# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Johnson

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1954
- **Citation:** 348 U.S. 875

## Text

77 SEP 23 1954
HAROLD B. WHLEY, Cle

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 360

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner and Appellant Below,

MACK HENRY JOHNSON,
Respondent and Appellee Below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, IR.,

1122 Whitney Building,

New Orleans, Louisiana,
Attorney for Louisiana &
Arkansas Railway Company,
Petitioner and Appellant
Below.

JOSEPH R. BROWN,
ELIZABETH R. HAAK,
MILLING, SAAL, SAUNDERS,
BENSON & WOODWARD,
Of Counsel,

INDEX

PAGE
Petition for Writ of Certiorari 1
I. Citation of Opinions Below 1
II. Statement of Jurisdiction 2
III. Questions Presented 2
IV. The Statutes Involved 3

V. Statement of the Case and Reasons Relied on for
Allowance of Writ 3
A. Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence... 3
B. Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Work Record. 5

C. Admission of Repetitive Hearsay by
Physicians 7
Conclusion 8
Appendix A 9
Appendix B 17
TABLE OF CASES CITED

Altmayer v. Travelers Protective Ass’n of America,
119 F. 2d 1005, 1008 7

Boston and Albany R. R. Co. v. O’Reilly, 158 U.S.
334, 39 L. Ed. 1006 7
Cardwell v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 382, 386 (CCA 5) 7
Carver v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 40 L. Ed. 532 8

Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Garwood, 167 F. 2d 848
(CCA 8) 7

Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 3 Wall. 114, 18
L. Ed. 116 6
Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 104, 26 L. Ed. 322— 4
Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795, 18 L. Ed. 653 7

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 708, 57
L. Ed. 820, 1035 4

Flannagan v. Provident L. & A. Ins. Co., 22 F. 2d
/ v 7

=

ii

TABLE OF CASES CITED—(Continued)

PAGE

Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U.S. 47, 28 L. Ed. 62 7
Gomila, et al v. United States, 146 F. 2d 372 (CCA

5) 4

Hill v. A. J. Canfield Co., 157 F. 2d 849 (CCA 7) — 4
Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. 438, 11 Wall. 438,

20 L. Ed. 197 6
Hunter v. United States, 62 F. 2d 217 4
Johnson v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company,

214 F. 2d 290 (CCA 5) 9
Mason v. United States, 63 F. 2d 791 4
Moscahlades, et al v. Montagnio, 172 N.Y.S. 332 4
National Bank of the Metropolis v. Kennedy, 84 U.S.

19, 17 Wall. 19, 21 L. Ed. 554 6
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 23 L. Ed. 286 8
Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 161 F. 2d. 323,

(CCA 5) 4
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 77 L.

..... 4

Reading Co. v. Larkin, 114 F. 2d 416 (CCA 3) 4,5

Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. 2d,
234, 241, cert. den.; 311 U.S. 699, 85 L. Ed. 453 4
Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Parker

(CCA 9) 36 F. 2d 926 4
Sparf v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51, 39 L. Ed. 343, * 8
Union Oil Co. of California v. Hunt, 111 F. 2d 269,

278 (CCA 9) 6

Williams v. United States, 93 F. 2d 685

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED
Act of April 22, 1908, as amended, 35 Stat. 65 et
seq.; U.S. Code Title 45, Secs. 51-59 3
Federal Employers Liability Act 3
28 U. S. C. Sec. 1254 (1)

—

iii

TABLE OF TEXT BOOKS CITED

Annotation, 130 A. L. R. 978 7
26 Tulane Law Review 375 7
30 Virginia Law Review 87, 90 5
7
4

VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 1722
VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Secs. 1714, 1715,
1788, 1789

Supreme Court of the United States

No.

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner and Appellant Below,

versus

MACK HENRY JOHNSON,
Respondent and Appellee Below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associates Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company, petitioner,
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, entered in the above entitled case on June 30,
1954.

1

CITATION OF OPINIONS BELOW

There is no report of an opinion of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in
this matter.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’ is reported in 214 F. 2d 290.

1 Appendix A.

my 7

II.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

(i) The decree sought to be reviewed was entered
June 30, 1954.

(ii) Application for rehearing was filed July 20,
-1954, and denied July 30, 1954. An order to stay the
mandate for sixty days from July 29, 1954, was entered
August 6, 1954.

(iii) The statutory provision that confers on this
court jurisdiction to review the decree in question, by
writ of certiorari, is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254 (1).

III.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the trial court should permit plaintiff
to testify to what he was told an hour and a half prior
to the accident in question by a party since deceased
(being the only testimony on the subject) to justify and
explain his violation of railroad operating rules, which
if enforced, would have averted the head-on collision of
two passenger trains, in which he was allegedly injured.

2. Whether a trial court may properly exclude the
record of plaintiff’s service over a period of thirty years,
showing frequent reprimands and four dismissals for
cause, which petitioner sought to introduce in refutation
of plaintiffs contention that he was a good employee,
dismissed without cause, and in support of medical testi-
mony that consideration of a pre-traumatic personality
was of great importance in determining the existence and
extent of the traumatic neurosis allegedly suffered by
plaintiff.

Yr

3

3. Whether a number of physicians should be per-
mitted to repeat on the witness stand what plaintiff told
them about the aceident itself.

IV.
THE STATUTES INVOLVED

This case was based upon Act of April 22, 1908, as
amended, 35 Stat. 65 et seq.; U.S. Code Title 45, Secs.
51-59.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND REASONS
RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT

A.

Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence

The accident in question occurred as a result of the
violation of operating rules by one or more of appellant’s
employees on the northbound train involved in the col-
lision. Petitioner contends that the accident would not
have occurred had plaintiff obeyed the applicable rule.“
Plaintiff was permitted to testify over petitioner’s ob-
jection* that the conductor had told him an hour and a
half previously,“ that the trainmaster, in violation of the

2 Federal Employers in on which

3 The northbound train on which plain was the rear Let gee
was required by the time table to take a siding so n
the track ten minutes before 3 train was dn Rule 90

Foaling that if the Engineer and Conductor do not ai dag of the

466, 469, all of which is summarized in the second paragraph of 2
opinion an at th the eo Court herein (Appendix A).

saint EPP; 418 to 418 Conversation occurred at Essen just after the

stopped at 5:26 A.M. . „

ool wander te p. 61). The accident occurred at 7:02 A.M. Tr. p. 120.

—

rules, was operating the train by use of the train radio
in the locomotive, and that because of this conversation
he did not take steps to stop the train pursuant to the
rules, which would have averted the collision. The con-
ductor had been killed in the same accident in which
plaintiff was allegedly injured.“

The Appellate Court held the hearsay evidence of
which petitioner complains, to be admissible as a verbal
act. Mr. Justice Minton, in considering a similar ques-
tion took the contrary view.“

This Court denied certiorari in a case which repro-
bated as prejudicial error the admission of hearsay evi-
dence not within one of the recognized and established
exceptions and held that the basis for the exclusion of
hearsay lies in the fact that it is not subject to the fear
of perjury or the tests ordinarily applied to the ascer-
tainment of truth by cross-examination, which is essential
to the administration of justice.“

The Appellate Court, in deciding the case at bar,
relied on a text, not appropriate, and two cases.“ In
the first of the cases the evidence was admitted under
a specific statute, and was therefore not applicable,

6 Request for admission No. 21, and answer, Tr. pp. 36, 59. See
also Tr. 11 314.

7 Hill v. A. J. Canfield Co., 157 F. 2d 849 (CCA 7).

8 Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. 2d 234, cert. den.;
311 U.S. 699, 85 L. Ed. 453.

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 708, 57 L. Ed. 820, 1035;
Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 104, 26 L. Ed. 322. See also Gomila, et
al v United States, 146 F. 2d 372 (CCA 5); Quercia v. United States,
289 U.S. 466, 470, 77 L. Ed. 1321, 1325; Hunter v. United States, 62 F.
2d 217; Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Parker (CCA 9) 36
F. 2d 926; Mason v. United States, 63 F. 2d 791; Williams v. United
States, 93 F. 2d 685; Moscahlades, et al v. Montagnio, 172 N.Y.S. 332.

10 VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., Secs. 1714, 1715, 1788, 1789;
Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, (CCA 5) 161 F. 2d 325; Reading Co.
v. Larkin, (CCA 8) 114 F. 2d 416.

11 Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, (CCA 5) 161 F. 2d 325.

—

5

and in the second! it was said that: “The qualifications
which render the incidence of a litigated act admissible
are ‘that they are part of the immediate preparations
for or emanations of such act * * * In any event,
the rule as applied by the Appellate Court has been re-
jected by this Court.“

B.
Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Work Record

Plaintiff, aged 63 at the time of the accident, claimed
that he suffered physical injury and a traumatic neurosis,
which he claims resulted in a loss of potency. The ortho-
pedists, including his own, testified that his injuries,
orthopedically, were minute.“ Defendant sought to in-
troduce plaintiff’s work record,“ and when it was ex-
cluded, entered an offer of proof.“ This evidence was
improperly excluded because:

(a) As plaintiff’s leading psychiatrist ad-
mitted,” a predisposition to nervousness has a
part in the traumatic neurosis, and a person with
a pre-existing nervous condition is much more
likely to suffer such a neurosis. In determining
the existence of a traumatic neurosis, it is neces-
sary to take into account the pre-traumatic per-
sonality."

(b) Petitioner was unable to satisfactorily
meet and answer the impression that plaintiff
endeavored to, and apparently succeeded in con-
veying to the jury, that he was an able, efficient,
loyal employee, steadfast in his devotion to duty.

Such work record was not only important to

12 Reading Co. v. Larkin, (CCA 3) 114 F. 2d 416.

13 See Note 9 supra.

14 Tr. pp. 278, 237, 892.

5 age ot to 479 and 571 to 576, 9 herein as Appendix B.
r. p

17 Tr. p. 524.

18 30 Va. Law Review 87, 90.

6

show plaintiff’s pre-traumatic personality but also
to refute the false impression that was created
in the minds of the jury as to the efficiency and
capabilities of this man. It shows that he was
reprimanded or given demerits for responsibility
in connection with accidents on ten occasions prior
to the accident in question. He was dismissed
from service for cause and re-employed four times
before the accident in question. On the last
occasion his dismissal from service was for vio-
lation of Rule G“, which, as was shown by the
offer of proof,“ was the rule which prohibited
the use of intoxicating liquors on duty.

The magnitude of the award could only have
resulted from a misconception by the jury of the
extent of plaintiff's alleged injuries. We respect-
fully submit that the exclusion of this important
evidence, which was properly admissible in view
of the contention of plaintiff that he had suffered
a traumatic neurosis and was improperly dis-
charged without cause” after thirty years of con-
tinuous service, was a grievous blow to peti-
tioner, and grossly improper.

This Court has said that courts should be
careful in the administration of the law of evi-
dence not to shut out the truth; that facts
proved by way of circumstantial evidence may be
explained by the defense;* and that if evidence
conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the
improbability of the fact in controversy, it should
go to the jury.”

19 Tr. p. 575.

20 P. Ex. 26, Tr. pp. 403, 404, 428.

21 Tr. p. 403.

22 Cliquot’s Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 3 Wall. 114, 18 L. Ed. 116.

23 National Bank of the Metropolis v. Kennedy, 84 U.S. 19, 17 Wall.
19, 21 L. Ed. 554.

24 Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. 438, 11 Wall. 438, 20 L. Ed. 197.
35. Also: Union Oil Co. of California v. Hunt, 111 F. 2d 269, 278 (C. C. A.

7

C.

Admission of Repetitive Hearsay By Physicians

Appellant objected”* to the court permitting several
of the doctors who testified, to recite the history?“ that
plaintiff repeated to them, including certain facts in
connection with the accident, not connected with his
physical condition. As undesirable as this practice is,
when done by one physician, the error is compounded by
the constant repetition. It would be difficult indeed for
a juror to be able to differentiate between fact and un-
supported statements which were constantly reiterated
by responsible individuals, who in fact were only repeat-
ing what plaintiff told them. As Dr. Connelly said,”
the stories told by plaintiff to each of these doctors had
a parrot-like similarity, and we respectfully submit that
a constant repetition of a statement creates a tendency
on the part of the hearer to believe it to be true. In this
instance and under these circumstances, we believe that
it was material error for the court to have permitted
these eminent members of the medical profession to re-
peatedly recite plaintiff’s story.

This Court, in an identical case, said that it should
appear beyond a doubt that the error complained of did
not and could not prejudice the rights of the party ob-
jecting.* The reception of such testimony has been
repeatedly reprobated by the courts.” The Appellate

25 Tr. pp. 202, 203.

26 Tr. pp. 203, 212, 213, 225, 506, 766, 767.

27 Tr. p. 685.

5 and Albany R. R. Co. v. OReilly, 158 U.S. 334, 39 L. Ed.

29 Deery v. Cray, 72 U.S. 5 Wall. 795, 18 L. Ed. 653; Gilmer v.
Higley, 110 U.S. 47, 28 L. Ed. 62; Flannagan v. Provident L. & A. Ins.
Co., 22 F. 2d 136 (C.C.A. 4, 1927); Altmayer v. Travelers Protective
Ass’n of America, 119 F. 2d 1005, 1008; Cardwell v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 382,
386 (C. C. A. 5) Annotation 130 A.L.R. 978; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.
Garwood, 167 F. 2d 848 (C. C. A. 8); VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed.
Sec. 1722; 26 Tulane Law Review 375.

8

Court in its opinion, said that the testimony was not
objected to on the ground that it was hearsay. The ob-
jection read as follows:

“We would like to note an objection to the
doctor reading into the record each time what the
plaintiff told him.”

The word hearsay was not used, but to object to a
recitation of what plaintiff told the witness can be noth-
ing but an objection to hearsay. This Court decided in
an identical case that the objection to hearsay was im-
plicit in the one made.“

We therefore respectfully submit that the rule ap-
plied by the Appellate Court was incorrect, and the rea-
son given therefor erroneous.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully submits that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in the
respects above mentioned, has so far sanctioned a de-
parture by the trial court from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise
of this Court’s power of supervision.

Respectfully submitted,

M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, JR.,

Attorney for Louisiana &
Arkansas Railway Company,
Petitioner.

JOSEPH R. BROWN,

ELIZABETH R. HAAK,

MILLING, SAAL, SAUNDERS,

BENSON & WOODWARD,
Of Counsel.

30 Sparf v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51, 39 L. Ed. 343, 345. See also Carver
v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 40 L. Ed. 532; Nudd v. Burrows, 91
U.S. 426, 23 L. Ed. 286.

9
APPENDIX A

In The
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Fifth Circuit

No. 14970

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,
Appellant,
versus

MACK HENRY JOHNSON,
Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana.

(June 30, 1954.)
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, RIVES, Circuit

Judge, and DAWKINS, District Judge.
RIVES, Circuit Judge: In an action under the Fed-

eral Employer’s Liability Act,’ appellee recovered a judg-
ment on a jury’s verdict in the amount of $28,000.00 for
personal injuries suffered in a collision between two of
the appellant’s trains at a point 1.67 miles north of
Lettsworth, Louisiana, on August 10, 1951. Appellee was
the rear brakeman on a troop train running northward
when it collided head on with a streamlined passenger
train traveling southward. The trainmaster who was
riding on the northbound train and the other four mem-
bers of the crew of that train and eight other persons

145 U.S.C.A. 51-59.

10

were killed and 69 injured in the collision. Appellee was
riding on the rear platform of the last car and jumped
just before the impact.

Under the rules of the railroad, the northbound train
should have taken a siding so that it would clear the
time of the southbound train by at least 10 minutes. The
rules further provided that, if the train did not take
such siding, the conductor would take immediate action
to stop the train, and the firemen, brakemen and other
members of the crew would also be held responsible for
failure to take immediate action to stop the train. The
last siding that the northbound train could have taken
so as to clear the time of the southbound train by as
much as 10 minutes was at Batchelor, Louisiana, ap-
proximately 6.9 miles south of Lettsworth. There was
also a switch track at Lettsworth onto which the train
might have been moved in time to avoid the accident,
but not in time to clear the full 10 minutes pursuant to
the rules.

Appellee contended that the collision occurred as a
result of the negligence of the trainmaster who was rid-
ing on the engine of the northbound train and, accord-
ing to appellee, had taken over its operations; and, if not
from the sole negligence of the trainmaster, then as a
result also of the concurring negligence of the engineer
and conductor of the northbound train. Appellant as-
serted as a defense that the appellee was guilty of negli-
gence which was the sole cause of the collision, or in the
alternative in diminution of damages that the appellee
was guilty of contributory negligence. The appellant also
denied that the injuries received by the appellee were
serious and claimed that his only injury was a sprained
ankle.

11

On this appeal the appellant complains of the refusal
of one of its requested instructions to the jury, that a
part of the charge to the jury was erroneous, that the
court made erroneous rulings on the evidence, permitted
improper argument by appellee's counsel, made erroneous
statements prejudicial to the appellee, and in general did
not conduct the trial with the air of impartiality to
which every litigant is entitled.

The instruction refused read as follows:

Where a trainman has a personal duty to
perform under the operating rules of the defend-
ant railroad and fails in that duty, as a result of
which he is injured, he is not entitled to recover
under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, not-
withstanding the fact that it was also the duty
of other members of the crew to watch for an ap-
proaching train with which his train collided, and
that their negligence may have contributed in a
proximate way to the injury of the plaintiff.”

As requiring the giving of this instruction, appel-
lant cites the cases of Unadilla Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278
U.S. 189, and Southern Ry. Co. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S.
313, to which we may add the case of Davis v. Kennedy,
266 U.S. 147. All of these cases were decided before
the 1989 amendment to the Federal Employer’s Liability
Act, now brought forward as 45 U.S.C.A. 54, did away
with the defense of assumption of risk. At that time,
the so-called “primary duty rule” was applied to the
conductor in Unadilla Ry. Co. v. Caldine, supra, and
Southern Ry. Co. v. Youngblood, supra, and to the engi-
neer in Davis v. Kennedy, supra. Following the enact-
ment of the 1939 amendment, the Supreme Court held
that “every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk
was obliterated from the law” and that the “primary

12

duty rule” in Unadilla Ry. Co. v. Caldine, supra, and
Davis v. Kennedy, supra, had been “swept into discard”.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58,
63, 64. Since that decision, in cases arising under the
Federal Employer’s Liability Act, even the engineer has
been held not barred by the “primary duty rule“, At-
lantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mangum, 34 So. 2d 848;
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Anderson, 38 S.E. 2d 610,
see also Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry. Co., 6th Cir., 160
F. 2d 654, 657. We hold, therefore, that there was no
error on the part of the district court in refusing to give
the appellant’s requested charge, nor in the part of its
oral charge on the same subject; but that, to the con-
trary, the court probably charged the jury more favor-
ably to the appellant than it was entitled in submitting
to the jury the issue of whether the appellee’s negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the accident.

We have carefully examined the record in this case,
and, while it may be that the learned district judge at
times showed some impatience or irritation with the
claim of a total defense which did not exist in point of
law, we are further impressed with his fairness, and we
cannot sustain the appellant’s contention that its case
was prejudiced by any claimed unfair manner in which
the trial was conducted. No objection was taken to any
of the remarks complained of and we have no further
occasion to consider such remarks. Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers,
5th Cir., 182 F. 2d 576, 579.

The appellee testified that as the northbound train
was going around the curve on which the collision oc-
cured, he was leaning out looking forward on the train
for possible “hot boxes” when he noticed the southbound
train and the imminence of the collision. Someone had

13

applied the emergency brakes before he could do so. Ac-
cordingly, he jumped, did a double somersault and hit
the ground. The appellee was between 63 and 64 years
of age. His physical injuries at the time did not seem
serious and did not prevent his performance of his flag-
ging duties nor his getting back to Lettsworth to notify
the dispatcher of the tragic accident. He was, however,
hospitalized after the accident and several reputable psy-
chiatrists testified that he had suffered a severe nervous
shock, a traumatic neurosis, which in their opinion per-
manently and totally disabled him and also rendered him
nervous, depressed and impotent. The claim that the
verdict was for an excessive amount does not present a
question for re-examination here. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Burkett, 5th Cir., 192 F. 2d 941, 945, and cases
there cited.

Appellant strenuously insists that the court erred in
permitting the appellee, over the appellant’s objection,
to relate his conversation with the conductor, afterward
killed in the accident, when the northbound train stopped
a few miles south of Baton Rouge. The train was due
to take a siding at Essen, Louisiana, for still another
train of the defendant known as No. 9, which was a
superior train and had the clearance and right-of-way
over the northbound train. Instead, the train passed the
siding at Essen and later stopped, at which time Mr.
B. T. Moore, the trainmaster, used the radio equipment
to contact the appellant’s operator at Baton Rouge and
to order that No. 9, the superior train, remain in the
station until the northbound train had arrived. Over
the appellant’s objection, the appellee was permitted to
testify that he asked the conductor, who was later killed
in the accident, why the northbound train did not stop
at Essen, and was told by the conductor that the train-

14

master was with the engineer at the head of the train,
had a radio and was running the train up there, and
that they knew what they were doing, but the conductor
did not. That conversation, we think, was admissible as
circumstantial evidence going to show the method of
operation of the train on this fatal journey by the train-
master. It was really a verbal act relevant to be con-
sidered in determining the negligence vel non and the
degree thereof on the part of the conductor and also on
the part of the appellee. VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d.
ed., Sections 1714, 1715, 1788, 1789; Petroleum Carrier
Corp. v. Snyder, 5th Cir., 161 F. 2d 325; Reading Co.
v. Larkin, 3d. Cir., 114 F. 2d 416.

Appellant insists that the district court erred in not
admitting appellee’s work record kept by the appellant
and which showed various infractions of the rules by
the appellee during the course of his employment from
1919 to 1951. The appellant contends that the work
record is material and relevant to the issue of whether
or not the appellee had a pre-existing neurotic condition.
It would, no doubt, have been proper for the skilled phy-
chiatrists to take that word record into consideration in
diagnosing the appellee’s condition and the cause thereof,
but very clearly, we think, the record without explana-
tory evidence would have been of no help to the jury.
The trial, which consumed five days time, probably
would have been extended over several days more in tak-
ing evidence as to each of the particular charges, de-
merits and reprimands shown in this work record. There
was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
excluding it.

Appellant urges that the district court erred in per-
mitting several of the doctors who testified to recite the

15

history that appellee repeated to them. The appellant
did not object to such history as given by the first doctor
who testified, but did object to its continued repetition.
Evidence as to what a patient has told a doctor for the
purpose of medical treatment is admissible as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. United States v. Calvey, 3d.
Cir., 110 F. 2d 327, 330. Such evidence may not be
admissible if made by a patient to a physician not for
the purpose of treatment but to qualify the physician to
testify as an expert witness. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Dixon, 5th Cir., 207 F. 2d 899, 903. The testimony
was not, however, objected to on that ground, but the
sole complaint was to the repetition of appellee’s state-
ments, a matter resting, we think, within the sound dis-
cretion of the district judge.

Appellant’s investigation in preparing its defense
included placing the appellee under the surveillance of
a detective, who admitted on cross-examination that he
tried to induce the appellee to drink alcoholic liquors
when the appellee had expressed a preference for soft
drinks. There was also evidence that appellant’s chief
surgeon, at the direction of its vice-president, had repri-
manded its division surgeon for giving the appellee a
statement to the Railroad Retirement Board that he
needed retirement on account of shock and injury to his
ankle. Appellee’s counsel, in arguing the case to the
jury, stated in part: “Now in this case you will note that
the plaintiff was dealing with a very, very resourceful
defendant; a defendant which in many respects would
stop at nothing; a very resourceful defendant.” The
district court overruled appellant’s objection to this argu-
ment. In the part of the argument immediately preced-
ing, counsel for the appellee had commented on the
employment and conduct of the private detective and

16

immediately following he commented on the reprimand
to the doctor. We cannot say, under the circumstances
of this case, that the district court abused its discretion
in overruling the objection to this argument. That was
the only objection made to the argument which is set out
in full in the transcript, and which, as a whole, was a
fair though vigorous presentation of the issues. Finding
no error in the record, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD OF EMPLOYEES
I PR-4166 12-15-19

Name JOHNSON - MACK MARY Social Security No._703-18-2572
! — Birthplace__Wekefield, Louisiana.
rane MAME Ax Location oF DESCRIPTION, — wa

If any relatives in service of this Company
Color Hair?. Mak ce names:

i Identifying Meret les |___

ford

nation
t.rasponsibility for 5

1 injury. to.

Wright

n 4 nspected fin » od oO:
bility in accident, IAA IZ088 co
8

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

1 Ä o

APPENDIX B

7-16-84 - J&A Transportation Rules examination - Certificate $66. ;

8-19-36 - Reprimenied for his responsibility in accident, cars knocked over derail, An
Trein #51, 8-1-36. AXL-2556. 1

12- 8-36 - Reprimanded for his responsibility in sceifdent, EAMV crossing gate orcken 6
Sibley by Extre 552 North, November 26, 1936. 4

- Participated in strike of Train, Y,ri and “nginemen.

- Returned to service strike settled.

11-23-36 - Issued Switch Key 75488 in exchange for old key #3866-S.

1-14-37 »“ rating on physical examination.
6-12-37 - 5 demerits for failure to have watch inspected first period January, 195%.
716-38 - Relieved from service for inattention to his duties and passengers, Train fy

Shreveport, 8-15-38, “visiting” with otéer negroes standing around on stati
platform and feiling to comply with instructions of Superintendent to pey
to his work.
7-27-38 - Re-instated.
8-29-38 - 5 for his responsibility in accident, main line switch run thre
N in #4, 8-1-3868, Packton. 3228.
8-23-39 - Relieved from service as Porter on Trains 2-3 and 4-1 account failure to 5
perform duties as train porter; permitted to go back in freight service on
41, Shreveport to filston, and 42, Filston via Minden to Shreveport.
10-10-39 - 5 demerits for failure to have watch inspected second period May, 1959. 8
2-23-40 - Instructed to report to hier surgeon for physical examination before March
1940. a
3-11-40 - Heported for physical re-examination - Given —1 rating account eyes need
checking, teeth need attention and needs re-vaccination. Instructed to
attended to immediately.
4-19-40 - Dismisse@ from service for villetion of “yle d and gbsenting himself from
without permission, April 14, 1940. 2
10-17-40 - he- employed ad Brakeman - “ew Orleans, Louisiane. Issued the following ¢ n
property: IAA switch Key #5881; T&P Switch Key #9606; In Rule cook #1016;
Rule ook #3280. / 3-19-41 Passed Ter Rules Exam. issued Certificate 10.
10- 7-41 - Passed IAA Transportation Department Rules examination - Certificate Nos 40 —
9 9-42 - 5 demerits forfailure to have vatch inspecged during second period April, 1
4- 1-43 Ns demerits for feilure to have watch inspected second period
1942 and 5 demerits for not answering correspogdence.
9- 7-43 - Complaint from White Sydtem of New Orlesns, inc., for balance of §56.44 dus
thea. 5
2-25-45 - 5 Demerits for his responsibility in accident 10: 10 . u., Jamery 4, 108,
NO. 35, Sngine 508, when C&O 11360, empty box, wes sideswiped by 1&NO 543525
43232 at North end of 014 Pass. AX-6996. .
5-25-45 - Issued four large Yrakeman's Suttons ard ‘CS Coach Key, unnumbered.
5-27-45 - Issued IAA Coach Key No. 905 in exchange for coach key turmd in ac
1-15-46 -- Qualified on Transportation Rules,
2 8-47 -_25 Demerits, Responsibility AX-7742, Lobdell, Train #37, 1/21/47.
6-17-48 - 5 Demerits, Watch Inspection Failure, March, 1948.
8-20-51 - Digmiaged, as per Supt. R. Norwood's letter that date, file AI-9251, for
— in commection with headon collision between Extre 5li
and 10. 1 near M 738 north of Letteworth, La., August 10, 1951, while
as rear brakeman on Extra 51A North out of New Orleans August 10, 1951.

U. S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FLED SEP g 1953

Dep. Cen

INDEX

PAGE
1
1
2
2
3
13
28
CITATIONS
Cases:
Lehigh V. r America (CCA
24 15440 K Fed. 900, 902 f : 14
Pope v. Allis, 6 Sup. Ct. 69, 115 U.S. 368, 29 L. Ed. 398 (1885) — 14
White v. Mechanics Securities Corporation, 46 Sup. Ct. 116, 269
U.S. 283, 70 L. Ed. 170 (1925) > 14
Hyman v. Wheeler, 29 Fed. 347 (1886) 14
General Electric Company v. Jonathan Clark & Sons, 108 Fed.
170 e 14
vagsstyrelson v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F. (2d
ff cc 2nd 1929) satin 14
1455 v. Edward L. Burton & Co., (CCA 10th 1948) 187 F.
* 286 14
v. Continental American Bank & Trust Company, (D. C.
CD ‘La. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 450 14
Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 5th Cir., 161 F. 2d 3258 17
Reading Co. v. Larkin, 3d. Cir., 114 F. 2d 416 17
Coll v. Easton Transit Co., 180 Pa. 618, 626, 37 A. 89, 90 17
Norwich & New York „ v. John 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 3, 2 1. E („ — 18
Bevard v. Bevard, 103 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. D.C. 1952) 19, 27

United States v. Gruber, 128 F. (2d) 307 (2nd Cir. 1941) — 19, 27

ae ge Pa epee of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153
F. (2d) 284 (8rd Cir. 1946) 19,

Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wallace 463, 18 L. Ed. 423, 426 (1867)

Lowisville & Nashville R. Co. v. M’Clish, 115 F. 268, 275 (CCA
6th 1902)

Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines, 188 F. (2d) 993 (1951)
Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. (2d) 395 (CCA, 5th 1949)
Hubech v. United States, 174 F. (2d) 7 (5th CCA, 1949)
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F. (2d) 519 (D.C. C.A. 1947)
Peters v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 107 F.

(2d) 9 (8rd Cir. 1939)
U. S. v. Calvey, 110 F. 2d 327 (8rd Cir. 1940)

Bartkoski v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co., 172 F. 2d 1007 (8rd
Cir. 1949)

Other citations:
VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d. ed., Sections 1714, 1715, 1788, 1789
8 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed., Section 1720

&5

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 360

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
versus

MACK HENRY JOHNSON.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

BRIEF FOR MACK HENRY JOHNSON
IN OPPOSITION.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at
214 F. (2d) 290.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on June 30, 1954, and application for rehearing was
denied on July 30, 1954. The order to stay the mandate
for sixty days from July 29, 1954, was entered on August
6, 1954. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254 (1). :

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the trial court properly permitted plain-
tiff to testify what he was told by the conductor, an
agent of the defendant railroad while in the scope of his
employment, shortly before the accident as to the method
of operation of the defendant railroad, which method of
operation corroborated by other evidence not objected to
was responsible for the accident in which plaintiff was
injured and where the defendant, in cross-examination of
plaintiff and direct examination of defendant’s own wit-
ness, asked questions concerning the same subject matter.

2. Whether the trial court properly exercised its dis-
cretion in excluding hearsay evidence as to alleged past
acts of plaintiff which acts could not possibly have any
bearing on the question of negligence or any other issue
in this case.

3. Whether the trial court properly permitted evi-
dence by doctors as to symptoms of traumatic neurosis
where the only method of showing traumatic neurosis is
by subjective symptoms and where defendant did not
object to such testimony by the first doctor testifying and
where the objection of defendant was based on repetition
and not hearsay and where defendant asked plaintiff's
doctors on cross-examination and defendant’s doctors on
direct examination to reiterate the subjective symptoms
as told them by plaintiff.

STATUTE INVOLVED

This action is under the Act of April 22, 1908, as
amended, 35 Stat. 65 et seq.; U.S. Code Title 45, Sections
51-59 (Federal Employer’s Liability Act).

STATEMENT

This is an action under the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act (U. S. C. Title 45, Secs. 51-59) to recover
damages for serious personal injuries suffered by the
respondent, Mack Henry Johnson, as a result of the negli-
gence of the petitioner’s employees, other than the re-
spondent, in a collision between two of the petitioner’s
trains (Extra 51-A North and Southern Belle No. 1) at
Lettsworth, Louisiana on August 10, 1951.

Extra 51-A North, as the name implies, was an
extra train which had no regular schedule and it was
inferior to the Southern Belle No. 1, which was operated
on a regular schedule. (Tr. p. 826)

A chart that was introduced in evidence (Pl. 1, Tr.
p. 79) shows the location of the wreck and the relevant
information as to distances and the curvature of the
roadway near the point of collision. The wreck took place
1.67 miles south of Lettsworth, Louisiana. The Southern
Belle No. 1 had a complete crew, all of whom were
killed, and Extra 51-A North, the train on which the
respondent was riding, aside from having a complete
crew, also had aboard B. T. Moore, the trainmaster. The
trainmaster, and all members of that crew, with the
exception of the respondent, were killed.

In the instant case the petitioner asserted as a de-
fense that the respondent was the sole cause of the col-
lision and, in the alternative, that the respondent was
guilty of contributory negligence, which was the proxi-
mate cause of the collision.

On February 11, 1953, Mrs. Irene Booth Moore, sur-
viving widow of B. T. Moore, the trainmaster who was

—

4

aboard Extra 51-A North at the time of the collision,
filed suit against the petitioner in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana,
Shreveport Division, Civil Action No. 3995, (Pl. 2, Tr.
pp. 40-D to 40-K), and the petitioner filed its answer on
April 11, 1953 (Pl. 2, Tr. pp. 40-K to 40-0). In the
answer filed by the petitioner in the B. T. Moore case,
it set forth that B. T. Moore was solely responsible
for the collision, in answer to paragraph 8 (Pl. 2, Tr.
pp. 40-F and 40-L). Also, in answer to paragraphs 13
and 14, the petitioner denied that the conductor of Extra
51-A North was at fault (Pl. 2, Tr. pp. 40-G and 40-L).
In answer to paragraph 15 (Pl. 2, Tr. pp. 40-G, 40-H,
40-L, and 40-M), the petitioner admitted “ * * * that
the negligence of Benjamin T. Moore, agent, representa-
tive and official of defendant on said train Extra 51-A
in failing to do what he should have done was the cause
of the accident.” In answer to paragraph 16 (Pl. 2, Tr.
pp. 40-H and 40-M) the petitioner denied that the place
given Moore to work was not reasonably safe and
that the operation of the trains was hazardous, except so
for as the said Moore himself made the place furnished
him an unsafe place and made the operation of the trains
hazardous.” In answer to paragraph 18 (Pl. 2, Tr. pp.
40-H, 40-I, and 40-M), the petitioner admitted that
through its employees it was operating the two trains
referred to in the complaint, and in particular, it admits
that through its agent, representative and official, Ben-
jamin T. Moore, it was in control of Extra 51A;
In paragraph 27 (Pl. 2, Tr. p. 40-N) the petitioner al-
leges “that the collision between the two trains referred
to in the complaint was due solely to the negligence of
Benjamin T. Moore, respondent’s deceased, in failing to
perform his responsibilities and duties to see that the
operating rules and special rules and instructions in the

5

movement of train Extra 51-A North were complied
with. Such duties were his responsibility and only his
responsibility. To perform them was the reason that
Trainmaster Moore was instructed to ride this train.
These duties and responsibilities could not be delegated
by him to members of the crew.” In paragraph 28 (Pl.
2, Tr. p. 40-N) the petitioner plead in the alternative in
the Moore case that if the petitioner was guilty of any
negligence in the operation of Extra 51-A North because
of the actions of any of its employees, he was barred
from recovery on the ground of contributory negligence
of Benjamin T. Moore in failing to perform his duties
as set out in paragraph 27 of its answer; and, alter-
natively, it plead that because of Moore’s contributory
negligence, the damages that could be recovered should
be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to Moore.

Thus, in an action in the Federal Court by the widow
of the Trainmaster who was aboard Extra 51-A North
at the time of the collision, the petitioner asserted af-
firmatively that Moore was the sole and only person
responsible for the collision and the answer in that suit
was filed subsequent to the petitioner’s answer in the
instant case wherein it set forth the alleged negligence
of the respondent.

On August 10, 1951, Extra 51-A North departed
from the West Yard, New Orleans, Louisiana, at about
3:15 a.m. (Tr. p. 406) On Board was the trainmaster,
B. T. Moore, (Tr. pp. 303, 304, 404) whom the crew con-
sidered and recognized as the boss. (Tr. p. 411) No
train order was valid unless it bore the initial “B.T.M.”.
(Tr. pp. 308, 304, 828-A) The conductor (Tr. p. 404),
the skipper of the train, the engineer, (Tr. p. 405) the

front brakeman (Tr. p. 405), the fireman, (Tr. p. 405)
and the respondent were aboard. Also aboard was J. W.
Sandifer, (Tr. p. 405) passenger representative of the
petitioner (Tr. p. 291), who reported only to the presi-
dent of the Company. (Tr. pp. 291, 292) In New Orleans
it was decided that since B. T. Moore was going to ride
in the cab with the engineer, (Tr. pp. 294, 295) that
the conductor would ride the rear of the train. (Tr.
p. 294)

Before Extra 51-A North left the West Yard at
New Orleans, B. T. Moore had a conversation with the
telegraph operator. Moore told the operator to tell the
dispatcher to give an order in reference to another train,
not involved in this collision, which order was given.
Moore also called the operator at Simmesport and told
him to have his watch card and things ready so that he
could inspect them. Moore was in possession of the
Simmesport operator’s watch, that had been cleaned, and
he was going to hand it to the operator as the train
passed Simmesport. (Tr. p. 122).

When the Extra 51-A North was a short distance
from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, there was a train owned
and operated by the petitioner, known as No. 9, which
was a superior train and had the clearance and right
of way over Extra 51-A North. (Tr. pp. 296, 297, 298)
Under the rules of the petitioner, Extra 51-A North
should have taken a siding at Essen, Louisiana. (Tr. pp.
297, 298, 299) Instead of taking the siding at Essen,
B. T. Moore passed Essen and later stopped and he then
used the radio equipment and contacted the petitioner’s
operator at Baton Rouge, ordering that No. 9, the su-
perior train, remain in the station unti] Extra 51-A
North had arrived. (Tr. pp. 333, 334)

7

When Extra 51-A North left Baton Rouge and New
Roads, B. T. Moore was aboard and in the cab of the
engine. (Tr. p. 295) Extra 51-A North should have
stopped at Batchelor, Louisiana, and taken a siding be-
cause there was insufficient time under the schedule to
clear the superior train, Southern Belle No. 1 (Tr. pp.
822, 823)

Near Baton Rouge, Mack Johnson wanted to know
why Extra 51-A North did not stop at Essen, and he was
told by the conductor that the trainmaster was
at the head end, with Yates, with a radio and he was
running it up there and he didn’t know what they were
doing. We didn’t have a radio on the hind end. There
wasn’t any radio back there. All in my power was to
do to call the attention of the conductor when he was
with and tell him of these things. He didn’t stop the
train, and I couldn’t take over stopping the train because
I am not a conductor, but I was following the rules; to
take instructions from the conductor, or help in notifying
him any time of these things when he was with me, and
I did it.” (Tr. pp. 414, 415; Rule 107).

Further, the conductor told Mack Johnson that “* * *
the trainmaster was on the head end of the train; and
he didn’t pull the air. The trainmaster was on the head
end running it, with a radio up there, and they knew
what they were doing, and he didn’t pull no cord. I
called his attention to it.” (Tr. pp. 414, 415).

Just before Extra 51-A North arrived at New Roads,
on the back platform, the conductor told Mack Johnson
to “watch the order board at New Roads * * for just
a few minutes * I am going towards the head end.
You watch this end closely and watch the board at

8

Morganza. I am going as far as I can for No. 1, and
you stay back here and watch close; check on the order
board at Morganza.” (Tr. pp. 416, 417).

About the time that the Southern Belle No. 1 was
due out of Alexandria, the telegraph operator for the
petitioner at Alexandria, Louisiana, spoke to the engi-
neer of another train, not involved in the collision, Extra
56-A North, who was then located near Simmesport,
setting forth that the Southern Belle No. 1 was eight
minutes late leaving Alexandria. (Tr. pp. 123, 124, 353,
854). No one knows whether B. T. Moore and Yates,
on Extra 51-A North heard this conversation.

Extra 56-A North reached Bijou at approximately
5:45 A.M. August 10, 1951, (Tr. p. 354) and about 5:50
A.M., the engineer heard someone who identified him-
self as Simmesport call Extra 51-A North. Southern
Belle No. 1 passed right by Extra 56-A North at ap-
proximately 6:25 A.M. The engineer, Jimmy F. Mims,
on Extra 56-A North, waved at Engineer Rainey on
No. 1 and tried by radio to communicate with him but
got no response. Between 6:53, 4, 5 and 7:00 A.M. the
engineer on Extra 56-A North heard an urgent call,
stating “Extra 51-A North; Simmesport calling Extra
51-A North.” Then the engineer heard the call from
Simmesport to Extra 51-A North saying “Yes, sir,” “No,
Sir” or “All right, sir.” (Tr. pp. 353-368).

Near the time of the wreck, as Mack Johnson testi-
fied, “ * * * there was no one back there but me, but
with the instructions from the conductor to stay back
there and watch that hind end, that he was going as far
as he could go for No. 1, and after we got on past Letts-
worth I noticed the time. But they kept going. They

9

all were on the head end somewhere. I know he left
me and told me that's where he was going. He had been
using the radio and I knowed it was complicated. I
figured they knowed what they was doing. I didn’t
have nothing back there to do but try to watch the hind
end as flagman. We were going around that curve,
and I was looking around that curve, and then I saw
this No. 1 coming around there. He was making an
effort to stop. By the time I reached for the chord the
brakes had been applied on and reduced the speed of
the train. I stayed until I seed they were going to
together and I tried to get off the best way I could. By
doing so that is where I injured myself. * * * (r.
pp. 418, 419).

Thus at approximately 7:02 A.M. on August 10,
1951, a collision took place (Tr. p. 418), and as the
petitioner itself alleged in the Moore case, it was solely
and only caused by B. T. Moore. Surely, the jury was
correct in finding that the respondent could have done
nothing to prevent the accident in view of the superior
authority aboard and all of the other circumstances.

As the Extra 51-A North was going around the
fatal curve, the respondent, following his usual instruc-
tions and procedure, was looking for hot-boxes (Tr. p.
418) and noted he saw No. 1 and the terrifying sight
(Tr. p. 419) of the oncoming collision. After doing
everything possible he did a “double summerset” and hit
the ground. (Tr. p. 437)

The respondent was then treated for a very long
period of time by Dr. Henry Leidenheimer, who had
been Division Surgeon for the Louisiana and Arkansas
Railway Company Hospital Association for approxi-

10

mately forty-two years. (Tr. p. 129) Further, the
doctor’s son was the Asst. Division Surgeon. (Pl. 3; Tr.
pp. 131, 182). Paul Sippel served as Vice-President of
the petitioner and as Chairman of the Board of the
Hospital Association. (Tr. p. 130)

The original card, Dr. Leidenheimer’s (Pl. 4, Tr.
p. 140, 967) showed that among other ailments, the re-
spondent suffered from nervous shock. (Tr. pp. 138,
139). Further, he had on many occasions certified that
the respondent was suffering from ailments including
shock and was totally disabled. He did this as late as
January 25, 1953. (Nat. Life 1-26, Tr. p. 127, Pl. 27,
28, Tr. p. 430; Tr. pp. 125-127, 140, 141, 151, 152).
This petitioner's physician was so fearful of his position
that he said that he would not make a statement or
testify as to anything that would hurt the petitioner in
litigation, even though he was under oath. (Pl. 5, Tr. p.
145, Pl. 6, Tr. p. 147, Tr. pp. 156, 157). An insight as
to how Dr. Leidenheimer felt will appear from the follow-
ing two exhibits (Pl. 5, Tr. p. 145, Pl. 6, Tr. p. 147).

Plaintiff 5: (p. 145)

“Shreveport, La., May 23, 1953.

“Dr. Henry Leidenheimer,
Audubon Building,
New Orleans, Louisiana.

“Mr. Sippel contacted me yesterday and
wanted to know why you gave Mack Henry John-
son, Brakeman who was injured in the collision
at Lettsworth, a statement to the railroad Retire-
ment Board that he needs retirement on account
of ‘shock and injury to his ankle.’ Inasmuch as
there is some litigation still pending concerning
this accident, we feel that it is an official ad-
mission of you, as Division Surgeon, to give such

11

a written recommendation and Mr. Sippel asks
that you drop me a line concerning same at your
earliest convenience, in order that we may get the
correct impression of the matter.

“Thanking you for your promptness in at-
tending to this as you did for my request con-
cerning Mr. Mills, (for which I thank you) I am

s/ A. A. Herold, Sr.,
Sincerely,
Chief Surgeon.
AAH:h
ec: Mr. P. Sippel”

Plaintiff 6: (p. 146)

“May 30, 1953.
Dr. A. A. Herold
Shreveport, La.

The communication of recent date received
and carefully perused. It smacks of Nazism
whereby a person is considered guilty on hearsay
evidence of rumor in contrast to the American
way, a man is innocent until proven otherwise.
This tale is fantastic and as for the Railroad
Retirement Board acting on my recommendation
it is hoey, for they wouldn't care a d-

The allegation is so vague, inexplicit and
lacks substantiation that I am impelled to ask,
did Mr. Sippel see such a recommendation over
my signature? I too would like to see this paper.

I must confess that I do not recall every
incident that has occurred in the past three years,
and my railroad correspondence is too volumingus
to maintain a perfect filing system.

As regards ‘official admission’, I have al-
ways been scrupulously careful not to do anything
inimical to best interest of the railroad. In fact
the attorneys for Johnson had requested a state-
ment of his injuries and my answer to them was

12

that I did not regard it as proper to do so. Any
information of such nature must come from the
Chief Surgeon or the Claim Agent.

I was called down before by the Chief Sur-
geon for treating Johnson at the association’s
expense after he was fired, notwithstanding I
had not been notified of his dismissal I still con-
tinued to treat him for, here again, for obvious
reasons it would serve the company best.

If (?) I have inadvertently made such a
recommendation, I am man enough to admit hav-
ing done so, but I must have the proof.

Sincerely,
ec: Mr. Sipple”

Of course, Dr. Leidenheimer could not deny his find-
ings, so the petitioner was in a position where the man
it controlled could not help it, regardless of his desire.

(Tr. pp. 129-177)

The testimony of the physchiatrists and Dr. Manuel
Gardberg (Tr. p. 179 et seq.) is clear in showing the
serious illness of the respondent (Tr. pp. 202, 255, 505).
Dr. Bick, the psychiatrist, chosen by the petitioner, but
later put on the stand by the respondent, substantiated
the respondent’s physicians. (Tr. pp. 202-210) After the
petitioner did not receive its desired result from Dr.
Bick it repudiated him (Tr. pp. 18-B-18-D) and asked
the Court to cause the plaintiff to be examined by an-
other psychiatrist. This psychiatrist disagreed with the
other doctors (Tr. p. 678). From a medical standpoint
the evidence was clear and the jury understood every-
thing.

The petitioner felt it necessary to attempt to im-
peach the testimony of the respondent. This was at-

13

tempted relative to immaterial issues and by the shameful
testimony by Willie Webb (Tr. pp. 770-810) and Dave
Mitchell (Tr. pp. 718-726). A review of this testimony
will serve no purpose since we submit that when this
Honorable Court reads their testimony, it will have the
same reaction as the Jury.

The trial lasted five days and the facts were brought
out clearly. The Jury had full knowledge of every aspect
of the case.

The Jury returned a verdict in the amount of
$28,000 (Tr. p. 78). On appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, the judgment was affirmed (214
F. (2d) 290). Petition for rehearing was thereafter
denied.

ARGUMENT
1.

The petitioner complains that the respondent was
permitted to testify as to what he had been told by the
deceased conductor as to how the train was being oper-
ated by the trainmaster. (Tr. pp. 413, 414).

Petitioner sets forth in its brief that it con-
tends that the accident would not have occurred had re-
spondent obeyed the applicable rule .” (Petitioner’s
Br. p. 8). It should be noted that in the case filed by
Mrs. Irene Booth Moore, widow of B. T. Moore, the train-
master who was aboard: Extra 51-A North, which suit
was filed in the Western District of Louisiana, the Peti-
tioner in its answer affirmatively set forth that the sole
cause of the accident was the conduct of B. T. Moore
(Pl. 2; Tr. pp. 40-G, 40-H, 40-L, 40-M, and 40-N). The
affirmative allegations contained in the petitioner’s an-

14

swer filed in the Western District, subsequent to the
filing of its answer in the instant case, were never
rebutted. In fact the record shows that they were proven.
See Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Allied Machinery Co. of
America (CCA 2nd 1921) 271 Fed. 900, 902; Pope v.
Allis, 6 Sup. Ct. 69, 115 U.S. 363, 29 L. Ed. 393 (1885) ;
White v. Mechanics Securities Corporation, 46 Sup. Ct.
116, 269 U.S. 283, 70 L. Ed. 170 (1925); Hyman v.
Wheeler, 29 Fed. 347 (1886); General Electric Company
v. Jonathan Clark & Sons, 108 Fed. 170 (1901) ; Kingley
Jarnvagsstyrelson v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F. (2d)
195 (CCA 2nd 1929) ; Rogers v. Edward L. Burton & Co.,
(CCA 10th 1943) 137 F. (2d) 286; U. S. v. Continental
American Bank & Trust Company, (D.C. W.D. La. 1948)
79 F. Supp. 450.

One of the major arguments of the petitioner in de-
fense of its case in the District, Circuit and now this
Honorable Court is that the respondent did not cause the
train to stop shortly before the accident. The petitioner
contends that the respondent’s alleged action was the
sole cause of the accident. (Tr. p. 14). It was proper
for the respondent to show the circumstances at the time
of and shortly before the accident in order to rebut this
contention. For this reason respondent elicited the testi-
mony concerning conversations had between the respond-
ent and the deceased conductor, Marcotte.

The train on which the appellee was riding was
Extra 51-A North, a troop train going from New Or-
leans, Louisiana, to Shreveport, Louisiana. On board the
train were B. T. Moore, a trainmaster who, as such, was
in charge of all operations of all trains, (Tr. p. 404)
J. W. Sandifer, (Tr. p. 405) the conductor, (Tr. p. 404)
the engineer, (Tr. p. 405), the front brakeman, (Tr. p.

15

405) the flagman, (Tr. p. 405) and the respondent,
Mack Henry Johnson, the rear brakeman.

The respondent proved that B. T. Moore, the train-
master for the petitioner, was riding the engine of the
train on which the respondent was a member of the crew
at the time of his injury. (Tr. pp. 40-E, No. 7, 40-L,
No. 7).

After Extra 51-A North violated the rules in not
taking a siding at Essen, Louisiana, so that Train No.
9, which had the right of way, could go through, (Tr.
p. 407) the respondent inquired of the conductor as to the
reasons and was told:

“Why the train didn’t take the siding at
Essen? Because the conductor said to me, the
trainmaster was on the head end, with Yates,
with a radio and he was running it up there and
he didn’t know what they were doing. We didn’t
have any radio on the hind end. There wasn’t
any radio back there. All in my power was to do
to call the attention of the conductor when he
was with and tell him of these things. He didn’t
stop the train, and I couldn’t take over stopping
the train because I am not a conductor, but I
was following the rules; to take instructions from
the conductor, or help in notifying him any time
of these things when he was with me, and I did
it.” (Tr. p. 414).

According to the operating rules of the railroad,
the personnel aboard the train are to take orders from
the conductor. (Tr. pp. 464, 465). In addition, the train-
master, who is responsible for all train orders, was
aboard the train. In view of the presence of the con-
ductor and the trainmaster, the conversations, which
occurred shortly before the wreck at Lettsworth, become

,

16

extremely important. These conversations which the
petitioner testified to, concern the orders given to him
by the conductor, and, further concern the information
given to the petitioner that the train was being run by
the trainmaster and that the train was proceeding by the
use of the radio. (Tr. pp. 406, 411, 412, 413, 414)

We believe that there are many reasons why peti-
tioner’s contention before this Honorable Court is errone-
ous. The Fifth Circuit Court gave the clearest answer
as follows (214 F. (2d) 290, 292, 293):

“Appellant strenuously insists that the court
erred in permitting the respondent, over the peti-
tioner’s objection, to relate his conversation with
the conductor, afterward killed in the accident,
when the northbound train stopped a few miles
south of Baton Rouge. The train was due to take
a siding at Essen, Louisiana, for still another
train of the petitioner known as No. 9, which was
a superior train and had the clearance and right-
of-way over the northbound train. Instead, the
train passed the siding at Essen and later stopped,
at which time Mr. B. T. Moore, the trainmaster,
used the radio equipment to contact the petitioner’s
operator at Baton Rouge and to order that No. 9,
the superior train, remain in the station until the
northbound train had arrived. Over the peti-
tioner’s objection, the respondent was permitted
to testify that he asked the conductor, who was
later killed in the accident, why the northbound
train did not stop at Essen, and was told by the
conductor that the trainmaster was with the engi-
neer at the head of the train, had a radio and was
running the train up there, and that they knew
what they were doing, but the conductor did not.
That conversation, we think, was admissible as
circumstantial evidence going to show the method
of operation of the train on this fatal cane ans by
the trainmaster. It was really a verbal act rele-

17

vant to be considered in determining a negligence
vel non and the degree thereof on the part of the
conductor and also on the part of the respondent.
VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d. ed., Sections 1714,
1715, 1788, 1789; Petrolewm Carrier Corp. v.
Snyder, 5th Cir., 161 F. 2d 325; Reading Co. v.
Larkin, 3d. Cir., 114 F. 2d 416.“

Further, we submit that this testimony is admissible
on the ground that it constituted an admission by an
agent of the railroad in the scope of his employment as
to the method of operation of the train by the train-
master, B. T. Moore, and the conductor and for the
further reason that it formed a part of the res gestae.

In the case of Reading Company v. Larkin, 114 F.
2d 416 (8rd Cir. 1940) an analogous situation to the
case at bar was discussed. In this case, the injured
employee testified as to instructions given him by the
conductor on the morning of the accident. The appellant
in that case contended that the Court erred in admitting
this testimony on two grounds: (1) hearsay, and (2)
because the statement made by the Conductor was not
within the scope of his authority and therefore not bind-
ing on the railroad. The Court said on page 419:

“When illustrative of a particular litigated
act, testimony with respect to circumstances which
are the undersigned incidents of the litigated act,
is admissible, although hearsay, as part of the
res gestae. Coll v. Easton Transit Co., 180 Pa.

618, 626, 37 A. 89, 90. The qualifications which
render the incidents of a litigated act admissible

1 The petitioner in its brief at page 4 cites several cases, e.g. Hill
v. A. J. Canfield Co., 157 F. (2d) 849 (C.C.A. 7th). That case, as well
as the other cases concern the question as to whether testimony is ad-
missible solely because the declarant is dead. .

18

are ‘that they are part of the immediate prepara-
tions for or emanations of such act, and are not
promoted by the calculated policy of the actors.’
Coll v. Easton Transit Co., supra. Here the par-
ticular litigated act was the plaintiff’s participa-
tion in the movement forward of commerce in
transit between states. The conductor’s state-
ment with respect to the placing of the empty coal
car in immediate preparation of the movement of
the cargo was, therefore, admissible as a part of
the res gestae.”

In the case of Norwich & New York Transportation
Co. v. John Flint, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 3, 20 L. Ed. 556, 557
(1872) the plaintiff was injured aboard a boat, which
carried a detachment of U. S. Soldiers. Testimony was
allowed by the lower court to the effect that they heard
a sergeant reporting to an officer that the men aboard
the boat were getting out of hand and that the officer
replied that the sergeant mind his orders. Shortly there-
after, the plaintiff was injured by a shot fired by one
of the soldiers. The testimony was offered for the pur-
pose of proving the condition of affairs aboard the boat.
The Court said:

“Tt is hardly necessary for us to enter into
a lengthy discussion on the admissibility of the
testimony in question. The opinion of the circuit
court which has been laid before us, is sufficiently
full on the subject, and need not be repeated. We
have no hesitation in regarding the incident testi-
fied to as part of the res gestae, and as entirely
competent for the purposes for which it was of-
fered. The statements of the sergeant were not
offered in evidence for the purpose of proving
the facts stated by him, but the whole incident
(including those statements) was adduced in evi-
dence for the purpose of showing the manner in
which the officers attended to their duty whilst
the disturbance was going on; the fact that notice

19

of its progress was communicated; the time that
it continued, and the degree of alarm it was cal-
culated to excite in such a person as the sergeant
appeared to be. These were substantially the
purposes for which the evidence was professedly
offered, and for these purposes, as part of the
res gestae, it was clearly competent.”

If this Honorable Court should find that there was
any possible reason for exclusion, then any conceivable
feature of hearsay was cured by the cross-examination
by the petitioner on the same subject of the respondent
himself and by the examination by the petitioner of its
witnesses. (Tr. pp. 626, 627). Bevard v. Bevard, 103 F.
Sup. 533 (D.C. D.C. 1952); United States v. Gruber, 123
F. (2d) 307 (2nd Cir. 1941); and Trouser Corporation
of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153 F. (2d) 284
(8rd Cir. 1945).

2.

Petitioner complains in its brief that the District
Court acted improperly in excluding the respondent’s
prior work record and attaches as an exhibit the entire
work record of the respondent while in the petitioner’s
employ. Among other defenses raised by the petitioner
in this case, is the contention by the petitioner that the
respondent, Mack Henry Johnson, suffered from neurosis
before the accident which is involved in this litigation
and that the traumatic neurosis which is complained of
here is merely an aggravation of a previously existing
neurosis. The petitioner contends in its brief that the
work record is material and relevant to the issue of
whether or not the respondent had a pre-existing neurotic
condition. That portion of the work record which the
petitioner desired to introduce concerned various repri-
mands and demerits given the respondent, the first of

ee q

20

which was given in 1924 and the last of which was given
in 1949. (Tr. p. 477) Respondent contends that none of
these incidents has any connection with the present acci-
dent and is irrelevant and immaterial on all issues in-
volved in this matter.

There can be no contention by the petitioner that the
previous acts of the respondent are indicative of any
past negligence on the part of the respondent which
would have a bearing on the issues in this case.

In the case of Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wallace 463, 18
L. Ed. 423, 426 (1867), there was an attempt to show
that the maker of a note had a habit of gambling when
drunk. The purpose of this testimony was to create the
basis for the defense that the money was loaned for the
purpose of a gambling debt and therefore illegal. The
Court excluded this testimony and gave the following
reason :

“All evidence must have relevancy to the ques-
tion in issue, and tend to prove it. If not a link
in the chain of proof, it is not properly receivable.
Could the habit of Thomas F. Bowie to gamble,
when drunk, legally tend to prove that he did
gamble on the day the notes were executed? The
general character and habits of Bowie were not
fit subjects of injury in this suit for any pur-
pose. The rules of law do not require the plain-
tiff to be prepared with proofs to meet such
evidence. That Bowie gambled at other times,
when in liquor, was surely no legal proof that be-
cause he was in liquor on the first day of January,
1857, he gambled with Steer.”

In the case of Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
M’Clish, 115 F. 268, 275 (CCA 6th 1902), the Court was
asked to decide whether it could properly receive evidence
as to the deceased’s habit of jumping on trains near the

21

place where the body was found. The Court held, in
excluding this evidence, as follows:

“The learned counsel for plaintiff in error
admit the general rule to be that testimony of-
fered for the purpose of establishing contributory
negligence of the deceased, like other testimony,
must be limited to proving facts existing at the
time of the happening of the injury complained
of. It is contended, however, that when there is
no eyewitness to the occurrence, and the manner
of its happening is to be left to circumstantial
evidence alone, it is competent to show the habit
of the deceased in the respect of doing the thing
which it is claimed he did at the time of receiving
his injury. The argument is, proof of habit to
do the thing in question renders it more likely
that it was done at the time in controversy. There
are not lacking authorities to support this view,
but we think the better rule is that such testi-
mony tends to raise collateral issues, the beget
uncertainty and false inferences from events
which have no bearing upon the real issues. A
man may be careful upon one occasion and care-
less upon another. It is not fair deduction to
say that because the deceased sometimes boarded
trains in motion that, therefore, he was attempt-
ing to board a train when killed. Such testimony,
tending to show contributory negligence, could be
met with other testimony tending to show that
such was not his habit, and the attention of the
jury would be diverted from what happened on
the occasion of the injury to the consideration of
the character and habits of the deceased at other
times. We think the testimony should be con-
fined to the conduct of the deceased in the par-
ticular instances under investigation in the light
of the facts competent to be directly or circum-
stantially proved.”

If counsel for petitioner were permitted to introduce
into evidence the irrelevant and immaterial evidence as

22

to the entire work record, the trial of this matter, which
took five days, would have extended over several more
days, since it then would have been necessary to have
a trial on each one of the particular charges made in
the work record.

There have been numerous cases in which parties
have tried to introduce records which were made by one
of the parties to the accident as evidence of the facts
surrounding the accident or event in dispute. In these
cases the courts have properly held that such testimony
is not admissible in evidence since it is hearsay on top
of hearsay. In the case of Universal Airline v. Eastern
Air Lines, 188 F. (2d) 993 (1951), the court was con-
sidering whether or not a report of the Civil Aeronautics
Board as to the details surrounding an accident was
properly admissible in court as evidence. The court held:

“The reports of ex parte hearings and investi-
gations are generally excluded, not because of
danger of ‘usurpation of the jury’s function’ but
because the evidence is improper and irrelevant,
even if the hearing is before a judge sitting with-
out a jury. Such reports, or testimony concerning
such reports, would be hearsay based on hearsay.
The rights of parties are to be determined by
testimony adduced at the trial according to the
rules of examination and cross-examination.”

See also Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. (2d) 395
(CCA, 5th 1949) and Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.
(2d) 7 (5th CCA, 1949).

We submit that the work record which petitioner
sought to introduce in this case is in no different position
than the records described in the cited cases, with the
exception that the work record concerns numerous events.

23

If the record of one event, is not admissible, then, we
submit, a fortiori, the introduction into evidence of the
work record would merely be a cumulation of errors.
Further, in line with this thought, the record of the in-
vestigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission and
its findings and conclusions in reference to the instant
collision could not be referred to or introduced into evi-
dence by the respondent. The fact that Mack Henry
Johnson had been employed by the L & A Railroad con-
stantly since December 15, 1919, should be sufficient in
itself to show that the petitioner considered the respond-
ent an able and conscientious employee. In fact, it is
impossible to conceive of the petitioner keeping an em-
ployee in service, when the public interest is involved,
if it did not have that view.

The petitioner objects to several doctors reciting the
history of the illness as given to them by the respondent.
This recitation included certain facts about the accident.

First it should be pointed out that the petitioner
did not object to the evidence on the ground of hearsay,
„ * * but the sole complaint, was to the repetition of
appellee’s statements, a matter resting, we think, within
the sound discretion of the district judge.” As further
stated by the Fifth Circuit Court, the appellant
did not object to such history as given by the first
doctor who testified, but did object to its continued
repetition * * * .” (214 F. (2d) 290, 293).

eet art eee rent errors

24

It must be noted that the respondent was suffering
from traumatic neurosis (Tr. pp. 255-259, 505-517) and
impotency, (Tr. pp. 255-259, 505-517, 211-217) among
other ailments. In such a case it is indispensible that the
subjective symptoms of which the party complains should
be known by the physician in order for him to give an
opinion. The portion of the history which related to
the train wreck itself had to be known by the doctors
in order for them to understand the basis for the re-
spondent’s traumatic neurosis (Tr. pp. 205, 276, 511). If
such information could not be given to the physician and
later set forth by the physician in court it would be im-
possible for any individual suffering from a traumatic
neurosis to prove his case.

In the case of Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F. (2d)
519 D.C. C.A. 1947), the plaintiff asked for an annul-
ment of her marriage on the grounds of impotency on
the part of the husband. The husband was examined
by a psychiatrist who found that he was suffering from
psycho-neurosis. The question before the court was
whether or not the doctor should be allowed to give his
‘opinion as to the matrimonial capacity of the husband
at the time of his examination since the answer to be
given would be based on statements made by the husband
himself. The court said on page 520:

“The courts have long recognized the fact that
impotence is frequently the result of phychogenic
causes. Indeed one medical autherity states that
most cases of impotence seen by urologists are of
the psychic type rather than the result of physical
defects. The same authority says that in some
such cases individuals who have imagined and
convinced themselves that they are impotent may
by the force of such mental conviction be unable

VVV

25

to perform the sexual act although in reality
nothing but their state of mind prevents them

him by the patient. Accordingly it was 1
for Dr. Klein to base his diagnosis as to de-
fendant’s im upon the history and symp-
toms which latter related to him and the trial
justice should have permitted him to answer the

question propounded to him.”

In th. case of Peters v. Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany of N: # York, 107 F. (2d) 9 (8rd Cir. 1939), a
doctor was allowed to give his opinion as to the cause

The court, in holding that this opinion was not properly
admissible, stated on page 12:

“In the case at bar, the plaintiff-appellant’s
expert balked at basing his opinion on certain
specific and enunmerated symptoms. He then vol-
unteered to and did base it on the medical history
of the case. He was not even asked to give that
history and his entire opinion becomes therefore
clearly inadmissible.”

“Unfortunately for the plaintiff-appellant this
logic does not extend to cover the circumstance of
the principal case. We are not dealing with per-
sonal knowledge of the patient’s symptoms, exami-
nation) alone, but with personal knowledge of
the patient’s statement of those symptoms (his-
tory) as well. Under the adversary system the
failure of a cross-examiner to expose the basis of
a physician’s opinion may imply an acknowledg-
ment that the underlying data or premises are

26

present and warrant it. This assumes, of course,
that there is no other reason for such failure to
cross-examine. It is just here, we think, that the
distinction between medical examination and medi-
cal history exists. As we have seen, the admissi-
bility of the latter depends on a not altogether
clearly defined exception to the hearsay rule. 3
Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed., Section 1720. The
cross-examiner’s failure to pry into the expert’s
premises may therefore indicate merely his un-
certainty, an uncertainty whose cure by way of
charge to the jury would result in confusion and
complexity and would defeat Dean Wigmore’s con-
ception of practicality. We might add that the
history of a disease dependent largely on mental
processes is about as far removed from a physi-
cian’s direct physical examination as could be
conceived.”

It is important to note that the doctors, in stating
their opinions as to the type of illness suffered by the
respondent in this case, did not rely solely on the sub-
jective symptoms elicited to them by the respondent. For
example, Doctor John W. Bick, Jr., the psychiatrist who
was chosen by the petitioner to examine the respondent
(Tr. p. 40-A), then repudiated by the petitioner (Tr. pp.
18-B, C, D), but put on the stand by the respondent so
that the jury could get the complete picture (Tr. p. 202),
stated (Tr. p. 208):

“Physically, the patient appears to be a well
developed, well nourished, negro male of sixty-
five. I thought for the most part his conversa-
tion was slow and I had some difficulty in elicit-
ing responses: He walks with a slight limp as
though sparing the right leg. He seems somewhat
depressed, rather disinterested in his surround-
ings, complains mostly of feelings of despondency,
sleep difficulty, headaches, and nightmares.” (Tr.
pp. 203 and 204)

27

The respondent was present in court, testified on
direct and cross-examination. The testimony as to the
history of his illness was substantially the same as he
gave to each of the doctors who examined him. It might
be pointed out that the respondent was subjected to an
examination by five doctors chosen by the petitioner (Tr.
pp. 202, 631, 647, 678, 761) excluding Dr. Leidenheimer
who was under the petitioner’s control and who treated
the respondent for a long period of time and whose diag-
nosis in all written reports confirmed the respondent’s
position. (Tr. pp. 136-142) During the trial the peti-
tioner had the right to cross-examine the respondent as
to any of the facts which he had given to the doctors. -
Under said circumstances, it is inconceivable that the
petitioner can complain as to the history received by the

various doctors, which history was indispensible for them
to know in order for their opinions to be given. The
petitioner must have recognized that in a case of this
sort, the testimony of the doctors as to the case history
is properly admissible and must necessarily be given
since he made no objection to such history given by Dr.
Manuel Gardberg, the first doctor who testified, (Tr. p.
179) and in examining doctors employed by the peti-
tioner and on cross-examination of doctors employed by
respondent he asked them to give the history (Tr. pp.
190, 191, 218, 219, 260, 266, 274, 518, 525, 636, 638,
648, 649, 650, 685, 761, 762, 763) as given by the re-
spondent insofar as they needed to give the history to
form an opinion in this matter. Such testimony is prop-
erly admissible and should be given its proper weight
since counsel for the petitioner asked for the same testi-
mony of the same or previous witnesses. Bevard v.
Bevard, 103 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. D.C. 1952); United
States v. Gruber, 123 F. (2d) 307 (2nd Cir. 1941);

— —

28

Trouser Corporation of America d. Goodman & Theise,
Inc., 153 F. (2d) 284 (8rd Cir. 1946).

It should be pointed out that the respondent was
examined approximately eleven times by Dr. Edward H.
Knight and Dr. Max E. Johnson. Dr. Max E. Johnson,
in his direet testimony, stated that if there was any
chance of feigning illness on the part of the respondent,’
such action would have been discovered during the course
of the eleven interviews. (Tr. p. 515). In addition, the
appellee was sent to Dr. Johnson and Dr. Knight for the
purpose of treatment. (Tr. p. 266) It is a well settled
rule that the history given to a doctor for the purpose of
treatment is properly admissible in court and is an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. See: U. S. v. Calvey, 110
F. 2d 327 (8rd Cir. 1940); Bartkoski v. Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R. Co., 172 F. 2d 1007 (8rd Cir. 1949).

In conclusion the respondent submits that the his-
tory as given by the respondent to the doctors was prop-
erly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. If
it is not an exception to the hearsay rule, respondent
contends that it was still properly admissible on the
grounds that the petitioner did not object to such testi-
mony on the ground that (1) that it constituted hearsay,
and (2) that the appellant asked for the same history
from his own doctors and asked questions in direct and
cross-examination of witnesses in which they would
necessarily have to give portions of the history, thus
waiving any objection which he might have.

CONCLUSION

The judgment below is correct, and there is no con-
flict of decisions. We therefore respectfully submit that

29
the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT WEINSTEIN,
Attorney for Mack Henry Johnson,
Respondent.

PHILIP D. RITTENBERG,

FRED BRONFIN,

HENRY F. YODER,

ALBERT MINTZ,

RITTENBERG, WEINSTEIN & BRONFIN,
Of Counsel.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_2393%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
