# Opposition Brief — National Labor Relations Board v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_0893%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1951 - **Citation:** 342 U.S. 885 ## Text Supreme Court of the United States Ocroser Term, 1951. No. 249 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, vs. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. KeEnnetx F’, Burgess, Gorpon W. Winks, Attorneys for Respondent. Swiey, Austin, Burcess & Smirn, Of Counsel. PAGE i, Pe eee rere eee rer re rere beey Pua wry 1 ORT PEE Pe PEL ET VERS) eS 1 NE ie No kab kciead'gs dh whbh nei encnsons 2 Reasons why the writ should be denied .............. 3 The first question presented .................205 + The second question presented .................. 4 The third question presented .................. 9 The fourth question (not presented).....:...... 15 | NSPE TPP OE ore rs ere heed Feet ey ie 16 CITATIONS. Cases. J. I. Case Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 332 (1944). .11, 14, 15 Fort Wayne Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 111 F. 2d 869 1 Es to EE ns 4s bE cd eae 8 Hamilton v. N. L. R. B., 160 F. 2d 465 (C. C. A. 6, + 5 Rr ree nr ee srry Oe NE TE Pye a Ny 11 Hazel-Atlas Co. v. N. L. R. B., 127 F. 2d 109 (C. C. A. = Re rrr tre re rere oe een 7 Interlake Iron Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 131 F. 2d 129 (C. C. FE er re ee ee etre: a International Brotherhood v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694 SUPERS. ciccauns xn dea kev ho Kened deewenncs 25 RR Nt ie JURY 6c ns uouoire ocdvedacawaia secs 29 RI Sie aa vas odo KEG Aas eee ek 31 te cg ihe OE AITO ED Pr ae tee a ene 30 MSI. Us hain ah cdi 4d bh keh ka eda eens 34 EXxuisits. Respondent’s Exhibits: me & Gimer OF tramdfor)...... * * * 732 Trial Examiner Bennett: What did you say your present title is? The Witness: Division Traffic Superintendent. ~~ e * * * (By Mr. Winks.) Now, among other districts, was the district in which the Englewood office is a part un- der your supervision? DARK PAC Testimony of Henry E. Wageck. 35 A. Yes, sir, that is the Wentworth-Oakland District. Q. And who was the District Superintendent of that district in April and May of 1947? A. Mr. N. R. Harrison, Jr. Q. Did he report to you? A. Yes, sir. 733 Q. Did you say anything to him about filling those 734 jobs, replacing those absentees? A. No, I did not. Q. Why didn’t you mention that? A. That is part of Mr. Harrison’s responsibility, to fill the positions when they are absent, from the replacement force. He takes care of that. * * * * * 739. Q. Did you ever at any time give any instructions to Mr. Harrison with respect to the replacement of Mrs. Gaittens or Miss Jensen? A. No, I did not. That is his responsibility to re- place them. Q. Now, did you ever at any time receive any instruc- tions from Mr. Aller with respect to the replacement of Mrs. Gaittens or Miss Jensen? A. No, I did not. Q. Do you know whether or not those two individuals had been replaced on April 11, 1947? A. Mr. Harrison informed me they had been, yes. Q. Was that replacement permanent or temporary? A. It was the same as any other replacement, as per- manent as any other replacement we make. * J e s * 740 Cross-Examination. * a * & 743 The Witness: Well, I don’t know what Mr. Aller had in mind but those replacements as far as I was concerned were permanent the first day they were made. Trial Examiner Bennett: Which replacement? AGE BLEEDTHRU 36 Witnesses for Respondent. The Witness: The replacement of these supervisors. Trial Examiner Bennett: And when did you make them? The Witness: The first day of absence, in the replace- ment force. Q. (By Mr. Licari.) What kind of replacements were they? A. Supervisory replacements. Q. What is that? A. Supervisory replacement. Q. With whom did you replace them? A. That I do not know the names. We replaced them from the supervisory force, replacement supervisory force. Q. Did you confer with Mr. Aller with respect to the replacements? A. Mr. Aller? . Yes. 744 A. I did not. * . ® GEORGE W. FITZGERALD, a witness called by and on behalf of the Respondent, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: Direct Examination. Q. (By Mr. Winks.) Will you state your name and business address? A. George W. FitzGerald, 5643 North Broadway. Q. Is that in Chicago? A. Chicago, Illinois. . . By whom are you employed, Mr. FitzGerald? A. Illinois Bell Telephone Company. 7 s 7 Q. What has been your experience with the company? A. I have had various assignments in the traffic de- partment. The last six years I have been division 745 traffic superintendent, North Division. * o * ” x Q. In April and May of 1947 were the Austin-Kedzie = Edgewater-Rogers Park districts under your super- vision? DARK PA Testimony of George W. Fitzgerald. ; 37 A. They were. Q. And who was in charge of those districts under your supervision? A. Mr. R. C. Leetz was in charge of the Austin-Kedzie district, and Mr. R. E. Wade was in charge of the Edge- water-Rogers Park district. o * 746 Q. Did you say anything to Mr. Leetz about fill- ing those jobs? A. No, I did not. I assumed he would fill them becanse that is the normal function of his job, to run the distriet. Q. Did Mr. Aller, when you talked with him, say any- thing to you about filling the jobs? A. No, he did not. * * e . + 750 Q. Did you ever at any time give any instructions to Mr. Wade or Mr. Leetz with respect to the re- placement of any of the four individuals to whom Ilet- ters were sent? A. No, I did not. Q. Did Mr. Aller at any time ever give you any in- structions with respect to the replacement of those four individuals? A. No, he did not. 751 Q. Now, had those four individuals been replaced on April 11, 19479 A. To the best of my knowledge they had been, yes. Q. How do you know that? A. I was told by the district men that they had re- placed them. Q. Were those replacements permanent or temporary? A. They were just regular replacements. They were permanent as far as I am concerned. 753 Cross-E ramination. J — a & & Q. (By Mr. Lieari.) 1 dirert your attention to pages 507 and 508 of the transeript. W, . vou read it? - * o e eee SE SIL IT AGE BLEEDTHRU 38 Witnesses for Respondent. What do you say to that testimony, Mr. Witness? A. Well, I consider that they were permanently re- placed before Mr. Aller said so. I don’t know what he had in mind. Q. You receive your instructions from Mr. Aller, don’t you? A. No, sir, not on that. Q. You consult with him on personnel matters, don’t you? 754 A. That is not a personnel matter in my opinion. Q. You mean you don’t think a change in person- nel duties is a personnel matter? A. The selection of particular people, how many and when is not a personnel matter as related to Mr. Aller. DARK PA Respondent’s Exhibit No.1. 39 RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT NO. 1. May 2, 1947 Mrs. Dillas: I will arrange to transfer to any State Area Traffic Office any of the 9 employees recently demoted from Super- visor and P.B.X. Placement Supervisor who may request such transfer. Such transfer shall be without prejudice or loss of seniority to any such employee. In the State Area each of these employees will be given the opportunity to be promoted to the first opening as a supervisor for which she is qualified. For a girl never before in a toll office this would be at least 60 days from the date of transfer. A. F. Stephenson. RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT NO. 8. Section 3 Page 4 Induction of Telephone Operators The Union First Week By C. O. As your training and experience progress, various sub- jects related to your job and your Company will become of more interest to you. During training, M.... ~-owy the instructor, will discuss some of these matters with you. Later M -4 the assistant chief operator, will con- tinue the discussion of additional subjects from time to time. One of the first items along this line is that of the ‘*Union.”’ We can discuss that now. The Telephone Company management sincerely believes in the principle of collective bargaining. It recognizes GE BLEEDTHRU 40 Respondent’s Exhibit No. 22. that employees, if they so desire, are entitled to deal with the Company through their own freely chosen representa- tives. For many years the Company has dealt collectively with the employees through their organization. At present, the operators, supervisors and clerks of the State Area Traffic Department are represented by the Illinois Traffic Division 14, Communications Workers of America. Mi88 ........-----000-— spelt Gitataaes is the Union Representative in this office. The Union and the Company bargain together periodi- eally on wages and working conditions and set down the matters agreed upon in a contract. A copy of the present contract is available at my desk for reference or study. October 1948. RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT 22. AGREEMENT. This Agreement, made and entered into this 21st day of December, 1945, by and between the Illinois Telephone Traffic Union (N. F. T. W.), hereinafter called the ‘‘ Union,”’ and the Illinois Bell Telephone Company, hereinafter called the ‘‘Company’’: Witnesseth: Whereas, the Union does hereby certify that it has of this date not less than sixty-seven hundred (6,700) mem- bers in good standing, who are non-supervisory employees of the Traffic Department, State Area, of the Company, and the Company agrees that this number constitutes a major- ity of the non-supervisory employees, Traffic Department, State Area; and Whereas, the Company recognizes the Union as the sole collective bargaining agent for all of its non-supervisory employees in the Traffic Department, State Area; OT DARK PA * Respondent’s Exhibit No. 22. : 4 Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises herein contained, the parties agree hereto as follows: Article XXIII. Duration of Agreement. 23.01. This Agreement is for the period commencing May 9, 1945, and ending May 9, 1946, and shall continue in full force and effect after such period of time unless termi- nated by thirty-day notice in writing from either of the parties hereto to the other. In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed in duplicate by their officers thereunto duly authorized, all on the day and year first above written. Illinois Telephone Traffic Illinois Bell Telephone Union (N. F.T. W.), Company, . By Anne C. Benscoter, By A. F. Stephenson, President. General Traffic Manager. By Hazel Richards, Acting Vice President. (Amendments of January 14, 1946, January 18, 1946, March 20, 1946, and May 16, 1946 omitted in printing.) ene é 43 At a regular term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held in the City of Chicago and begun on the third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty, and of our Independence the one hundred and seventy - fifth: No. 10305 National Lasor RELATIONS BoarD, PETITIONER vs. ILLINoIs BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, RESPONDENT Petition for Enforcement of Order of the National Labor Relations Board And afterward, to-wit, on the twenty-third day oiApril, 1951, the following further proceedings were had and entered of record, to-wit: UniTep States Court oF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Cuicaco 10, ILLINo1s Monday, April 23, 1951 Before Hon. J. Eart Masor, Chief Judge; Hon. Orro KERNER, Cir- cuit Judge; Hon. H. NatHan Swain, Circuit Judge No. 10305 NaTIONAL LaBor RELATIONS BoaRD, PETITIONER vs. ILLINoIs BELL TELEPHONE CoMPANY, RESPONDENT Petition for Enforcement of Order of the National Labor Relations Board Now this day come the parties by their counsel, and this cause” comes on to be heard on the transcript of the record and the briefs of counsel and on oral argument by Mr. Robert Ackerberg, counsel for the Petitioner and by Mr. George M. Winks, counsel for the Re- spondent, and the Court takes this matter under advisement. And afterward, to-wit, on the twenty-first day of May, 1951, there was filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court the opinion of the GE BLEEDTHRU 44 Court, which said opinion is in the words and figures following, to-wit: IN THE UNITED States Court oF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, Octoser TERM, 1950, Aprit Session, 1951 No. 10305 NATIONAL LasBor RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER vs. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, RESPONDENT Petition for Enforcement of an Order of The National Labor Re- lations Board Heard April 23, 1951. Decided May 21, 1951 Before Masor, Chief Judge, Kerner and Swarm, Circuit Judges Maygor, Chief Judge: This is a petition by National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the Board) for enforcement of its order issued against re- spondent, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, on March 16, 1950, following the usual proceedings in such cases. Respondent denies the validity of the order and requests that enforcement be denied. The case has to do with the demotion by respondent of eight supervisory employees ' because of certain activities under circum- stances hereinafter set forth. The Board concluded that such em- ployees were engaged in a concerted activity protected by § 7 of the Act and that respondent’s action violated § 8 (1) of the Act, and “because such a demotion amounts to a discrimination in hire and tenure of employment and thereby discourages membership in a labor organization it also violates Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.” The issues for decision are in the main legal in their nature because there is little, if any, dispute in the evidentiary facts. To bring such issues into focus, however, it appears necessary to make a rather de- tailed statement of the facts. Respondent, an Illinois corporation with its principal office in Chicago, Illinois, is engaged in the com- 1The employees demoted were Frances Regan, Lillian Jensen, Edith Holmes, Irene Keuther, Helen Marcellaio, Rose Winder, Cath- erine Brophy and Dorothy Jungbluth. Whether they were super- visory employees within the contemplation of the Act is open to question. The Board takes the position, under the circumstances of the case, that it is immaterial, and we shall do likewise. naODY DAC 45 munications industry, rendering telephone service both within and without the State of Illinois. The unions involved in the proceeding, directly or indirectly, are Illinois Telephone Traffic Union (called I.T.T.U.) and Chicago Telephone Traffic Union (called C.T.T.U.). The membership in the former in the main consisted of those em- ployed in the State outside of the boundaries of Chicago; the latter represented those employed within the City of Chicago. The for- mer, as the duly designated bargaining agent for the employees in the State area, had a contract with respondent which expired on or about March 1, 1947. On April 7, 1947, that union commenced _ 4N economic strike against respondent to obtain changes in working conditions, as well as a wage increase. Picket lines were set up at respondent’s installations throughout the State area, and also at all exchanges within the Chicago area, on the morning of April 7. The strike lasted through May 8, 1947, and picket lines were maintained at all central office exchanges within the Chicago area until that time. The C.T.T.U. was the duly designated bargaining agent for re- spondent’s employees in the Chicago area, including those involved in this proceeding. This union also had a contract with respondent, entered into on July 25, 1946, which expired March 29, 1947. On March 25, 1947, C.T.T.U. and respondent signed an “Extension Agreement” extending the old agreement until April 28, 1947. An- other “Extension Agreement” was entered into on April 25, 1947, extending the old agreement to June 2, 1947, and a new contract was signed on May 15, 1947. As the Trial Examiner stated, “C.T.T.U. did not engage officially or unofficially in the strike commenced by I.T.T.U. on April 7, 1947 but, as appears above, it met with Re- spondent during the strike period and ultimately signed a new con- tract on May 15.” The record does not disclose the number of respondent’s employees who were members of these respective unions; however, the contract entered into between respondent and C.T.T.U. in July, 1946, recites that not less than 6,000 employees were members of that union in good standing. It appears that some of the involved employees held membership in both unions at the time of the strike. Seven were members of the striking union, three were members of C.T.T.U., and one was not a member of either; however, as stated, all eight employees were in the bargaining unit represented by C.T.T.U. As noted, I.T.T.U. commenced an economic strike against re- spondent on April 7, 1947, and established picket lines not only at respondent’s installations throughout the State area but also at respondent’s installations throughout the Chicago area represented by C.T.T.U., and also as noted, C.T.T.U. did not participate in any way in the strike. At that time, it was engaged in bargaining with € BLEEDTHRU 46 respondent for a new contract. On April 8, the eight employees in- volved, without any previous notice or warning to respondent, failed to report for work because of their refusal to cross the picket line of the striking union. Subsequently, respondent, upon inquiry, was told by the employees that this was the reason for their refusal to work. As witnesses before the Trial Examiner, they testified to the same effect. Typical of such testimony is that of Miss Jungbluth, “I didn’t want to come in because there was a picket line and I didn’t believe in crossing the picket line’; Miss Marcellaio, “I saw the picket line and I went home”; Miss Keuther, “As a union mem- ber and also as an American citizen, I said, I feel it is my duty to respect a picket line.” Miss Holmes did not approach the picket line but by telephone from her home learned that there were pickets in front of the office and refused to come to work “until after the pick- ets have been removed.” On Apri! 11 and 12, 1947, respondent directed a letter to each of the involved employees in which they were told that their jobs would be placed in jeopardy by a continued absence from work, that they were being demoted from their authority as supervisor to that of operator, and that their employment would be suspended as of the first day they failed to report for the new assignment. Respond- ent during the time of the absence of these employees arranged to have their work performed by utilizing its replacement supervisors, by recalling regular supervisors who were off duty, and in general by reallocating the work of its force of telephone supervisors. At the termination of the I.T.T.U. strike on May 8, 1947, the pickets were removed. The following day, or shortly thereafter, the de- moted employees reported for work and each was assigned to the position and duties of a telephone operator. The salary paid an operator was lower than than received by a supervisor. It was the demotion of these eight employees by respondent which the Board found to be a violation of §§ 8 (1) and 8 (3) of the Act. On this premise the Board’s order requires the respondent«to cease and desist from discouraging membership in Illinois Traffic Division 14, C.W.A. (successor of I.T.T.U.) or any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminating in their employment and in any like or related manner from coercing its employees of the right guaranteed by § 7 of the Act. And respondent was required to offer the eight employees reinstatement to their former positions as tele- phone supervisors, to make them whole for any loss in wages, pen- sion rights or sick benefits which they suffered as a result of their demotions, and to post appropriate notices. The crucial issue, as we view the situation, is whether the eight employees were protected by § 7 of the Act. If so, the finding of an DARK PAC | —— 47 unfair labor practice and the order resulting therefrom is sustain- able; otherwise, not. That section provides (29 U.S.C.A. § 157): “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” It is the Board’s theory that the eight employees were engaged in “concerted activities” for their “mutual aid or protection.” The Board terms the activities of the eight employees a “strike,” while respondent labels it as a “wildcat strike.” In our view, it was not a strike in any ordinary connotation of that term. This court, in Conn v. N.L.R.B., 108 F. 2d 390, 397, accepted the definition of a strike as contained in American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Volume 24, page 123, as follows: “The term ‘strike’ is applied commonly to a combined effort on the part of a body of workmen employed by the same mas- ter to enforce a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or some other concession, by stopping work in a body at a pre-arranged time, and refusing to resume work until the demanded con- cession shall have been granted.” While the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 is inapplicable because the events in controversy took place prior to its enactment, it is interesting to note that § 142 provides: “The term ‘strike’ includes any strike or other concerted stop- page of work by employees * * * and any concerted slow- down or other concerted interruption of operations by em- ployees.” There is no evidence that these eight employees acted in combina- tion or concert. They did not converse with each other or any other person regarding the activity in which they engaged, that is, a refusal to cross the picket line. The record discloses unmistakably that each acted in her own individual capacity. The Board in its brief states, “Their only concern was to help the I.T.T.U.” Even that concession is the result only of a dubious inference. None af the involved employees testified to any such concern. Their testi- mony discloses that their refusal to cross the picket line was a matter of principle, and that it would have made no difference whether the picket line was maintained by I.T.T.U. or some other union. The Board in its brief states that these employees “had no grievance which could have been adjusted through grievance pro- cedures. The object behind their refusal to cross the picket line was merely to support the grievance of others.” And at another point 48 the Board states, “Here, there was no controversy between respond- ent and the C.T.T.U.; the complainants merely refused to cross the I.T.T.U. picket lines to support the demands of the I.T.T.U. rather than their own grievances.” Assuming, however, contrary to what we think, that the involved employees engaged in “concerted activities,” we are unable to dis- cern from this record, and particularly in view of the concessions made by the Board, how it can be held that such activities were for their “mutual aid or protection.” They neither sought nor were en- titled to seek on their own behalf any aid or protection from re- spondent. That was the sole function of C.T.T.U., the duly selected and existing bargaining representative for the unit of which the in- volved employees were a part. The Board in its brief concedes, “These agreements [those between respondent and C.T.T.U.] bound the employees to work in conformity with the wages, hours, and working conditions provided in them. Employees dissatisfied, for example, with their wages were not entitled to seek to revise them by strike action before the expiration of their agreements.” In other words, these employees were without right to bargain with respondent or to strike because of any grievance which they had or for their own aid or protection, but they had such a right, according to the Board, in behalf of employees of a different unit and repre- sented by a different bargaining agent. So far as we are aware, no court has passed upon the precise ques- tion here involved; however, there are numerous cases where it has been held under a variety of circumstances that concerted activities by a group of employees were not protected by § 7 of the Act. South- ern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 US. 31, 46; NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344; NLRB v. Reynolds International Pen Co., 162 F. 2d 680, 683; NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199, 202; Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F. 2d 749, 752. No good purpose could be served in a detailed analysis of these and other cases which could be cited. The case most nearly in point is that of NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199. There, as here, the company was bargaining with a union as a representative of its own employees. While so engaged, a number of the employees ceased work in what is referred to as a “wildcat strike.” The dis- charge of such employees was found by the Board to be an unfair labor practice, but the court denied enforcement of its order. The Board before that court argued, as it does here, that the employees who went on strike were engaged in concerted activities for their “mutual aid or protection.” The court in denying such contention stated (page 202): “* * * we are of opinion that the ‘wild cat’ strike in which the employees were engaged and for which they were discharged was not such a concerted activity as falls within the protection 49 of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, but a strike in violation of the purposes of the act by a minority group of employees in an effort to interfere with the collective bargain- ing by the duly authorized bargaining agent selected by all the employees. The purpose of the act was not to guarantee to employees the right to do as they please but to guarantee to them the right of collective bargaining for the purpose of preserving industrial peace.” And on the following page: “Even though the majority of the employees in an industry may have selected their bargaining agent and the agent may have been recognized by the employer, there can be no effective bar- gaining if small groups of employees are at liberty to ignore the bargaining agency thus set up, take particular matters into their own hands and deal independently with the employer. The whole purpose of the act is to give to the employees as a whole, through action of a majority, the right to bargain with the employer with respect to such matters as wages, hours and conditions of work.” In distinguishing the Draper case, the Board states: “In this case, the concerted activity engaged in bore no relationship to the then current bargaining negotiations between the C.T.T.U. and respond- ent.” We think that is a questionable statement. It may be that the activities had no appreciable effect upon bargaining negotiations then in progress but, if so, it was only because of the small number of employees who were participants (1%, so it is stated in respond- ent’s brief). But suppose it had been 10% or 50%, of those in the bargaining unit represented by C.T.T.U. Under such circumstances, could it be held that cessation of work by such a large proportion of members of the unit would not seriously interfere with the preroga- tives which the Act confers upon the agent selected to represent it? Not only would the authority of the bargaining agent be impaired under such circumstances, but any contract entered into would be of little value. Such activities by a large group would clearly be in derogation of the authority of the bargaining agent and would not be protected by § 7. And we discern no reason why a small group of employees (eight, in the instant case) would be entitled to the pro- tection of the Act for activities which, if indulged in by a larger group, would be unprotected. : In J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 US. 332, 339, the court made the following pertinent observations: “The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bar- 50 gain, individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result.” The Trial Examiner in his findings, referring to the refusal of the involved employees to cross the picket line, stated, “By so doing these eight employees placed themselves in the position of sympathy strikers who made common cause with those engaged in the economic strike against their common employer. As a result, their legal status became identically that of the striking employees of the ITTU State unit, namely economic strikers.” We think it is a novel theory that the mere refusal to cross a picket line, in the absence of any other activity, makes the one who refuses a party to the strike, but even so, as already shown, such refusal was not for the “mutual aid or protection” of the employees involved. It could have only been for the benefit and aid of those in a different bargaining unit, the repre- sentative of which could not have represented the involved em- ployees and, consequently, could have obtained nothing from re- spondent for their benefit. The unreasonableness of the Board’s decision is emphasized by its order wherein respondent is directed to cease and desist from “inter- fering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Illinois Traffic Division 14, Communications Workers of America, successor of Illinois Telephone Traffic Union, N.F.T.W., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through rep- resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activ- ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities * * *.” Other than the incidents which we have discussed, there is not a scintilla of proof that respondent interfered in any form or manner with the right of its employees to join a labor organization of their own choice, or that it refused to bargain collectively with the agents selected by such employees. In fact, the record indisputably demon- strates that respondent bargained with C.T.T.U. in good faith, with a resultant contract, and it also bargained with the striking union, with a like result. There is no evidence of any hostility or favorit- ism on behalf of respondent against or for any union. Aside from what we have heretofore said, the Board is not entitled to enforce- ment of the broad, sweeping terms of the order presented. Cf. Interlake Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 131 F. 2d 129, 184; Western Cart- ridge Co. v. NLRB, 139 F. 2d 855, 858. The petition for enforcement of the Board’s order is denied. A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 51 And on the same day, to-wit, on the twenty-first day of May, 1951, the following further proceedings were had and entered of record, to-wit: Unitep States Court or APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH Circuit a Cuicaco 10, ILuinors Monday, May 21, 1951 Before Hon. J. Eart Masor, Chief Judge; Hon. Orto Kerner, Cir- cuit Judge; Hon. H. Naruan Swat, Circuit Judge No. 10305 NATIONAL LaBor RELATIONS BoarD, PETITIONER vs. ILLINoIs BELL TELEPHONE CoMPANY, RESPONDENT Petition for Enforcement of an Order of The National Labor Re- lations Board This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the National Labor Relations Board, and was argued by counsel, On consideration whereof, It is ordered and adjudged by this Court. that the petition for enforcement of the order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board, entered in this cause on March 16, 1950, be, and the same is hereby, denied. And afterward, to-wit, on the seventh day of August, 1951, the following further proceedings were had and entered of record, to-wit: UnitTep States Court or APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH Circuit Cuicaco 10, ILurNois Tuesday, August 7, 1951 Before Hon. Orro Kerner, Circuit Judge No. 10305 NATIONAL LaBor RELATIONS BoakD, PETITIONER vs. ILLINoIs BELL TELEPHONE CoMPANY, RESPONDENT Petition for Enforcement of an Order of The National Labor Re- lations Board On application of counsel for Petitioner, it is ordered that the certified transcript of record of proceedings before the National 2) Labor Relations Board be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. UNITED STATES CourT oF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Curcaco 10, [LurNots I, KennetH J. Carrick, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, do hereby certify that the fore- going typewritten pages contain a true copy of the order taking the cause under advisement, the opinion of the Court, the judg- ment of the Court, and the order to transmit the original tran- script of record to the Supreme Court of the United States in: Cause No. 10305, National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, vs. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Respondent, as the same remains upon the files and records of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In testimony whereof I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of said United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, at the City of Chicago, this seventh day of August A.D. 1951. [SEAL] (S.) Kenneto J. Carrick, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circut. Wu. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981 962508 106 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_0893%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.