# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Seltenreich v. Town of Fairbanks

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1954
- **Citation:** 348 U.S. 887

## Text

- U

In the Supreme Cp

FILED
AUG 9 1954

§

HAROLD B. WILLEY, Clerk

OF THE

United States,

OcToBER TERM, 1954

‘No. 271

FRED SELTENREICH and HAWLEY EvANs,
a partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks Air
Service, JEss BacHNER, W. C.
MitTcHELL and Davi B. PHILLIPs,
a co-partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks
Aircraft Service,

Petitioners,
vs. :

THE Town oF FatRBANKs, and Fatr-
BANKS ScHoo.t District, an Inde-

pendent School District Corporation,
Respondents.

4

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Hvsert A. GILBERT,
524 Third Avenue, Fairbanks, Alaska,

Attorney for Petitioner.

Gerorce B. McN ass, JR.,
P. O. Box 682, Fairbanks, Alaska,
Ropert A. PaRRIsH,
P. O. Box 646, Fairbanks, Alaska,

Of Counsel.

Subject Index
Page

Opinions and orders below ..............cceececcuceccece. 2

ths semana spas TEE TEE EP OE PETE EN Laer aaa Lo ah 3

Questions presented for review ............cecccuccucecce, 3

Constitutional provisions, statutes and Federal Rules of Civil
WUMNGNS CII ois cick dude seonivcles cebek us 4

ROE OE II nis ig sheen sini Senna ns Skea ks 4

Basis of federal jurisdiction in court of first instance... .. .. 7

PEI ss i ka neensin nha ab wk des La 7

Question Number One.

Did the district court for the district of Alaska, fourth di-
vision, and the court of appeals for the ninth circuit de-
cide a question which was not open on hearing of motion
for interlocutory injunction and prejudice the position of
petitioners on final hearing? ............ccccccceccecce, 9

Question Number Two.

Did the decisions, while going beyond the question of a prima
facie showing made for the purpose of obtaining an inter-
locutory injunction, proceed upon assumptions of fact not
sustained by the evidences which petitioners could have
negatived by proof adduced at final hearing? ............ 18

Question Number Three.

Has there been a fair compliance with Rule 52(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?...................... 27

‘* Question Number Four.
Should said decisions be allowed to stand, would petitioners
be deprived of property and property rights without due
process of law?

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

American Cutting Alloys v. General Electric Company, 135
rs SN Gee ee eae ae bake cap bees ice 20
Anderson et al v. Souza, 232 P 274 ........... eee eee eee 24
Antonick et al v. Chamberlain et al, 1947 US Av R518.... 24
Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 1930 US Av R1............ 24
Brooks et al v. Peterson et al, 31 So (2d) 472............. 24
Brown v. Quinland, Inc., 18.F (2d) 228.................. 27
Crew et al v. Gallagher, 1948 U S Av R 167.............. 24

Cuyahoga River Power Company v. City of Akron, 240 US
DTA Gin chcus eel, ce aeebcebedaes s04bbensee ected ee 25
Delta Air Corp. et al v. Kersey et al, 20 SE (2d) 245...... 24
Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F (2d) 571.............. 20

First Presbyterian Church of Santa Barbara, California v.
CE Ms cic cv cnaebenceescedeaessese 20
Hagar v. Reclamation District, 110 U S 516............... 30

Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., 147 F (2d) 532 28
Hayde et al v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., et al, 1948 US

RD Nick eS Ga dards Ua RR dpe kak nce eG ne 0.46% 0 86 UKE 24
Jordan v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 77

ee es eu Nee kedaececenceeene 20
Kersey v. City of Atlanta, 20S E (2d) 245............... 24
Kuntz v. Warner Flying Service, 43 N W (2d) 475........ 24
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Company, 309 U S

SEs cdkseha iar Chae teehee iste wie cis sices vceee vec 27, 29
Oechsle et al v. Ruhl, 54 Atlantic (2d) 462............... 24
Rhodes v. Biacitelli, 1948 U S Av R 534...... doiiinie't:nh dignianas 24

Schilling et al v. Schweitzer-Cummings Co., 142 F (2d) 82 27
Smith v. New England Aircraft Company, 170 N E 385.... 24
Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F (2d) 201, 88 ALR

a a

TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES CrreD iii
Pages
Thrasher v. Atlanta, 173 S E 817,99 AL R158........... 24
Vanderslice v. Shawn, 11 Atlantic (2d) 87................ 24

Warren Township School District v. Detroit, 14 N W (2d)
WE: NARs chines cbcE cheered TaEUl oxeiss Josbeae Siwkas 24

Statutes

Alaska Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949, Title 16, Article I,
Section 35, Subdivision 20 ...............cccccsceccces 4, 25
Session Laws of Alaska, 1951, Chapter 61................. 4, 25
United States Code, Title 28, Section 1254(1)............. 3
United States Code, Title 48, Section 101 ................. 7

Contitutions
Constitution of the United States:
NNN ap NE OP obi ba os Sec de O8 vc ve au cons 3, 4, 25
MI OE BB. os cide cv idencsdcsceccccas 3,4
Rules
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Re END A hdd b uk vate hr aKcucda eb bch newes bas 4,19
RE SUMED. ibaa van 000-55 Rk eARWNRE Riese v.00 cba’ 4, 6, 27
Texts

1 Barron and Holtzoff, Section 243..................e000- 19
arama Times, Be TB sooo ic vivcvicn ca cdcdeascsochs 30

renee eeeeeersereeeeeeneeeaceneeceSeAeaeS

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

Ruited States

FRED SELTENREICH and HAWLEY Evans, |
a partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks Air |
Service, JEss BacHNerR, W. C.
MITCHELL and Davin B. PHILIPs,
a co-partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks

Aircraft Service,
Petttioners, ¢
vs.

THE Town or FarrsBanks, and Fair-
BANKs ScHoot District, an Inde-
pendent School District Corporation,

Respondents.

—

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

ee

2

To the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the
Umted States, and to the Honorable Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States:

The above named Petitioners respectfully pray that

a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, entered in the above entitled cause, affirming

the judgment of the District Court for the District of

Alaska, Fourth Judicial Division, number 13,357, and

the order of said Court of Appeals denying Petition-

ers’ Petition for Rehearing.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW.

On the 4th day of March, 1952, the District Court
for the District of Alaska, Fourth Division, entered
an order denying Plaintiffs-Petiticners’ Motion for
Interlocutory Injunction, said judgment being based
upon a written opinion of even date therewith which
is reported in Volume 103 of Federal Supplement at
page 319.

On the 10th day of March, 1954, judgment was en-
tered by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirming the judgment of the trial court, said judg-
ment being based upon an opinion of even date there-
with which is reported in Volume 211 of Federal Re-
porter, Second Series, at page 83.

A Petition for Rehearing was denied on the 30th
day of April, 1954.

3

On the 27th day of July, 1954, an order was en-
tered by the Honorable Hugo L. Black, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
extending the time in which to file Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to and including the 10th day of August,
1954,

Copies of said judgments, opinions and orders are
appended hereto.

JURISDICTION.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Article
I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in construing statutory enactment of the Ter-
ritory of Alaska having impaired the obligation of
contracts, and the 5th and 14th Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, Petitioners having
been deprived of property and property rights with-
out due process of law.

The statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on
this Court is Title 28, Section 1254 (1), United States
Code.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

1. Did the District Court for the District of Alaska
Fourth. Division, and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decide a question which was not open
on hearing of Motion for Interlocutory Injunction
and prejudice the position of Petitioners on final
hearing ?

4

2. Did the decisions, while going beyond the ques-
tion of a prima facie showing made for the purpose
of obtaining an interlocutory injunction, proceed
upon assumptions of fact not sustained by the evi-
dence which petitioners could have negatived by proof
adduced at final hearing?

3. Has there been a fair compliance with Rule
52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

4, Should said decisions be allowed to stand, would
petitioners be deprived of property and property
rights without due process of law?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INVOLVED.

Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the
United States; Amendments 5 and 14 to the Consti-
tution of the United States; Title 16, Article I, Sec-
tion 35, Sub-division 20 of Alaska Compiled Laws
Annotated, 1949; Chapter 61, Session Laws of Alaska,
1951; and Rules 7 (a), 8 (c) and 52 (a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF CASE.

On the 12th day of October, 1951, petitioners and
others filed a complaint in the District Court for the
District of Alaska, Fourth Division, seeking to en- —
join and restrain the City of Fairbanks, Alaska, from _

| — ee
5

disposing of, closing, interfering with or interrupting
the use of the Fairbanks Municipal Airport, said air-
port, by resolution of the Common Council of said
City, having been designated as Weeks Field.

On the same date a Motion for Interlocutory In-
junction was filed and an order was entered by the
Court requiring that Defendant Town of Fairbanks
appear at the hour of 4:00 o’clock P. M. on the 15th
day of October, 1951, to show cause why said inter-
locutory injunction should not issue.

On motion of the Fairbanks School District an or-
der was entered on October 13, 1951, allowing said
School District to intervene. An answer was filed by
said intervenor on the 16th day of October, 1951.

An answer was filed by Defendant Town of Fair-
banks on October 16, 1951.

On October 16, 1951, arguments were heard on Pe-
titioners’ Motion for Interlocutory Injunction and
the Court took the matter under advisement.

Three days later, and on the 19th day of October,
1951, Petitioners filed an additional Motion for Tem-
porary Restraining Order, based upon an affidavit,
this time requesting an order restraining an over-
zealous city from erecting a power line across the
Weeks Field runway. The construction of said power
‘line would have, and did, effectively close said air-
field. —

The Court’s order:

“Denied this 19th day of October, 1951, as no
cause of action for a restraining order is shown

6

and also privi motion for an injunction in this
cause is pending awaiting the filing of briefs in
this cause.’’
s/ Harry E. Pratt
District Judge

The happening sought to be prevented by the in-
terlocutory injunction was effectively accomplished
by the erection of the power line across the runway.

On the 9th day of November, 1951, Defendant Town
of Fairbanks filed an amended answer.

The Court kept the matter under advisement. Time,
and more time passed until the 4th day of March,
1952, 140 days later, when the Court in a written
opinion passed on the motion for interlocutory in-
junction and denied same.

The Court did not make its findings of fact and
enter its conclusions of law in regard to whether or
not a sufficient showing had been made to entitle Pe-
titioners to an interlocutory injunction pending final
hearing as provided by Rule 52 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure but proceeded to determine
the case as if on final hearing.

Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which Court disregarded the conten-
tions of all parties and proceeded to determine the
case upon its merits, and in so doing, decided a ques-
tion which was not open and before the Court.

The judgment of the District Court was affirmed.

There is presently pending in the Court of first
instance a complaint seeking equitable relief. By the

7

actions heretofore undertaken by the Courts of trial
and appellate jurisdiction, the action has already been
decided upon its merits, without first having given
Petitioners their day in Court. As a consequence
thereof, Petitioners have been deprived of property
and property rights without due process of law.

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
IN COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE.

Title 48, Section 101, United States Code, provides,
in part, as follows:

“There is established a District Court for the
District of Alaska, with the jurisdiction of Dis-
trict Courts of the United States and with gen-
eral jurisdiction in civil, criminal, equity and
admiralty causes; * * *,’’

ARGUMENT.

Plaintiffs’ complaint stated a cause of action. In-
tervenor Fairbanks School District filed an answer
and Defendant Town of Fairbanks filed an answer
and amended answer. All of said answers admitted
and denied portions of the allegations contained in
Plaintiffs’ complaint and contained several affirma-
tive defenses. The cause was at issue,

At the time of the filing of their complaint Plain-
tiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction pending
the trial of the action. The Court took the matter
under advisement.

—,
8

Due to the fact that the rights and property of
Plaintiffs were in danger of irreparable injury because
of the planned construction of a power line across the
runway of the airport, Plaintiffs asked for a tempor-
ary restraining order to prevent the Town of Fair-
banks from constructing said power line pending the
decision of the Court on the temporary injunction
then before it. The trial Court arbitrarily and with
an uncommon abuse of its judicial discretion denied
the motion for the restraining order.

The power line was constructed, thereby effectively
closing the airport. This was the very thing that Pe-
titioners sought to prevent by their Petition for In-
terlocutory Injunction which the Court, at that time,
had under advisement.

In an outstanding demonstration of disregard for
the principles upon which the systems of American
and English jurisprudence are founded and with a
callous exhibition of judicial oppression, the trial
Court held the motion for interlocutory injunction
under advisement for a period of 140 days, during
which time Plaintiffs were allowed to wither on the
vine, their businesses to be irreparably damaged and
their means of livelihood taken from them.

At the end of the ruinous 140 days the Court,.not
content with merely denying the motion for interlocu-
tory injunction which was the only question open to
it at the time, in a written opinion and in complete
disregard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
decided the case on its merits.

>
9

An orderly presentation of the questions before this
Court requires that they be considered in the se-
quence set forth above.

QUESTION NUMBER ONE.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA,
POURTH DIVISION, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIROUIT DECIDE A QUESTION WHICH WAS
NOT OPEN ON HEARING OF MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY
INJUNCTION AND PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF PETI-
TIONERS ON FINAL HEARING?

An examination of the written opinion of the Dis-
trict Court reveals that the following questions were
resolved :

1, Where deed executed in 1922, by trustee for
townsite of Fairbanks, Alaska, in favor of Town,
provided that land conveyed was to be held in trust
for park and recreational purposes and that if any
portion was used for other purpose title would revert
to grantor, and thereafter federal government recog-
nized fact that deed was either void or voidable and
made exchange of deeds whereby United States
through subsequent townsite trustee deeded said tracts
to town without any limitation or retriction whatso-
ever as to use tracts. were to be put, and although
town used tracts conveyed. for airport purposes, it
specifically retained control of airport and made rules
requiring doing of certain acts by those using airport,
including payment of rent for hangar and other
facilitiessm~peyment of landing fees, etc., the tract
was never dedicated to public use as an airport.

10

2. Where deed conveying to town of Fairbanks,
Alaska, tract of land of 5.28 acres contained no limita-
tion as to use of ground conveyed thereby, and did not
provide that reversion of title should take place if
land were used for any particular purpose, deed could
not act as a dedication of property for any particular

purpose.

3. Under laws of Alaska, when a deed describes
land by metes and bounds and makes an erroneous
statement as to acreage involved, deed conveys land
as described by metes and bounds and in disregard
of alleged acreage.

4. Where grantors deeded to Territory of Alaska
a piece of land described by metes and bounds alleged
to contain 60.5 acres, and grantors thereafter executed
form of deed which was merely a statement that their
deed contained 62 acres, instead of recited 60.5 acres,
that they wanted to give excess over 60 acres to town
of Fairbanks when a more correct description of
excess was ascertained, and Territory of Alaska con-
veyed identical land to Town by means of description
identical with that of deed, statement on part of
grantor was immaterial, as Town received all of
tract alleged to contain 60.5 acres and also two acres
exceeding the 60.5 acres.

5. Where grantors deeded realty to Territory of
Alaska without limitation to use Territory was to put
land conveyed, fact that grantors in subsequent deed
recited that their former deeds to Territory was in-
tended to convey ground for airfield purposes, was

-

11

insufficient to constitute proof of making dedication
of property for public use as an airfield.

6. Where ordinance of Town of Fairbanks estab-
lishing municipal airport provided for setting apart
as much of the ‘‘park reserve’’ as necessary for use
of landing field, but provided nothing in ordinance
should be construed to divest town of its title to lands
embraced within park reserve, nor as a surrender
by Town of its right to manage park reserve as public
park, and provided for an airport commission and for
termination of leases and that buildings located on
leased land should become the property of City if
not removed within 30 days after termination of lease,
such provisions negatived any intention on part of
town to dedicate land mentioned as ‘‘park reserve’’
to public use as airport.

7. Ordinance of Town of Fairbanks, Alaska,
promulgating regulations for operation of municipal
airport providing that only aircraft and airmen li-
censed by Civil Aeronautics Authority of the United
States could operate on or over airport, except student
fliers or public aircraft, providing that persons using
airport for commercial aviation or other commercial
or private purpose should first secure permit from
city clerk and pay fees and charges prescribed, and
that any one violating ordinance shall be subject to
fine and/or imprisonment and suspension from use
of airport not to exceed 30 days made it clear that
town did not and had not relinquished ownership
and control of airport and the right to use same as
source of income and to administer such use to full

12

extent of powers given to it in regard to other prop-
erty of municipality.

8. Where Common Council of Town of Fairbanks,
Alaska, passed resolution that town was not finan-
cially able to continue maintenance of municipal air-
port, that construction and operation of new airport
approximately two miles from city, which was avail-
able for public use and by all aircraft carrying
freight and passengers to and from city, was larger,
better constructed and safer and ample to serve all
needs of city and general public, that municipal air-
port was no longer being used, except by small one-
engined airplanes and that buildings in close prox-
imity rendered municipal airport to longer safe, and
the land embraced in airport was needed for housing
and recreational purposes and municipal airport
would be ordered closed, resolution furnished cumula-
tive evidence of fact that town did not intend to con-
- vey tracts used for municipal airport to use of public.

9. Where property of the Town of Fairbanks,
Alaska, used for purpose of municipal airport re-
mained property of city, not subject to any public
trust, city had full power to pass ordinance order-
ing the closing of the airport under statutory pro-
visions, to prohibit conduct endangering public peace,
public health, or public safety, and the owner of the
property had the right to prohibit the use of its prop-
erty for landing and take-offs of airplanes inasmuch
as that was greatly endangering public safety.

10. Where no answer or denial of any sort was
filed by plaintiffs to intervenor’s first affirmative

= cn
13

defense, it would be assumed that Plaintiffs intended
to and did admit the matters set forth in such defense.

11. Execution by Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, of
deed of property, formerly used for municipal airport
to independent school district, implied finding on part
of common council of town that in its judgment land
deeded was no longer required for municipal purpose,
and as realty had never been acquired or held for any
public use or devoted thereto, no ratification of sale
and execution of deed was required by statute.

12. Where realty owned by Town of Fairbanks,
Alaska, used for municipal airport purposes was
never dedicated by town to such use, if common coun-
cil failed to make finding that in their judgment
premises were no longer needed for municipal pur-
poses, or that in their judgment it was advantageous
to city to donate premises to school district, such
failure on part of council would not inure to benefit
of Plaintiffs or assist them in making out any sort
of case for obtaining preliminary injunction to re-
strain abandonment of municipal airport by town.

13. Where description of land in propositions of
ballot of special election of February 21, 1950, in
Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, were so vague and in-
definite as not to give voters knowledge of land re-
ferred to, propositions were invalid and did not fur-
nish ratification by voters of any ordinance or other
sale of realty.

14. Where propositions submitted on ballots of
special election of February 21, 1950, held in Town

14

of Fairbanks, Alaska, for purpose of obtaining rati-
fication by voters of sale of real estate contain suffi-
cient description of land, but did not show that
common council passed ordinance setting forth terms
of proposed sale and consideration therefor, and that
council in their best judgment determined premises
were no longer required for municipal purposes,
proposition was invalid and did not furnish ratifica-
tion by voters of any ordinance or other sale of real
estate.

15. A common law dedication requires a definite
intention on the part of grantor to dedicate designated
land to public use.

16. A common law dedication requires that an in-
tention on part of grantor to dedicate designated land
to public use be shown clearly and unequivocally.

17. Where deeds by which realty was conveyed to
town of Fairbanks, Alaska, contained no limitation
requiring land to be used for an airfield and contained
no clauses stating that if land conveyed were used
for any purpose other than airport purposes, it
would revert to grantor, plaintiff’s right to restrain
use by town of property for other than airport pur-
poses and to restrain closing down of airport could
not be based on an express dedication, as none existed,
and in absence of elements of common law dedication,
could not be based on such a dedication.

18. Under statute providing that common council,
in order to make available sites for operation thereon
of new industry, which will benefit civic welfare of

-—

municipality, may sell, lease or dispose thereof on
such terms or conditions as may be deemed advanta-
geous to civic welfare of municipality, to such persons
or corporations as will agree to install, maintain and
operate thereupon such new ‘“‘industry’’ and such
sites, shall not be deemed to be ‘‘property”’ acquired,
owned or held for any public use or devoted thereto,
housing authority is within meaning of quoted word.

15

19. Under statute providing that common council,
in order to make available sites for operation thereon
of new industries which will benefit civic welfare of
municipality, may sell, lease or dispose of on such
terms or conditions as may be deemed advantageous
to civic welfare of municipality to such persons or
corporations as will agree to install, maintain and
operate thereon such new industry and such sites, shall
not be deemed to be property acquired, owned or
held for any public use or devoted thereto, common
council of Fairbanks, Alaska, could sell, lease, or
otherwise dispose of land previously devoted to air-
port purposes, by making such lands available as sites
for new housing industry by complying with terms
of statute.

20. Where deed executed by grantor to town of
Fairbanks, Alaska,. recited as a part of consideration
that grantor should have continuous, free and un-
interrupted right-of-way to and from municipal air-
port to one of the lots, and grantor alone signed deed,
recital that grantor was to have right-of-way con-
stituted self-serving declaration which was not binding
on town, and grantor’s rights under deed were a

16

mere license which would terminate on death of either
party, and was not transferable or descendable.

21. An easement requires both a dominant and a
servient tenement.

22. An easement must rest upon a grant thereof,
it cannot exist by parol.

23. A plaintiff must have a clear right to the is-
suance of a preliminary injunction.

24. Where plaintiffs failed to establish that realty
owned by municipality was dedicated to public use
as an airport, and evidence showed that independent
school district had built a school house costing $600,000
on airport property after closing of airport, and that
if plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunction
to restrain closing of the airport was granted grounds
could not be used by reason of danger of injuring
and killing some of the 450 school children if planes
were permitted to land and take off from field, and
there was no showing by plaintiffs of any damage
for any specific amount if preliminary injunction
were denied and defendant town alleged as affirmative
defense that plaintiffs were indebted to defendant for
use of airport and plaintiffs made no showing whatso-
ever that defendant or intervenor school district were
unable to respond in damages to any extent that was
probable in action, plaintiffs’ application for prelimi-
nary injunction would be denied.

The only question properly before the Court and
open to decision was whether or not sufficient showing
had been made to entitle Plaintiffs to an interlocutory

——

injunction. From the above items, numbered 1 to 24,
inclusive, it is abundantly obvious that more than one
question was resolved. It is also abundantly obvious
that the running commentary and observations of the
Court on the aileged ‘‘facts’” or ‘‘assumptions of
fact,’”” most of which are misleading or erroneous
and which could have been negatived by plaintiffs by
proof adduced upon final hearing, are highly preju-
dicial to petitioners on final hearing.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was a
bit more restrained in its determination, finding only
the following:

1. Under statute authorizing municipalities to sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of property when in judg-
ment of city council same should no longer be re-
quired for municipal purposes, council has power to
determine that property ceases to be needed for public
use, without necessity of ratification by voters, and
not necessarily coincidental with sale of or other
disposal of property.

17

2. An airport operated under normal conditions
and with adequate supervision and controls is not
a ‘“‘nuisance per se.”’

3. Where airport was little used, a better airport
having been made available by government, and new
school building had been constructed nearby with
result that continued use of field endangered children
and other persons, Fairbanks council properly closed
the airport and enacted ordinance prohibiting use
thereof, and operators of aircraft service who did

a
18

not own airport were not entitled to eee ray against
such action. we

Can it be said that the Court of ‘Seplile for the
Ninth Circuit did not decide questions not open and
to the prejudice of the position of Petitioners?

QUESTION NUMBER TWO.

DID THE DECISIONS, WHILE GOING BEYOND THE QUESTION
OF A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING MADE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF OBTAINING AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION, PRO-
CEED UPON ASSUMPTIONS OF FACT NOT SUSTAINED BY
THE EVIDENCE WHICH PETITIONERS COULD HAVE NEG-
ATIVED BY PROOF ADDUCED AT FINAL HEARING?

Perhaps the outstanding contribution of the trial

Court to the reported law of this country is the

following:

‘Where no answer or denial of any sort was filed
by plaintiffs to intervenor’s first affirmative de-
fense, it would be assumed that plaintiffs intended
to and did admit the matters set forth in such
defense.”’

- Based upon the foregoing gem of judicial reasoning
and wisdom, the trial Court proceeded to assume as
fact all of the allegations contained in the various
affirmative defenses set forth as parts of the answers
of defendant Town of Fairbanks and intervenor Fair-
banks School District—even the affirmative defenses
set forth as a part of the answer of defendant Town

| eee Lelie eeseeere ee
19

of Fairbanks filed on November 9, 1952, after the
matter had been taken under advisement.

That the effect thereby given to Rules 7 (a) and 8
(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is con-
trary to all accepted interpretations is beyond
question.

“The concept that it is the function of the
pleadings to create issues of fact is as true under
the rule (Rule 7) as under the former practice
but even after the pleadings are closed, the issues
to be determined may be modified, enlarged or
narrowed before trial.

While the pleadings are not closed until answer
has been filed, there is no place in modern pro-
cedure for useless or frivolous pleadings. Ordi-
narily the complaint and answer are all that are
necessary.

A reply is required to a counterclaim, but not

| to any other allegations of the answer containing
the counterclaim, and is the final pleading re-
quired or permitted.

An answer must be filed to a cross-claim and a
third party answer to a third party complaint.

In brief the rule permits only necessary plead-
ings.

No reply is required to an answer which does
not assert a counterclaim.

Affirmative defenses included in the answer do
not necessitate a reply nor is a reply permitted
to such answer unless the Court orders a reply.
Some real reason or necessity must be shown in
order to justify the Court in requiring a reply to
an answer.’’ 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Section 243.

20 .

See also:
Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F (2d) 571;
Jordan v. Hartford ‘Accident and Indemnity
Company, 77 Fed. Supp. 817;

American Cutting Alloys v. General Electric
Company, 135 F (2d) 502;

First Presbyterian Church of Santa Barbara,
California v. Rabbitt, 118 F (2d) 732.

The matters above set forth, which were assumed
to be fact by the Court, were used as a basis for not
only denying the interlocutory injunction prayed for
but for deciding the case upon its merits.

By adding insult to injury, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in its opinion asswmed to find as
follows:

‘“‘The school building itself is said to extend
into the airport runway.”’

Such a finding is sufficient to remind one of a
choice piece of malicious gossip which is added to
and made more vicious by each purveyor.

Were these assumptions sustained by the evidence?
Could they have been negatived by proof adduced at
final hearing? Let us consider.

Intervenor admits in paragraph III of its first af-
firmative defense (which the Court assumed to be
fact) that the Schooi District undertook to construct
and operate the school with full knowledge of the
exi of the municipal airport. The deed to the
property upon which the school building is situate
contains the following reservation:

21

“‘The Grantor (Town of Fairbanks) reserves,
as long as Weeks Field shall be operated as a
municipal airport and for six (6) months there-
after, the right to the uninterrupted use of all
the land lying northerly of a line 110 feet south-
erly and parallel to the landing field light line
used in connection with the operation of Weeks
Field as an airport, said line being more par-
ticularly shown upon the plat referred to above
and made a part hereof. The Grantor reserves
the right to lease any of the lands hereinabove
reserved for airport or similar purposes, for a
like period.’’

With such knowledge and after accepting such res-
ervation, intervenor complains of irreparable damages
to be sustained due to the continued use of the air-
port facilities. Intervenor complains that it (through
its Board of Directors) has resolved to keep the new
school closed until the airport is closed; that if it
does so it will suffer actual damages in the amount
of $134,800.00, the loss of the use of a $660,000.00
school building and with a demagogic and wholly
unnecessary and unjustified conclusion, states the
following :

‘That the loss of human resources can not be
estimated in dollars and cents. That no amount of
money can compensate for the loss of educational
opportunity to the school children by reason of
the closure of Denali School; that two years of
makeshift schoolroom and classroom usage scat-
tered around the Town of Fairbanks will exact
a toll in child health that can never be remedied
and cannot be measured in dollars and cents. For

22

the plaintiffs to inflict such conditions upon help-
less children for purely commercial gain is neither
just nor equitable.”’

Equitable? More about equities!

‘‘That Intervenor is informed and believes that
the following named Plaintiffs are indebted to
the City of Fairbanks for the use of Weeks Field
airport in the past, and that such indebtedness is
in the amount:stated opposite the names of each
plaintiff and is and remains unpaid :

- Northern Consolidated Airlines ——.. $5,500.00
Fairbanks Air Service 565.00
Alaska Flying School 480.00
That by reason thereof, the plaintiffs so in-

debted to the City of Fairbanks are not entitled

to the equitable relief which they here seek, be-
cause of the equitable maxim that he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands.”

Equitable? Perhaps this Court is familiar with the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.

After a running commentary upon the lack of merit
of Plaintiffs’ action, the trial Court made the follow-
ing observation :

‘“‘In Paragraph XI of Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint it is stated: ‘That each of the Plain-
tiffs herein is engaged in the aircraft or allied
business at or adjacent to Weeks: Field; are
property owners adjacent to Weeks Field and

ve vested property interests therein.’

\ ‘Phe Defendant and Intervenor have denied the

- matters set forth in Paragraph XI above men-

| cence aan

23

tioned. Other than the Gillam easement no evi-
dence of any sort was introduced by the Plain-
tiffs to substantiate any of the allegations in
said Paragraph XI. As the burden of proof is
on Plaintiffs to prove the allegations of their
amended complaint by a preponderance of the
evidence in the case, and the plaintiffs having
failed entirely to do so, it becomes apparent .. .”’

This was an allegation of fact made by Petitioners
which was denied by Defendant and Intervenor. Cer-
tainly this was a fact at issue in the action which
was subject to proof to be adduced at final hearing.

The trial Court made an assumption of fact based
upon the denial of Defendant and Intervenor. Such
assumption was highly prejudicial to Petitioners and
was one which could have been negatived by proof.

It might well be noted that the answers of Defend-
ant and Intervenor were filed on the 16th day of
October, 1951, the date upon which the matter was
taken under advisement by the Court. The amended
answer of Defendant was filed on November 9, 1951.
Could Petitioners be penalized for something they
were doubly precluded from doing—by law and by
time ?

The trial Court made an assumption of fact to the
effect that Weeks Field constituted a nuisance, said
assumption being based upon the allegations contained
in the affirmative defenses contained in the answers
of Defendant and Intervenor. An airport is not a
Ruisance per se. See: Thrasher v. City of Atlanta,

=a

24

176 SE 817; ‘Anderson et al v. Souza, 232 P 274;
Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F (2d) 201,
83 A L R 319; Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 43
NW (2d) 475; Brooks et al v. Peterson et al, 31 So.
(2d) 472; Thrasher v. ‘Atlanta, 173 SE 817,99 ALR
158; Delta Air Corp. et al v. Kersey et al, 20 SE (2d)
245; Kersey v. City of Atlanta, 20 SE (2d) 246;
Hayde et al v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., et al, 1948
U S Av R 601; ‘Antonick et al v. Chamberlain et al,
1947 U S Av R 518; Batcheller v. Commonwealth,
1930 U S Av R1; Smith v. New England ‘Aircraft
Company, 170 NE 385; Warren Township School
District v. Detroit, 14 NW (2d) 134; Crew et al v.
Gallagher, 1948 U S Av R 167; Rhodes v. Biacitelli,
1948 U S Av R 534; Ocechsle et al v. Ruhl, 54 Atlantic
(2d) 462; Vanderslice v. Shawn, 11 Atlantic (2d) 87.

Since an airport is not a nuisance per se it must,
if a nuisance at all, be a nuisance in fact. A determi-
nation of this fact is a judicial function, a determina-
tion which must be made after all the facts are before
the Court and all interested parties have had an
opportunity to be heard, and not upon a mere assump-
tion of fact taken from controverted issues upon which
the parties have not been heard.

The foregoing assumptions of fact by the trial Court,
and numerous others, were not sustained by competent
evidence. They were premature findings based upon
the affirmative defenses contained in the answers of
defendant and intervenor which were entitled to no
more weight than the allegations contained in Peti-
tioners’ complaint.

agen

25

Being premature and subject to being negatived by
proof upon final hearing, such asswmptions of fact
are most prejudicial to the rights of Petitioners.

By making the asswmption of fact contained in its
opinion, which were taken from the answers and af-
firmative defenses filed by Defendant and Intervenor
and not supported by evidence, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit felt constrained to interpret
Title 16 Article 1, Section 35, Subdivision 20 of Alaska
Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949 and the amendment
thereto contained in Chapter 61, Session Laws of
Alaska, 1951.

By making these premature and unjustified assump-
tions and basing its opinion thereon, the Court has run
squarely afoul Section 10 of Article 1 of the Consti-
tution of the United States.

It is alleged in Petitioners’ complaint and denied
in the answers of Defendant and Intervenor that con-
tractual rights are involved. Whether or not such
contractual rights and property rights exist is a mat-
ter to be determined upon final hearing by competent
evidence, not by allegation and denial.

To interpret the statute in such a way as to allow
any municipality created by statute to, by ordinance,
impair the obligation of contract, is a clear violation
of Petitioners’ constitutional rights.

It is well settled that action by a municipality comes
within the purview of said section. See: Cuyahoga
River Power Company v. City of ‘Akron, 240 U 8S
462.

—

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, based upon a question which was not before
the Court and open to decision, would necessarily,
should it appear upon final hearing that contractual
rights were involved, be in violation of said section 10.

Its consideration in general is amply dem astrated
by the finding that ‘‘the school building itself is said
to extend into the airport runway’’, said finding be-
ing so clearly negatived by the facts presented as to
preclude discussion.

These questions, and others, decided by the Courts
below and based therein upon assumptions of fact
which were not sustained by competent evidence,
when such questions were not before either Court,
most certainly prejudice the rights of Petitioners.

Had the Courts below confined themselves to the
one and only issue presented, all of these assumptions
would have disappeared or have been negatived by
proof adduced upon final hearing.

| ageemraneringes
27

QUESTION NUMBER THREE.
HAS THERE BEEN A FAIR COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 52 (a)
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?
Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is, in part, as follows:

“‘(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the Court
shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the en-
try of the appropriate judgment; and in granting
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the Court
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of
its action. * * *,”

It is well settled that where interlocutory injunction
is denied without findings of fact or conclusions of
law as required by the above stated Rule, the judg-
ment will be reversed and the case remanded. See:
Brown v. Quinland, Inc., 18 F (2d) 228; Mayo v.
Lakeland Highlands Canning Company, 309 US 310.

Findings of fact should be pertinent to the issue
and supported by the evidence. In Schilling et al v.
Schweitzer-Cummings Co., 142 F (2d) 82, the Court
stated :
“‘The ultimate test as to the adequacy of find-
ings will always be whether they are sufficiently
comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to pro-
vide a basis for decision, and whether they are
supported by the evidence, To the extent that
they are, in addition, non-argumentative in form,
free from conclusions of law and from the re-
dundancy so frequently found in pleadings, they
will be more useful to all concerned.”

28

While we hold no argument with the fact that such
required findings of fact and conclusions of law may
be included in and made a part of a written or memo-
randum opinion, we do insist that the trial Court
speaks only through its findings and judgment. The
opinion must, of necessity, be based upon its findings
and the findings must be confined to the question or
questions open and be supported by competent evi-
dence.

Since only one question, viz, whether or not sufii-
cient showing had been made to entitle Petitioners
to an interlocutory injunction pending final hearing,
was open to the Court, facts relative to that question,
and that question alone, should have been found. Any
variation therefrom would not constitute a fair com-
pliance with the Rule.

In Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., 147
F (2d) 532, the Court stated:

‘*Findings of facts are not to be made in vacuo
but only in connection with an issue of fact which
is before the Court for adjudication and after the
evidence bearing upon that issue has been re-
ceived and considered by the fact finder. For us
to direct the District Court, in advance of its
having heard the plaintiff’s defense to the de-
fendant’s counterclaims, to make the fact find-
ings which they seek would be to compel the
Court to prejudge crucial fact questions in the
ease, a procedure which is abhorrent to the con-
eepts of fairness involved in due process of law.
Moreover, it might well be discovered after the
hearing that the findings so made without knowl-
edge of the issues in the solution of which they

29

were to be employed had been framed in such a
way as to be quite inappropriate to meet the fact
issues actually presented to the Court for deter-
mination.”’

Consider the situation in the present case in the
light of the above quoted well reasoned opinion. Cer-
tainly the entire procedure had in the Courts below
was abhorrent to the concepts of fairness involved in
due process of law.

“It is of highest importance to a proper review
of the action of a Court in granting or refusing
a preliminary injunction that there should be a
fair compliance with Rule 52 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.’’, Mayo v. Lakeland
Highlands Canning Co., supra.

It can not by any stretch of the imagination be
concluded that there was a fair compliance with the
Rule. The errors, unjustified findings and assumptions
of the trial Court led the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit into committing grievous error.

QUESTION NUMBER FOUR.

SHOULD SAID DECISIONS BE ALLOWED TO STAND, WOULD
PETITIONERS BE DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY AND PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW?

What is due process of law depends on the circum-
stances. It varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.

Chancellor Kent, 2 Com. 13, adopts this mode of
construing the phrase:

t
30

‘‘The better and larger definition of due proc-
ess of law is that it means law in its regular
course of administration through courts of jus-
tice.”’

In Hagar v. Reclamation District, 110 US 516, this
Court stated the following:

“By due process of law is meant one, which
following the forms of law, is appropriate to the
case, and just to the parties affected. It must be
pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law;
it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and
whenever necessary to the protection of the par-
ties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard
respecting the justice of the judgment sought.
The clause in question means, therefore, that
there can be no proceeding against life, liberty or
property which may result in the deprivation of
either, without the observance of those general
rules established in our system of jurisprudence
for the security of private rights.’

Under those requirements, could it be due process
of law for a Court to entertain a motion for an inter-
locutory injunction and to arbitrarily refuse to pro-
tect the rights of Petitioners even while the motion
was pending and while the Court had the matter
under advisement; to hold the motion under advise-
ment for a period of 140 days while Petitioners were
being irreparably damaged; to deny the motion for
interlocutory injunction upon assumptions of fact
clearly forbidden by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; to, while making and proceeding under said

ze
4

- |

31

unjustified assumptions of fact, proceed to consider
questions which were not open to the Court upon the
hearings; to, while considering those questions, pro-
ceed to decide the case upon its merits and to base
its decision upon controverted issues which could be
negatived by evidence adduced at final hearing; to
leave petitioners with a pending equity action which,
in effect, has already been disposed of on a motion
for interlocutory injunction; to, in effect, deny pe-
titioners their day in. Court.

We think not. Should the decisions of the District
Court for the District of ‘Alaska, Fourth Division,
be allowed to stand, Petitioners will be deprived of
property and property rights without due process of
law.

CONCLUSION.
Petitioners have been required, in this Court and in
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in view
of the action of the trial Court to argue matters of
procedure and its effect upon their constitutional
rights. Had the trial Court confined itself to the issues
presented, the whole matter would very likely have
been disposed of long ago, Since the trial Court es-
sayed to assume facts from controverted issues which
could have been negatived by proof on final hearing,
_ Petitioners have been deprived of their day in Court;

have been deprived of property and property rights
_ without due process of law.

32

For the above stated reasons, the Petition for Wa if
of Certiorari should be granted. a

Dated, Fairbanks, Alaska,
July 30, 1954.
Respectfully submitted,
Husert A. GIBErt,
Attorney for Petitioner.
GrorcE B. McN Bp, JR.,
Rosert A. PARRIsH,
Of Counsel.

(Appendix Follows.)

Index to Appendix

Page
Order of District Court for District of Alaska, Fourth
Division, denying motion for Interlocutory Injunction... 1

2. Opinion of District Court for District of Alaska, Fourth
Division, reported in 103 Fed. Supp. at page 319...... 3

3. Judgment of Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit affirm-
ing judgment of trial court................ceeceeeeees 45

4. Opinion of Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
ported in 211 F (2d) at page 83..................00.. 46

5. Order by Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit denying
Petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing.................... 53

6. Order extending time in which to file Petition for Writ
PP eee TTT e TEPC TE TT eee ere e 54

7. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United
NR Si bs Shas KAN Fp CUM EAR OK TES SoA OKO 55

8. The 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
NS ON ea hh sane Gk 6 ees bk ae bn eG) BET ee TE 55

9. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
NN Ss SGa5 ee ls BS ECE in et btn Vee 55
10. Chapter 61, Session Laws of Alaska, 1951.............. 56
11. Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...... 58
12. Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...... 59
18. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. .... 59

Appendix

In the District Court for the District of Alaska
Fourth Division

No. 6926

Fred Seltenreich, et al,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
The Town of Fairbanks, >
Defendant,

Fairbanks School District,
Intervenor.

ORDER
Whereas, the above-named plaintiffs filed a motion
herein upon the 12th day of October, 1951, asking for
a preliminary injunction in the above-mentioned
cause; and

Whereas, argument was had upon the motion and
the same was duly submitted by the parties upon
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, defendant’s answer,
intervenor’s answer, and three affidavits; and

Whereas, it appears to the Court from the matters
set forth in its opinion in this case of even date here-
_ with that said motion for a preliminary injunction
should be denied;

2

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that said mo-
tion be and the same hereby is denied.

Dated at Fairbanks, Alaska, this 4th day of March,
1952.

8/ Harry E. Pratt
District Judge

Entered in Court Journal March 4, 1952.
(Endorsed): Filed March 4, 1952.

agama
3

In the District Court for the District of Alaska
Fourth Division

No. 6926

Fred Seltenreich and Hawley Evans,
a partnership doing business as
Fairbanks Air Service, Jess Bach-

ner, W. C. Mitchell and David B.

Phillips, a co-partnership doing

business as Fairbanks Aircraft

Service, 4

Plaintiffs,

vs.

The Town of Fairbanks and Fair-
banks School District, an independ-
ent School District Corporation,

Defendants.

OPINION

Robert A. Parrish and George B. McNabb, of Fair-
banks, Alaska, attorneys for plaintiffs;

Julien A. Hurley and Mike A. Stepovich, of Fair-
banks, Alaska, attorneys for defendants; |

Maurice T. Johnson, of Fairbanks, Alaska, attor-
ney for intervenor.

This cause came on for hearing on plaintiffs’ mo-

tion filed herein on the twelfth day of October, 1951,
for a temporary injunction restraining the Town of

a

Fairbanks, Alaska, from abandoning the business of
conducting a municipal airport.

The plaintiffs alleged that the land included within
said municipal airport, which is generally known as
‘*Weeks Field’’, had been dedicated to the use of the
public as an airport and devoted to such use for many
years, as shown by the exhibits.

The defendant and intervenor maintain that said
airport has never been dedicated to a public use or
devoted thereto; that the Federal Government has
completed an international airport two miles from the
Town of Fairbanks which is available to plaintiffs;
that the town is losing money in operating said air-
port and can not afford to do so; that plaintiffs are
indebted to defendant, for airport services, as follows
to-wit:

Northern Consolidated Airlines ....$5,500
Fairbanks Air Service 0. 565
Alaska Flying School 480

Total $6,545

The motion was argued and submitted upon plain-
tiff’s amended complaint, defendant’s answer, inter-
venor’s answer, and the affidavits of L. F. Joy, James
C. Ryan, and E. A. Tonseth.

Briefs were submitted by counsel for all parties.

Wherever “exhibits” are herein mentioned, the

reference will be to the exhibits attached to plaintiffs’

ded complaint, unless the contrary is specifically _
stated ; “SLA” will be used to designate the Sessi

Laws of Alaska; the Town of Fairbanks, will be re-
ferred to as the “‘town’’ or the “city’’; ‘A, J.’? will
mean American Jurisprudence; and ‘‘McQuillin’’ will
mean MeQuillin or Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edi-
tion.
See. I
Dedicated to Public Use.

(a) The following quotations are from Volume 11
of MeQuillin

‘Accordingly a dedication of land is generally de-
fined as its devotion to a public use by an unequivocal
act of the owner of the fees, manifesting an intention
that it shall be accepted and used presently or in the
future. The intention of the owner to dedicate and
acceptance thereof by the public are the essential
elements of a complete dedication.’’ S. 33.02, pages
579-580.

“In other words, the mere fact that private prop-
erty is used by the public is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the absence of an intent to dedicate it to
the public * * *. If the user by the public does not
exclude the owner’s private rights, such user will
ordinarily be regarded as merely permissive.’’ Pages

“The intent of the dedicator is the foundation and
life of all dedications, and the intent must be clearly
‘ and unequivocally manifested.” Page 669, S. 33.36..

~ “The burden of proof to establish a dedication is
on the party asserting it. Dedication is not presumed
nor does a presumption of an intent to dedi¢ate arise

unless it is clearly shown by the owner’s acts and
declarations, or by a line of conduct the only reason-
able explanation of which is that a dedication was in-
tended.’’ Pages 671-2.

‘“‘It is variously stated that the evidence to establish
a dedication must be clear and conclusive; must be
clear and convincing; must be clear and unequivocal;
must tend to substantiate a clear intention to dedi-
cate, or must be sttict, cogent and convincing.’’ Page
674,

‘* * * it is elementary that an acceptance, either
by public user or formal act, is necessary * * *. Ac-
cordingly, the general rule is that to complete a com-
mon-law dedication, acceptance is required. Pages
682-5, S. 33.43.

‘‘The general rule is that proof of acceptance by
the public must be unequivocal, clear and satisfactory,
and inconsistent with any other construction.’’ Pages
727 and 728, 8. 33.54.

The following quotations are from 16 A, J.:

“Dedication is the intentional appropriation of
land by the owner to some public use.”’ 16 A. J., page
348, S. 2.

**In all cases, the burden of proof is on the party
asserting a dedication.’’ Page 417, S. 75.

_ &* * * The essence of a dedication to public uses
is that it shall be for the use of the public at large
* * * and if from the nature of the user it must be
confined. to a few individuals, such as use of land for
piling wood, the idea of dedication is negatived

ema

7

* * * and a grant by the owner of a private right
of way over his land to buyers of different parcels
of the same to furnish them with convenient access
to the street is no pomenen to public use.’’ Page
359, S. 15.

“‘The intention of the owner to set apart lands or
property for the use of the public is the foundation
and life of every dedication. * * * This intention is
essential whether an express or an implied dedica-
tion is relied on. * * * In order to constitute a dedi-
cation by parol, there must be some acts proved evinc-
ing a clear intention to dedicate the property to public
use. In any case the intention must clearly appear
and the acts and declarations of the owner relied on
to establish it must be convincing and unequivocal
* * *. Likewise, the intention must be to make a per-
petual dedication.’’ Pages 361-2, S. 17.

Proprietary Jse

(b) The following quotations are from 37 A. J.:

‘*Every municipal corporation has a two-fold char-
acter, * * * one is political, governmental, legislative,
or public, while the other is variously designated
as private, proprietary, municipal, or ministerial
* * * In its governmental or public character, the
corporation is made, by the state, one of its instru-
ments * * *, But in its proprietary or private char-
acter, the theory is that the powers are supposed not
to be conferred primarily * * * from consideration
connected with the government of the state at large,
but for the private advantage of the compact com-

—
8

munity which is incorporated * * *; and as to such
powers * * * the corporation is frequently regarded
as having the rights and obligations of a private,
rather than of a public corporation. * * * The dis-
tinction between acts in the performance of a govern-
mental function and those in * * * a proprietary
function is that in the case of the former, the munic-
ipal corporation is executing the legislative mandate
with respect to a public duty generally, while in the
other, it is exercising its private rights as a corporate
body * * * even though the public may derive a com-
mon benefit therefrom. * * * All functions of a munic-
ipal corporation not governmental are said to be
municipal.’’ Page 727, S. 114.

Walla Walla v. Water Company, 172 US page

1;

Linne v. Bredes (Wn.), 86 Pac. 858.

In Seafeld v. Port of Astoria, 16 Pac. 2d, page
943 (Ore.) it is stated as set forth in the syllabus:

‘‘Term ‘governmental functions’ should be limited
to duties imposed by states on municipal corporation,
which latter must perform at peril, and other func-
tions of municipal corporation are strictly ‘munici-
pal’.”” ;

‘*Property held by municipal corporation in pro-
prietary capacity ordinarily may be alienated with-
out consent of Legislature.”

_ In Arkansas Valley, etc. v. Morgan et al, 229 SW
2d page 134 it is held as stated in the syllabus:

“ A city entering into contracts involving, not
government of its citizens, but only convenience,

pepo lage
9

pleasure and profit of city and its people, acts in
‘proprietary capacity’.’’

“Powers granted municipality for private advan-
tages must be regarded as exercised by municipality
as private corporation, though public may also derive
benefit therefrom.”’

‘“‘A municipal corporation, in its purely business,
as distinguished from governmental, relations, is
governed by the same rules and held to same standard
of just dealing prescribed by law for private indi-
viduals or corporations and is clothed with same full
measure of authority over its property.”

In City of Hazard v. Duff (Ky.), 154 SW 2d, page
29(8) it is stated:

“* * * but the courts in general, and those of this
state in particular, are committed to the rule that a
municipality engaged in maintaining and operating a
waterworks does so in the exercise of a proprietary
or private character as distinguished from a govern-
mental character.”’

In Dix et al v. Port of Orford et al (Ore.), 282
Pac. page 110 (2-4) it.is stated:

“As a general rule, the power of a municipality to
convey property is equal to its power to acquire it.
At common law a municipal corporation, unless re-
strained by its charter, could dispose of property
in the same manner as private individuals. 19 R. C. L.
772. In the instant case, we do not think that the
property acquired through purchase was dedicated to

_ 4 public use. True, it inured to the benefit of the pub-

10

lic, but the port was engaged in this commercial enter-
prise for profit as a toll was charged any shipper who
used the wharf or docking facilities. It was not open
to indiscriminate use by the public. In the mainte-
nance and operation of this property, the port was
acting in a proprietary capacity. * * * It held title
to property which had been acquired for strictly cor-
porate uses. * * * It is not a case of holding title
to property in trust where there has been a dedication
to a public use. * * * In our opinion the lower court
erred in concluding that the port was exercising a
governmental function in the maintainance and oper-
ation of this dock and wharf.”’

“In operating a public utility in a private or pro-
prietary capacity, the municipality possesses the same
rights and powers with reference to its management
and control that a private owner possesses.”’

12 McQuillin page 682;
Dolan v. Louisville Water Co., 174 SW 2d 425.

Property which is not appropriated or devoted to
a public use may be disposed of by a city without
special statutory authority.

Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Ine. v. City of
Lexington, 186 SW 2d 203,

-In the operation of a public utility, it is generally
held that a municipal corporation acts in a proprie-
tary, rather than a governmental, capacity.

\ 87 A. J. p. 729;

» 12 MeQuillin 3rd Ed. p. 678;
18 McQuillin, p, 114 8S. 53.100.

_
rt

“‘Generally, a public purpose has for its objective
the promotion of the public health, safety, morals,
general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment
of all of the inhabitants or residents within the munic-
ipal corporation * * *,’’

37 A. J. page 734.

‘The general rule * * * is that property held in a
governmental capacity, i.e., for a public use, cannot
be sold without legislative authority * * * but it is
otherwise as a property held in a private capacity
and not devoted to any special public use.”’

10 McQuillin, page 72;
12 McQuillin, page 678.

‘“* * * All property of the municipal corporation

of a private nature may be sold.”’
10 MeQuillin, page 74.

‘All property held by the city in fee simple, with-
out limitation on restriction as to its alienation, may
be disposed of by the city at any time before it is
dedicated to a public use. In other words, the city
has the right to sell or dispose of property, real or
personal, to which it has the absolute title * * * in
substantially the same manner as an individual unless
restrained by statute or charter * * *.’’

10 MecQuillin, page 75.

““* * * Land bought for a public purpose, if not
actually so used, cannot be said to be affected by a
publie trust, and hence may be sold.’’

10 MecQuillin, page 76;
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Lexington,
186 SW 2d 202;

12

Kings County Insurance Co. v. Stevenr, 5 NE
353 ;

People v. State Tax Commission, 202 NYS 310;

City National Bank of Kiowa, 230 Pac. 894;

Seafeldt v. Port of Astoria, 16 Pac. 2d 945;

Haesloop v. Charleston, 115 SE 600;

Williamsburg v. Lyell, 112 SE 668;

Head-Lipscomb-McCormick Co. v. Bristol, 105
SE 500; .

Konrad v. Rogers, 36 NW 261.

‘So where land is donated to a village without any
restrictions it may sell such lands.’’
Jenkins v. Hanson, 112 NW 216.

‘It frequently has been reiterated that a munici-
pality functions in a corporate or proprietary capac-
ity in the operation and maintenance of public
utilities * * * consequently municipal ownership of
public utilities * * * must of necessity carry with it
the same duty, responsibility and liability on account
of negligence * * *.’’

18 McQuillin, page 414 S. 43.100;
37 ‘A. J. 729 N.1. (101).

7 Sec. IT
What the Exhibits Show
(a) “Exhibit A is a deed executed July 1, 1922, by
George A. Parks as trustee for the townsite of Fair-
banks, Alaska, party of the first part, in favor of

13

the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc., party of ‘the
second part. The deed conveys Tracts G, H, I, and J
of said townsite but provides that the land conveyed
is to be held in trust for park and recreational pur-
poses and that if any portion of said land is used
for other purposes the title thereto will revert to the
grantor. The townsite mentions section 11 of the Act
of Congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1095-
99) and the regulations thereunder as his authority.

26 Stat. page 1099 states:

“Sec. 11. That * * * lands in Alaska may be entered
for townsite purposes * * * by such trustee * * *
as may be named by the Secretary of the Interior
for that purpose, such entries to be made under the
provisions of section 2387 R. S. US * * * and the
Secretary of the Interior shall provide by regulation
for the proper execution of the trust in favor of the
inhabitants of the townsite * * * according to the
spirit and intent of said section * * *,’?

Sec. 2387 R. S. US provides:

“Whenever any public lands have been settled upon
as a town-site * * * it is lawful, in case such town be
incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof
*** to enter at the proper land-office * * * the land
so settled * * * in trust for the several use and benefit
of the occupants thereof * * *; the execution of which
trust * * * to be conducted under such regulations
as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of
the State or Territory in which the same may be
situated.”’

14

The regulations of the Secretary of the Interior,
pursuant to the laws above mentioned, appear in 45
Land Decisions of the Department of the Interior
at page 242 and are as follows, with reference to the
present inquiry:

“The following regulations are prescribed in ac-
cordance with said act’’ (Sec. 11, Act of March 3,
1891 aforesaid) :

“1. ‘Tf the land is unsurveyed the occupants must,
by application * * * obtain a survey of the exterior
lines * * *. There must be excluded from the tract
to be surveyed and entered for the town site any lands
set aside by the district court under section 31 of
the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat. 321, 332), for use
as jail and courthouse sites, also all lands needed
for Government purposes or use, together with any
existing valid claim initiated under Russian rule.”’

«# * * 3. The trustee will file his * * * notice of
intention to make proof * * * and proof must be made
showing occupancy of the tract * * * and that the
town site does not contain any land occupied by the
United States for school or other purposes or land
occupied under any existing valid claim initiated
under Russian rule.”

“«“# * * 6. Lands possessed by Indian or native
Alaskan occupants shall not be assessed nor conveyed
by the trustee.’’

“«* *\* 11, After deeds have been issued to the
Parties entitled thereto the trustee will publish notice |

15

that he will sell * * * all lots and tracts remaining
unoccupied and unclaimed at the date of the trustee’s
entry * * *. The notice of public sale will be published
* * * and copies thereof posted * * * Each lot must
be sold at a fair price * * *. Lots remaining unsold
at the close of the public sale in an unincorporated
town may again be offered at a fair price if a suffi-
cient demand appears therefor.’’

“12. Immediately after the public sale the trustee
will make * * * his final report * * *. If the town is
incorporated such remaining proceeds may be turned
over to the municipality for use and benefit thereof.
After the public sale and upon proof of the incor-
poration of the town, all lots then remaining unsold
will be deeded to the municipality, and all munici-
pal public reserves will, by a separate deed, be con-
veyed to the municipality in trust for the publie
purposes for which they were reserved.’’

Section 31 of the Act of June 6, 1900, above men-
tioned in paragraph 1 of the regulations aforesaid is
found in 81 Stat. p. 332. Its provisions as relating
to the present inquiry are as follows:

““* * * Any part or portion of the siikpabaibteliild
public domain of the United States, embracing not
‘more than four thousand square feet * * * may be
set aside by order of the court as a jail site
Sorte PE certified copy of which order of the court
shall be transmitted to the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office * * * and thereafter the ground des-
eribed shall be reserved from sale or other disposition

ce & 8 19

Bi
16

Exhibit B is a copy of a deed issued by the Town
of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc., to the United States of
America on January 11, 1950, quit-claiming as to said
Tracts G, H, I, and J.

Exhibit C is a deed dated February 9, 1950, from
the United States to present Trustee of the Town
of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc., conveying said tracts to
the present townsite trustee of Fairbanks, Alaska,
and reciting that the provision in the deed of Parks,
trustee, requiring said tracts to be used for parks
and recreational purposes was unauthorized under
the regulations authorizing the issuance of the deed
(Regulation July 19, 1916, 45 L. D., par. 12, page
244). Exhibit C does not contain any limitations on
the use of said tracts.

Exhibit D is a deed of date February 9, 1950, be-
tween the present trustee for the townsite and the
Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc. It conveys said
tracts to the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc. without
any limitation as to their use.

“In Paragraph ITI of plaintiffs’ amended complaint
it is alleged that the defendant did acquire, in 1922,
the property described in Exhibits A, B, C, and D, as
more particularly shown on map Exhibit E.

Whether the Parks’ deed (Exhibit A) was void
or invalid, it could not operate as a dedication for
an airport of the tracts of land therein mentioned,
for the reason that it expressly limited the use of.
the said tracts for the purpose of parks and recrea-—
tion. It made no attempt to operate as an express

EE
17

dedication for airport purposes. The Town of Fair-
banks, no doubt believing that it was limited to the
use of said tracts for parks and recreational purposes,
never accepted said Parks’ deed as any dedication
for airport purposes or otherwise. Neither did the
Town of Fairbanks ever accept the limitation of the
Parks’ deed for parks and recreation. The town did
use said tracts for airport purposes but it was in a
proprietary capacity. At all times the Town of Fair-
banks specifically retained control of the airport and
made the rules requiring the doing of certain things
by those using the airport including the payment
of rent for hangar and other facilities and the pay-
ment of landing fees, and so forth.

The Parks’ deed was neither void nor voidable,
as to the limitation of use for parks and recreational
purposes. The Federal Government recognized that
fact and made an exchange of deeds in 1950 whereby
the United States through the present townsite trustee
for Fairbanks deeded said tracts to the Town of Fair-
banks without any limitation or restriction whatso-
ever as to the use said tracts were to be put. It was
a clear and unequivocal act showing that there was
no intention on the part of the Federal Government
to limit the use of said tracts. In fact, there would
have been no statutory authorization for the Fed-
eral Government to make a limitation on the use
that said tracts were to be put. The City of Fair-
hanks, in 1950, became the owner in fee simple with-
out. limitation as to use of said tracts. Said deed of
February 9, 1950, from the townsite trustee to the

18

City of Fairbanks, Inc., gave the city the right to
use said tracts without any restriction as to use.

It seems very clear, therefore, that the airport as
constituted by the tracts mentioned in paragraph IIT
of said amended complaint has never been dedicated to
the public use of the airport.

(b) In paragraph IV of »laintiffs’ amended com-
plaint it is alleged that the defendant acquired prop-
erty from Paul and Stacia Rickert for airport pur-
poses, according to Exhibits F, H, 1, and J, as shown
on Exhibit E, a map.

Exhibit F is a copy of a deed between Paul J. Rick-
ert and Stacia T. Rickert, parties of the first part,
and the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, party of the sec-
ond part. The deed sells, conveys, and confirms unto
the party of the second part a tract of land of 5.28
acres.

Nowhere in the deed is there any limitation as to
the use of the ground conveyed thereby. There is a

paragraph of warranty on the part of the grantors and
there is a statement that the deed is ‘‘for and in con-

sideration of the sum of One Dollar, lawful money
of the United States of America, and other good and
valuable consideration, to them in hand paid by the
party of the second part, the receipt of all which is

hereby acknowledged.”

The deed (Exhibit G) did not contain any provision
to theeffect that the land therein mentioned should be
soit for any particular purpose, nor did it attempt to.
provide that a revision should take place of the title

q
ey
J
y

19

if the land were used for any particular purpose. The
deed was executed August 10, 1927. The minutes of
the council meeting of the Town of Fairbanks on Au-
gust 23, 1927, recite:

‘‘A deed from Stacia and Paul Rickert giving
the city for airport purposes, 5.28 acres of land
from their homestead was read and it was moved
** * that the gift be accepted, Carried.”

The deed does not limit the use of the land con-
veyed to any purpose and does not provide for a re-
verter in case the land is used for any unauthorized
purpose. The deed is a fee simple deed and negatives
that the Rickerts had any intention of limiting the use
of the land. It certainly could not act as a dedication
as none of the elements of a dedication exist in regard
to this deed.

Exhibit H is a copy of a deed dated September 11,
1929, wherein Jaul J. Rickert and Stacia T. Rickert,
as parties of the first part, deed to the Territory of
Alaska, as party of the second part, for and in con-
sideration of the sum of One Dollar, ‘‘the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged,’’ a described piece of
land alleged to contain 60.5 acres. There is no limita-
tion whatsoever as to the use the Territory of Alaska
is to put said land conveyed.

siauiiie alleiel deiedaniie dint Staats
statement on the part of Paul and Stacia Rickert
that their deed to the Territory of Alaska (Exhibit H)
contains 62 acres instead of the recited 60.5 acres
and that they wanted to give the excess over 60 acres

to the Town of Fairbanks when a more correct de-
scription of said excess is ascertained. In said Exhibit
I it is stated that Exhibit H was ‘‘intended to convey
60 acres of ground for airfield purposes * * *”’ There
was no limitation in Exhibit H that the property was
to be used for airfield purposes by the Territory of
Alaska or anyone else. The deed, Exhibit I], describes
the property conveyed by metes and bounds and ends
the description by saying it contains 60.5 acres. Under
the laws of Alaska, when a deed describes the land by
metes and bounds and makes an erroneous state-
ment as to the acreage involved, the deed conveys the
land as described by metes and bounds and in disre-
gard of the alleged acreage.

(58-7-3(1) Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated.)

Inasmuch as the Territory of Alaska, by deed of
June 23, 1945, Exhibit J, conveyed the identical land
mentioned in Exhibits H and I to the Town of Fair-
banks by means of a description identical with that
of Exhibit H is immaterial, as the town got all of the
tract alleged to contain 60.5 acres and also the two
acres exceeding the 60.5 acres.

The fact that Paul and Stacia Rickert in their deed
(Exhibit I) to recite that their former deed (Exhibit
H) to the Territory of Alaska was intended to convey
ground for airfield purposes is insufficient to consti-
tute proof of the making of a dedication of the prop-
erty mentioned in Exhibit H for the public use of
said land as a airfield. The deed transferred a fee
simple title without limitations and that would control

2

over the surplus allegation by way of recital in Ex-
hibit H.

Exhibit J is a copy of a deed of date June 23, 1945,
wherein the Territory of Alaska deeded to the Town
of Fairbanks, Alaska, the property described in Ex-
hibit H by means of a description which is the same
as that contained in Exhibit H. There is no mention
of the last-mentioned deed of the land being used for
any particular purpose.

Consequently it seems clear that the exhibits men-
tioned in said paragraph IV of plaintiffs’ amended
complaint (Exhibits F, H, I, and J) do not contain
any dedication of any land for a public use and de-
voted thereto.

(c) In paragraph V of plaintiffs’ amended com-
plaint it is stated that Paul and Stacia Rickert did
convey to the defendant (as shown by Exhibit G) 5.28
acres by gift for airfield purposes.

Exhibit G is a copy of the minutes of a regular meet-
ing of the City Council of Fairbanks on August 23,
1927. It states among other things:

‘“‘Mr. Thompson read a telegram from Gen. Steese
to Hawley Sterling stating that $1,000.00 more would
be necessary to complete the work on the airport,
$500.00 from the City and $500.00 from the Territory.
Moved by Kubon seconded by Kennedy that an addi-
tional $500.00 be appropriated from City funds for
this purpose. Carried. A deed from Stacia and Paul
Rickert giving the City for airport purposes 5.28 acres
of land from their homestead was read, and it was

21

22

moved by Kennedy seconded by Gilcher that the gift
be accepted. Carried. * * *”’

It is believed that the above minutes do not show
that the city or the Territory actually paid the $500
authorized to be paid. Even if the Territory did actu-
ally pay the $500, the Territory of Alaska, and not the
plaintiffs in this case, would be the party to complain
about the abandonment of the airport. Further, the
fact that when the Rickerts executed their deed in
favor of the city for 5.28 acres, they made no such lim-
itation. That negatives that they desired to limit the
use of the land to the purposes of an airport. The deed
is an absolute conveyance without any limitation of
use. There is no provision for a reverter in case the
property is used for purposes other than an airport.

It is believed the deeds of Mr. and Mrs. Rickert
(Exhibit F conveying 5.28 acres to defendant and
Exhibit H conveying 60.5 acres to the Territory) being
without limitation show the intention of the grantors
and it controls over their recital in Exhibit I that they
had intended, in executing said Exhibits F and H,
to limit the use of said lands to airport purposes. =

(d) In paragraph VIII the plaintiffs allege that
defendant did acquire for airport purposes 370 acres
of real property as evidenced by Exhibits Q and R.

_ Exhibit Q is Resolution No, 21 of the Town Couneil
of Fairbanks, Alaska, submitted and passed on the

9th day.of January, 1950, The following portions wis ;
ecard cenicineniets eee

‘2
‘Resolution No. 21”’

‘Whereas, the City of Fairbanks did purchase ap-
proximately 370 acres of land, being portions of the
Rickert and Day Homesteads, for airport purposes;
and

‘“Whereas, the airport known as Weeks Field will
be abandoned during the year 1950; and

‘“Whereas, the city proposes to subdivide the land
purchased for airport purposes, together with Tracts
‘G’, “H’, ‘I’ and ‘J’ that was deeded to the City by
Trustee Deed so as to encourage housing develop-
ment in the City of Fairbanks; * * *

‘Now, therefore, be it resolved * * * that the Mayor
be and he hereby is authorized to exchange deeds with
the U. S. Government in order to obtain an unre-
stricted deed to Tracks ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’ and ‘J’.”’

‘The vote:

“‘Ayes: Anderson, Pata Fenton, Hetnts; ani
Van Scoy.

‘‘Nay: None.’’

Exhibit R is practically the same as Exhibit Q ex-
cept in that it authorizes an ae of deeds vine
W. George Moore. :

The plaintiffs seem to believe that if the ‘Town of
Fairbanks purchased any land with the intention of

using it as ‘an airport they were forthwith : estopped
from ever using it for anything élse or ab

airport business altogether.

It is believed that this theory is incorrect.

(e) Exhibit N is an ordinance of the Town of Fair-
banks, Alaska, passed upon the 21st day of July, 1931.
It establishes ‘‘for the use of the City of Fairbanks,
Alaska, its inhabitants, and of visiting aircraft * * *
municipal airport * * *; that said airport shall be
available for use by public, private and commercial
aireraft.’’ As much of the ‘‘Park Reserve’’ as may
be necessary for use as a landing field is set aside but
it is provided that nothing in that ordinance shall be
construed as a surrender by the town of its right to
regulate and manage the ‘‘Park Reserve”’ as a public
park. An Airport Commission was provided for, with
authority to promulgate rules and regulations, which
shall be in effect until the same shall be altered,
amended, or repealed by the Common Council. Any
regulation so altered by the Common Council shall not
be thereafter subject to any sense by said Airport
Commission.

A portion of the ‘‘Park Reserve’’ (which is in Tract

J) was reserved for the purpose of leasing to those en-
gaged in ‘‘commercial,” public, or private opera-
tion of aircraft. The Mayor was given authority to
lease portions of land in said airport, Subparagraph
(b) of Section 6 of Exhibit N provides:
.. “The rental charge for the leased area shall be Ten
Dollars per fifty front feet paralleling any runway,
or fraction, thereat, per year, payable annually in ad-
vance.”

| ggmeeneaes

25

Subparagraph (c) of said exhibit makes provision
for the lessor terminating leases.
Subparagraph (e) of said Section 6 of said Exhibit
N provides that buildings erected on leased land shall
_ become the property of the city if not removed within
30 days after the termination of such lease.

From the above, it is clear that the Common Council
of the Town of Fairbanks was creating, by said or-
dinance, an airport which was definitely the property
of and under the control of the Town of Fairbanks.
Its requirement of rental for using parts of the air-
port for buildings at a rental therein set forth neg-
atives any intention on the part of the town to dedicate
the land mentioned as ‘‘Park Reserve’’ to the public.
The ordinance in effect required anyone who wanted
to use the airport to atorn to the Town of Fairbanks,
Alaska, as their landlord and pay rent and abide by
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Airport
Commission or the Common Council of the Town of
Fairbanks, Alaska.

(f) Exhibit P is a copy of an Ordinance of the
Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, of date August 4, 1940. It
promulgates regulations. Section 1 provides that only
aircraft and airmen licensed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority of the United States shall-operate on or
over the Fairbanks airport (except student fliers or
public aircraft). Section 4 ° provides that persons
using the airport for commercial aviation or other
commercial or private purposes shall first secure a per-
mit from the City Clerk and pay the fees and charges

prescribed. Section 35 provides that anyone violating —

the provisions of the ordinance (Exhibit P) shall be

subject to a fine and/or imprisonment and suspension
from the use of the airport for not to exceed 30 days.

This ordinance again makes it clear that. the Town
of Fairbanks, Alaska, did not and had not relinquished
ownership and control of said airport and the right to
use the same as a source of income and to administer
such use to the full extent of the powers given it in
regard to other property of the municipality.

(g) Exhibit I is a copy of a Resolution of the
Common Council of the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska.
Among its previsions are the following:

““Whereas, most of the owners of aircraft now using
the municipal airport at Fairbanks, Alaska, commonly
known as ‘Weeks Field,’ have failed and refused to
pay to the City of Fairbanks the money now due and
owing from said owners to the City of Fairbanks for
the use of said airport, and the City of Fairbanks is
not financially able to continue the maintenance of said
municipal airport or to employ the proper persons to
manage and control the same, and,

‘“Whereas, a new airport, commonly known as the
‘International Airport,’ has been constructed by the
Federal Government approximately two miles from
the City of Fairbanks and is now available for the —
public use and by all aircraft carrying freight and

to and from the City of Fairbanks and isa —
much larger, better constructed airport and is under
the control of the Civil Aeronautics Administration —

‘27

and ample to serve all of the needs of the City of Fair-
banks and the general public for a public airport, and,

“Whereas, the ‘Weeks Field’ airport is no longer
being used and has not been used since April 17, 1951,
by airplanes of a gross weight of over 12,500 pounds,
and is now being used by only-a small number of one-
engine airplanes, and,

‘Whereas, new buildings, including residences and
a new school building, have been built in close prox-
imity to said “Weeks Field’ airport and as a result
thereof the said ‘Weeks Field’ airport is no longer
safe and the use thereof endangers not only the lives
of those who use the airport but the lives of those
living in the vicinity of said airport and the children
who will attend said school, and .

‘Whereas, it is no longer necessary or convenient
to longer continue the use of said ‘Weeks Field’ air-
port for the general welfare or benefit of the general
public and the condition of said airport is unfit for the
landing aireraft, and,

‘*Whereas, the land embraced in said “Weeks Field’
is now needed for housing and recreational purposes
and can no longer be safely used as an airport; :

“‘Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered by and on
behalf of the Common Council of the City of Fair-
banks, Alaska, that the said municipal airport com-
monly known as ‘Weeks Field’ be, and the same is
hereby closed for use as an airport and the use of the
same on and after the 15th day of October, 1951, either

Pte:

3

for the landing or taking off of airplanes is hereby pro-
hibited.
‘‘ Adopted this 17th day of September, 1951.
‘“‘ROBERT HOOPES,
‘Mayor
(City of Fairbanks Seal)
** Attest :
“EK. A. TONSETH,
‘Municipal Clerk.”’

This furnishes cumulative evidence of the fact that
the Town of Fairbanks did not intend to convey said
tracts to the use of the public.

(h) Exhibit S is a copy of Ordinance No. 527
passed by the Common Council of the Town of Fair-
banks, Alaska, upon the 17th day of September, 1951.
It provides that it shall be unlawful for anyone to
land an airplane or to take off with an airplane from
the land known as Weeks Field after the 15th day
of October, 1951.

(i) Paragraphs XV A and XV B of plaintiffs’
amended complaint allege that Resolution No. 51 (Ex-
hibit O) is in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, in that it deprives the plaintiffs of the
property without due process of law. It is believed
that the matters herein set forth show that no dedica-
tion was ever made for the Fairbanks airport; that all
of the property of the city hereinbefore mentioned re-
ye private property of the city, not subject to
blic trust, and that the city had full power to
pass the ordinance, Exhibit 0, under the provisions of

29

Section 16-1-35 eleventh ACLA 1949 “‘to prohibit * * *
conduct endangering the public peace, public health,
or public safety.’’ The town, being the owner of the
property heretofore mentioned, had a right to prohibit
the use of its property for landing and take-offs of
airplanes inasmuch as that was greatly endangering
the public safety.

As the mere intention to use said homesteads for air-
port purposes is a far ery from a dedication of the
land to the public for airport purposes, it is believed
that Exhibit Q in no way proves any of the issues
of this case, even though it be considered that said
town at one time intended to use said Day and Rickert
homesteads for airport purposes.

The other recitals of the resolution show that no-
tice was given on the 9th day of January, 1950, that
Weeks Field would be abandoned during the year of
1950, thus giving ample opportunity to plaintiffs to
avail themselves of the airport facilities of the Inter-
national Airport or elsewhere.

Said Resolution No. 21 also authorizes an exchange
of deeds with the United States in @rder to obtain
an unrestricted deed to Tracts G, H, I, and K as au-
thorized by Chapter 7, SLA 1931 (16-1-35, 20th Sub-
division, page 196° ACLA °49). That such an ex-
change of deeds was advantageous to the town, in the
judgment of the Common Council, appears by vert.
eation from the terms of the resolution. Fe

Exhibit R is Resolution No. 22 of the said Town ’
Council. It is practically the same as Resolution No.

21, except that it authorizes an exchange of deeds with
W. George Moore.

Sec. ITT
Denali Purchase
(a) In intervenor’s first affirmative defense it is
set forth that it ‘‘has acquired from the City of Fair-
banks the following described property by deed made
and executed on the 9th day of June, 1950, and re-
corded on the 21st day of June, 1

No answer or denial of any sort was filed by the
plaintiffs to the intervenor’s first affirmative defense.
Consequently it is believed that the plaintiffs intended
to and did admit the matters set forth in said first af-
firmative defense of intervenor.

That the deed was duly and legally authorized and
executed by the Town of Fairbanks to the intervenor
is necessarily admitted by failure to answer said first
affirmative defense. Such admission is consistent with
plaintiffs’ map, Exhibit E, which shows the ground in
controversy in this suit to be entirely within the bound-
aries of the Town of Fairbanks except on the south
side. In other words, the Weeks Field shown by said
map goes no farther west than to the westerly bound-
ary of the town.

‘The plaintiffs’ position hiendis entirely upon
whether or not'a dedication was made of the property —
constituting Weeks Field. Inasmuch as such a dedi-
cation is not sustained by the evidence in this case but —

31

is negatived it would be immaterial, as far as the
plaintiffs are concerned, what the position of the in-
tervenor is in regard to said Denali School premises.

The execution of the deed to the intervenor im-
plies a finding on the part of the Common Council of
Fairbanks, Alaska, that in its judgment the land
deeded is no longer required for municipal purposes.
Such a finding and such a deed were authorized by the
first clause of Chapter 7 SLA 1931, which became the
first paragraph of Section 16-1-35, 20th Subdivision,
ACLA 1949. No ratification of said sale of the Denali
School lands and the execution of the deed is required
by said first clause of Chapter 7 SLA 1931 as to land
which had not been acquired or held for any public
use or devoted thereto, such as the land within the
Denali School premises.

(b) If the Common Council of Fairbanks failed to
make the finding mentioned in the first clause of said
Chapter 7 SLA 1931 that in their Judgment the Denali
premises were no longer required for municipal pur-
poses or, as authorized by the second clause of said
Chapter 7, that in their judgment it was advantageous
to the city to donate said Denali premises to said school
district, such failure on the part. of the City. Council
would not inure to the benefit of the plaintiffs or assist
ae
inary injunction.

The above stated with due sitaasdeentlins of the fact
that said Chapter 7 SLA 1931 and Chapter 27 SLA
1945 constitute a part (along with a number of amend-
ments) of Chapter 61 SLA 1951, which became 6f-

fective 90 days after the passage thereof, which was
upon the 22nd day of March, 1951.

(c) In paragraph IX of plaintiffs’ amended com-
plaint it is stated that Weeks Field, by dedication and
user, has become public property, as evidenced by Ex-
hibits G, N,; O, P, Q, and R. It is believed that said
exhibits last mentioned, as well as all other exhibits
in the ease, fail to show any dedication of said Weeks
Field for a public purpose, but in fact definitely show
that it was the intention of the owner thereof to make
no such dedication.

While the intervenor and no doubt other persons
(excluding the present plaintiffs) have a right to pro-
cure the findings of the City Council mentioned above
relative to said Denali School premises, such right
does not in any way assist the plaintiffs in making
out their case.

Sec. IV
Intervenor’s Exhibit B

(Ballot of Special Election of February 21, 1950)

. . (a) The deseriptions of land in Propositions Nos.
_3;4, 5, 6,7, and 8 of said ballot (Exhibit B) are so

vague and indefinite as not to give the voters a knowl-

edge of the land referred to. a 3 furnishes a

good, example. It asks the voter: ‘‘Shall the City of
airbanks sell and convey to the Fairview Develop-

ment.

ion a parcel of land containing approx-
imately 12 acres and located partially in the original
townsite of Fairbanks and partially immediately south —

a
of the south boundary of the original plat of the town-
site of Fairbanks * * *,’’

Propositions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, therefore, are
invalid and do not furnish a ratification by the voters
of any ordinance or other sale of real estate as men-
tioned in the fourth clause of Chapter 7 SLA 1931;
Section 16-1-35 page 196 ACLA 1949, Such ratifica-
tion is, however, not necessary under the first and
second clauses of said Chapter 7 SLA 1931.

Proposition No. 9 has a sufficient description of the
land to be sold but is defective in the following par-
ticulars, to-wit:

(1) That there is no showing that the Common
Council of Fairbanks passed an ordinance setting
forth the terms of the proposed sale and the consider-
ation thereof ;

(2) That said Common Council in their best judg-
ment considered that said premises were no longer re-
quired for municipal purposes.

There having been no written grant to the public of
the land involved in the municipal airport in this case,
the only manner in which said lands could be held in
trust for the public, in this case, would be if the facts
complied with the -common law to what constitutes
a dedication to the public use.

A common law dedication, as mentioned before, re-
quires a definite intention on the part of the grantor
to dedicate designated land to the public use. There
- was certainly no such intention shown in this case.

34

A common law dedication further requires that such
an intention exists and be shown clearly and unequivo-
cally. Certainly no such matter was shown in this case.

Most of Weeks Field lies within the boundaries of
the original Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, in Tracts |
G, H, I, and J, which were tied up by a limitation for
use only as a public park and for recreational pur-
poses from 1912 until 1950. The Town of Fairbanks
was very careful in all of its ordinances to show that
it was reserving all rights with reference to said tracts.
At no time before or after execution of the deed to
said tracts without limitation as to the use thereof, did
the Town of Fairbanks express any intention to dedi-
cate said tracts to the general public.

(b) Necessity of Reverter Clause in Deed:

In Wright v. Morgan, 191 US p. 55, it was held that
where the statute provided ‘“‘that reservations may
be made for parks and other public purposes’’ in pat-
ents it probably meant no more than to explain the
- motive for a sale under the circumstances at the min-
imum price; that the deed was a conveyance of title
with no restrictions upon its use, nor right of re-
entry for condition broken; that in view of the strong
disinclination of the courts to annex conditions or
restrictions in the absence of a clear expression of
such intent, it would seem to be the duty of the Court
to hold that no such condition or restriction is in-

- Ti Sharp v. Guthrie (Okla.) 145 Pac. 164, a patent
contained the following: ‘‘to have and to hold and =

maintain the same for the sole and separate use, bene-
fit and purpose of a public park for public uses and
no other.”” On rehearing in 152 Pac. p. 403, the Court
held that the City took a fee-simple title, free from
any trust or condition, and with power of alienation.

In Ward v. Klamath County (Ore.) 218 Pac. 927,
it was held that where the deed provided that a Court
House should be built upon the land, but did not pro-
vide for a reverter, it gave an indefeasible title.

In 19 A.J., page 527, Sec. 65, it is stated:

“It is a well-settled rule that conditions tending to
destroy estates, such as conditions subsequent, are not
favored in law. They are strictly construed. Accord-
ingly, no provision will be interpreted to create such a
condition if the language will bear any other reason-
able interpretation, or unless the language, used un-
equivocally, indicates an intention upon the part of
the grantor or devisor to that effect and plainly ad-
mits of such construction.”’

To the same effect are the cases of Toole v. Christ
Church (Texas 740), 141 SW 2d 720, et al., v. City of
Houston (Texas ’46), 196 SW 2d 553; Board of Edu-
eation v. Brophy (N. J. 1919), 106 ATL 32, and Briggs
v. Grand Rapids (Michigan 1932) 245 NW 5565.

(c) In this case it is clear that there was, in the
deeds given to the Town of Fairbanks, no limitation
requiring the land to be used for an airfield. Likewise
in said deeds there was no clause stating that if the
land conveyed were used for any purpose other than
airport purposes it would revert to the grantor.

Plaintiffs’ rights cannot be based upon an express —
dedication, as none existed. Plaintiffs’ rights could
be perfected by a common law dedication, but the evi-
dence in this case fails to show any of the elements of
a common law dedication and, in fact, definitely shows
the lack of such a dedication.

Sec. V
Housing Industry

Chapter 27 SLA 1945, which constitute the second
paragraph in Section 16-1-35 page 197 ACLA 1949,
provides :

«* * * That the Common Council in order to make
available sites for the * * * operation thereon of new
industries which will benefit the civil welfare of the
municipality * * * may sell, lease, or dispose thereof
upon such terms or conditions as may be deemed ad-
vantageous to the civic welfare of the community, to
such persons * * * or corporations as will agree to in-
stall, maintain and operate thereupon such new in-
dustry *.* * and such sites * * * shall not be deemed
to be ‘property acquired, owned or held for any public
use or. devoted thereto’ as used herein.”’

‘“‘Industry’’ is defined as follows: |
‘The result of operations whereby man changes and
makes fit for his use materials which were unservice-

— a natural state.’’
\ 43 0.5.8, page 40, note 6.

37

“Trade is defined as commercial enterprises and in-
dustries as that branch of trade employing capital and
labor.”’

People Ex Rel. Padula v. Hughes, 16 NE 2d
922-24.

‘“‘Any department or branch of art, occupation or
business ; especially one which employs much labor and
capital and is a distinct branch of trade; as the sugar
industry.’’

State Ex Rel. K. C. Power and Light Company
v. Smith, 111 SW 2, 515;

Dressen v. Department of Labor, etc. 66 Pac.
2d 869 (the oyster industry).

The housing industry which sprang up during
World War II is an industry using untold millions of
dollars of capital and enormous numbers of men and
women employees. It seems to be included in the defi-
nitions of industry above mentioned. It is believed,
therefore, that under Chapter 27 SLA 1945 (which
became the second paragraph of Section 16-1-35 page
197 SLA 1949, and later the second paragraph of
Chapter 61 SLA 1951 with the exception that the
word “‘property’’ was erroneously spelled “‘property’’
in the next to the last line on page 158 Chapter 61
SLA 1951) the Common Council of Fairbanks, Alaska,
has authority to sell, lease, or dispose of available sites
upon such terms as may be deemed by it advantageous
to the civic welfare of the municipality, to such per-
sons as will agree to install, maintain, and operate
thereon such new industries. It is believed that the

38

housing propositions mentioned in Propositions 3 to 9,
inclusive, on said official ballot would constitute new
industries which would benefit the civic welfare of
the municipality of Fairbanks, Alaska. There is no
requirement in said Chapter 27 for a ratification by
the voters of the action of the Common Council as to
such sites. The chapter specially provides that such
sites ‘‘shall not be deemed to be property acquired,
owned, or held for any public use or devoted thereto.”

Thus, under said Chapter 27 the Common Council of
Fairbanks, Alaska, could sell, lease, or otherwise dis-
post of the lands mentioned in Propositions 3 to 9, in-
clusive of said official ballot by making such land
available as sites for new housing industries. Under the
terms of said chapter it would be necessary for the
Common Council of Fairbanks to find that the sale of
such sites would benefit the civic welfare of the mu-
nicipality and that the terms of such sale or sales were
deemed by the Common Council to be advantageous
to the civic welfare of the municipality. An agreement
on the part of the grantees in the deed, or lease, to in-
stall; maintain and operate such industries on such
sites would likewise be necessary to comply with said
ehapter.

Perhaps the Common Council of the Town of Fair-
banks and the grantees of new industries have already
done all that is required of them under said Chapter
27. However, there is no direct showing of compliance
_ with said Chapter 27 made in the pleadings or affi-
davits upon which this application for a temporary
injunction is based. Under said Chapter 27 it is im-

material whether the property in any site mentioned
therein was held for a public use or otherwise, as the
chapter specifically states that the sites shall not be
deemed to be ‘‘property acquired, owned, or held for
any public use or devoted thereto.’’

Said Chapter 27 SLA 1945 plays no part with the
rights of the plaintiffs in this case, inasmuch as they
have no rights in said airport, as no dedication thereof
for a public use was ever made.

As is shown by an analysis above set forth with ref-
‘erence to said Chapter 27 SLA 1945, the Common
Council of Fairbanks has not made any of the find-
ings which are required in order to sell the mu-
nicipal property of the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska,
or the propositions set forth in Intervenor’s Exhibit
B or the Denali School premises. The fact that the in-
tervenor and perhaps others have a right to get some
of such findings from the City Council does not assist
the plaintiffs in making out their case.

Sec. VI
Gillam Easement

(a) Presumably to show a special interest in the
subject matter of this action, the plaintiffs allege that
one Harold Gillam as party of the first part executed
a deed on August 17, 1940, in favor of the Town of
Fairbanks, Alaska, grantee (Exhibit M), conveying
Lots 1 and 2 of the Rickert Homestead. The plain-
tiffs claim that Mr. Gillam was the owner of an ease-
ment or right-of-way between Lot 3 of said Rickert

Ss 40

Homestead and Weeks Field. The deed which was ex-
ecuted by Harold Gillam to the Town recites a con-
sideration to him in hand paid and further alleges:
‘‘and a further consideration that said party of the
first part shall have a continuous, free, and unob-
structed right-of-way to and from the Fairbanks Mu-
nicipal Airport to Lot 3.’’ Mr. Gillam alone signed
the deed. The recital that he is to have that right-of-
way constitutes a self-serving declaration which would
not be binding upon the Town of Fairbanks and would
not constitute any note or memorandum signed by the
party to be bound, to wit, the Town of Fairbanks,

‘‘An easement must rest upon a grant thereof; it

can not exist by parol.’’
17 A.J. 936 par. 18.

‘‘Generally, when an easement is created by ex-
press grant, words of inheritance are necessary to
_make it a perpetual interest. This is said to be the
rule also as to easements by reservation * * * Thus,
it has been held that the word ‘heirs’ is necessary to
create an easement in fee by way of reservation, but
not to create it by way of exception if the grantor
ity cone agin adm erlorl attripert deol hee

bi rar) reves aah ie.

—_—_—_—*__
41

Gillam’s rights were a mere license, and such license
terminates upon the death of either party and is not
transferable or descendible.

17 A.J..p. 926, par. 5 and p. 927 N. 9.

Paragraph VI of plaintiffs’ amended complaint al-
leges that Gillam, in executing the deed, retained a
right-of-way and that the plaintiffs Northern Con-
solidated Airlines and Fred Seltenreich and others
are successors and assigns of said Gillam. The inter-
venor has denied all of the allegations of said para-
graph VI. An examination of the deed shows that
Gillam did not in any possible way retain or except or
reservo a right-of-way from the operation of the deed.
The only thing we have about a right-of-way is
Gillam’s own statement appearing in the deed which
he, himself, was executing.

As Gillam had nothing more than a license which
was unassignable and which could not be inherited,
said alleged right-of-way was a mere license which
became of no effect when assigned to the plaintiffs. —

The question of said easement is immaterial, inas-
much as plaintiffs’ case depended upon there being a
dedication of Weeks Field and as the evidence shows
no such dedication to have existed. ste Ree 3

(by “In Paragraph XI of plaintiffs’ piisnld allie
plaint it is stated: ‘‘That.each of the plaintiffs herein

_is engaged in the aircraft or an allied business:at or
adjacent to Weeks Field; are property owners ad-
- agitate —_ eS ee

42

The defendant and intervenor have denied the mat-
ters set forth in said paragraph XI above mentioned.
Other than as to the alleged Gillam easement no evi-
dence of any sort was introduced by the plaintiffs to
substantiate any of the allegations in said paragraph
XI. As the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs to
prove the allegations of their amended complaint
by a preponderance of the evidence in the case, and
the plaintiffs having failed entirely so to do, it be-
comes apparent that even if Weeks Field had been
properly dedicated to a public use the plaintiffs could
not have prevailed herein in their application for a
preliminary injunction because of failure to show any
special damage by reason of the action of defendant
and/or. intervenor.
McCormick v. Chicago Yacht Club, 163 NE 418;
60 A.L.R. 770;
| 16 A.J. p. 414 S. 67.

(ce) The evidence (and by this I mean the plead-
ings and affidavits upon which this cause was sub-
mitted) shows that the intervenor has built a school-
house costing $660,000 upon said Weeks Field and
that if a preliminary injunction were granted in this
ease the intervenor would be unable to use said school
by reason of the danger of injuring and killing some
of the 450 school children if planes were permitted to
land and take off from Weeks Field; that intervenor
would simply have to close down the school house and
rent quart in basements, churches, and other places
our ‘town at a cost of $134,800 during the probable.
time before final judgment herein. This matter was

eS

set forth by affidavit and by intervenor in its first af-
firmative defense, and no denial of the same was made
by plaintiffs.

There is no showing by the plaintiffs of any damage.
to them in any specific amount if the. preliminary in~
junction be denied. There are general statements of
irreparable loss, etc., in paragraph XVI of the
amended complaint. Paragraph XVI of said amended
complaint is denied by the defendant and intervenor
and no showing of loss was made by plaintiffs other
than the allegations above mentioned in said para-
graph XVI. It thus appears that the loss which would
be incurred by the intervenor from the allowance of «
preliminary injunction would be many times greater
than that which would be suffered by the plaintiffs,
which would furnish a sufficient ground for denying
the preliminary injunction.

(d) As the decisions of the Supreme Court show
that plaintiff must have a clear right to the issuance
of a preliminary injunction, it appears that no such
injunction should be issued in this case.

Ohio Oil Company v. Conway, 278 U.S. 813;

Harrisville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 US:
334;

Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Gay! Co., 309
U.S. 310. ——

(e) It is alleged in defendant’s third further and
affirmative defense set forth in the answer and in in-
tervenor’s third affirmative defense to plaintiffs’
amended complaint that the plaintiffs are indebted to

44
the defendant for the use of Weeks Airport in the
part in the following sums:
Northern Consolidated Airlines $5,500
Fairbanks Air Service $ 565
Alaska Flying School $ 480
The allegations of said indebtedness are not denied
by plaintiffs. ,

‘While said indebtedness might throw some light on
the financial standing of said plaintiffs it would not
seem that said indebtedness should constitute a bar
in. this equitable suit under the maxim that he who
seeks equity must do equity and must come into the
court with clean hands.

Plaintiffs have made no showing whatsoever that
the defendant or, the intervenor is unable to respond
in damages to any extent that is probable in this ac-
tion.

From the above, matters it appears that plaintiffs’
application for a preliminary injunction, as mentioned
above, should be denied.

simone yeteete Aes, fis Hh day of March, .

/s/ Harry E. Pratt,
i. & ; District Judge

(aiboaiea:) “Filed March 4, 1952.

‘ Pe ee ee } at 3 $ ¢
bye ¥ 5 ae Bee, a Sete wrt »

ot PPLE Ss (e Bereter o She} 4 + tery ela Gergen
, Feet

AA

45

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

No. 13,357

Fred Seltenreich, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

The Town of Fairbanks and Fairbanks
School District, an independent
School District Corporation,

Appellees.

~~

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the District Court for the District of
Alaska, Fourth Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript
of the Record from the District Court for the District
of Alaska, Fourth Division, and was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the
said District Court in this cause be, and seeactuee

46

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

Fred Seltenreich and Hawley Evans,
a partnership doing business as Fair-
banks Air Service, Jess Bachner, W.
C. Mitchell and David B. Phillips, a
eopartnership doing business as Fair-
banks Aircraft Service, No. 13,357

oe Appellants, Mar. 10, 1954

The Town of Fairbanks and Fairbanks
School District, an independent
School District Corporation,

Appellees.

Oppeal from the District Court for the Territory
of Alaska, Fourth Division

Before: Denman, Chief Judge.
ve Healy and Pope, Circuit Judges.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court
of Alaska denying appellants’ motion for an inter-
loeutory injunction enjoining the Town of Fairbanks
from closing Weeks Field, an airport owned and form-
erly operated by the Town. The motion is subsidiary
toa len suit seeking permanent injunctive relief.

A are severally engaged in aircraft s
or ss cipubatinn ct x teedstng sotiool Tae piled a 7
prior to its closing were using the field in these enter-
prises. They, or some of them, appear to own adjacent —

>————EEEEEEEEs

47

property, and one of them claims to be the owner of a
right of way over lots giving access to the field.

It appears from the showings for and against the
motion that beginning with the year 1922 the Town
acquired by purchase or otherwise various tracts of the
land which serve to make up Weeks Field. Several
parcels were acquired by deed from the Territory
from private owners, which deeds apparently con-
tained no restrictions. The bulk of the area was trans-
ferred to the Town by the United States, or rather
by the Townsite Trustee, its agent. These latter
transfers directed that the tracts be held by the Town
in trust ‘‘for park and recreational purposes,’’ and
provided for reversion should they be otherwise used.
Subsequently it appears to have been determined that
the Townsite Trustee was without authority to impose
restrictions of this character; and in order to dispense
with them the Town deeded the tracts to the United
States which in turn conveyed them back to the Town-
site Trustee with instructions to grant the same ‘‘omit-
ting the reversionary clause.’’ Accordingly in 1950 the
Town obtained the lands unconditionally.

In 1950 the corporate limits of Fairbanks were ex-
tended to embrace Weeks Field. About this time an
extensive airport, constructed by the Federal govern-
ment some two miles from the Town, was completed
and became available for general public use. It ap-
pears that the Civil Aeronautics Administration trans-
ferred its functions to the latter field, ceasing super-
vision over the Weeks airport runway and discon-

_ tinuing its operation of the control tower there. The

48

Fairbanks School District, an organization indepent-
ent of the Town, acquired from the latter a parcel of
land on the municipal airport and proceeded to build
a school there, accommodating ultimately 750 pupils.
The school building itself is said to extend into the air-
port runway. These several developments and other
considerations induced a determination on the part
of the city council of Fairbanks to close Weeks Field
and abandon its use as an airport.

_ Appellants’ counsel frame the question for our
decision in this fashion: ‘‘May a municipal corpora-
tion lawfully abandon a public airport?’’ In their
effort to negative that proposition they have supplied
us with a brief of a hundred forty pages citing more
than three hundred cases, none of which is materially
helpful so far as concerns the specific situation before
us. We need not stop to inquire whether appellants
have standing to sue; for present purposes, disregard-
ing the Town’s argument to the contrary, we assume
that they have. Nor is it necessary to explore the broad
field of abstract opinion into which counsel’s labors
have carried them. (Footnote: The briefs—more
especially that of the appellants—discuss the point
whether the Town holds the airport in its proprietary
or in its governmental capacity, appellants adhering to
the latter theory. The question is interesting, but in
the circumstances of this case we regard it as purely
academic.) A sufficient answer to the question as to
the. vali¢ ty of the measures the Town of Fairbanks
aken in the specific situation confronting it may,
we think, be arrived at in fairly brief compass. .__

49

The powers in general of city councils of munici-
palities in the class of Fairbanks are set out in the
Alaska Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949, Title 16
Article 1, § 35. Subdivision Twentieth of that section
authorizes those bodies ‘‘to acquire by purchase or
otherwise, and to hold real estate and other property
* * * and to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of such
real estate and other property, * * * including prop-
erty acquired or held for any public use or devoted
thereto, when in the judgment of the city council the
same shall no longer be required for municipal pur-
poses; * * *”’ (Footnote: The power to acquire, main-
tain and operate airports was specifically delegated in
subdivision Fifty (b) of the same Section. However,
this provision ‘was superseded by the Alaska Municipal
Airport Act of February 24, 1949. Ch. 14 SLA 1949,
This Act. authorizes the disposal by municipalities .of
airports and facilities ‘‘in accordance with the laws
of this Territory governing the disposition of other
property of tbe municipality.’’) (Emphasis supplied.)
By legislative amendment approved March 22, 1951,
it was provided that no sale, lease or other disposition
of real property valued at more than $5,000 shall be
valid unless ratified by a majority of the qualified
‘electors of the municipality voting at an election held
for that purpose. Ch. 61 SLA 1951. However, we are
ing to the sale or shes tapenade i
ety bt ater with te auto of the ty conn
_ to determine whether and.when property acquired or

held by municipality for any public use or devoted

50

thereto ceases to be needed for such use. That such
power of judgment is intended to be vested in the city
council seems implicit in the statutory language above
italicized. No ratification by the voters is required
by the statute to confirm that judgment; nor would it
appear to be essential that the exercise of the coun-
cil’s judgment in this respect be coincidental with the
sale or other disposal of the property. (Footnote: It is
significant in this connection to compare the provi-
sions of 1 Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated, 1949, p.
253, relating to the vacation of streets and alleyways.
These provisions authorize the common councils of in-
corporated towns to vacate by ordinance streets and
alleys when required by public interest and conven-
ience. But the statute requires ratification of the
vacating ordinance by the qualified voters of the
Town.)

“The Municipal Airport Act, § 2(7) (a), referred to
in footnote 2, supra, authorizes municipalities to
adopt “such reasonable ordinances, resolutions, rules,
regulations and orders as it shall deem necessary for
the management, government, and use of’’ airport
facilities under its control ‘‘whether situated within or
without the town limits of the municipality. For the
enforcement thereof, the municipality may, by ordi-
nance or resolution, * * * fix penalties, within the
limits preseribed by law, for the violation of munici-
pal ¢ Jinances * * *’? 2

In September 1951 the city council of Fairbanks —
adopted a resolution ordering that ‘the said municipal _
airport comraonly known as ‘Weeks Field’ be, and

51

the same is hereby, closed for use as an airport and
the use of the same on and after the 15th day of
October, 1951, either for the landing or the taking off
of airplanes is hereby prohibited.’”? The resolution
recited at length the circumstances impelling the coun-
cil to take this action. Among the reasons stated were
the inability financially of the Town to continue the
maintenance of the airport or to employ proper per-
sons to manage and control the same; the availability
of the much larger, better constructed and safer air-
port made available by the Government within two
miles of the City; the fact that the governmental air-
port is under the control of the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration and is ample to serve all the needs of the
Town of Fairbanks and the general public for a
public airport that Weeks Field was presently being
-used only by a small number of one-engine airplanes;
that a new school building had been constructed in
close proximity to Weeks Field runway with the result
that the continued use of the field endangered not only
the lives of those using the airport but the lives of.the
children attending the school and of other people liv-
ing in the vicinity; and that the further continuance
of the airport was no longer necessary for the general
ap ag agri i
unfit for the landing of aircraft.

This resolution was followed a few days tate: by
the adoption by the council of an ordinance prohibit-
ing the use of the land owned by the City, commonly
known as Weeks Field, for airport purposes and pro-

hibiting the landing and taking off of aireraft there-

52

from. Violation of the ordinance was declared a mis-
demeanor punishable by fine or by imprisonment for
not to exceed 30 days. Shortly afterwards, and prior
to the closing date specified in the resolution, appel-
lants moved the court for the interlocutory injunction
the denial of which is the subject of this appeal.

Appellants argue with many references to decided
cases that an airport is not a nuisance per se, but at
most is a nuisance in fact; and that the problem as to
whether it is the latter poses a judicial question, hence
one beyond the competence of the city council. Doubt-
less an airport operated under normal conditions and
with adequate supervision and controls is not classifi-
able as per se a nuisance, but it is clear that Weeks
Field had ceased to belong in that category. Under the
conditions described its continued use for the landing
and taking off of planes posed an obvious hazard to
life and limb which the council was not warranted in
ignoring. The prohibition and penalizing of such
operations was an appropriate exercise of the police
power of the municipality. Moreover, it must be re-
membered that the land was the property of the
Town, not of appellants. The counc

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_2408%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
