# Respondents Opposing Brief — Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners of California (No. 248) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_1375%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Respondents Opposing Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1957 ## Text am we” ig ; eae » Dy i : 6 Meifert vo State Baard of Medical Revistration, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 L: R.A. CN. S.) 811... SS Minner, In re. 3 1. 2d 473....... ee eA are Re het b. , Murrill vo State Board of Accountaney, 97 Cai. App. 2d 709, 218 f: 2d 569 ARs) eee Setters oer ONE. BO Fe B Newman v. Board of Civil Service Com., 140 Cal. App. 2d 907, ee re a ee r Olson.v. Wathon, 143 Cal. App. 2d 343, 300 Ps 2d 35 li Pamless” Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cai. 285, REG F a ea ee ee ee bscnert =) $5 8 ee ENRON PETE re wee no People 'v, Theodore, 121 Cal. App. 2d 17, 262 VT. 2d 630 Rosenblatt vo Cal State Board of Pharmacy, 69 Cal a9, 158 P. 2d BF Schneider vy. Civil Service Cor.. 137 Cal App. 2d 2d 306) State vo Hovorka, ON.S.) 1273, 10 Ann. Cas. 398 State Medical Board, 32) Minn. 324. State v. ”) ’ 50 Am. Rep. 575... Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 43S. Ct. 24 Calitornia Business ‘ os % , s California Business Calitarnia Pusimess California }yusiness Cahtormia Statutes Calitornia Statutes California Statutes - /United States Code United States Code United States Code United States Cocte United 2 Gahiornia Jurisprudence 2d, pp. 393 Pa PAGE mA . 4) \pp 2d i2 277, 20 P. 1, STATUTES and Professions Code, Sec. 2300 and Professions Code, Sex 236) and Protessions Code, Sec 2372 and Professions Code, See, 2383 ieeveseabanasets 16, 4: 2, 0 of 1937, Chap. 399, p. 1275 of 1937, Chap. 414. p. 1377 of 1951, Chap. 792, Sec. 1 Title 26, Sec. 143(a) » Tithe 20, Sec. 1450) > Title 3x, , Title 38, Sec. tig ag Pa Set Spe Pee pif t7 715 States Constitution, Art. TP. sec. 10 FeXT BOOK —_G— , 67 1., Ed. 194 »~S) 11. 2 IN THE ene ‘ Supreme Court of the United States: OctoBer Perm, 1oS60 PGS. ose RirewaArRD Doteras Porstsu. MOD. ‘THe Boarp o¢ Merntoart EXAMINE OF: THE STATE OF ¢ CALIFORNIA, . Defendant and Nespendent, and s fre Distkiet Cot eror \prear ot rae StAtE oF Cant PORNEA TN AND FOR THI Sptoonp APPELLATE District, Res pode ne. RESPONDENT'S OPPOSING BRIEF. Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts. On about Pauly 21. 1954 an Accusation’ was tiled with, the Board of Medical lexaminers of the State ot Cali- é fornia alleging that petitioner, Richard Douglas Furnish, M.D... had been gilt. of unprotessional conduct con- trary te the provistons of Section 2383 of the Business and Protessions Code in that on or about May 4, 1953, in the United States District Court, he was onvieted of telonies and criminal offenses invelving moral turpitiyle. te wits, two counts of violation of Title 26 Loos. ©. Section I43¢b), in that he did wiltully and Yr ann. Take knowingly attempt to defeat and evade a large part’ of the ancome tax owing. by him te the United State Ot America tor the calendar vears 19497 -and 19048. and each ot osad vears” [Clk Tro pp. 39-40]. A hearing was held on February TP, 1955 before a Hearing Officer duly assstuned. by saad Beard (Clk. Trop. 33] at which time the c mplainant offered and there waseintroduced a duly coritied copycat the record of conviction in the case in the United States Distriet Court’ for the ‘Sonthern Dis- wich of California, Central Division. entitled “United States of America vs. Richard Douglas Furnish (charged gs Richard D0 Furnish’. No. 22.754 Criminal, estab- »’ shine that Richard Donglas Furnish, on May*4. 1933, was convicted, tollowime his pleas of polo contendere, of tweocounts of viddation of 26 UL S.C. Secticn’ 143¢b) “ Tncorte Pax Evasion tor the calendar vears 1047 and IS PCUK. PP. pp. S132.) At this: administrative hearme, comphunant coneeded that it had not sustained t he Parden of prow! to establish that the aforesaid con- at turpittide. jCtK. Troop. 60.7. Wdainant based its) sought for disciplinary action oon petitioner's convichion of aes under Busi-- Ness and Protessions Code Section 2383, 40k. Tr. p. O67. ] Peollowing said) administrative oe the Hearing Otheer in his Proposed Decision found that Dr. Furnish had beer convicted of two felonies (Ok. Trop. 79] and Proposed a oohe Vear suspension of his license ‘but. sus- pended: the exteution thereof and Placed the doctor on three vears’ pre bation on speciticd terms and conditions. LCIk. Tr. pp. 780.) The Board Gf Medical Examiners ided not te adopt the Hearing Wfficer’s Proposed De- cision, notified the parties accordingly. and attorded to them an opportunity to file written argument with the ae a Boal [CIk. Tr. p. 77.] Following the filing of briefs (Clk. Tr. pp. 83-97]. the Board itself decided the case cand, after finding that Dr. Furnish had been convicted of two telenies as: alleged in the Accusation [Clk. Tr. p. Ol]. thereafter “suspended. His license to practice medt- cine ands surgery for a period of one year. [Clk. Tr. p. 1Ol.| . Dr. Furnish’s Petition tor Rehearing [ Clk. Tr. p. LOF] was denied by ‘the Board. [Clk. a, 0. 442.) Petitioner then sought-a Writ of Mandate from. the Los Angeles Superior Court to set aside the order of the Board setting the aforessd stispension for one year, (Clk. Tr. pp. 1. 14} The administrative record was. incorporated ino the Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate. [CTk. Tr. p. 30.]) .The Board's Demurrer (Clk. Tre p. TLL was sustained avithout leave te amend [Ck Tr. p. 116] and’ an appeal rm. er. aK TO] was taken trom: the Judgment of Dismissal [C1k. Troy 117] oa. 2 On appeal the Judgement of the Superior Court was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. Division One, HO ALC A. 361, 308 P. 2d 924. A Petition for Re- hearing was denied by said District Court of Appeal on \prilO. 1987, and a subsequent application for said Court to grant a rehearing on its.own motion alse was denied on April 19; 1957, (150 A. C. A: 324. 309 P. 2d. 493.) Thereafter a Petition tor Heanine in the California Supreme Court was denied on May 15, 1957. (48 A.C, - No, 12. Minutes p. 2.) The Petition for this Writ. of Certiorart. toll awed. , ‘ : { & Issues. Succinctly stated, respondent's major contentions are as follows: | Ll. Under the California Medical Practice Act (Bus. and Prot, Code, Sec. 2383), conviction of a fe ‘ony, and conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude each is an independent grouhd) for? disciplinary action, 2. Under the California Medical Practice Act (Bus. and Prof. Code, See. 2383). a conviction follgwing a plea of nolo contendere made to a.charge of felony ex- pressiy is deemed to be ‘a conviction for disciplinary Purposes, 3. No problem of ex .post facto is herein invalved since petitioner was disciplined for his two felony con- cictions in the year 1953, subsequent to the enactment of LOST legislation which made suc h convictions grounds for disciplinary action, 4. The extent of the penalty within the Board's ,jur- isdiction was. tor the Board to«determine. Further, the penalty of a one year suspension was reasonable. 5. The California Board of Medical Examiners is’ vested with exclusive power ‘and jurisdiction to discipline one of its licentiates for cause prescribed by law. and said Board cannot be ‘divested of such jurisdiction by any voluntary declarations ef a Trial Judge in a prior criminal pr weeding. : ‘ Vv $— ARGUMENT. I. . There Is No Federal Question Herein Involved. Conviction of a felonyis am independent ground for disciplinary action under Section 2383-of the California Business and Professions Code. Said code section also expressly provides that a conviction. following a plea of nolo contendere is a conviction for disciplinary purposes. ‘It is undisputed that petitioner, in the case entitled “The United States of America. vs. Richard Douglas Furnish (charged as Richard D. Furnish}, No. 22754 Criminal, in the United. States District: Cotirt) for the Southern Distriet of California, Central Division, was convicted, after pleas of nolo contendere, of two counts of felonies, to wit: violation of Tithe 26 U.S. C. Seetion , 145¢b) (Income Tax Evasfon), | The accusation against petitioner, Riehard Douglas Furnish, M.D... in paragraph TIE thereot, charged: “That the respondent has been guilty of unpro- fessional conduct contrary to the provisions of Sec- tion 2383 of the Business and Prefessions Code of the State-of California, as follows: "That on Gr about May 4, 1953, in a proceeding then pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Califorrfia, Central Divi- sion, entitled ‘United States of America ys: Richard Douglas. Furnish (charged as Richard D. Furnish)’, No, 22.754 Criminal. the respondent was convicted cot felonies and criminal offenses involving moral turpitude, te wit: tiwe ce ants of vielatior of Title | 26 ULS.C. Section 145¢b). in that he did wilfully. and knowingly attempt to defeat and evade a large , —— part of the income tax owing by him to the United a States*ot America for the. calendar years 1947 -and 1048, and each of said years.) [ Clk. Tr. p. 40.] At the ‘alfninisirative hearing on February 11, 1955 the complainant made it clear that the Board of Medical Examiners was not, seeking to discipline Dr. Furnish for the cawiviction of a criminfal offense or offenses involv- ing moral turpitude. Indeed, the complainant frankly conceded that it had not sustained the burden of proof on the issue of moral turpitude. [@lk. Tr. p. 66.] How- ever, the, complainant unquestionably proved convictions of felduies which, pursuant to Business “and Professions: R. . . > > . - a . Code Section 2383, are independent grounds tor disct- ~plinary action. Mm PNY ae A ET TUTTE tt RE a ne Pursuant to Section 2383 of the Business and Profes-” sions Cade, corivietion of a felony or offense ‘involving moral turpitude constitutes unproféssional conduct. The use of the disjunctive in such section makes it clear that these are separate and alternative grounds for disciplinary action. Further, for purposes of Section 2383, Moreover, it has been uniformly held that under federal law it is not the actual punishment imposed but that which ‘the statute authorizes which determines whether the crime is a fefony or misdemeanor, | 5 Cartwright v7. United States, 1460 F. 2d 133, 135; See also: y In re Muiner, 3B. 2d 473, 474 (Supreme Court ot Kansas). a _ : °. In the -instant case. the duly certified record of con. Vietion in thevcase entitled “United States of America vs. Richard Douglas. Furnish ccharged as Richard D. Fur- nish)", United States District Court tor the Southern District of California, Central Division, No, 22,734 Crini- nal, was introduced in evidence. Such record of convic- tion, pursuant to Business and Professions Code Section 2383, was conclusive evidence of unprofessional conduct in that Dr. Furnish was convicted of felonies, to wit: two counts of violation of Tithe 26 U.S. C. Section 145(b). Hence, the conclusion is inescapable that there ee ev identiary support for Finding No. IIT, to wit: “That en or about May 4, 1953, in a ‘proceeding then pending in the United States District Court tor the Southern District of California, Central Division, entitled ‘United States of America vs. Richard Doug- las Furnish (charged as Richard D. Furnish)’, No. 22.754 Criminal. the respondent was convicted upon his plea of nolo contendere of two felonies, being two counts of violation of . Title 26 U.S.C. Section 145(h), charging, that he did wilfully and knowingly attempt to defeat and evade a large part of the income tax owing by him to the United: States of America for the calendar vears 1947 and 1948, and each oi said vears.” [Clk. Tr. p. 101] | and Determination of Issues, No. I, namely: “That respondent has been convicted of two fel- onies, thereby subjecting his license and certificate to disciplinary action by virtue of the provisions ot Section 2383 of the Business and Professions Code of the State of California,” [Clk. Tr. p. 101] set forth in the November 10, 1955 Decision of the Board of Medical Examiners. : ¢ ” pate tees = . = . . . ° k For the teregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the trial court herein, correctly sustained respondent's demurrer without leave to amend based upon Petitioner's failure to state a cause of action. I]. No Problem of Ex Post Facto Legislation Is Hefein| Involved. * The Petitioner was disciplined for conviction of felonies and these convictions eccurred after Business and: 'Pro- ressions Code Section 2383 made such convictions grounds for disciplinary action, Respondent submits that no prob- lem of ex post facta legisiation is herein presented for the reasons hereinafter set forth. 1.) The disciplinary action against’ petitioner was not hased upon substantive acts which occurred in the vears 1947 and 1948. The disciplinary action against petitioner was predicated solely and exclusively on his two felony- convictions in the ¥ear 1952, It is clear that the petitioner was convicted of two counts of felonies (violation of Title 26 U.S. C. Section 145(b)) on May. 4, 1953. [CIk., Tr. pp. $1-52.].. Section/ 2383 of the Business and. Professions Code was adopted in the vear 1951 by Statutes 1951. Chapter 792, Section 1. Petitioner’s convictions of felonies, and his nolo contendere pleas in 1953, each ‘occurred subsequent to the 1951 amendment of Business and Professions Code Section 2383. When petitioner entered his nolo contenderé pleas and was convicted of two counts of felonies, the law at such time, and since 1951, made convictions of felonies vrounds for. disciplinary action iad the law also ex- pressly provided that a conviction following a plea of nolo contendere made to a charge of a fexony was deemed to. be a conviction for disciplinary purposes. ‘ et, ee 2 . > - THe offenses commartted Inn the heensee are not diréctly involved. Tt is the judgment of convietion ov reason of those acts which ts the basis for disciplinary action herein, Karrell ve Watson, Wo Cal. App. 2d 7609, 774, 254 gee Bin) B . . 2. It has been held that under -both the State and United States Constitution the phrase ex post facte is not applicable to civil laws. | (.Murrill @. State Board of Ae- countancy, 97 Cal. App. 2d 709, 711; 218 P. 2d 569 and ‘cases therein cited.) | 3. The right of a medical doctor to practice his pro- ‘ fession is a property right. Such right is a qualified one, ~and.is held in subordination to the duty of the State un- der the police power to protect the public health. Hawker 7. New York,.170 U. S. 189, 18 S. Ct. 573, 42 L. Ed. 1002; Lawrence 7. Bd. of Registration, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N. E. 174, 176... : ‘ In Butcher 7. Maybury, & F. 2d 155, at 158. the court quotes from a note found on page 1273 of & LRA. (N.S.) as fe Mows: “*The granting of a license in such cases is merely the means taken by the state, in the exercise of its police power, to regulate and restrict the engaging in certain professions and occupations for the public good, and confers no rights whatever, in the way of a contract with the state. upon the licensee. He takes the same subject to the right of the state; at any time that the public good demands, to make further restrictions and regulations thereto: and.) if such restrictions and regulations are reasonable, they will be upheld, even thotigh they may actually prohibit —13— - some people from further engaging in such oceiupa- tions or @protessions under a lieense previously granted. "- e In accord: | S : Statev. Hovorka, 100, Minn, 249, 252, 110 NW: 870, 871, 8 LR. AL ON. S.) 1273, 1275 (10 ‘Ann: Cas. 398): _ Rosenblatt v. Cal. St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73-74, 158 P. 2d 199. Indeed, the courts have held that the legislature may prescribe qualifications, both as to character and learning, which will require those in practice to give up. their: occupation. : Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U, S. 114, 122, 9: S.-Ct.-251,32.L__Ed_ 634: | = aes Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S. Ct. _ $73, 42 L. Ed. 1002; : | _ Rosenblatt v. Cal. St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 69, Cal. ° App. 2d 69, 73-75, 158 P. 2d 199. Legislation prescribing qualifications which a practi- tioner cannot meet because of conditions or acts antedat- ing the enactment of the particular legislation is valid. “uch legislation does not, constitute -punishment ; it is legitimate regulation. . inn, Hawker v. New York, 1700. S. 189. supra; Murrill v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 97 Cal. App.. 2d 709,711. 218 P. 2d 669; Meffert v. State ‘Board of Medical Registration; 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 1. R. A. (N.S.) 811. The only limitation onthe above doctrines is the prin- ciple that the regulatioffS must be reasonable and must —l4+— 6 hear some relation te the service te be rendered by the. licensee: Ay In Vazker v Neze York. supra, the appellant was tried and convicted in New York of the crime of dhortion In 1X78, In. 1893 the legislature of the Stare of New York passed a statute which prohibited anvone to practice medicine atter he had been convieted of a felony. The single question presented in) Hazeker v. New York was whether the statute prohibiting one who had been convicted of a felony to practicé medicine, and making it a mis- demeanor if he should do so, was an cr fest facto law in contravention of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, In holding that the statute was Not an ea’ post facto law and not unconstitutional, the Supreme Court sti ated that the police power of the state. entitled the state to enact legislation which defined the qualifications of those who attempted to” practice medi-~ cine, and. that stich legislation: is a proper exercise of the police power. The-Court then stated, at page 196: “That the form in which this legislation is cast suggests the idea of the imposition of an additional punishinent for past offenses is not conclusive. We. must look at the substance, and not the form, and the statute should be regarded as though it in termes de- clared that one who had violated the criminal laws of the state should be deemed of ‘such bad character as to be unfit te practice: medicine, and that the record of a trial and conviction should be conclusive, evidence of such violation. All that. is embraced in these propositions is condensed into the single clause ot the statute, and it means that, and nothing more. The state is not secking to further punish a criminal, but only to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character. The vital matter ts, not the conviction, - - . . —15— but the violation of law. The fermer is merely the prescribed evidence of the latter... 2” ( Eaphasis added. ) sot we a 4. Finally. respondent rsepectfully points out that even during: the years 1948 and 1949, wheti Petitioner com- Jnitted the substantive agts, the expressed California Leg- islative policy made conviction of a felony, in and of itself and without regard to whether moral turpitude was in- volved, grounds for disciplining a licensed California doc- tor. Specifically, Section 2383 of the California Business and Professions Code read as follows: “The conviction of a felony or of any offense in- volving moral turpitude constitutes unprofessional conduct withim the meaning. of this chapter. The record of the conviction is conclusive evidence of such unprofessional conduct.” (Added by Cal. Stats.°1937, Ch. 414) p. 1377, making effective Stats. 1937, Ch. 399, p. 1275.) t No | - . HLL The Extent of the Penalty Is for the Administrative Agency to.Determine. : Once it is settled that grounds for disciplinary action exist, it is well settled that the extent of the penalty within the area of the Board's discretion is tor the Board to determine. _ ae “2 Cal. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, p. 393; Fuller. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 Cal. App. 2d 734, 737-738, 59, P. 2d 171; King v. Board of Medical Examiners, 65 Cal. App. ‘2d 644, 652, 151 P. 2d 282: Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 300, 14 P. 2d 67; a ” am Black ii ‘Strate Personnel Board, 136 Cad. App.- 7 2d 904, 912, 289 TP 2d 863: AY Aneider “ae Crs] Seratce Com... Lae « Cal. App. -2d 277, 285, 200 BP. 2d 300: Newman v. Beard of Cistl Service Com., 140° Cal. App. 2d 907, 912, 296 P. 2d 41: Olson v. Watson, 143 Cal. App. 24-343, 351, 300- P. 2d 35. . In the instant case. the Board of Medical [examiners suspended petitioner’s Heense as a physician and surgeon for a period of one vear. , There is no question but that the penalty of a’ one year suspension was within the jurisdiction of the Board. | Indeed, the Board by law was authorized to have imposed. a penalty ef revocation. (Bus. and Prot. Code, Sec. 2372.) Speetically. Business and Professions Code Sec- tion 2372 reads as follows: os . ies “The board shall discipline the holder of any cer- tiftcate, whose default has been entered or who has: been héard by the board and’ found guilty. by any of the following -methods: | (a) Suspending judgment. (b) Placing him upon’ probation. (c} Suspending his right*to practice for a period not exceeding one year. . (d) Revoking his certificate. | (¢) Taking such other action in relation to dis- ciplining him as the board i in its discretion may deem proper. However, thes Th vard did not impose the extreme penalty. The Board exe reised its discretion and fixed a lesser: ‘pen- alty. to-wit: the one year Suspension, “\ on, re That the penalty. of a one vear suspension by the Board is not excessive is demonstrated by the Judgment of the United States Distriet Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, in the case entitled “United States of America vs.-Richard Douglas Furnish”, Crimi- nal No. 22,754, wherein the Court imposed a fine of $5,000 on each of two counts (a total fine of $10,000) of conviction of violation of Title 26 U. S./C. Section 145(b), namely, income tax evasion.. [Cik” Tr. p. 51.) _ Respondent respectfully points out that the instant case is not one where the evidence does not suffice to support ome or more grounds for disciplinary action. The sig- nificance of this fact is indicated by the following lan-_ guage. from Black @. State Personnel Board, 136 Cal. App. 2d 904, 912, 289 P. 2d 863, 867: «This case does not fall “within the ambit of Cooper v.. State Board ‘of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. 24.242, 252 [217 P. 2d 630, 18 A.L.R. 2d 593], and Nelson v. Department of Corrections, supra, 110 Cal. App. 2d 335, cases in which the court, hav- ing found one charge unsupported, remitted the mat- ter to the administrative agenct for the purpose of. ° reconsidering the amount of the penalty. .. _ | IV. ; The California State Board of Medical Examiners Has Exclusive Jurisdiction to Discipline Its Licentiates. By law, the California State Board of Medical Ex- aminers is vested with exclusive power to discipline its — ’ .licentiates for the causes prescribed by law. (Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code, Secs. 2360 and 2361.) It is ‘respectfully, submitted that said Board cannot be divested of its juris- diction and power to discipline because of the voluntary declarations of a Trial Judge in a criminal proceeding to —18— which the California Board of Medieal Examiners wa. not a party. [tis well settled that the regulatory power of the State properly may be committed to an administrative board. Douglas 7. Noble, 261 U.S: 105; 170. 43. S. Ct. 303, 67 L.. Ed. 590: 525 3 State v. State Medical Board, 32 Minn. 324. 20 ‘N. W. 238, 50 i sid a4, 047. Implicit in the Trial pare 5 statgnent, to wit: “T think on a plea of nolo contendere they do. not consider it—at least the Medical. Board does not consider that as a ground for revoking his license, and ‘unless they have professional grounds his license should not be revoked for this” particular offense. ie [Ck Tr. p. 63.) is the Judge’ s recognition that. the power to discipline is is exclusively vested in the State Medical Board. Petitioner's, medical license was not before the Trial Judge in the criminal proceeding and said Judge pur- ported to: make no. finding or ruling with respect thereto for the reason that such matter was not within his juris- diction. ak It is to be 1 noted that the Trial Judge's remarks, gratui- tous as they were, only professed his belief that the Cali- fornia Médical Board would not revoke Petitioner's license, and. the Board did not revoke but rather suspended such license for one year. Further, despite the Trial Judge's remarks about Peti- tioner’s license, it is apparent that-the Trial Judge con- sidered Petitioner's conduct serious enough to warrant convicting petitioner en two felony counts and fining him a total of $10,000; Pi; | a aN The California Legislature having made. eonvietion of 4 felony grounds for disciplinary aetion against a licensed physician ‘and surgeon, and further having specitically designated a conviction tollowing a plea of mele contendere as a ‘conviction for disciplinary purposes, it is respect tully submitted that Respondent Board. properly | stus- pended for a period of one year the license of Petitioner 7 o- herein. Conclusion. — Respondent respectfully submits that. the Petitioner Kerein has failed to present a substantial federal question as would require this Honorable Court to exercise its -jurisdiction within. the meaning of Zucht v7. King, 260 U. S. 174, 176, 43 S. Ct. 24,-67 L. Ed. 194; Upon the record and fer the reasons hereinabove stated, respondent requests that the writ prayed for. herein be denied. Respect fully submitted, Epmunp G, Brown, -Attorney General of the State of California. ; | Howarp SEyYMouR GoLpIN, Deputy lttorney General, Atiornevs for Respondent. James L. MAMAKOs, Deputy Attorney General, Of Counsel. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_1375%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.