# Reply Brief for the Petitioner — Ward v. Thomas

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0344%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief for the Petitioner
- **Published:** January 1, 1956
- **Citation:** 350 U.S. 958

## Text

FILED
JAN 2) 1956

a

In Tue
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1955

No. 574

Wurm FE, Warp,
Petitioner

Vs.

‘Cxartes 8. Txomas, Secretary of
the Department of the Navy,

Respondent

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF TO
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Marcus BorcHarpr
Cownsel for Petitioner
423 Homer Building

Washington, D. C.

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

- October Term, 1955
No. 574

Wim FE, Warp,
Petitioner
vs.

Cartes S. Tuomas, Secretary of
the Department of the Navy,
Respondent

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF TO
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

In the Brief for Respondent in opposition to the Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, filed herein,
gross inaccuracies appear, as to both the facts and the law,
which require a reply.

First, the “QUESTION PRESENTED” therein is er-
roneously set forthe PETITIONER WAS NOT RE-
MOVED FOR “IMPROPER CONDUCT”, as alleged by
respondent (Resp. Brief, p. 2). He was removed for ‘‘UN-
SATISFACTORY SERVICE’”’,—as he was orally told on
May 7, 1951, and as he was informed at all times there-
after, including the formal “Notification of Personnel Ac-

tion”, a photostat of which appears on page 27 of petition
herein.

Next, the respondent endeavors to convey the faise im-
pression that petitioner contends that; Section 6 of the

2

Act of September 30, 1950, referred to as the Performance
Rating Act of 1950, 5 U.S.C. § 2005, “was intended to limit
discharges for cause under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act”, 5
U.S.C. 652, (Resp. Brief, p. 7). The petitioner, at no time,
raised such a contention. Section 6 of the Act of Septem-
ber 30, 1950, has reference to job performance and not
“misconduct” or “discharges for cause”. It provides for a
procedure to be complied with in the removal of a govern-
ment employee for “unsatisfactory service” or job per-
formance.

At the time of the enactment of this Act, federal em-
ployees were being removed from office on any ground
whatsoever, under regulations promulgated under the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912.

However, at the hearings, pertaining to the 1950 legisla-
tion, representatives of various government employee or-
ganizations, appeared, and urged that where job perform-
ance was involved, federal career workers should be pro-
tected against misuse of laws or administrative regula-
tions, then in effect, governing personnel.

The legislative history of the Act of September 30, 1950,
reveals that Chairman Mitchell and Commissioner Perkins
of the Civil Service Commission considered removal regu-
lations then in effect, adequate in “protecting employees
against arbitrary, capricious or unjust discharge”, for
misconduct, inefficiency or for any other reason. But Con-
gress thought otherwise, and overruled their objections,
and the removal provision in question thus was imcorpo-
rated im the law.

There can be no question that Congress intended to pre-
scribe a procedure in the new law, governing the removal
of federal employees where job performance was involved.

To offset this construction of the law, the respondent
endeavors to suggest (Resp. Brief, p. 14) that although
this may be the construction of the law by a subsequent

zz

Congressional Committee, such later construction “cannot
be invoked to supplant the contemporaneous intent of the
Congress which enacted the particular legislation under
consideration”. There is no such attempt made, whatso-
ever, THE INTENT OF THE CONGRESS THAT EN-
ACTED THE REMOVAL PROVISION OF SECTION 6
OF THE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1950, WAS IDEN-
TICALLY THE SAME AS THE SUBSEQUENT CON-
GRESS CONSTRUED IT TO BE.

As stated in the case of United States v. Henning, 344
U.S. 66, cited by respondent,

“The conclusion is irresistible that . . . Congress
said what it meant and meant what it said.”
Petitioner, in his brief, has set forth specific important
“Reasons for Granting the Writ”. Nowhere in respond-
ent’s brief has exception been taken to such reasons, or
any of them, because the respondent unquestionably recog-
nizes their merit,—that questions of grave and vital im-
portance are involved, affecting several million federal
employees; that the issue involved raises a substantial
question of law for the first time; that a final determina-
tion should be made by this Honorable Court as to the
applicability of Section 6 of the Act of September 30,
1950, where a federal employee’s removal was sought be-
cause of his alleged wnsatisfactory work performance and
mot for “misconduct”.

3

It is respectfully submitted that a Writ of Certiorari
should be granted herein.

Marcus Borcwarptr
Counsel for Petitioner
423 Homer Building
Washington, D. C.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0344%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
