# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Nachtman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1957
- **Citation:** 352 U.S. 971

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser TERM, 1956
No. 5 9 8

Joun S. Nacutman, Petitioner

V.

Jones & LAvuGHLIN STEEL CorPoRATION

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

—_——

Davin G. Bress
Suetpon EF, Bernstein
Attorneys for Petitioner
Rust Bldg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.
Of Counsel:

Newmyer & Bress
Rust Bldg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.

Patterson, CrawFrorp, ARENSBERG & DuNN
First National Bank Building
Pittsburgh 22, Pa.

Sot SHApPPIRIO
Washington Loan & Trust Bldg.
Washington, D. C.

Press or Byron S. ApaMs, WasnrIncton, D.C.

EE
NOV 27 956
JOHN T. FEY, Clerk

ee

—)

P. one . SADA le ERAS ene RR LO GE Oh ETT Sk eee een ee Se ee eT ee ee eT)

INDEX
Page
SOE: TY no a tied ecennsdcekdekesnckistinan 2
PIII on. hc cic ccaasundetsandevacakeatktswees 2
COUN TID ia occ scecsccisescccsdnnasce 2
ORR i SS GI ok 0 0.6 6665068 ce cneeeckenrnd 3
i: FO THE hci c a nnincdecanctnaeceanss 3
PA Se ME: Kkin whehcbcadcdckachétiesvonuass 4
5, Fe Oe IONS inks ckcéwancctcnincacs 4
URE TE, TE nn 0 kas a Scwdceedeasdands 4
Bom, TRUUAR GE. DIMA acdc cccnccscnnccscas 6
te ES vnc d nec cacicbanenensaavea 7
Marion T. ARGANBRIGHT—ALBERT BRoWN..... 7
I TD oi. in ca chkd tan weesnses 8
Frank Bursa, AnTHUR W. Kizroy anp ARTHUR
Se: MN. wacacdcdéaacccncsaceustansens 8
SE A FE Gh a nN kdeckécdeseckencekbsscann 10
Bee BD ooo. ka cdncecicccddncesnene 13
BNE WOOD: ccd dnienwcnsnetcctecetensataceces 13
REASONS FoR GRANTING THE WRIT ................05- 14
I. The Trial Judge, With the Court Below’s Later
Approval, Usurped the Jury’s Exclusive Function
By Granting Judgment N.O.V. on Conflicting Evi-
dence as to Validity of the Patents; That Action
is a Shocking Invasion of the Jury’s Authority
and a Gross Impairment of the Constitutional
Right to Trial by Jury in Patent Cases as in Other
SN BORD os navncensecccicasevknctacuccene 14

2 See ete ee

5

4

pw rry.

1 Ne eal Ret atl ROUT SEK rete

yak they

ee Cs oe

eee Petty i ge FEMA RII Si Rane IMTS 8 eR AS le Se -* anew ay + — oe ti ~ ey

il Index Continued.

Page

A. Resolution of the Validity Issues Necessarily
Turned on Numerous Open Factual Questions,
Which the Trial Court Improperly Resolved
Contrary to the Verdict ......ccscccccccsess 14

B. No Question Has Been Raised That the Jury
Acted Other than Under Proper Instructions
of Law; The Question is Whether Judge or
Jury are to Resolve Evidentiary Disputes
Within the Framework of the Legal Principles
Underlying the Concept of Invention ........ 19

C. This Court Has Had No Oceasion in This
Century to Define the Limits of Judicial Re-
view of Jury Verdicts in Patent Cases; A Re-
statement of the Constitutional Limits of Re-
view Would be Timely Because of the Current
Trend to Substitute Judicial Views of the Facts
POE GEE FUE coon cvsaccccsccnsccsees 32

II. The Evidence of Patentability Was not More Sub-
stantial Because of the Procedural Error of the
Trial Court in Exeluding Rebuttal Proof of Va-
lidity; the Trial Court’s Ruling is Contrary to
the Statutory Presumption of Validity Impos-
ing the Burden of Proof of Invalidity on the De-
SN wa HRSG UKE CRTAE SADR BAGO RNGeE San Genaens 33

III. The Directed Verdict on the Cause of Action for
Wrongful Misappropriation Deprived Plaintiff of
His Right to a Jury Trial on This Claim; The
Rulings Below That a Cause of Action Was Not
Kstablished Conflict With Decisions of Other Cir-
SE cc NAR EN KANG COSEAAVEROSAD SS UDGES RON GSO bh0% 34

EERE ES CONIDIA Se ee OO Ee ee 38

Aprenprix A—Oprtnion or Court oF APPEALS

AppenbIx B—Some or THE Factuat Issues IMPROPERLY
Reso.vepD By TRIAL JUDGE ON DispuTED EVIDENCE

Index Continued. iii
CITATIONS
CasEs: Page
Abott v. Coe, 71 App. D.C. 195, 109 F.2d 449, 451
EA eer erry Tee rr ee eee 19
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moyer, 113 F.2d 974, 980 (C.A.
Re eo er ik eae Tek 17
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88, 35 L.ed.
i Ek eek ov inhds véaakaas Rhu dkehewee as 26
A. & P. v. Super-Market Equip. Co.; 340 U.S. 147, 95
SB gs TSE erry errr eee 30
Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 284, 36 Lied. 154
PE tcc wurst ekse bh RscRcubaend cokwheneneas 18, 22

Battin v. Taggert, 17 Howard 74, 15 L.ed. 37 (1854) . .27, 32
Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812, 19 L.ed. 829 (1869) 28
Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962 (C.A. 7,

SE vane bh aGERADS KA AAD AASS ObENE RAKES RK KODE E NOS 36
Burcham v. J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 209 F.2d 35, 38

SR A Eb kang 54h ohn duke kk chadekd ce awes 26
Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., Fed. Case No. 2,485, 2

Beery GEE (00, Bieat., ORB) oun ncscaccacascces 28
Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 178 F. 2d 794 (C.A.

7, 1949) ; cert. dem. 339 U.S. 915 .............00. 22
Consolidated Contract Co. v. Hassam Paving Co., 227

ee OR Or ED kd a bch ea cunt an ksGaandes 8
Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286, 39

i Sr CE nest be hsbbaheansatveeekhaheah 22
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S.

— ee ee Se ot | errr 20

Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (C.A. 2, 1952) 16
Foote v. Selsby, Fed. Case No. 4,916 (C.C. N.Y., 1849),

a % Roo Saree preererT pe ee 28
Gen’l Talking Pictures Corp. v. Amer. Tri-Ergon

Corp., 96 F.2d 800, 811 (C.A. 3, 1938) ........... 19
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 74 L.ed. 720 (1930).. 26
Heide v. Panoulias, 188 Fed. 914, 916-917 (C.A. 2,

SEE. c<cckcue cds Reb k bus MASnensedechestiinses 28
Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (C.A. 4,

1936), cert. den. 298 U.S. 673 ................05. 36
Hunt Bros. Fruit Packing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 Fed. 257

Deis te SE Shs cudeevchshnnddnkes spa n'eéaksa's 28
James Heddon’s Sons v. South Bend Bait Co., 14 F.2d

805 (C.A. 7, 1926), cert. den. 273 U.S. 137 (1927) 22
Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 36, 30 L.ed. 54, 58 (1886) 27

iv Index Continued.
Page
Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86
PE ELIE, SAT IOS 35
Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., et al. v. Miller Saw
Trimmer Co., 6 F.2d 417, 418 (C.A. 3, 1925)...... 19

Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 38 L.ed. 657 (1894)... 19
Mumm v. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171-2, 81 L.ed.
ARO: ATCO 34
Neff v. Pa. R.R. Co., 173 F.2d 931 (C.A. 3, 1949)...... 17
Neville Coke & Chemical Co. vy. Comm. Internal Rev-
enue, 148 F.2d 599, 603 (C.A. 3, 1945), cert. den.

Pik &, & ye ee err Peer rrr rs 16
N.L.R.B. v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F.2d 79, 86 (C.A.

RD kis setnkacdsndnvadkescscummsencvarvass 16
Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195 F.2d 971

(C.A. 3, 1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 844 ........... 30
Poppenhusen v. Falke, Fed. Case No. 11,279 (C.C.

N.Y, BOGD) oo. cecncsncsncecsesnecsscsesesauces 28
Quock Ting v. U.S., 140 U.S. 417, 35 Led. 501 (1891)... 16
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 190 F.2d 921

OF SE OR RE orn RR ENE 16
Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (C.A.

BORNE conchae winenanvusesnevessvessensavas 36, 37
Schulz v. Pa. R.R. Co., 100 L.ed. 430, 432-433 ........ 29
The S.C.L. No. 9, 114 F.2d 964 (C.A. 3, 1940)......... 16
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (C.A. 7,

et eee eo eee 35, 36, 37
Sonnetheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S.

S00. GOB. 65 Tae, GOO ERGSGE. osc sccccavscevcasen 16
T.H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Casting Co.,

250 U.S. 383, 63 L.ed. 1045 (1919) .............. 8
Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,

ae, GD Ee. GD CMO 5 66 cc ace icsrdccasusaenes 26

The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 131, 41 L.ed. 937 (1897) 16
The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Whet. (U.S.) 283, 5 L.ed.

ee ee oo aA et ee a 16
Thompson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S.

eae. Wk Be WG COO oo cleanin. 28
Turril v. Michigan Southern & N.I.R. Co., 68 U.S. 491,

Oe els. Ge CEE had 6 c04 poo dnb entunsyakebas 28

Washburn v. Gould, Fed. Case No. 17,214, 3 Story 122
CEs Ss MED -Litadancaekeeces Keeeuveeac es 28

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1956

No.

Joun §. Nacutman, Petitioner
Vv.

Jones & LAUGHLIN STEEL CoRPORATION

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Joun S. Nacutman, prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirming a judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, the trial court having directed
a verdict on petitioner’s cause of action for wrongful mis-
appropriation of ideas and plans and having granted
judgment n.o.v. on his cause of action for patent infringe-
ment after a jury verdict finding said patents valid and
awarding petitioner damages for their infringement.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 235
F. 2d 211 (also reprinted as Appendix A hereto). The
opinion of the District Court is reported at 90 F. Supp.
739 (also I 327-358a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered June
27, 1956. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on
August 31, 1956. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In a suit for infringement based on four complex com-
bination patents covering processes and apparatus in the
art of electro-tinning of steel strip and for misappropriation
of know-how and operating information to practice electro-
tinning disclosed in the course of negotiations contemplat-
ing the sale of electro-tinning apparatus, the trial court
directed a verdict on the misappropriation cause of action
and granted judgment n.o.v, after a jury verdict for plain-
tiff-petitioner in the infringement action. The questions
presented are:

1. Whether petitioner was effectively denied his con-
stitutional right of trial by jury when the trial court, by
substituting its own comparison and analysis of structures
and its own selection and views of evidence, held the patents
to be anticipated unpatentable aggregations after the jury
had made special findings of validity on the basis of con-
flicting evidence with respect thereto submitted to the jury
under the very instructions requested by the defendant-
respondent.

2. Whether in view of (a) the statutory presumption of
validity, (b) the wide acceptance and use of petitioner’s
patents under license, (c) the extreme complexity of the
patents, (d) the art’s need for the solution furnished, (e)

3

uncontradicted evidence that petitioner was the first to
install and operate continuous electro-tinning systems and
(f) expert testimony with respect to the interdependence
of the several steps in the combination patents—the trial
court can, by judgment n.o.v., intrude into the jury’s
exclusive fact-finding province and substitute its own views
of novelty, invention, anticipation, patentable combina-
tion, ete.

3. Whether the trial court’s power to review the evidence
on motion for judgment n.o.v. is any greater in patent
litigation than in other jury cases,

4. Whether petitioner was denied a fair trial in view
of the trial court’s refusal to permit him to offer rebuttal
testimony on the validity issues to contravene the defense
of invalidity.

5. Whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict
on the claim for misappropriation, and the Court of Ap-
peals erred in affirming that direction, in the light of
conflicting decisions in other courts of appeal that an
actionable breach of confidential disclosure exists in such
circumstances,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On July 3, 1950, petitioner filed an amended complaint
charging: (1) infringement of certain of his electro-tinning
patents’ and (2) wrongful misappropriation of ideas and

1 Reissue 20,788—PIl. Ex. 1, IT 356*-358a; 2,240,265—PI. Ex. 2,
IT 359-372a ; 2,459,674—PI1. Ex. 3, I] 373-382a. Nachtman 2,341,157
listed in the complaint was voluntarily dropped at the pre-trial,
and Nachtman 2,576,074 (Pl. Ex. 4, I] 383-392a) was brought in
by counterclaim filed January 25, 1952. Claim for damages on
the latter patent was withdrawn before the case was submitted to
the jury (1 321-322a; see also I 312-313a).

[*II 356a refers to Appellant’s Appendix below, Volume II.
Use of the letter ‘‘b’’ after the page number indicates Appellee’s
Appendix. |

Oe Nee

4

plans submitted to respondent via the Blaw-Knox Company
with whom petitioner was associated. Trial by jury ter-
minated by a directed verdict on the latter cause of action
(I 320-321a; see also I 284-285a, I 309-310a, 31la) and by
a plaintiff’s verdict in the sum of $1,474,495.72 for infringe-
ment of the first three patents in issue (I 324, 326a)
after the jury had specially found each of petitioner’s four
patents in issue valid and infringed (I 324-326a). There-
after, in an opinion and order of August 4, 1955 (I 327-
354a), the trial court granted judgment n.o.v. on the
ground petitioner’s patents were invalid, the thrust of
the opinion being that they were anticipated by prior art
and were unpatentable aggregations.” The Court below
affirmed by an opinion which, insofar as the patent issues
were concerned, was in effect merely an adoption by refer-
ence of the trial court’s opinion.

B. THE EVIDENCE?
1. Plaintiff's Witnesses:
Joun S. NacHTMAN

After describing his academic background in metallurgy
and his continuous practical industrial experience from
1922 until shortly before trial when he was supervisor of
materials and research for the Navy (I 11-14a), petitioner

? Simultaneously, the trial court entered an alternative order
granting a motion for new trial on the ground there was no sub-
stantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict on damages and
that the verdict was excessive (I 355a; I 352-353a).

While petitioner is of the view, urged below, that in the eviden-
tiary situation on the damage issue this was an abuse of discretion,
that question is not presented here because it was not passed upon
below.

3 Because the questions here presented involve the sufficiency of
the evidence—most favorably construed for plaintiff—to support
causes of action upon which a jury verdict for petitioner should
have been invulnerable from judicial interference, it will, unfor-
tunately, be necessary to discuss the evidence at some length to
show how petitioner has been denied his constitutional right of
trial by jury.

0

testified that in 1929 he installed at Thomas Steel Company
the first pilot line and in 1931-1932, the first commercial
line for continuous electro-tinplating, that to the best of
his knowledge this was the first such continuous tin line
in this country or Europe and that he alone determined
and was responsible for the components and setup of those
lines (I 16-21a); that until that time tinplate had been
produced by slower and inferior, non-continuous hot-dip
methods (I 21-22a); that the Thomas line, which he laid
out and installed, was essentially that covered by his Re-
issue Patent 20,788 (I 49-53a) and produced the first con-
tinuous electro-tinplate satisfactory for deep drawing,
stamping and forming (I 48a); that in 1936, while at
Crucible Steel Company, he installed another continuous
electro-tinning line, the lay-out and components of which
were his own creation incorporating his inventions (I 45a),
which tin line included novel advances over the Thomas
line (such as higher speed, tension control, wet mechanical
brushing, a brightening unit, ete.) and that, to his knowl-
edge, this Crucible line was the first continuous electro-
tinning installation in the world for production of bright
tinplate (I 22-26a).

Petitioner further testified (I 26-40a) that in the late
30’s he became associated with the Blaw-Knex Company
to head a newly created Electro-Chemical Division set up
to design and manufacture continuous electro-plating
equipment; that he had a contract with Blaw-Knox—the
terms of which the trial court erroneously excluded from
evidence, but which was proffered to show petitioner’s
financial interest in Blaw-Knox activities (see I 155-159a,
I 27-30a) ; that in 1938 and 1939, he and other Blaw-Knox
officials negotiated with Jones & Laughlin officials for the
sale of continuous electro-tinning lines; that under dates
of May 12, 1938 (PI. Ex. 41, I 32-36a) and September 19,
1939 (Pl. Ex. 42, I 37-39a), submitting detailed engineering
drawings and specifications, detailed offers to sell such
equipment were made—the disclosures of which on their

ELE ION, PEPE Se Y

ROR RAP EKG AY LAE

PLIES

—
6

face, show that they were basea on petitioner’s ideas and
inventions, which petitioner corroborated by testifying
that he was the only one at Blaw-Knox with a background
and know-how in electro-tinning and that he furnished the
necessary technical data and information for composing
the tin lines in question (I 39-40a).

Petitioner also testified that subsequent to his associa-
tion with Blaw-Knox he became head of researeh at Sharon
Steel where a pilot (experimental) tin line, the components
of which he determined, was set up under his supervision
and direction and that during this period (1944-1945)
J. & L. officials inspected the Sharon installation and
talked with him because, as they told him, J. & L. was
encountering difficulties in its then new continuous electro-
tinning lines (I 41-43a, I 57-58a). Finally, petitioner
testified he had licensed the majority (eleven) of the steel
companies producing tinplate, to produce under his patents
(I 44-45a).

Dr. Reetnatp 8S. Dean

After stating his extensive experience in metallurgical
engineering (I 72-77a), Dr. Dean made a step by step
comparison of the Blaw-Knox disclosures with respond-
ent’s electro-tinning lines (I 77-97a). He concluded ‘‘that
the succession of steps is identical in the two lines. Every
important step... every significant step in the continuous
plating of tin is found in both of these lines . . . the
sequence is the same ... [and] the function of each piece
of equipment is equivalent, particularly the functioning
of each element in these two lines are equivalent’? (I 97a).
On cross-examination, he further testified that the Blaw-
Knox submission (including the specifications, letters of
transmittal, ete.) ‘*... provided a general engineering basis
to teach one how to carry out the general process .. .’’
(I 134a).

7

Dr. Dean made similar step by step comparisons of
respondent’s infringing structure with the disclosures of
petitioner’s patents and concluded that the elements or
steps of each of petitioner’s patents was duplicated in the
required sequence in respondent’s infringing structure by
identical or equivalent elements or steps. As to Reissue
20,788, see I 98-106a; as to 2,240,265 see I 108-117a; as to
2,459,674 see I 117-121a, and; as to 2,576,074 see I 121-126a.
There was only token opposition to Dr. Dean’s overwhelm-
ing proof of infringement.

Dr. Dean also explained the inter-relationship of the
several Nachtman patents in issue (I 106-107a) and their
relation to the Blaw-Knox submission, the latter occupying
‘‘a somewhat different position than these patents [in
that it] is an attempt on the part of the inventor or his
associates to provide an engineering basis, description,
drawings, to teach the people to whom it was presented
and who were presumably skilled in the general art, how
to carry out the continuous tinning operation’’ (I 107a).

James R. Powe

Powell, a J. & L. official, testified that the installation of
electro-tinning at J. & L. was a ‘‘war baby’’ brought about
by the urgent need for conservation of basic tin (I 152a;
see also I 257a where trial judge inhibited cross-examina-
tion of defense witness Reed on this subject).

Marion T. ARGANBRIGHT—ALBERT Brown

Arganbright, a J. & L. fiscal official, testified to the pro-
duction and sales figures for hot-dip and electro-tin for
the six year infringing period (I 159-166a; see also I 285-
286a) which showed that during the period in question
(1944-1950), the sales of electro-tin sharply increased while
those of hot-dip decreased. Brown, another J. & L. official,
confirmed that electro-tin production increased year by
year while hot-dip decreased (I 161-165a), and further

PO SRO LL LOI GN CS EOIN | PASO INS SS SRLS. TONE OP

PPR

8

that electro-tinning permitted thinner and variable coating
of basic tin not possible under the old hot-dip methods
(I 165-166a ; to same effect see testimony of defense witness
Reed at I 201-202a, I 206-207a).

2. Defense Witnesses:

Frank Bursa, ArtHuR W. Kitroy anp Artuur M. Hatrir:»

These employees (or former employees) of Acme Steel
Company testified, on deposition, in a defense effort to
establish that the Acme electro-galvanizing practice antici-
pated petitioner’s inventions. In so accepting that testi-
mony (I 335a), the trial court’s opinion omits vital
testimony of these witnesses seriously reflecting upon the
probative weight of their effort to establish the Acme prac-
tice as prior use.

Bursa was a mechanic (I 167a, I 172a, I 63b) without
any knowledge of physics or chemistry or of the solutions
used at Aeme (I 168a, 172a), nor did he have any technical
knowledge of the details of the alleged Acme installations
(see, e.g., I 169a, I 171a, I 173-174a). He handled gener-
ators and the cleaning of a zine electro-galvanizing line,
yet he was called upon to testify from memory as to a
chemical zine electro-galvanizing process and apparatus
forty years (Bursa I 64b) after the event! The Acme No.
1 line was admittedly experimental (I 173a, I 57b, I 65b)
and was dismantled when No. 2, which was entirely differ-
ent (I 52b), was built in 1916 (I 178a, I 171a, I 65b).*

Bursa’s testimony as to Acme lines 3 [installed a year
after No. 2 (1 171a)] through 12 is worthless because after
1917 he had nothing to do with this gaivanizing equipment
(I 170a, I 64b). In any event, Bursa’s testimony that

4 Having been an abandoned experiment, the No. 1 line could not,
of course, constitute anticipation. 7. H. Symington Co. v. National
Malleable Casting Co., 250 U.S. 383, 63 L. ed. 1045 (1919) ; Con-
solidated Contract Co. v. Hassam Paving Co., 227 F. 436, 441
(C.A. 9, 1915).

9

Acme’s lines 2-12 all used a lead pan to heat the strip
and not box annealing (I 176a, I 52b), plainly destroyed
that practice as prior public use of petitioner’s Reissue
process because uncontradicted evidence for petitioner
(See Tour infra) established that a lead pan process can-
not be used as suitable preparation for tin electro-plating.

Finally, as to Bursa’s testimony (as well as that of the
other Acme personnel) there were no correlated drawings
or other physical exhibits to corroborate or support his
putative forty-year memory of the actual continuous opera-
tion of an involved electro-chemical process and apparatus
with which he, a mechanic, had nothing to do after
1917, and precious little to do with prior to 1917!
A transparent attempt was made to introduce some
exhibits, but they were directed to isolated elements
in the Aeme line susceptible to any interpretation desired;
some were not clearly identified, some were after Bursa’s
time with these lines and most were old and well known
brackets and tanks commonly used for all kinds of things.
None could possibly corroborate the existence of any spe-
cific continuous or other electro-plating process or appara-
tus; all were nondescript items with no specificity to indi-
eate any process or apparatus predecessor to the patents
in suit.

The other Acme mechanic, Hatfield, is even less accept-
able. Hatfield contradicted Bursa as to who installed No.
2, Bursa saying Meaker (I 168a, I 55b), while Hatfield
claimed he built it (I 182a, I 79b). Hatfield said they
started out with brushes on line No. 7 which gave trouble,
whereas Bursa suggested that the absence of brushing
rolls on No. 7 was because the drawing was merely a
layout (original Trial Transcript pp. 460, 398). Yet Hat-
field insisted there were brushes with wood cores and
said nothing of brushing rolls (original Trial Transcript
p. 461). Hatfield insisted Acme built No. 7 (I 182a) and
he saw nobody from Meaker (I 183a, I 75b).

a ER ie

s PLP GME OAT, LW ED NO I TRO ONES ANE oe iE SY RR
r

10

Kilroy, the other Acme witness, agreed with Bursa
that No. 1 was only experimental (I 178a). He admitted
they used acid with too high a temperature on the steel
strip in operating the No. 2 line (original Trial Transcript
pp. 438-439). He contradicted Bursa by saying No. 2 was
not a Meaker installation (original Trial Transcript p.
439). He did not know the proportions in the zine plating
solution. He testified that there was no electro-galvanizing
of strip at the Riverdale plant of Acme until he came out
in 1928 and installed the No. 7 line (original Trial Tran-
script p. 431). There was no hoist in the No, 2 line as
originally installed (original Trial Transcript p. 440).
He discredited the Meaker installations by testifying they
created brittleness in the strip (I 179a), but he did not
tell how or when he cured that deficiency.

One of the features in Nachtman patent 2,240,265 making
a major contribution to the continuous method of produc-
ing steel strip with bright electro-tinplate, is wet mechani-
eal cleaning. The trial court below said that Hatfield’s
uncontradicted testimony showed the same brushing at
Acme (I 343-344a). But, as shown, Hatfield was a mechanic
testifying from memory to an electro-chemical process
some twenty years after the event, his testimony was in
part inconsistent with other Acme witnesses and there
were no exhibits or other tangible evidence to support his
assertion that Acme used wet mechanical brushing.

Lovts J. Reep

This J. & L. official sought to establish that a series
of prior patents and uses anticipated Nachtman and that,
in several respects, the J. & L. tin lines did not conform
to the Nachtman disclosures. On cross-examination each
of those alleged prior art patents or uses and each of the
alleged distinctions between J. & L. and Nachtman was
inquired into with the result: that Reed admitted to
numerous material differences between the Acme-Meaker
electro-galvanizing practice as compared to Nachtman—

————

pie

11

J. & L. electro-tinning (I 194-199a, I 216-217a); that Reed
admitted to material distinctions between the Kirschner
patent and Nachtman—J. & L. (I 219-226a); that Reed
admitted to material distinctions between Nachtman—J. &
L. and the Aronson patent (I 226-234a), the Aylsworth
patent (1 234-240a),° the King patent (I 240-242a), the
Mascuch patent (I 242-250a, I 273-276a), the Coe patent
(I 250-251a), the Ferm patent (I 252-254a), the Stahl und
Eisen disclosures (I 254-255a) and the Madsenell process
(I 255-256a).

Reed in effect admitted that he could not point to any
alleged prior art which individually or collectively described
a complete continuous electro-tinning line in its indicated
sequence of steps (I 240a, I 218-220a) and he did not know
of any continuous electro-tinning mill before 1929 (when
petitioner instelled the first Thomas line) or of any line
for bright tin plate before 1936 (when petitioner installed
the line with a brightener at Crucible—I 261a).

Finally, Reed attempted to show non-invention by testi-
fying that continuous electro-tinning was not practicable
until development of the so-called 4-high mill for rolling
of thin sheet steel and he identified an obviously inad-
missible article from a technical magazine purporting to
prove the relatively late development of the 4-high mill.®

5 On direct, Reed compared the pickling step in Aylsworth with
that provided in Nachtman and J. & L. On cross, however, he
admitted that Aylsworth called for an alkaline pickle while Nacht-
man and J. & L. used an acid pickle to remove scale and rust before
plating. He could not state whether an alkaline could perform the
same function—which it cannot—because he said, he did not know
enough about chemistry (I 234-238a).

® Petitioner validly objected to introduction of this alleged his-
torical article from the American Iron & Steel Institute Year Book
on the ground its assertions offered to prove the advent of thin-
gauge rolling were hearsay and admission of the article would
defeat cross-examination. The article was erroneously admitted
(I 187-189a) and relied upon by the trial court in its opinion imply-
ing that the Nachtman developments were inevitable after thin-
gauge rolling was developed as indicated in that article (I 338a).

PEP LIE

Beertyco wn sesen: SEIT ANDERE PW TOOT AOA IE RAE LOA PRE TA

? =

12

llowever, cross-examination revealed that thin rolled strip
sveel had long been available and that Reed’s knowledge
of the subject was itself thin (I 208-213a).

Because of its impact from a credibility standpoint
(reflecting on his interpretation of alleged prior art patents
and uses adopted by the trial court on the validity issues),
it is important to briefly refer to Reed’s testimony on the
infringement issue. Reed noted several distinctions be-
tween the J. & L. line and the Nachtman patents, which,
upon cross-examination, were shown to be questionable
and/or falsified. Thus: (1) Reed claimed that when
J. & L. was foreed to put in a continuous electro-tinning
line during the war [to save tin], it eut short its own
investigations and bought the plans of an established
producer, Crown Cork & Seal Company, but he admitted
that examination of the Crown Cork drawings, which were
not produced at the trial, would offer the best means of
determining whether J. & L. had in fact based its line on
Crown Cork (I 258-261a); (2) based on alleged schematic
drawings of its wet brusher, Reed claimed that it did not
brush ‘‘areuate’’ surfaces of the tin strip (as claimed in
Nachtman 2,240,265)—Dr. Dean to the contrary (I 139-
140a)—but on cross-examination Reed conceded that there
were original installation drawings for the brusher not
produced in court which he had not compared with the
schematic—after the fact—reproductions (I 261-263a; see
also I 190-19la where petitioner objected to the admis-
sibility of schematic drawings in lieu of the original
installation drawings) ;’ (3) Reed testified that while
Nachtman’s patent 2,459,674 called for a two-zone fusing
chamber, in the J. & L. brightener there was only one zone
and he demonstrated from a colored schematic drawing
prepared by him to so establish the fact, but on cross-

7 Dr. Dean and petitioner both testified that when they inspected
the J. & L. line [as provided by court order], the brusher had a
cover on it which, they were told, could not be removed while the
line was in operation (I 139a, I 7la, I 68-69a).

13

examination, when faced with a photograph of the J. & L.
brightener, Reed admitted that because the spacing of the
induction coils at the top and bottom of its brightener
and the current applied in each area was substantially
disparate, it was in effect a two-zone fusion chamber (I 264-
266a); (4) Reed, testifying from a large-scale coloramic
rendering of the J. & L. line prepared under his direction
shortly before trial and purporting to be the same as cer-
tain of petitioner’s exhibits which had been prepared under
his (Reed’s) supervision when this case was in its infancy
(and then delivered to petitioner), stated that the J. & L.
line was different than Nachtman patent 2,240,265 in that
Nachtman called for the strip to proceed ‘‘immediately’”’
from the wet brusher to the plating tank whereas at J. & L.
the strip first went through a rinse tank, but on cross-
examination when confronted with the fact that that pur-
ported rinse tank did not appear on petitioner’s exhibits
he could not explain the discrepancy (I 214-216a).

3. Rebuttal Evidence:
Sam Tour

This witness, long experienced, academically and prac-
tically, in the metallurgical field (I 286-289a), was called
principally to rebut the defense evidence of invalidity and
to explain the inter-relationship of the elements in the
Nachtman patents so as to prove invention and that there
was a true combination rather than mere aggregation, but
after an extended colloquy the trial judge inhibited such
rebuttal proof on the erroneous ground that having relief
on the presumption of validity, rebuttal proof could not
extend to the same matter except insofar as such rebuttal
was directed to specific prior art patents testified to by
witnesses for the defense (see Reasons For Granting the
Writ, infra, Point II). To the extent he was permitted
to testify on matters affecting validity, Tour briefly differ-
entiated the Meaker, Acme and Stahl und Eisen practices
and disclosures relating to electro-galvanizing from electro-

vm ere,

14

tinning as disclosed by Nachtman and practiced by J. & L.,
pointing out that the essential difference between the two
arts was in the pre-treatment and that the sequence of
pre-treatment or preparatory steps for electro-tinning
was essentially different and what would work for electro-
galvanizing would not work for electro-tinning (I 296-
301a). The witness further testified that he had examined
the several other prior art references relied upon by the
defense and compared them with the Nachtman patents
and that in his opinion none of them read on the Nachtman
patents and none disclosed a method or apparatus suitable
for continuous electro-tinning (I 301-302a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I

THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE JURY'S EXCLUSIVE FUNC-
TION BY GRANTING JUDGMENT N.O.V. ON CONFLICTING
EVIDENCE AS TO VALIDITY OF THE PATENTS: THAT
ACTION IS A SHOCKING INVASION OF THE JURY’S AU-
THORITY AND A GROSS IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN PATENT CASES AS
IN OTHER JURY ACTIONS.

A. Resolution of the Validity Issues Necessarily Turned on
Numerous Open Factual Questions, Which the Trial Court
Improperly Resolved Contrary to the Verdict

If the ‘‘facts’’ are as marshalled in the trial court’s
opinion, then the conclusions reached below are probably
sound. But, notwithstanding the lip service given by the
trial judge (I 332-333a) to the requirement that ‘‘. . . the
evidence in the case is now to be reviewed on the basis
that plaintiff is entitled to all the inferences and the evi-
dence is to be considered in the light most favorable to
him, because he has the verdict of the jury .. .’’, the
trial judge did not in fact so approach the evidentiary
record. Regardless what the trial judge said about judicial
limits upon review of jury verdicts, he im fact completely
pre-empted the jury’s prerogative and reached the con-
clusion he did only by following his personal conclusions

cali

angie,

15

on the evidence, his personal views as to relative credibility,
his personal views as to relative probative weight of the
evidence and his personal comparison of structures.

Symptomatic and typical of that gross departure from
the constitutional dichotomy of functions between judges
and juries, is the trial court’s extensive quotation from
and reliance upon an article which appeared in a trade
magazine ‘‘Steel’’ on June 19, 1939, under the name of
plaintiff, John S. Nachtman, to indicate as a ‘‘fact’’? what
the state of the art was when petitioner applied for and
obtained his patents (I 330-333a; see also references at
I 338a, I 348a).

Over petitioner’s objection (I 187-189a), on cross-
examination the defense offered this article in evidence and
examined petitioner as to whether he had written it. It
needs no extended argument to demonstrate that the article
was pure hearsay as to the truth of the matter therein
asserted and was admissible, if at all, only to show admis-
sions against interest or to impeach petitioner if he had
written the article. But petitioner denied he had written
the article or had seen or approved it, and he explained
on redirect examination that the article was probably
written by a Vice-President of Blaw. <nox Company (with
which he was then associated) for sales promotional pur-
poses (I 59-61a). There was no other evidence (at trial
or on pre-trial discovery) as to responsibility for the
‘*Steel’’ article.

Thus the jury clearly had the right, if on the state of
the record it was not compelled, to conclude that petitioner
did not write the article and that, therefore, nothing
therein could be taken against him. We have stressed this
point not because the ‘‘Steel’’ article is detrimental to
petitioner’s case (see, e.g., Appendix B, infra, item 10),
but because it is emphatic and positive and obvious proof
that the trial court did not, as it professed to have dore,

Porritt ered oe marien coon es * . ‘ eos és » ‘ é ” Lake

16

approach the question of validity of the patents on the
basis of conclusions or inferences taken most favorably
to the plaintiff. And the same gross invasion of the
jury’s function was continued with respect to almost every
single facet of evidentiary matter bearing on the validity
issue.

Even though there were myriad differences between the
structures and/or disclosures of the alleged prior art pat-
ents and uses and Nachtman’s (see, e.g., portion of
Statement supra, summarizing Reed testimony), the trial
court presumed to make its own comparisons. In so doing
the trial court overlooked the jury’s exclusive right to
have entirely ignored Reed’s ‘‘expert’’ testimony for the
defense purporting to show prior art for which, as the
summary of Reed’s testimony shows, the jury had ample
cause in: (1) Reed’s obvious interest, bias and partiality ;°
(2) his lack of candor; (3) the misleading and/or falsified
exhibits prepared under his direction in an effort to show
differences between Nachtman and J. & L. which did not
exist ;® (4) his admissions of substantial differences between
the Nachtman disclosures and patents he (Reed) had

8 Even if uncontradicted, Reed’s testimony could have been
ignored. Quock Ting v. U.S., 140 U.S. 417, 35 L. ed. 501 (1891) ;
The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 131, 41 L. ed. 937 (1897); Neville
Coke & Chemical Co. v. Comm. Internal Revenue, 148 F. 2d 599,
603, (C.A. 3, 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 726, 90 L. ed. 431; The
S.C.L. No. 9, 114 F. 2d 964 (C.A. 3, 1940), holding that the fact
that expert opinion evidence was not controverted did not make
it binding upon the court, ‘‘being oral, its credibility was for the
court {or jury] at all times, even though unrefuted.’’

Reed’s interest was even more warrant. Sonnetheil v. Christian
Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408, 43 L. ed. 492 (1898);
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 88 L. ed. 967
(1944), no error where jury disbelieved defendant’s employees
who were presented as ‘‘experts’’ as to the value of gas leases;
see also Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) Vol. IIT, § 949, p. 449.

® The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 283, 5 L. ed. 454,
(1822); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F. 2d 265, 269 (C.A. 2, 1952) ;
N.L.R.B. v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F. 2d 79, 86 (C.A. 9, 1953).

cs aaa MD SRE RAK ota ‘ RS RAE ON Ao hal MERE RAL IIUA DAA A CAIN Tel i RL SACP ORE NRRL iit Kes A ARNG

17

cited as prior art and; (5) his admitted lack of expertese
at critical points of inquiry (see, e.g., fn. 5, supra).'°

That the jury may have properly disregarded the en-
tirety of Reed’s testimony—on the validity as well as the
infringement issues—is of prime significance in appreciat-
ing the trial court’s statement of the ‘‘facts’’, because much
of what that statement assumes to have been established
with respect to the disclosures of alleged prior art patents
and uses does not clearly appear on the face of the pub-
lished patents but is actually an adoption of Reed’s in-
terpretation, Reed having been the only ‘‘expert’’ appear-
ing for the defense.’' Thus if, as it had the right and
indeed good reason to do, the jury chose to ignore Reed,
then there was ruled out as a factual basis for judicial
review of the validity questions any interpretations of

1 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moyer, 113 F. 2d 974, 980 (C.A. 3, 1940) ;
Neff v. Pa. R.R. Co., 173 F. 2d 931 (C.A. 3, 1949).

1 For example, the statement by the court (I 345a) that Kirsch-
ner brightens by passing the strip through a hot air furnace and
then cooling was obviously based on acceptance of Reed’s testi-
mony despite the fact that Reed was thoroughly discredited.
Reed testified (I 156b) that ‘‘The apparatus for brightening by
heating the strip . . . is shown in 13 on the Kirschner draw-
ing ...’’ This is a false statement. There is no brightening in
Kirschner furnace 13 nor does Kirschner say so. There can be
no brightening at this point because Kirschner uses an adhesion
flux which produces oxides and there can be no brightening until
the oxides are eliminated. Kirschner gets no bright coating until :
after he washes in bath 14. (II 437a, lines 15-20).

Similarly the trial court (I 348a) relied on Reed’s testimony
as to the Masecuch patent which testimony misled the Court into
the view that Mascuch showed the general arrangement used by
defendant insofar as patent 2,459,674 is concerned. Reed testi-
fied that Maseuch device shows an electrict heater (I 152b) that
could heat the steel high enough to brighten tin coated electro-
coated strip (I 153b, last paragraph). But Reed knew (I 247a)
that Mascuch taught nothing of the kind because Masecuch does

not disclose any temperature for his heating which would give ¥
brightening and actually Mascuch does not use furnace 26 to a
brighten but uses the entirely separate and distinct polishing rollers 4
27 and 27a (II 45la, lines 84-85). The furnace in Mascuch is z
for annealing, not brightening (I 244a). é

18

alleged prior art offered by Reed in an effort to show
anticipation.

Similarly, in construing the terminology of Reissue
20,788 as against the original patent to determine whether
it was for the same invention, the trial judge took it upon
himself to make this comparison (or to adopt Reed’s
comparison based on Reed’s interpretation) again pre-
empting the jury’s exclusive prerogative to make the
comparison as a question of fact based on the jury’s
evaluation of what evidence to accept or reject. In deter-
mining whether the testimony as to the Aeme practice was
sufficiently credible’ the judge again pre-empted the jury’s
exclusive function of resolving this comparison of struc-
tures and its credibility as a matter of fact. And in
resolving whether what Nachtman developed went beyond
prior art in the field and whether it was mere mechanical
improvement or invention, the trial judge again encroached
upon the jury’s exclus.ve province.

Finally, having given the jury the very instruction re-
quested by defendant as to the applicable law under which
it should determine whether plaintiff’s patents involved
mere aggregation or patentable combination—the hind-
sight conclusion which, apart from constitutional principle,
the jury was equally capable of making as the judge—the
trial judge again encroached upon the jury’s exclusive
prerogative of making that determination as a matter
of fact.

Obviously the jury rightfully may have disbelieved the al-
leged Acme practice because: (1) The Acme witnesses were not
qualified; (2) The Acme people were largely testifying to events
many years past; (3) The Acme witnesses contradicted each other;
(4) The Acme witnesses were hazy or uninformed on details;
(5) No connected and informative plans, specifications or other
records were offered to corroborate the alleged Acme practice, and;
(6) Petitioner was denied an opportunity to inspect and compare
the Acme line (I 183-184a). See Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S
275, 36 L. ed. 154 (1891) diseussed infra IT.

19

To avoid any contention that the foregoing assertions
are overstatements to create an issue on petition for a
writ of certiorari, counsel have prepared and attach hereto
as Appendix B an analysis of some of the factual issues
showing with respect to each such issue what was said by
the trial judge in his opinion as contrasted with what the
evidentiary record shows. That analysis unquestionably
reflects that upon factual issue after factual issue, where
the evidence or the inferences therefrom were in dispute
or open to question, the trial court, although purporting
to resolve the factual issue most favorably to petitioner
actually resolved the issue most favorably to the defense
by ignoring evidence or inferences favorable to petitioner
and by adopting as fact certain evidence the probative
weight of which was seriousiy in doubt.

B. No Question Has Been Raised That the Jury Acted Other
Than Under Proper Instructions of Law: the Question Is
Whether Judge or Jury Are to Resolve Evidentiary Dis-
putes Within the Framework of the Legal Principles Un-
derlying the Concept of Invention.

In summary the evidence showed:

1. That petitioner’s patents were issued as combination
patents and that, therefore, the Patent Office, after con-
sideration of the same issues raised by the defense, had
given its expert view that they were valid combinations.
Since by definition a combination does not depend for its
validity upon the novelty (or non-anticipation) of any
of its constituent elements, that expert appraisal is obvi-
ously entitled to far greater weight than the normal pre-
sumption of validity flowing from issuance and must be
accepted in the absence of evidence in character and
amount to carry thorough conviction. Morgan v. Daniels,
153 U.S. 120, 38 L. ed. 657 (1894); Miehle Printing Press
€ Manufacturing Co., et al vy. Miller Saw Trimmer Co.,
6 F. 2d 417, 418 (C. A. 3, 1925); Abbott v. Coe, 71 App.
D.C. 195, 109 F. 2d 449, 451 (1940); General Talking

20

Pictures Corp. v. Amer. Tri-Ergon Corp., 96 F. 2d 800,
811 (C.A. 3, 1938).

2. One of petitioner’s experts (Mr. Tour) testified to
the critical necessity of the claimed pretreatment or pre-
paratory steps for electro-tinning, thus giving in combina-
tion with the plating operation, a unitary result that was
neither disclosed nor even conceived in the prior art or
putative uses.

3. It is undenied and undeniable that continuous electro-
tinning resulted in an entirely new product suitable for
deep drawing, forming and stamping and commercially
produceable in substantial quantity—an established cri-
terion of invention. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated
Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 484, 55 L. ed, 527 (1911).

4. It is undenied and undeniable that industry had long
needed and sought that new result—also a recognized
indicium of invention. T. W. Lippert, Metallurgical Edi-
tor, The Iron Age, in an article entitled ‘‘A Unique Tin
Plate—A New Producer’’, on July 2, 1936, wrote:

“Thus it is not impossible that the conventional
hot-dip tin plate industry may have an_ incipient
revolution on its hands—the first radical change in
a product which has been familiar for centuries and
is today made in essentially the same manner as it
was in 77 A. D.

“The United States was long dependent on the
British Isles for its tin plate ...’’

5. It is undenied that petitioner designed and installed
the first continuous electro-tinning installations—also
recognized as an earmark of invention (I 16-21a; I 22-26a;
I 45a; and the admissions of defense witness Reed I 218-
220a, IT 240a, I 261a).

6. The law presumes a patent valid until the person
attacking it proves the contrary. 35 U.S.C. 282. The
only proof offered by the defense was a mumbo-jumbo

21

assortment of alleged prior art patents and unproved prior
uses, none of which is readily understandable or applicable
without expert interpretation—and the only ‘‘expert’’
interpretation offered by the defense (and apparently
relied upon below) was that of the thoroughly impeached
and discredited Mr. Reed.

In the face of the foregoing evidentiary situation there
is no basis for the trial court’s statements that it ‘*. . . is
unable to pinpoint any contribution to the art which
would amount to an invention when applied to tin rather
than zine’’ [referring to the Acme practice] (I 339a),
and that ‘‘there is no showing of a new or surprising result
or a result which is more than the mere sum of the expected
result of the several steps’’ (I 34la). That there was
a new result in the Nachtman process is indubitably re-
flected by the record fact that Nachtman was the first
to conceive of and execute a process for producing electro-
plated tin suitable for deep drawing and stamping, never
before available in the art. When the trial court says the
result was not surprising nor unexpected, this is clearly
a hindsight judgment—substituted for the jury’s judgment
to the contrary—ignoring the realities of an industry
seeking a result but never having obtained it before
Nachtman.

The error below becomes more apparent upon an analysis
of the distinct contributions of the several Nachtman pat-
ents which were improperly lumped in the determination
below that all of the patents were unpatentable aggrega-
tions. Reissue 20,788, (Pl. Ex. 1, II 356a), the granddaddy,
gave the world a new result that created a new industry—
production of an adherent, uniform, non-porous electro-
tinplate on annealed and tempered steel strip resulting
in a product permitting mechanical operations such as
deep drawing, stamping and forming (I 21a).

The burden of the trial court’s opinion appears to be
that this patent was no more than a Roebling annealing

22

furnace plus an Acme type of plating line, so that the
reissue was both anticipated and a mere aggregation.
The first error in this approach—an invasion of the jury’s
province—is the assumption of fact that the Acme practice
was actually what the Acme witnesses said it was. But,
as already shown, there were many reasons for the jury
to have discarded the alleged Acme use (see fn. 12, supra),
not the least of which was the fact that the evidence
offered was practically entirely oral. See Barbed Wire
Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 284 36 L. ed. 154 (1891), where 24
witnesses testified orally (143 U.S. at 287) and putative
specimen of the wire produced (143 U.S. at 291), which
this Court deemed wholly unsatisfactory proof of alleged
prior use. To the same effect see Deering v. Winona
Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286, 39 L. ed. 153 (1894).

The second error in the conclusion below that merely
putting a Roebling furnace together with an Acme line
did not constitute patentable combination was the assump-
tion that the court was better equipped than the jury to
make this ex post facto judgment of fact and that the
jury’s conclusion that the evidence pointed to the fact
of combination rather than mere aggregation was con-
stitutionally assailable in the evidentiary circumstances.
Among such circumstances was evidence that the Acme
line was no more than a zine plating system, was intended
as no more and neither it nor the Meaker system were
adapted to electro-tinning (I 137a). Cogent evidence that
the Acme-Meaker zine electro-plating processes are worth-
less for tin electro-plating is the fact that J. & L. itself
does not use Acme-Meaker. Prior use to invalidate must
establish that identically the same process or apparatus
constituted the prior use. Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v.
Jacobs, 178 F. 2d 794 (C.A. 7, 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S.
915 (1950); James Heddon’s Sons v. South Bend Bait Co.,
14 F. 2d 805 (C.A. 7, 1926), cert. den. 273 U.S. 137 (1927).
The wisdom of this rule in the context of the instant
situation is obvious when we consider the uncontradicted

Tait be A Beat

evidence that the Acme zine electro-plating process could
not be used to tinplate and would be inoperative if so
applied. Zine can be prepared for electro-plating by
processes which will not prepare the surface properly
for tin plating (I 298a). In Acme a lead pan is used to
heat the strip, which emerges in red hot condition and
thus renders the strip worthless for electro-tinplating
(I 299a; see also Reed at I 195a). In short, zine electro-
plating and tin electro-plating are distinct arts (Dean:
I 137a) and each requires different critical conditions so
that the Meaker-Acme zine processes do not describe a
satisfactory process for electro-tinning (I 298a).

But even assuming the Reissue merely put a Roebling
furnace together with an established Acme practice, this
constituted far more than merely stringing beads or using
two old devices to perform their same old independent
functions in the same old way without any new or different
unanticipatable result: In the first place, the resultant
product is not only entirely different, but has utility for
purposes not possible with prior art tin-dip products. In
the second place, the Acme-Meaker zine plating could not
be used to make tinplate, and no one ever succeeded in
making commercial electro-tinplate of uniform, nonporous,
acerent coat prior to petitioner. J. & L. itself does not
use the Acme-Meaker line. In the third place, Tour’s
testimony showed that heating to anneal in combination
with slow cooling out of air gave a surface that could be
acid-pickled to remove any oxide or coat without producing
a useless acid-brittle strip, which strip would be so clean
on mere water wash as to obtain in the plating step the
adherent, nonporous, uniform electro-tinplate for the first
time in the history of the world. Each step modified the
next succeeding step as to make the final result possible.

Thus, there was more than sufficient basis for the jury
to conclude as a basis for factually finding a true combina-
tion that each of the two basic subdivisions of the com-
bination therefore mutually contribute to a new, different

24

and unitary result. Finally, keeping in mind that ‘‘ Knowl-
edge after the event is always easy,’"* we find the real
answer to the assertion below that the ‘‘court is unable
to pinpoint any contribution to the art which would amount
to an invention when applied to tin rather than zine’’
(I 339a). The plain and simple truth is that the need
and the demand were there, Acme-Meaker and all other
prior art were there, yet no one, prior to Nachtman, knew
how to make electro-tinplate to give an adherent, uniform,
nonporous coat—let alone a bright coat! And when peti-
tioner solved the problems of the industry his contributions
were warmly embraced. That his methods and apparatus
were novel is not open to doubt. The question is, did it
involve invention to take these steps and combine them to
produce a new article and a new industry? To suggest
that reasonable men could not conclude in such cireum-
stances that putting together the indicated elements was
unanticipated and invention elevates ex post facto wishful
thinking to unrealistic dignity.

But even if, arguendo, Reissue 20,788 were invalid as
anticipated and a mere aggregation, there is no basis for
the summary assertion below that the other Nachtman
patents in issue were similarly invalid. While the Reissue
was the granddaddy patent, nevertheless each of the suc-
ceeding patents themselves introduced new revolutionary
features essential to their new total unitary result and
giving them distinct standing as patentable combinations
independent of the validity or invalidity of the Reissue
patent. For example, patent 2,240,265 contains claims
covering the first teaching in the art of a commercial
method for the production of bright electrotinplate made
possible by a combination, inter alia, of (1) wet mechanical
brushing with (2) heating to alloy the tin to the strip while
(3) controlling the tension in the electroplating line. It
was one of the great contributions to the development of

18 Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428,
435, 55 L. ed. 527 (1911).

25

the tin can industry. This combination of steps is essen-
tially different from that claimed in the Reissue patent
and created a function and result beyond anything taught
in that reissue. Hence any holding of invalidity against
Reissue 20,788 is in no way determinative of the validity
of 2,240,265, whether based on prior art or on the ground
of aggregation.

Similar considerations apply to tae two remaining Nacht-
man patents. 2,459,674 covers an apparatus which gave
the world for the first time a commercially useful com-
bination for producing bright electro-tinplate, by requiring
(1) means to preheat the coated strip but below fusion,
in combination with (2) separate means for brief heating
to fusion of the coat to get bright plate and (3) quick
solidification of the fused coat to set it in unmarred condi-
tion, all made possible by (4) control of tension on the
strip. It was brilliantly new in both concept and execution.
Here again it is at once apparent that the mechanism
is entirely different from that necessary to practice the
methods of Reissue 20,788 or 2,240,285, so that any holding
of invalidity of either of those two prior patents, whether
on anticipation by art or of aggregation, does not dispose
of the question of the validity of 2,459,674.

And finally, 2,567,074 was also a novel contribution of
apparatus elements that made possible modern automatic
high-velocity, high-volume production of electro-tinplate,
in a plating line that requires, inter alia, storage equip-
ment, e.g., loopers at both near the beginning and end of
the line, properly placed in an electro-gtating system to be
coordinated with elements to stop the strip completely at
certain points in the line while maintaining rapid continu-
ous movement at other points in the line under controlled
tension. This was made possible by the use of elements
to provide drag tension to prevent surges of strip and
uneven travel, ete., while maintaining control of tension
throughout. And all being capable of being handled

26

mechanically, thus making automatic operation possible.
Here again it will be seen that the features go far beyond
those of any of the first three mentioned patents to Nacht-
man and this last patent also contributes a function and
result beyond them. So that once again any reasons for
invalidity of Reissue 20,788 or 2,240,265 or 2,459,674 do
not obtain against 2,567,074.

In the face of the substantial evidence of patentability
noted above—of the patentability of each of the Nachtman
patents for their several distinct contributions—and the
firm basis indicated upon which a jury of reasonable men
could conclude, within accepted and undisputed standards
of invention, that true patentable combinations were in-
volved, the only explanation for the action of both courts
below appears to lie in an approach to jury verdicts in
patent cases different from that in other types of litigation.
But in all cases where a jury sits, patent cases or other-
wise, it behooves judges to resist

‘*. . . the seductive argument [often] made that a
conclusion of fact which appears to the court to be
reasonable is so clear that reasonable men could reach
no other. If this sort of reasoning is allowed to
prevail, however, it means that the courts are substi-
tuting their judgment for that of the jury on fact
questions in violation of the constitutional require-
ment.’’"*

The constitutional assurance of a jury trial cannot be
impaired by judicial tampering with the jury’s resolution
of disputed facts or inferences within that realm in which
reasonable men could differ. See: Aetna Lafe Insurance
Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88, 35 L. ed. 371, 376 (1890) ;
Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35,
88 L. ed. 525 (1943); Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 74
L. ed. 720 (1930).

44 From opinion of Chief Judge Parker in Burcham v. J. P.
Stevens & Co., Inc., 209 F. 2d 35, 38 (C.A. 4, 1954).

27

This Court’s decisions in the patent field early laid
down the judicial approach to the jury function in patent
eases. In Battin v. Taggert, 17 Howard 74, 85, 15 L. ed.
37, 41 (1854), the trial court had directed a verdict for
the alleged infringer on the basis of patent invalidity.
Reversing, this Court stated:

‘“‘This .. . took from the jury, facts which it was
their province to examine and determine. It was the
right of the jury to determine from the facts in the
ease whether the specifications, including the claim,
were so precise as to enable any person skilled in the
structure of machines, to make the one described. This
the statute required, and of this the jury are to judge.

‘‘The jury are also to judge of the novelty of the
invention, and whether the renewed patent is for the
same invention as the original patent; and they are
to determine whether the invention has been aban-
doned to the public. There are other questions of
fact which come within the province of a jury, such
as the identity of the machine used by the defendant
with that of the plaintiff or whether they have been
constructed and act on the same principle.’’

In similar vein, and parallel to the instant case, is
Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 36, 30 L. ed. 54, 58 (1886),
where in an action for infringement of an improvement
in furnaces for smelting, the defense claimed anticipation
by a machine described in an earlier publication. There
were differences in the machines and their arrangements
and experts disagreed as to whether these differences
were material to the result and whether any improvement
in plaintiff’s machine was the result of invention. Revers-
ing a directed verdict for defendant, this Court held that:

‘Clearly it was not a matter of law that the specifi-
cations of the plaintiff’s patent, and the publication
of Karsten, taken in connection with the drawings,
... described the same thing ... this was a question
of fact properly to be left for determination to the
jury, under suitable instructions . . .”’

k
FEMI LO TIO POR 4

MPO EVE ISG

28

So too in Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812, 19 L. ed. 829
(1869), the Court held that the trial court could not in-
struct the jury as a matter of law that the specifications
of a patent in issue compared with those of an alleged
prior art patent, but that whether or not they did compare
was a matter to be determined by the jury on all the
evidence. To the same effeet see Turril v. Michigan
Southern & NAR. Co., 68 U.S. 491, 17 L. ed. 668 (1863).
So too in Thompson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
265 U.S. 445, 68 L. ed. 1098 (1924), the Court held that
the question whether an improvement requires mere
mechanical skill or the exercise of the faculty of invention
is one of fact, and in an action at law for infringement
is to be left to the determination of the jury.

Farlier lower court decisions are to the same effect.”
Well might the courts below have heeded the opinion in
Heide v. Panoulias, 188 F. 914, 916-917 (C.A. 2, 1911) that:

‘‘Ordinarily the presence or absence of ‘invention’
and ‘infringement’ are questions of fact. When dis-
posed of by the trier of facts in an equity suit, his
decision may be reviewed on appeal. When disposed of
by the verdict of a jury, properly instructed, its
decision on those points are not reviewable on appeal.

1 Thus in Hunt Bros. Fruit Packing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 Fed.
257 (C.A. 3, 1892), the court held that whether there was in-
fringement of a patent for fruit dryers and whether the use of
a particular device therein was known at the time of plaintiff’s
application, were questions of fact to be left to the jury. In
Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., Fed. Case No. 2,485, 2 Story, 432
(C.C. Mass., 1843), the court held that objections that a patent
invention is old, or that the original and the renewed patent are
not for the same invention or that either were obtained with a
fraudulent intent, all involve matters of fact, and are for the
jury to decide. To the same effect see Poppenhusen v. Falke,
Fed. Case No. 11,279, (C.C. N.Y., 1861), holding that whether a
reissued patent is for the same invention as the original, is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. See also Foote v. Selsby, Fed. Case,
No. 4,916 (C.C. N.Y., 1849), aff'd 55 U.S. 218; Washburn v.
Gould, Fed. Case No. 17,214, 3 Story 122 (C.C. Mass., 1844).

RR

29

‘*In the case at bar there was conflicting testimony
as to both invention and infringement. The experts
disputed as to how prior patents worked and as to
whether they were practical. They disputed vigor-
ously as to the meaning of the phrase ‘dipping frame’,
used in the claim, whether it would convey to one
skilled in the art the idea both of a pin-bar and of a
wire mesh basket. They disputed as to whether a
machine made under the patent in suit would or would
not work. We are satisfied that under the authorities
cited the trial judge would have committed error,
had he decided these questions of validity and infringe-
ment, instead of sending them to the jury.’? (Empha-
sis supplied.)

Cf. Walker on Patents (Sth ed.) § 536.

On the conflicting evidence in the record in this case
the issues incident to the question of patentability were
essentially no different than the issue of negligence in a
tort action, as to which this Court, in Schulz v. Pa. RR.
Co., 100 L. ed. 430, 432-433, stated:

‘*In considering the scope of the issues entrusted to
juries in cases like this, it must be borne in mind that
negligence cannot be established by direct, precise
evidence such as can be used to show that a piece
of ground is or is not an acre. Surveyors can measure
an acre. But measuring negligence is different. The
definitions of negligence are not definitions at all,
strictly speaking. Usually one discussing the subject
will say that negligence consists of doing that which
a person of reasonable prudence would not have done,
or of failing to do that which a person of reasonable
prudence would have done under like circumstances.
Issues of negligence, therefore, call for the exercise
of common sense and sound judgment under the cir-
cumstances of particular cases. ‘We think these are
questions for the jury to determine. We see no reason,
so long as the jury system is the law of the land, and
the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed
questions of fact, why it should not decide such ques-
tions as these, as well as others.’ ...

Oi Sis 4

TIMP OPO RTT TET

PA MR a I

30

‘¢. . “The very essence of its function is to select
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that
which it considers most reasonable.’ Fact finding
does not require mathematical certainty. Jurors are
supposed to reach their conclusions on the basis of com-
mon sense, common understanding and fair beliefs,
grounded on evidence consisting of direct statements
by witnesses or proof of circumstances from which
inferences can fairly be drawn.’’

The effort below to equate the situation here with that
in such eases as Packwood vy. Briggs & Stratton Corp.,
195 F. 2d 971 (C.A. 3, 1952), cert. den, 344 U.S. 844, or
A, & P. vy. Super Market Equipment Co., 340 U.S. 147,
95 L. ed. 162 (1950), as a self-justification for interference
with the jury’s verdict ignores the realities of a simple,
obvious structure on the one hand and the complexities of
that involved on the other. There is no parity between
the simple devices of Packwood and A. & P. and those
here requiring resolution of complex disputed evidence
and comparison of complex structures in order to arrive
at a conclusion whether there was anticipation and whether
the elements of the structures in issue mutually contributed
to each other to create a new unitary combination result.

To assume the absence of an area of factual dispute
over the involved structures here would be to ignore even
the trial judge’s own involved and labored analysis of
evidence and comparison of structures to reach the result
he did. It would also ignore the Patent Office expert con-
clusion of patentability, the testimony of expert witnesses
at trial that true elements of combination were involved,
and finally, it would ignore that on defense motion for
summary judgment and on defense motion for a directed
verdict, the trial judge himself could not find such a simple
and obvious anticipation or lack of patentable combination
as to warrant granting either of said motions.

Whether Nachtman contributed a new and surprising
result is no more measurable with certainty than is the

31

issue of negligence and, therefore, both are issues of fact
for the jury. Moreover, while in an ordinary negligence
or contract action the constitutional assurance of a right
to jury trial is merely for the protection of the litigants
themselves, in patent cases resolution of the issue of
invention vitally affects the community at large which
ultimately pays for the monopoly of the patent and which
likewise benefits from its fruits. In such circumstances
there is warrant for having the determination of invention
or lack of invention made by a broader representative
base of the community, namely the jury.

We do not take issue with the views below that the
jury’s verdict must be consistent with standards and rules
developed for use as guides to the systematic and orderly
definition and application of the concept of invention (slip
opinion, page 3). But that statement of principle cannot
be used, as it has below, to avoid the ultimate question
whether judges or juries are to be given the right to sift
and analyze the evidence to ascertain whether it does so
aceord with such rules and principles. When, as here,
application of the rules and standards for invention in-
volves determining points of similarity and dissimilarity
between the structures of the patents in issue and alleged
prior art, whether there is novelty in the patents in issue,
whether those patents are true combinations (i.e., whether
there is mutual interdependence of their elements to obtain
a new unitary result or whether the elements are merely
old devices strung together like beads, each element per-
forming in the same old way with new result)—when, as
here, resolution of such problems necessarily involves
selective review of the evidentiary record, an evaluation
of credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of
testimony—then in these circumstances application of the
pertinent standards for invention is necessarily a function
solely for the jury acting under appropriate instructions
from the trial court.

OF! PPAR LI SHER NIL IEA LEE CREA IRE IE

RPER ULES

32

C. This Court Has Had No Occasion in This Century to Define
the Limits of Judicial Review of Jury Verdicts in Patent
Cases; a Restatement of the Constitutional Limits of
Review Would be Timely Because of the Current Trend
to Substitute Judicial Views of the Facts for Jury
Findings.

As we have shown, notwithstanding the lip service given
below to the respective spheres of judge and jury, the trial
judge, with later appellate approval, entirely misconceived
his function in relation to the jury verdict. Battin v.
Taggert and the other early decisions of this Court noted
supra clearly articulated the supremacy of the jury in
resolving evidentiary disputes, comparing structures and
performing the other incidents of fact finding in patent
litigation (whether on the issue of validity or that of
infringement) just as in other jury cases. But with the
passage of time the lower courts have departed from the
constitutional standards thus expressed.

The decisions below are evidence of a not episodice—
though erroneous—modern notion that in patent litigation
the jury is not to be trusted with, or is not capable of
making, ultimate factual resolutions, particularly on ques-
tions of validity. Unless the constitutional expressions
of Battin v. Taggert are authoritatively restated increas-
ing currency may be given the notions below that the
jury’s prerogatives and functions are diminished and
those of the judiciary correspondingly enlarged in resolv-
ing factual matters incident to the determination of the
validity of patents. It is therefore imperative, we submit,
that this Court take this occasion to exercise its super-
visory jurisdiction to bring the lower courts back within
the limits of the constitutional standards for review of
jury verdicts applicable to patent and other litigation
alike.

33
II.

THE EVIDENCE OF PATENTABILITY WAS NOT MORE SUB-
STANTIAL BECAUSE OF THE PROCEDURAL ERROR OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN EXCLUDING REBUTTAL PROOF OF
VALIDITY; THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING IS CONTRARY
TO THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY IMPOS-
ING THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF INVALIDITY ON THE
DEFENSE.

On plaintiff’s case in chief there was no particular effort
to adduce evidence of the validity of the patents in issue
because 35 U.S.C. 282 provides that ‘‘a patent shall be
presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity
of a patent shall rest on a party asserting it.’’ After an
extensive defense effort to establish invalidity of the pat-
ents, petitioner, in rebuttal, attempted to go into the
validity question to show, for example, through the witness
Tour, the relation of the alleged prior art to petitioner’s
patents from the standpoint of showing that petitioner’s
patents covered patentable combinations (I 289a, 291a,
292a, 295a, 308a). This was the subject of an extensive
colloquy between the trial court and counsel at the begin-
ning of Tour’s rebuttal testimony (see particularly I 289-
289a), resulting in the court’s conclusion that because
petitioner had relied, in his ease in chief, on the presump-
tion of validity he could not in rebuttal go back to the
issue of validity except to rebut specific assertions with
respect to prior art patents relied upon in the defense.

In the face of the clear language of the statute this
was plain error which was urged upon the court below
but not commented upon in its opinion. Certainly the
inhibiting effects of the trial court’s ruling in establishing
the validity of petitioner’s patents is obvious and in the
petition for rehearing below petitioner summarized the
type of evidence that would have been offered but for
the trial judge’s erroneous ruling (see Petition For Re-
hearing, pp. 9-12).

The question here raised does not appear to have been
the subject of any direct holding previously by this Court

34

or any of the lower courts, possibly because the statute is
so clear on the subject. However, in Mumm vy. Decker &
Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171-2 81 L. ed. 983, 985-6 (1937), this
Court did say:

‘‘In a suit for infringement of a patent it is not a
part of the plaintiff’s case to negative prior publica-
tion or prior use... These are matters of affirmative
defense. The issue of the patent is enough to show,
until the contrary appears, that all conditions under
which a discovery is patentable in accordance with
the statutes have been met. Hence, the burden of
proving want of novelty is upon him who avers it.
Walker, Patents, §116. Not only is the burden to
make good this defense upon the party setting it up,
but his burden is a heavy one, as it has been held that
‘every reasonable doubt should be resolved against
him.’ . .. What must be so completely established
by the defendant cannot be regarded as a part of the
plaintiff’s case ...’’

Thus, Mumm v. Decker & Sons, supra, would indicate
material error in the trial judge’s procedural approach
to proof on the issue of validity. But the matter is of
such substantial significance that it ought to be squarely
considered and determined by this Court as a guide for
the future trial of patent eases in the lower courts,

Ill.

THE DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL MISAPPROPRIATION DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF
OF HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THIS CLAIM: THE
RULINGS BELOW THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT
ESTABLISHED CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER
CIRCUITS.

As reflected more fully in the Statement, supra, the
evidence showed that while petitioner was associated with
the Blaw-Knox Company, he and other officials negotiated
with Jones & Laughlin with a view to selling and installing
electro-tinning lines at J. & L. incorporating petitioner’s
conceptions, and that, in the course of those negotiations,

35

they disclosed to J. & L. engineering detail and data beyond
the disclosures of then or later patents, and finally, that
the tin lines disclosed in the so-called Blaw-Knox sub-
missions to J. & L. corresponded with the tin lines later
constructed and in use at J. & L.’s plant.

In this evidentiary posture it was plain error for the
trial court to have directed a verdict on the misappropria-
tion claim. Independent of the protection afforded by the
patent laws, equity will not suffer one to use or disclose
an idea or trade secret when such use or disclosure would
constitute a breach of confidence. Restatement, Torts,
§757(b). Thus Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach,
239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913) held that a plaintiff is en-
titled to relief when he has shown the following elements:
(1) the existence of a trade secret or secret process of
manufacture (2) which is communicated to the defendant
(3) while he is in a position of trust and confidence and
(4) use by the defendant to the injury of the plaintiff.
(Note: The disclosures here in question were made and
misappropriated in Pennsylvania.)

Since petitioner possessed detailed plans and specifica-
tions for a complicated process of electro-tinning, then
unknown and not in general use in the industry, it is clear
that he (via Blaw-Knox) was in possession of a ‘‘trade
secret’’ or a ‘‘secret process of manufacture’’. See Re-
statement, Torts, §757, Comment b, Definition of trade
secret. See also Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F. 2d 369
(C.A. 7, 1953), decided under Pennsylvania law. The
detailed plans and specifications for electro-tinning equip-
ment provided, as Dr. Dean testified, an engineering basis
beyond the disclosures of the patents and are thus clearly
encompassed within the definition of a ‘‘trade secret’”’ or a
**seeret process of manufacture’’. And it was admitted
defendant received and reviewed those detailed plans and
specifications in the course of and as a result of negotia-
tions looking towards its purchase of a tinning line. Simi-

SO POOPIE

PPE LOR EL OOO

By Por: REPT DS

SEE aS

FY ELEY TOILETTE YG SMT PS RI

IEP,

AGLI 8.

36

larly the evidence unquestionably established, by com-
parison of structures, Jones and Laughlin’s ultimate use
of the Blaw-Knox disclosures.

In the circumstances the only real question of fact was
whether Jones & Laughlin was in a position of trust and
confidence when it received these disclosures. In this
connection, stripped of all surplusage, the relationship of
the parties was one of prospective buyer and seller;
petitioner had an electro-tinning process he desired to
market and J. & L. was a potential buyer. And the detailed
plans, together with prices, were submitted to enable J. & L.
to evaluate them for the purpose of consummating a sale.
In those circumstances, although there were no express
terms that J. & L. would hold petitioner’s plans in trust
and not use or disclose them, a disclosure in confidence was
implicit. It was so held on almost identical facts in Smith
v. Dravo Corp., supra. See also Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp
Mfg. Co., 80 F. 2d 912, (C.A. 4, 1986), cert. den. 298 U.S.
673; Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F. 2d 921
(C.A, 2, 1951). See also Restatement, Torts, § 757, Com-
ment on clause (b), p. 18; Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co.,
56 F. 2d 962 (C.A. 7, 1932).

While the trial court did not clearly articulate the
reasons for its direction of a verdict on the misappropria-
tion claim beyond referring to an insufficiency of evidence
thereon (see I 321a), the court below purported to find
a series of reasons justifying that action, none of which,
in our view, detracts from the clear conflict between the
rulings below and the decisions in other circuit courts of
appeal and the highest court of Pennsylvania enunciating
Pennsylvania law applicable in this case. That conflict of
decisions was noted in the Petition for Rehearing below
which analyzed, seriatim, each step of the last paragraph
of the opinion below to show the lack of foundation there-
for. That petition showed: (1) that the assertion that
the misappropriation claim ‘‘was not strongly pressed’’,
even if it were true—which the record plainly shows it

37

is aot—is no reflection on the merits of the claim and that
claims for misappropriation are frequently asserted sup-
plementary to patent claims and upheld even when the
primary patent claim fails; (2) that the assertion peti-
tioner abandoned his claim for separate damages with
respect to the cause of action for misappropriation, is
without record foundation; (3) that even if petitioner’s
patents were unpatentable aggregations, they were not
freely available to Jones & Laughlin because, as Dr. Dean’s
uncontradicted testimony showed, the Blaw-Knox submis-
sions (which were the subject of the distinct cause of
action for wrongful misappropriation) went beyond the
disclosures of the patents, and because the validity or
invalidity of the patents themselves would legally have
no effect on the distinct cause of action for wrongful mis-
appropriation (citing Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp.
and Smith v. Dravo Corp., both supra); (4) that the asser-
tion that ‘‘there was no evidence that a trust relationship
between plaintiff and defendant was created by the trans-
action’’ ignores numerous decisions of other circuits and
in Pennsylvania that a confidential relationship is implicit
in the type of transaction in question, and that if, in a
non-jury case, a court could imply confidence from such
circumstances, there was no basis below to foreclose the
jury from finding as a fact that confidence should be im-
plied in like cireumstances; and (5) that the assertion it
was Blaw-Knox and not petitioner which made the sub-
missions and that Blaw-Knox has not complained, was
grossly unfair to petitioner’s strenuous efforts, blocked by
the trial court, to offer evidence of his financial relationship
with Blaw-Knox and his interest in any disclosures made
by them.

Thus, the decision below is plainly in conflict with the
decisions of other courts of appeal holding that a confiden-
tial relationship, breach of which is actionable, may be
implied in circumstances such as are here present so that
certainly whether such confidence could be implied in

38

the circumstances here was a factual matter for resolution
by the jury.

CONCLUSION

The decision below, both with respect to the cause of
action for patent infringement and that for wrongful
misappropriation, represents a gross departure from our
constitutional jury tradition applicable in patent cases
as well as in other litigation, requiring the exercise of this
Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to assure the integrity
of the jury process and the right to constitutional trial
by jury. If more than lip service to the jury system is
to be compelled in patent litigation, and if, in such litiga-
tion, the power of review of trial courts on motion for
judgment n.o.v. or of appellate courts, is to be kept within
historically proper channels, then the action of the court
below must be reviewed and reversed here.

Additionally, the courts below have decided an impor-
tant question of procedure, relating to method of proof in
patent litigation, contrary to the terms of statute and
requiring this Court’s consideration for the future guid-
ance of lower courts, and have decided a question of sub-
stantive law in a manner in conflict with the decisions of
other Courts of Appeal so that resolution of the conflict
by this Court is both desirable and necessary.

PRE GY) ERS eae Re NR CR err RO REI, 1S Lt RS ng aE, ES —

39

Accordingly, this petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Davin G. Bress
SxHeupon E. Bernstein
Attorneys for Petitioner
Rust Bidg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.

Of Counsel:

Newmyer & Bress
Rust Bldg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.

Pattrerson, Crawrorp, ARENSBERG & DunNN
First National Bank Building
Pittsburgh 22, Pa.

Sot SHapprrio
Washington Loan & Trust Bldg.
Washington, D. C.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0987%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
