# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Indian Towing Co. v. United States (No. 195)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1960

## Text

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1959

Baw

No.

INDIAN TOWING CO., INC. ET AL.

) He a - —_
Petitioners,

VETSUSN

UNITED. STATES OF -AMERICA,.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR -
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

RICHARD B. MONTGOMERY, JR.
S06 Natl Bank of Commerce Bldg.
New Orleans 12, Lowiisiana,

Attorney for Petitioners.

Of Counsel:

HENRY J. READ
MONTGOMERY, BARNETT, BROWN & READ.

St. N. xs a

“The Bref Specisliste” 430 Chartres :

Montgomery & Co..

SUBJECT INDEX.
OPINIONS BELOW AND JURISDICTION
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
STATUTES INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE,

ARGUMENT UNDER THE FIRST QUE STION

ARGUMENT UNDER THE uoccapeas ‘QUES-

TION

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES:

A. “indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana :

B. Opinion of the United States Court-of Ap-
peals for the — Cirewit .

2a Jeiliiiiens of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

D. Order Extending Time to File Petition for

_ Writ of Certiorari
E. 28 U. S. C. Section 13461b)

F. 14 U. S.C. 81. ©

32

37

56

at
AUTHORITIES CITED.

Atlas, The, 93 U. S. 302
Beaconfield, The, 15 S. Ct. 860

Cordinger v. Los Angeles bi reas Company, 127
S. W. 2d) 105

Cutler, The, 58 F. Supp. 864 (D. C. N. Y. 1944),
affirmed 147 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. (2d) 1945)

D’Anna v. U. S., 181-F. (2d) 335
Eidson, et al., v. Maddox, 24 S. E. (2d) 895
Glass v. MeCullough Transfer Co., 189 F. (2d)

Halcyon Lines, et al., v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and
. Refitting Corp., 72 S. Ct. 277

Haynie v. Jones, et al., 32 N. E. (2d) 561
Hoesel v. Caia, 53 N. E. (2d) 165

Indian Towing Company, Inc., v. United sos of
America, 350 U. S. 61, 76S. Ct. Rep. 122

Marian J.-Maple. Hill iC. C. A. 2d) 1982 A.M. C.

1278
O’Brien Brothers, The, 258 Fed. 614

Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Gilmore, 28 S, Ct.
133

Pure Oil Ata The, v. Tugs Fred B. Zigler &

Z-Eight ‘D. C.L. A.) 1952 A. M. C. 1518

Page

6 .

+
ad

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it
AUTHORITIES CITED—-‘ Continued)
_ Reynolds Metals Company v. Yturbide, 258 F. (2d)
321
Ryan v. _Dendinger, Inc., 9 S. (2d) 849

San Juan Light & Transit Confpany y. Belen Re-
quena, 224 U.S. 89, 32 S. Ct. Rep. 399

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85
Smith v. Fisher, et al., 115-N. FE. (2d) 78

’ Spears v. United Railroad of San Francisco, 47
Pacific 956

Uv. & wv. Johnson, 181 F. (2d) 577
U.S. v. Kesinger, 190 F. (2d) 529

White v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance (o..

et al., 60 S. (2d) 245

William C. Atwater, The, 110 F. (2d) 644 (C. C.

A. (2d) 1940)

STATUTES.
14 U. S.'C.. 81
28 U. S. C. See. 1254 (1)
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. See. 1346 (bi

MISCELLANEOUS.
American Jurisprudence 38, page 989 ;
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, See. 19.12

Page

_ INTHE — |
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1959

Siege

INDIAN TOWING CO., INC., ET AL.,
| - Petitioners,
versus 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
‘ ‘ Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT: OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

Petitioners pray that a.writ of certiorari issue to
review a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit and in support of their petition
show: .-

OPINIONS BELOW AND JURISDICTION.

The findings of fact and conclusion of law consti-.

tuting the opinion of the District Court (?. 582) are
printed in Appendix A hereto and are reported in 182
Fed. Supp. 264. The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R.

a

ts

598) is printed in Appendix “B” hereto and is reported
in 276 Fed. (2d) 300. =,

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, dated Feb-
ruary 29, 1960, was entered the same date ‘ Appendix C).
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S..C.
Sec. 1254 (1). Upon application of counsel for peti-
tioners, the time for filing a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari in this case was extended’ up to and including
June 30, 1960, bi order of this Court dated May ‘19,
1960 (Appendix D).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
The questions presented here are the following:

1. Does the standard of care imposed upon the -
United States Coast Guard in the maintenance of aids to
navigation permit that agency to install the component
parts of a light circuit ina lighthouse with the intention
of leaving those parts on station until a failure occurs.
or is the Coast Guard required to conduct periodic inspec-
tions of the vomponent parts of. the light circuit in order
to discover and correct defects resulting from wear and
tear before a failure of the light occurs?

2. Does the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in a case in which the Coast Guard is chan ‘ged
with negligent maintenance of a lighthouse impose insurer
' liability on the Coast Guard?°

STATUTES INVOLVED.

* The statute which has been interpreted by the prior
- opinion of this Court and which must be applied in deter-
mining the issues presented by this petition is the Federal

‘Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. Section 1346(b) printed as
Appendix E. In addition, petitioners refer to the statu-
tory authority pursuant to which the United: States Coast

Guard established and maintained the lighthouse on Chan- °

deleur Island, which authority is found in 14 U.S. C..81,
printed as — FL

- STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

‘This Court has said in’a prior opinion in this case
that the United States Coast Guard is obligated to use
due care to make certain that lighthouses operated .by’ the
Coast Guard are kept in good working order. The lan-
guage of this Court in Indian Towing Company v. The
United States of America, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. Reporter
122, at page 126, is as follows:

“The Coast Guard need not undertake the light-
house service. But once it-exercised its discretion
to operate a light on ChandeJeur Island and engen-
dered reliance on the guidance afforded by the —
light, it was obligated to use due care to make cer-
tain that the light was kept in good working order;
and, if the light did become extinguished, then the
Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care
to diseover this fact and to repair the light or give
Warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast
Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby
caused to petitioners, the United States is liable
under the Tort Claims Act.” (Emphasis ours.)

The casualty out of which this litigation pose Oc-
curred on the night of September 30-October 1, #654. The
Barge AS-16, owned by United Marine Company, one of

>

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petitioners, and carrying 1204,5 tons of triple super phos-
| phate, owned by Minnesota Farm Bureau Service Co., an-
other of the petitioners, was in tow of the Tug NAVAJO,
owned by Indian Towing Company, also named as a peti-
tioner, proceeding westward from Tampa to New Orleans
in the Gulf of Mexico. The lighthouse on Chandeleur
Island off the Mississippi Coast failed some time prior to
the night in question and was not in operation as the tow
approached the island. (R. 144-45). Visibility was poor.
and the wind was from 30 to 35 miles per hour, with
waves six to seven feet in height. The éaptain of the
NAVAJO was looking for and expecting to see Chande-
leur light, and, since the light was extinguished, ran
aground. (R. 114.1 The grounding caused substantial
damage ta the Barge AS-16 and her cargo. Petitioners
contend that the failure of the light was the cause of the
grounding and subsequent damage -to ‘the Barge AS-16
and her cargo and that the failure of the light resulted
from the negligence of Coast Guard personnel in that they _
failed to exercise due care in the maintenance of the sun
relay which was a part of the circuit of the light.

This case was initiated by the filing of a civil
action under the Federal Tort.Claims Act. Respondent
moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action
alleged was rot wit the purview of the statute, and
the motion was granted. (R. 9.) Petitioners appealed
and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the action of the trial judge. (R. 16.) This Court
granted certiorari and reversed (R. 17), and a trial on
the merits followed before the same judge who had: orig-
-inally granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, culminating
in the trial court’s acceptanee, without modification, of

5

praposed finding of fact and conclusion of law submitted
by the respondent. (R. 582.) The Court of Appeals,
speaking through a member of the panel which had af-
firmed the original dismissal of this ‘action, endorsed the
findings and conclusions of the trial judge, stating that
ihe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, upon which petitioners
rely, does not place upon the respondent liability without
fault or make respondent an insurer of the operation of
the lighthouse on Chandeleur Island. (R. 600.) :

ARGUMENT UNDER THE FIRST QUESTION.

The issue presented here is whether the owners of
the Barge AS-16 and her cargo are entitled to recover
for the damages which they sustained. Although Indian
Towing Company, the owner of the tug NAVAJO, appears
“48 a nominal party in this case, no recovery is sought for
any damage sustained by the tug. The question which
must be. determined is whether the failure of the light-
house contributed to the grounding of the barge. It is not
necessary to consider whether or not the negligence of the
Tug NAVAJO contributed to the grounding, for whatever
negligence may have occurred on the part of those in
charge of the NAVAJO would -not be attributed to the
innocent barge and cargo. The Cutler, 58 F. Supp. 864
'D. C. N. Y. 1944), affirmed 147 F. (2d) 045 (C. C. A?
(2d) 1945); The Pure Oil Company v. Tugs Fred B. Zig-
ler & Z-Eight iD. C. L. A.) 1952 A. M. C. 1518; The
William C. Atwater, 110 F. (2d) 644 iC. C. A. 12d)
19401; Marian J.-Maple Hill (C. C. A. (2d) 1932 A. M. C.
1278); The Atlas, 93 U. S; 302; The Beaconsfield, 15 8.
Ct. 860.. As long as there is a degree of contributing
fault on the part of the respondent, the owners of the
barge and the cargo laden therein are entitled to recovery.

even though the negligence of the NAVAJO was also a
contributing cause. This is so even if the NAVAJO’S neg-
ligence outweighed that of the respondent. Ryan v. Dendin-
ger, Ine., 9S. (2d) 849; The O'Brien Brothers, 258 Fed.
614; Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Gilmore, 28 S. Ce.
133; White v. State Farm Mutual Aulo Insurance Co.,
et-al., 60S. 12d) 245; Halcyon Lines, et al., v. Haenn Ship -
Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 72 S. Ct. 277: Hoesel v. Cain,
53 .N. E..(2d) 165; Eidson, et al.,v. Maddox, 24 8, E. (2d)
895; Spears v. United Railroad of San Francisco, 117
Pacific 956; Cordinger v. Los Angeles Traction Company,
127 S. W. (24) 105; Haynie v. Jones, et al., 32 N. E. (2d)
561; Smith v. Fisher, et al., 115°N. E. (2d) 78: Glass v.
McCullough Transfer Co., 189 F. (2d) 105. In deciding
_ this case with emphasis on the negligence of the Tug
NAVAJQ, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
have impliedly and erroneously attributed that negligence
to the barge and her cargo. ,"

Since the causal connection between the failure of
the liglit and the grounding of the barge is obvious beyond
the possibility of argument, the government did not pro-
pose to the District Court a finding that the failure of the :
light did not contribute to the grounding. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals avoided any conclusion
with reference to the causal connection between the light’s
failure and the grounding, and confined their conclusions
instead to the fact that the negligence of Coast Guard per-
sonnel did not contribute to the grounding of the barge.
(R. 595, 599.1 Thus, on the face of the record, neither
Court has decided whether or not. the failure of the light
was causally connected to the grounding of the barge.
This is a significant omission in view of the fact that the

government's navigational expert testified that in his opin-
ion the grounding would not have occurred if the light had
been in operation. *R. 363.) It is clear from a reading
of the findings of the trial judge that this case was dis-
posed of on the basic proposition that the failure of the
light did not cause the grounding, and that the negligence
of’ the navigator of the NAVAJO did. Pretermitting °
entirely the fact that such negligence, if it occurred, is not
attributable to fie barge and her cargo, and ‘considering
only the causation problem, i. e., the relation between the
failure of the light and the damage caused to the owners
of the barge and cargo, it is pertinent ‘to point out the
verbiage of the statute pursuant to which the Coast Guard
established and maintained Chandeleur Light. That stat-
ute, appearing as Appendix F, provides that the purpose
of aids to navigation. including Chandeleur ‘Light is “to
aid navigation and to prevent disasters”. It is apparent
from ‘the wording of the Statuté that lighthouses are
maintained to prevent marine disasters even though the
navigator of a vessel does not’ navizate perfectly. The
owners of the Barge AS-16 and her cargo were entitléd
to the warning afforded by the Chandeleur Light even
though the Tug NAVAJO may not have been navigated
perfectly. Since the light failed to serve one of the pur-
poses for which it was established, the causal connection
between that failure and the grounding, insofar as the
barge and cargo are concerned, cannot be seriously ques-
tioned.

The failure of Chandeleur Light resulted from the
nitting and scoring ‘and ‘corrosion of the contact points
in the sun relay which was a vital component part of the
cireuit of .the light. (R, 26, 592.) The electrical system

in the light was installed in July of 1949, less than two
years before the failure which caused this grounding, and
consisted of a set of. wet storage battery cells totalling
32 volts, a flasher mechanism, a lamp changer, and a
sun relay unit which caused the light to function at night
and turned it off during the daylight. hours to conserve
the batteries. The sun relay itself consisted principally
of.a metal cylinder coated with carbon. During the day
the cylinder absorbs heat and the increase in temperature
causes the cylinder to expand. This expansion is trans-
mitted to a pivotal arm which moves up and down, mak-
ing and breaking contact with a silver base plate in the
relay. During the night the silver points at the end of
the pivotal arm are in contact with the silver base plate,
completing“the circuit, while during the day the contact
points separate from the base plate, breaking the circuit.
The relay is not installed directly in the main 32-volt
circuit, but in a separate 12-volt circuit, because the con-
tact points hold up more satisfactorily under lower volt-
age. (R. 248.) The relay is a reliable device which oper-
ates for years if properly maintained. However, the
pitting of its contact points is a natural consequence of
use and the points require cleaning and adjustment at
intervals which vary according to the electrical load car-
ried. (R. 493.)

The nature and extent of the pitting which caused

the failure in this instance was described in the cross-

examination of Warrant Officer Holmes of the Coast

.Guard, who was in command of the party which repaired
the light after the failure (R. 460):

“Q. Mr. Holmes, I want you to describe for me
in a little more detail this pitting that you

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”

found onthe base plate. Was it—well, I think
I'll leave it to you, to use your words. What

. did it look like to you?

Did you ever see fine gritted sandpaper?

Yes. :
That but.on a dark color.

Now this was just a material which had
formed on the base plate?
To my knowledge, yes, sir.

Was there damage to the plate itself?
Damage? To what effect, sir?

To the plate itself. Was the surface of the
plate damaged?
It would be damaged if there was pitting, sir.

Then understand you to mean that the plate
itself was scored, was it not?
Not to any great extent, sir.

Well, it was scored to an extent which in your
Opinion prevented it from’ making contact,
wasn’t it?

I won’t say scored, sir; I'll say the pitting on
it prevented it from making the contact.

THE COURT: Well was it sort of a deposit on

there?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, more like a deposit, In

other werds, it didn’t eat down into the metal
to any great degree where it would have been
impossible to remove it = swiping across your
plate.

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10

Well then-why did you regulate the arm so that
it would make contact at a different place un
the plate?

As a preventative measure.

In other words, you thought that perhaps the
plate had been damaged to an extent which
would interfere with the contact?

As a preventative measure.

Am I stating it correctly?
As a preventative measure, yes, sir.

Wait, just a moment. I say from what you
observed you thought that possibly the plate
had been damaged to an extent which would
interfere with future contacts?

I didn’t think that it would prevent or - - - pre-
vent any future contacts. I wanted to do
something to prevent a reoccurrence of the fact
that if one section of it was damaged this
time, maybe -if-you put the points back in the
same section again, that point would be more
vulnerable to damage than a new point.

Now, I'm reading from your prior deposi-
tion - - -

Yes, sir

--- in which you say that, in describing what
you saw and indicating the base plate. you say,
‘In here, this was all scored and corroded and
pitted up to a degree where it wouldn't make
proper contact.’ Is that an accurate descrip-
tion of what you saw?

oO

nesses for both parties,

11

Well, to a certain degree. In other words, a
fine point like that. you're not gouging or any-
thing or massive holes in it. A little object
‘like this, which is probably an eighth of an
inch wide and a-half inch long, any pitting on
it would give indications that it’ was marred.

Do you still accept the language which I read

to vou as accurate? -
I will accept it, sir, if I said it.

- Was the condition which you saw a highly un-

usual condition.
It was my first occurrence with that condition.

You had never seen a base plate pitted to that
extent before? :
I've never seen this - - - any base plate in a

sun relay pitted period.

At all?
No, sir.

. So that what you found was 4 very unusual

condition, was it not? |
To the best of my knowledge, it was.” (Em-
phasis ours.)

All of the expert testimony in the record, from wit-
showed that the pitting and scor-
ing and cor rosion which caused the failure of ‘the light was
in turn caused by the fact that current in excess of that
‘which was recommended by the manufacturer was per-
mitted to pass through the contact points in the relay at
some time prior to failure. 1R. 249, 250, 322-324.) Re-
spondent’s personnel conducted periodic inspections of the _

.
s
-

12

lighthouse, but they were instructed not to remove the base
cover of the relay to check the contact points in the relay,
and. in fact the points were not checked during periodic
‘inspections in order to determine whether a gradual pit-
ting condition was developing (R..400, 401): nor did
respondent’s personnel ever check the circuit to determine

the amount of current passing through the contact points.

during the operation of the relay. (R. 406, 378.)'

The electrical experts who testified at the trial
agreed that the pitting described by Holmes was the result
of current in excess of that recommended by the manu-
facturer passing through the points of the relay. It fol-
lows inevitably that either the original installation of the
relay was improper, or that something occurred between
the time of installation in July-of 1949 and the time of
failure in September 1951 which caused or permitted
. excess current to flow through the contact points of the
relay. The source of the excessive current was unex-
plained and neither of the courts below required an expla-
nation of the respondent, although the respondent offered

no testimony from any witness connected with the origifial.

installation to prove that, at least originally, the manu-
facturer’s recommendations were followed. But it is not
only the excessive current about which, petitioners com-
plain. It is the added fact that Coast Guard personnel
took no steps during the periodic inspections of the light
to discover the gradual cumulative effect of the current,
whether normal! or abnormal. Respondent's personnel did

'The witnesses Brooks and Stone were the only persons who.had
anything to do with the maintenance of the light. Brooks
suggested that “the base electrician” checked the amperage
of the sun relay current ‘R. 378) but the electrician did not
So testify. :

—" «

not inspect the contacts in the sun relay in.order to dis-
cover and correct incipient failure before it occurred, but
rather conceived their duty to require no more than re-

» 43

placement of the mechanism if, as and when it failed.

Professor James Cronvich of the Tulane University
School of Engineering commented upon the characteristics

and performance of the relay (R. 249):

“Q.

Is it a correct statement to say that the—an
excessive amount of current being allowed to

pass through the silvey contact points would -

increase the likelihood of pitting?
It would.

And the greater the amount of current. the
greater the amownt of pitting?
That’s correct.

If you found, as a purely hypothetical situa-
tion, that the silver contacts in a relay such
as we have here were pitted to an extent which
broke the circuit and prevented the operation
of a light such as Chandeleur Light, would it
be your opinion that this condition could only
result from an excessive amount of current

being allowed to pass through the contact:
points?

I would say yes, assuming—as I recall] it—
this relay was in service only two years.

In other words, you would say that then the
rated amperage recommended by the manu-
facturer had been exceeded?

That's right.”

Ves

14

“THE COURT: Well, you don’t know whether there

was any pitting or not, do you?

THE WITNESS: No, I don’t know. I just assumed

from: what I’ve been told.

MR. READ: I asked him to assume that.
THE COURT: I undefstand.”

“BY MR. READ:

Q.

Assuming that the relay was operated with the
rated limits of the manufacturer’s recom-
mendations for a two-year period, would there
have occurred sufficient pitting to have caused
a failure of the relay?

Within his recommendations I doubt that it
should have caused sufficient pitting for
trouble.” -

ernment, Professor Cronvich stated (T. 254):

“Q.

As to the pitting, can you say definitely that
a sun relay system operated within the manu-
facturer—that these contacts operated ‘within
the manufacturer’s specifications and amount
of current could not fail?

It would be very highly improbable because of
the number of operations which you have are

so very small in the life of a typical relay like :
that compared with the ordinary contacts

which you might have. ..

But it ‘might for causes unknown. There —

might be a pitting that would not be explain-
able on the basis of ordinary functioning?

Under cross-examination by counsel for the gov-

15

A. No. If there is pitting there should be some
reason for the pitting and certainly with the
low ‘currents which are expected to get in
there, the amount of pitting in the number of
‘operations which that relay should give should
be very smail.”

Respondent's expert, Harvey, agreed with Profes-
sor Cronvich ‘R. 322-324):

- “Q. - Now, I assume that you're familiar - - - 1 know
| you’re familiar with the fact that according
to the manufacturer’s recommendation there is
a certain rated current which is supposed to
be allowed to pass through the sun relay. Isn't
that correct?

Yes, sir.

What is that at Chandeleur?
At Chandeleur?

Yes, ° :

The only current that will pass through the
sun relay would be the current that it.takes
to operate that protective relay is like I said
approximately 48 milliamps.

POPS }

Q. Well, ---I’m reading here from a brochure
which is put out by the manufacturer of this.
The company happens to be the A. G. A. Divi-

‘sion of the Elastic Stop Nut Corporation of
America. That's the manufacturer. And on
page --- - I guess it is page-one, it’s unnum-
bered, but I find this recommendation: ‘con-

my

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16

tacts are rated at 3 amperes or 25 watt A. C.
and J.5 ampere or 10 watt D. C.’

You’re familiar with that, is that correct?
Yes, sir.

Now if that rate is not exceeded would it be.
your opinion that the contact points inside the

_relay would not noticeably pit in a two year

period?
No, sir.

You think they would not become noticeably
pitted in a two year period?

If they were - - - With the allotted ampere rat-
ings that the book that you have in front of
you gives - - -.

Yes?
- - - after they’ve been out two years some-
times you will see a little bit black where the

. points wil! meet but not any excessive pitting.

Well I take it that any contact being made
and broken like this would cause some pitting,
is that correct?

Well yes sir, it should. - :

And you're saying that in a two year period,
if the manufacturer’s recommendations are
followed, that pitting should not reach propor-
tions which would interfere with the operation
of the relay?

That’s right, sir.

So that it would be your opinion that if such
a condition had occurred, then in some way an

{ =e

17

excessive amount of current must have been
allowed to pass through those contact points? °
A. If it was pitted very bad, yes, sir. °

Q. ff it was pitted to a degree which would inter-
fere with the operations of the relay?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Your answer would be yes?

A. Yes.” ;
This uncoatradicted evidence showed that the contacts
would not have pitted to a disabling degree in two years
‘if the current had been within the proper limits. More
over, the manager of the plant which manufactures the
sun relay testified that even in normal use, that is, use
within the proper current limits, the contact points in the
relay are subject to wear (pitting), that they require
cleaning and adjustment, and that the degree of pitting
Which will occur depends. tipon the load to which the con-
tacts are subjected. His.testimony was (R. 493) :

“A. ...T do believe that you must put in one other
qualification and that the contacts which make
and break loads will wear, that there will be a
migration of material from one element to the
other, ,and that that must be compensated for
either by readjustment or by cleaning or re-
placement.

Q. That is anticipated and is very gradual, isn’t
it?

A. Well, it depends upon the load that is imposed
upon ‘the contacts; and, as you know, you can’
—a heavy load will damage a contact more

18

quickly than will a light load.” {Emphasis
ours. }

This witness further testified ‘hat the “life of the con-
tacts are so, closely interrelated to the type of load that
is imposed that I don’t think | could have or make any
prognosticaticns as to the. possible life’ of the” relay.
(R. 502.) He added that under a normal load the device
is reliable (R. 503) and that when used under a normal
load the Wearing process, /. ¢., pitting, is very gradual
(R. 493) From the testimony it is obvious that. the
“espondent nad no right to assume that the relay would
function indefinitely without maintenance regardless of
the amount of current used. ;

From the testimony of the manufucturer’s repre-
sentative, it is apparent that the dependability of the
relay is not absolute, but requires that care must be. taken
to assure that the recommended current is not exceeded,
and tnat even in circumstances of normal and proper use, _
the contacts require cleaning and adjustment from time
to time,

Chandeleur Light was under the jurisdiction of
the Gulfport Light Station and Chief Stone of the Coast
Guard was in charge. Stone testified at length concerning
the maintenance accorded the lighthouse in general and
the sun relay in particular. The contact points which
failed are inside.a cover over the base of the relay. Chief
Stone was told never to remove that cover. (R. 399-4007)

He testified as follows:

“Q. Well is it correct to say that insofar as the
relay itself was concerned that your routine

19

we.

check simply calls for the covering of the relay
with a metal cylinder in order to determine
whether the light went on?

A. That's right, sir. Yes, sir.

Q. And you did nothing further with reference to
the relay other than that in your routine in-
spections?

That’s right.

Q. For instance you would have no occasion to re-
move the base cover?
A. Not as long as that relay was working there
"and that connection was stil] good. There was
no reason in the world for it. ©

Q. Well then I take it that as far as you were con-
cerned you would leave the relay out there as
long as it functioned -Properly?

- A. That’s right.

Q. That is, until it failed?
A. That’s right.” (Emphasis ours. )

‘In addition to the failure to conduct periodic checks in
order to determine the extent of the gradual pitting
process, neither Stone nor his assistant ever conducted
any ‘fests to determine whether the rated amperage rec-
ommended ‘by the manufacturer of the relay was being
exceeded. (R. 406, 370, 371.)

The respondent has rested its case on proof of peri-
odie inspection of some but not all of the component parts
of the Chandeleur Light’ circuit. But a chain is only as
strong as its weakest link and the sun relay was the

20

-bridge which connected: the component parts of the light
circuit into an éffective whole.” It would have required
about three minutes during the periodic inspection of the
light circuit to remove the base cover of the relay and
check the contact points. (R. 471.) Respondent’s agents
did not do: 30 bécause it was their intention not to prevent

failure but only to repair it promptly after it occurred.

Respondent, in an effort .to excuse its failure to
guard against the gradual pitting process, proposed to the
Trial Court a finding that “incipient failure of the contact
points cannot be accurately determined by disassembly of
the unit for .Visual ‘inspection, because some darkening ©
and oxidation of the silver occurs in normal use. and some
piived contacts nonetheless complete the electrical circuit.
while continuity can be lost in others which: superficially
appear to be perfectly good.” (R. 592.) The literal accept-
ance of this finding is of no-solace to the respondent for
it clearly indicates the necessity for periodic cleaning and
adjustment of the contact points. The manufacturer says
that under normal use contacts will be subject to pitting
and do require cleaning and adjustment. This finding
of fact by the trial court accepts the manufacturer's
opinion. There is no indic ition in the record that the
pitting, scoring and corrosion which caused the failure,
an end result which came about by. the gradual process
of use, vould not have been discovered if the contact points
had been examined during the periodic inspections of the
light, since inspections were supposed to be made once a
month. (R. 349.) The manufactu'er’s representative said
‘R. 489):

“. .. DT have seen pitted contacts which have high
resistance. I have seen pitted contacts which would

2

continue, which would have a certain continuity. .
There is a degree of pitting, and | certainly can-
not pose as an authority on how much a contact
will tolerate before continuity is lost.” ( Emphasis.
ours. }

Thus it appears that the seriousness of the pitting prob-
lem is a matter of degree, and that when pitting develops
beyond a certain poirt continuity in the circuit is lost.
It is quite true that in some instances it. would be impos- °
sible, by merely looking at the contact points, to ascertain
whether they would or would ngt be conductive. But this
is not to say that the failure of the contact points could
not be avoided by periodic examination, for if the points
were chécked periodically they would be cleaned periodi-
cally if and when they showed signs of pitting, and the
pitting would never approach 2 dangerous degree. Peri-
odie checking and cleaning would prevent the pitting from
approaching the danger point of broken continuity. The
testimony on this point from the manufacturer's repre-
‘entative is as follows (R. 495) -
“I don’t think that there vould be anything notice-
able? I don’t think there is any warning. I believe
a light is either on or it’s off. And I believe that
continuity would be maintained until a lead point
of failure. The only way that I think you would
detect a gradual lessening is to put some unusual’
measuring laboratory-type devices to analyze the
circuit. Things normally work until they fail and
like the one-horse shay, they stop.” ‘Emphasis
ours. }

99

It is quite clear that when the manufacturer’s re})-
resentative says that there would not be “anything notice-
able”, that there would not be “any warning,” that the
light “is either on or it is off,” he is not Saying that “‘in-
cipient failure,” that is, pitting in its early stages, could
not have been seen.if the points had been examined. He
is saying that mere observation of the over-all circuit

-~ Would not reveal the pitting until the light failed, which

is of course true, because the current through the contact
points would not gradually diminish but would continue
undiminished until the point of failure. The manufac: *
turer’s representative, in th® above excerpt, is not refer-
ring to the appearance of the contact points themselves.
He is saying that the light would burn with normal bright-
ness while thé gradual pitting was building up to that
point at which the degree of pitting was such as to inter-
fere with the continuity of the circuit. This js obvious
from his reference to “some unusual Measuring labora-
tory-type devices to analyze the circuit.” He could not
have been referring to the. contact points themselves, for
it requires no “unusual laboratory-type device” to look
at the contact points and see if they are clean and un-
damaged or wheiher they are pitted and scored. Even
normal pitting is obvious to the naked eye and the need
for cleaning would have been obvious if an inspection had
been made. The abnormal pitting, scoring and corrosion
found by Holmes after the light failed would have been
just as apparent before the failure as it was to Holmes
afterwards. It was the lack of adequate inspection of
the contact points which permitted the pitting to reach
the degree which prevented the light from functioning.

23

ARGUMENT UNDER THE SECOND QUESTION.

Petitioners submit that the record contains affirma-
tive evidence of the neglizence of the Coast Guard per-
sonnel charged with the maintenance of Chandeleur Light:
but pretermitting entirely the affirmative proof: of negli-
‘gence elicited ‘from respondent's own Witnesses, petition-
ers rely alternatively upon the specially pleaded doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, as the facts retlected in the record
create an inexorable implication of negligence. The
Appellate Court disposed of this theory with the following
comment (R. 600):

“Relying on the ‘doctrine of res ipsa loquitur’, a
doctrine which is ‘not proof and does not supply
Want of proof’, but is merely an elegant and, to
some, a niystifying way of stating ‘a rule of inter-
pretation by which evidence of facts is made to
speak the lavical conclusions naturally flowing
therefrom’, appellants seem to feel that it operates
here to impose upon the United States a kind of
ability without fault, making the United States,
as the owner and operator of the light, an insurer
against its failing. |

“Appellants in’ short seem to insist that proof
merely that the light failed imposed liability upon
the United States as a matter of law and, though
the district judge has, upon an examination of the
evidence, found and concluded that plaintiffs have
not shown that the United States was at fault, it
must nevertheless be cast in judgment,

“We think the slightest reflection upon the mean-
ing and appliéation of the rule appellants’ invoke,

24

as it is stated and applied in 38 Am. Jur.. p. 989,
and in the cases they cite,? will show that this is
not so.” —

The Court of Appeals expressed an entirely erroneous con-
cept of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and of petitioner-’
reliance thereon. The doctrine does not imply liabilit)
without fau!t or insurer liability as, for example, the
liability of a shipowner for failure to provide a seaworth)
vessel. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85. The
obvious distinction between the doctrine of liability with. -
out fault and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is apparen*
from the classic definition of res ipsa loquitur appearing
in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 989:.-

“While the mere fact of an injury will not give.
rise to & presumption of negligence on the part of
anyone, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an’
expression which means. literally, the transaction
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accom-
_panying an injury may be such as to raise a pre-
“umption, or at least permit an inference, of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant. The conclu-
Sion to be drawn from the cases as to what consti-
tutes the rule of res ipsa joquitur is that proof .
that the thing which caused the injury to the plain-
tiff was under the control and management of the
defendant, and that the oecurrence was such as in
the ordinary course of things would not happen if
those who had its control or management used:
proper care, affords sufficient evidence, or. as
sometimes stated by the courts, reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation by the defendant,

25

that the injury arose from or was caused. by the
defendant's want of care.”

The mechanism which failed in this case was under the
exclusive control &nd management of the Coast Guard,
a> it Was located within the structure of the lighthouse
and the respondent had the only key. (R. 363-365.) The
sun relay Was an ordinarily reliable device, which, when
yroperty installed and maintained, had an anticipated
Working life ot from 20 to 60 years. (R. 592.) Respondent
admits thee the failure which eccurred in this case was
“such an occurrence as-in the ordinary course of things
would not heppen. As has been said already, the manu-
facturer of the sun relay conditions its reliability. upon
tue use of . limited current through its contact points
and adds thac all contact points, in the course of ordinary
use, incur some pitting and do require cleaning and ad-
justment. In this. context the respondent has come for-
ward with no testimony from anyone connected with the
installation of the sun relay in the light circuit in 1949
‘o prove its proper installation initially, and the men
charged with the maintenance of the light have said that
thev were not instructed or equipped to check the amount
of current flowing through the contacts during 1949, 1950,
and+1951, and that. furthermore, they were instructed
nat to go into the base of the relay in order to determine
if and to what extent pitting was occurring, in spite of
the fact that pitting is an expected by-product of the
_ use of any electrical contacts. . :

Respondent’ proposed, the District Court adopted,
and the Court of Appeals approved a finding of fact to
the effect that “the cause of the pitting is stil] not known”.

26

(R. 592.) To state the situation more accurately, how-
ever, it should be said that the cause of the pitting is
known, /. ¢., the excessive current. What ‘is net known
with certainty is the source of thie excessive current. Only
two witnesses with qualifications in the field of electric:!
circuits testified at the trial. One was Professor Cron-
vich, offered by petitioners: the other was Harvey, offered
by respondent. -Beth men expressed the opinion that the
pitting and scoring described by Holmes must have been
caused by excessive current. Neither expert could ac:
count for the inoperative condition of the contacts in the
short two-year span during which the sun relay had been
installed in Chandeleur Light except by the ‘assumption
that excessive’ current had been used t ictuate the relay.
So it is not-correct, as a’matter of fact. to say that the
cause of the pitting is not known, for the record contains
convincing evidence that excessive current caused jt.
What the record does not show conclusively, however, js
where the excessive current came from.

Petitioners submit that it is incumbent upon the
respondent ‘o come forward with an explanation of the
source ‘of the excessive current Which caused the failure
of the relay or to negative the possibility that negligence
on its part permitted excessive current. to pass through
the: contact points of the sun relay for a period Jong. .
enough to make it fail. Petitioners have proved the cause
of the failure of the sun relay, namely, ‘the pitting of its
contact points, and have also’ proved the cause of the pit-
ting, namely, excessive current. No one has proved the
source of the excess current. but petitioners submit tha:
i? is not incumbent upon them to come forward with a
detailed analysis of the circuit. which was under the exclu-

Be

-ive control of the government for many years preceding
and following the failure, in order to pin-point the exact
manner in which excessive current was permitted to pass
through the sun relay. It will doubtless be respondent's
position here, as it was below, that there is no source from
Which the additional current could come, but the incor-
rectness of this statement can be easily demonstrated.
The iight circuit itself was a 32-volt circuit. Because
the contact points in the relay last longer under a lower
voltage, the relay. was installed in an auxiliary 12-volt
circuit. Tne manufacturer's recommendation of a maxi-
mum safe current through the contact points was 1.5
amperes at 12 volts..(R. 592.1 Amperage indicates the
strength of « current of electricity measured in amperes,
Voltage measures the strength of an electrical force. An
ohm is the unit of electrical resistance, Amperage is
equal to voltage divided by ohms and the strength of
@ current In amperes is expressed -by* the following
formula: . .

‘Voltage
amaperace — —..........
ohms

In the 12-volt current with which we are concerned, a
wirrent of 1.5 amperes depends upon a resistance of 8
aims. The electromotive force of 12 volts is inherently
sufficient to cause current in excess of 1.5 amperes to
low through the relay if the resistance of the circuit
diminishes below & ohms. Professor Cronvich theorized
that there may have been: a short in the cail terminals
of the protective relay ‘T. p. 255) which could have de-
creased the resistance of the circuit and drawn a current

28.

in excess of 1.5 amperes through the relay. Even assum-
ing that respondent. had proved proper installation in
1949, which it did not do, since no o0.°e connected with the
installation. was called to testify, a snort in the coil ter-
minals of th relay some time between 1949 and “1951 i-
a logical explanation of the damaging current.

Respondent must admit’ that proper care required
that the relay be used within the recommended amperage
of the manufacturer. But the men in charge of Chande-
leur Light were not even furnished with an ammeter.
a simple instrument with which it would have been possi~
ble to measure in amperage the amount of electrical cur-
rent flowing through the circuit. (R. 406.) Petitioner:
submit that it is incumbent upon the respondent to nega-

tive the possibility of excessive current altogether or .

explain it in a manner consistent with the exercise of
due care by zespondent’s agents. This case is within the
Scope of the doctrine of res ipsa loguitur as applied hy
this Court in San Juan Light & Transit Company v. Bele)
Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 32 S. Ct. Reporter 399. In tha:
case the defendant power company was held responsible
for an unexplained increase in the voltage supplied to the
plaintiff's residence. Exception was taken ¢to the Tria!
Court’s actioa in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquituyr,
and Justice Van Devanter resolved the issue in‘the follow-
ing language: ‘

“Exception to this instruction was taken upon the
ground that it erroneously applied the doctrine of |
res ipsa loquitur. -While recognizing that that doc-
trine is of restricted scope, and when misapplied
is calculated to operate prejudicially, ‘we think

29

there was no error in its application in .this in-
_ stance. The deceased was without fault. The de-
fendant’s primary wire was carrying a current of
high and deadly voltage. Its secondary wire con-
veyed to his residence an excessive*and dangerous
current which could only have come from its pri-
mary wire. Had its wires and converters been
in proper condition, the excessive and dangerous
current would not have been communicated to its
secondary wire, and the injury would not have oc-
curred. These wires and converters were exclu-
sively under its control, and it was charged with
the continuing duty of taking reasonable precau-
tions, proportioned to the danger to be apprehended.
to maintain them in proper condition. In the ordi-
nary or usual course of things, the injury would
not have occurred had that duty been performed.
Not onl did the injury occur, but immediately
thereafter both converters were found to be out
of order: one being heated and its insulation
charred, and the protecting ground wire of the
other being broken or severed. Besides, the de-
fendant engaged to supply a current of low. volt-
age, reasonably safe and suitable for lighting, while
the current delivered on this occasion was of high
Voltage, extremely dangerous and unsuitable for
lighting purposes. These circumstances pointed
So persuasively to negligence on its part that it was
hot too much to e4]]) upon it for an explanation.

“Of course, if the cause of the injury was one
Which it could not have foreseen and guarded
against, it was not culpable; but in the absence of

30

that or some other explanation there was enough
to justify the jury in finding it culpable. This
Was all that was meant by the instruction, rea-

sonably interpreted. It was not’ a model, and, if

it stood atone, might be subject to criticism. But.
it read in the light of what preceded and followed
it, and of the case before the jury, it was unob-
jectionable. When so read it rightly declared and
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Which is,
when a thing which causes injury, without fault

of the injured person, is shown to be under the ex-

: «

clusive control of the defendant, and the injury

is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does

not occur if the one having such contro} uses proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an explanation, that the injury arose from the
defendant's want of care. Inland & Seaboard Coast-
ing Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551, 554, 35 L. ed. 270,
271, 11-Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Zahniser y. Pennsy]-

Vania Torpedo Co.,°190 Pa. 350. 42 Atl. 707; Alex-

By

ander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209° Pa. o71, 67
L. R. A. 475, 58 Atl. 1068: Trenton Passenger R.
Co. v. Cooper, 60 N. J. L. 219, 38 L. R. A. 637,
64 Am. S:. Rep. 592, 37 Atl. 730: Newark Electric
Light & P. Ce. vy, Ruddy, 62 N. J. L. 505, 57 L. R.
A. 624, 41 Atl. 712: 2 Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. 1424;
4 Wigmore, Ev. § 2509.” ;

its own evidence respondent has established that under
ordinary circumstances the re
years if properly maintained and operated. But
. did occur, ‘and respondent’s
Reynolds Metals Company v. Vturbide, 258 F. (2d) 321.

lay will operate for many
a failure
dilemma is well stated in

31.

in Which opiniopr Judge Pope of the Ninth Cireuit Court
of Appeals included ‘page 330) the following quotation
from Harper & James’ Tie Law of Torts, Section 19.12:

“Defendant in a res ipsa case may show by evi- |
dence how! the accident happened, but ordinarily
this does not entitle him to a directed verdict. The
jury mav still reject the evidence or find that’ the
explanation does not preclude the likelihood of neg-
ligence. * * * In most res ipsa loquitur cases de- 4.
fendant eannot: definitely éxplain the accident. His’
usual defense consists, of proof of the precautions
he did. take ‘in constructing, maintaining, and op-
erating the injuring instrumentality, Once in a

. freat while such proof May conclusively show that
the accident did not in fact happen, or thatit was
ehot caused by defendant. But this is seldom the
outcome. And where-it js not, defendant is in thjs
dilemma; the léss effective his precautions to pre-
vent the occurrence the more apt they are to appear
negligent; the more effect®e the precautions testi-
fied to, the less likely they are to have ‘been’ taken
in this case since the accident did happen.”

.

There is no indication in the jurisprudence that the courts

have been loath to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
against the United States in cases brought under the Fed-
eral Torts Claims Act. D’Anna v. U.S. 181 F-. (2d) 335:
U.S. 1. Johnson, 18) F. (2d) 577: U.S. x. Kesinger, 190
F. 12d) 529, In the Kesinger case. supra, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Was concerned with the
crash of a government ai rplane and observed (page 531):
“An airplane of a proven safe. type of design tak-
ing off for an ordinary routine flight under nor-

ma} weather conditions does not crash in the ordi-
nary course of things, unless there has been a fail-
ure to properly inspect, service and maintain it,
or unless it is not operated with due care.”

In the above authorities, which were cited to the Court
of Appeals, the courts were of course not concerned with
‘any concept of insurer liability or liability without fault,
as the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed to be peti-
tioners’ contention.in this ease. These authorities involve
litigations in which the courts assumed from the sur-
rounding “eircumstances that negligence had’ in fact oc-
curred, although not proved by direct evidence. In the
ease at hand, petitioners have never contended and do not
‘now contend that the Coast Guard is the insurer of the
perfect perfermance of Chandeleur Light. Petitioners
have contended, on the contrary, that the evidence of
respondent’s own personnel shows a negligent failure to
maintain the light. Alternatively, and if the positive
evidence of negligence is found wanting, petitioners point
to the unexplained failure within two years of a device
in respondents’ custody, designed to function for from 20 |
to 60 years, which failure has not been explained in any
manner consistent with the exercise of due care by the
respondent.

°

CONCLUSION.

The importance of the decision of which review is
here sought lies in the fact that the Coast Guard ss the
custodian of nundreds of similar aids to nagivation along
the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coastlines. These aids are
relied upon continuously by commercial shipping and pri-
vate boatsmen. The import of the decision cf the Circuit

33

Court, approving as it does, without modification, the
findings proposed to and adopted by the District Court,
is twofold: First, it absolves the Coast Guard from the
consequence of an obvious failure to use means reatlily
available to discover and correct incipient failure of an
. aid to navigation before it occurs, and permits the Coast
Guard to acquit itself of responsibility by prompt repair
‘of a failure after it occurs, cantrary to the opinion of this
Court (quoted on page 3 of this brief) in which it is
clearly provided that it is the Coast Guard's obligation
not only to use due care to discover failures and repair
them prompt!y but also to use due care to prevent their
occurrence. Secondly, the opinion of-the Court of Appeals,
by its misconception of petitioners’ contentions with
regard to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, has nullified,
in large measure, the practical application of the opinion
_of this Court in this case by equating the doctrine of yes
ipsa loquitur with the concept ef liability without fault
or insurer liability. By construing reliance upon the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur as reliance upon the doctrine
of liability without fault, the Court of Appeals has de-
prived petitioners of the real benefit to be derived from
res ipsa loquitur, and has disposed of petitioners’ rights,
not on the basis of whether or ,,ot negligence has been
proved, byt on the assumption that petitioners seek recov-
ery from a respondent against whom no charge of negli-
gence is made. Petitioners have never contended that
they are entitled to a judgment based upon insurer lia-
bility, or liability without fault, and the Court of Appeals

34

‘has applied a false standard in judging the responsibility
of the respondent. :

When a failure of an aid to navigation maintained
-by the Coast Guard occurs, a party injured as a result
of the failure will in most instances, gp not always, find
it impossible to prove negligence, when negligence has in
fact occurred, without the assistance afforded by the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, properly applied. For this doc-
‘trine, if it does nothing else, at least’ requires the Coast
Guard to come forward with an explanation of the failure.
or if the cause of the failure cannot be discovered, with
evidence of the manner in which the device which failed
was procured, installed, checked and maintained so that
the Court can decide whether, under all of the cireum-
stances, the failure occurred in spite of the exercise of
due care by the Coast Guard. ‘lo approach a case of
this kind, as the Court uf Appeals has done, as one in °
which the Court is required to decide, not whether the
Coast Guard was negligent, but rather whether the Coast
Guard is iab'e as an insurer, without negligence, is to pre-
_ judge the very question which is at the heart of the pro! i
lem. Havine prejudged the question of nesligence,’ a
Court will obviously be less critical and less demanding
in weighing the testimony of Coast Guard personnel with
regard to What transpired prior to the failure.
:
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case
modifies in targe measure this Court’s requirement that the
- Coast Guard must use due care to make certain that light-
houses are kept in good werking order. It is of obviou-
importance to the shipping industry and to the operators

35

of private pleasure craft in. coastal waters. It is sub-
mitted that the case ts a proper one for the exercise of
this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD B. MONTGOMERY, JR.
806 Natl. Bank of Commerce Bldg.,
New Orleans 12, Louisiana,
_Attorney for Petitioners.
Of Coursel: ‘ ;
HENRY J. READ
MONTGOMERY, BARNETT. BROWN & READ

te

c

APPENDICES ©

37

APPENDIX “A”.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

» . FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

‘Number and Title Omitted. ' Filed: October 8, 1959)

CHRISTENBERRY, J. °

The foregoing matters have been consylidated for
‘trial, and having been tried to the court without a jury,
the vourt having heard evidence and the arguments of
counse) and having taken time to consider the matters,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Indian Towing Company, Inc., is a corporation
.organized and existing under the laws of Louisiana, and
on or about October 1; 1951, and at all times material
hereto. was the owner of the Tug NAVAJO.

2. United Marine Company is a Louisiana part-
nership. composed of Lester F. Alexander, Leslie B.
Durant, Wiley F. Wroten and William E. Padel, and on or
about October 1, 1951, and at all times material hereto,
was the owner of the Barge AS-16 which was under char-
ter to Upper Mississippi Towing Corperation.

3. Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation is a cor- ,
poration organized ar.’ existing under the laws of Minne-

.

38

sota. and’ on or about October 1, 1951, and at all times
material hereto, had a towage cortract with Indian Tow-

-ing Company pursuant to which the Tug NAVAJO was

to tow the Barge AS-16 from Tampa, Florida, to New
Orleans, Louisiana.

4. Minnesota Farm Bureau Service Company is a .
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Min-
nesota, and on or about October 1, 1951 and at all times
material hereto, owned a cargo of triple super phosphate
aboard the Barge AS-16.

5. United Firemen’s Insurarice Company’ is a cor-
poration organized and existing under the laws of New
York, and on or about October 1, i95i and at all times
maierial herete, was the insurer of the cargo of triple
super phosphate aboard the Barge AS-16.

6. «he General Insurance Company is a corpora-
tion organized and existing under the laws of Washington.
and on or about October’ 1, 1951 and at all times material
hereto, was the hull insurer of the Barge AS-16.

7. The United States of America. through the
United States Coast Guard, on or about October 1, 1951.
and at all times material herete, owned, maintained and
operated an Aid to Navigation identified as Chandeleur
Light situated near the NW end of the northermost of the
Chandeleur Islands, Gulf cf Mexico, approximately 22

miles in a straight line and 26-27 miles by boat from
Gulfport, Mississippi, the location of the nearest manne‘
Coast Guard shore station. The light itself was atop
a 99-foot structure and had aq visibilit.- of 16 miles in

39

clear weather. It was automatic in operation, and drew
its power from a bank of storage cells, iotaling 32 volts.
A component element of the: system was a sun relay
swjtch-or unit by which the light was caused to function
only dvring hours of darkness.

8. In 1949 when the light was made electric and
automatic in operation, its resident personnel was dis-
continued. Primary-responsibility for its maintenance
and operation was assigned the Gulfport Light Attendant
Station, Gulfport, Mississippi, which also had such respon-
sibility for. approximately 55 other lighted aids to navi-
gation. At that time and subsequently through October
1951 and to the date of trial, instructions for the inspec-
tion and maintenance of Chandeleur Light called for a
check of the component elements at least once every thirty
days, which inspection included a check of the functioning
of the whole by artificially darkening the sun relay unit,
thus causing the light to come on, if all were in working
order,

9. Shipping interests and the public generally were
notified of the unmarmed status through “Local Notice to
Mariners No, 107” of 1949. All published light lists sub-
sequent to-1949 have designated thie Chandeleur Light as
unmanned and this was shown, in the 1951 Light List by
‘the symbol “U" which was defined:

“U after the name of the light indicates the light
is unwatched. All lighted buoys are unwatched.
Unwatched lights may become irregular or extin-
guished although such apparatus have a high de-
gree of reliability.”

40

bond

10. The NAVAJO was a_pilothouse-controiled
single screw 900 HP Diesel propelled steel hull -vessel of
88 foot length, 22 foot beam and 8!5-9 fqot draft. On or
‘about October 1, 1951, and at all times material hereto,
her personnel consisted of a captain, a mate, two engi-
neers, two deckhands and a cook. She was equipped with |
a radio,-a radio direction finder and & standard magnetic
compass, but had no radar and her fathometer was in-
operative. .She had aboard the charts of the Gulf Coast
area, the Light Lists and some other navigational pub-
lications, but did not have Tide and Current Tables.

11. The AS-16 was an unmanned steel barge of
190 foot length, 40 foot beam, and 91. foot draft. During
the voyage here involved she was fully loaded with triple
super phosphate, and from the time of ‘departure from
Tampa Bar to her grounding she was towed astern the
NAVAJO at the end of a 800-900 foot manila hawser.

12. The NAVAJO and her tow departed Tampa
Bar at 10:00 P.M. September 28, 1951, going directly
in open water in her landfall off Sand Island Light at the
entrance to Mobile Bay, reaching a position approximately
5 miles off the light at 6:00 P.M. September 30, 1951.
having averaged 7 knots for the 311 mile distance. She
then proceeded Westerly and parallel to the coast to a
point approximately 5-6 miles abeam of the Horn Island
Light,.reaching’this position at 9:20 P. M. September 30.
1951, and, having averaged 6.9 knots for the 23 mile dis-
tance. The wind at this time was approximately 30-35
miles per hcur, waves were approximately 5-6 feet and
visibility not more than 10 miles. Her master, who regu-
larly had the 6 to 12 watch, was at the conn.

13. After leaving the position abeam Horn-Island
Light, the master followed a compass course of 268 mag-
netic intending to make good an actual course of 265
magnetic. Wind and sea conditions continued substan-
tially the. same, but visibility gradually lessened. * The 3
allowance of course set over course intended was to com-
pensate for the northeast wind, the effect of whith the
master thought would be substantially reduced by a tide
continuing on the flood during this time. Actually, how-
ever, as he could have determined from tide tables if they
had been aboard, the tide did not continue on the flood for
this period, but went to-the ebb on or before 10:30 P.M.
on the night of September 30th-October Ist, 1951. With
weather conditions such as existed at that time, a tidal
flow of up to four knots could have been reasonably antici-
pated. The NAVAJO, then past Horn Island Light and
on her way toward Ship Island.Pass, was thus strongly
set to the south by both wind and tide, which were now
cumulative in effect. ,

14. The master was to be relieved at 12 o'clock
midnight by the mate who was assigned the 12 to 6 watch.
Between 11:30 P. M. and 12 midnight, prior to his time
to take over, the mate attempted to ascertain the position
of the NAVAJO and her tow and found that the master
did not know “where he was at”. No fixed of any kind
had been obtained by the master in the two hours and
forty-nine minutes since leaving Horn Island. Accord-
ingly, the mate refused to relieve the master of the conn.

15. The master remained at the conn, and despite
being lost, continued on the same compass course and the
same speed until he ran aground at 12:20 A.M. October

1, 1951, less than a mile from the northernmost tip of
Chandeleur Island. From the time she left her position
abeam Horn: Island until.the time of the grounding the
NAVAJO had averaged 6.53 knots for the distance of
19.6 miles.

oe
»

16. With an inoperative fathometer, the NAVAJO
could determine the depth of the water she was in only
by taking soundings with a hand lead line. These, to be
accurate and reliable, must be "taken at dead slow speed,
which with a tug and tow, such as the NAVAJO and the
AS-16, ‘requires a slowing and regaining speed that costs
10-15 minutes in lost time. The NAVAJO could not have
taken more than one or possibly two such soundings and
maintained her average speed of 6.53 knots between her
Horn Island fix and her grounding.

17. At the time of Grounding visibility had been
reduced to 485 miles. The course actually made good
from the NAVAJO’S position off Horn Island to her
grouiding was 253 magnetic. A course of 265 mag-
netic, such as her master thought he was on, would have
carried the vessel and her tow to the north,and outside
the then range of visibility of Chandeleur Light, and he

would never have seen it, hut would have instead picked

up the sea buoy midway between Chandeleur and Ship
Islands.

18, With a visibility of 4-5 miles and heading west

from his Horn Island fix at an average speed of 6.53 -

knots, the master of the NAVAJO should have expected
to sight either the sea buoy midway between Chandeleur
and Ship Island, or Chandeleur Light itself, not later than

midnight, twent’ minutes before his grounding. At this
point, if he had not identified his position, he had then
run out his time. Proper and competent seamanship in
such a situation is either to anchor in order to detér-
mine position, or to effect a 180 change in direction and
go back over the original course. To proceed on with
the same course and speed was to invite the disaster that
occurred,

, 19. The NAVAJO was first to touch bottom, and
i the master immediately sought to avoid stranding his tug
' -by backing and tarning. In aid of this maneuver the
mate cut the hawser to the AS-16, setting the barge
adrift while still afloat. During or shortly: subsequent
to, this maneuvering, ‘the searchlight of the NAVAJO
which had not been used since leaving Tampa was lighted
for the first time, and the crew members were able to see
a structure on shore which was identified as the structure
of Chandeieur Light.” The light itself was not functioning.

r 20. The barge, ‘set adrift, grounded approximately
100G-2000 feet from the base of the Chandeleur Light
structure and the tug proceeded on to Gulfport, Missis-

sippi, without her tow. As a result of the stranding the
AS-16 was damaged and her cargo damaged and or lost.

21. The Tug NAVAJO on October 1, 1951 and at
all times material hereto, was inadequately equipped, un-
seaworthy and unfit for safe navigation of the waters
surrounding Chandeleur Island in that she did not have
, aboard tide and current tables in an area characterized by

strong and abruptly changing tidal currents,.and in that
her fathometer was inoperative in an area of shoal waters
and low, sandy islands of limited visibility.

lle

44

22. The Tug NAVAJO was in charge of and being
navigated by a master who was careless, incompetent, neg-
ligent and at fault in the following particulars :

ia! He placed absolute reliance on an unmanned
and unvatched light.

(bi He made inadequate and improper allowance=
for tide, wind and weather conditions.

ic) He did not properly consult or use wach navi-
gational aids, facilities and equipment as the NAVAJO
did carry.

. (d) He continued under way at the same cours
and speed despite having run his time ovt on his expected
sighting if he had been on his dead reckoning course.

‘e) He continued under way-at the same course
and speed despite not knowing: his position. ;

if) He contirned into shoal waters, not knowine
the depch, and taking insufficient and or unreliable souna-
_ ings.

ig’ He ran his vessel and her tow aground on
well known and fully charted body of land.

23. The stranding of the AS-16 with the resultan’
- damage to the hull of the barge and the damage and or
loss of her cargo was caused proximately by the unsafe.
unfit and unseaworthy condition of the Tug NAVAJO.
and particularly her ‘inadequate - and improperly main-
tained nav igational aids, facilities and equipment; and by
the gross carelessness, incompetence, negligence and fau!:
of her master as set out above.

24. The Coast Guard hed no notice from an;
source of the failure of Chandeleur Light prior to approxi-

45

mately 10:30 P.M. October 2, 1951. At that time the
Coast Guard Cutter NIKE, returning to station in Gulf-
port from patrol off Campeche, Mexico, having failed to
pick up the loom of the light off the C handeleur Islands,
h:id.anchored and determined that the light was not func-
tioning. She forthwith radioed this information to the
Coast Guard District Office in New Orleans, which ih
turn immediately sent out a broadcast‘ to all shipping
interests and the public generally, notifying them that
the light was’ extinguished. ;
25. The Coast Guard used all means reasonably
‘available to it in discovering that Chandeleur Light was
out, and gave immediate warning by radio and publication
of the fact of the extinguishment of the ligut to all ship-
. ping interests and the public generally.

Y
26. At the same time the Coast Guard District

Office broadcast warning that Chandeleur Light was #-
tinguished, the Coast Guard Cutter SALVIA was dis-
patched to correct the nonfunctioning of Chandéleur
Light. She arrived off Chandeleur Islands the following
morning, October 3, 1951, and succeeded in relighting the
light in the afternoon of that day. The fact of relighting
was immediately broadcast to all shipping interests.

27. The Coast Guard, after discovery that Chande-
leur Light was out, acted with all possible speed in repair-
ing and relighting it.

28. In restoring Chandeleur Light to uormal oper-
ating condition, the party assigned this task from the
SALVIA checked all component elements of the light sys-
tem. The sun relay unit was,found to be malfunctioning.

46

This unit was removed from its position, at which time
its base was found to be partially filled with mud from
dirt daubers, a species of wasp, but none of this mud wa-
in the interior part where the silver contact points which
make and break the circuit are located. The unit wa-
disassembled and a fine deposit with pitting was found on
the contact points. These were cleaned and adjusted, an‘
the unit reassembled, placed back in position, connected!
and checked. The entire light was then found to function
normally. * a

29. There had been no indication of failure or
malfunctioning of the sun relay unit or-any other part
of the Chandeleur Light system during the entire time
between its installation in 1949 and the outage in October
1951. The last regular inspection of the Chandeleur Ligh:
had been made on September 7, 1951, approximately three
weeks prior to the grounding of the NAVAJO and its tow
At that time the regular checks were made, including the
artificial darkening of the sun relay. and the light oper-
ated. normally. No irregularities or malfunctioning |
any sort were found.

30. The melfrnctioning of the-sun relay unit.-
whien in turn caused the outage of Chanceleur Light. wa- .

not due to the mud. in its hase, but was due to a failure of
the silver contact points, because of pitting, to complete
the electrical circuit of the relay system. The cause of
this pitting. suffieent to bring, abut failure in this in-
stallation, which had not occurred previously and has ne"
accurred subsequently up to the date ef trial, is stil! no"

known. As installed in the Chand leur Light system the

unit hud’a separate 12 voli cireuit with a total curren

mA

. AT

flowing through it of .048 amperes. less than 1 30th the
maximum safe. current permitted by the manufacturer’-
<pecifications for this unit of 1.4 amperes at 12 volts.

.

31. Incipient failure of the contact noints cannot
he accurately determined by disassembly of the unit and
visual inspection, because some darkening and oxidation
of the silver occurs in normal use, and some pitted con-
tacts nonetheless complete the electrical circuit, while con-
tinuity can be lost in others which superficially appear to
be perfectly. good.

’

32. The sun relay unit as used in the Chandeleur
Light system is of standard design. having been originally
devised by the Swedish scientist. Gustaf Dalen, around the
turn of the century and manufactured in something simi-
lar to its present state by the same concern, the American
Gas Accumulator Company. since 1921] or 1922. It is the
most reliable of the light-actuated switches, and when in-
stalled in such a station as Chandeleur Light has an antii-
pated working life without failure of from 20 to 60 vears.
Its failure, on station was an occurrence. that could not
have been reasonably foreseen.

”
;

3%. The Coast Guard used due care to make cer-
tain that Chandeleur Light was kept in good working
order. The standards set. und the adherence to the-e
standar «, show no negligence whatsoever on its part.

34. The casualty complained of was not crused or
contributed to by ony act or neglect of governmental per-
sonnel but was occasioned solely by negligence. fault:
carelessness and incompetence in the maintenance end
operation of the NAVAJO and her tow.

48

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This court has jurisdiction of. these actions, and
venue is properly laid in the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana; 28 USC 1346. =

2. Running aground on a well known and fully
charted body of land in itself raises a presumption of
negligence and fault. The Helen B. Moran, 255 F. 342: ~
New York Trap Rock Corporation v. The Dynamic, 5!)
F.-Supp. 507, aff'd 136 F. 12d) 683. Not only was this +
presumption not rebutted by plaintiffs, but negligence
and lack of reasonable and due care in’ the maintenance
and operation of the NAVAJO were affirmatively shown.

3. The Tug NAVAJO on October 1, 1951 was un-

seaworthy for the area in which she was being navigated
in the following respects: (1) She was in charge of and
being navigated by an incompetent master; (2) she did
not have tide and current tables, which “were necessary
navigational i:formation; and :5) her fathometer wa-
inonerative. The Maria, 91 F. (2d) 819; The T. J. Hoo})-
er, 60°F. (2d) 737. Her unseaworthiness was a proxi-
mate cause of the stranding, which in turn led to the
loss and damage in question.

4. The Tug NAVAJO and her tow on October 1
1951 were navigaied in a careless, reckless, impruden:
and unseamanlike fashion in the following respects 11"
_ inadequate and improper allowances were made for tide.
wind and weather ‘conditions: '2) the same course and
speed were maintained despite the fact that her pos!*'on
was unknown; ‘3: the same course and speed were main- -.
tained despite the failure to pick up her sigutings; (4°

49..."

the same course and speed were maintained in shoal
waters without taking proper soundings; and (5) from
her last known position to her grounding no check or
determination of any kind was made to find out if any
discrepancy existed between the course actually made
good and the course intendei to be made, but: instead,
absolute reliance for warning in the event of such dis-
crepaney was placed on an unmanned light known to be
subject to irregularity or extinguishment. These errors
of navigation were a proximate cause of the stranding,
which in turn led to the loss and. damage in question.

5. The Coast Guard had neither actual nor con-
structive notice that Chandeleur Light was out on October
1, 1951, and the failure on the part of the NAVAJO to
know that the light was out was not caused by’ any negli-
gence or lack of due and reasonable care on the part of
the Coast Guard. Russell, Poling & Company v, Conner
Standard Marine Corp., 252 F. (2dr 167.

6. Taking into account its own past experience
and the experience of others with the sun relay’ unit, to-
‘ovther with what was inherently probable from the nature
of the device itself, the Coast Guard could not have rea-
sonably anticipated the failure on October 1, 1951, of the
unit from nitted contact points, which in turn caused ex-
Pigehyeresaige of Chandeleur Light. The Germanic, 196
i". S. 589; Ford v. Tremont Lumber Co., (La. 1909), 49
So. pe The bare possibility of such failure is not a basis
upon which to predicate a wrong. Brady v. Southern Rail-
way Co., 320 U. S, 476. In-maintaining and operating
Chandeleur Light as an aid to navigation, the Coast Guard
used due and reasonable ‘care in the performance of its

,

50

duty. Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350
U.S. 61.

7. The damage to the AS-16 and the damage tir
and or loss of ker cargo growing vut of, her stranding on
October 1, 1951, was not caused or contributed to in any
way by any act or neglect of the United States, ts agents
servants or employees, and plaintiffs accordingly are not
entitled to recovery from the United States.

& The-United States is entitled to judgment in its
favor dismissing the complaints herein with costs.

New Orleans, Louisiana, October &, 1959.
s Herbert W. Christenberry

UNITED STATES DiS7RICT JUDGE

51

APPENDIX “B”.

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF |
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

IN THE
- UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS’
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

INDIAN TOWING CO., INC., ET AL...
‘ | Appellants,
versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District- of Louisiana

(February 29, 1960:

Before RIVES, Chief Judge. and HUTCHESON and
TUTTLE, Circuht Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs, owners
of the Barge AS-16 and her cargo, in separate suits, con- |
svlidated for trial. for damages against the United States
resulting fromthe grounding of the Barge on Chandeleur
’ Island when, on the night of September 30-October 1,.1951,
the Chandeleur light failed. are here appealing from judg-

52 :

ments finding the United.States not guilty of negligence
and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. :

Entered upon full findings of fact and conclusions
of law which, setting out in detail, and stating the effect
of, the relevant evidence, the judgments found and heli
that the United States was not negligent or in any way
at fault jn installing and maintaining the light, ‘and
that the damage to the barge and its cargo was caused hy
the unsafe, unfit, and unseaworthy condition of the barge

and the gross carelessness, incompetence, negligence ani

fault of the master.

Attacking as clearly erroneous the findings .and
conclusions (1) that the Coast Guard was not negligent
in the installation and or maintenance of Chandeleur
light, and (2) that the stranding of the Barge AS-16
was caused selely by the Tug Navajo, and was not cause d
or contributed to by any negligence on the part of .
United States, the appellants insist that the findings me
judgments muy not stand. We do not think so.

The case was tried by the court without a jury.
and the district judge. in his function as trier of the facts,
resolved the fact issues against the plaintiffs. Appellants,
however, arfue the appeal as though the district judge
had determined, as matter of law, that a verdict again-*
plaintiffs was demanded and had directed one accor(-
ingly. Of course, this will not at all do. All that oc-
curred here is that the district judge, on evidence we think
fully supporting his finding, determined that plaintif?s
did not sustain their burden of showing that defendant
was at fault and gave judgments aecordingly.

OO

53

Relying on the “doctrine of res ipsa loquitur”, a
doctrine which is “not proof and.does not supply want of
proof” but is merely an elegant and, to some, a mystifying
way of stating “a rule of interpretation by which evidence
of facts is made to speak the logical conclusions nat-
urally flowing therefrom”, appellants seem to fee] that
it onerates here to impose upon the United States a kind
of liability without fault, making the United States, as
the owner and operator of the light, an insurer against
its failing.

*

Appellants in short sem to insist that proof merely
that the light failed imposed liability upon the United
States as a matter of law and, though the aistrict judge
has, upon an examination of the evidence, found and con-
cluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the United
States was at fault, it must nevertheless be cast in judg-
ment.

We think the slightest reflection upon the meaning
and application of the rule appellants invoke, as it is
stated and applied in 38 Am. Jur., p. 989, and in the cases
they cite, will show that this is not so.

In Reynolds Metals Co. ¥. Yturbide, 258 F. (2u)
321, the case most strongly .relied on by appellants, at
page 331 the court said:

“When res ipsa’ loquitur is applied, the facts of the
oceurrence warrant the inference of negligence.
They furnish substantial evidence of negligence
where the direct evidence of it may be lacking, but,
they make a case to be decided by the jury. In
finding itself in the dilemma mentioned by Harper

and James in the language quoted above, the appel-
lant is in no different sithation than any other
defendant who finds itself in a res ipsa case and
before a jury. It is not as appellant asserts the
victim of the application of a rule of absotate lia-
bility.’ ( Emphasis added. |

In Smith v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 976, at pp..
877-8, where the doctrine was invoked to meet the burden
of proof imposed upon the libellant, this court, affirming
the judgment of the district judge, finding the United
States not guilty of negligence, stated:

“Appellent has not produced any direct evidence to
support his allegations of negligence. *** To meet
the burden of proof imposed upon him he rélies
upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Neither the
happening of the event nor any circumstances sur-
rounding the same points to any negligent act or
omission which caused the batten to give way and
injure appellant. In the absence of such,a show-
ing, the application of the doctrine would make ap-
pellee an insurer against the accident. Cf. Burton
v. Greig, 5 Cir., 271: Fed. 271; The Tawmie, 5 Cir.,
80 F. (2d) 792. The doctrine’ is not applicable
in any case unless, by process of probable reason-
ing, the facts and circumstances point out the
wrongdoer the tortious character uf his .act and-
exclude other. probable causes of the injury. The
doctrine js not proof and does not supply a want
of proof.” ‘Emphasis added.)

Because the evidence supporting his findings and
judgment is set out fully and fairly in the findings and

‘wind

conclusions of the district’ judge, with which we agree,
it will serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the state- .
ment here. It will be sufficient for us to refer with
approval to it and to declare; that we cannot say that
any of the findings are clearly erroneous; that, indeed, we |
are of the clear opinion that the judgment was right and
should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED?

56

APPENDIX “C”,

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT 01

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
JUDGMENT. |

Extract from the Minutes of February 29, 1460.

INDIAN TOWING CO., INC., ET AL...’
No. 18038, versus

UNITE D'STATES OF AME RICA.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcrip’
of the record from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by
counsel ;
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF,« It. is now
_ere ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judg:
ment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the
same is hereby, affirmed.

.

?

|

~

‘APPENDIX “D”.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No.* , Octoher Term, 1959.

INDIAN TOWING CO., INC. ET AL., ”
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES

]
*

ORDER EXTENDING TIME a PE TITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTI

Bar!

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of
cunsel for petitioner's),

[T IS ORDERED that the time for filing petition
for writ of certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and
the same is hereby; extended to and including June 30th,
1960 ;

‘Sr HUGO L.-BLACK

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States.
Dated this , 19
day of May, 1960.

- APPENDIX “E”.
Za U.S. C. Section 1346 tb:

Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title.
the district courts, ‘together with the District Court for
the Territory of Alaska, the United States District Cour
for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945,
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or deat!

caused by the negtigent or wrongful aet or omission of.an\y

employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the Unjted States, if a private person, would. be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act. or omission occurred.

she)
*

APPENDIX “F”:

1. S. C..8}
In order to aid navigation and to prevent disasters,
and aircraft. the Coast
Guard may establish, maintain, and operate:

colisions, and wrecks of vessels

‘l) aids to maritime navigation required to serve

the needs of the armed forces or of ‘the commerce of the
United States: ° ;

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_0455%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
