# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — White v. Commissioner (No. 841)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1956

## Text

FILED
‘No. 841 MAR 15 1957

i"
IN THE LJOHN T. FEY, Clerk

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1956
Nos. and

= La

EASTERN AIR LINES, INC

-

Petitioner,
v.

UNION TRUST COMPANY, et al.,

Respondents.
eee

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIO.
RARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT

——————————

JosePpH W. HENpeRSoN
1910 Packard Building
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

Ricuarp W. Gainer
820 Woodward Building
Washington, D. C.

Joun M. AHERNE
99 John Street

New York 38, N. Y.

Attorneys for Petitioner

Paneer era

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955 .......... la

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, United States v. Union
De OR ea Khd Gh ec eacaebbhsn wo schxese

Eastern Air Lives, Inc.,
Appellant,

Vv.

Union Trust Company et al.,
Appellees.

Unitep States or AMERICA,
Appellant,

V.

Union Trust Company et al.,
Appellees.

Nos. 11991, 11992, 12017, 12018.

Argued June 22, 1954.
Decided Feb. 8, 1955.
Petition for Rehearing In Bane Denied in all Cases on
April 15, 1955.

Petition for Rehearing Denied by the Division which
Heard the Case in Nos. 11991-2 on May 4, 1955.

Petition for Rehearing Denied by the Division which
Heard the Cases in Nos. 12017-8 on May 11, 1955.

As Amended June 24, 1955.

Mr. Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., with whom
Mr. Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., and Mr. John

2a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

M. Aherne, of the bar of the Supreme Court of New York,
were on the brief, for appellant in Nos. 11,991 and 11,992.

Mr. Lester S. Jayson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of the
bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice,
by special leave of Court, with whom Messrs. Leo A.
Rover, U. S. Atty., Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of
Justice and D. G. Galotta, Atty., Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration, were on the brief, for appellants in Nos.
12,017 and 12,018. Mr. Lewis A. Carroll, Asst. U. S.
Atty., entered an appearance for appellants in Nos. 12,017
and 12,018.

Mr. David G. Bress, with whom Messrs. Sheldon E.
Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and Jo V. Morgan, Jr.,
Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees in all
cases.

Before Epcerton, Witsur K. Mixer and Fany, Circuit
Judges.

Wisur K. Miter, Circuit Judge.

On the morning of November 1, 1949, an Eastern Air
Lines DC-4 plane was flying from New York to Washing-
ton, carrying fifty-one passengers and a crew of four.
When it was on final approach for landing on runway 3
at the Washington National Airport and at an altitude of
about 300 feet, the airliner was struck from above and
behind by a P-38 military-type aircraft just purchased
by the Bolivian Government, which was being tested by
a Bolivian military pilot, Eric Bridoux, who was its only
occupant. The DC-4 was cut in two. The forward part
fell in the Potomac River, the after portion on the Vir-
ginia shore. All fifty-five persons aboard were killed.
The P-38, badly damaged, of course, plunged into the

3a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

river but somehow Bridoux escaped from the cockpit.
He was rescued and, despite serious injuries, survived.

These suits were brought in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia by the Union Trust
Company and Melville W. Stuart as the executors of
Ralph F. Miller and Mildred E. Miller, his wife, who were
passengers on the DC-4. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and
Eric Bridoux were named as defendants in two of the
actions and the United States was the defendant in the
other two.! Many similar suits filed on behalf of the
estates of others who died in the fatal crash are pending
under an agreement that the determination of liability in
these cases shall govern their disposition.”

Although the two captioned cases against Bridoux and
Eastern were tried to a jury, and the two against the
Government to the Court, by agreement of the parties all
four actions were tried simultaneously. The jury found
Bridoux not “liable,” but found against Eastern Air Lines
in the sum of $50,000 for the estate of Ralph F. Miller
and in thé sum of $15,000 for the estate of his wife. In
the Federal Tort Claims actions against the United States,
the trial judge held the Government liable to the estates
and fixed the damages at $50,000 and $15,000 respectively.
D. C. 113 F. Supp. 80. Eastern Air Lines and the United
States appeal.

1 Aubin & Lyons, t/a Universal Marine and Supply Company,
were also named as defendants on the theory they owned or had
some interest in the P-38. They were dismissed when it appeared
that title to the plane had passed to the Bolivian Government.

2It was also agreed that the determination of the situs of the
accident (whether it occurred over the Potomae River, which is
in the District of Columbia, or over land in Virginia), made in
these eases, shall be binding in all the others. The situs is im-
portant because a Virginia statute limits recovery for wrongful
death to $15,000. In the District of Columbia there is no statu-
tory limit.

Ser nen nee

4a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

I

We first summarize the factual background which is
essential to an understanding of the reasons for reversal
advanced by the appellants. The Washington National
is a controlled airport; that is to say, from a glass-
enclosed observation platform in a control tower standing
above and west of runway 3, employees of the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration observe arriving and departing
planes and direct their movements by radio. An incoming
plane may not land and a departing plane may not take
off until it receives tower permission to do so.

The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics adopted, and
published in the Federal Register October 14, 1949 [14
Fed. Reg. 6247-6250], a regulation for the administration
of the Washington National, which is a civilian airport
owned by the United States. Section 570.55(c) of the
regulation is as follows:

“(e) Aircraft landing or taking off shall conform to
the air traffic pattern as published jointly in the
Airman’s Guide by the Anacostia Naval Air Station,
Bolling Field and the Washington National Airport.”

The air traffic pattern referred to is a map of the air-
port and vicinity, with lines drawn over it intended to
show the general flight patterns for taking off from and
landing on the various runways. For landing on runway
3, it shows a southward pattern to a point south of
Alexandria (the downwind leg), then an east turn until
over the Potomac River (the base leg), then northwardly
over the river to a point a short distance northeast of
Alexandria, where it curves to the left over the Potomac
Yards, and then a curve to the right in a line for a
straight approach to runway 3. The drawing itself was

5a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

published in the Airman’s Guide March 1, 1949, but was
not published in the Federal Register until August 7,
1952, long after the accident here involved. The regu-
lation published October 14, 1949, referred to but did not
include the traffic pattern.

Over Eastern Air Lines’ vehement objection, the trial
court admitted the traffic pattern when it was offered in
evidence by the *rnellees, and charged the jury that it
was a binding Federal regulation, and that an unauthor-
ized deviation therefrom would be negligence per se.
Eastern admittedly had knowledge of the pattern.

On the morning of the accident Glenn D. Tigner, one
of the seven traffic control operators who were working
in the tower, was advised by the Eastern DC-4 at about
11:38 a. m. that it was over Beltsville, Maryland, 15
miles northeast of the airport, and was asked for landing
instructions. Tigner authorized it to enter a left traffic
pattern for landing on runway 3 and advised the pilot
to contact the tower again from a point closer to the
airport. Tigner testified that in a second communication,
when the Eastern plane was still north of the airport, he
cleared it to land on runway 3.3 He fixed the time of the

3The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics was called by the
court as a witness on the meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared to land.’’
He testified that when a plane in the traffic pattern of an airport
is ‘‘cleared to land,’’ the pilot of the plane is thereby authorized
to commence his landing approach operation immediately; in
other words, when a pilot receives that clearance, wherever he may
be in the traffic pattern, there is no plane ahead of him and he
may make his turn at his discretion and consistently with the safe
management of his plane, and may come in and land at once on
the runway which has been designated by the tower. That this
is the only meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared to land’’ was the
unanimous testimony of all the certified air traffie controllers who
testified on the subject. The trial judge instructed the jury as
a cory of law that such was the meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared
to land.’

6a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

clearance as approximately 11:44 a. m. The DC-4 con
tinued its flight and entered the traffic pattern as it hac
been directed to do. It had circled from the patter
and was on final approach for runway 3 when it wa
struck by the Bolivian plane.

The Bolivian P-38 had taken off from runway 3 at 11:3
a. m. and therefere had been in the air only between nin
and ten minutes when the collision occurred. Shortly afte
he had cleared the DC-4 to land, Tigner observed the P-3
at a high altitude, circling Alexandria about seven mile
south of the airport, heading toward the east and startin,
a turn to its left. Tigner was then talking to anothe
plane. He was informed by a tower colleague the P-38 wa
requesting landing instructions. He saw it continuing it
left turn and said by radio, “Bolivian 927, did you reques
landing instructions?” Bridoux replied he had done s
whereupon Tigner told him he was cleared to enter th
left traffic pattern for runwaj 3 and asked him to repo!
on his downwind leg west of the airport.

Tigner said when he next saw the P-38 it was abot
five miles southwest of the airport at about 4,000 fe«
heading northeastwardly with its gear down and in
steep and rapid descent. At 11:45 a. m. he warned tl
DC-4 that the P-38 was in traffic. He said to the P-3
“Bolivian 927, make a 360 to your left. You are No.
to land. Traffic is an Eastern DC-4, turning final ahea
and below you.” Bridoux did not acknowledge the messag
and did not turn as directed. Tigner then called, “Bolivia
927, turn left, turn left. You are No. 2 to land, followir
an Eastern DC-4 turning final ahead and below you
Bridoux did not ack.owledge or comply.

During these transmissions the DC-4 was on its ba:
leg turning into final approach. When Tigner saw tl

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

7a

P-38 was not complying with his instructions, he called
the DC-4 and said, “Eastern 527, make an immediate
left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and behind you.” The
DC-4, which had gone only about a quarter of a mile on
final approach, responded with a surge of power into
a left turn. As it did so, the Bolivian plaue struck i:

Bridoux testified that a minute after his take-off le
began to have engine trouble. He reported that fact to
the tower and requested landing instructions. Receiving
no answer, he repeated his request and the tower said,
“Land 2 on Runway 3,” which he understood to mean there
was another plane ahead of him behind which he was
to land. He testified he also understood this message to
constitute a clearance to land rather than merely clear-
ance to enter the traffic pattern.

When he was about two miles west of the airport
descending at a rate of 500 to 600 feet a minute, F vidoux
said he saw a plane making a final approach for a landing
either on runway 36 or 3, which was either a Beechcraft
C-45 or a Lockheed C-60. He said, “* * * I realized
that that was the reason I was No. 2 to land.” He con-
tinued flying south until he was about five or six miles
south of the field and then made a 90-degree left turn.
As he did so, he observed the Lockheed or Beecheraft on
the ground taxiing toward the buildings. He had not
seen it actually land.

Having been told by the tower he was No. 2 to land on
runway 3 and having seen, as he thought, that the plane
which was No. 1 to land on that runway had already done
so and had taxied away, Bridoux concluded it was unneces-
sary for him to check with the tower to learn wheth.
the plane ahead of him had landed. We reproduce in the

7

8a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

margin‘ his testimony that he regarded the tower’s state-
ment, “You are No. 2 to land on runway 3,” as absolute
clearance to land after he had decided for himself, without
further communication with or from the tower, that the
No. 1 plane was out of the way.

After seeing the Lockheed or Beechcraft taxiing from
runway 3, Bridoux flew on for about one and one-quarter
miles and made another 90-degree left turn to proceed
on final approach, after which he headed north flying
at 150 m. p. h. and at an altitude of about 1,200 feet. He
said he then called the tower, advising he was on final
approach and that the tower responded, saying, “Bolivian
P-38, prepare to land on runway 3,” and gave him the
wind direction; and that he acknowledged the instruction.
He then put his flaps down, reduced his speed to about
130 m. p. h., and began an § turn to line up with runway 3.
As he did so he heard over the radio, “Clear to the left,
clear to the left,’ but thought the instruction was for
somebody on the ground. He did not turn to the left or

4‘*Q. As a matter of fact, at that point you not only accepted
that clearance which you told us was given, but you made another |
complete 360-degree turn around the airport; and then after you ©
had done that, you started downwind leg five or six miles. A.
Because I was No. 2 to land, sir.

‘““Q. You at no time, Captain, asked the identity of the plane
that was ahead of you, did you, Captain? A. No, sir.

‘*Q. And you had no way of knowing, based upon information
from the tower, that that plane was ahead of you, did you,
Captain? A. Unless I see.

‘“*Q. And you didn’t see it. A. I saw it on final approach, the
C-45 or C-60.

‘“Q. What you are telling us is after getting that clearance,
you assumed the plane you saw was the one they meant was ahead
of you? A. Yes, sir.

‘*Q. But you didn’t check with the tower to see if that was the
plane? A. Why have I got to check, if I am seeing?

‘‘Q. I am not asking you why. I am simply asking you if it
isn’t a fact that you didn’t check back with the tower to see if

9a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

take any other action, but continued on his course and
the collision occurred two or three seconds later.

The visibility from the P-38 was structurally limited so
that Bridoux could not see ahead of him except at a
considerable distance. He was flying entirely by time,
computing the distance covered by multiplying his speed
per minute by the number of minutes traveled. He said
that at an altitude of 1,200 feet and four and a half miles
from the airport he could see nothing ahead and below
for a distance of two and one-half miles. It is also ob-
served that Bridoux said that as he descended the nose
of his plane was not more than ten degrees under hori-
zontal, and that he was accomplishing the descent by
reducing his speed. Thus there was not enough nose
declination to increase appreciably the extent of visibility
immediately in front of and below the P-38. Bridoux did
not see the Eastern DC-4 at any time.

that plane you saw was the one ahead of you. A. It isn’t neces-
sary, because I was seeing the airplane.

‘**Q. Would you please answer yes or no to my question? You
didn’t check back with the tower to see if that plane you told us
you noticed on final approach was the one ahead of you, did you?
A. When I was on final approach, I called the tower.

“*Q. Captain, I am asking you, sir, if after you saw that plane,
which you said seemed to be lined up for landing, which seemed
to be on approach for landing on runway 38, did you at any time
thereafter ask the tower if that was the plane that had been ahead
of you? A. No, I didn’t ask. It wasn’t necessary to.

“*Q. You did not ask the tower— A. Because it wasn’t neces-
sary. I was seeing the airplane. I was watching it.

““Q. What you mean is you saw a plane. A. Yes, sir.

**Q. You have no way of knowing whether that one was the
one the tower was referring to, or some other plane, have you,
Captain? A. There was a way, because he was on final approach.
If he didn’t land yet, I understand he is No. 1.

““Q. Isn't it a fact that from that point on there was a lapse
of four or five minutes before you came in, on your own final
approach? and was on tower frequency, just as Eastern was.

To the contrary, Tigner testified positively that he
cleared the DC-4 to land, after which it swung from the
pattern in a wide turn to approach runway 3. He ad-
hered to that statement despite vigorous cross-examina-
tion. Tigner further said the Eastern DC—4 followed his
instructions throughout the entire flight. The first notice
to Eastern that the P-38 was in the air was a few seconds
before the impact when the tower said, “Eastern 537,
make an immediate left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and
behind you.” Instantly responding to this direction, the
engines of the DC-4 roared and the plane began a left
turn but was struck before it could escape.

Thus the question is whether Shaw's negative testimony
that he heard no landing clearance given Eastern had

5 He qualified this statement somewhat by saving that, from the
time he was over Beltsville until his plane landed, ‘‘to the best
of my recollection I never took off the headset.’’

l6a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

-enough probative value, as against Tigner’s affirmative
statement that he gave the clearance, to form an issue of
fact for the jury.

It is generally held in railroad crossing cases that nega-
tive testimony of a witness that he did not hear a warning
signal from a locomotive is sufficient to form an issue of
fact, in the face of affirmative evidence that the warning
was sounded, provided the witness was in a position to
hear, and provided his attention was not distracted. A
different situation is presented, however, when the wit-
ness is shown not to have been in a position to hear
or appears to have been inattentive. The testimony of
such a witness that he did not hear the warning signal
has little or no probative force. Small v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 1935, 65 App. D. C. 112, 80 F. 2d 704; Strider v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 1932, 60 F. 2d 2387; V enchik
v. Pennsylvainia R. Co., 1941, 143 Pa. Super. 465, 18 A.
94 118; Lanier v. Missouri P. R. Co., 1929, 9 La. App.
586, 119 So. 710; Zotter v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 1924,
280 Pa. 14, 124 A. 284; Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 1922, 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101; Rickert v. Union fe A
Co., 1916, 100 Neb. 304, 160 N. W. 86; Young v. Erie R.
Co., 1913, 158 App. Div. 14, 143 N Y. S. 176; Jordan v.
Osborne, 1911, 147 Wis. 623, 133 N. W. 32; Hubbard v.
Boston & A. R. Co., 1893, 159 Mass. 320, 34 N. E. 459.
Under the rule just stated Shaw’s negative testimony was
insufficient to form an issue if he either (a) was not in a
position during all the crucial nine-minute period to hear
messages sent from the tower to the Eastern plane 36 or
(b) appears not to have been attentive to all tower broad-
casts during that period.

It is an unquestioned and unquestionable fact that Shaw
was not in a position to hear messages from the tower

6 The period from 11:38 a. m., when Eastern was cleared into
the pattern, until 11 :46-11:47 a. m., when the crashed occurred.

;

17a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

during all the critical nine-minute period. He testified
that, when the radio switch button was depressed for
transmission from his plane, incoming messages on that
frequency could not be heard by him or Captain Porter.
Consequently, whenever the latter called the tower during
the nine-minute period, or depressed the switch button
for that purpose, it was impossibe for him or Shaw to
hear a message broadcast from the tower to Eastern.

Captain Porter did not turn his radio selector to the
tower until approximately 11:42 or 11:43. It follows that
Shaw’s plane was on tower frequency only during the last
four or five minutes of the critical nine-minute period.
The evidence is not clear as to when and how often during
that brief period Porter depressed the switch button to
call the tower and so shut off Shaw’s ability to hear a
message from the tower to Eastern.

In this connection it is to be noted that Shaw could
not have heard the tower clearing Eastern to enter the
left traffic pattern, which he said he heard at approxi-
mately 11:42 or 11:43 while he was over Beltsville. This
is so because the parties agreed and stipulated that
Kastern received traffic pattern clearance at 11:38 a. m.—
the exact time at which Shaw unequivocally said he was
over the Baltimore relay about 15 miles northwardly from
Beltsville,?7 with his radio not yet tuned to the tower. It
is therefore clear that Shaw did not hear—as he said and

7 He was positive of that time and said the times of all other
incidents thereafter to which he testified were fixed by him through
arithmetical computations based on his presence at the Baltimore
relay at 11:38 a. m.

He described the Baltimore relay as ‘‘a radio fixing where two
beams meet * * * when you get a solid hum.”’ which is approxi-
mately 15 miles northwardly from the Beltsville fan marker. The
latter is a 75-megacycle transmitter just slightly northeast of
Beltsville, Maryland. It makes a fan-shaped transmission into
the air, by which planes are informed ihey are at Beltsville.

Se ew ®

18a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

no doubt thought he did—the tower clear Eastern to enter
the traffic pattern.

What, then, cid Shaw hear at approximately 11:42 or
11:43 a. m.? Tigner testified that at approximately 11:44
a. m. he cleared Eastern to land. Since both Shaw and
Tigner were approximating the time, it may well have
been that Shaw heard the landing clearance given at
that time and inadvertently mistook it for traffic pattern
clearance.8 As we have said, it is certain he did not hear
Fastern’s clearance for the pattern. It follows that Shaw’s
statement that he heard no landing clearance to Eastern
is unconvincing.

Moreover, Shaw’s general situation was not conducive
to careful attention, as he was operating the controls of
his plane as it came over Beltsville to Hains Point and
to the airport. The pilot, Captain Porter, was therefore
primarily responsible for radio communications during
that time. Shaw was handling the controls of a huge
airplane and knew his colleague was charged with the
duty of sending and receiving radio messages. We cannot
attribute to him undivided attention to tower broadcasts
to other planes, although he may have had earphones
on. This is not to say he could not hear the communica-
tions he said he heard; but that he was not in the favorable
attitude of one whose negative testimony is for that
reason held to make an issue of fact.®

8 We observe that in a statement given March 4, 1950, to an
investigator of the CAB in Miami, Florida, Shaw said he ‘*heard
the tower giving Eastern landing clearance.’’ To be sure, he
testified that in making the statement he had misused the term
‘landing clearance.’’ But whether he in fact misused the term
‘landing clearance’ in describing the clearance he heard, is
open to serious question because, as we have shown, he could not
have heard the actual traffic pattern clearance which was given
earlier to Eastern.

9 Captain Porter did not testify.

19a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

As to whether his testimony shows he listened carefully
to the messages sent to Eastern by the tower—an illus-
tration will be indicative: After testifying that at 11:45
or 11:46 he heard the tower say, “Eastern, traffic, a P-38,”
Shaw said, “And at that point he gave them a direction;
but the direction didn’t register.” (By “direction” he
said he meant the position of the P-38.) The direction of
the Bolivian plane given to Eastern by the tower “doesn’t
stick in my mind,” he said, although he remembered that a
direction was given. The full message was stated thus
by Tigner, who sent it: “Eastern 537, make an immediate
left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and behind you.” (Tigner
is corroborated by other tower operators and also by
undisputed evidence that thereupon Eastern began an
immediate left turn.) So, Shaw’s possible inattention is
shown by the fact he heard only part of the message, and
remembered only part of what he heard.

All these considerations show the inadequacy of Shaw’s
negative testimony ; that his claimed failure to hear Tigner
clear Eastern to land was due to the depression of the
switch which cut off radio reception, or due either to
inattention or misinterpretation, and was not enough to
raise an issue of fact for the jury as to whether the DC-4
had left the traffie pattern without tower authority to
do so.

The negative testimony is weakened further by the
fact that, because of the human instinct of self-preserva-
tion and the disposition of men to avoid personal harm,
Kastern’s dead pilots are presumed to have acted with
diligence and due care. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Toops, 1930, 281 U. 8. 351, 356, 50 S. Ct. 281, 74 L. Bad.
896; Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 1906, 200 U. S. 480,
488, 26 S. Ct. 3038, 50 L. Ed. 564; Campbell v. District of
Columbia, 1935, 64 App. D. C. 375, 78 F. 2d 725; Baltimore
€ P. R. Co, v. Carrington, 1894, 3 App. D. C. 101; Bratt

20a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

v. Western Air Lines, 10 Cir., 1948, 169 F. 2d 214, 216;
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Spike, 8 Cir., 1903, 121 F. 44, 47.
It has been said the presumption “rises to the dignity of
evidence.” United States v. Fotopulos, 9 Cir., 1950, 180
F.. 2d 631, 637.

As we said in Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 1951, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 188 F. 2d 993,
it is not for us to substitute our views for those of the
trier of fact in the District Court when there is conflicting
evidence. But here, as in that case, the evidence con-
cerning the crucial fact is without substantial conflict.
Affirmative testiruony that the Eastern plane was cleared
to land was not countered by evidence sufficient to form
a factual issue; hence the appellees failed to carry their
burden of showing the contrary by a preponderance of the
proof. The intervention of the jury is required only
where some question of fact is actually in controversy.
Oscanyan v. Arms Ce., 1880, 103 U. S. 261, 266, 26 L. Ed.
539.

While there were other charges of negligence against
Eastern which were submitted to the jury, certainly the
principal accusation was that it attempted to land with-
out having been cleared by the tower to do so. Since the
trial court simply asked the jury, “Is Eastern Air Lines
liable?” and the jury simply answered, “Yes,” we do not
know in what way its members considered Eastern had
been negligent; but we do know the jury was authorized
by the court to find against the Air Lines if it should con-
clude the DC-4 had not received landing clearance. We
are therefore forced to hold the trial court erred in sub-
mitting to the jury the question whether the Eastern
plane unauthorizedly deviated from the traffic pattern.
Having so held, we think it unnecessary to discuss the
other grounds for reversal advanced by Eastern Air
Lines. The judgments against it will be reversed, and
the cases will be remanded for a new trial.

2la

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

Ill

The principal question presented by the Government’s
appeal is whether the United States has consented to be
sued for negligence of its control tower employees in
regulating air traffic at a public airport. In answering
the question, we must construe the Federal Tort Claims
Act which limits the liability of the United States to
that which a “private individual” would have “under like
circumstances,” and excludes claims arising from the
performance of a discretionary function or duty.1!

1028 U. S. C. §1346(b) and § 2674 are as follows:

§1346(b). ‘Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of
this title, the district courts * * * shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.”’

§ 2674. ‘The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or for punitive damages.

“If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the
law of the place where the act or omission complained of
occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for
damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu
thereof. June 25, 1948, ¢. 646, §1, 62 Stat. 983.”

11The pertinent portion of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is as follows:
‘“‘The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to—
““(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execu-

22a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

The Government insists that its tower operators per-
form governmental functions of a regulatory nature; that
no private individual has such power of regulation; that
therefore the Act does not permit suit based on negligent
performance of their duties. The situation involved here,
says the Government, when viewed in all the circum-
stances, “cannot be equated to one which would predicate
analogous private liability,” and so it is said the claims
are excluded from the coverage of the Tort Claims Act.

The history of the development of the control tower
is helpful in considering whether there is or may be
private liability analogous to that sought to be imposed
upon the United States in this case. What is said to
be the forerunner of the present control tower was con-
structed in 1931 at an airport in Cleveland, Ohio. During
the following five years 20 other cities erected and operated
towers, and by 1939 there were 52 towers being operated
by municipalities.

Regulations promulgated under the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 provided for the issuance of certificates of
competence to tower operators; and standard procedures,
equipment, installations and tower operating techniques
were suggested, but were not required to be adopted.
November 1, 1941, the CAA issued a Manual of Opera-
tions setting forth Standard Airport Traffic Control Pro-
cedures, and shortly thereafter all certificated tower
operators were required to apply them.

In August, 1941, Congress appropriated funds to enable
CAA to maintain and operate a number of towers.
Through gradual increase in funds available, the CAA

tion of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.’’

23a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

was operating 165 of the country’s 200 towers on Novem-
ber 1, 1949, the date of the accident involved here. As
late as April, 1954, there were stil! a number of towers
in operation which had not been taken over by CAA
personnel. The operators in those non-Government towers
must be certificated by CAA before they may control
civil aircraft in air commerce.!2, Such towers are subject
to CAA inspection;!#3 and the Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics has prescribed procedures and techniques
which must be followed by the towermen. Nevertheless,
these non-CAA controllers are not government employees,
and perform no governmental function.

Airports are usually constructed, maintained and oper-
ated by municipalities, probably because the cost of con-
struction is great and the prospect of financial reward
does not attract private capital. But, as far as we know,
as of November 1, 1949, there was no reason why a private
individual or a private corporation could not construct an
airport and operate a control tower manned by its own
operators certificated by the CAA. Such an individual or
corporation would of course be liable for the negligence

1249 U. S. C. A. §401(6) includes within its definition of an
airman ‘‘any individual who serves in the capacity of * * * ai--
traffic control-tower operator.’’ And 49 U. S. C. A. §560(a) (2)
prohibits any person from serving as an airman in any capacity
without an appropriate certificate to so serve. To be eligible for
a control tower operator certificate an applicant must meet physi-
eal, experience and other qualifications and must pass an examina-
~e on the subject of air traffic control. 14 Code Fed. Regs.

art 26.

1349 U. S. C. A. § 556 is as follows:

‘“‘The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics is empowered to
inspect, classify, and rate any air navigation facility available
for the use of civil aircraft of the United States, as to its
suitability for such use. The Administrator of Civil Aero-
nautics is empowered to issue a certificate for any such air
navigation facility.’’

24a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

of privately employed tower operators. It follows that,
when the United States entered the business of operating
a civil airport and an air traffic control tower in connec-
tion therewith, it assumed a role which might be and was
assumed by private interests. Hence, under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1346(b) and 2674, the Government is liable for the
negligent acts or omissions of its control tower operators
in the performance of their functions and duties, unless
those Code provisions do not apply because the operators’
activities are of the sort described in the exceptions sub-
section, § 2680(a).

The United States insists that the subsection applies,
and shields it from liability here. It argues that
§ 2680(a)

«“* * * incorporates into the Act the historic prin-
ciple that the courts will not, in a private action,
revise or review executive conduct involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion of a public char-
acter”;

that the tower operators’ duties are public in nature and
involve the exercise of discretion and judgment, with the
result that neither the operators nor the United States can
be held liable for their negligent performance.

The principle referred to is indeed historic, as it was
stated in Marbury v. Madison, 1803, 1 Cranch 137, 169-
170, 5 U. S. 137, 169-170, 2 L. Ed. 60, and has since been
consistently adhered to. We have no doubt that the
principle was consciously restated by Congress when it
declared in § 2680(a) that the United States should not
be liable on

“Any claim * * * based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal

—

:

25a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.”

The heart of the question, however, is whether this case
falls within the historic principle; whether the Govern-
ment is correct in saying, as the second step in its argu-
ment, “that the tower operators’ duties are public in
nature and involve the exercise of discretion and judg-
ment.” We think the statement is incorrect, for the rea-
sons hereinafter given. We hold that the tower operators
merely handle operational details which are outside the
area of the discretionary functions and duties referred
to in 4 2680(a); and that, consequently, the Tort Claims
Act permits the Government to be sued for damages sus-
tained because of their negligence.

Applicable authority is available to sustain our view,
as comparable questions have been considered by other
courts. Costley v. United States, 5 Cir., 1950, 181 F. 2d
723, involved the question whether the Tort Claims Act
permitted the Government to be sued for the negligence
of its employees in an army hospital. A master sergeant’s
wife was admitted to the maternity section. As an inci-
dent to delivering her child, employees of the United
States prepared and injected into her body a drug which
yas intended to be a spinal anaesthetic but in fact was
a very harmful substance which caused the woman to be
permanently paralyzed from the waist down.

The question on appeal from the District Court’s dis-
missal was whether the employees were under a duty to
use due skill and reasonable care in attending Mrs. Cost-
ley after having admitted her to the hospital under an
army regulation authorizing her admission, or whether
they were performing a discretionary duty or function
which, under § 2680(a), cannot be made the basis of a
tort claim against the Government. The Court of Ap-

26a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

peals quoted the army regulation that wives of soldiers
may be admitted to army hospitals when suitable facilities
for hospitalization are available, and then said, 181 F. 2d
at page 725:

“With facilities available for her care, Mrs. Costley
was admitted to the hospital pursuant to the above
regulation. Having decided that there were facilities
available, and having admitted her for treatment, the
hospital authorities no longer had any discretion to
exercise with regard to whether she was to receive
careful or negligent treatment. A duty arose at this
point to treat her with the same care, skill, diligence,
and ability, that would be owing by a private person
or corporation under the same or similar circum-
stances.”

In accord are Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 4
Cir., 1951, 193 F. 2d 631, and United States v. Gray, 10
Cir., 1952, 199 F. 2d 239. Judge Dobie’s Somerset opinion
sufficiently distinguishes Feres v. United States, 1950, 340
U. S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152, by saying, 193 F. 2d
at page 634:

«* * * All that case really decided was the ‘Govern-
ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries (arose)
out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.’ ”

The holding of the Costley, Somerset and Gray cases
was neither overruled nor impaired by the later decision
of the Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States, 1953,
346 U. S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427.14 That was a

14 The Government says the Somerset Seafood Co. case was over-
ruled by the Dalehite opinion. We think not; our analysis of that
opinion convinces us to the contrary.

—

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

27a

test case representing some 300 separate personal and
property claims aggregating $200,000,000 which were based
on explosions of fertilizer with an ammonium nitrate base,
at Texas City, Texas, in 1947. Suing under the Tort
Claims Act, the plaintiffs claimed negligence substantially
on the part of the entire body of federal officials and em-
ployees involved in a program of production of the mate-
rial—Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN)—in
which the original fire occured and which exploded. This
fertilizer had been produced and distributed at the in-
stance, according to the specifications, and under the con-
trol of the United States.

The question before the Court was whether the acts
and omissions alleged as negligence were done or omitted
in th performance of or failure to perform a discretion-
ary function or duty within the meaning of § 2680(a).
The Court said, 346 U. S. at page 34, 73 S. Ct. at page
697 :

«“* * * The ‘discretion’ protected by the section
* * * is the discretion of the executive or the admin-
istrator to act according to one’s judgment of the
best course, a concept of substantial historical an-
cestry in American law.”

The statement just quoted was supported in 73 S. Ct. at
page 967, by footnote 30, which is as follows:

“It seems sufficient to cite Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60; Spalding v. Vilas, 161
U. S. 483, 498, 16 S. Ct. 631, 637, 40 L. Ed. 780; Alzna
v. Johnson, 231 U. S. 106, 34 S. Ct. 27, 58 L. Ed. 142;

15 This is the ‘‘historie principle,’’ referred to in the Govern-
ment’s brief, about which there can be no dispute. But, as we
have said, the real question here is whether tower activities fall
within the principle.

¥y
6
:

28a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

State of Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. 8. 627, 663, 34
S. Ct. 938, 940, 58 L. Ed. 1506; Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 131, 60 S. Ct. 869, 878, 84
L. Ed. 1108.”

The Court went on to say, 346 U. S. at pages 35 and 36,
73 S. Ct. at page 968:

“It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case,
precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to
hold, as we do, that the ‘discretionary function or
duty’ that cannot form a basis for suit under the
Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of
programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in estab-
lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions. Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion. * * *”

It was then pointed out that the Cabinet-level decision to
institute the fertilizer export program was a discretionary —
act; that the basic “Plan” for the production of FGAN |
was drafted by the Office of the Field Director of Am-
munition Plants in June 1946, prior to beginning pro-
duction. It was further stated that each of the specific
acts of negligence charged in the manufacture of FGAN
was in accordance with and done under specifications and
directions set forth in the basic Plan for the production
of fertilizer. Each of the acts looked upon as negligence
was directed by this Plan. The Court concluded as fol-
lows, 346 U. S. at page 42, 73'S. Ct. at page 971:

“In short, the alleged ‘negligence’ does not sub-
ject the Government to liability. The decisions held
culpable were all responsibly made at a planning
rather than operational level and involved considera-

29a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

tions more or less important to the practicability of
the Government’s fertilizer program.”

We may fairly infer from the statement just quoted
that the United States is liable for the negligence of its
employees at the operational level, where there is no
“room for policy judgment and decision.” This leads us
to the Government’s argument that the negligence charged
against the tower operators is the same as that charged
against th Coast Guard in the Dalehite case, which the
Supreme Court held was not actionable because of the
discretionary exception. We quote in the margin the
Supreme Court’s disposition of the alleged negligence of
the Coast Guard.!6

16 346 U. S. at pages 42-43 and 44, 73 S. Ct. at pages 971-972:

‘*The findings of negligence on the part of the Coast Guard
in failing to supervise the storage of the FGAN, and in fight-
ing the fire after it started, were rejected by a majority of
the Court of Appeals. [Dalehite v. United States, 5 Cir.]
197 F. 2d at 777, 780, 781. We do not enter into an examina-
tion of these factual findings. We prefer, again, to rest
our decision on the Act.

*‘The District Court’s holding that the Coast Guard and
other agencies were negligent in failing to prevent the fire by
regulating storage or loading of the fertilizer in some different
fashion is like his specifie citations of negligence discussed
above. They are classically within the exception. ‘The power
to adopt regulations or by-laws * * * for the preservation
of the public health, or to pass ordinances preseribing and
regulating the duties of policemen and firemen * * * are
generally regarded as discretionary, because, in their nature,
they are legislative.’ Weightman v. Corporation of Washing-
ton, 1 Black 39, 49, 17 L. Ed. 52. The courts have tradi-
tionally refused to question the judgments on which they are
based. Zywicki v. Jos. R. Foard Co., D. C., 206 F. 975;
Gutowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 127 Md. 502, 96 A. 630;
State of Maryland to use of Goralski v. General Stevedoring
Co., D. C., 213 F. 51.

‘* As to the alleged failure in fighting the fire, we think this

a

30a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

The Court made it clear that, as far as the alleged
official dereliction of duty in failing to police the ship-
board loading was concerned, the decision not to do so
had been made at a policy-forming level and was not the
decision of the individual members of the Coast Guard
whose duty it would have been to do the policing had
they been instructed to do it. The Court said:

«“* * © To impose liability for the alleged nonfeas-
ance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the
United States liable in tort for failure to impose a
quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease.”

We may paraphrase the quoted sentence thus:

“To impose liability for the alleged nonfeasance of
the Coast Guard would be like holding the United
States liable in tort for the failure of the CAA to
take over for maintenance and operation a certain air
traffic control tower.”

Had the Coast Guard authorities decided to supervise the
storage, we have no doubt the United States would have

too without the Act. The Act did not create new causes
of action where none existed before.

‘««@ # ® the liability assumed by the Government here is
that created by ‘‘all the circumstances,’’ not that which a
few of the circumstances might create. We find no parallel
liability before, and we think no new one has been created
by, this Act. Its effect is to waive immunity from recognized
causes of action and was not to visit the Government with
novel and unprecedented liabilities.’ Feres v. United States,
340 U. S. 135, 142, 71 S. Ct. 153, 157, 95 L. Ed. 152.

‘*It did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure
or carelessness of public firemen does not create private ac-
tionable rights. * * * To impose liability for the alleged non-
feasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the United
States liable in tort for failure to impose a quarantine for,
let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.’’

3la

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

been liable in tort for any causal negligence of its per-
sonnel acting at the operational level. So it is here:
discretion was exercised when it was decided to operate
the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to
operate it negligently.

The distinction between non-actionable planning and
actionable negligence in carrying out the plan, was clearly
stated by the Supreme Court in Johnston v. District of
Columbia, 1886, 118 U. S. 19, 6 S. Ct. 923, 30 L. Ed. 75.
Johnston’s property was damaged when a sewer over-
flowed. He sued the District of Columbia, alleging that it
“knowing!y coustructed and continued upon an unreason-
able and defective plan, and of inadequate capacity for its
purpose, and wrongfully permitted [it] to become clogged
up.” The Court said, 118 U. S. at pages 20-21, 6 S. Ct.
at page 924:

“The duties of the municipal authorities, in adopt-
ing a general plan of drainage, and determining
when and where sewers shall be built, of what size
and at what level, are of a quasi judicial nature,
involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and
large discretion, and depending upon considerations
affecting the public health and general convenience
throughout an extensive territory; and the exercise
of such judgment and discretion, in the selection and
adoption of the general plan or system of drainage,
is not subject to revision by a court or jury in a
private action for not sufficiently draining a par-
ticular lot of land. But the construction and repair
of sewers, according to the general plan so adopted,
are simply ministerial duties; and for any negligence
in so constructing a sewer, or keeping it in repair,
the municipality which has constructed and owns
the sewer may be sued by a person whose property
is thereby injured.”

i. en et oo ee i ec So oS a

32a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

With this distinction in mind, we turn to the trial
court’s opinion and find the following statement as to the
nature of the acts and omissions of the tower operators
which were held to constitute negligence :

“* * * As to negligence, I find that there was
failure of the control tower personnel to issue a
timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38
being on final approach; in the failure, also, to warn
the P-38 that Eastern was on final approach; in
clearing both planes for the same runway at ap-
proximately the same time, having in mind their
respective positions in relation to each other and
the speed of both their approach and descent; and
the failure to keep both planes advised as to the
activities of the other; I find this to be negligence
and concurrent both in character and in relation
to that found by the jury with respect to the defend-
ant Eastern. I find, further, that such negligence
contributed proximately to the injury complained of.”

The three negligent omissions and the one affirmative
negligent act found by the court were not “decisions
responsibly made at a planning level” and did not in-
volve any consideration important to the practicability of
the Governnent’s program of controlling air traffic at
public airports. The tower operators acted, and failed
to act, at an operational level. While they were in a
sense exercising discretion as to what they should and
should not do, they were not performing the sort of
discretionary functions contemplated by § 2680(a) and
clearly described in the Dalehite decision.

It is therefore our opinion that, if a Government tower-
man negligently clears two planes to land on the same
runway at the same time, or is guilty of some other
negligent act or omission in doing his work, the Govern-

33a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

ment is liable for resulting injury in the same manner
and for the same reason that it is liable for injury done
by the driver of a mail truck who, in exercising discretion
as to how to drive, negligently runs through a red traffic
light. ,

The Government contends, however, that even though
its theory of non-liability under § 2680(a) be rejected,
the judgments against it should be reversed because the
trial court’s findings do not provide sufficient factual bases
for its ultimate conclusion of negligence. We deem it
unnecessary to do more than quote the pertinent findings
of fact, which expanded the above quotation from the
trial court’s opinion:

“3. At all times in question, there was available
in good operating condition in the control tower at
said airport and in each plane voice radio equipment
for two-way contact between said tower and either
plane or between the tower and both planes simul-
taneously.

“4. For an adequate period of time before the
collision, both planes were visible to the control
tower personnel who observed said planes and knew
that said planes were on converging approaches for
landing on runway 3, and said personnel had an
adequate opportunity to give timely warnings and
instructions to each plane.

“>. At all times in question, weather conditions
at and near the airport were excellent and visibility

unimpeded.

“6. At pll times in question, the Washington Na-
tional Airport and the control tower facilities thereat
were owned by the defendant, United States of Amer-
ica, and were being operated by it through its agents

34a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

and employees (the tower personnel) assigned there-
to by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, an agency
of the United States.

“7. The said agents and employees of the United
States in their operation of the control tower at said
airport failed to exercise reasonable care and were
guilty of negligence in the circumstances in question
in that, having in mind the respective positions of
said planes in relation to each other and their speed
of approach and descent:

“a) they failed to issue a timely warning to the
Eastern plane concerning the P-38 on final approach;

“b) they failed to warn the P-38 that the Eastern
plane was on final approach;

“e) they cleared both planes for the same runway
at approximately the same time; and

“d) they failed to keep both planes advised of the
activities of the other.

“8. The negligence of United States through its
agents and employees, as set out in finding No. 7
above, was a proximate cause of the fatal collision
resulting in the deaths of plaintiffs’ decedents, and
such negligence of the United States also concurred
with the negligence of Eastern as the proximate
cause of said collision.

“9. The collision occurred over the Potomac River
within the boundary of the District of Columbia.”

These findings seem to us to be sufficiently in detail to
justify the conclusion of negligence.

It is observed that the Government does not directly
charge that the evidence is insufficient to support the find-
ings of fact which were made by the trial judge. We have

35a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

considered the question, however, and have concluded
there was proof adequate to support the findings, although
it is meager with respect to the finding that the tower
cleared both planes for the same runway at approximately
the same time—which is probably the most important of
the findings. For, although the trial court was amply
justified in finding (contrary to the jury’s apparent con-
clusion) that the Eastern plane was cleared to land—and
indeed could hardly have found otherwise,—there is only
slight evidence tending to show the Bolivian plane was
ever cleared to land.

Bridoux himself practically conceded his own negligence
of which the jury rather unaccountably exonerated him)
n mistaking the message “You are No. 2 to land” for
ictual and absolute landing clearance. But he did say:
‘I said ‘Washington Tower, Bolivian P-38 on final ap-
roach.” They responded to me immediately, * * * ‘Boli-
‘lan P-38, prepare to land on runway 3” Consequently,
f the trial judge believed, as apparently he did, that
sridoux actually sent such a message and received such
in answer from the tower, there was some evidence that
he tower gave landing clearance to the Bolivian as well
s to the DC-+4. We cannot substitute our judgment on a
actual issue for that of the trial judge simply because
re might have reached a different conclusion.

As to all the foregoing, the court is unanimous. We
re divided, however, as to another contention of the
‘nited States which remains to be considered: that it
‘as error to measure the Government's liability under the
iw of the District of Columbia,!7 which does not limit the
mount of damages for wrongful death, instead of under-
ne law of Virginia, which limits recovery to $15,000 for

17 The trial judge found from conflicting evidence that the
cident oceurred over the Potomae River, which is in the District
f Columbia.

36a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

the death of one person. The contention is based on the
fact, that although the planes collided in the District of
Columbia, the negligent acts and omissions of the tower
operators occurred in the tower, which is in Virginia.

The general conflicts rule disregards the law of the place
of the negligent act or omission and, instead, uses the law
of the place where the injury was sustained. My brothers
Edgerton and Fahy are of the view that the trial court
erred in applying the general rule here because the Tort
Claims Act provides in § 1346(b) that

«“* * * the district courts * * * shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, * * * for * * *
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the government * * * under
circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.” (Emphasis supplied.)

They hold that Congress thus provided in explicit terms
for the Government's liability to be measured under the
law of the place where its negligent employee’s act or
omission occurred, and that therefore the Act requires
Virginia law to be applied in this case.

I do not agree that the language of § 1346(b) compels
us to conclude that Congress had in mind the general
conflicts rule to which reference has been made and in-
tended to make it inapplicable in situations such as this.
I think the legislative expression “in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred” was
intended to mean, and therefore should be construed as
meaning, “in accordance with the law of the place where
the tort occurred.” An act, in legal as well as in popular
use; is not merely a voluntary muscular contraction, but

~

-

37a

Oriqimal Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

something more. The word commonly includes the con-
sequences of the muscular contraction. If the defendant
pulls the trigger and the bullet kills a man, in legal as
in popular usage the killing is said to be the defendant’s
act.

In accordance with this usage, I interpret the statutory
words “act or omission” as including not only the mes-
sages negligently sent or omitted by the tower operators,
but also their immediate consequences. This is consistent
with § 377 of Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), which
reads: “The place of wrong is in the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place.” .

My interpretation also accords with that indicated by
Assistant Attorney General Shea in his testimony before
the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning the
Tort Claims bill,!8 as being the then interpretation of the
Department of Justice. Ie said, when asked where a
claimant brings suit,.“Either where the claimant resides,
or in the locale of the injury or damage.” (Italics sup-
plied.) The witness was referring to the venue provision
of the then pending legislation which is now 28 U.S. C.
§ 1402(b):

“(b) Any civil action on a tort claim against the
United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of
this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omis-
sion complained of occurred. June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§1, 62 Stat. 937.”

The words of § 1402(b) which he was construing are not
only the same words which oceur in § 1346(b), with which
18 Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th

Cong., 2nd Sess.. on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 (Jan. 29, 1942),
p. 9.

38a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

we are concerned, but also were used with a direct refer-
ence to that section.

The judgments against the United States will be af-
firmed, except that the judgment for $150,000 in No, 12,017
will be reduced to $15,000 to meet the limitation imposed
by the law of Virginia on the amount of recovery.

The judgments in Nos. 11,991 and 11,992 are reversed
and the cases are remanded for a new trial restricted to
the issue of liability. The judgment in No. 12,017 is
affirmed as modified and the judgment in No. 12,018 is
affirmed.

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, United States v. Union
Trust Co. et all.

Octroser TERM 1955
Per Curtam Deciston—December 5, 1955

(350 U. S$. 907)

No. 296. United States v. Union Trust Co. et al. On
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Perr
Curtam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted
and the judgment is affirmed. Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U. S. 61. Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant
Attorney General Burger, Paul A. Sweeney and Lester S.
Jayson for the United States. David G. Bress, Sheldon
E. Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and Jo V. Morgan, Jr.
for respondents. Reported below: 95 U. S. App. D. C.
189, 221 F. 2d 62.

eee

39a

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, Union Trust Co. et al. v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

OctToser Term 1955
Per Curtam Deciston—December 5, 1955

(350 U. S. 907)

No. 298. Union Trust Co. et al. v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted
and the judgment is reversed. Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER
and Mr. Justice Harian would not grant certiorari. David
G. Bress, Sheldon E. Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and
Jo V. Morgan, Jr. for petitioners. Joseph W. Henderson,
Richard W. Galiher and John M. Aherne for respondent.
Reported below: 95 U.S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F, 2d 62.

—___.

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated February 27, 1956, Union Trust Co. et al. v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

Per Curiam Deciston—February 27, 1956
(350 U. S. 962)

No. 298. Union Trust Co. et al. v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. On consideration of the petition for rehearing, the
order of December 5, 1955, is reopened and is modified by
directing that the case be remanded to the Court of Ap-
peals to permit that court to pass upon the several issues
left undecided by our reversal of its judgment.

40a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tur District or CotumBia Crrcvit

Nos. 11,991 and 11,992

>
—_

Eastern Air Lives, Ivc.,
Appellant,
Vv.

Uxiox Trust Co., et al.,
Appellees.

Argued June 6, 1996

Decided Sept. 20, 1956

Petition for Rehearing In Bane Denied Jan. 9, 1957

Messrs. Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., and
Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr.
John M. Aherne, New York City, of the bar of the Su-
preme Court of New York, was on the brief, for appel-
lant.

Mr. David G. Bress, Washington, D. C., with whom
Messrs. Sheldon E. Bernstein, Alvin L, Newmyer and Jo
V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D, C., were on the brief, for
appellees.

Before Epcertox, Chief Judge, and WILBcR KK. MiIcuer
and Fauy, Cireuit Judges.

Wiscr K. Mutter, Circuit Judge: When these cases
were first before us, we reversed the judgments against

r

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

4la

Eastern Air Lines in an opinion to which reference is
made for a statement of the factual situation. 1955, 95
U. S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F. 2d 62. We held that,
since the pilot of a National airliner flying in the general
vicinity was admittedly not in a position during all of
the critical period to hear radio messages sent by the
contro] tower to the Eastern plane, and since he appeared
not to have been fully attentive to such tower broadcasts
as he actually did hear during that period, the National
pilot’s negative testimony that he heard no landing clear-
ance given the Eastern plane did not have enough proba-
tive value, as against the tower operator’s affirmative
statement that he gave such clearance, to form an issue
of fact for the jury.

Having so held, we concluded the trial court erred in
submitting to the jury the question whether the Eastern
plane had negligently deviated from the traffic pattern
without tower clearance to do so, when it was struck from
above and behind by the Bolivian plane. Because of that
conclusion, we reversed the judgments without reaching
other grounds for reversal advanced by Eastern Air
Lines.

There followed a petition for a writ of certiorari, with
respect to which the Supreme Court said December 5,
1955, “The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and
the judgment is reversed.” 350 U.S. 907, 76 S. Ct. 192.
On petition for rehearing by Eastern Air Lines, the
Supreme Court ordered on February 27, 1956:

“On consideration of the petition for rehearing,
the order of December 5, 1955, ante, p. 907, is re-
opened and is modified by directing that the case be
remanded to the Court of Appeals to permit that
court to pass upon the several issues left undecided
by our reversal of its judgment.” 350 U. S. 962. 76
S. Ct. 429.

a

42a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

Thus the cases are again before us. Supplemental briefs
have been filed and further oral argument has been heard.

Eastern Air Lines urges it was deprived of a fair trial
by the plaintiff's “clear design to destroy the character,
integrity and credibility of the tower witnesses by base-
less charges of fabrication and concoction.” The trial
judge told the jury such charges had first been made and
then withdrawn, and then charged in regard thereto:
“So, therefore, 1 want to immediately have you dispel
that from your minds, because counsel have said there
is no charge of fabrication or concoction or subornation
of perjury, if you will, in this case.” While the record
furnishes some basis for supposing the plaintiffs had the
design attributed to them by Eastern, we think the court's
admonition was adequate to remove any possible prejudice
from the minds of the jurors if they were otherwise un-
prejudiced, and that reversal on this ground alone is not
warranted,

Kastern says it was gravely prejudiced by the fact that
the jury heard all the evidence in the non-jury case; that
alleged fault on the part of the tower operators was im-
puted to it by the jury. Even though we assume that
Eastern was disadvantaged because the cases against it
and the non-jury cases against the Government were tried
at the same time, Eastern for reasons then deemed pru-
dent consented to consolidation of the cases for simul-
taneous trial. It cannot now complain because this was
done.

In our first opinion we rejected Eastern’s contention
that the trial court erred in receiving in evidence the
approach and landing pattern offered as an exhibit by
the appellees because it had not properly been officially
prescribed; and held the Eastern pilots were required to
follow the pattern unless landing clearance, which au-
thorizes deviation from it, had been given by the tower.

43a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

Eastern urges that we reconsider the ruling and hold the
pattern inadmissible. We adhere to our original holding
in this regard.

Finally, Eastern urges that the trial judge erred in
denying its alternative motions for judgment non obstante
veredicto or for a new trial, filed under Rule 50(b), Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.1| The motion asked the
court to set aside the verdicts in favor of Bridoux, the
Bolivian pilot, as well as those against Eastern. The
appellees moved for a new trial of their cases against
Bridoux if a new trial were awarded to Eastern Air
Lines.

The new trial issue includes the inquiry whether the
verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence,
whether they were induced by passion, sympathy and
prejudice, and whether a miscarriage of justice will re-
sult therefrom, These included inquires, particularly the
latter, contain a combination of questions. One phase of

1The pertinent portion of the Rule is as follows:

“*(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. Whenever a
motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the
court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to later determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion. Within 10 days after the reception of a
verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may
move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon
set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with
his motion for a directed verdict * * ® A motion for a
new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial
may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict. was
returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may
reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed. °° *" 980.8.C. A.

44a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

resulting injustice is asserted by the appellant in this
quotation from its supplemmental brief, at pages 2 and 3:

«* * * The District Court, in the Tort Claims
Act cases, found that Eastern had been cleared
to land, and this Court ruled that such finding
was ‘amply justified’ (Op. p. 38; [95 U. S. App.
D. C. 189], 221 F. 2d 62, 79). Under the trial court’s
charge to the jury, Eastern could have been found
liable only if it had not been cleared to land.
Having found against Eastern the jury necessarily
found that Eastern was not cleared to land, thus
placing it in direct conflict with the fact finding
of the Trial Judge. The result is an extraordinary
and unusual situation in which, having heard the
same evidence from the same witnesses, at the same
time, and on the same record, the court (as a trier
of the facts) and jury reach precisely contradictory
conclusions. Based upon the court’s fact finding, final
judgments have been entered against the United
States and duly affirmed by this Court and by the
United States Supreme Court. The jury finding
against Eastern is now before this Court for exam-
ination to determine if a new trial should be had.

“It is a self-evident truth that the same proposition

é cannot be true and false at the same time, and under
3 the same aspect. Therefore either the jury was wrong
3 in finding that Eastern was not cleared to land, or
; the Trial Judge was wrong in finding that Eastern

was cleared to land. The existence of this extraordi-
nary and unseemly conflict of findings speaks most
eloquently to the necessity for a new trial.”

Before considering the new trial issue, we must decide
whether the phase of it suggested in the foregoing quota-

s.. ee Age ered te te

eal

45a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

tion remains open after remand, in view of the Supreme
Court’s decision that the District Court did not err in
submitting the clearance question to the jury. We think it
is still open. In submitting the clearance question t» the
jury, the trial judge simply held that, viewing the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, an issue
of fact had been raised, and in this he has been upheld
by the Supreme Court; but he did not weigh or evaluate
‘ae evidence pro and con until he ruled on the motion
for a new trial and this ruling has not been passed on
by the Supreme Court.

A holding that a verdict for the defendant should not
be directed does not necessarily mean that a verdict
against him should not be set aside on a motion for a
new trial. There is a clear distinction between a trial
judge’s duty in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict
and his duty in ruling on a motion for a new trial. The
distinction is reflected in Rule 50(b) and is shown in the
cases. For example, in Garrison vy. United States, 4 Cir.,
1932, 62 F. 2d 41, Judge Parker said, at page 42:

“e * * Where there is substantia! evidence in sup-
port of plaintiff’s case, the judge may not direct a
verdict against him, even though he may not believe
his evidence or may think that the weight of the
evidence is on the other side: for, under the consti-
tutional guaranty of trial by jury, it is for the jury
to weigh the evidence and pass upon its credibility.
He may, however, set aside a verdict supported by
substantial evidence where in his opinion it is con-
trary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based
upon evidence which is false; for, even though the
evidence be sufficien preclude the direction of a
verdict, it is still his to exercise his power over
the proceedings before him to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. * * *”

Ge eT eal Aelita Fit Be 4

2 SRF ee,

oa

Buiswe ‘-

46a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

In Aetna Casualty &€ Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 1941, 122 F.
2d 350, the Fourth Circuit again discussed the subject,
and said at pages 352-53:

“* * * On such a motion {for a new trial] it is the
duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial, if he is of opinion that the verdict is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based
upon evidence which is false, or will result in a mis-
carriage of justice, even though there may be sub-
stantial evidence which would prevent the direction
of a verdict. The exercise of this power is not in
derogation of the right of trial by jury but is one
of the historic safeguards of that right. Smith v.
Times Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 35 L.R.A.
$19; Bright v. Eynon 1 Burr. 390; Mellin v. Taylor
3 B.N.C. 109, 132 Eng. Reports 351. The matter was
well put by Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Smith v. Times
Publishing Co., supra * * * as follows: “The authority
of the common pleas in the control and revision of
excessive verdicts through the means of new trials
was firmly settled in England before the foundation
of this colony, and has always existed here without
challenge under any of our constitutions. It is a
power to examine the whole case on the law and the
evidence, with a view to securing a result, not merely
legal, but also not manifestly against justice,—a
power exercised in pursuance of a sound judicial
discretion, without which the jury system would be a
capricious and intolerable tyranny, which no people
could long endure, This court has had occasion mere
than once recently to say that it was @ power the
courts ought to exercise unflinchingly.’ (Italics sup-
plied).”

47a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

And at page 354, the court said:

“To the federal trial judge, the law gives ample
power to see that justice is done in causes pending
before him; and the responsibility attendant upon
such power is his in full measure. While according
due respect to the findings of the jury, he should not
hesitate to set aside their verdict and grant a new
trial in any case where the ends of justice so re-
quire.”

The foregoing paragraph was repeated in Virginian Ry.
Co. v. Armentrout, 4 Cir., 1948, 166 F. 2d 400, 408, 4 A. L.
R. 2d 1064, with this addition:

“The power of this court to reverse the trial court
for failure to exercise the power, where such failure,
as here, amounts to an abuse of discretion, is like-
wise clear. * * *”

Other cases setting forth these principles include the
following: Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 1940, 311
U. S. 243, 251, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147; Mt. Adams &
E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 6 Cir., 1896, 74 Fed.
463; Felton v. Spiro, 6 Cir., 1897, 78 Fed. 576: Adams v.
United States, 7 Cir., 1940, 116 F. 2d 199; General Ameri-
can Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 6 Cir., 1948, 136 F.
2d 821; Marsh vy. Illinois Central R. R., 5 Cir. 1949, 175
F. 2d 498; Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Cir., 1951, 186
F. 2d 926, 932 note 10; Snead v. New York Central R. R.,
4 Cir., 1954, 216 F. 2d 169.

We conclude, on the authorities and on reason as well,
that the trial judge had the power and duty to grant a
new trie! if the verdicts were against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if for any reason or combination of rea-
sons justice would miscarry if they were allowed to
stand; and that this court has the power and duty to

48a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

reverse and order a new trial if the trial judge abused
his diseretion in denying the metion therefor.

As to what has been said so far in this opinion, the
court is unanimous, We are not in agreement, however,
as to the disposition of the new trial issue. My brothers
Kdgerton and Fahy take the view that the verdicts were
not so clearly against the weight of the evidence or so
plainly the result of passion, prejudice and sympathy, or
otherwise so unjust that the trial judge can be said to
have abused his discretion in refusing to grant a new
trial. It follows that this final point urged by Eastern is
rejected by a majority of the court and the judgn..#‘s
against the appellant will be affirmed.

I think Eastern Air Lines is entitled to a new trial and
that the trial judge abused the judicial discretion com-
mitted to him when he denied the motion. Although the
discretion is broad and appellate review thereof is limited
in scope, I suggest that the denial of a aew trial must
he held an abuse of discretion when it is demonstrable
bevond peradventure that the verdict was flagrantly
against the great weight of the evidence and that grave
injustice will flow from it. Such is the situation here,
in my opinion.

In the first place, a simple statement of what happened
on the fatal morning is sufficient to arouse misgivings as
to the validity of the jury’s verdict. Shortly before noon
on a clear, bright day, the Eastern airliner with two
experienced pilots and 53 other persons aboar@ was
swinging into final approach for landing. The Bolivian
pilot, in a warplane so constructed that he could not see
before and below him, was hurrying to land because of
an ailing engine. He mistakenly thought, without asking
the tower, that the plane authorized to land ahead of him
on the runway he was approaching had already landed
and was out of the way. So he came hurtling downward

pina

49a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

and, without ever seeing the Eastern plane, struck it
from above and behind, cut it in two, and killed the 55
persons who were aboard. Yet the jury said the Bolivian
pilet was not negligent, and that the collision was caused
by negligence on the part of the airliner’s pilot.

There is no basis whatever for exonerating the Bolivian
of negligence, as 1 shall show. The only substanaal basis
for attributing negligence to the stricken airliner is the
charge that it had not been cleared to land and so had
unauthorizedly deviated from the pattern when it swung
into final approach, and had negligently placed itself in
the path of danger. Undoub‘edly the jury decided to con-
clude that the tower had not cleared the Eastern plane
for landing, so the weight of the evidence on that subject
must be examined.

The tower operator unqualifiedly said he had given
clearance to Eastern. He said the liner responded imme-
diately to all his instructions from the time of its first
appearance, including his direction to turn, unfortunately
given too late, when he saw Bridoux was coming on re-
gardless. The dead pilots are presumed to have done
their duty. They were experienced men entrusted with
the lives of a large number of people, and were of course
imbued with the universal instinct of self-preservation.
Moreover, the tower operator was confirmed by Bridoux
himself, perhaps unwittingly, when he said the tower told
him, “You are No. 2 to land on runway 3.” The evidence
shows no plane but Eastern which could have been No. 1
to land on that runway.

There was no affirmative evidence tending to show that
landing clearance had not been given to the airliner.

2 The appellees urge, unconvincingly I think, that the jury may
have thought Eastern was cleared to land and may have found
it negligent for some other reason. The other negligence attrib-
uted to Eastern was too slight, and too much dependent upon
lack of clearance, to give credence to the argument.

. > ner eae

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py SS BOI LOSE Cte ADB EL LD ch aM

TOR RAS An

Benicia wire

50a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

Lt. Shaw, the National pilot flying near Hains Point,
merely said se heard none. His negative testimony is
the on'y basis for the jury’s conclusion. Shaw admitted,
however, that he could not hear tower messages when his
colleague depressed the transmitting key. He was en-
gaged at the controls of a large airplane and did not
remember all the tower communications which he did
hear.

The jury’s finding that Eastern had not been cleared
to land, based on such flimsy evidence, when considered
in connection with its astonishing verdict in favor of Bri-
doux, impresses me as having been the product of emo-
tion rather than of evidence. I think the trial judge
abused his discretion in not setting aside the verdicts as
arbitrarily arrived at, contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.

This brings me to a consideration of the jury’s exon-
eration of Bridoux and the part it probably played in
producing the verdicts against Eastern Air Lines. There
may be some question as to whether the verdict in favor
of the Bolivian pilot, who was of course a defendant in
the jury trial along with Eastern, is before us for review,
since there was no appeal from the judgment thereon.
The propriety of the verdict was before the district
judge, however, on the motion for a new trial; it was
expressly drawn to his attention and he had the power
sua sponte to grant a new trial of the cases against
Bridoux. Sulzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 8 Cir.
1937, 88 F. 2d 122. Regardless of that, the fact that
the jury found for Bridoux is pertinent for consider-
ation; for, if the verdict in his favor was contrary to the
weight of the evidence and was dictated by sympathy, as
I think it clearly was, the jury’s willingness to depart
from the evidence and to be swayed by emotion is
demonstrated.

5la

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

The source of the jury’s sympathy for Bridoux is
easily seen in his testimony. His story was a moving
one, even in cold print. It must have been even more
dramatic and appealing when he told from the witness
stand in faulty English how he had never seen the
Eastern craft, how he plui.ged into the Potomac, and
how he escaped from bis plane as it lay on the bottom
of the river, although he was grievously injured.

But the fact is that, to all intents and purposes, he
admitted guilt of the grossest sort of negligence, except
for which the collision would not have occurred. He was
flying over the busy National Airport a plane which
probably should not have been permitted to ascend into
such crowded air because its structural design limited
visibility and because it had a defective engine which
developed trouble when he had been aloft only a few
minutes. He was in a hurry to land.

In this situation, when the tower said in response to
his request for landing instructions, “You are No. 2 to
land on runway 3,” Bridoux said he regarded the state-
ment as actual and absolute landing clearance as soon
as he should decide for himself, without further commu-
nication from or with the tower, that the No. 1 plane to
land on runway 3 was out of the way. Not only did he
testify that he so regarded the tower statement when it
was made to him, but he also argumentatively insisted
from the witness stand that he had correctly interpreted
the tower message.

This misinterpretation, due either to stupidity or un-
familiarity with the English language, was the primary
cause of the collision, for Bridoux acted in accordance
with his misunderstanding. He said he saw a plane on
the ground ahead of him which he concluded was the
No. 1 plane already landed, and so he thought it unneces-
sary to check with the tower to learn whether the plane

- ve areing

52a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

cleared to land before him had actually landed. Instead
he proceeded to descend blindly at the rate of 500 feet
per minute and at a forward speed of 150 miles per hour.
As a consequence he struck the Eastern plane, which he
never saw and which was vainly trying to escape from
him in response to frantic warning given by the tower
operator when he saw Bridoux was not turning to the
left as he had been told to do. Bridoux said he heard
this instruction but thought it was directed to a plane on
the ground. The fact that the Bolivian pilot’s mistaken
idea that he had been authorized to land without further
clearance was the primary cause of the collision is also
reflected in these questions to Bridoux and his answers
to them:

“Q. It would have prevented this accident, wouldn't
it, if you had called the tower and inquired as to the
identity of the plane abhead of you? A. Except that
I happened to observe this plane on final approach,
not any other plane. Therefore I assumed this was |
the No. 1. This was the only one on final approach.

“Q@. And that is where the trouble came in, be-
cause you assumed that was the plane that was ahead
of you, isn’t it, Captain’ A. Probably, sir.”

In view of the foregoing, it is unthinkable that the jury
had any reason except sympathy for finding that the
probably judgment-proof Bridoux was not negligent. It
was an easy step for such an impressionable jury, through
sympathy for the more than 50 dead and their bereaved
dependents, to find against the luckless appellant, whose
witnesses were killed in the crash.

Other factors, insufficient sta’. ng alone to require re-
versal, may have contributed to the totality of unfairness.
For example, the appellees’ attempt to show “that the
tower statements and testimony did in fact result from |

53a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

mutual consultations between the tower men and their
superiors”? may have been regarded by the jury as a
charge of fabrication and concoction and therefore as an
attack on the veracity and integrity of the tower oper-
ators. To be sure, the appellees disclaimed any intention
of charging them with corruption, and the court conse-
quently admonished the jury to put out of their minds
the idea there was any charge of concocted or fabricated
testimony by the tower witnesses. But a jury willing to
depart from the evidence so far as to find a verdict for
the Bolivian pilot might well have been willing to ignore
the court’s admonition, and to seize upon the idea of
fabrication as a reason for rejecting the tower testimony.

We have seen that it is the duty of a trial judge to
grant a new trial when it is clearly necessary to do so
in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. He ought
to perform the duty by exercising the power “unflinch-
ingly,” as the Pennsylvania court said. It is equally our
duty to see that a miscarriage of justice does not result
from a jury’s verdict. From the same evidence which
the jury heard, the trial judge found the tower operators
had negligently cleared both Eastern and Bolivian to land
on the same runway at approximately the same time, and
awarded judgment against the Government principally
because of that negligence. Thus he did not agree with
the jury on the fundamental issue as to whether Eastern
was negligent, but found that its plane had been cleared
to land. His finding has in effect been affirmed by the
Supreme Court, and I think is conclusively correct. Cer-
tainly it was amply justified by the evidence. Had the
jury reached the same sound conclusion, it would have
been bound to absolve Eastern.

3 Appellee’s brief on remand, p. 3.

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Beecarniscsaniaxc:

54a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

This court’s affirmance of the judgments against the
appellant produces this anomalous situation: Eastern
Air Lines and the United States have both been mulcted
in damages because of contrary findings on a single fun-
damental factual issue. The judgments against both de-
fendants cannot possibly be correct; justice has miscar-
ried either as to Eastern or as to the Government.
Since the Supreme Court has affirmed the judgments
against the latter, and so has stamped approval on the
finding that the Eastern plane was cleared to land, I see
no escape from the conclusion that Eastern Air Lines is
the victim of injustice.

I would resolve the anomaly by reversing the judg-
ments and remanding the cases for a new trial with direc-
tions that, if the evidence on the subject is substantially
the same as before, the landing clearance question should
not be submitted to the jury, since the question has now,
as it had not when the first jury was instructed, been
authoritatively answered; other acts of negligence alleged
against Eastern, if supported sufficiently by evidence,
should be submitted for the jury’s consideration. I am
unwilling to believe the court is powerless to right the
wrong which has been done in these cases.

Affirmed.

4United States v. Union Trust Co., 1955, 350 U. S. 907, 76
S. Ct. 192.

J Sohal eons
55a

Opinion of United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For tHe District or CoLUMBIA

>
>

Civ. Nos. 4691-50, 4692-50

Union Trust Co. or District or CoLtumsia et al.,
Plaintiffs,

V.

Unitep Srates,
Defendants.
(Two cases)

>
—

Galiher & Stewart, Washington, D. C., and Bigham,
Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for defendant
Eastern Air Lines, Ine.

David G. Bress and Sheldon Bernstein, Washington,
D. C., for Union Trust Co.

Ross O’Donoghue and Vincent Burke, Jr., Asst. U S.
Attys., Washington, D. C., for U. S.

McGume, District Judge.

These are wrongful death actions by the executor of
the estates of Ralph E. Miller and Mildred Miller, hus-
band and wife, who died in an air collision of November 1,
1949, in the vicinity of Washington National Airport while
they were passengers in an Eastern Airlines plane.

Before trial the parties had stipulated and agreed on
the following facts:

At approximately 11:46-11:47 A. M., E. S. T. on Novem-
ber 1, 1949, an Eastern Airlines DC-4 No. N88727, de-

| | Pee ged ae

56a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

nominated as Eastern flight 537, and a P-38 military type
aircraft No. NX-26927 collided in mid-air while the East-
ern DC-4 plane was approximately 300 feet in the air on
final approach for landing on runway number 3 at the
Washington National Airport, Washington, D. C. Eastern
flight 537 was carrying a crew of 4 persons (pilot, copilot,
steward and stewardess) and 51 passengers, all of whom,
including plaintiffs’ decedents, were killed in and as a
direct and proximate result of said accident. The P-38
was carrying only the pilot, Eric Rios Bridoux, a citizen
of Bolivia and an officer in the Bolivan Air Force who was
then operating the P-38. Bridoux was seriously injured
in said collision but survived. Both aircraft were com-
pletely wrecked and such debris or components of the
planes as were thereafter found in or near the scene of
the collision are indicated on a stipulated chart.

Kastern’s flight 537 was enroute from Boston, Massa-
chusetts, via intermediate points to Washington, D. C.
Over Beltsville, Maryland, 15 miles northeast of the
Washington National Airport, flight 537 contacted the
Washington control tower on 119.1 megacycles voice radio
communications and the flight was cleared by the tower
to enter a left traffic pattern for landing on runway num-
ber 3. One minute before that clearance, that is, at 11:37
A. M., E. S. T., the P-38 had taken off from runway num-
ber 3 at Washington National Airport on a test flight.
From the time the P-38 departed until after the accident,
visibility in the vicinity of the airport remained at 15
miles, ceiling was 6,500 feet with scattered clouds at 3,500
and surface wind was from the northeast 20-25 miles
per hour.

As to the defendant Eastern Airlines, there was a jury
verdict against it, while the defendant Bridoux was
exonerated.

The case of the defendant United States was tried to

———— tae

57a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

the Court at the same time, the plaintiff alleging negli-
gence of a concurring character specifically set forth in a
pretrial stipulation:

a. The failure of the control tower personnel to issue
a timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38 being
on final approach;

b. The failure of the tower personnel to take appro-
priate steps to warn the P-38 that the Eastern plane was
on final approach and to deter him from flight actions in-
consistent with or dangerous thereto;

ce. The failure of the tower personnel to take appro-
priate action to separate the two planes involved so as to
avoid collision;

d. The failure of the tower personnel to employ simul-
taneous radio transmissions to both planes to assure each
being advised as to the actions of and the directions to
the other;

e. The failure of the tower personnel to require the
Eastern plane to follow the prescribed landing pattern
and toleration of a shortcut thereof;

f. The failure of the tower to warn the P-38 that the
Eastern plane was not following the prescribed landing
pattern but was shortcutting same;

g. Violation of air regulations then and there in full
force and effect, as follows: Civil Air Regulations, Part
26, § 26.26, Aeronautical Rules for the Washington Na-
tional Airport, § 571.3.

I conclude under the statute, the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq., so-called relied
upon by the plaintiff in its suit against the Government,
that the United States has waived immunity, and the
Court has jurisdiction.

Ae ee Fe EN

58a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953 |

The case of Feres, Exrecutrix v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152, relied on heavily by the
Government in support of its motion for a directed judg-
ment in its favor, can be distinguished.

True, Mr. Justice Jackson, who spoke for the Court and
interpreting the statute said: “* * * It will be seen that
this is not the creation of new causes of action but accep-
tance of liability under circumstances that would bring
private [emphasis supplied] liability into existence.” 340
U. S. at page 141, 71 S. Ct. at page 157.

And it is on this language that the Government seizes
with avidity. It contends that since the United States,
through the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administra-
tor of Civil Aeronautics, in discharge of a congressional
mandate, has promulgated exhaustive and complete air
traffic rules governing all phases of air traffic operation
and control, which have nationwide force and application
—that this is a function sovereign in character and con-
stitutional in genesis:

“Congress has recognized the natural responsibility
for regulating air commerce. Federal control is inten-
sive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in
the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by
federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in
the hands of federally certified personnel and under
an intricate system of federal commands. The moment
a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an
elaborate and detailed system of controls. Jt takes off
only by instruction from the control tower, té travels
on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its in-
tended landing, and it obeys signals and orders.
{Emphasis supplied] Its privileges, rights, and pro-
tection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the
Federal Government alone and not to any state gov-

—— “ ~e wu tate cure — OSE AEE RL AR SS

59a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

ernment.” Northwest Air Lines v. State of Minnesota,
1944, 322 U. S. 292, 303, 64 S. Ct. 990, 956, 88 L. Ed.
1283.

With the duty thus imposed of the “regulation of air
commerce in such manner as to best promote its develop-
ment and safety * * *”, Title 49 U. S. C. A. § 402(e),
there follows as a matter of course the corollary re-
sponsibility to promote safety of flight, by the prescrip-
tion of air traffic rules, and their revision from time to
time as circumstances and conditions warrant and dictate,
«* * * for the prevention of collisions between aircraft,
and between aircraft and land or water vehicles.” 49
U.S. C. A. § 551(a) (7).

Thus the Government concludes since this function is
purely governmental—that is, sovereign—there is no lia-
bility since the only allowable claims are those which “* * °
in the same manner and to the same extent a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances * * *” would be liable
for, with certain exceptions not material here, and since
there is no liability of a private individual “even re-
motely analogous to that * * *” now asserted against the
Unted States, the claim falls.

For it is argued no private individual has power to
assume the prerogatives of sovereignty, for no private
person, individual or corporate could possibly act in the
capacity in which the United States acts in its regulation
of air commerce, citing Feres, supra.

But the Feres case as has been said can be distinguished
for it went off on the matter of status. And the distine-
tion is one of substance. Feres was a soldier who per-
ished in a barracks fire while on active duty; the negli-
gence alleged being the quartering him in barracks which
were known or should have been known to have been un-

60a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

safe because of a defective heating plant—the Court con-
cluding : .

“We know of no American law which ever has per-
mitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against
either his superior officers or the Government he is
serving. [Italics supplied.] Nor is there any liability
‘under like circumstances,’ for no private individual
has power to conscript or mobilize a private army
with such authorities over persons as the Govern.
ment vests in echelons of command.” 340 U. S. supra,
at page 141, 71 S. Ct. at page 157.

It is upon this language which the Government strongly
relies, but in support of the distinction made, it is sug-
gested that the concluding paragraph of the upinion, 340
U. S. supra, at page 146, 71 S. Ct. 153, clearly and con-
clusively shows that the Government’s argument is actu-
ally what it purports to be—analogous only, and remotely
so. That paragraph as is germane reads as follows:

“We conclude that the Government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service. * * * We do
not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created
a new cause of action dependent on local law for
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.”
(Emphasis supplied.) 340 U. S. supra, at page 146,
71S. Ct. at page 159.

Thus it appears emphasizing the distinction made.

In this connection it is interesting to note the case of
United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 70 S. Ct. 10, 94
L. Ed. 3, decided in October Term 1949 and just about
eleven months before the decision in Feres. There, the

= PRE ERNE ARE OE RN A CAE, CMR Oy ee MR ESSER PR

6la

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of New York dismissed an action brought against
the United States under the Act to recover for the wrong-
ful death of a flight engineer at an airfield in Newfound-
land leased by the United States from Great Britain,
alleging, it appears, negligence upon the part of the
United States in the operation of the field. Spelar v. U.S.,
D. C., 75 F. Supp. 967. The Court of Appeals, 2 Cir.,
reversed, 171 F. 2d 208.

The decedent Spelar was an employee of American
Overseas Airlines and was killed in a take-off crash. The
plane involved was that of the decedent. The District
Court as has been said dismissed the action,—not, how-
ever, on the ground of governmental immunity but pre-
dicated its action on the fact of the incident occurring in
a “foreign country” and thus within a specific exception
set forth in the statute! The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals, holding with the Court of first
instance.

Now this is of interest solely as an indication that
apparently the government in the Spelar case was not
quite so certain of the point it argues here with such
urgency, and it must have had some doubt about it, be-
cause it preferred to take its position on the more certain
ground of a statutory exception. Nor was an appeal taken
in Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 at page 833,
in which Judge Roche met the issue head on and decided
it adversely to the government, and in an opinion that
has since been liberally quoted and relied on.

Certainly if the regulation of air commerce is a sov-
ereign function that of the Coast Guard is sovereign also,
being as it is “a military service and a branch of the
armed forces of the United States at all times * * *”,

128 U.S. C. § 2680(k).

62a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

Title 14, U. S. C. A. ¢1, and an essential part of its
function is aids to navigation. 14 U. S. C. A. § 81.

And further, part of its function in this respect is to
maintain Loran stations “(b) required to serve the needs
of the maritime commerce of the United States; or (ce)
required to serve the needs of the air commerce of the
United States as determined by the Administrator of
Civil Aeronautics.” (Italies supplied.) Id.; ef. also 14
U.S. C. A. § 82. |

Yet it has been held that a case was stated against the |
United States under the Federal Tort Claims
—>

EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,
v.

UNION TRUST COMPANY, e? al.,
Respondents.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

——— — — ——

JosepH W. Henperson
1910 Packard Building
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

Ricwarp W. Gainer
820 Woodward Building
Washington, D. C.
Jonun M. AHERNE

99 John Street
New York 38, N. Y.

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1956
No. 841

’™
—-

Eastern Arr Lines, Inc.,
Petitioner,
We

Union Trust Company, et al.,
Respondents.

>
>

To the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice, and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States:

Your petitioner, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. begs leave to
make the following reply to respondents’ brief in opposi-
tion,

The statement in the two introductory paragraphs of
the opposition brief that fifty-five bereaved families “are
still awaiting relief” must be the result of oversight. The
two respondents, parties to this record, now have final
judgments, each for $15,000, in their separate suits against
the United States. Although more than a year has passed
no attempt has ever been made to enforce those judgments.
By stipulation those final judgments are controlling upon
the United States in the some fifty other suits arising out
of this disaster. So far as petitioner has been able to
learn no steps have ever been taken to liquidate or enforce
this adjudicated liability of the United States in any case.
If the bereaved families “are still awaiting relief” it must
be because someone has failed to make available to them
relief which they already are entitled to.

2

Counsel for petitioner feel it unnecessary to do more
than deny the baseless charges of “sophistry” “legerde-
main” “distortion” and “concoction” which the opposition
brief repeatedly makes. The record will speak for itself;
and when the record is read, we rather believe it will show
that the shoe is on the other foot.

It is, indeed, strange the respondent should now assert
(Brief pp. 2-6) that the admissibility of Exhibit “7” is
academic. A position so transparently untenable is tanta-
mount to a confession of error on the point it seeks to
by-pass.

It was respondent’s contention from the beginning, and
this jury was charged, not that an unauthorized departure
from the traffic pattern could be some evidence of negli-
gence, but that, in and of itself, such departure was
negligence per se—negligence as a matter of law. The
charge was:

«“* * * the unauthorized stepping out of the pat-
tern, * * * would be a violation of law, because the
pattern is prescribed by rule which has the force and
effect of law. And so, therefore, unauthorized action
of the character I have just referred to would be
negligence, * * * negligence per se, in other words,
would be negligence as a result of the very act itself
and no further proof would be necessary.” (X JA
2109; opposition appendix p. 2a; our italics).

That, precisely, was respondents’ contention! and the Dis-

1 See the pre-trial order which charged Eastern with ‘‘ deviating
from the prescribed landing pattern and procedures’’ (I JA 21-
22). See counsel’s opening to the jury ‘‘First they (Eastern)
have violated the law with respect to the prescribed landing pat-
tern’’ (I JA 63). Respondents’ closing summation to the jury
is not in the record, but it is fair to infer that it fully exploited
the pre-trial order, the opening statement, and Exhibit 7.

_—

3

trict Judge informed the jury that it was. He told them
immediately following the above instruction:

“This is the negligence, in this aspect of the case
which plaintiff alleges against Eastern”. (X JA 2109).

In the face of this record the brief in opposition asserts
(P. 6) that the admissibility of the traffic pattern, and
its character as a federal regulation was “academic” and
“played no part” in the verdict. If there be “distortion”
“legerdemain” or “concoction”, we submit this as a sample.
It will be remembered that the Court of Appeals twice
considered and passed upon the admissibility of Ex. 7.
221 F. 2d 62; 239 F. 2d 25; App. pp. 10a-13a, 42a-43a.
It was the very essence of respondents’ case against East-
ern. They cannot now disclaim it.

Respondents’ next contention is also a prayer to
by-pass the traffic pattern point. The argument, indeed,
is one of desperation. At no time, either intention-
ally or accidentally, did Eastern waive the point. None
of the cases cited is authority for the proposition that
it did.

When this case first came to this Court in No. 298 at
the October Term 1955, a district court judgment in favor
of respondents had been reversed by the Court of Appeals
with direction for a new trial. That judgment of the
Court of Appeals was interlocutory. The admissibility
of Exhibit “7” had been decided adversely to Eastern in
a judgment of the Court of Appeals which also directed
a new trial. Eastern’s right to raise the point existed
only in respect of a final judgment terminating the litiga-
tion, not in respect of a judgment which remanded the
case for a new trial, (Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163,
171-173) and opened the record for such new and different
evidence as the parties might see fit to adduce—all of
which could again come before the Court of Appeals on

+

a new record; and possibly also before this Court. East-
ern was not an aggrieved party. The judgment against it
had been reversed and the correctness of the traffic pattern
ruling in that posture of the case was “not appropriate
for adjudication” at the instance of the then respondent.
Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70; Layne & Bowler
Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U. S. 387, 393.

All this was pointed out in Eastern’s petition for a
rehearing of the per curiam decision of December 5, 1955
in No. 298 October Term 1955 (350 U. S. 907). That peti-
tion urged as a “further” reason for a rehearing and
remand to the Court of Appeals that “the Court of Appeals
erroneously decided and this Court did not review a major
issue of law under the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act” (p. 48). The flat reversal of the Court of Appeals
judgment effected by the per curiam of Dee. 5, 1955 (350
U. S. 907), it was pointed out, would have the effect of
depriving the “then respondent (petitioner) of opportunity
to seek review in this court of a major federal question,
of universal importance under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, * * *”. The remand to the Court of Ap-
peals prayed for would undo that situation and afford
such an opportunity. The per curiam order of February
27, 1956 (350 U. S. 962), responsive in part to that prayer,
granted the remand prayed for. The case has now ripened
into a final judgment terminating the entire litigation;
and it is before this Court on a petition for certiorari. A
federal question of transcendent importance is squarely
and timely presented,

Replying briefly to respondents’ argument on the merits
as to the admissibility of Exhibit “7”: First, respondent
scrambles together the separate function of “Public In-
formation” and “Rule Making”, as though they were indis-
tinguishable. Both are integral parts of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (Senate Document No. 248, 79th Con-

5

gress, pp. 193-195). Publication in Federal Register of a
substantive rule 30 days before its effective date is not
merely a public information requirement. It is a sine qua
non to the existence of valid federal regulation (5 U.S. C.
1003(c). The footnote on page 13 of respondents’ brief,
quoting from page 415 of Senate Document No. 248 is a
sample of respondents’ confusion. That quotation refers
solely to “organization” of agencies and “procedure”
before agencies—not to the rule making process. It deals
with the adjectival aspects—with practice before agencies.
Constructive notice can have nothing to do with the ques-
tion whether an administrative regulation (purporting to
have the force and effect of law) ever came into existence
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The relation
of constructive notice to the rule making process erected
by the Act is soundly stated in Hotch vy. U. S., 212 F.
2d 280.

But respondents’ main reliance seems to be upon the
doctrine of incorporation by reference (Brief pp. 9-12),
viz., that the Federal Register incorporated by reference
the Airmans Guide and thus complied with the notice of
intention to adopt a regulation (plus opportunity to be
heard) as well as with the enactment of the definitive
rule. The application of the doctrine of incorporation by
reference to the rule making process, with all its safe-
guards so carefully constructed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, would not only be contrary to its plain
words; it would, indeed, emasculate the most important
piece of procedural legislation enacted within our mem-
ory; legislation which the late Mr. Justice Jackson, writ-
ing for a unanimous court, said “created safeguards even
narrower than the constitutional ones against arbitrary
official encroachment upon private rights” U. S. v. Morton
Salt, 338 U. S. 632, 644 (1950).

—_—_—_—_-_a7=o~~-_™

6

In reply to pages 14-20 of the brief in opposition, peti-
tioner’s position in its second reason for granting the writ
(Pet. pp. 29-36) does not involve a review of questions of
fact, nor a reappraisal of the evidence, as respondent
would have the Court believe. It presents the simple
question of law whether on this record the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the verdict.
None of the facts upon which it rests is in dispute. It
may be a convenience to recall that the more outstanding
features of the record, viz., (1) the District Judge and
the jury made exactly contradictory findings on the same
evidence, from the same witnesses, on the same record;
(2) accepting the testimony of Bridoux (the Bolivian
pilot) as it was given no rational human being could say
(as the jury said) that he was innocent of fault; (3) the
jury exonerated Bridoux, and held Kastern.

These features alone demonstrate an abuse of judicial
discretion in the court’s refusal to use the corrective
power inherent in the grant of a new trial. This Court
cannot be as powerless as respondents say it is.

* * * *

One further point will bear brief comment. Respondent
complains, harshly, (Brief footnote 1, pp. 4-5; p. 16) of
petitioner’s statement that if the jury had found the Kast-
ern plane clear to land the other allegations of fault be-
came minor, trifling and nugatory, under the law as
charged by the trial court. That statement is squarely
and solidly grounded upon the undisputable language of
the printed record. It will be remembered that respond-
ents stipulated in the pre-trial order that the DC-4 was on
final approach, at an altitude of 300 feet, when it was
struck (I JA 22). An airplane on final approach has the
right of way, and is required to maintain its course and

7

speed? (Id.). Grounded on this clear rule of air traffic,
and upon the conceded duties of the control tower, the
trial court charged that if the DC-4 was clear to land it
was “entitled to assume that no other plane has been
cleared to land on the same runway at the same time,
and that all other craft in the control zone have
been properly separated by the tower and do not con-
stitute a collision hazard to it” (X JA 2111). And
furthermore that if the DC-4, once cleared to land,
“saw or should have seen the P-38” on its downwind or
base leg was not required “to change its course,” unless it
actually knew or should have actually known that the
P-38 constituted a collision hazard (X JA 2110-2111). It
was entitled to rely upon the clearance which it had
received from the tower, and was entitled to expect that
the tower would do its duty and separate the planes. And
especially is the court’s attention directed to that part of
the trial judge’s charge in which he said “* * * and if you
find that to be a fact (viz. that the DC-4 was clear to
land) * * * then the plaintiff’s allegation of negligence in
this respect falls, because * * * the Eastern airliner would
be in the place where it was permitted to be at the
time in question.” (X JA 2111-2112, our italics).

Thus it is an uncontrovertible record fact, based upon
the stipulation that the DC-4 was on final approach when
she was struck, and under the law is charged if the jury

2The Air Traffic Rules then in effect were published in the
1949 Edition of the Code of Federal Regulations, 14 C. F. R.
Part 60. 14 C. F. R. 60.14(e) provided ‘‘ Aircraft while on final
approach to land, or while landing, have the right of way over
other aircraft * * *.’’; and the ‘‘Right-of-Way”’ rule (14 C. F. R.
60.14) provided that all other aircraft shall ‘‘keep out of the
way’’ of the craft having the right of way; and that an aircraft
having the right of way ‘‘will normally maintain its course and
speed, * * *’.. The Air Traffic Rules presently in effect are
found in 14 C. F. R. Part 60, 1953 Edition, as supplemented.

NS OE TR CORT ce Oe oe

rae»

8

found the DC-4 had been cleared to land, all other allega-
tions of fault went by the board in the posture in which
the case was submitted to the jury.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should
be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JosEPpH W. HEeNpDERSON
1910 Packard Building
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

Ricuarp W. Gainer
820 Woodward Building
Washington, D. C.

Joun M. AHERNE
99 John Street
New York 38, N. Y.

Attorneys for Petitioner

iy

eo

- hiten viahemie Td
ame Uy

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_1148%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
