# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Click v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0413%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1956 - **Citation:** 350 U.S. 994 ## Text : N 2° 1956 Supreme Court of the Unit States J BAROLD B. WILEY, Cle OCTOBER TERM, 1955. SE No. 653 | E z e as . & aceite Hats C. F. CLICK, Res ey Petitioner, versus JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. Sg 3 ey § “4 e a = & 5 Be = * bi WILL O. Attorney for Petitioner, 100 Law Exchange Building, Jacksonville, Florida. & bs & i Es bd # a % ¥ Pe . . _— LAEGER EG BOM ORE LE EPIL PEL I L LE O ep NY at Binge ed OTE Mica aro Fong? * seals ina . SUBJECT INDEX PAGE I. REFERENCE TO OPINIONS ................ 1 II. CONC:SE STATEMENT JF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS INVOKED ..... 3 Ill. THE CERTIFIED RECORD .................. 3 IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................. 5 ae Sn or ere eee 7 We. BLATEeeers OF PACTS . i... 6066 565.0c se. 8 VII. METHOD OF RAISING FEDERAL QUES- MEET i RAS I eves soko vie ere eel ens 11 Pe I na 54055 6ds sr Naa io ees 13 I £0 brcias bak oo baw ee ee ee 22 ENE. AP ecvevewn A ihaeekisiee ee. 23 1, Deneny Tene i so ee 23 2. Opinion delivered in the Supreme Court of POE rth S ie eka THREE ECE OL CharT 24 3. Order denying Petition for Rehearing ...... 25 4. Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Title 45 .. 26 yt aes wr NT, LE ORF ERIN BNL REE RED IED AI EL DANTE ie BCP SP AT oR ALE Bi OS en ST ILA OP OR PRT Rt —— II CASES CITED PAGE Allbright v. Pennsylvania, 37 A. 2870, certiorari de- nied 65, S.C. 72; 00 L.Ed. 500 ............... 20 Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry . a OL AAR ETEE SE UN Pate 0 TELL BE tL SC ON ae a Yardmaster H. Wilson who is said to have replied “I just thought you were beefing.” Mr. Wilson was one of the plaintiff’s witnesses at the first trial. He testified: “I heard him mention he didn’t like to work around where that weed killer had to be sprayed” (record p. 139). Click made that complaint several times, but there is nothing in Wilson’s testimony that indicates that he had any knowledge that the spray was harmful, and in fact Mr. Wilson did not know what had caused Click’s skin eruption (record p. 141). In fact, to begin with, Click didn’t complain much be- cause he “didn’t know what was eating on him” (record p. 166). Furthermore, the cause has not been definitely deter- mined. Dr. Bowen testified as to his diagnosis of plaintiff in April and May of 1952 (record pp. 179,190), but as to his condition in June of 1951, Dr. Bowen stated that “‘it could have been penicillin, it could have been creosote . . . it could have been any number of things’ (record pp. 242-243). It was not until he compiled his affidavits to oppose the motion for summary judgment that plaintiff attempted to prove notice to the defendant of his condition. And, as has been pointed out, the statements contained in the affidavits are not of facts, but are conclusions that have no probative value. III QUESTION PRESENTED WHERE THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES THAT THE DEFENDANT CARELESSLY AND NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO FURNISH THE PLAINTIFF A SAFE PLACE TO WORK BY SPRAYING THE WEEDS BETWEEN TRACKS WITH A TOXIC AND POI- SONOUS SPRAY, MAY THE PLAINTIFF RECOVER BY PROVING ONLY THAT HE SUFFERED IN- JURY FROM THE SPRAY? This question was and should be answered in the nega- tive. [7] The defendant cannot admit that plaintiff has correctly | stated the question presented. Plaintiff states the question | presented as follows: “Where plaintiff contracted an occupational disease | known as dermatitus from a ‘weed killer’ consisting of _ creosote and diesel oil, a highly toxic and poisonous liquid, wilfully sprayed by defendant on its tracks, yards, roadbed and premises where plaintiff, defendant’s em- ployee, railroading in interstate commerce, was required to walk and work, and the plaintiff became photosensi- tized, burned, poisoned and infected thereby, resulting | in said dermatitus, and the plaintiff brought an action | against defendant under the Federal Employers’ Liabil- ity Act, to which assumption of risk is no defense, and contributory negligence is only a partial defense, did the Supreme Court of Florida properly apply the applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court under said Act in affirming an order entering a summary judgment by the trial court, without submitting the question of proximate cause to the jury?” The question as thus stated assumes the correctness of plaintiff’s position on the very point here in controversy. The plaintiff assumes that the creosote and diesel oil spray is “a highly toxic and poisonous liquid,” but that is not borne out by the record. The question presented is not whether the allegations and proof of defendant’s negligence was sufficient, but whether or not there was any negligence alleged or proven. It is the duty of the carrier to use rea- sonable care to furnish its employees with a reasonably safe place to work, not to insure its employees from all injury. — a The question presented might be fairly stated: “Where the complaint alleges that the defendant care- — lessly and negligently failed to furnish the plaintiff a safe place to work by spraying the weeds between tracks with [8] _" a toxic and poisonous spray, may the plaintiff recover by proving only that he suffered injury from the spray?” IV ARGUMENT It is necessary that the plaintiff prove that the creosote and diesel oil spray was a toxic and poisonous liquid. This he totally failed to do. Plaintiff’s witness, Dr. Jack H. Bowen, said that the use of the spray was no more of a hazard than the normal haz- ards of living (record p. 28); that a normal person would not have a reaction to the spray (record p. 229); that in the case where a person does contract photosensitization from exposure to creosote it is the peculiar, unusual reaction in the body of the person that does it (record p. 244); and that it is a peculiar allergic reaction in the person that is rarely seen which causes him to suffer from photosensitiza- tion (record p. 229). There is no showing that the spray is “highly toxic and poisonous.” Out of several hundred employees of the defendant, plaintiff alone was affected. If the spray had been “highly toxic and poisonous” it would have adversely affected the normal man. It did not affect the normal man. Plaintiff attempts to impute an inference of carelessness or recklessness in the conduct of the defendant by saying that the liquid was “wilfully sprayed by defendant.” The Spray was used intentionally. The spray was known to de- fendant’s chief engineer as an effective means of killing [9] Aten ies Peet et weeds. He had used a similar solution with the Seaboard Air Line Railroad since the year 1947, with no record of any injury (record pp. 42,44). Plaintiff’s medical witness, Dr. Jack H. Bowen, stated that the creosote spray mixture was not harmful to the nor- mal person, and that the only way it could be ascertained to be harmful is to expose a person to it and observe the reaction (record p. 231); but that the risk of using the spray was no more of a hazard than anything else (record p. 28). If by the use of the word “wilfull” plaintiff intends to imply that the spray was used with reckless indifference to safety, that inference is not supported by the record. The answer to this question by the trial court and by the Supreme Court of Florida in the negative is correct. Before the plaintiff can recover under the Federal Employers’ Lia- bility Act he must allege and show negligence on the part of the employer, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. There are many decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while on duty, but the basis of his liability is negligence which must be in whole or in part the cause of the injury. One of the cases to reiterate the rule is Ellis v. Union P.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572, wherein the Court stated: “The Act does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur. And that negligence must be ‘in whole or in part’ the cause of the injury. 45 U.S.C.A. 51, 10A F.C.A. Title 45 Sec. 51; Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 484, 88 L ed. 239, 245 S.Ct. 232.” [10] Te Paget at ~~ es lee Aika SPR ke at ih bet 2 wer ee ne ee ey ene Rt hae re; oc) A ae Se oh RSIS SE SP Se ST eS OE a Pe Pra “~ al takes: iki de 4 ee A previous case is that of Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.ed. 520, Mr. Justice Murphy, writing for this Court, said: “In order to recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that respondent was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause in whole or in part of the fatal accident. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 87 L ed 610, 617, 63 S.Ct. 444, 143 A.L.R. 967.” See also Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.ed. 239, where this Court said: “Liability arises from negligence not from injury un- der this Act. And that negligence must be the cause of the injury. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 87 L. ed 610, 617, 63 S.Ct. 444, 143 A.L.R. 967.” See also the case of Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Berry, 286 U.S. 458, 52 S.Ct. 229, 76 L.ed. 1098. Mr. Justice Stone, in delivering the opinion of this Court, stated: “Proof of negligence by the railroad was prerequisite to recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” The case of Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458, 52 S.Ct. 229, 76 L.ed. 397, is likewise in point. Mr. Justice McReynolds, in delivering the opinion of this Court, stated: “As often pointed out, one who claims under the Federal Act must in some adequate way establish neg- ligence and causal connection between this and the in- jury. New York C. R. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486, 74 L. ed. 562, 50 S. Ct. 198, Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Troops, 281 U.S. 354, 74 L. ed. 899, 50 S.Ct. 281.” In the case of Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 [11] U.S. 587, 49 S.Ct. 442, 73 L.ed. 861, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in delivering the opinion of this Court, stated: “The language of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act shows unmistakably that the basis of recovery is negligence and that without such negligence no right of action is given under this act * * Petitioner contends that the doctrine of law laid down by these decisions are “swept into discard with the adoption of the 1939 amendment to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” Petitioner cites the case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.ed. 610, as authority. The 1939 amendment wiped out every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk. This Court said in that case: “Tt was this maze of law which Congress swept into discard with the adoption of the 1939 amendment to the Employers’ Liability Act, releasing the employee from the burden of assumption of risk by whatever name it was called. ‘he result is an act which requires cases tried under the Federal Act to be handled as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever existed.” Negligence must still be proven in order for an employee to recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The 1939 amendment did not change that rule. See Ellis v. Union P.R. Co., supra, and Brady v. Southern R. Co., supra. Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, employers’ liability is to be determined under the general rule which defines “negligence” as lack of due care under the circum- stances, or failure to do what a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such reasonable and prudent man, under existing circumstances, would not have done. Sheaf v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M. R. Co., 162 F 2d 110. [12] T 0 follow plaintiff’s contention to its logical conclusion would dispense with the necessity of finding negligence and would require every case under the Federal Employers’ Lia- bility Act to be submitted to a jury. But negligence must still be proven in order for an employee to recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The 1939 amend- ment did not change that rule. Ellis v. Union P.R. Co., supra, Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L ed 239. In stating his second question, plaintiff again assumes the correctness of his position on the very point in contro- versy: First, that the spray was poisonous and toxic and willfully used, and secondly, that the plaintiff was compelled to work in contact with the spray after it was known by the defendant to be poisonous. These assumptions are unwar- ranted and not supported by the record. The plaintiff im- putes negligence in that the defendant did not make tests of the mixture before it was used to assure that it would not be harmful, and further, that the defendant was negligent in continuing to use the mixture as a spray and to require the plaintiff to continue to work where it had been sprayed after he had complained about the use of it. The record discloses that plaintiff made some general complaints (record p. 139), but it is not indicated when the complaints were made, or that the yardmaster knew the cause of plaintiff’s skin eruption (record p. 141), or that plaintiff himself knew what caused his ailment until April or May of 1952 (record pp. 176,177, 189,190). If the plaintiff didn’t know the cause of his ailment until May of 1952, and if the yardmasters didn’t know the cause of plaintiff’s ailment, all of which is borne out by the record, then certainly the defendant had no knowledge of any harm to the plaintiff from use of the spray in the month of June 1951, the time complained of by the plaintiff. [13] But plaintiff says that defendant should have known that the spray was harmful, and if not harmful to others, the defendant should have known that it was harmful to plain- tiff. Plaintiff produced as a witness Jack H. Bowen, M.D., of whom plaintiff’s counsel said, “This gentleman is in a highly specialized field; probably not only outstanding in his pro- fession, but in this particular field, probably the most out- standing man in the southeastern part of the United States.” (record p. 238). Dr. Bowen testified that the use of the creosote spray was no more than the ordinary hazards of life (record p. 28), and that probably the only way you could tell whether or not the use of it would be harmful to anyone was to put it out and use it (record p. 231). If the hazard in the use of the spray is no more than the ordinary hazards of life, then the defendant was not negli- gent in using the spray without first making tests or experi- ments. Of the plaintiff’s ailment, Dr. Bowen said, “it is so un- usual to see a photosensitized dermatitis, very unusual . . .” (record p. 231); also, the normal person would not react to the fumes from the spray of creosote and diesel fuel as used by the defendant as a weed killer. “No. The usual person does not react to this. Of course, if they did, they wouldn’t use it down there.” (record p. 230) No reasonable physical examination of the plaintiff would have disclosed his peculiar reaction to the creosote spray: Mr. Murrell: Q “And there is no way to tell whether a person is or is not allergic, as I understand it, Doctor, until such time as the spray has been put out and they have been affected by it; is that correct?” [14] ane Dr. Bowen: A “That is actually the way it is done, usually done, because it is so unusual to see a photo- sensitized dermatitis, very unusual.” (record p. 231) Creamer v. Ogden Union Railway & D. Co., 242 P 2d ; 575, is similar to the instant case. Creamer was a coach _ cleaner for the railroad. He suffered heart injury from over- exertion. The Court stated: se ea) EE Rae Rew ee 7A Dea Se Bw 8 ial, “In a very able brief counsel urge . . . that out of 100 or more coach cleaners defendant should have foreseen the probability that one of them might possess a latent, undetectable physical weakness like plaintiff’s requiring defendant to furnish all coach cleaners with equipment capable of eliminating any manual labor possibly in- imicable to one having such weakness. Such contention, we believe and hold, would strain accepted concepts per- sonal to the mythical but nonetheless legally recognized ordinary prudent man, hitherto recognized by us (Las- agna v. McCarthy, 111 Utah 269, 177 P 2d 734), and, absent statutory requirement to the contrary, would cast a master in the role of insurer against undiscoverable physical eccentricity. The law does not accept such a view either generally (175 A.L.R. 985; Owen v. Roches- ter-Penfield Bus Co., 278 App. Div. 5, 103 NYS 2d 137; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Willhite, 300 Ky. 75, 187 SW 2d 1010; Spencer v. Atchison, T&SF Ry. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 490, 207 P. 2d 126) or under the F.E.L.A. (So. Ry. Co. v. Bell, 4th Cir., 114 F 2d 341; Lowden v. Bowen, 199 Okla. 180, 183 P 2d 980)—but honors the common law principle of ordinary prudence even where there is a failure to supply the latest and safest equip- ment. (Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Craven, 4th Cir., 185 F 2d 176; Lowden v. Bowen, supra). “Under the Act (Federal Employers’ Liability Act) the master’s negligence must be shown before liability arises.” (Lasagna v. McCarthy, supra) [15] Continuing, the Court further stated: | “Where a latent physical defect is not known either by the master or the servant . . . to hold the master liable regardless of such facts, ... is to predicate negligence on some elusive quality of clairvoyance quite inconsistent with principles of reasonable foreseeability. 175 ALR 985. We have held that where products sold in chan- nels of trade result in an injury to a person having an allergy that is not reasonably foreseeable, there can be no recovery, and we believe the reasoning there ap- plicable here. (Bennett v. Pilot Products Co. (Utah) 235 P 2d 525, 26 ALR 2d 958) ie I re “Our sympathy extends to plaintiff, but we must sub- ordinate it, if in the honoring of it we uproot the prin- ciple that, absent statutory requirement, there can be no recovery if no legal duty has been violated. “As to plaintiff's ...cention that denying recovery here denies him a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial, answer is foun”: in the language oi Mr. Justice Wolfc in a case decided ‘s, us (Raymond v. U.P.R. Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P 2d 137) and in decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court (Moore v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 340 US. 573, 71 S.Ct. 428, 95 L ed 574), to the effect that no such deprivation occurs where the facts indisputably establish no right to relief.” he ee ae es se a. SOO see eee In the Bennett case mentioned above, the Court stated : (26 ALR 2d, Text 961): “Appellant appeared to be sensitive to the mixture much the same as some people respond to strawberries, _ —a commodity honored so frequently by the authorities in illustrating difference in liability to the allergic in con- | trast to the normal individual. We believe, that under the facts of this case, the trial judge strained neither ; common sense nor realism in concluding that appellant’s ailment, being the result of an allergy, was not com- pensable as a matter of law. We are syinpathetic with appellant and her misfortune, but cannot require the [16] | —— merchant to assume the role of absolute insurer against physiological idiosyncracy. To do so also would invest the elusive ordinary prudent man with a quality of fore- seeability that would take him out of character com- pletely. Every substance, including food which is daily consumed by the public, occasionally becomes anathema to him peculiarly allergic to it. To require insurability against such an unforeseeable happenstance would weak- en the structure of common sense, as well as present an unreasonable burden on the channels of trade.” In Urie v. Thompson, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L ed. 1282, re- lied on by plaintiff, and in other cases involving silicosis, such as James v. Pennsylvania, 196 F 2d 1021, 101 Fed Supp 241, the employers’ liability has been determined from the negligent and faulty maintenance of the locomotive sand box which permitted the sand dust to escape in unreason- ably large quantities and thus injure the employee. Negli- gence is shown in the faulty maintenance, and the resulting ailment is one common to all people, and to which all peo- ple are susceptible, not an allergic reaction resulting from a physiological idiosyncracy. V CONCLUSION Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act the railroad is not a guarantor nor an insurer of the safety of its em- ployees. The basis of the railroad’s liability is its negli- gence, not the fact that injuries occur. In order for plaintiff to recover in this case, he must allege and prove, not that he was injured, but that the rail- road negligently failed to use reasonable care to furnish him a reasonably safe place in which to perform his duties. This can only be done by showing affirmatively the negligent act or omission which rendered his place to work not reasonably safe to the plaintiff. Then, that negligence must be shown [17] to be the proximate cause, in whole or in part, of the in- juries sustained by the plaintiff. The theory of the complaint in this action is that the defendant carelessly and negligently failed to furnish the plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. The place was the yards of the defendant at Jacksonville, Florida. Plaintiff contends that the diesel fuel-creosote spray rendered the yards unsafe. It may not have been safe for the plaintiff, but it was safe to the normal person, and there is no rea- sonable or foreseeable way in which the harmful effects to the plaintiff could have been anticipated. Plaintiff further contends that defendant required him to continue work after notice of the unsafe condition to plain- tiff. But the plaintiff himself did not know the cause of his injury; defendant’s yardmasters did not know the cause of plaintiff’s injury; and plaintiff’s medical witness could not express an opinion that plaintiff’s injury resulted from the cause alleged. In fact, the medical witness testified that in June of 1951, the date complained of, plaintiff’s injury “could have been penicillin, it could have been creosote. He has had two or three reactions, and it could have been any number of things” (record pp. 242, 243). If the allegations and facts proven in this case are sufficient to state or prove a cause of action, then the resulting allergic reaction to any substance by any employee, no matter how rare or unfore- seeable is sufficient upon which the jury may decide the question of negligence. Such a doctrine could so permeate the entire operation and maintenance of r ‘lroads as to make the business a hodgepodge of the whims and caprices of various juries in all sections of our nation. Such a view would necessarily set up the juries’ conception of what should be standard in place of the careful calculations and experience of engineers and other experts whose studied con- clusions have been the standard heretofore prescribed and followed. [18] The plaintiff is entitled to no presumption of negligence nor can the Court assume, or allow the jury to assume, any negligence merely upon proof of existing conditions. The negligence must be affirmatively shown and that negligence must be proven to be the proximate cause. It is respectfully submitted that, upon a careful con- sideration of the record, it will be found that there is no evidence, or any inference which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, which can sustain a recovery for the plain- tiff. Defendant further respectfully submits that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted _. Etxtiott ADAMS Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 423 Atlantic National Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida. February 27), 1956. McCarty, LANE & ADAMS Of Counsel for Respondent, 423 Atlantic National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida. [19] to be the proximate cause, in whole or in part, of the in- juries sustained by the plaintiff. The theory of the complaint in this action is that the defendant carelessly and negligently failed to furnish the plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. The place was the yards of the defendant at Jacksonville, Florida. Plaintiff contends that the diesel fuel-creosote spray rendered the yards unsafe. It may not have been safe for the plaintiff, but it was safe to the normal person, and there is no rea- sonable or foreseeable way in which the harmful effects to the plaintiff could have been anticipated. Plaintiff further contends that defendant required him to continue work after notice of the unsafe condition to plain- tiff. But the plaintiff himself did not know the cause of his injury; defendant’s yardmasters did not know the cause of plaintiff’s injury; and plaintiff’s medical witness could not express an opinion that plaintiff’s injury resulted from the cause alleged. In fact, the medical witness testified that in June of 1951, the date complained of, plaintiff’s injury “could have been penicillin, it could have been creosote. He has had two or three reactions, and it could have been any number of things” (record pp. 242, 243). If the allegations and facts proven in this case are sufficient to state or prove a cause of action, then the resulting allergic reaction to any substance by any employee, no matter how rare or unfore- seeable is sufficient upon which the jury may decide the question of negligence. Such a doctrine could so permeate the entire operation and maintenance of railroads as to make the business a hodgepodge of the whims and caprices of various juries in all sections of our nation. Such a view would necessarily set up the juries’ conception of what should be standard in place of the careful calculations and experience of engineers and other experts whose studied con- clusions have been the standard heretofore prescribed and followed. [18 ] A ee Sod ae tn % att es eR _ The plaintiff is entitled to no presumption of negligence nor can the Court assume, o. allow the jury to assume, any negligence merely upon proof of existing conditions. The negligence must be affirmatively shown and that negligence must be proven to be the proximate cause. It is respectfully submitted that, upon a careful con- sideration of the record, it will be found that there is no evidence, or any inference which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, which can sustain a recovery for the plain- tiff. Defendant further respectfully submits that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted -_~ ELiiott ADAMS Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 423 Atlantic National Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida. February 27), 1956. McCartuy, LANE & ADAMS Of Counsel for Respondent, 423 Atlantic National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida. [19] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0413%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.