# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Davies-Young Soap Co. v. Nu-Pro Manufacturing Co. (No. 780)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_0271%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1959

## Text

in the Supreme Court of the United Sates be

OCTOBER TERM, 1959. .

: : | pate No, 780. oe 7 fis

- THE DAVIES-YOUNG SOAP:COMPANY,
7 Petitioner,
Lov. |
NU-PRO MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit.

a .
a

. Harry.A. TouLMIn, Jr.,
) | 308 W. First Street,
) Dayton, Ohio, ,
— : Counsel for Petiti
“f+ Of Counsel: |
GeorceE W. STENGEL, :
‘ Toutmin & TouLMIN. in

’ : THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO—MAIN 1-5647

°@

‘TABLE OF CONTENTS. ©

2 >

Citations to Opinions Below,
Jurisdiction :

J Question Presented

Statute Involved

The Public Interest

Statement of the Cane.
. Argument a . | g

1. The Decision by the Court of ‘Appeals for the’

Eighth Circuit is in Conflict’ With Decisions
of This Cofirt and Other Courts of. Appeals

-‘peals Opinion'Do Not Support Its Position
3. Importance of the Question
Conclusion /
APPENDIX: > oom : Pace

Decision: of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit |

Opinion of. Roy W. Harper, District Judge

he — of the United States Court of _ Appeals
° for the Eighth Circuit

—[———

; ; ; 10. — }
say the specification limits and interprets as well as .de-
figes the invention claimed. The specification is the pub-
lic’s protection.
‘CONCLUSION.

As shown in the above argument, this petition for
certiorari should be granted because of the importance of
the question presented and the conflict of the decision be- ~
low with decisions by this Court and other Courts of Ap-

. peals. — 3 ?
+ ¢ Respectfully submitted,
ms Harry A. Toutmin, Jr,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Of Counsel Tt?
Georce W: STENGEL,.
” cee & TouLMIN.

ra ; foe i
5 ; . . a:

11

APPENDIX.
| DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Ss FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
| “(December 21,, 1959.). Ny.

‘Before GARDNER and VOGEL, Circuit Judges, and MickeL-,
soy, District Judge. af /

VocEL, Circuit Judge.
- ‘Fhis appeal arises out of a siuit brought by the appe ‘}-
lant, The Davies-Young Soap Company. ‘against the ap- .

fringement. The District Court. Judge-Harper presiding,

found it unnécessary to determine the question of ingringe-

, ment as it held appellant's patent invalid on the’ grounds ,

that it lacked novelty and invention and because “* * *

it fails particularly to point out and distinctly to claim the -

subject matter regarded as to the invention.” Judgment

. Was accordingly entered for the appellee, ‘from whith re-
sult appellant appeals.

_ Appellant is the assignee of United States tains Pat- -

: dis No. 2,729, 576, granted to Ralf B. Trusler on January

3 1956, entitled“: METHOD OF DRY CLEANING FAB-

RIC ‘AND SIMULTANEOUSLY RENDERING THE

- SAME ‘ANTISTATIC.” The object to be accomplished

by rendering clothes antistatic was to prevent them from

attracting lint and dirt and from adhering to the bodies of

their wearers. The patent contained a single claim. cov- -

ering, gt

“Phe method of dry cleaning fabrics sa clothing
and simultaneously rendering the same. antistatic,
which comprises washing the fabric and clothing with
dry cleaning solvent having from 0.2°, to 10°, by

YS weight of a detergent dissolved therein, .and then rins-
; ing the fabric and clothing with a ‘dry cleaning solvent

, 3

—r : t

pellee, Nu-Pro Manufacturing Company, for paten ine

12 ae eee

having from 0.02‘. to 5.0‘. by weight of an antistatic
agent dissolved therein, the antistatic agent being
applied to the fabric and clothing in the presence of
‘detergent carried thereby from the washing.”

Appellant profited from the patented process by manu- |
_ facturing and marketing a solution known as BUCKEYE |
- CLEAN-CHARGE, which, when used in accordance with
stated direcfions, contained amounts of detergent’ ‘and
anti-static agents falling within the patent percentages -
. and produced the desired anti- static condition.

. As early as May, 1952, appellee compounded and mar-
keted a dry cleaning detergent, known as CHARGIT.
which, according | to appellant's own testimony and ex-
hibil®, was also used in a manner so as to contai amourts
of detergent and anti-static agents coming within the per-
centage ranges specified in the patent claim. Appellant.
however, in order to avoid the defense that its patent has
been anticipated by: prior art, contends that this use of
CHARGIT is immaterial because, again according to its
own tests, the solution was nonetheless still nét used in
. amounts sufficient to render the garments cleaned with it
permanently anti-static. These facts alone compel a find-
-ing that. appellant’ s patenj was invalid. : aa

35 U.S.C. A. § 112 sets forth the requirements for a
patent application and concludes by stating:

“The specification shall conclude with one or more.
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claim-
ing the subject matter which the applicant — as:
his invention.’

Appellee’s product, CHARGIT. clearly conformed to ‘the:
directions of thé patent claim, yet admittedly it failed to.
achieve the result of the alleged invention. Manifestly,
then, the claim does’ not meet the statutory requirement
of fully stating the process which appellant claims to: be

eo

. 13
its invention. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
1942, 317 U. S. 228; Standard Brands v. Yeast Corp., 1939,

. 308 U.S. 34; L. L. Antle & Co. v. Genovese, 8 Cir., 1957,
245 F. 2d 215; Standard Oil of California v. Tide Water

Associated Oit Co., 3 Cir.1945, 154 F. 2d 579.
Appellant seeks to avert this:conclusion of invalidity:
by contending that:
. an Trusler’ s contribution was net simply dump-
ing a quantity of an-antistatic agent in with the sol-
vent and detergent in the washer, but it involved ton- .

' sideration and reconcilation of a ‘number of require-
ments for the detergent and antistatic agent," * ***,”

which assertion is follow ed by a list of some five-additiona] °
elements of the patented process, all of which are allegedly
stated in detail in.the patent specifications. These include.
the cundition that the detergent be “compatible” with the
anti-static agent, that*both be'soluble in hy ‘drocarbon and
chlorinated solvents, that the anti-static agent be capable
of being absorbed by the fabric fibres~so that it will not

‘be rinsed off by the solvent and detergent, and that.the

anti-static agent not be adversely affected -by heat nor,
itself, have any adverse effect on the color or character. of

the fibres. However, even assuming ¢hat these. added re-

quirements, when considered along with the rest of the

- patent, do accurately and adequately describe alleged in-

ventive process, the patent must still fall short ‘of validity.
It is well established that the claims, and not the speéci-

‘fications, is the measure of the inventive.mgnopoly and de-

ficiencies of the former cannot be cured by any terms of
the latter. Altoona Theatres v. Tri-Ergon Corp., 1935, 294
U.S. 477; Freedman v. Friedman, 4 Cir., 1957, 242 F. 2d
364; Aluminum Co. of America v. Thompson Products, 6

~ Cir.. 1941, 122 F. 2d 796; In re Cresswell, C. C. P. A., Pat-

ents, 1951, 187 F. 2d 632; Application of Custer,C. CP. A., .

14 :
Patents, 1949, 173 F. 2d 226; In re Gillis, C. C. P. A., Pat-
ents, 1939, 102 F. 2d 902; Belden v. Air Control Products,
D. C. W. D. Mich., 1956, 144 F. Supp. 248; Flakice Corp. v.
Liquid Freeze Corp., D. C. N. D..Cal.,. 1955, 130 F. Supp.

‘471. Thus, in Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 1949, 336

U.S. 271, 276-277, the Supreme Court ofsthe United States
stated:

“The: dMerence denen the District Court and
the Court’ of Appeals as to these findings comes to

this: The trial@burt looked at claims 24 and 26 alone: ~

_and declined. to interpret the terms ‘silicates’: and
‘metallic silicates’ therein as being limited or qualified
by specifications to mean only the nine metallic sili-
cates which had been proved operative. The District
Court considered the claims therefore were too broad
and comprehended more than the invention. The

Court of Appeals considered that because there was:
nothing in the record to show that the applicants for

the patent intended by these-claims to assert a mo-
nopoly broader than nine. metallic silicates named in

the specifications, the ‘court should have construed .

- the claims as thus narrowed and limited by the speci-
fications.

- The statute makes provision for epeuifiiintien
separately from the clayms and requires that .the

latter ‘shall particularly point out and distinctly

claim the part, improvement, or combination which

_he claims as his invention or discovery.’ It would ac-
complish little to require that claims be separately

-vain repetition is no more to be encouraged in patents
than in any other documents, and claims like other
‘oon aes may incorporate other matter by, refer-
ence, their text must be sufficient. to ‘particularly
point out and distinctly claim’ an identifiable inven-
tion or discovery. We have frequently held that it
is the claim which measures the grant to the patentee.
See, for example, Milcer Steel Co. v. Fuller Co., 316

”

x

written if they are not to be separately read. While .

15 -

U. S. 143, 145; General Electric Co. v. Wabash Co.,
‘304 U. S. 364, 369; Altoona Theatres v. Tri-Ergon
_Corp., 294 U. S. 477, 487.) While the cases more often _

have dealt with efforts to resort to specifications to

.expand claims, it is clear that the latter fail equally to

- perform their function as a measure of the grant when
they overclaim the invention.. When they do so to the
point of invalidity and are free from ambiguity
which might justify resort to the specifications, we
agree with the District Court that they are not to be
saved because the latter are less inclusive.”

Similarly, in General Electric Co. v, Wabash Appliance
Corp., 1938, 304 U. S. 364, 374-375, the court held a patent
invalid on its face, after first observing that:

“Finally, the product claims may not be saved by
.a limitation to products produced in accordance with
the process set out in the specification. * * * unless
the claim uses language e licitly referring to -the
method of preparation, or p rae the product in
phrases suggestive of that process, to save the product
claim in this fashion would constitute. an improper
importation into the claim of a factor nowhere de-
scribed there. The claims in suit seek to monopolize
the product however created, and may not be re-
worded, in an effort to establish their validity, to
cover only the products of the process described in
the specification, or its equivalent.”

The trial court having corretl; found appellant's.

' patent invalid by reason of the indefjniteness of its claim,

_it is unnecessary’ for this court to consider whether or not
appellant’s claimed invention was anticipated by prior art

_ or publication. ~ judgment of the court below is, there-

fore, affirmed.
A true copy. |

Attest:
Clerk, U. S. Court of —— —— Circuit.

16. | |
- OPINION OF ROY W. HARPER, DISTRICT JUDGE.

’ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
* Eastern District of Missouri,
St. Louis 1..
October 3, 1958. #8 *

Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, %
Attorneys:at Law, .
Boatmen’s Bank Building,
St. Louis-2, Missouri. of,

Attn.: Mr. ‘Marion S. Francis
Toulmin & Toulmin, : ,
Attorneys at Law,

308 West First Street, ek he .
Dayton, Ohio.: 5 is set
. aos ; Attn.: Mr. H. A. Toulmin gy.
Cohn, Powell & Cassidy, . ‘
- Attorneys at Law,
220 North Fourth Street,
. St. Louis 2, Missouri.

' Attn.: Mr. Lawrence 6 Cohn
Re: Davies-Young v. Nu-Pro Mfg. Co.—No. 10622(2)

Gentlemen: "

I had hoped to write a ‘memorandum opinion in the .
~ above styled case, but court commitments have interfered
to the extent that I have-not able to do so, and it ap-

: pearing that I am going:into a heavy trial schedule in the

immediate future I Wo not want to hold this matter under
submission any longer. For that reason I am going to, dis-
pose of it by writin this letter rather than a memorandum
opinion. :
First, I shall eal with plaintiff's motion to strike cer-
tain proof fromAhe record regarding prior users. ‘When
the defendant gave formal notice as to the patents and —
publicatians-it4intended to use, the plaintiff filed a motion

Sa - 7 /?

cerns
to require the defendant to elect a reasonable number,

but after the defendant's counsel reduced the number
plaintiff's motion was withdrawn.

| At the trial the defendant did not neni all of the
patents ‘of ‘which it hati givén plaintiff notice, but did v
_. stress prior invention and prior use as to which no statu-
tory notice had been given. ‘From the written records,
depositions, written memoranda and other documents and *
| letters in the file, plaintiff was well aware -that proof of
; i, prior uses would. be made at the trial. The chief complaint
’ which plaintiff ‘really has is that it received too much notice
rather than not enough. The court is. of the opinion that *. ae
the defendant gave plaintiff proper notice as required by
‘law and, that. the plaintiff'« ‘Ss motion to strike should be
overruled, ° :
| With respects to the atatie of the case, the first ques- .
tion for the court to determine is*whether or not the plain- -
tiff’s patent is valid. Your familiarity with the patent in
question makes it needless to repeat it here, but anti-static
agents have been standard constituents of dry cleaning
detergents’ for many years. In fact, the plaintiff. states
that the defendant’s product when, used in less than a 3‘;

concentration does not infringe: This, then, would require

outside experiment in order to determine whether or not

~ the patent was infringed, and under Standard Brands, Inc.

v. National’ Grain Yeast Corp., 308 U. Ss. 34, and’ United

Carbon Co. v. Binney and Smith Co., 317 U, S. 228, the
patent isyrendered void. ° .

Furtkér, plaintiff claims that it has the sole right to

use any ingredie?yt that is the slightest anti-static. This

is too broad a cl4im and is much broader than any in-

ventive concept or contribution to the art of dry cleaning.

The patent itself i is for a process in which an unpatentable

mixture is used, and: in such instances it is vitally im-

: ; |

ww

tn 18 “ia

portant to specify the mixture with some certainty. As
’ was stated in Antle v. Genovese, 245 F. 2d 215, the pur-
_ ported patent does not describe or define the process so
that others will be enabled to ascertain its-limits. As set -
out by the court in the Antle case, |. c. 222: ‘More“tspe-
cially, reasonable certainty was, required to inform the

_ public of the limits of the monopoly asserted.”

The patent in question, in the‘court’s opinion, does
not inform the public of the limits, the limits set out be-
ing entirely too indefinite, and even if not taught by the
prior art, it would fail,as being too-broad, for among other
things it fails to inform the public what to do so as not to
infringe. A number of publications were introduced, such
as a publication of the Atlas Powder Company, bulletins

* _ of Armour Chemical Division and DuPont. Chemical Com-

pany, an article in Industrial and Engineering Chemistry,
and an article in Chemical Week, all of which indicate to
the court the lack of novelty in the invention, it being
taught by the prior art.

Further, the testimony disclosed that the defendant’s
product CHARGIT had been on'sale and in use in this
country since May of 1952, and a number of dry cleaning
establishments were‘ operating and using CHARGIT in
1952. Since CHARGIT’ had been in use in the cleaning
trade before the plaintiff applied for its patent, this pro-
vides are added reason for the patent being invalid.

The court is accordingly ‘holding that the patent is

invalid, and ir view of that fact ‘it is not necessary to pass - ° 7

‘on the question, of infringement. Attorneys for the de-
fendant will prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and. judgment to he entered by the court and submit
copies thereof to the ment ¢ for the plaintiff.

Very truly yours,
Row. “HARPER.

-

?

* the United States District Court: for the Eastern District ae

19 °
JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES couRT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH ‘CIRCUIT. »

This cause came on to be heard on the-recerd_ from

of Missouri, and was argued by counsel.
On Consideration Whereof, it is now here endoved
and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the said

‘District Court, in this cause, be, and the same is nereby,

affirmed.
December 2ist, 1959,

—_

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386420_0271%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
