# Brief for the United States — Wolin v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1954
- **Citation:** 348 U.S. 819

## Text

Yuthe Supreme Court of the Winited States

OctToBER TERM, 1954

No. 90

Martin E. Wottn, InpivipuaLtty, Martin E.
Wout, Lrp., anp CHAL STEEL CoRPORATION,
PETITIONERS

Vv.

UniTep States OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R. 147-
151) is reported at 211 F. 2d 770.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was
entered on April 9, 1954 (R. 152), and a petition
for rehearing (R. 152-R. 156) was denied on
April 24, 1954 (R. 157). The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on May 24, 1954. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S. C. 1254 (1). See also Rules 37 (b) (2) and

45 (a), F. R. Crim. P.
(1)

SREY EPL PEP GILT ILE NELLIE A AER CIEE BEEN REEL EE SIG ER LEAL

2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, at a trial involving charges of
bribery of a government employee, the testimony
of the employee’s wife, to whom the checks were
made payable, that she paid little attention to the
details of the arrangement with her husband was
so inconsistent with her plea of guilty as to render
the use of her testimony willful misconduct by
the prosecution.

2. Whether the prosecuting attorney, in his
argument to the jury, misstated the evidence given
by a principal government witness in such manner
as to require a new trial.

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S. C. (Supp. V) 201 provides as follows:

Whoever promises, offers, or gives any
money or thing of value, or makes or ten-
ders any check, order, contract, undertak-
ing, obligation, gratuity, or security for
the payment of money or for the delivery
or conveyance of anything of value, to any
officer or employee or person acting for or
on behalf of the United States, or any
department or agency thereof, in any official
function, under or by authority of any
such department or agency or to any officer
or person acting for or on behalf of either
House of Congress, or any committee of
either House, or both Houses thereof, with
intent to influence his decision or action on
any question, matter, cause, or proceeding
which may at any time be pending, or which

3

may by law be brought before him in his
official capacity, or in his place of trust or
profit, or with intent to influence him to
commit or aid in committing, or to collude
in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportu-
nity for the commission of any fraud, on
the United States, or to induce him to do
or omit to do any act in violation of his
lawful duty, shall be fined not more than
three times the amount of such money or
value of such thing or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.

18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) 281 provides, in relevant
parts, as follows:

Whoever, being * * * or other officer or
employee of the United States or any de-
partment or agency thereof, directly or in-
directly receives or agrees to receive, any
compensation for any services rendered or
to be rendered, either by himself or an-
other, in relation to any proceeding, con-
tract, claim, controversy, charge, accusa-
tion, arrest, or other matter in which the
United States is a party or directly or in-
directly interested, before any department,
agency, court marshal, officer, or any civil,
military, or naval commission, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both; and shall be
incapable of holding any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the United States.

18 U. 8. C. (Supp. V) 371 provides, in relevant
part, as follows:

_—

6

Petitioner talked generally about applications for
licenses and suggested to Bennett tliat it would
be legal for him to sell steel while continuing
his government position. He said that the matter
could be handled by putting Mrs. Bennett on the
payroll and making payments to her. (R. 25-28.)

Shortly thereafter, Bennett told a Mr. Pardeo,
who wished to purchase tin plate, of the type of
material that petitioner had and said that ‘‘if
he could use some of that material I felt that
we could give him a license. Since he was buy-
ing for all Venezuelan trades, that is.”” (R. 29.)
Thereafter, when petitioner called about some
of his applications, he told Bennett that Pardeo
had been to see him and that he was sending
an application through (R. 29). Petitioner again
took Bennett and his wife to dinner and gave
Bennett $500.00 in cash (R. 30). Arrangements
were made to send the license applications to
Bennett’s home in order to make it appear that
Mrs. Bennett was doing the work. (R. 32-33.)
Bennett testified that petitioner ‘‘knew that if
Mr. Pardeo purchased material from him that I
would grant a license”’ (R. 31).

In September 1951, petitioner arranged for the
purchase of a car in Henry Bennett’s name,
partly with Bennett’s money and partly with
money advanced by petitioner, which was said
to be a commission on sales to Pardeo (R. 33-
40). Petitioner drew a check in the sum of
$1,972 to the order of Mrs. Bennett to have a

eC.

7

record of payments, including the money paid
to Bennett in cash (R. 38, 73). Petitioner ex-
plained the amount by stating that he credited
an order that was to be processed after he left
for Europe and said that a subsequent check for
$226 to Mrs. Bennett was a mistake (Tr. 1218-
1220, see R. 105-107).

When petitioner left for Europe in October
1951, he told the Bennetts that Mrs. Halperin
would handle licenses and commissions (R. 44).
Subsequently Bennett promised Mrs. Halperin
that 15 applications for licenses for sales in
Italy and Portugal to be filed by the Chal Steel
Corporation, one of the corporate defendants in
this case, would be in order (R. 46, 50). Ben-
nett approved them all but seven were not
recorded by him in accordance with the normal
routine of the Office of International Trade
(R. 51).

During the third and fourth quarters of 1951,
when substantially all of the petitioner’s license
applications were approved, other exporters’ ap-
plications for sending secondary tin plate to
Italy were being returned without approval
at the rate of 8 returned for every one approved
(Tr. 807-808 ; see also Tr. 1112). Indeed, Bennett
himself told one complaining exporter in Novem-
ber 1951, that tin plate licenses were not being
issued (Tr. 1102).

The testimony of Mrs. Bennett (R. 85-102),
on the basis of which petitioner frames one of his

present contentions, was to the effect that she
804984—54-—-2

8

accompanied her husband on the occasions on
which he and petitioner worked out their plans
for the payment of commissions (R. 89), the
sending of applications to the Bennett home (R.
88), and the placing of Mrs. Bennett on peti-
tioner’s payroll (R. 87, 89, 91). She testified
that she was aware of these arrangements al-
though she did not pay too much attention to the
conversations (R. 87, 88), and that she was
present during most of the negotiations for the
purchase by the Bennetts, through petitioner, of
an automobile (R. 92-93). She testified also that
she was not responsible in any way for referring
Pardeo to petitioner (R. 97-98), and that the
so-called commission checks issued in her name,
some of which she had deposited in the bank, were
for her husband (R. 96-97).

After the presentation of evidence on both sides
was complete, the prosecuting attorney stated, in
the early part of his summation to the jury:

My job is to put before you as best I
can all the admissible evidence that can
give you an adequate picture of what hap-
pened and that is what I will try to do.
* * * Now during the argument it is my
job to try to point out to you conclusions,
inferences that you can draw from these
facts, and that is what I intend to do. I
have to rely on my memory in recalling
the evidence. I don’t have a transcript of
the record. Unfortunately I understand
that Judge Arnold and Mr. Boothe [defense

|
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SpA TOP eens =

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counsel] have certain parts of it. If in
recalling evidence to you, ladies and gentle-
men, and believe me, I mean this, I don’t
agree with your recollection of what hap-
pened, take your own. I am not trying
to mislead you. My memory may be bad.
I am trying to remember the evidence as
I reeall it. So if I say something and you
don’t remember it that way, take your own
on it, but believe me, I am not doing it
intentionally. [Tr. 1361.]

In addition, the prosecuting attorney referred
to the fact that Mrs. Bennett had pleaded guilty,
and to the fact that she was unsentenced, and sug-
gested that the fact that she would later have to
appear before the same judge for sentencing was
an incentive for her to testify truthfully (Tr.
1407).

Defense counsel then made their summation
to the jury, which was not reported (R. 103),
following which the Government made rebuttal
argument. This argument contained the state-
ment which is made one of the bases for review
by this Court. It is italicized in context:

Some of the remarks made by Mr. Arnold
and Mr. Boothe, I think principally by Mr.
Arnold, went to the effect that there is

. nothing wrong about entertainment. The
mink coat era is fine. It is all right to take
Government employees out and show them
a good time. If it is done for one purpose.

— tet SAT RENE
Y PETS PAE SPENT

10

Sure. If it is done for another purpose,
no. You folks read the newspapers. You
have seen stories in the newspapers. Let
me put it to you this way: For every Gov-
ernment employee who has done wrong by
taking money, gifts and stuff like that for
doing something in the government, he
doesn’t do it on his own money, doesn’t
come out of the thin air and say, hello, Mr.
Bennett, here I am. You have to have a
Wolin in the background and in the fore-
ground. You can’t have a dishonest Gov-
ernment employee unless you’ve got some-
one giving him the money. It is impossible.
And the only way that the Government
service can be straightened around is not
only to get the Government employees who
do something wrong but to get the people
that give it to them because it takes two to
make that kind of a party. Believe me.
Money doesn’t grow on trees. It is given
for a purpose. So that you have this in-
stance here in front of you. You have
had Mr. Bennett on the stand who has told
you ladies and gentlemen in so many words
in plain and simple English, ‘I took money.
I took money in checks.’”?” Why? Because
I am a licensing officer. Bennett has told
you in plain and simple English, “‘I am
guilty.” Why would he tell you that?
Because he is.
Now who created the situation. Who
gave the wherewithal, who gave the money,
who gave the push? The, man who is on
trial here today. You don’t clean up the

11

Government, you don’t get the Government
employees by going after them alone. You
have to get the source of it, too. So when
the argument is made to you ladies and
gentlemen that entertainment is fine, that
the mink coats and everything is all right,
I say to you again, and your responsible
citizens, come from your walks of life,
spend here a couple of weeks—you spent
all of last week in this case—to clean up a
situation like that, there are two ways. If
you go about both of them you clean it up.
One, you get the Government employee who
isn’t living up to his trust and, No. 2, you
get the party on the outside of the Govern-
ment who doesn’t think enough of the
United States Government to stay away
from its employees with money and checks.
[R. 103-104; italics added. ]

At the close of this rebuttal, defense counsel
objected to the italicized portion of the state-
ment, urging that the ‘‘statement is so serious
and is such a complete departure from the record
that * * * we ought to be allowed at this point
to make a statement to the jury that it is not so
because the jury will not have the record with
them [and] * * * will have to rely on memory
and counsel’s complete misstatement * * *’’ (R.
119-120).

The trial judge said that he thought that the
proper way to handle the matter was to instruct
the jury that it was their recollection rather than
counsel’s statement which counted, and at the

12

very opening of his charge, he did so (R. 120),
stating, inter alia:
You rely upon your own recollection and
if the Court says anything * * * in re-
spect to the evidence that is contrary to
your recollection, you will follow your own
recollection and judgment and the same is
true with reference to what counsel may
have said to you in their recollections of
what this witness or that witness said is
not conclusive upon you at all. * * *’
After the jury had retired and had been out
approximately five hours, they returned to request
a transcript of the evidence. They indicated that
they wanted all the available testimony, but were
particularly interested in the testimony of the
petitioner (R. 134-135). Although all of the
testimony had not been transcribed, what they
were given included the testimony of petitioner
and that of Bennett (R. 135). Later, after the
jury had indicated its inability to reach a verdict,
and after the court had given the so-called “Allen
charge,”’ a verdict of guilty was reached (R. 148).
The petitioner, Martin E. Wolin, individually,
was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and
the two corporate defendants, to pay $1,000 fines
? Also, later in the charge, after reviewing the facts that
had been presented, and the issues which were open to the
jury, the court said again:
“* * * Tt does not mean to tell you that in its opinion any
of these facts exist except those that I have enumerated as

being uncontradicted. * * * It is for you to determine
whether or not those facts do exist in this case.” [R. 130.]

13

(R. 143-144). The judgment was unanimously
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (R. 152).

- ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner argues that Mrs. Bennett’s tes-
timony was so clearly inconsistent with her plea
of guilty that the prosecutor’s use of such testi-
mony represents knowing misconduct. The con-
tention is patently frivolous.

Mrs. Bennett’s testimony was not inconsistent
with her plea of guilty. The fact that, as her
testimony suggests, she did not pay detailed at-
tention to the arrangements between petitioner
and her husband (see Pet. p. 12) does not mean
that she claimed to be aware of so little of the
transaction as not to be criminally liable for her
participation therein. She admitted that she
knew that she was participating in an arrange-
ment whereby she would be put on petitioner’s
payroll (R. 87), that petitioner was to send li-
cense applications to her for remailing to the
Department of Commerce (R. 88, 89), and that
she was to be paid at the rate of $5 per ton
(R. 89). She testified further that her husband
had told petitioner he did not think the arrange-
ment would be legal, although petitioner assured
him that it would be (R. 89; see also R. 91).
She testified that petitioner’s applications were
received by mail at her home, and that she either
mailed them to the Office of International Trade
herself or her husband took them personally

14

(R. 90; see also R. 95). She testified that
she received checks from petitioner, purportedly
for commissions, even though she had done noth-
ing to earn them (R. 96-97), and she testified
that petitioner had given her a diamond and ruby
pin (R. 98). Her testimony was thus not a dec-
laration of innocence.

Moreover, Mrs. Bennett’s allegedly ambiguous
status was apparent to the jury. She explicitly
testified that she had pleaded guilty and was
unsentenced (R. 102) and the Government re-
ferred to these facts in its summation (Tr. 1407).
The jury, therefore, was able fully to appraise
her worth as a witness in accordance with the
full instructions to the jury by the court on that
point (see R. 132).

2. Petitioner also argues that this Court should
grant his petition in order to censure the prose-
cutor for having made what petitioner says are
misstatements of crucial evidence during his re-
buttal summation to the jury (Pet. 14-17).

The first objection to review of this point by
this Court is procedural. No report was made
of the summation for the defense, to which the
language complained of is, at least apparently,
a response. A reviewing court cannot, there-
fore, appraise, out of the context necessary to
understand it, a remark of a government attor-
ney made in course of such rebuttal. See e. g.,
Landay v. United States, 108 F. 2d 698, 706

Sead, MA AILS OLR ITAL PE FIER TEM PLETELY BIE Wve AYR PNY eb Sat rs REY hI rts ee Aa ORE te Her pe ne NRRL RS a8 wah
a

15

(C. A. 6), certiorari denied, 309 U. S. 681; Vause
y. United States, 53 F. 2d 346, 354 (C. A. 2), certi-
orari denied, 284 U. 8S. 661.

In any event, there was no misstatement, but
at most a restatement or interpretation of the
witness’s testimony. Bennett’s testimony was
clear to the effect that petitioner constantly
talked with him about approval of license appli-
cations; that petitioner expected Bennett to ap-
prove licenses for shipments to Pardeo (R. 31).
Bennett recognized that his conduct, objectively
viewed, showed favoritism toward petitioner (R.
84). Bennett unqualifiedly stated that he, rather
than Mrs. Bennett as petitioner had testified, took
the money. In the light of all the evidence it
was not unfair to say that Bennett testified that
he took it because he was a licensing officer and,
in effect, that he was guilty.

The statement was not part of a complete
review of the evidence, as petitioner suggests, but
was principally a way of making clear that no
government employee can be involved in a bribe
without there being someone out of government
who is also blameworthy. For the purpose of
setting in context petitioner’s guilt as instigator,
Bennett’s plea to the offense was stated, in per-
haps overly simplified terms, but certainly not in
essential falsehood. In short, examination of the
second and third paragraphs of the rebutia! argu-
ment (R. 103-104), rather than merely the short
excerpt to which petitioner refers, discloses that

ars a a wal A aa £

| pisses

16

petitioner’s request for review on this phase of
the ease is based on a misleading abbreviation
of the record.

Moreover, the trial judge, in response to peti-
tioner’s objections, emphasized to the jury at the
very outset of its charge, that the jury’s own
recollection of the facts was governing (R. 120),
and later explicitly reiterated the charge (R.
130). The importance of Bennett’s part in the
transaction has been stressed from the very begin-
ning of the case by petitioner’s own counsel who
said in his opening statement (Tr. 588) :

We have here a sixty page indictment
in thirteen counts, presented against this
man, and yet from that mass of papers,
there is only one question involved and
that is, Did Wolin pay any compensation
to Twila Bennett to get him business or
did he pay compensation to Bennett to
have him issue licenses? [See also Tr.
593-594. ]

In the face of the centrality of this issue from
the beginning to the end of the case, the jury
must have paid particular attention to the testi-
mony bearing upon it so that they could not
have been misled by the one statement upon which
petitioner relies. This is all the more true in
view of the fact that during the jury’s delibera-
tions, the record was requested (R. 134). Al-
though it was requested for the purpose, particu-
larly, of looking at petitioner’s testimony and

— -

—

17

although all of the record was not furnished, the
Bennett testimony was (R. 135-136), so that, as
to this issue, the jury did not have to rely in
any way on the proseeutor’s recollection.’

*In his petition for certiorari, petitioner makes much of
what he called an additional misrepresentation made by the
prosecution in the Court of Appeals. He refers to the gov-
ernment’s brief in the Court of Appeals and the opinion of
the Court, apparently in reliance on it, that the Government
rebuttal in the trial court was “apparently an attempt to
give the jury the Government’s idea of the total effect of
Bennett’s testimony and the inferences to be drawn there-
from, and thus to answer the argument of counsel for de-
fendants that there was no proof of a guilty principal whom
defendants could have aided and abetted.” [Emphasis
added, see Pet. 15.] Petitioner says no such argument was
made, and attempts to demonstrate that no such argument
could have been made.

We have suggested above that this Court’s certiorari juris-
diction is not a device to resolve arguments about what hap-
pened in the trial court, particularly where defense counsel
apparently elected to keep the real events unrecorded. We
also suggest that, contrary to petitioner’s argument here that
he could not have made an aider and abetter argument in the
trial court because in all the substantive counts petitioner
was indicted as a principal (Pet. 9), there were in fact aider
and abetter charges in the case against petitioner (see counts
1 to 4, Tr. 1-9). Although sustaining the conviction does
not depend on those counts, it is clear that the trial judge
talked about those counts in his charge to the jury (R. 123-
125), and it seems at least plausible that petitioner’s counsel
might have talked about them.

The record reveals, moreover, a further curious fact on this
aspect of the case. The very “misrepresentation” which peti-
tioner says the Court of Appeals accepted was also made in
the District Court. After verdict and judgment, the peti-
tioner made a motion for a new trial in which he relied, in
part, on the alleged misstatements as to Bennett’s testimony
(Tr. 485-500). The Government explained the statement
almost word for word as it did in the Court of Appeals, in a

18

CONCLUSION

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the |
petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.

Simon E. SosBeELorr,
Solicitor General.

WakRkEN Otney ITI,
Assistant Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,
JoHN R. WILKINS,
Attorneys.
JULY 1954.

memorandum filed and argued before the very judge who —
had just tried the case (Tr. 506-543, especially 513-515). —
Petitioner thereafter, and before the motion was ruled on,
filed a supplementary memorandum on other points which
were involved in this motion, but did not challenge the truth —
or the logic of the prosecution representation (Tr. 544-550). —

Later, in the Court of Appeals, the matter was challenged
only by a petition for rehearing in which petitioner conceded
that he had been remiss in not calling the court’s attention
before argument to the alleged misrepresentation in the Gov-
ernment’s brief (R. 155).

U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING JFFICE: 1984

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_2205%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
