# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Preferred Insurance v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1955
- **Citation:** 350 U.S. 837

## Text

a 3

JUL L1 1855
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United 8. WALEY, C
October Tagmy 55,

PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, MICHIGAN
SURETY COMPANY, a corporation, MID-STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation, and THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA, a corporation,

Petitioners,
US.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
FIDELITY-PHENIX FIRE INSUPANCE CO.,
Petit-oner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
ALBERT G. WHIPPLE,
Petitioner,
US.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
GEORGE STROPECK, ci
Petitioner,
US.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
US.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
ST. LOUIS FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
us.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

WILLIAM H. LEVIT,
210 West Seventh Street,
Los Angeles 14, California,
Attorney for Petitioners.

ALFRED W. NEWMAN,
BERT T. CRESSWELL,
_ HANS A. KRUGER,

_ GEORGE W. MURPHY,
Of Couns,

SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE
Op:nions below 2
Jurisdictional statement 2
Questions presented ...... 2
Statutes and Regulations involved. 3
Statement of the case 3
Reasons and argument for issuance of writ 6
I,
The questions involved are of such importance they should be
settled by this Court. 6
II.

Service incident property damage claims of military personnel
are covered by the Tort Claims Act; the rule of Feres v.
United States as to personal injury claims is not applicable

to property damage claims...... 7
A. The opinion of the Court of Appeals... 000002000... aS
B. The holding of the Feres case 8

C. The statutory treatment of and administrative con-
struction with respect to service incident property dam-

atje claims ; the enactment of the Tort Claims Act.......... 11
1. The Military Personnel Claims Act of May 29,
1945 . 11
2. The General Claims Acts preceding the Tort
Claims Act 12
a. The Gunfire Act of August 24, 1912.00.00. 12
b. The Small Tort Claims Act of December 28,
1922 13

c. The Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943.0... 14

PAGE

3. The Federal Tort Claims Act OE TB scveereirriceons 16

4. The Tort Claims Act covers service incident
property damage claims; Feres v. United States

is not to the contrary 18
III.
The property damage claims here involved were not service
incident 25

A. The test applied by the Courts of Appeals to prop-
erty damage claims was improper and contrary to the
rule of the Feres and Brooks cases 25

B. The administrative allowance of the uninsured claims
under the Military Personnel Claims Act is not here

controlling 28
Conclusion 29
Appendices :

Appendix A. Opinion of the Court of Appeals and Judg-
ments App. p. 1

Appendix B. Opinions of Judge Advocates General....App. p. 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CasEs PAGE
Billings v. Truesdell 321 U. S. 542. 21
Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49. 3, 6, 7, 25
Brown v. United States, 99 Fed. Supp. 685 25
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 >
Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655.......... 21

Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135............ 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 19
20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 111 Fed.

Supp. 899 2
Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111 21
Herring v. United States, 98 Fed. Supp. 69.......2..-..ceecesceseseeee 25
Lund v. United States, 104 Fed. Supp. 756. 26
Samson v. United States, 79 Fed. Supp. 406. 19, 25
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366....

3 Fy Shy Oe
United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110.00... 7, 19, 22, 23, 29
United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 7
United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183 21
United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217 7
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543. 7, 20
Zoula v. United States, 217 F. 2d 81 23

MISCELLANEOUS

1 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 331.......... 13

2 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, pp. 274-275 26
4 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 62.......... 26
4 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 287......16, 26
5 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 68............ 16

Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,
1912-1940, Sec. 709, p. 449 13

PAGE

Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,

1912-1940, Sec. 713, p. 456 13
1 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army, Claims, Sec. 94.3, pp. 65-66. 26
1 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General ot the
Armed Forces, Claims, Sec. 95.5, p. 70 17
1 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
Armed Forces, Claims, Sec. 95.7, p. 71-....-------------sesersesenseseneens 17
2 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
Armed Forces, Claims, Sec. 93.9, p. 63 17
2 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army, Claims, Sec. 94.1, p. tet 26
House Report No. 237 15
RULES
Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 19(1) (b)........ 7
Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 23(5)...........-..- 3
STATUTES
32 Code of Federal Regulations, Regulation 536.22 18

32 Code of Federal Regulations, Regulations 836.92-836.95........ 11
Federal Torts Claims Act (60 Stat. 842, amended by 62 Stat.
933, 982-4, 63 Stat. 62, 101, 106-7, 444)

Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 424(a) (60 Stat. 846)................--- 17
Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 1346(b) 16
Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 2672 16
Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943, Sec. 1 14
Military Claims Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 662) . 14
Military Claims Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 332) ‘aah a

Military Personnel Claims Act a pe Se 14, 15

v.

PAGE
Military Personnel Claims Act of 3-3-49 (9 Stat. 415); of 3-3-
63 (12 Stat. 743); of 3-3-85 (23 Stat. 350); of 7-9-18 (40
Stat. 880) 5 of 3-4-21 (41 Stat. 1436); of 5-29-45 (59 Stat.

225) il
United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1254(1)................ 2
United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1346 ................ 3,
United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Secs. 2671-2680........ 3,
United States Code Annotated, Title 31, Sec. 223(b).............. 9, 17
United States Code Annotated, Title 31, Sec. 322(c) on... 4, 11

United States Code Annotated, Title 31, Sec. 223(d)................ 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1955.

PREFERRED INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation; MicHI-

GAN Surety ComMpaNy, a corporation; Mrip-StatTes —

INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation; and THE Mer-
CANTILE INSURANCE CoMPANY OF AMERICA, a Corpora-
tion,
Petitioners,
US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Anp Five CONSOLIDATED CASES.

Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

To the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the
United States, and to the Honorable Associate Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Petitioners Preferred Insurance Company, Michigan

Surety Company, Mid-States Insurance Company, The

Mercantile Insurance Company of America, Fidelity-

Phenix Fire Insurance Company of New York, Albert

G. Whipple, George Stropeck, Government Employees In-

surance Company and St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance

Company, respectfully petition that writs of certiorari

eile

issue to review the judgments of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, entered in the above
cases on May 9, 1955.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals’ has not. yet been
reported. The opinion of the District Court is reported at
111 Fed. Supp. 899, sub nom. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. United States [R. 22-37]?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals were entered
May 9, 1955. No rehearings were requested, nor has any
order been made extending the time within which to peti-
tion for certiorari.

Jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgments of
the Court of Appeals is conferred by 28 USCA sec.
1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Are service incident property damage claims of
military personnel within the coverage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act?

2. In view of the completely different statutory history
and treatment of service incident property damage and

eel

Hereafter referred to as Opinion and reproduced in Appendix
“A,” pp. 1-13. Page references herein to the Opinion will be to
Appendix “A.”

2The Record references herein are to the Transcript of Record
before the Court of Appeals which has been filed with this Court
pursuant to Rule 21.

a

personal injury claims, is the rule of Feres v. U. S.,
340 U. S. 135, that service incident personal injury
claims are not covered by the Tort Claims Act, appli-
cable to such property damage claims?

3. Is it contrary to Brooks v. U. S., 337 U. S. 49,
and Feres v. U. S., supra, to hold that damage to property
of military personnel negligently caused by the govern-
ment, must be held to be service incident where, at the
time of damage, the property is located in a government
facility that the soldier is making use of voluntarily for
his own convenience and not pursuant to any military
orders or while on a military mission?

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED.

These suits involve the Federal Tort Claims Act (60
Stat. 842, amended by 62 Stat. 933, 982-4, 63 Stat. 62,
101, 106-7, 444; now 28 USCA secs. 1346, 2671-2680),
which act, for the sake of clarity and continuity, will be
referred to in more detail hereinafter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The consolidated cases* arose out of the crash of a
B-29 Air Force plane at Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base,
California, on August 5, 1950, as a result of the alleged

(a e

8These six cases involving identical questions were consolidated
for hearing both in the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
The plaintiffs and appellants in each of the six cases have joined
in this single petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 23, (5) of
the Rules of this Court.

ae

negligence of the government personnel in charge. The
resulting explosion and fire damaged a number of house
trailers owned and occupied by Air Force personnel as-
signed to the Base, and their families, which trailers were
parked in a trailer park located on the Base. The use of
the trailer park by the personnel was vuluntary and for
their convenience, and not under the compulsion of any
military orders; they could have lived off the Base had
they preferred. They paid rental to the government for
the trailer space occupied, and drew the regular quarters
allowance paid to personnel not furnished government
quarters. The trailer owners had no duties with respect
to the plane that crashed. At the time of the crash, they
were variously located, some on and some off duty, in the
trailer park, at other places on the Base, in neighboring
communities, and at other military installations in the
United States and overseas [R. 3-9, 12-17].

Petitioners, the insurers of the various trailers, paid the
respective owners the amounts of the losses, which pay-
ments totaled $68,340.57. The owners had other unin-
sured property that was damaged and for which they
made claim and were reimbursed by the government under
the Military Personnel Claims Act, 31 USCA, sec. 222(c).
Ti + claims of the insurers were not compensable under

ee

‘The Opinion inadvertently refers to the total amount of the
losses as $49,661. This latter figure represents the amount in-
volved in the Preferred Insurance Co. case.

a

that Act, as the Regulations under the Act exclude sub-
rogated claims’ [R. 6-7, 15, 18-20].

Petitioners then brought these suits in the District
Court under the Tort Claims Act (28 USCA, secs. 1346,
2671, et seq.) to recover the amounts of their respective
loss payments by virtue of their rights of subrogation
(See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338
U. S. 366).

The District Court dismissed the suits on the ground
that the Military Personnel Claims Act was the exclusive
remedy of military personnel for service incident property
damage, and therefore such claims were not covered by
the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed on
the ground that the rule of the Feres case with respect to
service incident personal injury claims was applicable to
property damage claims and because it found these claims
to be service incident.°

'The said Act and Regulations also contain many other restric-
tions and exclusions that apply directly to the claims of military
personnel, as will be noted infra.

*While these cases involve subrogated claims, the Opinion makes
clear that it necessarily and directly applies to all military personnel
(and not merely their insurers) and denies them the right to make
claim under the Tort Claims Act for service incident property

damage.

ain

REASONS AND ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF
WRIT.

I

The Questions Involved Are of Such Importance They
Should Be Settled by This Court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals denies to military
personnel the right to make claim under the Tort Claims
Act for service incident property damage, and leaves such
personnel with only the restricted coverage provided by the
Military Personnel Claims Act for such claims. As au-
thority, the Opinion relies entirely on Feres v. U. S.,
supra, which dealt only with service incident personal
injury claims. In reaching its decision, the Court of Ap-
peals has ignored and refused to consider the completely
different statutory background and treatment of, and ad-
ministrative construction with respect to, service incident
property damage and personal injury claims, which it is
felt establish that service incident property damage claims
are covered by the Tort Claims Act, and that the Feres
decision is inapplicable thereto.

Also, it is felt that the rule announced by the decision
as to whether property damage is service incident is in
conflict with the rule of the Feres and Brooks cases, and
improperly and substantially restricts the property damage
claim rights of military personnel.

While these questions are here raised by insurance com-
pany subrogees, there can be no question but that the
decision directly affects and applies to military personnel.

Because these cases involve important questions of in-

terpretation and coverage of the Tort Claims Act that
have not been decided by this @ourt and that substantially

—

me

affect the property damage ciaim rights of all members
of the armed forces, and involve the application of the
Feres and Brooks cases to these issues, it is submitted
that these questions should be settled by this Court (Re-
vised Rules, S. Ct. U. S., Rule 19, (1) (b))."

II.

Service Incident Property Damage Claims of Military
Personnel Are Covered by the Tort Claims Act;
the Rule of Feres v. United States as to Personal
Injury Claims Is Not Applicable to Property Dam-
age Claims.

A. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The Opinion notes that the Feres case dealt only with
service incident personal injury claims, but concludes that
the considerations that led to the Feres decision are
equally applicable to service incident property damage
claims. In reaching this conclusion the Opinion notes
(pp. 6-7) the stress placed in the Feres opinion on the
comprehensive system of benefits that Congress had pro-
vided over the years to take care of service incident per-
sonal injury claims. The Opinion then attempts to analo-

'This Court has granted certiorari in the following cases involv-
ing the construction and interpretation of the Tort Claims Act,
because of the importance of the question involved, or to determine
the proper application of its previous decisions to the question at
issue: Brooks v. U. S., 337 U. S. 49 (coverage of non-service in-
cident personal injury claim of soldier) ; U. S. v. Spelar, 338 U. S.
217 (coverage of claim arising at airbase in Newfoundland) ; U. S.
v. Aetna Cas. & S. Co., 338 U. S. 366 (coverage of claim of
subrogee) ; U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (impleading
U. S. as a third party defendant) ; Dalehite v. U. S., 346 U. S. 15
(liability of government for discretionary acts); U. S. v. Gilman,
347 U. S. 507 (right of U. S. to recover indemnity from em-
ployee); U. S. v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110 (coverage of claim for
injury sustained by veteran in Veterans Hospital).

ee

gize this personal injury system of benefits to the Military
Personnel Claims Act of 1945, which provides certain
claim benefits to soldiers for service incident property
damage. In this connection, the Opinion states that this
latter Act is “more liberal, adequate and satisfactory than
any of its predecessor acts” (p. 7); that a Congressional
Report preceding the passage of the Act referred to it as
a “single” statute for the settlement of such claims (p. 7,
footnote 1); and that.this Act provides “a simple, certain
and uniform method of compensation for service incident
property damage” (p. 9). Having thus satisfied itself
that the analogy between the treatment of personal injury
and property damage claims is complete, the Opinion con-
cludes that the “rationale” of Feres is applicable here,
and that service incident property damage claims are not
cavered by the Tort Claims Act (p. 9).

B. The Holding of the Feres Case.

Because the Opinion is based entirely on its conclusion
that the “rationale” of Feres is valid here, it is important
to first examine Feres and the problem of statutory con-
struction there involved.

In reaching its conclusion in that case that Congress
did not intend the Tort Claims Act to cover service in-
cident persanal injury claims, this Court considered it
important to note the pre-Tort Claims Act treatment of
such claims. This disclosed that over the years Congress
had provided a comprehensive and liberal system of simple,
certain and uniform benefits applicable to all soldiers and
all service incident injuries, and with remedies provided
for the enforcement thereof; further, it was noted that
no federal law had ever recognized such claims, but on the
contrary the claims statutes applicable to civilians gener-

aalins

ally, excluded service incident personal injury claims of
military personnel.®

That the foregoing played a heavy part in the conclu-
sion reached is evidenced by the following excerpts from
the Feres opinion :*

“This Act, however, should be construed to fit, so
far as will comport with its words, into the entire
statutory system of remedies against the Government
to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole”
(p. 139).

“The primary purpose of the Act was to extend
a remedy to those who had been without; if it in-
cidentally benefited those already well provided for,
it appears to have been unintentional. Congress was
suffering from no plague of private bills on behalf
of military and naval personnel, because a compre-
hensive system of relief had been authorized for
them and their dependants by statute” (p. 140).

“We know of no American law which ever has

permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against
either his superior officers or the government he is

serving” (p. 141).

“We find no parallel liability before and we think
no new one has been created by this Act. Its effect
is to waive immunity from recognized causes of ac-

snk for example, Military Claims Act of 1943, 31 USCA, sec.
(b).
In Dalehite v. U. S., 346 U. S. 15, 31-32, footnote 25, this Court
characterized the basis of its decision in the Feres case as follows:
“The existence of a uniform compensation system for in-
juries to those ing to the armed services led us to con-
clude that Congress not intended to depart from this sys-
~ and allow recovery by a tort action dependent on state
-_—

_

tion and was not to visit the Government with novel
and unprecedented liabilities” (p. 142).

“No Federal law recognizes a recovery such as
claimants seek. The Military Personnel Claims Act,
31 USCA sec. 223(b), FCA title 31, sec. 223(b)
(Now superseded by 28 USCA sec. 2672 [The Tort
Claims Act]) permitted recovery in some circum-
stances, but it specifically excluded claims of military
personnel ‘incident to their service.”°

“This court, in deciding claims for wrongs incident
to service under the Tort Claims Act, cannot escape
attributing some bearing upon it to enactments by
Congress which provided systems of simple, certain
and uniform compensation for injuries or death of
those in armed services. * * * If Congress had
contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to
apply in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why
it should have omitted any provision to adjust these
two types of remedies to each other. The absence
of any such adjustment is persuasive that there was
no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to
permit recovery for injuries incident to military ser-
vice” (p. 144).

“The compensation system, which normally re-
quires no litigation, is not negligible or niggardly
* * *” (p. 145).

The reference to the Military Personnel Claims Act was inad-
vertent, as the citation is to the Military Claims Act, supra, to
which the Court was obviously referring. Likewise, the reference
to claims excluded by that act must be deemed to be to personal
injury claims, with which the Court was concerned, and not to
property damage claims. As will be pointed out hereafter, service
incident property damage claims were covered under the Military
Claims Act.

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C. The Statutory Treatment of and Administrative Con-
struction With Respect to Service Incident Property
Damage Claims; the Enactment of the Tort Claims Act.

1. Tue Mititrary Personnet Craims Act or May
29, 1945 (59 Stat. 225; now, as amended, 31 USCA,
sec. 222(c)).

Since 1849, Military Personnel Claims Acts have been
available to military personnel with respect to service
incident property damage claims." While each of these
acts has been broader than its predecessor, basically, each
was (and is) simply an act of grace reposing complete
discretion in the administrative department concerned to
allow or reject any claim in whole or in part (subject to
the exclusions and restrictions in the Act and Regula-
tions); and no remedy is provided in the event of a
rejected or reduced claim.

These exclusions and restrictions are numerous and
broad. The 1945 Act (31 USCA, sec. 222(c)) ex-
cludes coverage for property (as to kind or amount) that
is not considered to be reasonable, useful, necessary, or
proper under the attendant circumstances, or where the
loss occurs at quarters occupied by the claimant which are
not assigned to him or otherwise provided in kind by the
Government; and since 1952, no claim may be made in
excess of $2500.00. The Regulations adopted by the
Secretary of Defense pursuant to the Act (32 C. F. R.
836.92-836.95) further exclude recovery for loss or dam-
age to motor vehicles (except in special circumstances
which may be presented for “consideration”), expensive

Mili Personnel Claims Acts of 3/3/49 (9 Stat. + id (40
3/3/63 (12 Stat. 743); of 3/3/85 (23 Stat. 350); of 7 as
Stat. 880) ; of 3/4/21 (41 Stat. 1436) ; of 5/29/45 (59 Gee:

31 US sec. 222(c)).

= on

articles, unnecessary property, jewelry, money (except
limited amounts deposited for safekeeping), clothing being
worn, transportation and baggage losses not conform-
ing to government requirements as to weight, etc., and
losses which have been recovered or are recoverable from
an insurer.”

It is apparent that this Act and the restricted benefits
provided by it are in no sense analogous to the personal
injury statutes and benefits considered in the Feres case.

2. THe GENERAL CLaims Acts PRECEDING THE Tort
Craims Act.

Since 1912, with the exception of the 1943-45 period,
Congress has provided that service incident property dam-
age claims of military personnel were covered under the
claim statutes applicable to civilians generally, and were
not restricted to the limited benefits of the Military Per-
sonnel Claims Act.

a. The Gunfire Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 586).

This was the first general claims act covering property
damage claims incident to noncombat activities of the
Army. It authorized the Secretary of War to consider

12The restricted coverage provided by this Act is illustrated by
the instant record. The sample claim attached to the Stipulation of
Facts [R. 18-20] shows that the soldier involved claimed he had
sustained a total property loss of $4857.49, of which $3200.00 was
covered by insurance and $1657.49 was uninsured. The insured
portion was not part of the claim because of the exclusion of in-
sured claims. The uninsured claim of $1657.49 was only allowed
in the sum of $852.25. Several of the trailers were damaged in
excess of $2500.00 [R. 7], and since 1952, no claim in excess of
that amount could be allowed, even if uninsured. And motor
vehicle damage could be allowed only because this occurrence was
classed as a public disaster [R. 36].

ee ae

and adjust “all claims” for damage to private property
not in excess of $1000 resulting from noncombat activ-
ities of the Army, with provision for Congress to appro-
priate the funds to pay allowed claims.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army ruled that
this act covered service incident property damage claims
of military personnel,“* and Congress appropriated the
funds over the years to pay such claims.

b. The Small Tort Claims Act of December 28, 1922
(42 Stat. 1066).

This was the first general tort claims act. It author-
ized department heads to consider and adjust “any claim”
for negligent damage to “privately owned property” up
to $1000 caused by the negligence of government em-
ployees. Allowed claims were certified to Congress for
payment; and claims over $1000 required a special Con-
gressional bill in order to be paid.

Again, the Judge Advocate General of the Army ruled
that this act covered service incident property damage
claims of military personnel,’* and Congress appropriated
the funds over the years to pay such claims.

Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,
1912-1940, p. 449, sec. 709. For the convenience of the Court,
Judge Advocate General opinions referred to in this Petition are
Teproduced in Appendix “B” hereto. This particular opinion will
be found at para. 1, p. 17, App. “B.”

“Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,
1912-40, p. 456, sec. 713.

(For this opinion, see para. 2(a), p. 18, App. “B”.)

1Bull. JAG 331. The reference is to Bulletins, Judge Advocate
General of the Army.)

(For this opinion, see para. 2(b), p. 18, App. “B”.)

elite

c. The Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943 (57 Stat.
372; now, as amended, 31 USCA, sec. 223(b)).

This Act, when enacted, authorized the Secretary of
War to consider and pay “any claim” for personal injury
or property damage (negligent or non-negligent), subject
to Regulations prescribed by him, caused by military
personnel and arising out of noncombat activities of the
War Department” not exceeding $500" in amount, with
provision for claims’ over that amount to be reported by
the Secretary of War to Congress for its consideration.

Section 1 excluded from its coverage “claims for dam-
age to or loss or destruction of property of military per-
sonnel or civilian employees of the War Department or of
the Army, or for personal injury or death of such per-
sons, if such damage, loss, destruction, injury or death
occurs incident to their service.”

Since this Act covered both negligence and non-negli-
gence claims against the Army, section 4 provided that the
Small Tort Claims Act of 1922, supra, was thereafter
inapplicable to the War Department, and that the Gunfire
Act of 1912, supra, was repealed.

As a result, service incident property damage claims
were thereafter (until 1945) covered only under the Mil-
itary Personnel Claims Act.

In 1945, Congress amended the Military Claims Act of
1943 so as to provide for the inclusion thereunder of
service incident property damage claims of military per-
sonnel. This amendment was contained in section 4 of the

15Jn 1945 (59 Stat. 662) this act was extended to include the
Navy Department. (See 31 USCA, sec. 223(d)).

16Jy 1946, this amount was increased to $1000 (60 Stat. 332).

—15—

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, supra, which pro-
vided as follows:

“Sec. 4. That portion of section 1 of the Act of
July 3, 1943 (Military Claims Act) reading as fol-
lows: ‘The provisions of this Act shall not be appli-
cable * * * to claims for damage to or loss or
destruction of property of military personnel or civil-
ian employees of the War Department or of the
Army, or for personal injury or death of such per-
sons, if such damage, loss, destruction, injury or
death occurs incident to their service’ is hereby
amended * * * to read as follows: ‘The provi-
sions of this Act shall not be applicable * * * to
claims for personal injury or death of military per-
sonnel or civilian employees of the War Department
or of the Army if such injury or death occurs inci-
dent to their service.’

11In footnote (1) of its Opinion (pp. 7-8), the Court of Appeals
quotes at length from House and Senate Reports on the 1945 Mili-
tary Personnel Claims Act which contain language indicating that
said Act was intended to provide a “single” remedy for service in-
cident property damage claims, This language appears to have been
responsible for the erroneous conclusion of the District Judge that
the Military Personnel Claims Act was the exclusive remedy for
such claims. By including this reference in its Opinion and by
other statements contained therein, it appears that the Court of
Appeals fell into the same error. In this connection it should be
noted that to House Report 237 (quoted in said footnote (1)),
there were attached letters from the Judge Advocate General and
the Secretary of War.(who apparently drafted the 1945 Act) in
which they point out that the 1945 amendment (sec. 4, supra) was
intended to restore to military personnel, service incident property
damage claim rights that had been taken away by the 1943 Military
Claims Act (and which deprivation had resulted in damage to troop
morale), by amending the Military Claims Act of 1943 so that it
would thereafter cover such claims. In any event, the 1945 amend-
ment itself is unambiguous and does so provide, and the inadvertent
use of the word “single” in said Reports can be of no significance.

piel

Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General of the Army
ruled that the Military Claims Act of 1943 covered serv-
ice incident property damage claims,’* and such claims
were paid by funds appropriated by the Congress.

(3) Tue Feperat Tort Crarms Act or 1946 (60 Stat.
842, amended by 62 Stat. 933, 982-4, 63 Stat. 62,
101, 106-7, 444; now 28 USCA secs. 1346, 2671-
2680).

In 1946, the same (79th) Congress that enacted the
Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, enacted the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. Section 2672 of the Act provides
for administrative settlement of claims not exceeding
$1,000:

“Sec. 2672. The head of each federal agency may
consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any
claim for money damages of $1,000 or less against
the United States * * * for injury or loss of
property or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred. * * *”

Section 1346(b) of the Act provides that suit may be
brought against the Government in the District Court on
all such claims, whether for more or less than $1,000.

184 Bull. JAG 287.

(For this opinion, see para. 3(a), p. 19, App. “B”.)
5 Bull. JAG 68.

(For this opinion, see para. 3(b), p. 20, App. “B”.)

cesiliiies

Section 424(a)" of the Act provided that all statutes
which authorized the administrative adjustment of claims
for property damage and personal injury due to the negli-
gence of government employees “are hereby repealed in
respect of claims cognizable” under the Act, and the Mili-
tary Claims Act of 1943 was specifically mentioned as
one of the statutes so repealed pro tanto. The net effect
of this repeal was to leave the latter act in force as to
non-negligence claims, and to transfer negligence claims
(both under and over $1,000) previously cognizable under
that act to the Tort Claims Act.”

Since the passage of the Tort Claims Act, the Judge
Advocates General of the services have ruled that service
incident property damage claims of military personnel are
covered under the Tort Claims Act as well as the other.
two acts.” And Congress has undoubtedly appropriated
the funds for payment of such claims.

The reference is to 60 Stat. 846, as this section of the Act has
never been codified.

°To this effect, see Historical Note entitled “Repeals” following
31 USCA, sec. 223(b) (Military Claims Act of 1943).

This repeal of the Military Claims Act by the Tort Claims Act
was noted by this Court in the Feres case (p. 144):

“The Military * * * Claims Act * * * (now super-
seded by 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2672) * * *”

211 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 95.7, p. 71. (The reference is to
ao “§ Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the Armed

orces.

(For this opinion, see para. 4(a), pp. 20-21, App. “B”.)

1 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 95.5, p. 70.

(For this opinion, see para. 4(b), pp. 21-23, App. “B”.)

2. Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 93.9, p. 63.
(For this opinion, see para. 4(c), pp. 23-24, App. “B”.)

on

(4) Tue Tort Craims Act Covers Service INCIDENT
Property Damace Cxiaims; Ferss v. U. S. Is Nor
TO THE CONTRARY.

In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that the only
reasonable conclusion is that in enacting the Tort Claims
Act, Congress imtended that service incident property
damage claims were to be covered thereunder.

Property damage claims of military personnel, both
service incident and non-service incident, and negligent
and non-negligent, arising out of noncombat activities of
the Air Force, were covered by the Military Claims Act
of 1943 prior to enactment of the Tort Claims Act.”
That act provided for administrative handling of claims
not in excess of $1,000, and for a Congressional bill if
over $1,000. The Military Claims Act was superseded
(as to negligence claims) by the Tort Claims Act. The
two statutes contain almost identical language as to claims
covered: “any claim against the United States * * *
for damage to or loss or destruction of property” (Mili-
tary Claims Act); “any claim against the United States
for myury or loss of property” (Tort Claims Act). The
superseding of the Military Claims Act by the Tort Claims
Act was in general language and it would be a strained
construction to hold that what Congress meant thereby
was that all negligence claims covered by the Military
Claims Act, except service incident property damage
claims of military personnel, were transferred to the Tort

22The claims here sued upon would have been so covered, since
they arose out of allegedly negligent noncombat activities of the
Air Force, and claims of subrogees were not excluded from cov-
erage under the Military Claims Act (32 C. F. R. 536.22).

canine

Claims Act.” And this conclusion finds confirmation in
the long standing Congressional policy that accorded mili-
tary personnel the same claim rights as civilians with re-
spect to such claims.

In the Feres case, with respect to service incident per-
sonal injury claims, this Court made the following sig-
nificant statements, some of which were quoted in U. S.
v. Brown, supra, 348 U. S. 110:

“We know of no American law which ever has per-
mitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against
either his superior officers or the government he is
serving (p. 141). * * * We find no parallel
liability before and we think no new one has been
created by this Act. Its effect is to waive immunity
from recognized causes of action and was not to visit
the Government with novel and unprecedented lia-
bilities (p. 142). * * * No federal law recog-
nizes a recovery such as claimants seek. The Mili-
tary * * * Claims Act, 31 USCA sec. 223(b)
* ¥* * (now superseded by 28 USCA sec. 2672),
permitted recovery in some circumstances, but it spe-
cifically excluded claims of military personnel ‘inci-
dent to their service’ (p. 144).”

While this language correctly describes the situation
with respect to service incident personal injuries, it is ap-
parent that precisely the opposite situation exists with
respect to service incident property damage claims. The
very Military Claims Act of 1943 referred to in the Feres

**For a case analyzing this superseding of the Military Claims
Act by the Tort Claims Act in an analogous situation and holding
that latter “must therefore be construed in the light of the law
which it supplanted”, see Samson v. U. S. (S. D., N. Y.), 79 Fed.
Supp. 406. ;

—20—

case (and prior federal claims statutes) covered service
incident property damage claims of military personnel.
So that as to such claims, in the language of Feres, there
was a “federal law (which) recognizes a recovery such
as claimants seek”; therefore, to hold that the Tort Claims
Act covers such claims is “not to visit the Government
with novel and unprecedented liabilities.”

The foregoing finds confirmation in this Court’s analy-
sis of the Tort Claims Act in U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co.,
340 U. S. 543, 548-9, where this Court stated:

“The words ‘any claim against the United States
_ . . om account of personal injury’ (emphasis sup-
plied) are broad words in common usage. They are
not words of art. * * *

This Act does not subject the Government to a
previously unrecognized type of obligation. Through
hundreds of private relief acts, each Congress for
many years has recognized the Government’s obliga-
tion to pay claims on account of damage to or loss
of property or on account of personal injury or death
caused by negligent or wrongful acts of employees of
the Government. This Act merely substitutes the
District Courts for Congress as the agency to de-
termine the validity and amount of the claims. It
suggests no reason for reading into it fine distinctions
between various types of such claims.”

In light of the admimistrative and Congressional bill cov-
erage of service incident property damage claims by the
Military Claims Act, to hold that such claims are covered
by the Tort Claims Act “does not subject the Govern-
ment to a previously unrecognized type of obligation.”
Moreover, the administrative construction under the
Tort Claims Act and under the claims statutes it super-

—

seded that service incident property damage claims were
covered thereunder, coupled with Congressional confirma-
tion and ratification of such construction by appropria-
tion of funds for payment of such claims, is entitled to
the greatest weight in determining the Congressional in-
tent with respect to this issue. To this effect, see:

Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, 116;

U. S. v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183, 193;

Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 552-3;

U. S. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 338 U. S.
366, 376-7;

Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S. (C. A. 9), 167
F. 2d 655, 657.

The Court of Appeals in its disposition of this case has
simply refused to consider or discuss this important prob-
lem of statutory construction and background, although
the same was fully presented in petitioners’ briefs. In this
connection, the Opinion does no more than cite the prior
claims statutes, and then summarily dismiss them as im-
material because they did not contain a suit provision, and
hence created no “liability” on the government (Op. pp.
8-9).

But, for the reasons heretofore noted, this cannot be
an adequate or tenable treatment of this issue. The cov-
erage of service incident property damage claims by the
administrative and Congressional bill provisions of the
Military Claims Act and prior acts was a recognition of
“a recovery such as claimants seek” and of the Govern-
ment’s “obligation” to pay such claims. Since it was con-
sidered material that these prior claims statutes excluded
service incident personal injury claims, as pointed out
in the Feres case supra, (p. 144), such statutes may not

wna

now be dismissed as immaterial where it is shown they
covered service incident property damage claims simply
because they did not permit suit. Moreover, no one could
sue the government for negligence before adoption of the
Tort Claims Act; therefore, the absence of a previous
right to sue cannot be relevant to a determination of
whether a particular group of claimants are covered under
the Act. For example, in determining whether subrogees
were intended to be covered by the Act, it has been held
material that their claims had been held to be covered
under these same prior claims statutes (See U. S. v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 338 U. S. 366, 376-377).

We are aware that in Feres, this Court was influenced
in part by its conclusion that suits for service incident
personal injury claims might have an adverse effect on
military discipline, having in mind the relation of the
soldier to his superiors (U. S. v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110).

But this ground of the decision cannot be isolated from
the problem of statutory construction and statutory back-
ground that was there presented. In Feres, this court did
not purport to substitute its judgment for that of Con-
gress as to whether soldiers should be permitted to sue the
government for service incident personal injuries; its
only purpose was to arrive at the Congressional intent. As
has been noted, in arriving at such intent an analysis of
the pre-Tort Claims Act treatment of such claims was
necessarily of prime significance. In the light of such
statutory background, to have there held that the Tort
Claims Act covered such personal injury claims would
have ‘been to attribute to Congress a completely unex-

nein

pressed intent to provide an entirely new and additional
remedy, in a situation where there was no need therefor.
Moreover, the Feres decision resulted in no restriction
whatsoever of existing service incident personal injury
claim benefits.

But it is a far cry from this situation to hold, as the
Court of Appeals does, that soldiers are to now be re-
stricted to the iimited benefits of the Military Personnel
Claims Act for service incident property damage,™* and
deprived of claim rights that have been accorded them
under the Tort Claims Act, because that Court concluded
that the benefits provided by the Military Personnel Claims
Act are sufficient and because such a conclusion may avoid
“serious disruption of military mission” (Op. p. 9).

It is submitted that to apply Feres to property damage
claims is a distortion of the holding in that case that here
results in a substantial restriction of the claim rights of

**A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Zoula v. U. S., 217 F. 2d 81. In that
case, it was held that service incident property damage claims
were excluded from coverage under the Tort Claims Act upon
the following grounds (1) a citation of the District Court Opinion
herein, (2) an approval and adoption of the argument of the gov-
ernment (made on appeal in both the Zoula case and the instant
cases) that “the complete and comprehensive system of administra-
tive compensation” provided by the Military Personnel Claims Act
“precludes resort by members of the armed services to the Tort

ims Act for a | property damage”; and (3) a strong intima-
tion that the Feres case really overruled the Brooks case wherein
it had been held that non-service incident personal injury claims
of military personnel were covered by the Tort Clairns Act. But
in U. S. v. Brown, supra, 348 U. S. 110, this Court held directly
contrary to points (2) and (3) and it would therefore that
the Zoula case is entitled to no weight. However, it adds to the
confusion surrounding the problem involved here, which should be
cleared up by this Court.

266

military, persennel,,, and: substitutes:.a.. judicial: opinion: of:
what.the law.should. be in.place.of what: Congress ‘has said.
it should be. Congress, in the exercise: of - its. powers,:
and no doubt because. of the many different factors. in-
volved, has seen fit over the years to treat service incident
personal injury and property damage claims in a completely
different. manner, and-it:is: not 'the :province of any court
to.interfere-.with..such-:policy.

Moreover; aetual- experience: has shown that, while-per-
miitting .claimis:for-service -incident personal injury claims:
under the:-Tort-Claims Act might: well: pose:serious prob--
lems with respect to.military discipline, this. has not proven.
to be so .with respect to service incident property damage.
claims, no doubt because of the different factors involved..
From 1946 to at least 1953 (when the District Judge an-
nounced his decision herein); the Tort Claims Act, as
noted:above;:has: been construed :to«inchide ‘service incident
property s damage:. claims,:, and this: period. included: the:
Korean.conflict.. And there has. been:.no indication from.
any source that such coverage had any adverse effect on.
military discipline or efficiency; on the contrary, were
soldiérsto. go uncompensated” for~ service incidént * prop-
erty, -damage::losses.resulting;: from:the-negligence: of thes
government;.an-adverse “efféct “on “morale could “be antici-:
pated :(see: Footnote 1}: Op. pp7+8).

—25s--
ITI,
The: Property’ Damage’ Claims: Hére Involved Were’
NotService: Incident:
A: The’Tést-Applied*by the Court of Appeals to Property
Damage: Claims’ Was: Improper’ and’ Contrary to~ the:
Ruté:of! the: Feres ‘and: Brooks Cases.’

The Opinion holds that damage to property must be
held to be service incident where, at the time of damage,
the property is located on a military base solely, because .
of the military service of the owner, and where. the .dam-
age results from.some military operation (Op. pp, 12-13),

It is..submitted.that .this test. is::contrary. to: a» proper-
application.-of ‘the: rule of. the: Feres and..Brooks:cases to
property damage losses; contrary to. administrative -con+-
struction,. and .results:in unjustly restricting: clain» rights:
of military personnel.for property damage icsses::

Inthe Feres case; this Court ‘held ‘that the Brook} ‘case’
announced the rulé-that ‘where'a soldier was injured while:
on’ furlough or léave, “tindéer’*compulsionm*of no ordérs’or~
duty and on no military~ mission,” ‘his’ injury’ was’ not’
service .incident; and was covered under: the:Tort :Cldizns
Act.

**It has been held that in determining whether a personal_in-
jury is service incident as regards the Tort Claims the -de-
ining factor ‘is the-status of the ‘soldier at the time ‘of ‘the-in-
jury, not the locale or source of the injury (¢.g. whether on~
ee or while: using) a government: facility, while «off
uty):

Brown v.U. S. (S.D., W. Va.), 99 Fed.. Supp, 685.-(sailor
on liberty pass killed while «swimming: in= pool on >navy.
base, held, not service incident) ;

Samson-v. U.'S: (S. D., N. Y.),. supra, 79 -Fed. Supp. 406
(soldier, off oor. injured while riding as a passenger
incarmty ‘bus: on ‘the base, held; not ‘service: incident) ;

Herring v. U. S. (Colo.), 98 Fed. Supp. 69.

x

Consistent with the foregoing, the Judge Advocates
General of the services have ruled as to property damage
claims of military personnel presented under these various
claim statutes, including the Tort Claims Act, that where
property of a soldier is damaged while located in a govern-
ment facility on a base, the damage is not incident to
service where the facility is being used by the soldier vol-
untarily for his own convenience, and not pursuant to
military orders. For example, the following losses were
held to be not incident to service: Army officer’s car
parked in a base parking lot where it was struck by an
Army truck”; soldier, off duty, was driving his car
on a base road, when it was struck by an Army truck”;
Air Force personnel sent clothes to Air Force laundry
where clothes were lost*; airman went swimming in base
pool and checked his watch in Air Force checkroom where
it was lost.” On the other hand, where an Army officer
was driving his car off the base, on a change of station
pursuant to orders authorizing travel by private convey-
ance, and the car was struck by an Army truck, the
damage was held to be incident to service.”

Likewise consistent with the foregoing is Lund v.
U. S. (Mass.) 104 Fed. Supp. 756 (cited in the
Opinion with disapproval, p. 13) where recovery was per-

262 Bull JAG, 274-275. (For this opinion, see para. 5(a), pp.
24-25, App. “B”).

274 Bull. JAG, 62. (For this opinion, see para. 5(b), p. 25,
App. “B”).

281 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 94.3, pp. 65-66. (For this opinion, see
para. 5/c), pp. 25-27, App. a it

2 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 94.1, p. 64. (For this opinion, see
para. 5(d), pp. 27-28, App. “B”).
“B") Bull. JAG, 287. (For this opinion, see para. 5(e), p. 29, App.

se

mitted under the Tort Claims Act for damage to a naval
officer’s automobile caused by a naval plane, while the
car was voluntarily parked in a base parking lot.

It is submitted that the foregoing establish that the
correct rule as to property damage is that such damage
is not incident to service, where, at the time of damage,
the property is located in a government facility which the
soldier is making use of voluntarily for his own conven-
ience, and not pursuant to any military orders or while
on a military mission.

The rule announced by the Opinion would result in
making any property damage loss occurring on a base inci-
dent to service, since a soldier’s property would always
be “located on a military base solely by virtue of the active
military service of the owner” and the entire area of
every military base is “absolutely subject to military con-
trol and discipline.” (Op. pp. 12-13.)

The right of a soldier to recover under the Tort Claims
Act for property damaged by the negligence of the gov-
ernment should not be made to depend upon the wholly
fortuitous circumstance of whether his property happens
to be on or off the base at the moment of damage. For
example, under the rule announced by the Opinion, if a
soldier voluntarily parked his car in a base parking
lot and an Army truck negligently ran into it, the soldier
must go uncompensated for the damage;” whereas, if
the car were parked a few feet away but outside the base
limits, and the same accident occurred, the soldier could
make claim for the damage under the Tort Claims Act.

*tAccording to the Opinion, he could not claim under the Tort
Claims Act since the loss would be service incident; and, as noted
above, motor vehicle damage such as this is excluded from cover-
age under the Military Personnel Claims Act.

oiilitiee

It is submitted that both claims (and the claims in the
instant cases) should be held to be not service incident,
since the use of the parking lot (here, the trailer park)
was voluntary and for the convenience of the personnel,
and not pursuant to any military orders or in connection
with any military mission.

B. The Administrative Allowance of the Uninsured Claims
Under the Military Personnel Claims Act Is Not Here
Controlling.

The Opinion holds that the administrative allowance of
the uninsured claims of the soldiers under the Military
Personnel Claims Act is conclusive that the damage was
service incident, for the purpose of these suits brought
under the Tort Claims Act, because the same accident and
personnel were involved; and because the Military Person-
nel Claims Act provides that any “administrative deter-
mination” thereunder is final and conclusive for all pur-
poses; and also because in the Feres case this Court an-
nounced “the principle of the exclusive character of fed-
eral plans for compensation.” (Op. pp. 10-12.)

None of these grounds are tenable because—

(1) The two statutes are completely independent and
an administrative determination under the Military Per-
sonnel Claims Act cannot serve to deprive the District
Court of the power to exercise its independent judgment
as to whether these claims are, in fact, service incident;
furthermore, at the time of such administrative determin-
ation the insurance companies were the owners of the
subrogated claims, and to deprive them of any right to be
heard with respect to this issue would be in violation of
the most elemental concept of due process.

(2) The Military Personnel Claims Act merely pro-
vides that the “settlement” (and not the administrative

—29—

determination of service incidence, as stated in the Opin-
ion) is final and conclusive.

(3) The “principle of the exclusive character of fed-
eral plans for compensation,” while applicable to some
types of compensation statutes, is not here applicable in
view of the express provision by Congress that the
Military Personnel Claims Act was not the exclusive
remedy for service incident property damage claims. (And
see U. S. v. Brown, supra, 348 U. S. 110.)

Conclusion.

The questions of construction and coverage of the Tort
Claims Act involved in these cases are of manifest im-
portance. The Feres case dealt with a materially differ-
ent problem, and to apply the rule of that case to property
damage claims unquestionably results in a substantial
restriction of claim rights of military personnel. It is
respectfully submitted that the resolving of these questions
is of such importance that it should receive the considera-
tion and decision of this Court. The petition for writs
of certiorari should be granted.

Los Angeles, California.
July 8, 1955.
Respectfully submitted,
Witiiam H. Levit,
Attorney for Petitioners.

ALFRED W. NEWMAN,
Rosert T. CRESSWELL,
Hans A. KrvuGeEr,
Grorce W. Murpry,

Of Counsel,

APPENDIX A.

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

4 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Preferred Insurance Company, a Corporation; Michi-
gan Surety Company, a Corporation; Midstates Insur-
ance Company, a Corporation; and The Mercantile In-
surance Company of America, a Corporation, appellants,
vs. United States of America, appellee. No. 13,889.*

May 9, 1955.

Appeal from the United States District Court, North-
ern District of California, Southern Division.

Before: Heaty and Bong, Circuit Judges, and Botonr,
District Judge.

Botpt, District Judge.
q Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ complaints for
- lack of jurisdiction was heard and considered on the al-
' legations of the complaints, an affidavit supporting the
motion and a written stipulation of facts. The motion
was granted and these appeals are from the judgments
of dismissal.
At 10:00 p.m. on August 5, 1950, an Air Force B-29
_ airplane crashed at the Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base
_ in California a few seconds after takeoff. The plane ex-
_ ploded near a trailer park on the Base extensively dam-
_ aging 17 trailers and property therein owned and used
for residence by enlisted men and officers in active duty
_ status and assigned to the Base at the time. Appellant
_ insurers in the several cases consolidated on this appeal,

*Consolidated on appeal with Nos. 14001 to 14005, inclusive.

eile

pursuant to the terms of insurance policies issued to the
owners of the trailers, paid them a total of $49,661 for
the damage to the trailers. The insureds had no un-
insured losses with respect to the fully insured trailers;
however, other property damage was suffered by the in-
sureds as a result of the same crash for which claims
were submitted to the Air Force under the Military Per-
sonnel Claims Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. 222c and paid, ex-
cept for the property covered by insurance as provided by
regulations under the Act.

The complaints, praying recovery against the United
States in the amount referred to and asserting jurisdic-
tion in the federal district court under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, alleged that the crash re-
sulted from negligent maintenance and operation of the
plane and that by payment of the insurance policy claims
the insurers became subrogated to the rights of their re-
spective insureds to the extent of the payments.

The stipulation of facts shows: The trailers were the
private property of the servicemen and the government
had no interest therein. There were not sufficient public
quarters on the Base to house the personnel assigned to
the Base and in the surrounding area there was a criti-
cal housing shortage. The owners of the trailers were
free to live off the Base and could leave it on the same
basis as other personnel, but for the convenience and
accommodation of personnel and for the :mutual benefit
of personnel and the Air Force the trailer park on the
Base was establishe?. The trailer park was not rey:iired
in the operation of the Base, no one was required to use
it and those who did so made voluntary application at
their discretion for permission to park their trailers there-
in. Personnel using the park were required to pay rental

anes

to the government for the space assigned and also to pay
for ultilities furnished. The servicemen using the trailer
park were entitled to and drew regular quarters allow-
ance paid to personnel not furnished government quar-
ters and who lived off the Base. The owners of the dam-
aged trailers had no duties whatever with respect to the
maintenance, servicing, loading, operation, dispatch or
control of the plane which crashed. At the time of the
crash the owners of the trailers, while in active duty
status and assigned to the Base, were variously located
both on and off duty in the trailer park, at other places
on the Base, in neighboring communities and at other
military installations in the United States and overseas.

The stipulation further shows: Detailed procedures
controlling the operation and maintenance of the trailer
park within the confines of the Base were prescribed in
a Base regulation. Only Air Force persornel and their
families assigned to the Base were allowed to use the
trailer park facilities. Specific assignments and termi-
nation of trailer space were made by the Base billeting
officer. Assignment of trailer park space automatically
terminated when the Base ceased to be the permanent
station of the individual concerned. The trailer park
was operated as a nonprofit activity, with occupants
charged a monthly fee determined by the billeting officer
and a council of park occupants appointed by the Base
commander. Repairs and removal of government prop-
erty could be made by Air Force installation personnel
only. The trailer park area was under military protec-
tion and subject to the jurisdiction of military police.
Each of the damaged trailers had been permanently placed
in position by jacks or other means for the duration ot
the owner’s permanent assignment to the Base,

—4—

In the District Court opinion, 111 Fed. Sup. 899, .it
was held that the property damage sustained by appellants’
insureds was incident to their military service within the
meaning of the Military Personnel Claims Act; that claim
under .said Act .is the exclusive remedy of a ‘serviceman
for service incident property damage; and that -neither
servicemen -nor their insurers by subrogation have-a:right
of action under the Federal Tort ‘Claims Act for property
damage so sustained, The two general questions pre-
sented on this appeal are: (1) Can one in active mili-
tary duty status maintain a claim against the United
States under the Tort Claims Act for property damage
accurring incident to military service? (2) ‘Was the
property damage for which subrogation recovery is
sought in the present cases incident to the service of
appellants’ insureds?

In Brooks v. U. S.,.337 U. S. 49 (1949) the Supreme
Court held that a serviceman injured while on leave and
away from his duty station by the negligent operation
of an army truck driven by a civilian employee could
maintain an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Thereafter in Feres v. U. S., 340 U.S. 135 (1950) the
Court held:

“We conclude that the Government is not liable un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service.” p. 146.

In Johansen y. U. S., 343 U. S. 427, 440 (1952) the
“This Court accepted the principle of the exclusive
character of federal plans for compensation in Feres
v. United States, 340 U. S. 135. Seeking so to apply

the Tort Claims Act to soldiers on active duty as |

~

‘to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole.’
p. 139, we gave weight to the character of the fed-
eral ‘systems of simple, certain, and uniform com-
pensation for injuries or death of those in armed
services.’” p. 144.

Recently both Feres and Brooks have been approved
in U. S. v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (Dec. 1954) :

“The Feres decision did not disapprove of the Brooks
case. It merely distinguished it, holding that the
Tort Claims Act does not cover ‘injuries to service-
men where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service. 340 U. S.
135, 146. The peculiar and special relationship of
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the main-
tenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given
or negligent acts committed in the course of mili-
tary duty, led the Court to read that Act as exclud-
ing claims of that character. . . . We adhere
also to the line drawn in the Feres case between in-
juries that did and injuries that did not arise out
of or in the course of military duty.”

Since the rule of Feres denying action under the Tort
Act for service incident personal injuries has been so
emphatically reaffirmed, whether the same rule applies
to service incident property damage claims will depend
on whether or not the rationale of the Feres decision is
valid as to such claims.

The Feres opinion, after pointing out considerations
persuasive of liability under the language of the Tort
Act, the inadequacy of legislative history and the un-

/

—

certainty or confusion created by the legislation, stated:
“Under these circumstances, no conclusion can be above
challenge, but if we misinterpret the Act, at least Con-
gress possesses a ready remedy.” p. 138. The decision
was unanimous and in the more than four years since it
was rendered Congress has not amended the Tort Claims
Act. Accordingly, the opinion must be accepted as dis-
pelling any doubt as to congressional intent in the adop-
tion of the Act. The four general considerations cited
in the opinion as supporting the decision are indicated
by the following quotations:

(1) “This Act, however, should be construed to
fit, so far as will comport with its words, ito the
entire statutory system of remedies against the Gov-
ernment to make a workable, consistent and equi-
table whole.” p. 139.

(2) “The primary purpose of the Act was to
extend a remedy to those who had been without; if
it incidentally benefited those already well provided
for, it appears to have been unintentional. Congress
was suffering from no plague of private bills on the
behalf of military and naval personnel, because a
comprehensive system of relief had been authorized
for them and their dependents by statute.” p. 140.

(3) “One obvious shortcoming im these claims
is that plaintiffs can point to no liability of a ‘private
individual even remotely analogous to that which
they are asserting against the United States. We
know of no American law which ever has permitted
a soldier to recover for negligence, against either
his superior officers or the Government he is serv-

ing.” p. 141,

sini

(4) “This Court, in deciding claims for wrongs
incident to service under the Tort Claims Act, can-
not escape attributing some beariig upon it to en-
actments by Congress which provide systems of sim-
ple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries
or death of those in armed services.” p. 144.

Each of these considerations is as applicable to property
damage incident to service as to personal injury incident
to service.

The Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, 59 Stat.
225, is a part of the statutory system of remedies against
the government adopted by Congress. The Act provides
a remedy for personal property loss or damage by service
personnel sustained incident to their service, which is con-
siderably more liberal, adequate and satisfactory than any
of its predecessor acts over a period of many years."

1The House and Senate Committees on Claims, reporting favor-
ably on the bill which became the Act, stated:

“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a single,
clear, definite, and workable statute for the settlement of claims of
military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department
or of the Army for the loss of their personal property incurred
while in the service and to repeal certain statutes which have been
found to be obsolete or unworkable and not appropriate to present
conditions.” (H. Rept. 237, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 1; S. Rept.
ns Fey Cong., Ist Sess., p. 2; see 91 Cong. Rec. 1540, 3990,

As noted by the court below, the 1945 Act completed the original
plan for consolidation into three separate statutes of all of the
statutory settlement provisions affecting the Armed Forces. H.
Rept. 237, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 3; S. Rept. 276, 79th Cong.,
Ist Sess., p. 3. The first two statutes, the Foreign Claims Act
(57 Stat. 666) and the Military Claims Act (57 Stat. 374), were
enacted in 1943. In referring to these two statutes and the need
for enacting H. Rept. 2068 as the third and final statute, Secretary
of War Patterson pointed out (H. Rept. 237, 79th Cong., Ist Sess.,
p. 4):

“By the passage of the act of April 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 66),
commonly referred to as the Foreign Claims Act, the Congress

silent

While the legislation preceding the Military Personnel
Claims Act provided compensation for service incident
property damage, not any of the previous acts created a
right of action in the serviceman or liability on the gov-
ernment even for damage caused by negligence of a gov-
ernment agent or employee.? Payment of claims under

made available to the War Department a thoroughly satisfactory
and workable basis for the settlement of claims for damages
caused by our armed forces in foreign countries.

“The next forward step came with the passage of the act of
July 3, 1943, which consolidated all then existing statutory pro-
visions for the administrative settlement of claims other than claims
under the Foreign Claims Act and claims of War Department and

2Fhe Military Personnel Claims Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat.

Tort Claims Act of December 28, 1922,
The Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943, 57

vnliin

all of the property claim acts has been a matter not of
right but of grace resting in administrative discretion.
None of the acts provided for judicial review of findings
or action on claims. There never has been and is not now
any act of Congress, unless it be the Tort Claims Act,
authorizing a serviceman in active duty status to sue the
government for service incident property damage, how-
ever inflicted.

As appears from the allowance and payment of claims
under the Military Personnel Claims Act by appellants’
insureds in these very cases, Congress has provided a
simple, certain and uniform method of compensation for
service incident property damage. This system avoids
the serious disruption of military mission and discipline
that well might follow civil litigation based on such claims.

We consider every essential element on which the Feres
rule was based fully applicable to service incident property
damage claims and therefore hold that Congress did not
intend a serviceman in active duty status to have a right
of action against the government under the Tort Claims
Act for property damage occurring incident to his mili-
tary service.

An insurer may sue under the Tort Claims Act upon
a claim to which it has become subrogated by payment of
a claim to an insured who would have been able to bring
such action. U. S. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338
U. S. 366. However, “one who rests on subrogation
stands in the place of one whose ciaim he has paid” and
“it is elementary that one cannot acquire by subrogation
what another whose rights he claims did not have.” U. S.
v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U. S. 234, 242. In the light
of these principles we now consider whether the damage
to the trailers of appellants’ insureds under the particu-

—10—

lar circumstances of these cases was sustained incident
to the military service of the insured.

Under the Military Personnel Claims Act, 59 Stat. 225,
the Secretary of the Air Force and those officers desig-
nated by him for the purpose are authorized to “consider,
_ . . determine, . . . and pay any claim not in ex-
cess of '$2;500 against the United States, . . . of mili-
tary personnel . . . when . . . the property [is]
determined to be reasonable, useful, necessary, or proper
under the attendant circumstances, . . . for damage
to or loss, . . . of personal property occurring inci-
dent to their service, . . . Provided, That the damage
to or loss, . . . of property . . . shall not have
occurred at quarters occupied by the claimant within the
continental United States (excluding Alaska) which are
not assigned to him or otherwise provided in kind by the
Government.” There is no definition of “incident to serv-
ice” in the Act or in the Air Force regulations authorized
by the Act but the regulations list a variety of examples
of allowable and nonallowable claims. 32 C. F. R.
836.92-3.

The allowance and payment of the claims made under
such Act by appellants’ insureds for damage to personal
property, other than the trailers, sustained in the same
trailer park and as a result of the same airplane crash,
must be presumed to have been based on an administra-
tive determination that the property damage occurred
“incident to service” since such is a requirement of the
Act and regulations for allowable claims. The Act does
’ not provide for judicial review of administrative action
on claims; but even if it did, administrative findings of
fact would have to be accepted by a court unless arbi-
trary, capricious or without evidentiary support. U, S.

2

é

_——

oe See

v. Babcock, 350 U. S. 328; Dismuke v. U. S., 297 U. S.
167; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288.

Inasmuch as the damage to the personal property for
which claim was made under the Military Personnel Claims
Act and the damage to the trailers for which claim is
made under the Tort Claims Act in these cases was sus-
tained by the same military personnel in the same acci-
dent, at the same time and place, and under identical con-
ditions, there would be no factual or legal basis for hold-
ing the one service incident and the other not, unless
the term “incident to service” has a different meaning
under the Tort Claims Act than it has under the Mili-
tary Personnel Claims Act. This is without regard either
to the effect of the language in the Military Personnel
Claims Act making the administrative determination “final
and conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary” or to “the principle
of the exclusive character of federal plans for compen-
sation in Feres v. United States” as stated in Johansen
and which has been applied by the Seventh Circuit in
Sasse v. U. S., 201 F. 2d 871, and by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Lewis v. U. S., 190 F.
2d 22, to the Federal Employees Compensation Act in re-
lation to claims asserted under the Tort Claims Act. Feres
bars action under the Tort Claims Act for injuries “aris-
ing out of or incident to service”; the Military Personnel
Claims Act authorizes claims for damage to property
“occurring incident to service.” It may be that “arising
out of” has a broader meaning than “incident to” al-
though both appear to be different ways of saying the
same thing. In any event, there is no logical basis or
practical reason under the facts of the instant cases for
holding that damage to the trailers could have been non-
service incident while the simultaneous damage to the

Se

other property of the same servicemen under identical cir-
cumstances was incident to their service.

Entirely aside from the filing of the claims by appel-
lants’ insureds under the Military Personnel Claims Act
and the action taken thereon, the allegations of the com-
plaints and the stipulated facts clearly show that the dam-
age to the trailers of the servicemen arose out of and
was in the course of activity incident to their military
service.

At the time of the damage the trailer owners were all
in active military duty status as distinguished from
civilian or inactive military status. The trailers were per-
manently set up on land inside the Base in spaces speci-
fically assigned by the Base billeting officer in an area
absolutely subject to military control and discipline. The
trailers were authorized to occupy the assigned spaces
solely by virtue of the active military status of their own-
ers. The fact that a serviceman be on furlough or leave
may be material to whether his personal injuries be serv-
ice incident or not according to where he is and what he
is doing at the time of injury. In itself furlough or leave
has no bearing on whether a serviceman’s property be
damaged incident to his military service. In the present
cases, whether the owners of the trailers were on fur-
lough or not is unimportant since the trailers were on the
military base at the place of damage only because the
owners were in active military duty status. The dam-
age to the trailers resulted directly from the flight of an
Air Force airplane operated in the course of military
service. The crash of an airplane immediately following
takeoff from an Air Force base certainly has a real and
substantial relationship to the military service of any serv-
iceman assigned to such base whether or not he has any

par”

direct part in the maintenance or operation of the par-
ticular plane. If, as in these particular cases, at the time
of damage the personal property of a serviceman is lo-
cated on a military base solely by virtue of the active
military service of the owner, and the damage results
directly from operations in military service, we hold that
the damage does arise out of and occurs in the course of
activity incident to the military service of the owner.

Lund v. U. S., 104 Fed. Supp. 756 (D. C. Mass. 1952)
is the only cited case involving property damage which on
essential facts similar but not identical to those of the
present cases is to the contrary of our holdings herein.
The opinion in that case acknowledges the difficulty of the
problem which it disposes of in a few sentences and with-
out persuasive analysis.

The judgments are affirmed.

(Endorsed): Opinicn. Filed May 9, 1955. Paul P.
O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Preferred Insurance Company, a Corporation; Michi-
gan Surety Company, a Corporation; Midstates Insurance
Company, a Corporation; and The Mercantile Insurance
Company of America, a Corporation, appellants, vs.
United States of America, appellee. No. 13,889.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause .carse on to be heard on the Transcript of.
the Record froin the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Califormia, Southern Division, and
was duly submitted.

sandiiiain

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said
District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May
9, 1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Insurance Company of New
York, appellant, vs. United States of America, appellee.
No. 14,001.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of
the Record from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Southern Division, and
was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said
District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9,
1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Albert G. Whipple, appellant, vs. United States of

America, appellee. No. 14,002.
, JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Southern Division,

ee We

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of the
Record from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Southern Division, and
was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said
District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9
1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Gearge Stropeck, appellant, vs. United States of Amer-
ica, appellee. No. 14,003.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of
the Record from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, Southern Division,
and was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said
District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9,
1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

= ss

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Government Employees Insurance Company, appellant, ©
vs. United States of America, appellee. No. 14,004.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the —
Northern District of California, Southern Division. 4
This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of —
the Record“from the United States District Court for —
the Northern District of California, Southern Division, —
and was duly submitted.
On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and :
adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said ”
District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

‘Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9, ’
1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. '

St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance Company, appellant,
vs. United States of America, appellee. No. 14,005.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the q
Northern District of California, Southern Division.
This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of —
the Record from the United States District Court for —
the Northern District of California, Southern Division, —
and was duly submitted.
On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and ~
adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said q
District Court in this cause be, and nereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9,
1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk. :

LT
APPENDIX B.
(Opinions of Judge Advocates General (JAG) ).
1. Opinion of JAG re Gunfire Act of 1912.

In Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the
Army, 1912-1940, Sec. 709, page 449 (Opinion No. 18-
463, 8/31/14), it appeared that an army officer occupied

. government quarters at West Point, and that heavy ar-

tillery practice caused a china closet in his quarters to fall,
thus breaking his china and glassware valued at $620.
The loss was held to be “in ‘the service” under the Mili-
tary Personnel Claims Act of 1885, but within one of the
exclusions ‘thereof, since the articles were of an \expen-
' sive nature. The Judge Advocate General ruled that the
- claim was, however, covered under the Gunfire Act of
1912, supra:

“Held, That from ‘the unusually expensive char-
atter of the articles destroyed, they ‘could ‘not be
considered such as the Secretary of War should
determine ‘to be reasonable, useful, and necessary
for the officer in service while in quarters, within
the meaning of the act of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat.
350) but that the claim might be adjusted and re-
ported to Congress for appropriation’ under the
provisions of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat.
586), as a loss of private property not exceeding
$1,000 in walwe occasioned by heavy gunfire and
target practice of troops, the act of applying to losses

1Since the opinion was written in 1914 and ‘the Digest was not

4 published until 1940, it may be assumed that over the years Con-
» gtess appropriated the money for payment of this and similar
- claims,

ain

of private property of officers residing upon mili-
tary reservations as well as to losses of the property
of civilians.”

2. Opinion of JAG re Small Tort Claims Act of 1922.

(a) “If the loss of private property of an officer
while in storage is due to the negligence of any off-
cer or enlisted man, though not payable under the
act of March 4, 1921 (Military Personnel Claims
Act of 1921) (41 Stat. 1436), under the Comptrol-
ler’s rulings, the amount may be certified to Con-
gress under the act of December 28, 1922 (42 Stat.
1066).” 332.32, May 21, 1926, Digest of Opinions,
Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1912-40, p.
456, Sec. 713.

(b) “Claim for loss of baggage. Claimant, an
Army officer, was ordered from a station in the con-
tinental United States to one in the Canal Zone.
After the effective date of his orders and after his
compliance with them the baggage in question was
purchased by third parties as a wedding present for
claimant and shipped to him by Army transport.
It was lost in transit. Claim disallowed. Held:
Baggage purchased after the effective date of change
of station orders may not be included in the au-
thorized change of station allowance of baggage
and its loss in transit is not reimbursable under the
act of Mar. 4, 1921, as implemented by AR 35-7100.
However, if such a loss is due to the negligence of
Government employees, relief may be had under
the act of Dec. 28, 1922, as implemented by AR
35-7070.” SPJGD, 1942/5773, Nov. 25, 1942, 1
Bull) JAG 331.

2The reference is to Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the

enti

— on

3. Opinions of JAG re Military Claims Act of 1943, as
Amended by the Military Personnel Claims Act of
1945.

(a) “Hereafter follow the first decisions under
the new regulations (A. R. 25-100, 29 May, 1945),
interpreting the act of 29 May, 1945. Any decision
on claims of military personnel or civilian employees
which has heretofore appeared in the Digests or Bul-
letins should be carefully examined as :» its applica-
bility under the new statute and regulations before
it may safely be regarded as authoritative. SPJGD/
D-39091, 31 July, 1945.

“Scope.—Claim for damage to automobile. Claim-
ant, an Army officer, while traveling in his automo-
bile pursuant to temporary duty orders, suffered
property damage as the result of the negligence of
an Army truck driver acting within the scope of
his employment. The claim had been disapproved
for the sole reason that the damage occurred incident
to claimant’s service, and, therefore, could not be
favorably considered under the provisions of the
act of 3 July, 1943 (57 Stat. 372). The claim was
considered under the provisions of the act of 3 July,
1943, as amended by sec. 4 of the Military Per-
sonnel Claims Act of 1945 (approved 29 May,
1945), and was allowed. Held: The Military Per-
sonnel Claims Act of 1945 has repealed the prohibi-
tion contained in the act of 3 July, 1943, against the
payment of claims of military personnel and civilian
employees of the War Department or the Army for
damage to or loss or destruction of property occur-
ing incident to their service * * * The claim,
being in all other respects within the provisions of
the act of 3 July, 1943, is now payable.” SPJGD/
D-36478, 31 July, 1945, 4 Bull. JAG 287,

4.

a

(b) “Secs. 1, 2, act of 3 July, 1943 (57 Stat. 372);
Sec. 4, act of 29 May, 1945 (Pub. Law 67, 79th
Cong. 59 Stat. 225); 31 U. S. C. 223b, 223c.

“Scope of act.—Claim for loss of property deliv-
ered to an Army hospital. Claimant deposited with
proper military authorities in the hospital French
francs worth $321.20 * * * He was given a
receipt, but the property was never returned to
him * * * The claim was filed under AR 25-100
(Military Personnel Claims Act), but was considered
under the provisions of AR 25-25 (Military Claims
Act), since, in the absence of special circumstances
not shown in this case, money claims under AR 25-100
will be limited to $100 or one month’s pay, which-
ever is greater. Claim approved for $321.20. Held:
The delivery of the French francs to authorized mili-
tary personnel constituted a bailment to the Govern-
ment. The claim is therefore payable without regard
as to the cause of the loss. The limitation of $100
or one month’s pay as applied to claims under AR
25-100 is not controlling in claims settled under
PR SR Bie eat SPJGD/D-186805, 2 Feb-
ruary, 1946; SPJGD/D-202385, 4 April, 1946, 5
Bull. JAG 68.

Opinions of JAG re Tort Clams Act.

In reading the following opinions, it should be noted

that AFR refers to Air Force Regulations, AFR 112-3
dealing with claims under the Military Claims Act of 1943,
AFR 112-4 dealing with claims under the Tort Claims

Act,

and AFR 112-7 dealing with claims under the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act of 1945.

(a) “Although par. 3(b)(5), AFR 112-7, pro-
vides for reimbursement for currency only in specific
and limited circumstances, in proper cases such claims

— fase
ee

may be approved under any of the categories enu-
merated in par. 3 of this regulation, except when a
determination is made that they are barred by par.
5a, or involve transportation losses (par 3b (2)).
Money last (stolen) while traveling under orders is
not considered reimbursable in view of EO 10053
and AFR 75-30 (5 Bull. JAG 98). Prior to the
enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act certain
claims for money losses were considered cognizable
under the Act of July 3, 1943, when not payable
under the Military Personnel Claims Act (par. 15),
but since then such claims may be cognizable under
either act, depending upon the factual situation in-
volved. For example, a claim for money deposited
at an Army hospital was presented by a soldier
patient but since the amount involved exceeded the
amount determined to be reasonable under the regu-
lation, payment was made under the Act of July 3,
1943 (5 Bull. JAG 68). Accordingly, there is a
marked distinction between the items of property for
which payment may be made under AFR 112-3,
AFR 112-4 and AFR 112-7, inasmuch as the Mili-
tary Personnel Claims Act and AFR 112-7 limits the
type and kind of property claims that may be pre-
sented thereunder (par. 3, AFR 112-7), whereas no
such restrictions are now contained in either of the
other acts (par. 15, AFR 112-3; par. 15, AFR
112-4).” Op. JAGAF 1952/18, 11/19/51, 1 Dig.
Ops., Sec. 95.7 (Claims), p. 71.

(b) “Sec. 95.5 Motor vehicles.

The claimant was assigned government quarters in
a building on an air base and was authorized to park

x

his car in a basement garage below. A fire of ‘un-
known’ origin broke out in the basement of this
building. As a result, the claimant’s automobile was
destroyed to such an extent that it would have to be
sold for salvage and a set of golf clubs and a golf
bag stored in the car were damaged to such an extent
that they were of no further use to the claimant.
In addition, clothing located in the claimant’s quar-
ters above the garage were damaged by smoke, neces-
sitating dry cleaning. HELD: The claim for the
loss of the automobile and golf equipment is cogniz-
able but not payable under AFR 112-3 and the Act
of July 3, 1943 (57 Stat. 372; 31 U. S. C. 223b),
for the reason that the property was not bailed to
the government at the time of the loss. While claim-
ant was permitted to park his car in the garage, it
was for his own convenience and at his own risk,
except for loss or damage caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of employees of the Gov-
ernment while acting within the scope of their em-
ployment (38 Am. Jur. 767). But no evidence of
tort liability was adduced (28 U. S. C. 2672 (Tort
Claims Act)) and such a loss was not incident to
‘noncombat activities’ within the meaning of AFR
112-3, par. 4e (7 Bull. JAG 193). Moreover, that
part of the claim covering the automobile and the
golf equipment which was in the automobile at the
time of the fire, is not payable under the Military
Personnel Claims Act of 1945 (31 U. S. C. 222c)
and AFR 112-7, as the property was not destroyed
‘at quarters’ or while in government ‘custody’ (par.
3b(1), AFR 112-7). Furthermore, claims for motor
vehicles are ordinarily not paid under such Act and
claimant’s loss does not fall within the exception pro-

fo

vided (par. 3b(4) and 4g, AFR 112-7). However,
that part of the claim for the cost of dry cleaning
of claimant’s clothing is approved, in accordance
with the provisions of the Military Personnel Claims
Act of 1945 and AFR 112-7, par. 3b(1), even
though the cost for such dry cleaning is not sub-
stantiated by a receipted bill, as the claim appears
credible.” Op. JAGAF 1951/100, 26 July 1951, 1
Dig. Ops., Sec. 95.5, p. 70 (Claims).

(c) “Sec. 93.9. Fire, flood, or other serious occur-
rence.

The claimant occupied assigned quarters at an
Air Force Base in the Canal Zone. The wooden
wall cabinet in the kitchen of his quarters suddenly
fell away from the wall, thereby breaking the china
and glassware stored in the cabinet, as well as arti-
cles on the drainboard beneath the cabinet. The
facts showed that the cabinet had been anchored to
the wall with four nails near its base when installed
several years before; however, inspections during use
had not revealed any defects. Moreover, the over-
loading of the cabinet appears to have been a con-
tributing factor in the accident. Held: Claim for
the loss of personal property is disapproved because
the property was not damaged or destroyed by ‘fire,
flood, hurricane or other serious occurrence’ while
located in assigned quarters (par. 3b(1), AFR
112-7, 15 February 1950). In this connection, the
occurrence that caused the damage is not the type of
incident that is considered to be a serious occurrence
because it has been construed to mean an occurrence
similar in character to those specifically mentioned,
j.e., typhoon, cloudburst, earthquake, explosion, etc.

fe. Saw

(7 Bull. JAG 89). Furthermore, although the Mili-
tary Personnel Claims Act of 1945, as amended, and
AFR 112-7, no longer limits recovery to rigid cate-
gories of claims enumerated therein, and any claim
falling within the general statutory provisions there-
of, not specifically excluded by statute or regulation,
may be submitted for consideration and in proper
cases approved for payment, this claim does not ap-
pear to be the type of ‘meritorious’ claim that falls
within the spirit of the statute (par. 3a, AFR 112-7),
because recovery is predicated solely on the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of government em-
ployees. Accordingly, in the continental United
States and its territorial possessions, including the
Canal Zone, the Federal Tort Claims Act and AFR
112-4 are preemptive in such circumstances (28 U.
S. C. 2671-80). However, in either event, the over-
loading of the cabinet would constitute negligence and
thus preclude payment of the claim (par. 7, AFR
112-4 and par. 4L, AFR 112-7).” Op. JAGAF
1952/83, 12 September 1949, 2 Dig. Ops., Sec. 93.9,
p. 63 (Claims).

5. Opinions of JAG as to whether property damage is

(a) “Act of 3 July 1943 (Military Claims Act).
+ * * ” + ~ ~

“Claim for damage to a privately owned car
of an Army officer. Claimant's car was properly
parked on an Army parking lot provided for officers
of the station complement. It was struck in the rear
by an unidentified vehicle which left traces of olive
drab paint and an indentation of the same measure:
ments as the bumper on Army vehicles. Claim

onlin

allowed. Held: It may be inferred, from the nature
of the damage and the fact that few persons other
than military personnel and civilian employees are
permitted to enter a military reservation during the
present emergency, that claimant’s car was damaged
by a person operating an Army vehicle within the
scope of his employment. The damage in the pres-
ent case may not be considered incident to the claim-
ant’s service, and therefore recovery is not barred
by Sec. 1 of the act.” SPJGD 1943/D-8458, 21 July
1943. (2 Bull. JAG, 274-5)*

(b) “Claim for damage to an automobile. A
Government vehicle in an access road on an Army
post had stopped to discharge passengers. Claimant,
a soldier not on duty, drove his privately-owned car
up behind the Army truck and stopped at an improper
parking place to permit a passenger to alight. The
Army driver backed out of the access road and struck
claimant’s car. Claim approved. Held: The sole
cause of the damage was the negligence of the Army
driver in backing without keeping a proper lookout
to assure himself that the movement could be made
in safety. Claimant’s stopping his vehicle did not
constitute negligence, and the property damage was
not incident to claimant’s service.” SPJGD/D-43824,
20 November 1944. (4 Bull. JAG, 62.)

(c) “An officer turned over his laundry, including
two Air Force type shirts, to an air base laundry
within the United States for laundering. Upon
picking up his laundry he discovered that the two
shirts had not been returned, and in their place he
had received two shirts belonging to another. These

8This claim arose during the 1943-5 period when service incident
damage claims were excluded from coverage under the
ilitary Claims Act of 1943.

—26—

shirts were returned to the laundry, which activity
was unable to locate the officer’s shirts, or adjust the
loss pursuant to USAF laundry regulations which,
in such cases, authorizes only repair or replacement
from overages (AFR 148-1, par. i7b).

“HELD THAT:

—the claim is not cognizable or payable under the
Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, as amended
(59 Stat. 225; 31 USC 222c) and AFR 112-7, inas-
much as such losses have historically been considered
as not incident to a claimant’s service, because laun-
dry regulations provide that the use of such an Air
Force “proprietary” facility is a courtesy to officers
and other individuals (including airmen, in cases in-
volving non-Government clothing) who are author-
ized to avail themselves of the privileges thereof
(AFR 148-1, par. 17b (2){d)).

* * * * * * ok *

“__the claim would be cognizable under the provi-
sions of 28 USC 2671-80 and AFR 112-4, if the loss
of the property was caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Air Force
while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment and was not merely lost due to 4 fire of “un-
known” causes, an “act of God,” a criminal act, etc.
(28 USC 2672; AFR 112-4; 6 Am. Jur., Bailments
$185; 7 Bull JAG 8; 2 Dig JAGAF 557). How-
ever, this claim would not be cognizable under AFR
112-3 if it is found from the evidence that the claim
is cognizable under 28 USC 2671-80, in view of the
partial repeal of the Act of 3 July 1943 (31 USC
223b) by the Federal Tort Claims Act (par. 3b AFR
112-3). But, in foreign countries the Act of July
3, 1943 would be applicable, in such circumstances.
Accordingly, if the investigation disclosed that the

=. a

claimant’s shirts were negligently delivered to another
individual. (Bailments, 185; 7 Bull. JAG 88; 2 Dig.
JAGAF 557). However, this by USAF personnel,
as alleged and could not be recovered, the claim would
be payable pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC
2671-80 and AFR 112-4, except for the laundry serv-
ice charge paid for cleaning the shirts, as this is not
a proper element of damages (AFR 112-2, par. 6b).

“__the above opinion applies equally as well to all
USAF activity cases of a similar nature, whether the
individual claimant be an officer, airman or civilian.
If it is the former, an airman’s claim should be ad-
judicated on the same basis as an officer’s or civilian’s
claim and the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of an employee of the Air Force while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, must be shown
before the claim may properly be approved for pay-
ment under applicable statutes and regulations (AFR
112-3; AFR 112-4; AFR 148-1).” Op. JAGAF
1951/97. 30 July 1951. 1 Dig. Ops., Claims sec.
94.3, pp. 65-6.

(d) “An airman delivered his wristwatch and
several other valuables to a Japanese civilian attend-
ant in the checkroom at an Air Force Base swimming
pool in occupied Japan and was issued identification
receipts therefor. The checkroom was operated as
an adjunct to the pool and was authorized by the
commanding officer through Special Services. The
Japanese attendants were employees of the Air Force
but due to the fact that Japan was an occupied coun-
try they were paid by the Japanese government. A
sign indicated that valuables would be received for
checking and it was customary for patrons to check
their valuables but no charge was made therefor.
When the airman returned for his property about
four hours later the watch could not be located

walks

nor its loss accounted for. Held: This claim is not
cognizable under the Military Personnel Claims Act
of 1945 (59 Stat. 225; 31 USC 222c), as amended,
and AFR 112-7, inasmuch as the loss was not inci-
dent to the airman’s service because he was using
the facility for his convenience and pleasure while off
duty (3 Dig. JAGAF, par. 21). However, the claim
is cognizable under the Act of 3 July 1943, as
amended (57 Stat. 372; 31 USC 223b), and AFR
112-3. Accordingly, the fact that the Japanese at-
tendants were paid by the Japanese government is not
controlling since volunteer workers, and others, have
been construed to be Air Force employees within the
meaning of this regulation, even though serving
without compensation. Hence, such persons are not
in the same category as nonappropriated fund em-
ployees, such as those engaged in exchange service
activities. Thus a bailment to the Air Force resulted
when the airman delivered his watch to the check-
room employees authorized to receive valuables. No
negligence of the claimant or assumption of risk by
him was involved. Therefore, since the loss occurred
in a foreign country, the claim is payable under the
provisions of AFR 112-3 because the loss was
caused by Air Force employees, which acting within
the scope of their employment, inasmuch as the fail-
ure to return or account for the loss of the bailed
property on demand established a prima facie case of
liability or presumption of negligence under the law
of bailments, which was not rebutted by the Air
Force (6 Am. Jur. Bailments §§208, 209, 222).
[Note: This opinion supersedes the opinion reported
as Op. JAGAF 1950/72, 7 June 1950, 2 Dig. JAGAF,
par. 285.]” Op. JAGAF 1953/8. 4 February 1952.
(2 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 94.1, p. 64.)

—29-—

(e) “Claim for damage to automobile. Claimant,
an Army officer, while traveling in his automobile
pursuant to temporary duty orders, suffered property
damage as the result of the negligence of an Army
truck driver acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. The claim had been disapproved for the sole
reason that the damage occurred incident to claim-
ant’s service, and, therefore, could not be favorably
considered under the provisions of the Act of 3 July,
1943 (57 Stat. 372). The claim was considered
under the provisions of the act of 3 July, 1943, as
amended by sec. 4 of the Military Personnel Claims
Act of 1945 (approved 29 May, 1945), and was
allowed. Held: The Military Personnel Claims Act
of 1945 has repealed the prohibition contained in
the Act of 3 July, 1943 against the payment of claims
of military personnel and civilian employees of the
War Department or the Army for damage to or loss
or destruction of property occurring incident to their
service * * *. The claim, being in all other respects
within the provisions of the Act of 3 July, 1943, is
now payable.”* SPJGD/D-36478, 31 July, 1945, 4
Bull. JAG 287.

eS

‘The claim was not payable under the Military Personnel Claims
Act because of the exclusion of motor vehicle damage therein.

.
INDEX
Page
Opinions below ...........eeee eee e cece eee ee ee eeees 1
ee eddaknetebaues Seeuewanteeveces 2
Question presented ...... 62... ese e cere eee eee ee eeees 2
Mintethen WVORVEd .. oon. cs ccc ccsccsevesencccesencs 2
Ns aang bu aidie soso pwnd hae bs whee SESERSS 5
— Argument ..... 1... cece eee eee eee eee e eee eee eeees 9
© Conclusion ...... 6... sseeeeeeeeee sees tener eneeeees 17
CITATIONS
Cases:

Allen v. D. D. Skousen Const. Co., 55 N. Mex. 1... 12

Archer v. United States, 217 F. 2d 548, certiorari
denied, 348 U.S. 953... ...... 6. cee cece eee eee 14
Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354... 2.2.6.6 eeee 15
Brooks v. United States, 337 US. 49...........- 9,10, 13
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135......... 9, 10, 11, 13
Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 US. 111.......-.--- 15
Great Lakes Corp. v. S.S. Co., 301 US. 646....... 16
Grimley, In re, 187 US. 147........+00 02 e seen 14

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo,
112 F. 2d 11, certiorari denied, 310 U.S. 649.... 12

Jefferson v. United States, 178 F. 2d 518, affirmed
sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135... 11,14
Lund v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 756.........- 14
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.........-....++++- 14

3 National Garment Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R.
Coo, 178 F. 2d BB... .. 2.2 e eee eee eee ee ee 16

O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Mazon, 340 U.S. 504... 12
P. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207 F. 2d 626,

certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 912............-.++-- 14
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117

—) GRP aeeet rr erry wey ree erg ore 16
Ritzman v. Trent and the United States, 125 F.

Supp. 664 ... 00... cece cece cece eee eeeeeees 14
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110........... 9, 10,13

(1)

I
Cases—Continued

Wallis v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 673

Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller, 157 Fla. 459

Zoula v. United States, 217 F. 2d 81
Statutes:

Act of July 3, 1952, 66 Stat. 321

Act of August 1, 1953, 67 Stat. 317

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945 (59 Stat.

Be a A pet nud oriiveis eed
National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, 501,
503; 5 U.S.C. 626)
28 U.S.C. 1346(b)

Miscellaneous:
32 C.F.R. 836.93 (i) and (j)

18 Comp. Gen. 203 (1938)
HLR. 404, 82d Cong., 2d sess. ...----++++eeeeees
S. Rept. 1691, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 3

Juthe Supreme Court of the Wited States

OctoBeR TERM, 1955

No. 222

PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
Micuican Surety Company, a corporation, Mip-
Srates INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation, and
THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMER-
ICA, a corporation, PETITIONERS

Vv.

Untrep StatTes oF AMERICA

AND Frve ConsoLIpATED CASES

ON PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court for the North-
ern District of California is reported at 111 F.
Supp. 899 (R. 22-37), sub nom. Fidelity-Phemx
Fire Insurance Co. v. United States. The opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (R.

(1)

2

49-58) is reprinted as Appendix A to the Petition
and is not yet reported.
JURISDICTION

The judgments of the court of appeals were en-
tered on May 9, 1955 (R. 59-64). The petition for
writs of certiorari was filed on July 11, 1955. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Tort Claims Act authorizes recov-
ery for property damage sustained by a member of
the armed forces incident to his service as the re-
sult of the alleged negligence of other military
personnel and accordingly furnishes a basis for an
insurer’s claim based on subrogation.

STATUTES INVOLVED
1. Section 1346(b) of Title 28 U.S.C. (part of
the Federal Tort Claims Act) provides:

Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of
this title, the district courts, together with the
District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the
United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing
on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the

3

United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.

2. The Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945
provides in pertinent part (59 Stat. 225) :*

Sec. 1. The Secretary of War, and such
other officer or officers as he may designate
for such purposes and under such regulations
as he may prescribe, are hereby authorized to
consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, settle,
and pay any claim against the United States,
including claims not heretofore satisfied aris-
ing on or after December 7, 1939, of military
personnel and civilian employees of the War
Department or of the Army, when such claim
is substantiated, and the property determined

1 The Military Personnel Claims Act was amended, subse-
quent to the crash which gave rise to the instant claims, on
July 3, 1952 (66 Stat. 321) and on August 1, 1953 (67 Stat.
317). The first amendment expressly extended the Act to
Air Force personnel claims. The 1953 amendment enlarged
the time for filing of certain claims. _.

At the time of the crash and before the 1952 amendment
making the Military Personnel Claims Act expressly ap-
plicable to claims by Air Force personnel, the functions of
the War Department with respect to Air Force persunnel
claims under the Military Personnel Claims Act had been
transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force by the National
Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, 501, 503; 5 U.S.C. 626).
That Act changed the title of the Secretary of War to Sec-
retary of the Army and created the Department of the Air
Force and its head, the Secretary of the Air Force. It also
provided for the transfer of appropriate functions from the
Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of the Air Force (61
Stat. 503).

4

to be reasonable, useful, necessary, or proper
under the attendant circumstances, in such
manner as the Secretary of War may by regu-
lation prescribe, for damage to or loss, destruc-
tion, capture, or abandonment of personal
property occurring incident to their service,
or to replace such personal property in kind:
Provided, That the damage to or loss, destruc-
tion, capture, or abandonment of property
shall not have been caused in whole or in part
by any negligence or wrongful act on the part
of the claimant, his agent, or employee, and
shall not have occurred at quarters occupied
by the claimant within continental United
States (excluding Alaska) which are not as-
signed to him or otherwise provided in kind
by the Government. No claim shall be settled
under this Act unless presented in writing
within one year after the accident or incident
out of which such claim arises shall have
occurred: Provided, That if such accident or
incident occurs in time of war, or if war inter-
venes within two years after its occurrence,
any claim may, on good cause shown, be pre-
sented within one year after peace is estab-
lished. Any such settlement made by the Sec-
retary of War, or his designee, under the au-
thority of this Act and such regulations as he
may prescribe hereunder, shall be final and
conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding
any other provision of law to the contrary.
Sro, 2. Such appropriations as may be re-

5

quired for the settlement of claims under the
provisions of this Act are hereby authorized.
Appropriations available to the War Depart-
ment for the settlement of claims under the
provisions of the Act of March 3, 1885 (23
Stat. 350), as amended, shall be available for
the settlement of claims under the provisions
of this Act.

Src. 3. Sections 3483-3488 of the Revised
Statutes (31 U.S.C. 209-214), and the Act of
March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. 350), as amended by
the Act of July 9, 1918 (40 Stat. 880), and by
the Act of March 4, 1921 (41 Stat. 1436; 31
U.S.C. 218-222), and by section 6 of the Act
of July 3, 1943 (57 Stat. 374; 31 U.S.C. 222a,
222b), are hereby repealed.

STATEMENT

Petitioners filed these six suits under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act to recoup the proceeds of
property damage policies paid by them to certain
insured servicemen whose house trailers had been
damaged by the crash of a military plane at an
Air Force base.

On August 5, 1950, an Air Force B-29 crashed
at the Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base in Cali-
fornia a few seconds after take-off (R. 49). The
plane exploded near the base’s trailer park, con-
taining 48 trailers owned and occupied by service-
men in active duty status and assigned to the base
at the time (R. 20, 49). The trailers and house-

6

hold and personal belongings: in. them suffered
considerable damage.

Petitioners are the insurers of the various trail-
ers (Pet. 4). In accord with the terms of insur-
ance policies issued by them to the trailer owners,
petitioners paid the servicemen a total of $68,-
340.57 for damage to the trailers (R. 5-6; Pet. 4).
Administrative claims for damage to the property
belonging to the militery personnel were also filed
with the Air Force by the servicemen under the
Military Personnel Claims Act, supra, pp. 3-5, and
were paid by the Air Force to the servicemen ‘‘ex-
cept for that property covered by insurance, as
provided by regulations under such statute’’ (R.
9, 15, 50).

The insurers’ complaints, filed under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, alleged that the crash re-
sulted from negligent maintenance and operation
of the Air Force plane (R. 5). The complaints
further asserted that, by payment of the proceeds
of the policies to the servicemen, the insurers had
become ‘‘subrogated to the rights of their respec-
tive insureds” against the United States to that
extent (R. 6).

The United States moved to dismiss (R. 10). In
a supporting affidavit the Government showed that
the insurers’ claims were for property losses of
‘‘military personnel in the United States Air
Forces stationed at [Fairfield-Suisun] Base in the
discharge of military functions, and that all of
these-men were on active duty, and duly assigned
to military functions, at and about the time of the

7

said erash’’ (R. 11, 49). The affidavit also showed
that all of the property in question “‘was located
on and within the said Base in an area duly as-
signed by competent military authority as an area
for trailers in which the men slept between hours
of work and that the area was under military pro-
tection’’ (R. 11).

The following additional facts with respect to
the operation of the base trailer park were stipu-
lated :

The detailed procedure controlling the operation
and maintenance of the trailer park within the
confines of the base were prescribed in a base regu-
lation (R. 13, 51). Only Air Force personnel and
their families assigned to the base were allowed to
use the trailer park facilities (R. 51). Specific
assignments and termination of trailer space were
made by the base billetting officer (R. 51). Assign-
ment of trailer park space automatically termin-
ated when the base ceased to be the permanent sta-
tion of the individual concerned (R. 17, 51). Like
the rest of the Air Force base, the trailer park
area was under military protection and subject
to the jurisdiction of military police (R. 51).

While the military personnel living at the base
trailer park were not required to live on the base,
there was a critical housing shortage in the sur-
rounding area (R. 50). The trailer park accord-
ingly had been set aside within the base for the con-
venience and accommodation of military personnel
and for the mutual benefit of the personnel and the
Air Force (R. 16, 50).

8

The district court, upon consideration of the
foregoing facts, ruled that the property damage
sustained by the Air Force personnel was incident
to their service, that their exclusive remedy was
under the Military Personnel Claims Act, and that
neither they nor their insurers could maintain
suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (R. 22-
37). The Government’s motions to dismiss were
accordingly granted and the claims dismissed (R.
38; Pet 5).

The court of appeals affirmed (R. 49-58; Pet.
Appendix A). It held that the insured servicemen
were themselves barred from bringing an action
for service-incident property damage under the
Tort Claims Act on the grounds (1) that ‘‘there
never has been and is not now any act of Congress
* * * authorizing a serviceman in active duty
status to sue the government for service incident
property damage, however inflicted’’ and (2) that
the servicemati’s sole remedy on such a claim is
the administrative relief provided by the Military
Personnel Claims Act (R. 55). Limiting the
servicemen to this administrative remedy, the
court emphasized, ‘‘avoids the serious disruption
of military mission and discipline that well might
follow civil litigation based on such claims” (R.
55). Since the insured servicemen themselves
could not bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the instant actions based on subrogation,
being completely derivative in nature, were like-
wise held barred (R. 56, 58).

9

ARGUMENT

In order to establish the validity of their subro-
gation claims, petitioners must sustain the position
that recovery may be had against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act on
claims of members of the armed forces arising in-
cident to their service. But this Court has already
considered and rejected that precise contention as
applied to personal injuries.* Since the record
plainly establishes that the servicemen’s claims
here involved were in fact incident to their mili-
tary service and since both courts below correctly
applied the rationale of the decisions of this Court
in denying recovery, there is, we submit, no war-
rant for further review of these cases.

1. It was implied in Brooks v. United States, 337
U.S. 49, 50, 52, that service-incident claims result-
ing, for example, from ‘‘a defective jeep,’’ are not
actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
next case of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
left nothing to implication. The Court squarely
held that the claims of military personnel there
involved were not within the coverage of the Act
because the claims arose as an incident of military
service. This holding was reiterated seven months
ago in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112,
113, where the Court expressly noted its adherence
to the line drawn in the Feres case as to claims

2 Feres v. United States, 340 US. 135; United States v.
ge 348 US. 110; and Brooks v. United States, 337
8. 49.

10

which ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service.”’

It is true that in both Brooks and Brown, un-
like Feres, it was concluded that causes of action
had been stated under the Tort Claims Act. But
Brooks and Brown, as those two opinions carefully
demonstrate, involved claims not incident to the
claimants’ military service. 337 U.S. 49, 52; 348
U.S. 110, 112. In the instant case, the facts leave
no room for doubt that the claim, like that in
Feres, is service-incident in nature and hence
barred under the Act. This is clearly borne out by
a comparison of the facts in the Brown and Brooks
eases, on one hand, with those in Feres and the
irstant cases, on the other.

In Brown, a veteran sued the United States for
the alleged negligence of another civilian at a
Veterans Administration hospital. Brown’s claim
arose, the Court noted, not while ‘‘he was subject to
military discipline’ but ‘‘after his discharge, while
he enjoyed a civilian status.” 348 U.S. 110, 112.
Similarly in Brooks, the plaintiff soldiers were rid-
ing in their privately owned automobile on a public
highway when they were struck by a government
vehicle driven by a civilian employee. They were
not then on any business even remotely connected
with their military service; nor were they on the
highway, where they were hit, because of their being
soldiers. 337 U.S. 49, 52.

The claims in Feres, on the other hand, show that
they arose not only incident to military service but
as a direct result thereof. Feres actually involved

11

three separate cases, those of Feres, Griggs, and
Jefferson, 340 U.S. 135, footnote. Feres, after com-
pleting his military duty for the day, burned to
death while sleeping in his quarters on the post.
Negligence was asserted on the part of other mili-
tary personnel in maintaining a defective heating
plant in the quarters. The Griggs and Jefferson
cases arose as malpractice actions by the plaintiff
soldiers for alleged negligence on the part of Army
surgeons at Army hospitals. In all three cases,
it is obvious that the claims were incident to and
had occurred because of the servicemen’s military
service—Feres was in his quarters on the post be-
cause he was in the service; Griggs and Jefferson
were operated on by Army doctors on Army op-
erating tables in an Army hospital because they
were in the military service.

Similarly in the instant cases, as the findings of
both lower courts make clear, the claims for ‘‘dam-
age to the trailers of the servicemen arose out of
and was in the course of activity incident to their
military service’’ (R. 26,57). It was only because
the servicemen, whose trailers were destroyed, were
members of the Air Force on active military duty
status assigned to Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base
that they were allowed to make use of the trailer
park facilities at the base (R. 50, 57-58). As ob-
served by the court below, ‘‘The trailers were au-
thorized to occupy the assigned spaces solely by
virtue of the active military status of their owners’’
(R. 57). The trailer park area was ‘‘absolutely
subject to military control and discipline’’ and ‘‘at

12

the time of the damage the trailer owners were all
in active military duty status as distinguished
from civilan or inactive military status’? (R. 57).
Obviously, in view of the regular heavy air traffic
at any Air Force base, the servicemen’s use of the
trailer park surrounded them with the precise con-
ditions out of which the instant claim arose. It
follows, as the court below emphasized, that ‘‘the
erash of an airplane immediately following takeoff
from an Air Force base certainly has a real and
substantial relationship to the military service of
any serviceman assigned to such base”’ (R. 58).
Since it was ‘‘solely by virtue of [the servicemen’s]
active military status’’ that their personal prop-
erty was placed in the ‘‘zone of special danger,”’
both courts below, we submit, correctly concluded
that the instant claims arose incident to military
service and hence were not cognizable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. See O’Leary v. Brown-
Pacific-Mazon, 340 U.S. 504, 506-507; Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F. 2d 11,
14 (0.A. D.C.), certiorari denied, 310 U.S. 649;
Allen v. D. D. Skousen Const. Co., 55 N. Mex. 1;
Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller, 157 Fla. 459.

The correctness of that conclusion is

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386418_0100%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
