# Respondents Brief — McHoney v. Marine Navigation Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1956
- **Citation:** 352 U.S. 930

## Text

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INDEX
PAGE
Orrntons BELow ........-.--------+- = 1
JURISDICTION ......-- ais 1
SraTEMENT OF THE CASE.... 2
Questions PRESENTED 6
ARGUMENT:
Summary OF ARGUMENT......... ae 7
I. The construction of the regulation by the
Court of Appeals is correct..... 8
Il. The decision of the Court of Appeals has no
bearing on the exercise by the Coast Guard of
the statutory powers granted it... 10

III. The Court is the proper tribunal to interpret
the meaning of an administrative regulation

and not the Coast Guard..............-----.--------+----+-+ 11
IV. An appeal does not lie from an order denying
a motion for rehearing..........-.-----------+---++----00-000-- 12

V. There was no proof to establish that the Coast
Guard Regulation was violated, even though
interpreted to apply to unloading 13

VI. There was no exception taken by the Peti-
tioners to the failure of the Court to charge in
the respect complained of and counsel for the
Petitioners stated at the conclusion of the
charge that they had no requests and no excep-
tions -

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OLLI RT IPT 2 BI Chen a RNS 5 De

ConcLusION

PML AIOE IR RE

InpEx To APPENDIX.

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of
Appeals

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Regulation...

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended
Regulation

TABLE OF CasEs.

Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
299 U. S. 393

Colley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 157 F. 2d 1007
(CCA 4)
Conboy v. First National Bank of Jersey City, 203
U.S. 141

Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. 2d 395 (CCA 5)
cert. den. 338 U.S. 815

M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614........
Meadows v. United States, 144 F. 2d 751 (CCA 4)......

Pfister v. Finance Corp., 317 U. 8. 144

Spellman v. American Barge Lines Co., 176 F. (a)
pi! :

Steuber v. Admiral Corp., 177 F. 2d 777 (CCA 7)
cert. den. 336 U. S. 961

U. 8. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150..............

Wright & Michigan Central R. Co., 130 F. 843
(CCA 6)

STaTures.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51..................

POSER ve

PAGE

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States —
Ocroser TERM, 1956. é.

e

No. 245 Mise. 0. 'T. 1956. :

Sam McHoney, Hersert DunMeEYER, JoHN SirH, FRANKLIN p
Waitt, Rosert JENKINS, CHAPEL Movzon, Limon JOYNER, :
Feurx McKyicut, Lurner Moorr, Toomas Burcn and &
Joun Bowens,
Petitioners, 4

vs. ,

Marine Navication Company, Inc.,
Respondent.

x

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, MARINE NAVIGATION i
COMPANY, INC., IN OPPOSITION TO THE i

ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

u

Opinions BELow.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of South Carolina is officially reported in
137 F. Supp. 263. The opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is officially reported in

233 F. 2d 769.

JURISDICTION.

It is not disputed that there is jurisdiction under Title
28 USC Sections 1254 (1) and 2101 (c). However, the peti-

ee

2

tion fails to establish that there exists any of the grounds
for granting a writ set forth in Rule 19 of the Revised Rules
of this court.

Although this court is asked to review an alleged failure
of the Trial Judge to charge the legal effect of a regulation
of the Coast Guard, no request was made to the Trial Judge
to charge the regulation according to its terms. Moreover,
no exception was made to the alleged failure so to charge
(Petitioners’ Appendix in Court of Appeals, 30a, 32a).

Thus, irrespective of the correctness of the interpreta-
tion of the regulation by the Court of Appeals, Petitioners
never properly raised objection to the charge as required
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, which
reads in part as follows:

‘‘No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds of his objection.’’

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

It is necessary to state at the outset that the Petitioners
take many liberties with the facts and they frequently
refer to matters completely outside the record. There-
fore, this court cannot accept the Petitioners’ statements
and arguments as reliable guides as to the proceedings
below.

The SS Marine Merchant, owned by the Respondent,
was chartered by The Texas Sulphur Company to transport
a cargo of bulk sulphur to the Port of Charleston. The
charterer employed James Doran Company as the steve-
dore to unload the cargo and the Petitioners were long-
shoremen in the employ of the stevedore.

a

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3

After the vessel was docked, the stevedore took charge
of those parts of the vessel necessary to the unloading of
the cargo, including the ship’s apparatus which was to be
used in lifting the stevedore’s metal buckets from the hold
to the dock. The function of the Petitioners was to shovel

loose sulphur from the hold into the lowered buckets. At
5 o’clock in the afternoon of February 5, 1952, while this

operation was in progress, a fire occurred in the #2 hold
where the Petitioners were working.

The Petitioners brought this suit against the Respond-
ent, alleging that they received injuries as a result of the
fire and asserting that the injuries so received were due to
the unseaworthiness of the vessel and the negligence of the
Respondent in various particulars. Respondent denied the
material allegations of the complaint. The cause came
on for trial before a United States District Judge and a
jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina. It was agreed by the parties,
with the approval of the Court, that the only questions to be
resolved at the trial were whether the ship was unseaworthy
and whether the Respondent was guilty of negligence. The
outcome of the trial was a verdict by the jury which found
for Respondent, answering, in the negative both of the ques-
tions submitted.

During the course of the trial, the Petitioners attempted
to show that the ship’s apparatus was not in proper working
order and that this caused a bucket to strike a metal part
of the ship, thereby making a spark which set off the fire.
The Petitioners also attempted to show that in other
respects the Respondent was negligent or the vessel was
unseaworthy. Respondent introduced considerable testi-
mony which established that the ship’s apparatus was in
no respect inadequate or defective and that there was no
fault on the part of the Respondent in respect to any of

LEEDTHRU

——

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4

the matters claimed by Petitioners. By its verdict the jury
found that defendant was not negligent and that its vessel
was seaworthy.

The Petitioners also charged that the Respondent failed
to ‘‘connect the ship’s water connections with a shore supply
source of water’’ and argued that such failure consti-
tuted a violation of the Coast Guard regulation (13a)*
which read in part as follows:

‘*A fire hose supplied with fresh water from a shore
supply source shall be available at each hatch
through which the sulfur is being loaded.’’

Respondent maintained that by its very terms the regu-
lation did not apply to the unloading operation then in
progress and established by uncontradicted testimony that,
in any event, the regulation was not violated since there
was available and put into use a fire hose leading from
the dock to the hold of the ship, which hose was supplied
with fresh water from a shore supply source.

The Trial Court ruled that the Coast Guard regulation
was applicable to unloading and so instructed the jury.
However, the Vourt refused to charge that the regulation
required a ‘‘connection’’ from the shore with the ship’s
water supply, because the regulation required only that
the hose be ‘‘available’’. At the completion of the charge,
the Court asked counsel for both parties whether there
were any other requests to charge or any exceptions and
counsel for the Petitioners stated that they had no further
requests and no exceptions (30a, 32a; Record in the Court
of Appeals).

Upon the verdict of the jury, the trial court entered
judgment for the Respondent. The Trial Court denied Peti-

* References are to the Appendix attached to this brief.

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5

tioners’ motions for a new trial or, in the alternative, judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment.

A stipulation*® was entered iato by the parties, setting
forth the sole question on appeal and the contents of the
record on appeal. The sole issue on appeal from the judg-
ment in the District Court was the following (la):

‘‘Did the Court below err in failing to charge the
jury as a matter of law that the U. 8. Coast Guard
regulation, referring to sulfur as a dangerously
inflammable cargo and requiring a ‘fire hose supplied
with fresh water from a shore supply source’ at each
hatch, was applicable herein during unloading of
sulfur, and that the violation thereof constituted
negligence per se?’’

The testimony and exhibits set forth in the stipulation
related only to the sole issue which Petitioners desired
to raise on appeal.

The Court of Appeals held that the regulation was
inapplicable to unloading operations and that there was
no error on the part of the Trial Judge in failing to charge
the jury in the respect complained of on appeal. The
Court of Appeals also stated in its opinion that the ques-
tion of Respondent’s negligence was fairly submitted to
the jury which found a verdict against the Petitioners and
that there was abundant evidence from which the jury
could have found that there was an adequate supply from
the shore of fresh water which was actually used to extin-
guish the fire. The judgment of the District Court was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which later denied Peti-
tioners’ application for rehearing. This Petition followed.

* Printed in the Appendix to this brief, pp. la-12a.

Sam cd Fe

SFEDTHRU

6

QuvueEsTions PRESENTED.

The questions for consideration on this Petition are:

1. Whether this Court should review the holding by
the Court of Appeals that the Coast Guard regulation
(now amended) did not by its terms apply to unloading of
sulfur.

2. Whether this Court should review the affirmance by
the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the District Court
because (he Trial Judge did not charge that the old regula-
tion required a ‘‘connection’’ between the shore and the
ship’s water system, particularly where the proof showed
that there was a shore fresh water hose available and actu-
ally used to extinguish the fire.

ResPponDENT’s Proor.

On the trial, Respondent showed that at 8 A. M. on the
morning of the fire, which occurred at 5 P. M., the ship’s
crew had laid out one of the ship’s hoses alongside the #2
hatch. It was in this hatch where the fire developed. The
nozzle was hung over the side of the ship through a chock
with water dribbling through it (lla).

When the fire broke out, the ship’s alarm was immedi-
ately sounded and the ship’s crew responded promptly
(10a, 11a). While the second assistant engineer hurried to
the engine room to increase the pressure on the ship’s
pump (10a), the mate and other members of the crew went
immediately to #2 hatch where two of the ship’s hoses
were manned and water from them played on the fire (11a).
Meanwhile, one of the longshoremen had procured from the
dock a hose which was abreast of the #2 hatch and water
from this hose was put on the fire (7a). Approximately
5 minutes after the fire started two of the ship’s personnel

|

DARK PAGE

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7 :

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descended into #2 hold to ascertain whether any of the
longshoremen pad failed to leave (9a). They found no one
in the hold but, aevertheless, they themselves remained there
some 10 to 19 minutes (9a, 10a). While in the hold, &
they noticed that the fire department of the City of Charles- S
ton had arrived on board the vessel (9a) by which time a
the fire had been extinguished (11a). The crew estimated =~
that the fire department arrived about 10 minutes after the

fire had started (11a).
ARGUMENT. 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. &

(1) There are no circumstances presented by this peti-
tion which warrant the exercise by this Court of its judicial
discretion to issue a writ of certiorari. There are no
special or important issues for review by this Court. The
judgments of the Courts below are not in conflict with the
decisions of this Court or any Court of Appeals.

(2) Petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
has decided important questions of federal law which now
require settlement by this Court, is not valid. The decision
below turned on a Coast Guard regulation which was
amended about six months after the trial. Thus the regu-
lation interpreted by the Court no longer has any effect on
the working conditions aboard vessels. Petitioners con-
| tended on the trial that despite the plain words of the old
regulation, which did not include ‘unloading’, the regu-
lation applied during unloading operations. The new
regulation is now applicable to both loading and unloading
so that the issue which Petitioners say should be settled by
this Court has already been settled by the Coast Guard
through the issuance of the new regulation.

LEEDTHRU

(3) Quite apart from the reasons given in its opinion,
the Court of Appeals could only have affirmed the judgment
of the Trial Court since the uncontradicted testimony
established that the requirements of the old regulation,
even if applicable, were fully complied with and, hence, a
charge on an abstract principle of law would have been
inappropriate.

(4) The Petitioners did not request the Court to charge
in respect to the Coast Guard regulation according to its
terms and did not except to the Court’s failure to charge
upon the consequences of a violation of the regulation.
Hence, they should not now be heard to complain of any
omission to charge on the subject.

Se

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE REGULATION BY THE CoURT OF
APPEALS IS CORRECT.

Petitioners urged the Court of Appeals to decide that a
phrase ‘‘each hatch through which sulphur is being loaded’’
means the same thing as if it read ‘‘each hatch through
which sulphur is being loaded or unloaded’’. This inter-
pretation cannot be found in the clear and unambiguous
wording of the regulation and it is, therefore, impossible
to see how the Court of Appeals could have arrived at any
other result.

The opinion is clear and logical and Respondent adopts
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.

The following language of this court in M. Kraus &
Bros. v. United States, 327 U. S. 614, p. 621 is appropriate
here:

‘« * * In other words, the Administrator’s pro-
visions must be explicit and unambiguous in order

DARK

PAGE |

2 A ne Ser EI FO

9

to sustain a criminal prosecution; they must ade-
quately inform those who are subject to their terms
what conduct will be considered evasive so as to bring
the criminal penalties of the Act into operation. See
United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (US) 76, 94-
96, 5 L. ed 37, 42, 43. The dividing line between
unlawful evasion and lawful action cannot be left
to conjecture. The elements of evasive conduct
should be so clearly expressed by the Administrator
that the ordinary person can know in advance how
to avoid an unlawful course of action.

* * * But patent omissions and uncertainties can-
not be disregarded when dealing with a criminal
prosecution. A prosecutor in framing an indictment,
a court in interpreting the Administrator’s regula-
tions or a jury in judging guilt cannot supply that
which the Administrator failed to do by express word
or fair implication. Not even the Administrator’s
interpretations of his own regulations can cure an
omission or add certainty and definiteness to other-
wise vague language. The prohibited conduct must,
for criminal purposes, be set forth with clarity in the
regulations and orders which he is authorized by
Congress to promulgate under the Act. Congress
has warned the public to look to that source alone
to discover what conduct is evasive and hence likely
to create criminal liability. United States v. Resnick,
299 U. S. 207, 81 L. ed 127, 57 S. Ct. 126.”

It follows that it would have been error for the Trial
Court to have specifically charged that the regulation
applied to the facts established.

EEDTHRU

a,

THE DECISION OF ‘THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO BEARING

ON THE EXERCISE BY THE Coast GUARD OF THE STATUTORY
POWERS GRANTED IT.

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not hinder or
frustrate the Coast Guard in the promulgation and enforce-
ment of any regulation that it may determine to be desirable
and necessary in exercising the authority granted to it by
statute. The Coast Guard is charged, among other things,
with the duty of supervision over the safety of merchant
vessels, and to accomplish this purpose is authorized to
issue regulations. The decision of the Court of Appeals
interprets one of the regulations issued pursuant to this
statutory authority, but could not prevent the Coast Guard
from changing that regulation so that the meaning would
be wholly different from that of the earlier reguiation as
interpreted.

Furthermore, Petitioners do not suggest anywhere that
the regulation as originally worded is applicable in respect
to any other situation than the one before this Court or
that any other suit is awaiting final determination by this
Court as to the meaning of the old regulation.

Administration of the new regulation is in no way
affected by what the Court of Appeals said about the old
one.

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iii.

Tue CouURT IS THE PROPER TRIBUNAL TO INTERPRET THE
MEANING OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND NOT THE

Coast GUARD.

Petitioners, on the one hand, assert that the Court
should properly interpret a Coast Guard regulation, but,
on the other hand, assert that a contrary interpretation by
the Coast Guard should be accepted. It is well established
that this is not the law. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louts-
ville & N. R. Co., 299 U.S. 393; Spellman v. American Barge
Lines Co., 176 F. (a) 716 (CCA 3); Wright & Michigan
Central R. Co., 130 F. 843 (CCA 6).

On the trial, the Court erroneously admitted, over the
objection of Respondent, a telegram interpreting the regu-
lation, although the Coast Guard conceded that never pre-
viously had the regulation been interpreted by it. The
actual enforcement of the regulation by the Coast Guard had
for years been contrary to the interpretation contained
in the telegram. (8a)

Thus Petitioners had the benefit of evidence, errone-
ously admitted, which was prejudicial to the Respondent.
Petitioners had the advantage also of the erroneous ruling
by the Trial Court that the regulation applied to unload-
ing operations, which ruling the Court of Appeals subse-
quently reversed.

Despite these errors which were seriously prejudicial
to the Respondent, the jury found that Respondent was not
guilty of negligence, its vessel was seaworthy and that the
Coast Guard regulation had not been violated.

EEDTHRU

a ar rn & warns

12

IV.

THE APPEAL DOES NOT LIE FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION
FOR REHEARING.

The law is clear that a party may not appeal from the
denial of his application for rehearing.

U. S. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 247;
Pfister v. Finance Corp., 317 U. S. 144, 149; Conboy v. First
National Bank of Jersey City, 203 U. 8. 141, 149.

In the guise of appealing from the denial of a rehearing
by the Court of Appeals, Petitioners argue and allege facts
which are not relevant to the sole point before this Court,
viz. whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the
Coast Guard regulation. Many of the facts mentioned by
Petitioners in their argument bear the taint referred to at
the outset of this brief, but because of their irrelevancy no
effort is now made to outline the inaccuracies. It is thought
sufficient to say that matters which are irrelevant, even if
true, will not be considered by this Court.

Petitioners refer to Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of this
Court as a basis for extending their argument beyond the
issue voluntarily stipulated. This rule has no relation
whatever to Petitioners’ transparent attempt to appeal a
second time having failed on the first attempt. In the
Court of Appeals, instead of designations by the parties
as to the contents of the record on appeal, both parties
stipulated as to the contents of the record and Petitioners
have never asked to be relieved of this stipulation.

Moreover, the petition carefully avoids stating what
additional facts, omitted from the record in the Court of
Appeals, would justify reversal.

Aig

POAC DINE MENS

13

V.

THERE WAS NO PROOF TO ESTABLISH THAT THE Coast GUARD
REGULATION WAS VIOLATED, EVEN THOUGH INTERPRETED TO APPLY
TO UNLOADING.

The gist of Petitioners’ argument is that they were
entitled to a directed verdict because there was no ‘‘con-
nection’’ maintained between a shore water supply and the
ship’s fire-fighting system. This is based on their erroneous
interpretation of the regulation that when the Coast Guard
used the word ‘‘available’’ it meant a ‘‘shore connection’’.
Disregarding for the moment this extravagant interpreta-
tion, such a direction of a verdict against Respondent in
the face of the evidence which Respondent had adduced
would have been reversible error.

Petitioners, on page 18 of their petition, make the
unjustifiable misstatement that there was an ‘‘admitted
violation’’ of the Coast Guard regulation. No such admis-
sion was ever made. On the contrary, the proof showed
full compliance with the regulation in all respects even as
to that part of the regulation relating to the availability of
a hose with fresh water.

The uncontradicted testimony was that a fire hose sup-
plied with fresh water from a shore supply source was
available at the hatch through which the sulfur was being
unloaded and was actually used upon the fire (7a). Since
this evidence could lead to the sole conclusion that the
regulation of the Coast Guard was complied with, even if
it were applicable to unloading, it would have been error
for the Court to charge that a violation of that regulation
constituted negligence per se.

cae

A court should not charge on an abstract principle of
law when there are no facts from which the jury could find
upon the proposition of law as charged.

¥i.

THERE WAS NO EXCEPTION TAKEN BY THE PETITIONERS TO
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO CHARGE IN THE RESPECT COM-
PLAINED OF AND COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS STATED AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CHARGE THAT THEY HAD NO REQUESTS AND
NO EXCEPTIONS.

At a conference in chambers prior to giving the charge,
Respondent presented a number of requests, which were
considered by the Court and passed upon. At the same
time, Petitioners presented their proposals to charge and
these likewise were discussed and passed upon. There-
after, the Court set forth in writing the complete charge
as he intended to deliver it and discussed this with counsel
for the parties, and counsel had full opportunity, before
addressing the jury, to consider the full text of the charge.

At the conclusion of his charge, the Trial Judge stated
‘*T believe there are no other requests to charge, are there?’’
to which Mr. Klonsky' replied ‘‘No, your Honor’’ (30a; rec-
ord in the Court of Appeals). Counsel for the Respondent
then inquired of the Court whether the requests previously
made on behalf of the Respondent had been recorded and
was informed that they had been recorded. After some dis-
cussion between the Court and the Clerk in respect to the
jurors, the following colloquy occurred (21a, Record Court
of Appeals) :

Mr. Waring:? I am just asking that the record
show that the exceptions made and discussed with

1Counsel for Petitioners (plaintiffs below).
2 Counsel for Respondent (defendant below).

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15

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the Court in connection with the charge shall apply
to the charge as given.

The Court: Yes, that is satisfactory. Didn’t you
have an exception?

Mr. Klonsky: I have no exceptions, your Honor.

Counsel for the Petitioners made it very clear to the
Court that they were fully content with the charge of the
Court as given. They now attempt to say that they had
previously made their point and were not required to urge
the Court further in the matter. However, from every-
thing that occurred, Petitioners made clear to the Court
that even though they may have previously wished to
except, they finally desired to withdraw any exceptions
previously indicated. The Court did not ask whether there
were any further exceptions to be made but asked whether
Petitioners ‘‘didn’t’’? have an exception and elicited the
response that the Petitioners had no exceptions.

It is submitted that at the termination of the trial,
counsel for the Petitioners realizing that their position in
respect of the alleged violation of the Coast Guard regu-
lation was at best tenuous and believing that the jury would
return a verdict in their favor on other grounds did not
wish to inject any possible charge which might subsequently
be held to be an error of law. Counsel for the Petitioners
were abundantly contented with the charge as a whole and
wished, therefore, to accept this charge without revision
in order to avoid a possible setting aside of the verdict
which they hoped to get. The Petitioners are now disap-
pointed with the result of the verdict and so are complain-
ing that the Court below did not do what the Petitioners
at that time did not, in point of fact, wish the Court to do.
If the Petitioners had actually wished the Court to correct
any errors which they believed existed in connection with
the charge, they would undoubtedly have urged their

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16

requests and taken their exceptions when the Court invited
them to do so.

In numerous decisions, it has been held that a claim
of error is unavailable to a party in the absence of his
request for instructions, and an objection to the instrue-
tions given. Colley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 157 F. 2d
1007 (CCA 4); Meadows v. United States, 144 F. 2d 751
(CCA 4); Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. 2d 395
(CCA 5), cert. den. 338 U. S. 815; Stueber v. Admiral Corp.,
177 F. 2d 777 (CCA 1) cert. den. 336 U. S. 961.

CONCLUSION.

PETITIONERS’ APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD
BE DENIED BECAUSE (1) THE CourT oF APPEAIS CORRECTLY
INTERPRETED THE Coast GUARD REGULATION HOLDING THAT IT
HAD NO APPLICATION TO AN UNLOADING OPERATION: (2) THE
MEANING OF THE REGULATION IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT AND IS
MOOT BECAUSE A NEW REGULATION HAS BEEN SUBSTITUTED: (3)
THERE IS NOTHING ELSE IN THE CASE WHICH MERITS THE CON-
SIDERATION OF THIS COURT BY WAY OF DIVERSITY OF OPINION
AMONG THE CIRCUITS OR OF THIS CouRT OR OTHERWISE.

It is respectfully submitted that the petition should be
denied.

Cuartes W. Wartne,
35 Broad Street,
Charleston, South Carolina,

Water X. Connor,
120 Broadway,
New York 5, New York,

Attorneys for Respondent, Marine
Navigation Company, Inc.

la

APPENDIX.

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in
Court of Appeals.

United States Court of Appeals

For tHe Fourts Circuit.

No. 7141.

Sam McHoney, Hersert Dunmeyer, Jonn Suiru, Franx-
LIN Wuirs, Rosert Jenkins, Cuapet Movzon, Limon
Joyner, Fevix McKnicut, Lurner Moore, THomas Burcu

and Joun Bowens,
Appellants,

vs.

Marine Navication Company, Inc.,
Appellee.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between
counsel for the respective parties hereto that the sole issue
on appeal from the final judgment entered in the cause in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
South Carolina, is as follows:

Did the Court below err in failing to charge the
jury as a matter of law that the U. S. Coast Guard
regulation, referring to sulfur as a dangerously inflam-
mable cargo and requiring a ‘‘fire hose supplied with
fresh water from a shore supply source”’’ at each hatch,
was applicable herein during unloading of sulfur, and
that the violation thereof constituted negligence per se?

Ir IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between
counsel for the respective parties hereto that the following

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

shall constitute the entire record in the cause on appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit; all or part of which may appear in either or both
appendices of the parties herein.

1. All of the pleadings filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina.

2. The Order for judgment of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina
dated December 9, 1954.

3. The judgment entered in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina dated
December 9, 1954.

4. The Opinion and Order of the Honorable Ashton H.
Williams, United States District Judge, dated September
3, 1955.

5. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of
the charge to the jury of the Honorable Ashton H. Williams,
United States District Judge.

6. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of
the colloquy between the Court and counsel following the
charge to the jury.

7. The deposition as read on the trial of the ship’s
master, Karl Seitz, taken March 9, 1954.

8. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of
all statements made and agreements reached at a confer-
ence between the Court and counsel for the parties in
Chambers on November 29, 1954.

9. A transcription of the Court Keporter’s record of
all statements made at a conference between the Court and

,

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

counsel for the respective parties in Chambers on December
1, 1954.

10. The following extract from the closing argument to
the jury of Charles W. Waring, Esquire :—

‘««* * * Then they say, ‘You should have had a hose
attached to a shore installation.’ Well now, the
Coast Guard regulation in existence at that time
states when sulphur is being unloaded—I mean, when
sulphur is being loaded. That is what the regulations
say. The Coast Guard now says that it is intended
that that shall mean unloading as well as loading.
But at that time, as Commander Thompson. testified
that his understanding of the meaning of that regu-
lation was that it applied to loading and not to
unloading.

Well so much for the regulation. Let’s say that
it may have been the proper interpretation at that
time, that it applied to unloading as well as loading.
Suppose it did. Is there any testimony that you know
of in this case that it would have helped put out that
fire to have had fresh water available instead of
salt water? Is fresh water any better for putting
out a fire than salt water? Now what is the differ-
ence and what is the effectiveness of one against the
other?’’

plus that additional portion up to line 3, page 12.

11. A transcription of Court Reporter’s record of objec-
tion by defendant, discussion thereon and Court’s ruling
in reference to offer of testimony through deposition of
Karl Seitz regarding alleged failure to have hose supplied
with fresh water from a shore supply source.

12. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of
the objection by defendant and the ruling of the Court dur-

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

ing the testimony of Ensign Marshall as to applicability of
the United States Coast Guard regulation with reference to
the availability of a hose supplied with fresh water from a
shore supply source.

13. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘11’’, consisting of teletype dis-
patches to and from the Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard.

14. Defendant’s Exhibit ‘‘L’’, consisting of teletype dis-
patches to and from the Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard.

15. Extract from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘17" relative to
the night relief engineer.

16. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘18’’, consisting of an excerpt
from the log of the Charleston Fire Department.

17. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘2’’, consisting of Section N-347,
Table K of the United States Coast Guard regulations

appearing on page 5256 of the Federal Register Reprint
Series No. 57-53.

18. The following extracts from the closing argument
to the jury of Robert Klonsky, Esquire :—

“c# * * You have the violation of the Coast Guard
regulation which has been interpreted to mean load-
ing as well as unloading. The Navy Captain said
there has never been a contrary interpretation. And
the law is fixed, and a violation of that law is
negligence.

* * * > * .

‘* * * You remember very definitely that the Coast
Guard regulation reads, and I will read it word for
word :—

Re TEL, n]

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Stepulation.as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

‘In the loading or unloading of sulphur in bulk,
the following conditions shall be complied with: a
fire hose supplied with fresh water from a shore
supply source shall be available at each hatch
through which sulphur is being loaded.’

‘‘Thereafter, we had Ensign Arnold Marshall, who
came with a communication from the United States
Coast Guard, and he presented to you the fact that
the interpretation of a law, which is a binding inter-
pretation from the date it started,—in this case, 1940,
was that the hazards are equal and therefore the regu-
lation applies to unloading as well as loading, with
respect to having a shore supply source.’’

19. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of
the defendant’s and plaintiffs’ motions for a directed ver-
dict.

20. The following statements setting forth in narrative
form portions of the testimony of various witnesses at the
trial of the cause:

(a) Caspar Miller, a witness for the Plaintiff testi-
fied that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as
Superintendent of the Columbus Street Terminals,
State Ports Authority, Charleston, South Carolina;
that at the Columbus Street Terminal dock, where the
SS. Marine Merchant was moored on that date, there
were hydrants providing hose connections with a shore
supply source of fresh water placed approximately 60
feet apart; that on the South end of the docks there
were located three hydrants and that no hose connec-
tions were located beyond the end of the warehouse
buildings; that the ship was moored toward the South
end of the dock and abreast of where she was moored
there were three fresh water hydrants at a distance of
one foot from the side of the vessel; that he was in his

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Stipulation as to Contents of Fecord in Court of Appeals.

office at the North end of the dock when the fire occurred
and knows nothing in regard to the fire.

(b) Walter J. Kruger, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was a Stevedore
Superintendent of the James Doran Company, which
company was employed at that time to unload the SS.
Marine Merchant; that a gang of longshoremen work-
ing under him was unloading the #2 hatch on the
afternoon of that date; that at about 5 P. M. he was in
an office on the dock about 100 feet from the #2 hold,
when he heard a commotion outside and it was reported
to him that a flash fire had occurred; that he ran on
board and upon arriving found that there were 3 water
hoses putting water into the hold, 2 of which were
from connections on board the vessel and one of which
was from a connection on the dock; that the hose from
the dock was long enough to reach up over the main
deck of the vessel; that when he arrived at the hatch,
he saw smoke but no flame and at that time 2 or 3 long-
shoremen were still below; that the Fire Department
arrived within 5 to 10 minutes after the witness reached
the scene; that generally ships’ hose are rolled upon
the racks but sometimes a hose with water running
from the nozzle, is laid out on the deck near the hatch
being worked ; that he does not remember whether there
was any ship’s hose laid out on the deck on the SS.
Marine Merchant at the time of the fire; that sulphur,
when being unloaded from a vessel, causes dust and
sometimes catches fire; that he had never before seen
a sulphur fire in the hold of a ship but he had seen fires
on railroad cars, and the fires would go out by them-
selves.

(c) Frank Mathis, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that he was employed by James Doran Com-
pany as a header on February 5, 1952; that his position
was bossing the longshoremen in the unloading of the

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

#2 hatch of the SS. Marine Merchant at the time of
the fire; that as he came up the ladder and out of the
mast house, which is forward of the #2 hatch, he heard
hollering and noticed the smoke coming from the #2
hatch opening; that he went to where the ship’s hose
was located on the starboard side of the mast house
and found that this hose was coiled up in the box and
he could not get water out of it; that he then got from
the dock a hose which was near at hand, right by the
+2 hatch and with that put water in the hold; that
after he got the dock hose in operation the ship’s
crew put water on the fire from two ship’s hose; that
he does not know how long these hoses were in opera-
tion before the Fire Department got there but that all
of the men were out of the hold before the Fire Depart-
ment arrived; that he did not see any ship’s hose laid
out on the deck with water running from it before the
fire broke out.

(d) Willie Butler, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that he was employed by James Doran Com-
pany as a hatch tender on February 5, 1952; that on
the afternoon of that date he was working at the #2
hatch on board the SS. Marine Merchant; that his
duties required him to stand on the main deck, just
aft of the +2 hatch, in order to give signals to the
winch operators; that at about 5 o’clock in the after-
noon he saw a flash fire occur in the #2 hold and this
was followed by a lot of smoke which billowed out of
the hold; that the first hose put on the fire was from
the dock and afterward two ship’s hose were used to
put water on the fire; that before the fire broke out
there was a ship’s hose laid out on the deck, near the
aft end of the midsection of the #2 hatch, and water
from this hose was put into the hold; that he does not
know how long it took the Fire Department to arrive
after the fire first commenced but water was put into
the hold before the Fire Department arrived.

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

(e) J. D. Thompson, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was and that he
is a Commander in the United States Coast Guard in
charge of Marine Inspection Office in Savannah,
Georgia, and was authorized by the Commandant of
the Coast Guard to testify in the cause. The witness
produced a communication from the Captain of the
Port to the Commandant of the United States Coast
Guard, and the answer thereto, which are in evidence
marked Defendant’s Exhibit ‘‘L’’. The witness fur-
ther testified that in connection with his inspections of
sulphur vessels, he had previously had occasion to
apply Subsection 6 of the Coast Guard regulation refer-
ring to availability of hose from a shore supply source
of fresh water and he had interpreted such regulation
to mean that it was not applicable during unloading of
sulphur from a vessel; that he had inspected the SS.
Marine Merchant on December 6, 1951, and had found
all safety appliances in order; that he had examined
and tested the ship’s hose and other fire fighting
equipment and found that they met Coast Guard
requirements; that as a result of his inspection he had
given a certificate to the vessel, certifying as to the
safety of the vessel and its appliances; that his inspec-
tion included safety of personnel as well as safety of
the vessel.

(f) Karl Seitz, a witness for the Defendant testi-
fied that he was the Master of the SS. Marine Merchant
on February 5, 1952; that there had been no change in
any of the safety appliances and equipment aboard
the vessel since the inspection made by Commander
Thompson on December 6, 1951; that when the fire
broke out aboard the vessel at about 5 o’clock on Feb-
ruary 5, 1992, he was in his office located behind the
wheel hous? on the bridge deck; that after the relief
mate rang ‘he general alarm it took him about one-half
minute to get to the scene of the fire at the #2 hatch;

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

that the general alarm bell rings throughout the ship;
that when he arrived at the #2 hatch, dense smoke
was coming out of the hold, crew members were putting
water from one hose into the hold and were bringing
another hose to bear from another hydrant; that he
also saw two stevedores operating a hose; that the
Fire Department did not arrive at the scene until 5
minutes after he received his first notice of the fire;
that the Fire Department first used water and then
foamite; that before the Fire Department arrived,
crew members put a Jacob’s ladder into the hold and
went down to see if any longshoremen were still there,
but found none.

(g) Edward E. Gavin, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was an able bodied
seaman employed aboard the SS. Marine Merchant;
that when the fire in the #2 hold broke out he was in
the mess hall and when he heard the general alarm he
ran out on the main deck, a distance of around 40 feet;
that he saw smoke coming out of the hold and a lot of
people around the #2 hatch; that he noticed that a fire
hose was being taken out of the rack but is not sure
whether any hose was being trained on the fire at that
time; that he and another crewman got a Jacob’s lad-
der and put it into the hold and went down to search
for any remaining longshoremen; that it was about
3 minutes from the time he arrived on the scene until
the time he went into the hold and by that time water
had been put into the hold; that he remained in the hold
about 10 or 15 minutes and during that time there was
a lot of water put down in the hold; that there were no
flames, just smoke; that he found no one down there;
that when he came up out of the hold the Fire Depart-
ment was there but he does not know when it arrived;
that the first hose brought to bear upon the fire was
from the #3 hydrant, which is located forward of the

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

midship’s house; that he does not remember whether
ary hose from a shore supply source was brought to
bear upon the fire.

(h) Anthony J. Arent, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as
the second assistant engineer on the SS. Marine Mer-
chant ; that he was standing on the boat deck when he
noticed smoke coming from the #2 hold, immediately
ran down to the engine room, pushed the steam valve
on the fire pump and increased the water pressure on
the fire lines and that full pressure was obtained within
30 seconds from the time that he turned on the valve;
that not more than 2 minutes elapsed between the time
that he first saw the smoke and the time that full water
pressure was obtained on the fire lines; that the night
engineer was in the engine room at the time that the
Witness turned on the steam valve and took over the
watch from the witness; that he went back on the main
deck to the #2 hatch and went down the Jacob’s ladder
into the hold to search for any longshoremen remain-
ing; he stayed in the hold from 10 to 15 minutes but
found no one.

(i) Robert P. Ruse, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as
chief mate on the SS. Marine Merchant; that on the
main deck of the vessel there were 9 fire stations with
hose attached; that the #1 fire station was aft of the
anchor windlass on the port side forward of the #1
hold ; that the #2 fire station was on the starboard side
at the mast house between the +1 and #2 holds; that
the #3 fire station was on the port side between the
#2 and #3 holds; that the #4 fire station was on the
starboard side on the bulkhead of the midships house;
that he was in his office one deck above the main deck
and about 75 feet from the +2 hatch when the night
relief mate ran in and told him there was a fire in the

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

#2 hold; that he directed the night relief mate to sound
the general alarm and increase the water pressure;
that within 10 to 15 seconds the general alarm rang, and
the witness went down on deck to the scene of the fire;
that several crewmen arrived at the #2 hatch at about
the same time as the witness; that he saw the #3 hose
laid out on the deck with water trickling from it under
low pressure and within one-half minute a full head of
water was put into the hold by the crew members man-
ning this hose; that shortly thereafter the #2 hose was
taken from the rack and put in operation on the fire;
that he was not aware of a hose in use from a shore
connection until later but did see one after the Fire
Department arrived; that the Fire Department came to
the scene about 10 minutes after the witness arrived on
the main deck; that he did not observe any flames in the
hold and the smoke cleared up in about 15 minutes;
that prior to the fire, the #3 hose was laying on the
deck with its nozzle through a scupper or chock and
water trickling out of it over the side of the vessel.

(j) Gilbert Morgan, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as
boatswain on the SS. Marine Merchant; that he heard
the general alarm sound and went to the main deck
near the #2 hatch; that on arrival, he found the #3
hose in operation with water directed on the fire; that
he then stretched out the #2 hose and turned on the
valve, thereby obtaining immediate water pressure;
that he put the #2 hose on the fire in the hold; that he
did not notice whether any longshoremen were still in
the hold when he reached the #2 hatch; that he saw
crew members go into the hold within 4 or 5 minutes
after his arrival and they remained below about 10 to
15 minutes while water was directed into the hold; that
the #3 hose was laid out on the deck at 8:00 A. M. on
February 5, 1952, with its nozzle through the chock,
dribbling water over the side.

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Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

(k) Manual Frieias, a witness for the Defendant,
testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as
an ordinary seaman on the SS. Marine M erchant ; that
when he was in the mess hall he heard the general alarm
and went to the main deck at the #2 hold; that the mas-
ter and chief mate were at the scene when he arrived;
that he directed water from the #3 hose upon the fire
in the hold under the supervision of the chief mate; that
at first a small trickle was coming out of the #3 hose
but in a half minute a full pressure of water came from
that hose and was put into the hold; that a few minutes
later the #2 hose was directed on the fire; that the Fire
Department arrived about 10 or 15 minutes after the
witness reached the scene of the fire; that he does not
recall the use of any shore hose until after the arrival
of the Fire Department; that he saw two crew members
go into the hold within 5 or 10 minutes after he got to
the scene and they remained below for about 10 to 15
minutes.

21. Testimony of William Schirmer.

22. Defendant-appellee is not hereby precluded from
incorporating in its appendix any testimony of any witness
or other parts of the proceedings below whether referred
to or not in this stipulation.

Rosert Kionskxy,
I. H. Jacosson,
Attorneys for Appellants.

Caries W. Warne,
Watrer X. Connor,
Attorneys for Appellee.

March 8, 1956.

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13a

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Regulation.

46 Code of Federal Regulations (Cumulative Supplement)
§146.27-100, pages 11120-11121.

In the loading or unloading of sulphur in bulk the fol-
lowing conditions shall be complied with:

(a) When sulphur in bulk is loaded in a deep hold with
general cargo in the Tween Deck hold above the sulphur a
dust proof wooden bulkhead inclosure shall be built in the
hatchways from the over deck of the lower hold to the
weather deck forming a tight enclosure to prevent sulfur
dust entering the Tween Decks during loading.

(b) Holds shall be cleaned of all debris.

(c) Ceiling shall be made tight to prevent sulfur dust
finding its way into the bilges; any chinking necessary in the
way of tank tops or bilges shall be with non-combustible
material.

(d) In order to minimize the movement of fine sulfur
dust during the loading, cowl ventilators serving the hold
into which the sulfur is being loaded shall be blanked off
to prevent circulation of air.

(e) ‘NO SMOKING”? signs shall be conspicuously dis-
played, and the officer in charge of loading shall see that they
are observed.

(f) An oxygen breathing apparatus, or proper gas mask,
shall be made readily available.

(g) A fire hose, supplied with fresh water from a shore
supply source, shall be available at each hatch through
which the sulfur is being loaded. (italics ours)

(h) Upon completion of loading, the sulfur shall be
leveled off and the sulfur dust deposited during the process
of loading, being extremely inflammable, shall be cared for
by sweeping or washing it down. This applies to the decks
and to the overhead structure within the holds.

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Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended Regulation.

(j) After unloading, all residue of sulfur dust shall be
thoroughly cleaned out of cargo holds before loading other
cargo therein.

(k) When sulfur is loaded by metal chute method, pro-
vision shall be made for proper grounding of the chute,
using flexible cable to prevent static discharge.

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended
Regulation.

46 Code of Federal Regulations 146.27-100 (June 10, 1955).

Nore: In the loading, handling and unloading of sulphur
in bulk the following conditions shall be complied with:

(a) When sulphur in bulk is loaded in a deep hold with
general cargo in the tween deck hold above the sulphur a
dust proof wooden bulkhead enclosure shall be built in the
hatchways from the over deck of the lower hold to the
weather deck forming a tight enclosure to prevent sulphur
dust entering the tween decks during loading.

(b) Holds shall be cleaned of all debris.

(c) Ceiling shall be made to prevent sulphur dust find-
ing its way into the bilges; any chinking necessary in the
way of tank tops or bilges shall be with non-combustible
material.

(d) In order to minimize the movement of fine sulphur
dust, cowl ventilators serving the hold into which sulphur is
being loaded or discharged shall be blanked off to prevent
circulation of air.

(e) ‘‘No Smoking”’ signs shall be conspicuously dis-
played, and the officer in charge shall ensure that they are
observed.

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Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended Regulation.

(f) An oxygen breathing apparatus, or proper gas
mask, shall be made readily available.

(g) A fire hose, preferably supplied with fresh water
from a shore supply source, shall be available at each hatch
through which sulphur is being worked. (italics ours)

(h) Upon completion of loading, the sulphur shall be
leveled off and the sulphur dust deposited during the process
of loading, being extremely inflammable, shall be cared for
by sweeping or washing it down. This applies to the decks
and to the overhead structure within the holds.

(j) After unloading, all residue of sulfur dust shall be
thoroughly cleaned out of cargo holds before loading other
cargo therein.

(k) When sulfur is loaded by metal chute method, pro-
vision shall be made for proper grounding of the chute,
using flexible cable to prevent static discharge.

(3861)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0917%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
