to the District of Columbia, where, as was found by the deputy commissioner ; ++* @ * some time between the conception and birth of Shirley Ann flarris Morton the mother of Evely: Morton, Peari Henrietta Harris, asked the cinplovee and Evelyn Morton to allow her to adopt the expeeted child, and this request was joined in by one Crawley Rogers with whom the said Pearl Henrietta Harris was then living; that when the child was born the said Evelyn Morion had it registered with the vital statis- tics authority as the child of Crawley Rogers and Evelyn H. Harris, her own maiden name * * *** (infra, App. A, p. 6a). That child was horn on June 18, 1946, in the District of Columbia (JA 94). Shortly thereafter, Respondent Evelyn Morton (hereafter referred to as Evelyn) testified, she and deceased moved from the District to Maryland (JA 95). While in Maryland, she filed a supplemental birth affidavit naming the child born to herself and Crawley Rogers as Shirley Ann Harris, reiterating that her own surname was Harris (JA 103). Nothing in the record indicates that the name of that child ever was changed to Morton. After re- siding in Maryland tor some five years, Evelyn testitied that she and deceased returned to the District of Columbia (JA 96), for two vears after which they returned to Mary- land (3.1 96), where Evelyn continues to reside (JA 91). ” In 1952, Evelyn had told the public authorities tn Maryiand that she had no one to help her with her bills (FA 101, 135, 138). After returning to Maryland in 1954, she applied for public assistance giving the surname of her first ehtld as Harris (JA 134, 137). In 1956, she did not know where de- ceased was living (.J. A 96). On oecasion, she has denied that her other child was fathered by the deceased employee (JA 104). REASONS FCR GRANTING THIS WRIT The finding that a common law marriage cristed vrolates the rule laid down by this Court i Travers ve. Reimharedt, 205 US. 423, 1 L. ed. 871, 27, S. Ct. 567, that the parties must live together ‘constantly and openly holding forth to the world” that they are husband and wite. One of the deputy commissioner's findings of fact, that: the parties to the alleged marriage agreed that their first child was to be considered the child of another man and the action of Evelyn in subsequently registering that child) as the child of that other man and herself as Evelyn Harris rather than Evelyn Morton, is a complete public disavowa! of any marital relationship between the parties hereto. A fundamental consideration in this Court’s deeision in Tra- vers Vv. Reenhardt, supra, was the uniform openness and consistency of the relationship between the parties (205 U.S. 442). Therefor, the finding in the present case by the deputy conanissioner that, in connection with the birth of Evelyn's first child, the parties denied the existence of any marital relationship between them shows that his finding that such a relationship existed is an error of law. Further, an analysis of the evidence. viewed in the light most favorable to Evelyn, shows that, under the law of the various jurisdictions where the parties to the present reta- tionship lived from time to time, no marital relationship could have come into being between tiem. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_1105%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.