# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Labor Relations Board v. Local 1566, International Longshoremen's Ass'n > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_0896%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1961 - **Citation:** 366 U.S. 909 ## Text She Supreme Goro he Wied ites a OCTOBER’ TE RM, 1960 | National Labor Re_ations Buanv, PerrrioNen, 4 9 Fg Se F A v. ; : ‘Lecat 1566, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN 's ASSOCIATION : -* "PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE’ UNITED _ STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT STUART ROTHMAN, , eneral Counsel, ° , DOMINICK L. MANOLI, . Associate: Generak Counsel, NORTON J. COME, Assistan?’ General Counsel, ? ‘~ : pit 5 Daye STANDAU E. WBINBRECHT, Attorne,, National Labor Relations Board, “ Washington m * C. ser _ - , —— ‘Eee INDEX a pee Page NE MN no wc wees ine cane nits veehes och esters Paina | Jurisdiction ..... ee a eee ee rc ee Ie Se ae Question presented............... Teoh tas AA ONG Statute involved ..... cataaek manatee [ROA ENO OR Sees ae Statement ae re ee Moaenes oP re aS ak Ee Ne A. The Board's findings ........ rrr y ES Sere. 4 'B. The Board’s conclusions and BN cw kc aihicha-s Bae 0s 8 C. The decision of the Court of Appeals................. 9 Reasons for granting the wih... cate WEN'S Assen TATION PETITION FOR A WRIT OF Cf RTIORARL (0 THE UNITED ‘STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIROUTI The .National -Labor “Relations Board prays that’ a writ of certiorari issue to review that part of the de- cision of the U nited States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered i in the above entitled ¢ aseon May 4, 1960, which denies’ enforcement of the reimburse. “ment provisions of the Board's order, . OPINION BELOW The opinion of the Court, of Appeals (Appendix, pp. 12-20, .jufra) isnot vet reported: The tindings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the Board (BLA, 2a-36a) ' are reported at 122 NLRB 967, iS ot “B. AC ‘voleneniad are to the appendix to the brief of the Board in ma court below. ! (1) 9 JURISDICTION The decree of the Court of Appeals ( Appendix pp. 21-25, infra) was entered on June 14, 1960. The poms tion of this Court.is invoked tinder 28 U ‘S. C. 204(1). |. . QUESTION PRESENTED. ‘Whether the Board, as a remedy for an arrangement hetween the employer and the union which unlawfully ‘conditions preference in hiring upon union member- ship, may require that the.employees be reimbursed for all dues and assessments which they paid to the union ander that arrangement. | STATUTE INVOLVED ~The relevant provisions of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended (61 Stat.136, 29 U S.C, 191, et seq. dy are as follows: Sec. 7. Employees shall have the. Highs to self- oFganization, to form, join, or assist Jabor organi- bations, to bargain collectively throug representa- taves of their own choosing, and to: ot ld in other concerted activities for the. purpose of ‘colfective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to. refrain from any or all “of such Xctivities except to the extent that such’ right niay be affected by an agreement requiring, membership in a labor organization as a condition - of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3). See. 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— . + * * * \* (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure ‘of employment or any term or condition of employ- By ment to eneourage or discourage membership in any labor organizaticn: Provide d, That nothing in this Act, or dn any other statute of the United... States, shall preclude“tin ¢ inployer hone making an. agreement with a labor organization (not estab-_ -lished, maintained, or assisted by any action de- fined in section. 8(a) of this Act as an unfair labor . practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whicheyer is the. later, (i) if such labor organization is the: repre- sentative of the employees as provided in section, 9(a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit. covered by such agreement when made ; and. has at - the time the agreement was made or within the preceding twelve months received from the Board a notice of compliance with sections 9(f). (Cy), (h), * * * : (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— - (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriniinate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to diseriminate against an. - employee with respect to whom member ship in such oid organization has been-denied or terminated on ‘some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re- aN 4 Sn ars quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ; sadn Silas fe * . *— * . Section. 10. * * *, (ce) * * * If upomthe preponderance of the testi- icc, * - 6 . Hiring at Maritime is effected through the, shape-up ¥ (B.A. 18a; 56a-d7a). Pursuant to this system men . _ seeking employment gather at Maritime's place of busi- ness at about 7:30 aim. each work day where, upon signal, they present themselves (‘‘shape-up"’) for selec- tion by Maritime’s hiring foremen to fill the available jobs (B.A. 18a; 54a-55a). The hiring’ foremen are members of the Union and follow the uniform ‘practice of employing union members in preference to other “applicants (B.A. 18a, 21a; 49a, 55a, 59a, T0a-71a, 74a). Thus applicants are classified in the shape-up as (1) hook men (sometimes also called button men) ; (2) card men; (3) those who have neither books nor cards (B.A. 19a-20a; 55a-56a). These terms refer to the union status of the applicant. Book men are full fledged members of the Union (B.A. 19a; 56a). They are is-’ sued a new and differently colored button each month upon payment to the Union of the month’s dues (B.A. 19a; 49a-50a ). The buttons are worn by the members in prominent display,-and are used to identify the weareras a member of the Union in good standing (B.A, 19a-20a ; 49a-50a, 98a, Tla) and thereby qualify- ing him for preference in hiring as required by the consiitttion of the International. Longshoremen’s As- sociation (B: A. 20a; 92a). Card men are not union members, but. are approved by the Union for work for a monthly period. upon pay- ment of a: fee-equivalent to a month's dues (B.A. 19a; 49a, 56a). “However, an individual who acquires cards for 12 consecutive: months,and who has 700 hours of waterfront work experience is eligible for full mem- bership in, the Union (B.A. 19a; 49a). ; 7 © At each morning shape-up the hiring foremen make the first job assignments to book men (B.A. 21a; 59a, “4a). If there are remaining jobs after the supply of hook men: haye been exhausted, assignments are then made among the-card men (B.A, 2la; 59a, 72a, 74a). Ik inally, if any work remains, the foremen make their selections from-applicants who have neither a. union hook nor a permit card (ibid.). The only: occasions upon which non-members are hired in preference to union members are instances where: the member is he- ing disciplined for a. violation of a union or contract. rule,,or where a special work assignment has been_re- served for the member (B.A. 22a ; DTa-D9a ), Marvin Gould and Zack Page were not members of the Union, but had worked at Maritime as card men since 1955 and 1952, respectively (B.A. 20a-21a, 28a- 29a; d9a-Wa, T2a-Tda, T7aj. Following a November 1956 strike in the Philadelphia waterfront, the Union initially refused to issue cards to Gould and Pave he- eause they had not performed picket duty, but with- drew the refusal several days later when the unfair labor practice charges were filed in this case (B.A, 20a- 2la; 67a-63a). Giotild and Page, however, neither re- quested nor obtained cards after.the initial refusal, but they continued to shape-up each morning at Maritime (B.A..21a, 29a+30a ; 67a-69a, Ta, qa). In this role they were accorded the lowest priority ‘under the hiring system, regardless of their employment experience, and accordingly obtained employment only whenever the supply of book men and card men did not exhaust the available work assignments (B.A. 308; 69a-7Ua). 8 ‘B. The —— s Conclusions and cn The Board concluded that the Union, by entering into and taking part in the hiring practices at Maritime through foremen subject to union discipline, caused discrimination in favor of union members, and thereby . jolated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act: By # part in subjecting employees Gould and Page tothis ~ discriminatory practice, the Union was similarly found ’ to have violated these statutory provisions. The Board also concluded that the union security provisions in the 1954 and 1957 contracts were invalid, and that ‘the Union had further ‘violated Section 8(b (2) and -(1). -(A) of the Act by maintaining them in effect. The in- validity of the union security clauses was premised on alternative grounds: first, that the language which purported to defer the clause granting preference t union members could not be given effect, Decause the hiring practice showed that ‘the, parties never Ye: sliy intended to postpone operation of the preference sys- tem’’ (B.A. da); and second, that the deferral language was ‘so obscure that a workingman covered by its pro-. visions could hardly be expected to know when union membership was required and when it was not’ ( id., n. 3). In addition, the union security clause in the 1957 contract was found to be independently unlawful, in view of the fact that the Union had not complied with the filing re quirements of the Act ‘at: the time such agreement was exectited (B.A. 8a-4a, 18a, Ba, 292-302)... / To remedy the foregoing violations the Board's order requires the Union to cease, and desist.frem entering into or maintaining any agreement or practice: with Maritime or any other employer member of- Philadel- 9 s phia Marine Trade Association, under which union nmiembers are given preference, in employment, except to the extent authorized by S section 8(a) (3) of the Act: from causing Maritime fo diseriminate unlawfully | the employment of Marvin Gould and Zac k Page, or -any other applicant; and from in any other.manner re- straining or coercing Maritime’s employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed in See tion 7 of thie Act. —Aftirmatively, the Board's order requires the Union to reimburse Maritime’s employees for all-fees, dues and » other monies collected pursuant to the wnlawlul eou- tracts and diseriminatory hiring practices, to make whole Gould and Page for any Rane ial wages Incurred as: a result-of the discriminationagainst them, and to post appropriate hotices. (BJA. da-Ta.) . : C2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, Phe Court of Appeals sustained the Boagd’s unfair labor practice findings, and granted enforcement of its order, except that portion requiring re ‘imbursement of monies paid to the Union. Enforcement of the latter portion was denied upon the authority and rewsoning of the court's cartier decisions in Nationa Labor Rela- tions Board v, American Dredging Company, 276 BF. 2d 286, petition for certiorari pending, No, 125, this ‘Perm, and National Labor Relations Board vy. United States Steel Corporation (American Bridge Divisions and Lacatl Tnion 542, International Union of Operating ‘Engineers, AFL-CIO, not vet reported, petition for * The court, in-its deeree.‘also modified the breadth of the cease and desist provisions (Appendix, fra, pp.-21-226. That modifies- tion ix not contested here. ; ~s 10 certiorari pending, No. 228, this.Term. (Appendix, infra, p. 19-20,). : ‘ . REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ‘ This case presents the question of whether the Board, as a remedy for hiring practices which unlawfully en- courage union membership, may require that monies paid by the ‘employ ees to the union w wa subjected to thoge practices be repaid to them, The Same question is presented in Local 60, E'nited Frotherhood of Car- penters Vv. National Labor Relations Board and Na- tional Labor Relations Board vy. Loeal 357, Interna- tional. Brothe rhood of Teamsters, Nos, 68 and 85, this Term, certiorari- granted, June 27, 1960. In addition, Board petitions are pending in other « "aSeS involving, the question, including American Dredging Company, and United States Steel Corporation (American Bridge Division’), relied upon by the court beiow—-Nos, 89, 120, © 123, 228, 229, this Term. The instant petition is filed to preserve the Board's position on the issue in this: o case. CONCLUSION: -For the foregoing reasons, the present petition should be granted, or, in the alternative, held in abeyance pend- , Se eG, , lie Tre oS ale ing a decision on the question in Nos. 68 and 89, : Respectfully submitted, Si Ant RoTHMAN, © General ( ‘ounsel, of Domi kK L. Manout, | ae 3 Associate General ( ‘ouesel, : ‘ Not TON J. COME, i . Assistant General Counsel, ®» Sranpat EK. WEINBRECHT, oh : aes | Attorney, ‘National Labor Relations Baard, ] authorize the filing of this petition fora writ of éRtiorari. | eras | Sonne od, Lee RANKIN, Solicitor General, Avausr 1960, # ad Sia i : ue payment of dues, received an identification button, dif: _ferently colored for each month. (2) Card-men, not members of the Union but who, upen payment of **dues’’ each nignth, were given a-card. With twelve consecutive cards and compiling 700 work-hours on the - waterfront, a card-man becomes eligible for ful! union membtrship. (3) Those applicants who had neither | books nor cards. Priority -was allocated according to these categories, book-men receiving preference and_ upon exhausting these; card-men and ete if.any jobs remained, the last class. , oa Gould and Page were card-men, bit in December 1956 the Union, through its Secret tary-Treasurer, re- fused to issue their cards ‘along, with sdme 7 to 10 other . men) because they had not picketed during a strike which‘oceurred about mid-Nov ember 1956.2 Subsequent - to their bringing charges‘the parties were informed that - the Union had reseinded its refusal to issue the cards, However, neither. again sought them. The Union resists enforcement of the Board's: orde or’ on the grounds that any discriminatory hiring practices at Maritime were the unilateral action of Maritime’s hiring foremen and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the Union participated therein; and the union security clause in the colleetive bargain- ing agreements‘was not unlawful since it was couched in terms of a ‘‘savings”’ or ‘deferral’ clause. The Union also contests:the Board's application of the ** Brown-- Olds Rule’ in its remedy. The Union does not question, and we shall not con- sider, the finding that it was unauthorized to: make a: union security contract in 1957 for failure to comply - with Section 9(f), (2) and (h) of the Act, nor the denial of its motion, at the hearing, for prodnetion of names and pre-hearing statements of witnesses. Ph Thigz,court, has reviewed? the whole tecord and con-' ‘ toe . 3, : c cludes there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings. Such findings therefore are con- elusive and will not de disturbed. Universal Camera’ Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 US, 474 (1951). | . ee . a? sg Union Participation The hiring svstem was based upon the union status of the men shaping-up-—-that is whether they had buttens, cards or neither—and it was the Union who determined that status and either issued, oF refused to issue, a but- ton or a card. When some nine to twelve card nien, including the, complainants Page and Goulds did not: walk -a picket line the Union reftited to issue them cards, This action might have been meaningless as a disciplinary measure if the Union had not heen com- pletely aware that without a card, auployment oppor- tunity was greatly reduced under Maritime’s hiring practiced) The constitution of the International pro- vides thaf only the regular PLA button ‘shall be ree- ognized in the ‘hiring of men for. work” and provides a penalty for violations, The constitution was sup- * plem nted on the lecal level by the collective bargain- ing agreements raljing for hiring preference for Union members.’ The sum of this is a elear indic. ation of a -Enion pol- icy or practice of preferential hiring. The Trial Rx- aminer held: | “* "© that where the circumstances disclose the establishment ‘or imposition ‘of a discriminatory hiring polity by or for a local union, that union may be held responsible where discrimination. is a proximate and foreseeable consequence of the’ operation of the-policy, and discrimination in fact ' The “deferral” clause of these agreements is discussed infra. 16° results. This is not to impose upon the local re- sponsibility for programs or conduct-over which it ~ has no control. It is merely to hold it accountable “for its own action. If the loeal wishes to avoid liability in such situations there are effective meth- ods by which it may disavow the offending policy.” At the hearing, tie Union attempted to rebut this evi- dence with testimony that the hiring foremen were not | aware of the:clause in the Internatfonal constitution. The Examiner did not credit this testimony since only one.of the five foremen would .so testify. Testimony that the local was orally advised B¥ the Lnternational >that the hiring’ clause_in-the constitution was nof en-. forced and that locals, in any event, have blanket an- thority to ignore any’ provision in the constitution which they deem illegal was considered }*incredible”’ ‘by the Examiner in the teeth of evidence that other pro- visions are followed and enforced, particularly a‘spe- cific method for dealing with the problem of illegal pro- visions, And the constitution itself declares uni) and void any local by-law in conflict with the constitution. The question of credibility of: testimony is within the Trial Examiner's domain. ‘** * * it is not our task to resolve questions of credibility of those who testify at the Board hearings.”* National Laber Relations Board v. Local 420, eti., 239 F.2d 827, 528.09 Cir. 1956), The Union attempts to meet the Examiner's finding by averring that union participation in unfair prae- tices must be proved by chrect evidence. We are of the opinion that this is erroneous. It is true that many of the cases cited by the Board in support of its position contain indisputable evidence thatthe offending union... formally requested or demanded that the company fol- low a discriminatory hiring practice. -Nee e.g. National Lhahor Relations Board v. Local 369, ete., 240 F.2a 539 - (3 Cir. 1956) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Local : 17 420, ete., 239. F.2d 327 (: 3 Cir. 1956). But these deci- — sions do not establish a minimum standard for finding _ union. participation. In fact in National Labor Rela- tions:Board ¥. Local 369, supra, at 544, this court stated : “The absence of proof that the Union spec ifically re- quested the Company to discriminate is not critical wheré there is substantial evidence to support the find- -ing of a dis-riminatory hiring arrangement actively ‘participated’in by the Union.” The Board may, as it did here, dvaw a reasonable inference from the believ- able evidence. It must, of course, be supported by sub- stantial evidence but an-inference as such is not pro- “seribed by the Act. This has been settled by Radio Offi- cers vy. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17, 48-52 (1954). There, Union participation was proved but the unfair practice, encouragement of union membership, was inferred by the Board. The Court, in upholding the Bogrd said at page 92: Since encouragement of union membership is ob- viously a natural and foreseeable consequence of any employer discrimination at the request of a . Union, those employers must be presumed to have. intended such encouragement. It follows that. it was eminently reasonable for the Board to infer encouragement of union membership * * *."", . Conversely, the unfair practice being proved, the Board may make a reasonable inference from all the evidenie that the Union participated in such practice. **The unfair labor -practice can be found from a procedure which shows a practice or understanding though it may’ not establish an express contract between the parties.” National Labor Relatiotis Board v. Loe al 420, supra at : — The Union’s contention that direct evidence, rather than inference, is necessary to implic ate jt in the unfair 18 pfactices is set\yt rest by the following language in Ra- dio Officers, supraat 50: “There is vothing in the language of the amend- ment [Taft-Hartley] itself that suggests denial to the Board of power to draw reasonable inferences. It is inconceivable that the authors of the reports [ House Reports on Taft-Hartley] intended such a result; for a fact-finding body must have’ some power to decide which inferences to draw and which to reject. We therefore conclude that in- sofar as the power to draw reasonable inferences ix concerned, Taft-Hartley did not alter prior law.”’ ‘ The testimony in this instane ¢ is sufficient to support the resulting inference of the Board. Whether this court would have arrived at: the same result is of no “matter. Our review is.limited to the sufficiency of the. supporting evidence, Universal Camera Corp, v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. supra, 488. : s . II ° Union Security Cliuse. We turn now to the legality of the union security clause contained in’ the collective bargaining agree- ments between the Union and Maritime. It reads: *Unton Security: As to any and all work covered hereunder, finally determined by duly constituted public authority, not to be subject to any statute forbidding a preferential hiring provision, the em- ployers agree to give preference to men who are “members of the Unjon in good standing. As to all ', other work, the employers agree to institute and maintain a unien shop as shall comply with Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations *Act or any amendment, thereto.”’ Ae eee The Board found that- this ae in both the 1954 and 1957 ag ‘coments, was illegal despite the deferral language therein, This decision was based on the tind- ing that, since the parties immediately, began dmple- menting the preferential portion without regard to the deferral language, the clause was executed with the present intent to create dise ‘riminatory conditions of employment. ee aye ta The Union counters, that a collective bargaining agreement valid on its fuce cannot be converted inte an ilhegal hiring clause because of subseqacit diserimina- tory practices. This argument can be dismissed as not: meeting the issue, The Board found: that the Agree- ment was not valid in faet, from its ery meception, it ‘cannot be seriously argued that the mere recitation of” words in a proper aud accepted form can throw a blan- “ket absolution over illegal acts presently performed ~ under a clause, included in a contract, purportedly to: cover a future possibility. of legal sanction, Finding as.we do, it is unnec essary to discuss the - ssue whether the clause meets. the requirement, of ‘clear and unequivocal’ set forth in Lewis v. Quality » Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140 (7 Cir, 1959). However in ‘passing, it should be pointed out that the elanse in. volved, in both meaning and clarity, is a far ery from the one discussed in the Lewis opinion. IIT: Th e Remedy ¢ The sole remaining problem is the Board's. appliea- tion of the * Brown-Olds Rule.” Ina recent decis jon, National Labor Relations Board v. American Dredging Company, —° F.2d (3 Cir, 1960), this court de- clined to enforce the rule against an émplover who “neither dominated the union nor collected the-fees and dues, Further, there was no evidence in the record iit- ’ © 20 -dicating that employees were required to join the union. as a condition to obtaining employment. ‘Requiring the "employer in that situation to reimburse fees and dues paid to their union would be a windfall for the em- plovees, and in no, way effectuate the purposes of the Act. And in National Labor Relations Board v. United States Steel Corporation (American Bridge Division) and Loeal Union 542, AFL-CIO, FP2d 7) (3 Cir. 1960), we have continued to insist that the reimburse- ment order must be limited to employees shown to have been coerced.) And we emphasize that in such alleged _ Instances it is necessary to produce evidence of coercion as to each individual concerning whom it is asserted. Since the record before us furnishes no proof of that type weare forced to refuse the part of the Board's order allowing: reimbursement to employees for fees and dues they had paid. Regarding Marvin Gould and Zack Page, they are to be made whole for any loss of pay incurred by them as a result of the discrimination against them above stated. ~ The Board's order will be enforced except as to Para- graph 2(a) thereof which will be stricken. The notice called for by Paragraph (¢) of the Order will be amended by striking out its last paragraph. A decree in accordance with this opinion may be submit- ted. | . 2) UNitep STaAtes Court of Arrrals ror THE THIRD CiRCUIT No, 12,908 NarioNaL Lapok RELATIONS Boakb, PETITIONER, - . - ’ igs Locan 1566, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S | ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT. DrcreEE ENrORCING IN Parr AND DENYING IN PART AN Oxper or THE Nationat Lanor RELATIONS Boarp Before: ‘Biacs, Chief Judge and Gooprich san Mee LAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges: THis CAUseé caine oll lo hie heard upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board to enforce its order dated January 16,1959, The Court heard argument of respective counsel on November 16, 1959, and has con- sidered the briefs and transcript of record filed in this ease, On May 4, 1960, the Court being fully advised in the premises, handed down its opinion enforcing in part-and setting aside in part.the Board’s said Order. In conformity therewith. it is hérehy Orperep. Abrtpari AND DPrerkep by the United .States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that Re- spondent, Local 1566, International Longshoremen's Association, its officers, representatives, agents, sueces- sors and assigns shall: | 1. Cease and Desist from: (a): Giving effect te, entering into, renewing, amain- taining, or enforcing any agreement, arrangement, un- deystanding or practice with Philadelphia Marine . Trade Association, Maritime Ship Cleaning and Main- tenance Co. or any othégamember emplover of Phila- 2 delphia Marine Trade Association, requiring employees or applicants for employment to be or become members - of, or to obtain clearance or approval from, the Re- spondent Union as a condition of, employment except as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the National La- - bor Relations Act, (hereinafter called the Act.) eet (b) Causing or attempting to cause Maritime Ship Cleaning and Maintenance Co. to refuse employment to Marvin Gould and Zack Page because they are not members-of, or have not secured clearance or approval from, the Respondent Union in violation of Section | 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the ’ Board has found will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Make whole Marvin Gould and Zack Page for any loss of. pay incurred as a result of the diserimina- tien against themr in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner’s Intermediate Report dated January 16, 1958 etititled **The remedy.” (b)- Post at its offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and alleother places where notices to members are cus- tomarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto and m@@med ** Appendix."’ Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fourth Region ( Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) shall, after being ‘duly signed by representatives of the Respondent, be posted immediately upon r ceipt thereof. and main- ‘ tained for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, o®covered by any other material. | ; («) Mail to the aforesaid Regional Director signed copies of the notice marked ** Appendix”’ for posting by we ao 93 pee ‘ : > Maritime Ship Cleaning and Maintenance Co., the em- ployer willing, in places where notices to emplovees.and prospective employees are customarily posted. (d) Notify the said Regional Diréctor in writing, within ten (#0) days from the date of this Decree what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith. % ° . . * By THE Court, | . (S) MeLavounix, © * eg 7 Crrenit Judge. Daten: June 14, 1960. i aaa ~ & 24 NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS OF LocaL 1566, INTERNATIONAL LONG- SHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AND FEMPLOYEES AND AP , enment FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MARITIME SHIP CLEAN- ING AND*MAINTEN ANCE CO, Pu RSU ANT To _ A DECREE of the U nited States Court of Appeals for the” Third Circuit, enforcing in part and denying in part, an order of the National Labor Relations’ Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that: We Witt Nor give effect to, enter into, renew, maintain, or enforce any agreement, arrangement, understanding, or practice with PHILADELPHIA MARINE TRADE AssOcIaATION, MARITIME SHIP CLEAN- ING AND MAINTENANCE Co,, or any other member employer of Philadelphia Marine Trade Associa- tion, requiring employees or applicants for employ- ment to, heeome members or ta obtain clearance or approval asa condition of emfPloyment, except to the extent that the requirement of clearance or ap- proval by a labor organization is lawfully imposed under the conditions stated ins Moantain -Pacifie Chapter of the Associated General Contractors. 119 NLRB No, 126. . r We WILL Nort cause or attempt té cause MARITIVE ‘SuHip CLEANING AND MAINTENANCE Co., its officers, agents, successors, or assigns, to discriminate against employees or applicants. for employment heeause they are not pmembers of or have not received clearance from our organization, in viola- tion of Section 8 (a) (3), | . » % 25 WeE WILL make Marvin Gould ‘and Zack Page whole for any loss of pay they aay have suffered as result of discrimination against them. : Local 1566, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE- ‘s MEN'S ASSUCIATION, (Labor Organization ; Dated -, " By ——, (Repres ntative ) (Title ’ This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the ~ date hereof, and must not be altered, defac ‘ed, or covered ‘by any other material. a % . R U S&S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 18860 Steeio *s . . --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_0896%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.