# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1958
- **Citation:** 358 U.S. 910

## Text

In THE

| Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM,

=” , No - 476

GOLDIE B. PRASHKER,
INC.,

1958

Executrix of the

Vi
4

f

8

Estate of Nathan

Prashker, deceased, and CHC IC E EMBROIDERY & LACE S.

—-——_

Petitioners,

CF? | |

C. Can the opinion of a leading aerodynamicist that
the accidents demonstrate the improper design
-and dangerous characteristics of th® airplane. be

3
be
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Satie

disregarded, asa matter of law, by the ‘court ”

below?

“eo
it ~

Ss ee en

FESS eC NI

_
:

. 2. Was not the direction. of -a verdict on the “‘alter-

‘native’? grounds of, contributory negligence as a matter
_ of law and faflure to prove negligence a. shocking denial

of petitioners’ ‘constitutional right to trial’ by jury that~

warrants the exercise of this court’s supervisory powers? _

3. Is the ‘manufacturer of an airplane insulated from
liability for its,failure to give necessary: warnings and for
its negligent ign by approval and ‘certification of that
airplane by a federal agency? ;

Constitutional Provision Involved
Constitution of the United States, Amendment VII:

‘‘In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy ‘shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial -
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the .
United States than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.’’ } : —: ot

Statement of the Cuan. 7

There are approximately 5,000 Beechcraft Bonanza air-

_ planes registered. About one out of every sixty manu-
factured has come apart in the air, killing all- occupants
“(one to four people in ‘each case).’ » According to peti-
tioners’ proof, which was largely confined to the Prashker

accident and the forty-five instances that preceded it, these
accidents were caused by the airplane’s unique and danger- —
ous combination of flying characteristics (or ‘‘handling
qualities’) which, under , certain conditions, disorient a

- pilot, make him sick, lead him to lose control of his, air-

plane, and through. the. force that he exerts on his ‘‘stick "
or rudder control, lead him to impose huge loads on the

1As ‘of December 31, 1957. seventy-nine -Bonanzas had come
apart in flight. a : ——

“6

4
wings which cause structural faure. The accidents have .
inwalved pilots of all degrees of experience. : .
Statistically, petitioners discovered and tried to ‘prove
that the Bonanza suffersstructural: failure in flight at a:

. rate fifteen times*the rate. of afl other single-engine civil

aircraft? A comparison between the number of Bonanza

_ Structural failure accidents and the number of all others

indicates that for all practical purposes the Bonanza, which .
is the only airplane certificated to make use of the unique

_ “*V?* tail,.is the only’ type @r model airplane that has come:
; apart with anything more ins isolated ‘frequency. .

Despite the obvious and frightening danger in the air-
plane, the Bonanza, at least through the time of the Prash- |
ker aceident, continued to be manufactured with the same _
design defects and without significant corrective changes.

Tle Bonanza conforms-to the standards of the Civil Air _
Regulations, promulgdted by the Civil Aeronautics Board ©
(14 C.F.R. Part 3). It has been and is ‘certificated and
approved by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, largely. |
because it conforms ‘with the standards of the Regulations |
(23e-26¢ )e?

Despite Civil Aeronautics Administration, approval, the .
respondent Beech, saw fit, in 1947 and 1948, to warn
* Bonanza users of the structural failure in flight possibility
in Bonanzas. Detailed accident reports, sometimes in hair-
raising language were sert out to all Bonanza users (PX
64-65, 341a-364a, 320a-323a). This policy, althorgh itself
igadequate to meet the danger, was discontinued in Oc-
tober, 1948, largely because of the pressure from dis-

* This rate is based on a simple comparison of the number of .
structural failure accidents with the- number of aircraf¢ registered
for a six-year petiod through the year of the Prashker accident, and
year by year through that period. The court below, while ruling
ee. »
cs

* Eleven of the 45 pilots were qualified instrument pilots (See
accident reports, 260a-261a, PX 32).

” The District Court refused to admit evidence of the omperied-
Cleveland weather. The court below recites this seviderice, however,
as though it were admitted (Opinion; yifra, p. 2a).

a

. ]

the route VER requirements (301a, 307a-30Sa ), There
was als evidence that™it was Prasiiker's regular practree
to chegk the weather (lla).

‘

. Prashker concedédly had no instrument rating (Sa). He
did have considerable ihstrument training, however -(9a, _
lla, PX. 3). He. was described by ‘his brother, also a
pilot, as. ‘ta very apable pilot, a yery safe pilot’? (Sa).
‘He knew the dangers of flying in bad weather (17a) and
his training was such aS would help him avoid bad
weather if that were possible (18a). ° .

.

Rulings of the Courts Below

At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the. District Court
directed a verdict for the respondents (aj in the ‘claims
_based on negligence, on the ground that the deceased, pilot

was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
(b) in the elaim for breach of warranty against the’ dis-
-tributor, on the ground that decedert’s negligence bars a.
recovery, (¢) in the claim fer breachtof warranty against
the manufacturer; on the basis of lack of privity under
- Kansas law, and (¢@} in the claim against the manufacturer
for’ pupitive damages on the ground that there was in-
sufficient evidence. |

On appeal by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals;
-tha® Court ‘affirmed, but on somewhat different grounds. ,
While stating that the petitioners’ position: on tlie ques-
tion of contributory negligence, wes starguable’’, it reiied
‘also. on. an alternative ground #@r decision’, that. the
plaintiffs, failed to prove negligence and breach ‘of war-,
rantv. As indicated, the. court affirmed the exclusion of
evidence of other accidents and the coniparative rate of.
failure on the ground of ‘‘irrelevancy *. & :

~

~y

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

ies ee ee
1. Holding the prigr Bonanza disintegration acci-
dents and the Bonanza’s disparate rate of failure
“irrelevant” was gross and shocking error, a vio-
lation of- local law, in conflict with other decisions

of the court below, and a deprivation of . jury
* trial. ‘

As to Prior Accidents °

The court below has decided, as a matter of law, that
the prior accidents were caused by pilot fault, and that.

therefore, they were “‘irrelevant’’ to:the issue of whether

the Bonanza was unsafe, and whethef its characteristics
caused (the Prashker accident (Opinionpsinira, p. Ta)

“This finding is in direct contradiction ty the petinoners’

expert proof that the accidents avere not erused by pilot
fault, but rather by the characteristics of the airplane.

tSee Dominaseh testimons, quoted supra, p. 6). The

court below has, in e ‘ffect, set itself up as a super-e ngineer
who can. read aircraft accident reports With eves “more

_ skilled than those of a jeading expert in the field.

The cour; has conclided that no inferences whatever,

may be drawn from the facet that an airplane comes apart

an the-air. **hecguse of the compromise required with

structural strength in designing an aireraft which will get
off the ‘ground’ (Opinion, imfra, p: lla). It has not
only ignered common sense, but has ignored ‘the direct
testimony -to,the contrary of a man Whose life's work has
heen devoted to aireraft design (See DommaschAestimony,
YT2as and transcript, pp. A887 and 1952). 7 ,

The finding. of the avert be low that the ace ‘denis were
urrebe ‘vant’’ defies understanding. - Instances ‘of struc-
tural failute in flight in Bonanzas are obviousl’ relevant
to the Prashker Instance of structural failure in flight in

a Bonanza, partic ularly when an expert specifiedlly sive

we

eae

eee wh

)

a : :

so, (235a, Zola, OfJa).. True, respondents may attempt
“to explain these instances and. distinguish them from the
Prashker accident. But a court may ari hold that they
are “‘irrelevant’’ as a matter of law.’

. Indeed, these reports of other accidents, were more
than relevant to the issue of causation. They were neces:
sary! “Asked ‘what material do vou as an engineer re-
quire to analyze the Prashker accident and come to a
conclusion om the cause of the Prashker accident,’ Mr.
Dommasch’ rephed ‘a study of similar’ circumstances of °
si@iar occurrences if they exist’’ (170a).. He added, ** thir
“is an essential ingredient, to my analysis —_or
accident’” (17la). a) a

The District Court refused to admit anf of the aceident
reports on the issue of dangerous cofMition and Cuuse-
tion, Since this was éssential evidence its exclusrom ¢ftee
tively prevented petitioners from introdueing specifi ex
pert proof on causation. This determination by the Dis
Os triet Court, along with the exclusion of all other related
evidence on the ground of Srrelevancy, was ‘affirmed 4)
the court below. It was in stark Violation of ‘the law of-
Pennsylvania where pie actident happened, the, law of
Delaware, where the case Was tried, and other deoision=

of the Court of Appeals.
a

*

: ee ° , e ° :
In Fisher v. Pomerows, Ine.. 322 Pa. 38, 185 A. 2h
(1936), and Baker v. Haaeu. 177 Pa. 128, 189, 140, 60
A. 705 (1806), fhe Stuprenw Court of Petnevivania clearly

”

aye

‘The court below, wenteeven furthest and impliedly held te
ever) the admisstor Of evidetice of sever ac idemi-, om the amute
issue of motice, Was Not M arranted. This was in direct conta Tretaent

_ tg the Court's holding. in Defugenw AMlis:Chaimers A/ta ¢
210 F.2d 404, 414 «C. A. 3, 1954,;,°crting Baltimore OF ie WB
v- Felgenhauer, 168 *. 2d 12,17 (C. A. 8, 1948), a twas conefars
to cleer Pennevivania Law. Aladicr \ Kirschbuvm Co., 208 ¥: att)

148 A. 851 (1930). Sehok V Pennsyivania bdison Co. 331 Va. 524

1A. 2yi GBO ¢1938); and Reid v Lintk, 200. Pa. 10 55 AL MY

(1903). : 5

held that evidence of prior occurrences was relevant. and
admissible on the issues of the existence’ of a dangerous
‘condition, and causation. ,

Potter v. Natural.Gas Company, 183 Pa: 575, 590, 39
A. 7 (1898), to the same effect, has striking significance
to the question at bar. One pricr instance, in which a pipe
laid by defendant at.the side of a highway had, through
a seraping sound made by the wheel of a_cart passing

over it, frightened a horse and caused him te jump, Was _

> held admissible. The court said it was reievant to deter-
mine whether - the pipe, in its position. on the road, was
dangerous to travelers by horse and vehicle: that if ©
excited fear in an ordinarily gentle horse, it-was:- part of
plaintiff’s case to preve it; that if the plaintiff's horse in
the ease then at bar: had jumped only becanse it was
exceptionally excitable, the defendant was not ‘bound to
foresee the danger. and guard against ‘it.

os
© In the instant case petitioners were ‘obliged to show

that the accident was caused by the dangerous character-

istics of the Bonanza airplane, rather than by any ~
proper conduct on the part of Prashker. The proof o

the prior accidents, which involved pilots of all rac
of experience, including pilots with air transport ratings.

instrument ratings, and commercial licenses,- was Clear.

demonstraticn that the Prashker accident, as well as, the
others, was caused by the airplane rather than the a

_dn Patton vy. B. dO. RR. Co., 197 F. 2d 732, 739 (C.

. 1952), the plaintiff's decedent had ton killed by ee
runaway gondola ears. The case was based upon negli.
gence in maintenance of brakes ‘on’ the defendant’s cars.
Emplovees of the railroad vard where the accident had
taken plaée testified to prior incidents where handbrake
‘on B. & O. ears proved inadequate, and wouldn’t hold.-
The court, which was the same court, though a different
pane! of judges as the court below, held that this was
not erros despite the fact-that the particular four ears
involyed in the accident were not singled out.

re, Gea.

13

In Hadley v. B. € 0. R. Co., 120 F. 2d 993, 995 (C.. A.
3, 1941), cited ‘in the Patton case, the Court said, at

page 995:

3 »
‘‘Furthermore the testimony qualified as relevant and
material under the general rule, that ‘the fact that
a given result recurs continually and frequently while
but one cause remains constant, is’ strong proof that.
such’ cause produces the result in question * * °’.
Henry Pennsylvania Trial Evidence, 3rd Ed. 33.”’

In Dimenco v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 19 F.R.D.

499

(D. Del., 1956), Chief Judge Leahy stated (p. 501):

‘A survey of authority indicates evidence of other
accidents and near accidents admissible to show dan-
werous character,and notice provided the nature of
‘che subject matter as in issue and provided substan-
tially similar‘conditions dstablish its probative value.”

e

At page 503, ‘he said: °

.

°

““T therefore find evidence of prior’ accidents and .

near accidents relevant and material ‘and ‘therefore -

admissjble under proper instructions, not as direct
evidence of the. fact of negligence, but to show the °
dangerous character of the crossing, notice to the
defendant, and failure thereafter to take proper: pre-

-eautions; evidence of subsequent accidents and near —

accidents, though not logically determinative of not-ce
of a prior condition, may be admissible to show exist- .
enee of dangerous character anc failure to take prover
precautions.”’ { ,

* As to Statistics ‘\

The court below affirmed the exclusion of the statistical

p. 1

proof in'very sweeping terms. It stated (Opinion, m/ra,.
Za): | ;

“As to the, issue of causation by a design defect,
the statistic tends to prove nothing more than the

a

: . It
individual accident reports. It is extremely dubious’
in fact, whether statistics involving probabilities as
to causation hive ‘any significane e at all w hen applied
toa particular incident.’ at 4

If the court is correetone-wonders how such ek
accepted ‘statistical’? evidence’as expectancy of life tables
are admitted. Actually, petitioners’ “‘statisties’* were
véry simple. .They consisted of CAA and CAB informa.
tion on the number of airplanes registered and the num-
her of strueturat fadure accidents. The Bonanza’s rate
of failure was 15 times the rate for all other airplanes,
by a siinple comparison, -

-nW right v. Carier Products Inc., O44 F. 9d-53, 56,
oF (GC. AL 2, 1957), a recent manufacturer’s liability

case involving the duty to warn, the defendant souglit

to establish the safety of its product, by a-statistical analy-
sis of the inéidence of injury. The Disiriet Court relied
very heavily upon -the small incidence in finding’ in favor

of the defendant. The Court of “Appeals, in reversing the.’

District Court inferentially ac knowledged that the sta-
‘ tistic had probative foree, altuough not the force given to
it by pe lower court.

In affirming the exclusion of thé statistieal proof, the
court below applied an incomprehensibie logic. The court
has said that since the statisties are based in part upon
Bonanza accidents whieh are irrelevant (Sinee, as a mat-
ter of law, the accidénts were caused bw pilot fallibility)

’ ‘

Sed eee

the statistics are also irre ‘levant. The court ptself admits .

the statistic is startling’ (infra, p. La).

“The statistics show that for any and all reasons the

Jonanza comes apart more than fifteen times as often as
all other aircraft. They consider all instances of struc-
tural failure in flight in single-engine civil airplanes. Theie
effeet is to eliminate extraneous and contributing factors
of causation, such as’ pilot fault, and to evaluate the rela-

15

tive safety of the Bonanza. The statistics demonstrate
the falsity of the assumption made by the court below—
that the Bonanza*accidents were ‘caused by pilot fault.
Inca sense, the statistics provide further proof that the
particular aceident reports were admissible on the issue
‘of dangerous condition, and causation,

This evidence was probative of the questions of nevli-
gence, ‘causation, and contributory negligence, since it
demonstrated that it was the airplane and not the pilots
that cased these accidents; and since it furnished the basis -
for expert proof to te same effect. The @ffect of its shock’
ing exelusion was to deny petitioners their constitutional
right to trial by jury.

cy

\

| 2. The direction of a verdict on the “alternative”
grounds of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and failure to prove negligence was a
shocking ‘invasion of the jury’s function, @ denial
of petitioners’ right to juty trial, and in conflict
‘ .. with standards well settled by this Court.
|

Even without the important evidence of the other acei-
dents, petitioners were clearly entitled toe go tor the jury
in their claims of negligence sand breach of warranty. This

right bas ‘been. denied them on the “‘altérnative* ground=

that (1) the decedent was cuilty of contributory negligence
‘asa matter ‘of Taw, and (2) ‘*no negligence can be imputed
to the defendants (Opinionsampra, p. 1a). oe

a. Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law

It is net entirely clear whether the court below did or
did not base its deeision on contributory negligence. The
court said, infra, p. 72:

“A decision based on Prashker’s contributory negli-
rence alone would depend on a presmunary holdime

that the evidenee would not support an inference that

— .

16.

bad weather may have dined in on him even though

-he Was exercising .due care for his-own safety. We.

‘incline to the view that no such inference is available,
but concede that the question may be arguable. There-
fore * * * we prefer to rely also on an alternative
ground far, decision. We think that no negligence
can be imputed to the defendants. ?

How can the ‘question of ‘contributory negligence he

Rig soe , and still not be left for the jury? - Schulz
.. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 350 U. S. 52% , 16 8.
Ct 608 (1956), this court, citing the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of the right to trial by jury, and having ‘granted
certiorari to consider the failure of the District Court to
let this case go to the jury, 350 U. S. 882,’’ stated (p. 526):

‘*The very essence of its function is to select from

among conflicting inferences’ and ee: that,

which it considers most reasonable.’

The ‘charge that Prashker was guilty of: contributory
negligence rests entirely on the. proposition | that he wil-
fully flew in instrument conditions while not possessing an
instrument rating.. The only. specifie indication of what
he did, however, is set forth in his own words. on the con-
trel tower radio—that he found himself ‘unable to main-
tain VFR,” and that he was ‘‘going to climb’? (30S8a).

The court below admits that it is ‘“‘inferrable from the
time intervals involved’’ that before giving this message,
-and shortly’ after taking off from Allegheny ‘County Air-
port, Prashker encountered worsening esnditions, and
turned back (Opinion, infra, p. 6a). “This, of course, is
the conduct of a reasonable, safe, pilot, who, &fter taking

off in-weather that is well above VER requirements, and .

headed in a direction where all av ailable weather reports

show substantially bettter conditions, finds that thie weather

_ ahead of him is worse than he hada right to expect. He
_furns, in an attempt to return to the airport of his de-

mi mig *

it

parture, but finds himself. trying to return through an
‘area Where the weather has deteriorated, and over a city,
where Regulations forbid him from flying at less” than
1,000 feet, He cannot -go down.. On his own ‘statement

he cannot maintain VFR at his level of flight., He does”
what, indeed, is the safest thing for him to do. He indi-*

cates to the tower controller (the aviation equivalent of
a policeman onthe ground) that he is going to climb so
that the tower may warn other aircraft of his presences

and he‘does climb, to get as much space between himselt |

and the ground as possible, and in the hope. that he will
find clear weather above. are :

‘Even if Prashker’s conduct was not aidea by a very
strong presumption of due care og the part.of a decedent,
its every move (from his turning from his course to Cleve-
land to his message to the tower) smacks of due care.
But, decisive of the question, is the very strong ‘presump-
-tion that the pilot exercised due care fer his own safety’.
Rennekamp v. Blair, 375, Pa, 620,101 A. 2d 669 (1954).
applying Pennsylvania law, applicable herein, inva strik-
ingly similar situation.” ee

;

The finding: of contributory negligence, if indeed there
was such a finding below, is in clear vioiation of the well
settled principle, to which the’ court below pays lip service,

that on a motion for a directed verdict at the close of plain-

tiff’s: case all evidence and inferences to be drawn there-

¢

* Respondents advanced the argurfent below. that the mere fact

that a VFR pilot flies in instrument weather constitutes a violation -
| ;

of Regulations. ‘This is rekutted by holdings of the: Civit Aero-
nautics Board in proceedings to remove or suspend. pilots’ licenses,
‘brought by the CAA. The CAB held that mere fact not-to be a
Violation, Rather, the determinative question is whether the pilot
knew, in advance, thit he would encounter instrument conditions,
and continued to:fly through those conditions nevertheless, or whether

he was confronted witht an emergency situation. See Pope, 33 CAB:

Rep. 514 (1950), Jungersen, 13 CAP. Rep. 544, 553, 554 (1952),
anil Jackson, 13 CAB Rep. 103 (1945).

ay

So 2

ls eee

from weet be read in ,the light most tavereble to the
piaintiffs, It is also a violation of the: principle. voiced in

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. Sv 645, 66 S.:Ct. 740 (1945); and,

followed in Pennsylvania in’ Antonelli v. Tumolo, 390 Pa.

6S, 73, 102 A. 2d 285 (1957) that it is error to take a case
froma the jury on the basis of inferences*in favor of a de-'

fendant, _— there are contrary inferences in favor of a
plaintiff,--

The decision below, if itis based on a finding of eon-

tributory, negligence as a matter, of.law, demands exercise
. of this Court’s supervisory powers, for. it is a transpareiit

invasion of the jury’s province which h should’ be checked

here before it gets out of bounds. * +.

b. Failuré to Prove Negligence ond Breach of Warranty

This Court has no more soleynn duty than the protection

~ of the Constitution and the rights and liberties guaranteed
by it.

“The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law
is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of
Iederal jurisprudence which is protected by the
Seventh Amendment, a right, so fundamental and
szered to the citizen * * * should be jealously guarded
by the court.” ;

These are the opening lines of this Court’s opinion in

Jacob v. City of New York,.315'U. S. 752, 86 L. Ed. 1166, -
' 1168 (1942), reversing the affirmance of a District -Court’s

dismissal of an action at the close of plaintiff’s ease upon
the ground that plaintiff-had failed: to prove faets sufficient

to justify submitting to the jury the issue of defendant’s-

negligence. Aceord Schulz v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,
300 U. S. 523, 76 8. Ct. 608 (1956) which similarly,
reversed a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’ S$ case.

There can be no doubt that even without the important
evidence of the 45 prior accidents, on the issues of danger-
ous condition-and causation, petitioners far exceeded the
minimum ‘Tequirements of proof of negligence.

“
Reteie
Lee S. Krernpier,
Musrox G. Sincorr, -
P Jay R. HANpWERGER:

“

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHe Tuirp Circuit }

No. 12,445.

GoLDIE B. PRASHKER, EXECUTRIX OF THE EstTaTE OF NATHAN.
Prasuker, Deceasgp, anp CHoice EMBROIDERY & Laces,

Inc.,
Appellants, | * -
. . v.
\ ‘
oe Beecu AIRCRAFT CoRPORATION AND ‘ATLANTIC AVIATION
CoRPORATION. A ers

7 .
. ’
AppeaL From THe Uniren States Districr Court For THE
io District of DELAWARE.

Argued April 18, 1958

Before Goopricn, McLavGHLin and STALey, Circuit Judges.

Opinion of the Court
(Filed July 21, 1958) ;

By “McLaveutin: Circuit Judge.

Nathan Prashker was a young man, twenty-seven years
old, unmarried, president of a family corporation, and the
holder of a private pilot’s lieense with some 215 hours
flying time to his credit. Or October 5,°1953 he undertook .
to fly from Allegheny County Airport near Pfttsbt rgh to

. Cleveland, about 150 iniles-distant, With his cousin, f young
“man who. was the father of several children. Thé visual
flight plan filed with the Allegheny tower by Prashker called
for a flight of approximately 42 minutes at 3,000 feet in a

ae

-

. | 2a
Appendix,
Beechcraft Bonanza, N 2168 D, recently acquired by the
_ family corporation and in which Pr: ashker had logged some

‘forty hours of flying time. — . ek
At the take-off point the-ceiling was estimated as S00

feet, visibility four miles with ¢ight rain band himae.—AT the |

Greater Pittsbursh—tirport conditions were better with

broken clouds at 5,000 feet, overcast at 9 O00 feet, visibility
12 miles with light rain. At Cleve land the ceiling was
15,000 feet with broken ciouds below t'.at, visibility 12 miles.
There is no indication other than that he was in the habit
of doing so that the weather conditions actually were
checked by Nathan Prashker, | so a
. N 2168 D with Nathan —— at. beh yuan de-
parted Allesheny County Airport at 12:09 P.M. he aded in
a northwest by west direction With instructions to Use cau-
tion.in passing through the Greater P ittsburgh area which
had a lot of instrument traffic. At 1222 the’ pilot called
Allegheny tower by radio, advising that he was’ over the
City of Pittsburgh at 2.500 feet, was unable to maintain
visual references, and that he was into and climbing up
through the overcast. immediately after the towér had:
advised that their last re pert for the tops-of the overcast
had heen 3.800 feet. Pittsbarch tower, who apparently had
heard P rashker report, called Alleghe ‘ty tower to advise

that a jet reported the cloud tops at 33,600 feet. This in- ‘

Jormation was relayed to N 2168 D and the pilot was then
asked sfor his approximate position. r rashker replied
terselt that he didn’? know. He was axked if he wepted to
return to the airport and he nervously said that he did hut
that ke didn’t know his position and that he was incapable
of fiving on instruments. : a
Immediately Allegheny tower: ‘cin Pittshart tower
to take a direction-finding reading on N 2168 D’s transinis-
sions and thie pilot was told to give a short count. The tower
heard him give the count and his identification. Pittsburgh
tower then told them to have the pilot steer 325 degrees
magnetic ;.this was immediately relayed to the pilot with the

3

iinet bi te

‘

a z “a
va 2 ee

; Appe ndi. r. \ :

information that it would take him to Conair Pittsburgh
Airport and that he should break out **in the vicinity of the

]

‘river’’. The acknowledgement came as a-broken and poor
transmission, Allegheny tower repeated the steerand-ad-

vised that the plane switch radio frequencies to work the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport, but there was ny ac -knowledge-
went. Repeated calls in the next minute were not answered. |

They at 12:27 an outside telephone call was received

from a woman reporting that she and a neighbor had’ just
seen an aircraft go behind a hill and that they thought it
had crashed. Eight minutes later a man ¢allea to report:
that he and his co-werkers had seen a’ wing fall off a plane
and that the plane had crashed in Pangburn Hollow, near
Elizabeth, Pennsvivania. Wiccan :
_ The crash scene was in a hilly, heavily wooded area
near but out of sight of the Monongahela River, about §
miles: south-southeast of the .Allegheny County Airport...
The left wing was detached from the main‘body of wreckage
and lav about 250 yards back along the flight path. The
left stabilizer and part of the rudder were Missing.

_These actions were brought in Delaware’ against Beech,
Aireraft Corporation as the manufacturer of the Bonanza.
and against Atlantic Aviation Corporation as the seller of
the aircraft, both of them-Delaware corporations, by the
executrix of ‘the estate of Nathan -Prashker and by Choice
Embroidery and Lace Company, the Prashker family cor-

poration, incorporated: in New: York, which owned the air-

eraft. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.

The claims against Atlantic are-for breach of the im-
plied warrantly of merchantability and for negligent failure
to warn of known dangerous propensities of the aircraft.

Four allegations of negligence are made against Beech:

(1} that the airplane was improperly designed; (2) that
after receiving notice of the improper design it failed to
make changes; (9) ‘that there was a failure to include

: The. execitrix herself is a new je rsey resident ; the decedent
was a resident of Pe mnsylvania.

|

4a .
Appendix. oe

necessary safety devices; and (4) that there was a failure .
to warn of the prospective dangers. Additionally there is
ar allegation sounding in deceit that it was a CONSCIOUS
, Poliey of Beech to disseminate false information as to the
strength and safety of the Bonanza. ‘There was further a
claim against Beech for breach ‘of warranty. ;
At the conclusion of a three week. presentation of the
- plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court directed’ a verdict in
favor of the.defendanis on the grounds that Nathan Prash-
ker had. ineontrovertibly been eontributorily negligent,
thereby barring recovery on any claims of negligence, that
there was no privicy between Beech and the plaintiffs to
sustain recovery on breach of warranty under the applica-
ble law of Kansas, and that though there was an implied

‘warranty ‘of merehantability between‘ Atlantic and the

plaintiffs there eSuld be no recovery thereon when the
damage to the plaintiffs. had beén proximately taused by
their own representative’s contributory negligence.

It is a truism that on a motion by the defendant for

a directed verdict -at the close @® the } ointiff’s case, the

evidence ‘and all the inferences reason oly ta be drawn
therefrom,must be viewed, in the light P ist favorable tu

the plaintiff:
We consider first thie hiatter of Nathan Prashker’s coun-

tributory negligence. Because the harm occurred im Penn-

sylvania, tnat is the place of the alleged tort. The United
States Distriet Court of Delaware. in vu diversity action *
posing a conflict of laws question looks to the conflicts rule
of Del aware to determine \the law .to be applied. ._Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 314 U.S: 487 (1941). Dela-
vare follows the usual course of focking to the law of the
place of -the alleged tort to determine the substantive rights

‘of the parties arising thereform. . Pack v. Beech. Aireraft

Co., 132-A.2d 54 (Del.S.Ct. 1957); Restatment, Confiet of
Laws, 4384. Thus, the’ law of Pennsylvania was applied
by the Distriet Court and wil! be looked to by us.

Appendix.

‘The Civil Air Regulations, which were put into evidence
>in this case, prohibit flying under instrument conditions
hia. pilot without an instrument rating and without recent
practive.?, A pilot. without instrument qualifications must
- adhere to “the, visual flight - ‘rules., These prohibit fiving
when visibility is less than three miles’ or when the ceiling
is less than 1,000 feet. Additionally they require that a
visibility of three miles be maintained at, all times while in
flight and that the plane approach clouds no cleser than*’
2,000 feet horizontally, 500 vertically under, and 1,000 feet |
vertically over.’ The regulations do contain a provision,
_ however, which permits’ departure fromthe other Regula- |
tions in event of emergency.* We-mention the regulations:
of the Civil Aeronautics Board in order to establish iim-,
partial and authoritative criteria: for judging theSquestion
presented to us! ;
The evidence shows that the necessity of prohibitions
on flight under instrument conditions by unqualified pilots
is dictated by the extreme likelihood of loss of control over,
the aireraft once visual points of refererice bgcome unavail-
able. This likelihood arises out of a vertigo induced by
the movements of the aircraft in which the pilot becomes
disoriented in Space to the point where he has difficulty
in distinguishing between right and left and up and viewn.
Normal sense perceptions ure vnréliable to the point of
being actively misleading. The plane can quickly go out of
control in. such eiregmestances. Even if the pilot can
recognize what maneuver the out-of-control plane is per-
forming his tendency is to. over-correct. The consequence
is for the plane again to go out of control, or if the cor-
rection § too violent resulting in an attempted maneuver
for which the plane is not designed, to tear the plane apary .
in mid-air by reason of the extreme forees exerted on it.

¥C. F R. = 65 dnd 43.68. Ee be .
C.F.R. s and 60.31. ! o
C.F.R 602 ett,

: ae
Appendix.

°'y

_ Nathan Prashker knew, or certainly should have known,
about and understood these and other factors involved in
flight safety. Much of the literature put into his hands by

‘the defendants at the time the Bonanza was purchased and

afterwards emphasized the necessity for maintaining posi-

_tive contro] over the aircraft at @ll times; it emphasized,

too, the extreme danger of losing that contrél when instru-

ment flight conditions were encountered by a pilot insuffi-_

. Nathan Prashk

>

. -
ciently skilled in coping with the difficulties peculiar to in-
‘struinent flying. Nathan Prashker knew, too, that his craft

was a faster, aerodynamically ‘*eleaner’’ airplane than had

- been the three” he had owged previously at varions times,

and that such an airplane could rapidly get into serious
trouble if not skillfully operated. A fast, ‘‘clean” airplate
is more difficult to fy, both on visual flight rules and on in-

struments because it respo&ds to contro) quickly and easily.

The contro] exe arises must, therefore, be skilled. In fact,

doubtless had the skill | requisite to handle
the Bonanza so long as he remained within the limitations
imposed by the visual flight rules and stayed out of instru-

* ment conditions.

The facts, however, diniaatiiin that Nathan Prash-
ker, w ittingly or not, madea number ofadecisions involving
bad judgment which set the stage for the ensuing tragedy.
To begin with he elected to takeoff from the Allegheny
County Airport in marginal weather conditions, judged
by the visual flight rules. -He thus assumed the risk of
getting into poorer flight conditions, even though he un-
doubtedly -hoped and may even have assumed that they
would inmprove. It is inferable from the time-intervals
involved that he shortly did encounter worsening condi-
tions and that he turned bagk toward Pittsburgh. Over the
city he made the grievous mistake of electing to go into the
overcast in an attempt to climb through it’

There was elicited on cress-examination from a part-.
time employee of Atlantic's, who was.also an airlines pilot

- of some 10,000 hours experience, testunony that he ‘had

.
‘ .

=

>

7a | : 2
Appendix.

never encountered a wedther condition which he could nat
have avoided either by going around, by turning back, or
presumably by staying on.the ground in the first place. It
is apparent, then, that what are alleged to be defects in
the Bonanza only become significant because Prashker had —
» gotten himself ipio a situation in which causes beyond his
ability to control inexorably commenced to operate: —

~ A decision based on Prashker’s, contributory ‘negligence
alone would depend on a preliminary holding that the
evidence would not support an inference that bad weather
may have closed in on him even thongh he was exercising
due care for his owfi safety. ° We incline to the view that
no such inference is available, but concede that the question
may be arguable. Therefore, and because the case has been
so thoroughly and well presented to us, we prefer to rely
also on an alternative ground for decision. We think that
no negligence can be imputed to the defendants.

Plaintiffs asserted that the Bonanza had been necli-
gently designed; they have attempted to spell out three
specific defects. The first of these alleged defects is that the
* Bonanza model involved’is subject to a lateral oscillation
of some two or three degrees, on either side.of a norm in
rough-air flight, and that this oscillation induees vertigo
whenever visua} references hecome unavaiiable. But there
was undispyted_evidence that any airc raft under similar
flight conditions is subject to some lateral oscillation. The

_ conclusion is that, although the existence of oscijlations

may explain how vertigo is induced, vertigo cannot be
avoided except by avoiding ‘the loss ‘of a visual reference:
in instrument flight the reference is supplied by the instru-
atents which in their use require a dgrree of skill amount-
ing to an art. *.
‘Another alleged defect was that the plane tended to
assume a nose-down attitude and once in that position
accelerated,dangerously. But the testimony was that the
nose of the Bonanza doef not drop of its own accord. Any
airplane certificated by the C.A.A. as was the Bonanza must

. e ; - re 8a

Appendiz.
be statically stable. The acceleration once the plane was
in a nose-down attitude was not extreme for an aircraft of
clean design; again this partict} ar aircraft required .a
measure of skill in flying it, and Nathan Prashker ap-
parently had that skill so long as he remained within the
limitations of the visual flight rules as. he was required to
do. Plaintiffs allege that the Bonanza would have been a
safer plane had it been equipped with dive brakes.” Beech
had in fact considered the use of dive-brakes but had

abandoned the idea largely because much the same result.

could be achieved by extending the landing gear. It is
doubtful in the extreme that Nathan Prasnker would have
thought to use the dive brakes even had they been installed
because the landing gear was still-retracted after the plane
had crashed.

The third alleged defect of which plaintiffs complain

is that stick-loads were dangérously light. They are im-
portant in preventing the pilot, when under stress, from
violently moving the controls, thereby imposing such stress
on the plane structure in its attempt to respond that it dis-
integrates. It appeared, however, that the Bonanza’s stick-
loads exceeded those imposed by the military’ for their air-

craft designed to perform more violent maneuvers’ than is «

the Bonanza.

In short -all these alleged defects were. either . non. ;
_ existent or present to an unavoidable -extent known to

Nathan’ Prashker. .Heeding the fundamental warning
- against an unqualified pilot's getting into instrument con-
ditions is the surest means to avoid unintentionally ex-
ceeding the inherent restrictions in the design of any air-
eraft. That Nathan Prashker could have violated that
tenet without negligerice on his part: does not, of course,
make the defendants liable absent negligence on their part.
Even if it can be said that there is a duty to warn of the
dangers in exceeding the inherent restriction in any air-
craft, that duty was adequately discharged by the warnings

to avoid instrument flight conditions which would be the

9a

: Appe nd ir. ;
only aniticipaiable way the restrictions. could be. uninten-
tionally exceeded by a pilot.

We turn now fo a consideration of the clatns for breach
_of warranty. Again the conflicts rule of Delaware is looked
_ to in order to deterniine what law shall be applied to judg-
ing these claims arising out of contract. No reason is per-
ceived why Delaware would refuse to apply the law that
the. parties have stipulated. to be the governing law by
-reason of the contract of sale of the airplane having, been |
entered there by Beech as seller and Atlantic as buyer.
’ Cf. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust do., 24 A.
94 309 (Del; Ch. 1942). The law of Kansas will, therefore,
be applied: to determining the breach of wHlatever war-

ranties accompanied the sale.

We think on the basis of the foregoing discussion

dealing with the physical limitations on airplane design.
- that the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning breach of warranty
“was insufficient to go to the jury. The eyide; fails to
demonstrate any breach Of either an express}or implied
warranty by Beech. We therefore pass without deciding,
the question of whether the law of Kansas w ould require
- privity between Beech and the plaintiffs.
As for the claimed breach of. the implied warranty of
merchantability between Choice ‘and Atlantic, we app,
through the Delaware rule of conflicts, the law: of, Néw.,
Jersey where the sale occurred, both for construing the
contract, Harris v..N.Y. Life Instirance. Co., 33 A.2d 1o+4
(Del. Ch. 1943). Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 178 ‘A. 651 (Del.
‘Super. 1935), and for ascertaining damages arising. from
any breach, Canadian Industrial Aleohol Co. v. Nelson, 188 ”
A. 39 (Del.S.Ct. 1936).

The méasure of damages which Choice asserts is the
value of the airplane, and ngt simply the difference in value
between the aircraft at-the time it was sold and ‘the value’
of a similar plane free from the ed defects making the
plane unmerchantable. The of damages for a
breach of. warranty is, und ersey law, the ‘loss

- 10a

: é
Appendix,

directly and naturally resulting in am ordinary course af
; 4 ents from such breach. DeRose v, Hunter Lindsay Corp.

N.J. Super. 178 (App. Div. 1956); Somerville Container
hikes v. General Metal Corp., 38 N.J. Supier. 348, amended
39 NJ. Super. S62 (App. Div. 1956). The inescapable in-
ference: is that the damage complained of must stem from
the breach of warranty and not from some other cause,
Thus, it is clear that if the damage to the plane was proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of *Choice’s pilot, Choice
cannot recover. Cf. Heath v. Channel Lumber Co., Ine.,
25 N,J. Super. 6, (App. Div. 1953). But since we have not

rested our decision as to the negligence issues solely on

Nathan Prashker'’s contributory neglicence, neither do
- we do so on this point; again, the plaintiff’S.evidence fails
to. prove that the plane was not reasonably fit for flying.

- One point remains for discussion and AMecision. Piain-
tiffs complain of the trial court's ruling which prevented
them from putting into evidence the reports of forty-five
fatal accidents involving structural failure in flight of
Bonanzas both on the issue of.cause and on the issue of

notice. The court permitted the introduction of only seven |

of the accident reports limited solely to the issue of notice
of the alleged defects. The plaintiffs also offered evidence,
which was rejected on both issues, of government. satistics
known to Beech that over a six year period prior to the
accident iri question the Bonanza had a rate of@tructural
failure in flight approximately fifteen times the rate for all
other single engine civil aircraft.

The first issue confronting the trial court upon the
ofier of the reports was whether evidence of accidents to
one model of the Bonanza could be relevant as to the cause
of accidents in other models. The court was justified in
putting the plaintiffs to'their proof. that the five different

Bonanza models involved in the series of accidents were

similar. The court ultimately decided that-the models were
more like each other thari like any other airplane.

‘ *
.

lla
Appendix,

‘At the same ‘time the court was justified in excluding
* evidence as to.accidents to the first model. The sum of the
changes made in the design of the first model through four
subsequent models permitted the trial court to regard the
first-and fifth planes as dissimilar aircraft. Evidence of
accidents in the first model would not have heen sufficiently
material to the cause of accidents in the fifth model to re-
quire its admission, The two most significant changes from
the preceding models occurred between the first and the
second and between the third and fourth. The first of these
changes involved increasing’ the limit design load factor

from 3.8 G's to 44 G's which moved the plane. from the

C.A.A.’s normal category to the utility category for certi-
fication purposes. At the same time gross- weight was in-
creased. These changes improved the structural stréngth
‘of the airplane. Tic second significant change was to the
ditedral and area of the ta.) which affected ‘the plane's
handling characteristics.

The second issue confronting the, frial court. once it .

had initially determined what models for puropses of the
case were identical and which reports could therefore be
relevant and material, was to decide whether the accident

reports were indeed relevant on the issues for which they -

were offered. The court found that on the issue of notice
of possible defects the reports were relevant, ut that as
to the cause of this accident they were irrelevant. Simi
larly the statistics were ruled irrelevant. a
The determinations of irrelevancy were proper. Each
accident report involved an instance of structural failure in
flight. where the airplane was, as plaintiffs assert, **palled
apart by loads in excess cf its stress Limitations. ** And
yet the stress limitations exceeded those which the Civil
Aeronautics Administration required as sufficient to assure

flight safety. Showing that the planes came apart is not
enough because of the compromise required with structural
strength in designing an aircraft which will get off the ~

ground. To be relevant on the issue of. causation attribyt-

s 4

‘12a
A ppendix.

able to a design defect the ego reports would have had

to show at least that the plahes involved had not gone out
of control prior to their coming apart, or if they had gone
out of control, that it had beep without fault by the pilot.
The seven reports in evidence—and they may be assumed |
best to present the plaintiffs’ .case—invariably involve

pilots unqualified to fly under instrument conditions who
nonetheless were in such conditions or, in a few instances
involving the unadmitted reports, pilots qualified for in-
strument flight who were in turbulent weather when the
accidents occurred. To hold the aircraft responsible on
such evidence would -be utterly to disrgard the factor of
human fallibility known inevitably to occur in such circum-
stances’ and would be patently unjustified. The reports,

: therefore, do not tend to prove the existence of a defect in

design of the Bonanza. The cases cited by plaintiffs on
the admissibility of prior occurrences as evidencing exist-'

ence of a dangerous condition are consequently inapposite.

_ . The statistic as to rate of ‘structural failure of the
Bonanza is, on its face, startling. But it involves the same .
accidents which were the subjects of the reports above a,
eussed. In view of what amounts to an explanation of eaclic
accident: which contributed to the ultimate statistic; that
statistic itself has no relevance as notice to Beech of the
existence. of a defect. As to the issue of causation by a
design defect, the statistic tends - ‘to prove na&hing more
than the individual accident reports. It is extremely du-
*bious, in fact, whether statistic: inv olving probabilities as
to causation have any significance at alk when applied to
a particular incident. : :

Even were it assumed that the accident reports and
statistics prove the Bonanza to We accident-prone under
conditions of turbulence in instryinent flight, probably th:
warning-t9 stay out of such conditions and emphasizing the
— of i ignoring it wo d be enough. By ‘‘accident-
prone’’ js meant that the-p ne has. some characteristics
which may, when a pilot loses\yisua! reference, call upon

a

. 13a
Appendiz.

*

him for a much greater degree of skill than. theretofore
he had ‘been required to exercise in controlling the air-
plane. If he has: the skill and can make the adjustment
quickly, he is safe. If the characteristics of the plane take
it out of control before he adjusts, he is in serious trouble. °
If it is possible to get into turbulent instrument flight con-
ditions despite the exercise of due care, then the pilot can
be said, in view of the warning, to have assumed the risk .
of the accident proneness every time he flies subject to the
possibility, that he may encounter turbulent instrument
conditions. ; : ” |

The limitation on introducing the evidence offered of
other accidents for the purpose of showing notice of de-
fects to Beech was, at the least, a proper exercise of “the
trial judge’s discretion in conducting the course of the trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

A True Copy :,

Teste: ° »

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.

- l4a

o

Judgment.

Present: Goopricu, McLavontin and STa.ey,,
Cireuit Judges,

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the
United States District Court: for the District of
Delaware and was argued by counsel — ;

On consideration’ whereof,.it is now here ordered and |
adjudged by this Court that the ‘judgment of the said.
District. Court in this case ‘be, and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

Attest:

aan | _ Harrrer G. Humpnrys,
| _* Chief Deputy Clerk.
July 21, 1958. .

Opinion Sur Petition for Rehearing.
‘Present: Goopricn, McLavcHuw and Sra.ey,
Circuit Judges.

After due consideration the petition for rehearing i in the
above-entitled case is hereby denied.
nay J
By the Court
JAireuit Judge
vA McLaveuun.

Dated: August 7, 1958.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386419_0593%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
