# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1951
- **Citation:** 342 U.S. 812

## Text

Page
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TREE EGS Aree aoa a Gee ere 2
NS ETE OEE ETT ORT TOTP Eee 3
Se ene care We eo atthe re ST ind 10
Reasons for granting the writ ....................
SII fee ee Cee Bem. aa adie te 21
I II ooo vin onc eatin dicesnisc cna s coxe 22
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eines CITATIONS

Wilson & Company, Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal

i Me es en CE, «ratte ewok ceca 1
BOGE E:T, ee es Bs ee eh ee ives. 3
Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294. ... 3
Jones Nat. Bank v. Yates, 240 U.S. 541........ 3
Miller v. Lancaster Bank, 106 U.S. 542........ 3
Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,

Be os oes pre es ee 7
Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,
8 ke re a ie ee ne eres 8

Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N. W.'1085. . 9
National Masonic Accident Assn. v. Burr, 44 Neb.
Bs I PWN ais cs iwrae Soa eas eevee 9
German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb.
Se SRR ee Sere ee ne oe re 9
Rentschler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb.
493, 253 N. W. 694, 95 A. L. R. 1 9
Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. (2d) 876........ 10
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S.
Ee ogee kk Bier De ase as oh eo 11
Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.0. v. Aleo
ee Cig OO We MO WIP: os ccc aes panes 11
Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Car-
ORRPR, GEG, THe Ws COP MIO. vow bee ks tees: 11
Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
NE OEE hv ees coe vba cet Valen 8

—4221

ii INDEX

Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J. D. Adams
map Ga, Be we Ge Gee... 5 5 ee en... 13
American Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research
Corp., 171 F. (2d) 115, certiorari denied 69

Page

ee 8 28 Srey eee 13
Almacenes Fernandez, S. A. v. Golodetz, 148 F. ~

Ce Ge Oe ss oe .. =. 13
Bank of Madison v. Graber, 158 F. (2d) 137.... 13

Uniao De Transportadores Para Importacao E.
Commercio, LTDA. v. Companhia De Nave-
gacao Carregadores Acoreanos, 84 F. Supp.

ERIS all Sat) So OE ee ee 13
Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg Trad-

ing Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978.................. 13
The Belize, 25 F. Supp. 663................... 13
Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U. S.

I a a oe ies wp ww os 13
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester

8 ee 13
Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson € Co., Inc.,

look ad sv ed ay Sow nes 0 «0 18
Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 242 N. Y. 97, 150

ISS Se eae a 19
Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert €

Sons (2 Cir.), 62 F. (2d 1004 .............. 19

Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, 4 Cir.,

97 F. (2d) 318, 117 A. L. R. 299..............
McDowell v. Thomas, 4 Neb. 542.............. 20
Hughes v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N. W.

309

LS he i i 20
Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263,
ee as ey Pe Oe ee. 20
Young v. Ragen, 337 U. S. 235................ 21
Statutes:
Title 28, U. S. C., Sec. 1257 (3) July 30, 1947, c.
ME I ce ce te ccc cee 3

Title 9, U. S. C., Sec. 2, July 30, 1947, c. 392,
RI Sea eran a 2

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No. 675

FREMONT CAKE & MEAL COMPANY, a corporation,

Petitioner,
v.

WILSON 2 COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME: COURT OF NEBRASKA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to
review a judgment on a directed verdict and order of the
District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska, entered on Sep-
tember 24, 1949, directing a verdict for the respondent
and entering judgment for it in the sum of $41,175.00
against the petitioner, which judgment was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in-an opinion dated August
2, 1950 and a motion for rehearing overruled by that Court
on January 13, 1951.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska has not
yet been reported in the official Nebraska reports but is
reported in 43 N. W. (2d) 657. A copy of this opinion
is attached to this petition as Exhibit B of the Appendix
to the petition (mfra) p. 23.

2
Jurisdiction

The date of the overruling of the motion for a rehear-
ing by the Supreme Court of Nebraska is January 13,
1951.

Questions Presented

1. Whether 2 State Court is required to enforce a writ-
ten agreement for arbitration in a contract involving inter-
state commerce, if the right to arbitration is not waived.

2. Whether a State Court may disregard the declara-
tion by Congress in the Federal Arbitration Statute, Sec-
tion 2 (Title 9, U. S. C., See. 2, July 30, 1947, ce. 392, Sec. 1,
61 Stat. 669), to the effect that a written provision in any
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract ‘‘shall be valid, irrevocable and enforce-
able.’’

3. Whether a State Court may disregard large parts of
a contract involving interstate commerce and defenses
and other rights available to the parties thereunder be-
cause such provisions refer to enforcement thereof by
arbitration and the courts of the State refuse to enforce
any agreement requiring arbitration.

4. Where a contract involving interstate commerce re-
quires arbitration as a condition precedent to the bringing
of any action, may the State Court disregard the require-
ment and entertain the action, as though such provision
were not valid, irrevocable and enforceable?

5. Is the question of the right to arbitration of a con-
troversy arising out of a contract involving a transaction
in interstate commerce controlled by the Federal statute
and decisions thereunder, or by State laws and decisions.’

1 Other points to be presented if a writ is granted are:
a. May a state court deny to a party to a contract the benefit of sub-

stantial defenses thereunder merely because the agreement provides for ~

3

Statute Involved

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 62 Stat.
929, June 25, 1948, c. 646, Section 1257 (3) of Title 28,
U.S.C. The points discussed also involve Title 9, U. S. C.
Section 2, July 30, 1947, c. 392, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 669.

Paragraph (3) of 62 Stat. 929, June 25, 1948, c. 646,
confers upon this Court jurisdiction to review by writ of
certiorari judgments or decrees of the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had where a title, right,
privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
a statute of the United States.

The following decisions sustain the power and jurisdic-
tion of this Court to review the order and judgment, re-
view of which is herewith sought:

Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12;

Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U. S. 294;
Jones Nat. Bank v. Yates, 240 U. S. 541;

Miller v. Lancaster Bank, 106 U. S. 542.

The Federal question of the right of the petitioner to
have the controversy herein submitted to arbitration in ac-

their enforcement by arbitration and that court refuses to enforce the
obligations to arbitrate?

b. Is a party excused from performing a contract where he has provided
therein to be relieved in the event of war and interference with performance
for that reason as an excuse, although enforceable by arbitration, and he
is so limited in production by war regulations and war restrictions on
repairs and replacements that he is unable to perform his contract?

c. Where the time for performance of a contract has expired, is a
promise thereafter for delivery without any new consideration enforce-
able where no damage resulted from the failure to deliver within the
original time limit?

d. Did the Supreme Court of Nebraska err in affirming the order of
the District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska?

e. Where arbitration is a condition precedent under the agreement, does
the party against whom a claim is asserted have to proceed with the
procedures of arbitration, in order not to lose his right, or is it sufficient
if he continually claims at every opportunity that the opposing party may
only proceed by way of arbitration?

4

cordance with the written contract between the parties and
Section 2, Title 9, United States Code (Appendix A, infra,
pp. 22), was raised in the following manner in the State
Court:

1. In the trial court a motion was made on June 24,
1949 to continue the case until arbitration could be had
(R., p. 8, Tr., pp. 13-17). This motion was overruled on
September 8, 1949 (R. 37, Tr., p. 32).

2. A further motion to stay proceedings until a deci-
sion could be had in the action to compel arbitration brought
in the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska, Lincoln Division, was made on September 12,
1949 (R. 37, Tr., pp. 33-41). This motion was overruled
by the trial court on the ground that the ‘‘parties cannot
oust the jurisdiction of the Courts by Contract,’’ on Sep-
tember 16, 1949 (R., p. 95, B. of Ex., p. 10).

3. On September 19, 1949, the first day of the trial of
the action after the jury was empaneled byt before any
evidence was introduced, the petitioner moved the Court
to dismiss the action as prematurely brought ‘‘for the
reason that there is no showing that any arbitration pro-
ceedings have been held in regard to this controversy in
accordance with the requirements of the contract and the
Statutes of the United States and the laws of the State of
Nebraska (R., p. 95, B. of Ex., p. 10). The same day that
motion was overruled (R. 95, B. of Ex., p. 10). ;

4. During the trial large portions of the contract de-
fining the rights and liabilities of the parties were excluded
on the ground that there was a reference to arbitration in
such portions of the agreement (R. 178-189, B. of Ex., pp.
162-232, 354-356).

5. At the close of respondent’s case petitioner moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that arbitration had
not been had according to the requirements of the contract

5

and this motion was overruled (R. 167, B. of Ex., pp. 139,
140).

6. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska error
was assigned as to each of the rulings, as follows:

Assignment of Errors

8. ‘‘The Court erred in not admitting the arbitra-
tion rules in evidence as a part of the contract be-
tween the parties.’’

11. ‘‘The Court erred in not holding that arbitra-
tion was a condition precedent to any enforcement of
the contract herein.’’

12. ‘‘The Court erred in not enforcing Title 9,
United States Code Annotated, Section 2, and holding
that the requirement for arbitration in the contract
involved in this action was ‘valid, irrevocable and en-
forceable.’ ’’

13. ‘‘The Court erred in holding that the question
of arbitration involved in this case was controlled by
the laws of the State of Nebraska and not the Federal
statutes on arbitration and the decisions thereunder.”’

14. ‘‘The Court erred in holding that the Federal
statutes on arbitration oust the jurisdiction of the
State Courts.’’

7. The Supreme Court of Nebraska in its opinion denied
the right of the petitioner to enforcement of the require-
ment for arbitration under the Federal arbitration stat-
ute, saying:

‘‘The Fremont company asserts the contract is sub-
ject to the rules of the National Soybean Processors
Association which appear in the Year Book and Trad-
ing Rules of the National Soybean Processors Asso-
ciation. Rule 115 contained therein deals with arbi-
tration. Rule 116 deals with contingencies, and spe-
cifically refers to war. We will discuss this rule later
in the opinion. In addition, rules for arbitration of
the American Arbitration Association are also perti-

6

nent to the contract, and the Fremont company as-
serts that the refusal of the trial court to admit into
evidence all of such rules relating to arbitration con-
stitutes prejudicial error. Further, the United States .
Arbitration Act, Title 9, U. S. C. A., sections 2,
3, and 4, are applicable and should be enforced in
the State Courts, and the failure of the trial court to
so do constitutes prejudicial error.

‘‘In this act it is provided that a written provision
in any contract involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration an existing controversy arising out of such
contract shall be valid and enforceable. By section 3
it is provided that if any suit or proceeding be brought
in any court of the United States upon any issue re-
ferable to arbitration, the court in which the suit is
pending, shall, on application of one of the parties stay
the trial until such arbitration has been had, provided
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed-
ings in such arbitration.

‘‘Section 4 provides in part as follows: ‘A party
aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition any court of the United States
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdic-
tion under the judicial code at law, in equity, or in
admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out
of the controversy between the parties, for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement.’

‘‘The proper legal steps were taken by the Fremont
company to present to the district court for Dodge
County the question as to whether or not arbitration
should be invoked by the trial court in the instant case.
The trial court ruled against the Fremont company
on its contention in such respect.

‘*A brief history in this litigation is appropriate to
relate in connection with this assignment of error. On
July 11, 1947, Wilson & Company filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Ne-
braska, Omaha Division, to recover damages against

7

the Fremont company for alleged breach of contract
(the contract involved in the instant case). On August
2, 1947, the Fremont company filed a motion to stay
proceedings until arbitration had been had in accord-
ance with Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 3. This motion
was sustained. Subsequent proceedings in the Federal
Court hereinafter referred to disclose no order upon
the ruling of the Court was signed by the parties
or presented to the Court for approval. See Wilson &
Co., v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364.

‘‘On July 19, 1948, Wilson & Company filed a mo-
tion to dismiss its action in the United States District
Court. This was before the service or filing of an an-
swer by the Fremont company. This motion was sus-
tained. In sustaining the plaintiff’s motion the Court
said the plaintiff had, perhaps still has, the absolute
choice of forums for the recovery of the damages it
claims, beyond the possible intervention of the defend-
ant. By plaintiff is meant Wilson & Company, by de-
fendant is meant the Fremont company. That reflec-
tion does not enter into the ruling upon the point;
but it obviates the suggestion that the procedure that
is made mandatory in the Federal Court is being im-
posed upon a litigant brought there against its will
and thereby deprived of the supposed advantages to
it of the State Court’s traditional usages unaffected
by Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 3. See Wilson & Co.,
Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., supra.

‘‘The instant case was filed by Wilson & Company
in the district court for Dodge County on October 29,
1948. The case proceeded to trial in the latter part
of September 1949, and judgment was entered on the
verdict on September 24, 1949.

‘‘On April 8, 1949, the Fremont company filed an
original action in the United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska, Omaha Division, seeking an
affirmative order to require Wilson & Company to sub-
mit this controversy to arbitration, as provided for
in U. 8. C. A., Title 9, section 4. This original action
was filed while the instant action was pending and

8

undetermined in the district court for Dodge County,
Nebraska. The United States District Court dis-
missed the Fremont company’s original action filed
therein on October 8, 1949, holding that the Fremont
company not only had taken none of the explicitly de-
fined steps to institute arbitration, but that its course
in the entire controversy had been dilatory and ob-
structive only. Despite the early threats of Wilson &
Company in two letters to invoke the arbitration clause
of the contract, it remained silent on the question
touching arbitration and did not itself initiate the
process or even assent to Wilson & Company’s sug-
gestion of its liability. See Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fre-
mont Cake & Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900.

‘‘This case was appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals, 8th Circuit, and on June 27, 1950, an opin-
ion was rendered by that Court wherein the United
States District Court was affirmed. There is no oc-
casion to quote from the opinion, except to say that
the Circuit Court stated the State Court obtained jur-
isdiction of the controversy between Wilson & Com-
pany and the Fremont company long prior to the com-
mencement of the present proceeding. ‘A conflict of
jurisdiction is always to be avoided if possible and it
is a general rule that the right of a plaintiff to prose-
cute his suit in a court having once attached, will not
be taken away by proceedings in another court. The
decision in this case does not purport to interfere in
any respect with the jurisdiction of the State Court
but unless it could have such an effect it can not be
said to determine any actual substantive controversy
between the parties.’ Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v.
Wilson € Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 60.

‘‘In connection with this assignment of error the
following authorities of this jurisdiction are appli-
cable.

‘“Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere be-
tween arbitration generally and arbitration as to dam-
ages only, it is well settled in this State that a pro-
vision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether of

9

all disputes arising under contract, or only the amount
of loss or damages sustained by the parties thereto,
will not be enforced, and that refusal to arbitrate is
not available to the parties in an action growing out
of the contract. See, Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254,
86 N. W. 1085; National Masonic Accident Assn. v.
Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N. W. 466; German-American
Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N. W. 406; Rents-
chler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W.
694, 95 A. L. R. 1. -

‘*We conclude that the Fremont company’s assign-
ment of error here discussed cannot be sustained.’’

It will be noted that the Supreme Court stated:

‘“‘The proper legal steps were taken by the Fremont
company to present to the District Court of Dodge
County the question as to whether or not arbitration
should be invoked by the trial court in the instant case.
The trial court ruled against the Fremont company
on its contention in such respect’? (R., p. 61).

In regard to the right of enforcement of the arbitration
provisions in the Supreme Court, it will be noted that
that Court said:

‘‘In connection with this assignment of error the fol-
lowing authorities of this jurisdiction are applicable.

‘*Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere be-
tween arbitration generally and arbitration as to dam-
ages only, it is well settled in this State that a pro-
vision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether of
all disputes arising under contract, or only the amount
of loss or damage sustained by the parties thereto,
will not be enforced, and that refusal to arbitrate 1s
not available to the parties in an action growing out
of the contract. See, Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254,
86 N. W. 1085; National Masonic Accident Assn. v.
Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N. W. 466; German-American
Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N. W. 406; Rent-
schler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb. 495, 253 N. W.

10

694, 95 A. L. R. 1. We conclude that the Fremont
company’s assignment of error here discussed cannot
be sustained’’ (R., pp. 62, 63).

Statement

1. There is a clear conflict in the present case between
the authority of the Congress of the United States and the
Courts of the State of Nebraska concerning the enforce-
ability of an arbitration provision in a contract involving
interstate commerce. In Title 9, Section 2, United States
Code, Congress has directed that such an arbitration pro-
vision shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable. The
District Court of Nebraska and the Supreme Court of
Nebraska have both held in this case that such a require-
ment for arbitration is in Nebraska, invalid and unen-
forceable under a long line of decisions.

In Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. Supp. 601,
the United States District Court for the District of Ken-
tucky, held that Section 2, Title 9, United States Code,
provided a substantive right.2, In Wilson & Co. v. Fremont
Cake & Meal Co.,77 F.. Supp. 364, the United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska, held in like manner in
a companion case where an application for a stay under
Title 9, Section 3, United States Code, was granted.’

In the case of Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. (2d) 876,

2It said: ‘‘When Congress declares that a provision for arbitration in any
contract involving interstate commerce or a maritime transaction is valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, the enforcement of such a provision is a substan-
tive right.’’

8It said: “Then the second section proceeds to lay down a rule of sub-
stantive law regarding the validity of an agreement for arbitration in case of
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce. Congress was here making a rule concerning subject matter within its
own constitutional legislative authority. It was not seeking to confer validity
to arbitration agreements generally, a matter outside the scope of Federal
powers. Instead it picked out’two important classes of transactions within
the Federal legislative domain and declared the effect of arbitration clauses
in agreements concerned therewith.’’

li

the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that an agreement that all differences arising under a con-
tract shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the law of
remedies and the law that governs remedies is the law of
the forum.

In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. 8. 109,
123, this Court said the substantive right created by an
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is recognized
as a perfect obligation.

Thus we find a conflict between the Federal Courts as
to scope and effect of the Federal Arbitration Act and a
complete disregard of its provisions by the Supreme Court
of Nebraska in this case.

In a comparable situation regarding the provisions of
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, the Federal Courts have held that a new substan-
tive right actionable in the Federal Courts was created by
Congress.*

2. The situation here well demonstrates the thwarting
of the congressional purposes and objects set forth in the
Federal Arbitration Act.

On July 11, 1947, respondent filed a complaint against

__petitioner in the United States District Court for the
District of Nebraska, Omaha Division, seeking damages in
the sum of $43,005.00 for the failure of petitioner to de-
liver six tank cars of soybean oil ander the written contract
involved in this appeal (R., p. 41, Tr., pp. 35, 36).° Petitioner

4 Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0. v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp.
626: ‘‘The remedy created by provision of Labor Management Relations Act
conferring upon Federal District Courts jurisdiction in actions for violation
of a contract between employer and labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting ecommerce creates a Federal remedy which is not con-
trolled by State law.’’ To like effect, see Shirley-Herman Co. v. International
Hod Carriers, etc., 182 F. 2d 806. é

58ee opinion Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364.
This was the same contract and almost identical complaint with the one in-
volved in this petition for certiorari.

12

did not answer but filed a motion to stay the proceedings
pending arbitration under Section 3, Title 9, United States
Code. The Court sustained the motion. Before a formal
order was entered, respondent dismissed the complaint
without prejudice and brought the action now appealed
from in the District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska (R.,
pp. 41, 42, Tr., pp. 37, 38).

Before answering to that petition and on April 8, 1949,
the petitioner here filed a complaint against the respond-
ent in the United States District Court of Nebraska, Omaha
Division, to require the respondent to arbitrate the con-
troversy under the agreements in the written contract
(R., pp. 11-16, Tr., pp. 17-22). The District Court dismissed
the complaint on the merits on the ground that although it
was stipulated that the respondent refused to arbitrate,
the petitioner here had taken none of the definitive steps
to initiate arbitration. The dismissal was affirmed on
the ground that the case was moot since the State Court
had entered judgment in favor of the respondent herein in
the amount of $41,175.00 and on the merits.’

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the lower court in holding that the respondent should have
proceeded with the definite steps for arbitration if it was
to obtain an affirmative order under Section 4 even though
it was stipulated and pleaded in the action to compel arbi-
tration under Section 4 of the Arbitration Act that the

6 The Court said in Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 83 F.
Supp. 900: ‘‘It has taken no affirmative action looking to the resolution, by
any forum, of its differences with Wilson & Company.’’

7In Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 183 F. (2d) 57, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said: ‘‘A conflict of jurisdiction is
always to be avoided if possible and it is a general rule that the right of a
plaintiff to prosecute his suit in a court having once attacked will not be taken
away by proceedings in another court. The decision in this case does not pur-
port to interfere in any respect with the jurisdiction of the State Court but
unless it could have such an effect it cannot be said to determine any actual
controversy between the parties.’’

13 P

respondent had refused to arbitrate and the record showed
that it had fought arbitration every step of the way. Such
an interpretation of the Act puts an unusual burden upon
a party who is not seeking any affirmative action as to the
controversy which is to be arbitrated according to the
contract. The Statutes and other Federal Courts have
always held that rights under the law could not be waived
or lost except by conduct that amounted to a relinquish-
ment ef rights and privileges under the general law of
waiver.®

However, the Court of Appeals used care to state that

8 Waiver of the right to arbitration requires affirmative action of the party
involved to give up the right with full knowledge.

Commencement of an action in court rather than reliance on arbitration with
answer by the opposing party on the merits is a waiver by both parties. Galion
Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F. (2d) 411. American
Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research Corp., 171 F. (2d) 115, certiorari denied
69 S. Ct. 515, 336 U. 8, 909. If one party to a contract brings suit and the
other party answers on merits instead of relying on arbitration, conduct may
amount to waiver. Almacenes Fernandez, S. A. v. Golodetz, 148 PF. (2) 625,
161 A. L. R. 1420; Bank of Madison v. Graber, 158 F. (2d) 137.

Where one party seeks to waive, repudiate or abandon arbitration, the other
may claim it as a defense.

Uniao De Transportadores Para Importacao E. Commercio, LTDA. v.
Companhia De Navegacao Carregadores Acoreanos, 84 F. Supp. 582; Kulukun-
dis Shipping Co. 8/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978; The Belize,
25 F. Supp. 663.

This Court in Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U. 8. 449, affirmed the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit and approved the grounds given by
that Court in denying the claim of waiver. The Court of Appeals held in
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester 8. Corp., 70 F. (2d) 297, that
it was the duty of the plaintiff to take the initiative in seeking arbitration,
saying in an opinion by Learned Hand, Circuit Judge, on p. 299: ‘*The plain-
tiff further objects that the defendant is ‘in default in proceeding with such
arbitration,’ within the meaning of section 3. True, it has not named its
arbitrator, but in its answer and moving affidavits has merely expressed its
willingness to submit to arbitration. This appears to us enough. It was the
plaintiff who declared the contract to be at an end; and with that the defend-
ant was contented. If the plaintiff meant to proceed further and enforce a
claim for damages, the initiative rested upon it; it should have named the
first arbitrator. If it did not but sued instead, it was itself the party who
fell ‘in default in proceeding with such arbitration,’ not the defendant.’’

14

its action should have no effect on the State Court action
(p. 12, supra). Returning to the State Court action now
involved in this petition for certiorari, we find that after
the petition was filed by respondent in the State Court
action on October 29, 1948, petitioner on November 18, 1948
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to file security for costs
required by the Nebraska law, which security having been
given after the motion was filed but before ruling, the mo-
tion was overruled on November 24, 1948. On December 3,
1948, petitioner filed a motion to make the petition more
definite and certain, which was overruled on April 4, 1949.
On June 24, 1949, having already on April 8, 1949 filed the
complaint to compel arbitration by Wilson & Company,
petitioner here filed a motion for a continuance and stay of
proceedings, pending the decision by the Federal Court
(R., pp. 8-11, Tr., pp. 13-17). That motion was argued be-
fore the State Court on August 22, 1949. The Court over-
ruled the motion (R., p. 95, Tr., p. 32).

Petitioner answered, praying for a stay pending arbi-
tration and presenting other defenses (R., pp. 5-7, Tr., pp.
9-11). Before the trial began after the jury was empaneled,
petitioner made a further motion to have the State Court
proceeding dismissed because it was prematurely brought
since there had been no arbitration as required by the con-
tract. This motion was overruled September 19, 1949
(R., p. 95, Tr., p. 52).

_* The case then went to trial before a jury and the Court

excluded large parts of the contract because they provided
for enforcement of arbitration (R., pp. 178-189, B. of Ex.,
pp. 162-232, 354-356). At the close of the case the State
Court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and entered judg-
ment in the amount of $41,175.00 against the petitioner
herein.

15

3. The parties agreed that any controversy arising out
of the contract in question should be settled by arbitration.°

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Petitioner tried in every way to get the matter decided
by arbitration. Each of the procedures urging such ac-
tion is set forth in detail above and will not be repeated.

9**Rule 115—Arbitration.

‘*Section 1. All controversies arising out of contracts made under these
Trading Rules or the breach thereof, unless amicably adjusted otherwise, shall
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules, then obtaining, of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered
may be entered in the highest court of the forum, State or Federal, having
jurisdiction.’’

Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364: ‘‘The
first dispute between the parties is whether there is in their contract any actual
agreement to arbitrate. That is one of two primary and equally vital ques-
tions presented upon the record. The plaintiff denies that such an agreement
was ever made. The contract must, therefore, be examined. It is set out in
a footnote.!

‘*Without resting any argument upon this factor, the plaintiff directs the
Court’s attention to the verbal parsimony which the contract betrays, and to
its execution for both parties to it by a single broker. Upon the latter point
it need be said only that both parties to this action adopted the memorandum
as their contract, the defendant delivered and the plaintiff accepted thirty
ear loads of oil under it, and the plaintiff’s entire complaint rests upon its
validity. And, so far as brevity is concerned, it is neither a virtue nor a vice,
except as it may disclose or obscure the intent of the makers of an agreement.

‘*‘The presently significant language of the contract is: ‘Rules National
Soybean Processors Association.’ Those rules are shown in an exhibit at-
tached to a stipulation in the files, generally entitled: ‘Year Book and Trad-
ing Rules, 1945-1946, National Soybean Processors Association.’ The trading
rules governing the purchase and sale of soybean oil are seventeen in number,
identified as Rules 101 to 117, both inclusive. Their text covers some fourteen
pages of a printed booklet, Rule 115, dealing with arbitration, is in the follow-
ing language:

‘«¢All controversies arising out of contracts made under these Trading
Rules or the breach thereof, unless amicably adjusted otherwise, shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules, then obtaining of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered
may be entered in the highest court of the forum, State or Federal having
jurisdiction.’

** Another booklet presented in evidence by the stipulation includes the rules
for arbitration of the American Arbitration Association, which are compre-

16

It would be difficult to find a case where a party was more
consistent in trying to obtain the benefits of its contract
under the Federal statute and its interpretations. Is it
possible that merely by going from a Federal Court to a
State Court a party to a contract involving interstate com-
merce may defeat the will of Congress regarding arbitra-
tion of controversies arising out of a contract involving
commerce?

There are thousands of contracts outstanding at all
times in the United States where a transaction involving
interstate commerce is involved and arbitration of any
controversy thereunder is stipulated by the parties in their
agreement. How are they to get the benefits of their con-
tract if it can be brushed aside as it was in this case? It is

hensive and voluminous and provide a detailed program or procedure for arbi-
tration. By the stipulation of the parties upon the submission of this motion,
they agree that ‘they are the rules which would govern the arbitration re-
quested by the defendant herein.’ Of that procedure, this Court now says
only that it is obviously operable. Whether resort to it is prudent or desir-
able is beyond the proper scope of the present study.’’

Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 83 F. Supp. 900: ‘‘ Wilson
& Company reasserts in argument all of its formerly tendered objections to
the imposition upon it of the obligation to suffer or participate in arbitration
of its claim. These include the contentions, (a) that the contract between the
parties does not contain a provision for arbitration; (b) that the contract
does not evidence any contract involving commerce within the true meaning
of Title 9, U. 8S. C. A., sections 1 and 2; (c) that the application of any or
all of the provisions of Title 9, U. 8. C. A. is limited to contracts which do
evidence a transaction involving commerce; and (d) that there is no arbitrable
controversy between the parties. Items (a) and (b) of those positions are
sufficiently discussed in the opinion reported in 77 F. Supp. 364; But it may
be added, without discussion or particularization, that the additional material
now before the Court in the way of letters between the parties and oral
testimony serves clearly to confirm the Court’s earlier and now reiterated, con-
clusion that the contract evidences a transaction involving commerce. In the
Court’s opinion that conclusion eliminates the necessity of passing upon the
academic question raised in item (ce). And, touching the presence of an
arbitrable controversy, the Court, at this time, in view of the entire record
before it, including the issues made by the pleadings in the Dodge County
case, still considers and holds that that question must be answered in the
affirmative.’’

17

important to the commercial activity of this country that
contracting parties be able to know whether such an agree-
ment for arbitration in a contract involving a transaction
in interstate commerce is valid, irrevocable and enforce-
able, or that such a Federal statute is merely so many
words without effect if the other party can rush the case
into the State Court first.

Obviously, the plaiatiff has the right to choose the forum
and in many cases titere is no ground for removal. If the
State Court has the power to strike down the Federal stat-
ute in this manner, arbitration agreements can have effect
only when the party asserting the complzint so elects.

The Federal Courts are overburdened with litigation
at many points throughout the country. The enforcement
of arbitration agreements and proper use of the arbitra-
tion statute should relieve some of that load. The statute
does not purport to require arbitration against the will of
the parties. It is only when they so agree in writing that
it applies. Why should a person be relieved of such an
agreement any more than the other terms of the contract?

In many cases as in this one the provision for arbitra-
tion makes it possible to have persons determine the factual
questions and apply principles of commercial law, where
they are peculiarly well informed in the field which is the
subject of controversy. In this action there were restric-
tions of the War Food Administration, the Commodity
Credit Corporation, the Department of Agriculture and the
Office of Price Administration, as well as technical ques-
tions as to the amount of oil that can be extracted from
a bushel of soybeans by various methods. There were ques-
tions about the effect of shutdowns caused by war priori-
ties on the capacity of the plant and the requirement that
oil be manufactured out of a certain crop. Respondent
knew that these matters would not be disregarded by

18

arbitrators who were familiar with the practices of the
trade and it was for that reason it was very eager to avoid
arbitration as was clearly demonstrated.”

Even though it first brought its case in Federal Court
it departed therefrom as soon as the Court ordered a
stay until arbitration could be had. It hoped that all of
the technical questions would be promptly brushed aside
on the ground that there was a reference to arbitration and

10In Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 86 F. Supp. 968,
Judge Delehant said: ‘‘Stated simply, until one party to the contract has
pursued its prescribed initiatory steps, it has not made any ‘demand’ and
thereby decisively required the other party to answer, or to act upon, such
demand for arbitration; and the vital condition precedent to a mandatory
order to proceed to arbitration has not been performed.

‘*That Fremont Company has taken none of those explicitly defined steps
is established by stipulation and evidence. Its course in the entire con-
troversy has been dilatory and obstructive only. It has taken no affirmative
action looking to the resolution, by any forum, of its differences with Wilson &
Company. Its claimed default in the delivery of soybean oil occurred late
in 1946, nearly three years ago. Despite the early threats of Wilson & Com-
pany in two letters, supra, to invoke the arbitration clause of the contract,
it remained silent touching arbitration and did not itself initiate the process
or even assent to Wilson & Company’s suggestion of its availability. Wilson
& Company then sued in this Court. Still, Fremont Company took no steps
to commence arbitration. It obtained the ruling announcing the granting of
its motion for a stay of proceedings in that suit, pending arbitration, which
was made over the vigorous objection of its adversary on many grounds, in-
cluding its position that it was not a party to any contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate on any agreement whatsoever upon the subject. That
motion did not demand, and the order if it had been entered, would not have
required, that Wilson & Company initiate arbitration. The action contem-
plated was merely the suspension of the prosecution of the suit pending arbi-
tration, presumably upon the initiation of Fremont Company, which, alone,
contended for it. Even then, with its right to require arbitration vindicated,
it remained silent and inert until the first case here had been dismissed and
the Dodge County, Nebraska, case had been instituted and pressed for nearly
six months, when it started this action. And it need not be asserted that the
filing of this case is no substitute for the initiatory steps contractually de-
fined for the setting on foot of arbitration.

**Confronted with that history of inaction, this Court finds that Wilson &
Company has not ‘failed, neglected or refused to arbitrate,’ and is not ‘in
default’ in the performance of any obligation incident to arbitration within
the meaning of Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 4; and that Fremont Company
is not ‘aggrieved’ by any default in that behalf on the part of Wilson &

19

for that reason they could not be considered. It was cor-
rect. The State Court even held that defenses because of
war and other contingencies could not be considered because
the agreement provided for their enforcement by arbitra-
tion. Large sections of the contract were not even al-
lowed to be introduced into evidence for this reason. If
the right to arbitration as to controversies involving inter-
state commerce is to be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
it must be given such effect in all of the forty-eight States
and not thrown out in Nebraska or other jurisdictions
which decide to disregard this Federal statute.

It is not as though Congress has not provided ample
safeguards for the courts to review any arbitration award.
Title 9, United States Code, covers those problems in de-
tail.”

Company. Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 242 N. Y. 97, 150 N. E. 614,
Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons (2 Cir.) 62 F. (2) 1004,
Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, supra.

‘*The Court is not unmindful of the admission in the pleadings by Wilson
& Company that it has refused to arbitrate and a like, though somewhat
qualified, stipulation upon the trial. But that ‘refusal’ must be understood
in its proper context. Denying its obligation to arbitrate under its contract,
Wilson & Company has not initiated the arbitration process but has refused
(or failed or neglected) to participate in arbitration proceedings started by
its opponent, for none have been thus started.

‘*Consideration has been given to the question whether the asserted denial
of the obligation to arbitrate relieves Fremont Company of the necessity of
taking the initiatory steps in arbitration, if it desires to insist upon its right
to that procedure. But the Court holds that the question must be answered
negatively. Here the very existence of an agreement for arbitration is in
bona fide dispute. That the dispute is real and substantial is not altered by
the circumstance that the Court has heretofore announced its conclusion that
there is such an agreement. Wilson & Company sincerely believes that the
Court was mistaken in that ruling. Such being the situation, Fremont Com-
pany ought to be required to take the definitive steps setting the arbitration
machinery in motion, thus putting Wilson & Company under the necessity of
determining whether, on the faith of its legal contention, it should ‘ fail,
neglect or refuse to arbitrate’ and thereby enter into ‘default’ in that respect.’’

11 Section 3 provides for stay of any court proceeding pending arbitration;
Section 4, for an order by the Federal Court compelling arbitration; Section
5, for the appointment of arbitrators; Section 6, for any application to be
handled as a motion; Section 7, procedures for handling witnesses before the

20

In Nebraska the same power to review arbitration awards
is recognized.”

4. If the Federal Arbitration Act is to be effective, it
should be liberally construed to carry out the congres-
sional purpose.”* It should not be defeated by conduct such
as is shown in this case.

arbitrators; Section 8, for proceedings begun by libel in admiralty and then
arbitration; Section 9, for confirmation of the award; Section 10, for vacat-
ing the award in any of the following situations: (a) where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (b) where there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (c) where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; (d) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; and in (e) a rehear-
ing by the arbitrators at the Court’s discretion; Section 11, modification or
correction of award upon the following grounds: (a) where there was an
evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in
the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;
(b) where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted; and (c) where the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy; Section 12, notice of motions to
vacate or modify and manner of service, stay of proceedings; Section 13, the
papers to be filed with order on motions, judgment, force and effect of the
judgment and its enforcement; Section 14, that the act should not apply
to contracts made prior to January 1, 1926.

12 Fraud, corruption, or misbehavior of the arbitrators is ground for set-
ting aside or impeaching the award. McDowell v. Thomas, 4 Neb. 542; Hughes
v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N. W. 309.

18 Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978:
‘«The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 was sustained as constitutional,
in its application to cases arising in admiralty. Marine Transit Corp. Vv.
Dreyfus, 1932, 284 U. 8. 263, 52 8. Ct. 166, 76 L. Ed. 516. The purpose of
that Act was deliberately to alter the judicial atmosphere previously exist-
ing. The report of the House Committee states, in part: ‘Arbitration agree-
ments are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to
make the contracting party live up to his agreement. He can no longer
refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him, An
arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs. * * * The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our
American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English
courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements

'

21
Conclusion :

The foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

MaxweELu V. BEGHTOL,
J. Lez Rankin,
Counsel for Petitioner.

to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their
jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it
by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too

-strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they

have frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the
injustice which results from it. The bill declares simply that such agree-
ments for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the
Federal courts for their enforcement. * * * It is particularly appropriate that
the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against
the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters, can be largely elimi-
nated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made
valid and enforceable.’

‘In the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to
shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration. Accordingly, in a case like
this, involving the Federal Act, we should not follow English or other deci-
sions which have narrowly construed the terms of arbitration agreements or
arbitration statutes.’’

Circuit Judge Frank presents an excellent discussion of the history of the
hostility of the courts toward arbitration agreements and rights in this case,
which the Court may wish to consider.

Young v. Ragen, Warden, 337 U. 8S. 235: ‘‘More than a question of State
procedure is involved when a State Court of last resort closes the door to
any consideration of a claim of denial] of a Federal right.’’

22
APPENDIX A
Title 28, U. S. C. A., Sec. 1257, Par. (3)

Sec. 1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

* * * * * * *

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty
or statute of the Unité States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title,
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commis-
sion held or authority exercised under, the United States.
June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 929.

Title 9, U. S. C. A., See. 1

Sec. 1. ‘‘Maritime transactions’’ and ‘‘commerce’’ de-
fined; exceptions to operation of title

‘‘Maritime transactions’’, as herein defined, means char-
ter parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements
relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs
to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign com-
merce which, if the subject of controversy, would be em-
braced within admiralty jurisdiction; ‘‘commerce’’, as
herein defined means commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory and
any State or foreign nation, or between the District of
Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation,
but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce. July 30, 1947, c. 392, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 669.

23

Sec. 2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thetdof or an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration existing controversy arising
out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enfo ‘ceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity'for the revocation of any con-
tract. July 30, 1947, c. 392, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 669.

APPENDIX B

Wuson & Company, Inc., a corporation, Appellee,
v.

Fremont Cake & Meat Company, A CORPORATION,
Appellant

43 N. W. 2d 657
Filed July 24, 1950. No. 32745

1. Trial. In determining whether or not a verdict should
have been directed by the trial court, the evidence must be
considered in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion was made; that is, every controverted
fact must be resolved in his favor and he should have the
benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced
therefrom.

2. Arbitration and Award: Courts. Where arbitration
constitutes a part of the contract between parties to it and
an attempt is made to enforce arbitration by invoking the
Federal Arbitration Act, in the courts of this state the
issue is one of procedure and not of substantive right, and
the laws of this state are controlling.

3. Arbitration and Award: Contracts. In this jurisdic-

24

tion a provision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether
of disputes arising under the contract generally or only
of the amount of any loss or damages sustained by the
parties thereto, will not be enforced; nor will refusal to
arbitrate be available in an action growing out of the con-
tract.

4. Sales. Where a certain date is fixed as the time limit
for delivery of six tank cars of soybean oil by the seller
to the purchaser, and by subsequent agreement between the .
parties in the form of correspondence the time limit date
for delivery is postponed, such agreement does not dis-
charge the original contract, but the same remains in full
force, changed only to the extent that delivery is post-
poned.

5. Contracts. If a party by his contract creates a duty
or imposes a charge upon himself, he must under any and
all conditions substantially comply with the undertaking.

6. —————. Inconvenience or the cost of compliance,
though they might make compliance a hardship, cannot
excuse a party from the performance of an absolute and
unqualified undertaking to do a thing that is possible and
lawful.

7. ————. A contract is not invalid, nor is the obligor
therein in any manner discharged from its binding effect,
because it turns out to be difficult or burdensome to per-
form.

8. Contracts: Sales. An abnormal rise in the price of
soybean products due to war or unusual trade conditions,
so that the processor thereof cannot perform a contract to
process and deliver the same to a contractee without greater
expense than anticiputed, is not an impossibility excusing
performance.

9. Sales: Damages. The measure of damages is the dif-
ference in the contract price of the merchandise and the
market value of the same at the time to which delivery is
postponed. If delivery is postponed by agreement of the
parties, the market value at the time to which delivery
is postponed is taken as the criterion.

Appeal from the district court for Dodge County: Rus-
sell A. Robinson, Judge. Affirmed.

Beghtol & Rankin, Sidner, Lee & Gunderson, Kenneth

25

E. Anderson, Nate C. Holman, George E. Svoboda, and
John C. Mason, for appellant.

Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda, Louis R. Simp-
son, and Spear, Lamme & Flory, for appellee.

Heard before Simmons, C. J., Carter, Messmore, Yeager,
Chappell, Wenke, and Boslaugh, JJ.

Messmore, J.

This is an action at law brought by the plaintiff, Wilson
& Company, a corporation, against the Fremont Cake &
Meal Company, a corporation, to recover damages for the
alleged breach of contract for the sale and delivery of soy-
bean oil to the plaintiff. At the close of all the evidence
the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict. This motion was
sustained. From the overruling of defendant’s motion for
a new trial and entry of judgment on the verdict in the
amount of $41,175 and costs, the defendant perfected ap-
peal to this court.

For convenience we will refer to the appellant, Fremont
Cake & Meal Company, a corporation, as the Fremont com-
pany, and to the appellee, Wilson & Company, corpora-
tion, as Wilson & Company. The Commodity Credit Cor-
poration, Washington, D. C., a corporate agency of the
United States government, will be referred to as the CCC,
and the Office of Price Administration, an agency of the
United States government, as the OPA.

We review the record with the following rule in mind:
‘‘In determining whether or not a verdict should have been
directed by the trial court, the evidence must be considered
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was made; that is, every controverted fact must
be resolved in his favor and he should have the benefit of
every inference that can reasonably be deduced there-
from.’’ Thoren v. Myers, 151 Neb. 453, 37 N. W. 2d 725.

The following facts are not in substantial dispute: On
August 10, 1945, Wilson & Company entered into a contract
identified as No. 3447-W, negotiated by B. E. Forssell, the
manager of the refinery department of Wilson & Company,
through the Marwood Company, Incorporated, a broker-
age concern. The contract was confirmed by B. E. Forssell,
and is as follows:

26

‘‘August 10, 1945 No. 3447-W

Seller; Marr Soybean Processing Company, 130 North
Broad Street, Fremont, Nebraska.

Buyer; Wilson and Company, Refinery Department, 4100
South Ashland Avenue, Chicago 9, Illinois.

Gentlemen: We confirm transaction today for your ac-
count as follows:

Commodity: Soybean oil.

Quality: Crude. ‘

Quantity: Thirty-six (36) Buyer furnishing tankcars |
of approximately 61,000 pounds capacity each.

Weight: Certified.

Price: Eleven and three-quarters cents (11%4c) per
pound (or O.P.A. ceiling price in effect at time of ship-
ment) f.o.b. Fremont, Nebraska.

Terms: Sight Draft/Bill of Lading attached for amount
of invoice, free of exchange to buyer. Weights & quality
guaranteed at destination.

Shipment: Time Three (3) tankcars each month Octo-
ber, 1945, through September, 1946. From Fremont, Ne-
braska.

Other Conditions: Seller warrants that crude soybean oil
covered by this contract will be produced from beans ac-
quired in accordance with his processor contract with the
CCC, or any other government agency controlling the
marketing and crushing of oilseeds during season 1945-46.
This contract is subject to any government regulation con-
trolling the movement and allocation of crude soybean oil.
Subject to tankear reguiations by ODT.

Rules Brokerage: National Soybean Processors Associa-
tion.

This confirmation is made in triplicate, one copy being

sent to the buyer, one to the seller, and one retained on
file in this office.

Marwood Company, Inc., As Brokers only, By Mar-
vin Wood. P,

Buyer to have privilege of unloading shipments imme-
diately on receipt, seller to be notified by mail of details
as to quality and weight adjustment.”’

27

On or about September 1, 1945, the Fremont company
succeeded to the business of the Marr Soybean Processing
Company. The Fremont company, with the consent of
Wilson & Company and the Marr Soybean Processing Com-
pany, adopted and agreed to carry out the terms of the
contract set out, and which will hereinafter be referred to
as the contract. The Fremont company, under the terms
of the contract, delivered to Wilson & Company 30 tank cars
of soybean oil at the price provided for in the contract.
When the Fremont company assumed the contract it was
obligated to take over contracts to furnish Armour &
Company 36 cars of oil, the Interstate Cottonseed Oil
Refining Company a minimum of 33 cars, in addition to
the 36 cars for Wilson & Company, making the total com-
mitment of 105 cars of oil.

On September 10, 1945, Harry E. Wiysel, manager of
the Fremont company, signed for the company the CCC
contract. The CCC contract provided: ‘‘1. Purchase of
Soybeans. The processor shall purchase for his own ac-
count, upon the terms and conditions hereinafter specified,
soybeans of the 1945 crop, either directly from producers
or from others who have paid producers not less than the
support prices specified * * * in a total quantity not in
excess of the quantity he can process on or before October
10, 1946 (to be determined by multiplying the total daily
capacity of the Plant * * *).’’

The last delivery was made by the Fremont company
on September 24, 1946, leaving six tank cars of soybean oil
to be delivered to Wilson & Company, which were never
delivered and which constitute the subject matter of the
instant case.

The plaintiff’s petition alleged that six tank cars of
soybean oil remained undelivered under the contract; that
by mutual consent the time for delivery of the same was
extended so that there could be delivered during the latter
part of October 1946, three of the tank cars of soybean oil,
and the last three during the latter part of November
1946. Due to the failure of delivery as pleaded, the plain-
tiff prayed damages in the amount of $43,005, based upon

7

28

the failure of the Fremont company to perform the con-
tract.

The defendant’s answer, insofar as the same need be
considered, alleged in substance that delivery under the
eontratt was to be made from October 1945, through Sep-
tember 1946; the soybean oil to be furnished under the
contract was required to be produced according to the
Fremont company’s contract with the CCC or any other
government agency controlling the marketing and crushing
of soybeans into oil during the 1946 season which ran from
September 10, 1945, to October 10, 1946; that the ¢ efend-
ant used all soybeans allowed it under the CCC contract
and allocated the oil processed therefrom between the three
contracts to which it was committed when it assumed the
contract from the Marr company; and that defendant noti-
fied plaintiff it would be required under a prior contract,
before proceeding with new contracts, to furnish two tank
cars of soybean oil. Defendant also alleged that Wilson &
Company was advised early in October 1946, that the con-
tract could not be fulfilled because of government regula-
tions controlling the movement and allocation of soybean
oil, and its processor’s contract; that any default that oc-
curred was on or before October 1, 1946; and further, that
Wilson & Company gave no notice of default as required
by rule 116 of the Soybean Processors Trading Rules. De-
fendant also alleged that the terms ‘‘Eleven and three-
quarters cents (1134c) per pound (or O.P.A. ceiling in
effect at time of shipment) f.o.b. Fremont, Nebraska,’’ were
intended and understood by the parties and the industry
and interpreted in practice to mean ceiling price now in
effect, or ceiling price in effect at the time of delivery, or
if no ceiling price, then market price at the time of de-
livery; and that the Fremont company never at any time
after October 1, 1946, offered to ship any soybean oil to
Wilson & Company except at the market price at time of
delivery.

Wilson & Company is engaged in the packing business,
and also refines crude soybean oil into margarine or cook-
ing oil.

29

We make reference to the documentary evidence only
insofar as the same relates to the six tauk cars of soybean
oil not delivered.

B. E. Forssell testified in behalf of Wilson & Company
that on or about the 10th of September 1946, he was in
Fremont and contacted Mr. Wiysel, manager of the Fre-
mont company. His purpose was to endeavor to purchase
soybean oil for his company. He talked to Wiysel about
the scarcity of oil and this contract. Wiysel told him:
‘*We owe you six tanks more than we are shipping this
month, but I think by next month we will be Okeh and
ship again.’’’ Forssell said that would be all right, ‘‘we
have a contract on it and I suppose you will live up to your
contract.’’ There was nothing more said by Wiysel.

On October 11, 1946, Wilson & Company wired the Fre-
mont company: ‘‘According Our Records We Have Six
Tanks Soybean Oil Still Due Us Marwood Contract 3447-W
Stop Please Wire When You Plan Load These Remaining
Six Tanks Due Give Us Loading Dates As You See Them.’’
On October 14, 1946, the Fremont company wired Wilson
& Company: ‘‘Expect To Load Three Tanks Last Half
October Three Tanks Last Half November Will Advise
Loading Dates Later.’’

This witness testified that he kept familiar with the OPA
ceiling prices, and on October 1, 1946, the ceiling price
was 11% cents per pound for soybean oil, the price -when
the contract was entered into. There was a very short
period during the summer when the ceiling prices were
off, but during the interim the price stayed at 1134 cents
per pound. The OPA was put back on with the same ceil-
ing price. On October 1, 1946, an order of the OPA made
the ceiling price 1314 cents per pound for soybean oil. One
delivery on this contract was made between October 1 and
October 16, 1946. It was shipped in September. The ceil:
ing price on the day of the last shipment was 1154 cents
per pound. The latter part of October and November
1946, when the Fremont company, by its telegram of Oc-
tober 14, 1946, stated it expected to load three tanks the
last part of October and three tanks the last half of Novem-

30

ber, the ceiling price at that time was 134% cents per pound.
On October 16, 1946, the ceiling price was withdrawn.

On November 1, 1946, Wilson & Company wired the Fre-
mont company, ‘‘Your Wire Oct. 14th Advising Expect To
Load Three Tanks Soybean Oil Last Half October Three
Tanks November When Will You Want These Empty
Tanks For Loading Wire Reply.’’ On November 2, 1946,
the Fremont company wired Wilson & Company: ‘‘Retel
Will Not Have Oil To Ship Until Late November Will
Contact You When Can Ship And Set Price On Oil.’’ This
last telegram received from the Fremont company by Wil-
son & Company was the first indication that there would
be any other price than the contract price charged for
the soybean oil.

On November 5, 1946, this witness received a long dis-
tance telephone call from Wiysel wherein Wiysel wanted
to make an adjustment as to prices on the six cars that
had not been delivered. He was informed that there was
no-adjustment, as the price was on the contract, 1154 cents
per pound.

On November 15, 1946, this witness wrote the Fremont
company referring to the telephone conversation with
Wiysel, and stated that this oil, on the basis of the con-
tract, was due and coming to Wilson & Company at 11%
cents per pound, f.o.b. Fremont, inasmuch as this was the
last OPA ceiling price in effect.
~ On November 16, 1946, the Fremont company wired
Forssell in Chicago: ‘‘Offer To Ship Six Cars Soybean
Oil December January If Accepted In Full Satisfaction
Of Harwood Contract No. 3447W.’’ On November 16, 1946,
Forssell wired the Fremont company in reply to this offer
to ship six cars of soybean oil December 1946, and Janu-
ary 1947, and that it was satisfactory to ship same on
dates mentioned at 1314 cents per pound in full satisfac-
tion of the contract.

On November 18, 1946, the Fremont company wired Fors-
sell: ‘‘Our Wire 16th Offer To Ship Six Cars Predicated
On Agreement At Current Oil Market Which We Believe
Is 23 Cents.’’ This marked the first time that the Fremont
company set a definite figure for the price of the six cars

31

in controversy, which was the current price on that date.
There was a fluctuation of prices after the ceiling was re-
moved, from 20 to 23 cents, and then from 24 to 25 cents the
latter part of November 1946. The last day of October the
market price was 22 cents.

On November 18, 1946, Forssell wrote the Fremont com-
pany making reference to its telegram of November 16th
wherein it offered to ship six cars of soybean oil in De-
cember and January in full satisfaction of the contract,
to which Wilson & Company replied that it would -accept
the six tanks at 13% cents per pound, and that they re-
ceived a telegram from Fremont company offering the six
cars at 23 cents per pound. Not to have any misunder-
standing, Wilson & Company reiterated the position as
outlined in its letter of November 15th, ‘‘that on the basis
of our contract with you this oil is due and coming to us at
11%¢, per lb., but without waiving any of our rights we
would accept these six tanks you offer us for December-
January shipment at 1314c per Ib. in full satisfaction of
this contract.’’ There was no reply received to this letter.

On December 2, 1946, Forssell wired the Fremont com-
pany: ‘‘No Reply Our Letter November 18th What Can
We Expect Six Tanks Soybean Oil Due On Marwood Con-
tract No. 3447-W.’’ December 3, 1946, the Fremont com-
pany wired Forssell: ‘‘Retel Offer Ship Car Soybean Oil
Current Market 25 Cents.’’ On December 3, 1946, the mar-
ket price of soybean oil was 25 cents per pound.

Harry E. Wiysel, manager for the Fremont company,
testified that its factory was located at Fremont, Nebraska,
and that it engaged in the processing of soybean oil; that
he was familiar with the CCC contract with his company,
and the same was referred to in the contract between
the Fremont company and Wilson & Company under the
language contained therein, ‘‘Other Conditions’’; and that
the CCC contract was the only contract under which the
Fremont company operated in the processing of soybeans
into crude oil during the season of 1945-1946. In accord-
ance with the CCC contract, the Fremont company went
into the market and purchased soybeans at $2.04 per
bushel, paid to the grower. The Fremont company sold

32

the soybeans to the CCC for $2.04 per bushel, and repur-
chased them from the CCC at 37 cents less a bushel, which
constituted the margin of profit to the Fremont company.

The CCC contract provided that the Fremont company

(the processor) was privileged to purchase soybeans of the
1945 crop ‘‘in a total quantity not in excess of the quantity
he (the processor) can process on or before October 10,
1946 (to be determined by multiplying the total daily ca-
pacity of the Plant * * *,’’ which is in this instance 2,300
bushels daily, which would entitle the Fremont company
to purchase 759,000 bushels. Wiysel further testified that
a bushel of soybeans would produce 8% pounds of oil, or,
6,451,500 pounds of soybeans would be equivalent to 105 2/3
tank cars. At the time the CCC contract was entered into
the Fremont company had commitments of 105 tank cars.
The Fremont company purchased 691,338 bushels of soy-
beans under the CCC contract between October 1, 1945, and
October 10, 1946, the production was based on 80 percent
of the plant’s capacity. Assuming that there were 8%
pounds of oil to the bushel, 96 tank cars of oil could be
produced. Thirty cars were delivered to Armour & Com-
pany, 27 cars to the Interstate Cottonseed Oil Refining
Company, and 30 cars to Wilson & Company, or a total
of 87 cars. Wiysel further testified that the total produc-
tion of soybean oil from the 1945 bean crop was 5,588,120
pounds. This would be equivalent to 91% cars.

The Fremont company’s plant was shut down in Sep-
tember, the greater part of October, and in November,
1945, due to inability to procure adequate machinery, steel,
and other items necessary to keep the plant in full produc-
tion.

Wiysel further testified that Wilson & Company never
at any time informed the Fremont company it would waive
the requirements that any soybean oil sold to it under this
contract be produced from beans acquired in accordance
with its contract with the CCC or any other government
agency controlling the marketing or crushing of oilseeds
during the season of 1945-1946, and nothing was said to
the Fremont company about waiving the defaults and the
delivery of soybean oil in October’ 1945, and April and

—-

33

May 1946. He testified that he kept advised of the OPA
ceiling prices in effect from time to time, and that after
October 16, 1946, the ceiling was unlimited; it was the
market price. He related his conversation with Forssell in
September 1946, where matters were discussed about the
contract, and wherein he related to Forssell the difficulties
he had during the past year, previous to September 1946,
to the effect that one large expeller was on order, that
delivery was promised in time to commence operation on
the 1945-1946 crop, that delivery was not made until Octo-
ber 1, and the plant was not in operation until the end of
October. He also explained to Forssell the difficulties in
obtaining repairs for the other expellers. One expeller
was down for six weeks and another a like period of time
in December and January, and they were unable to obtain
repairs due to war conditions. He further explained to
Forssell that the Fremont company had other contracts
that were to be filled, and that the Fremont company
carried the contracts making delivery on a pro rata basis,
month by month. Forssell said nothing with reference to
that matter, and indicated he would accept the oil at a
later date. Wiysel testified that the Fremont company
was agreeable to shipping the remaining six cars of oil
at a later date at the maximum permitted under the OPA.

The Fremont company asserts the contract is subject
to the rules of the National Soybean Processors Associa-
tion which appear in the Year Book and Trading Rules
of the National Soybean Processors Association. Rule 115
contained therein deals with arbitration. Rule 116 deals
with contingencies, and specifically refers to war. We will
discuss this rule later in the opinion. In addition, rules
for arbitration of the American Arbitration Association
are also pertinent to the contract, and the Fremont com-
pany asserts that the refusal of the trial court to admit
into evidence all of such rules relating to arbitration con-
stitutes prejudicial error. Further, the United States
Arbitration Act, Title 9, U. S. C. A., sections 2, 3, and 4,
are applicable and should be enforced in the state courts,
and the failure of the trial court to so do constitutes preju-
dicial error.

34

In this act it is provided that a written provision in
any contract involving commerce to settle by arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such contract shall
be valid and enforceable. By section 3 it is provided that
if any suit or proceeding be brought in any court of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration, the
court in which the suit is pending, shall, on application of
one of the parties stay the trial until such arbitration has
been had, provided the applicant for the stay is not in de-
fault in proceedings in such arbitration.

Section 4 provides in part as follows: ‘‘A party ag-
grieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition any court of the United States which, save for
such agreement, would have jurisdiction under the judi-
cial code at law, in equity, or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between
the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”’

The proper legal steps were taken by the Fremont com-
pany to present to the district court for Dodge County
the question as to whether or not arbitration should be
invoked by the trial court in the instant case. The trial
court ruled against the Fremont company on its conten-
tion in such respect.

A brief history of this litigation is appropriate to relate
in connection with this assignment of error. On July 11,
1947, Wilson & Company filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Nebraska, Omaha Divi-
sion, to recover damages against the Fremont company for
alleged breach of contract (the contract involved in the
instant case). On August 2, 1947, the Fremont company
filed a motion to stay proceedings until arbitration had
been had in accordance with Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 3.
This motion was sustained. Subsequent proceedings in
the federal court hereinafter referred to disclose no order
upon the ruling of the court was signed by the parties or
presented to the court for approval. See Wilson & Co.,
Ine. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364.

On July 19, 1948, Wilson & Company filed a motion to

35

dismiss its action in the United States District Court.
This was before the service or filing of an answer by the
Fremont company. This motion was sustained. In sus-
taining the plaintiff’s motion the court said the plaintiff
had, perhaps still has, the absolute choice of forums for
the recovery of the damages it claims, beyond the possible
intervention of the defendant. By plaintiff is meant Wil-
son & Company, by defendant is meant the Fremont com-
pany. That reflection does not enter into the ruling upon
the point; but it obviates the suggestion that the proce-
dure that is made mandatory in the federal court is being
imposed upon a litigant brought there against its will
and thereby deprived of the supposed advantages to it of
the state court’s traditional usages unaffected by Title 9,
U.S. C. A., section 3. See Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont
Cake & Meal Co., supra.

The instant case was filed by Wilson & Company in
the district court for Dodge County on October 29, 1948.
The case proceeded to trial in the latter part of Septem-
ber 1949, and judgment was entered on the verdict on Sep-
tember 24, 1949.

On April 8, 1949, the Fremont company filed an origi-
nal action in the United States District Court for the
District of Nebraska, Omaha Division, seeking an affirma-
tive order to require Wilson & Company to submit this
controversy to arbitration, as provided for in U. S. C. A,,
Title 9, section 4. This original action was filed while the
instant action was pending and undetermined in the district
court for Dodge County, Nebraska. The United States Dis-
trict Court dismissed the Fremont company’s original
action filed therein on October 8, 1949, holding that the
Fremont company not only had taken none of the explicitly
defined steps to institute arbitration, but that its course
in the entire controversy had been dilatory and obstruc-
tive only. Despite the early threats of Wilson & Company
in two letters to invoke the arbitration clause of the con-
tract, it remained silent on the question touching arbitra-
tion and did not itself initiate the process or even assent
to Wilson & Company’s suggestion of its liability. See

36

Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 83 F. Supp.
- 900.
This case was appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals, 8th Circuit, and on June 27, 1950, an opinion
was rendered by that court wherein the United States
District Court was affirmed. There is no occasion to
quote from the opinion, except to say that the Circuit
Court stated the state court obtained jurisdiction of the
controversy between Wilson & Company and the Fremont,
company long prior to the commencement of the present
proceeding. ‘‘A conflict of jurisdiction is always to be
avoided if possible and it is a general rule that the right
of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in a court having once
attached, will not be taken away by proceedings in an-
other court. The decision in this case does not purport
to interfere in any respect with the jurisdiction of the
State Court but unless it could have such an effect it can
not be said to determine any actual substantive contro-
versy between the parties.” Fremont Cake & Meal Co.
v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 60.
In eonnection with this assignment of error the fol-
lowing authorities of this jurisdiction are applicable.
Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere between
arbitration generally and arbitration as to damages
it is well settled in this state that a provision in a
tract requiring arbitration, whether of all disputes arising
under contract, or only the amounts of loss or damages
sustained by the parties thereto, will not be enforced, and
that refusal to arbitrate is not available to the parties in
an action growing out of the contract. See, Schrandt v.
Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N. W. 1085; National Masonic Acci-
dent Assn. v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N. W. 466; German-
American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N. W. 406;
Rentschler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253
N. W. 694, 95 A. L. R. 1.

We conclude that the Fremont company’s assignment
of error here discussed cannot be sustained.

The Fremont company contends a question for the jury
was presented by the conflict in the testimony of Forssell
and Wiysel regarding the telegrams and correspondence

only,
con-

a,

37

between them as to whether or not a new contract was
made between the parties requiring delivery at an agreed
price after September 1946.

The evidence shows that on October 11, 1946, a telegram
from Wilson & Company to the Fremont company stated:
‘‘ According Our Records We Have Six Tanks Soybean Oil
Still Due Us Marwood Contract 3447-W Stop Please Wire
When You Plan Load These Remaining Six Tanks Due
Give Us Loading Dates As You See Them.’’ The Fremont
company’s answer dated October 14, 1946, said: ‘‘Expect
To Load Three Tanks Last Half October Three Tanks
Last Half November Will Advise Loading Dates Later.’’
We believe this exchange of telegrams constituted the terms
of an extension agreement. It may be noted also that on
November 16, 1946, the Fremont company offered to ship
six cars of soybean oil in December and January, if ac-
cepted in full satisfaction of the Marwood contract, which
was accepted by Wilson & Company.

There is an exchange of telegrams between Wilson &
Company and the Fremont company with reference to the
acceptance of the six tank cars of oil in December 1946,
and January 1947, at 1344 cents per pound, which occurred
after the Fremont company refused to deliver at the con-
tract price. These telegrams show that in order to get
the oil, Wilson & Company not only agreed to a future

- delivery, but to an increase in price to meet the OPA ceiling
price in effect October 16, 1946.

Where a certain date is fixed as the time limit for de-
livery of merchandise by the seller to the purchaser, and
by subsequent agreement between the parties in the form
of correspondence the time limit date for delivery is post-
poned, such agreement does not discharge the original
contract, but the same remains in full force, changed only
to the extent that delivery is postponed. See, Sussman,
Wormser & Co. v. Sea Food Co., 127 Miss. 420, 90 So. 116.
See, also, Gruner Lumber Co. v. Algonquin Lumber Co.,
123 Miss. 157, 85 So. 191; Roberts v. Benjamin, 124 U. S.
64, 8S. Ct. 393, 31 L. Ed. 334.

There was no new contract made between the parties;

38

there was merely an extension of time for delivery of the
soybean oil.

The Fremont company contends that the trial court
erred in denying it a right at the close of the evidence
to amend its answer to further develop the defense that
it was precluded from performing the contract because
of war and conditions resulting therefrom.

This assignment of error is based on the evidence ad-
duced that the Fremont company was unable to procure,
due to priorities, the necessary machinery, supplies, and’
repairs to carry on maximum production of its plant; that
the plant was shut down at intervals during the period of
the contract so that delivery was impossible to be made
under the terms of the contract; and that this condition
made so by war developed unforeseen difficulties, and in
addition, by soybean shortages and the CCC contractual
limitations in procurement of the same. The evidence
does not show that the Fremont company was hindered,
delayed, or prevented by any act of war from processing
and delivering the six tanks of soybean oil in question.
The evidence does show that Wilson & Company con-
sented to and acquiesced in each delay of delivery with-
out waiving any of its rights under the contract to delivery
of the six tank cars of oil in question. No facts existed
when the contract in the instant case was made and as-
sumed by the Fremont company, which made it impossible
of performance.

‘Inconvenience or the cost of compliance, though they
might make compliance a hardship, cannot excuse a party
from the performance cf an absolute and unqualified
undertaking to do a thing that is possible and lawful.
Parties sui juris bind themselves by their lawful contracts,
and courts cannot alter them because they work a hard-
ship. The rights of the parties must be measured by the
contract which they themselves made. A contract is not
invalid, nor is the obligor therein in any manner discharged
from its binding effect, because it turns out to be difficult
or burdensome to perform. It has been said that difficul-
ties, even if unforeseen and however great, are no excuse,
and that the fact that a contract has become more burden-

39

some in its operation than was anticipated is not ground
for its rescission.’’ 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 362, p. 928.

‘*Contract obligations are not generally within the rule
that a person will be absolved from nonperformance of an
obligation or a duty imposed on him by law if performance
is rendered impossible without his fault by an act of God
or an unavoidable accident. * * * A more general rule which
is well settled, though subject to exceptions, is that super-
vening impossibility is not an excuse for nonperformance
of an act promised. A contract which is possible of per-
formance when made does not become invalid or unen-
forceable because conditions afterwards arise which render
' performance impossible. * * * If a party by his own con-
tract creates a duty or imposes a charge on himself, he
must under any and all conditions substantially comply
with the undertaking.’’ 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 363, p.
930. See, also, Columbus Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Columbus, 249
U. S. 399, 39 S. Ct. 349, 63 L. Ed. 699, 6 A. L. R. 1648;
Cameron-Hawn Realty Co. v. Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 101
N. E. 162, 49 L. R. A. N. S. 922.

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, conditions
arising from a state of war in which this country is en-
gaged will not ordinarily constitute an excuse for non-
performance of contract. See 17 C. J. S., Contracts, § 463,
p. 953. See, also, J. C. Lysle Milling Co. v. Sharp (Mo.
App.), 207 S. W. 72; Ingram Day Lumber Co. v. Kola
Lumber Co., 122 Miss. 632, 84 So. 693.

As stated in Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Lorenzo, 222 U. S.
481, 32 S. Ct. 133, 56 L. Ed. 277: ‘‘A part of the delay
seems to have been caused by the repeated breaking down
of the machinery, but nothing appears to take the case
out of the ordinary rule that performance of an absolute
undertaking is not exéused by facts of that sort.’’ See.
also, Sunseri v. Garcia & Maggini Co., 298 Pa. 249, 148
A. 81, 67 A. L. R. 1428.

Some contention is made by the Fremont company that
rule 116 of the Trading Rules 1945-1946, National Soybean
Processors Association, which constitutes a part of the
contract, governs. This rule deals with contingencies
and does mention: ‘‘If in consequence of any act of God,

40
fire, flood, wind, explosion, war, * * * an act of government,
* * * the Seller may be unable to ship or the Buyer un-
able to receive, * * *,’’ then provides a course of proce-
dure to invoke the rule. The contention is that Wilson &
Company failed to abide by or avail itself of this rule. The
rule was not admitted into evidence. The trial court re-
jected rule 116 on the ground that it was tied into the arbi-
tration feature of the contract. The rule also provided
that on failure of the parties to agree that the contingency |
‘has or will delay the execution of the contract, then the
matter shall be arbitrated in accordance with Rule 115
of these Trading Rules * * *.’’

We have heretofore expressed the inapplicability of
the rules with reference to arbitration in the instant case.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the Fremont company the right to amend
its answer, as contended for by it.

The Fremont company further contends that the trial
court erred in not admitting all of the correspondence
between the parties, citing section 25-1215, R. R. S. 1943,
as follows: ‘‘When part of an act, declaration, conversa-
tion or writing is given in evidence by one party, the
whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the
other. When a letter is read, all other letters on the same
subject between the same parties may be given. When a
detached act, declaration, conversation or writing is given
in evidence, any other act, declaration or writing which is
necessary to make it fully understood, or to explain the
same, may also be given in evidence.’ It cites also, Jensen
v. Romigh, 133 Neb. 71, 274 N. W. 199; Culver v. Union
P. R. R. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794; Roeder v. State,
119 Neb. 116, 227 N. W. 446. ?

This assignment of error involves certain correspond-
ence between Wilson & Company and one Mr. Eighmy,
connected with a firm processing soybean oil which had
no connection with the Fremont company. This corre-
spondence was to the effect that Wilson & Company de-
sired Eighmy to use his best offices to persuade the Fre-
mont company to abide by the terms of its contract with
Wilson & Company. Eighmy’s reply was to the effect that

41

Wilson & Company should not Ue favored in such respect,
and should pay the market price for soybean oil. We are
unable to discern in what manner this correspondence
could affect any issue in this case. No prejudicial error
resulted to the Fremont company by the rejection of this
evidence.

The balance of the evidence upon which the Fremont
company predicates error by the trial court not admitting
the same, relates to correspondence by Wilson & Com-
pany through its counsel and representatives, relating to
invoking arbitration against the Fremont company, also
the refusal of the trial court in not admitting in evidence
the entire complaint filed by the Fremont company in
the federal court, after Wilson & Company introduced
a part thereof as admissions against interest. The part
of the complaint the Fremont company desired in evi-
dence dealt with arbitration. Suffice it is to say, the arbi-
tration feature of the contract is not here involved. The
trial court did not commit prejudicial error in rejecting
this evidence.

The Fremont company contends the jury should have
been permitted to decide whether or not, under the pecu-
liar condition existing at the time the contract was made,
the parties intended the price to be 1134 cents in any
event unless the OPA fixed a different price, or whether
it was the intention to recite the OPA price then in effect
and prescribe a third person, to wit the OPA, to fix the
price. If the latter was the case, then the failure of the
OPA to fix any price after October 16, 1946, would dis-
charge both parties from any liability under the contract.
The Fremont company cites section 69-410, R. S. 1943.
The contract is plain. It provided for 11% cents per pound
unless the OPA raised the ceiling above that figure, and
then it would be the ceiling price fixed by the OPA. In
the absence of a ceiling price fixed by the OPA, the contract
price is just what the contract provided, 1134 cents per
pound. .

Forssell testified that the OPA ceiling was removed
October 16, 1946. The evidence is that the OPA eliminated
all control of soybeans. There was no ceiling price there-

42

after. The seller could sell at the market price, above the
market price, or below the market price. There were no
restrictions, and no reason why a jury should pass upon
the question as contended for by the Fremont company.
The Fremont company was obligated and required to fulfill
its contractual obligation to Wilson & Company separate
and apart from any contract with the CCC which it vol-
untarily entered into. In this connection there is no doubt
that the Wilson & Company contract could have been ful-
filled by the Fremont company. They were permitted to
purchase enough soybeans under the CCC contract to ful-
fill this contract. There was no reason for Wilson & Com-
pany to be required to prorate with any other commitments
held by the Fremont company when they took over the
Marr company obligations.

The measure of damages, where the delivery date within
which delivery must be made has been postponed by the
parties, is the difference between the contract price of the
goods and their market value at such postponed date of
delivery. See Sussman, Wormser & Co. v. Sea Food Co.,
supra.

The measure of damages in this case is the difference in
the contract price of the six tank cars of soybean oil in
question and the market value of the same at the time
to which delivery is postponed. If delivery is postponed
by agreement of the parties, the market value at the time
to which delivery is postponed is taken as the criterion.
See, Summers v. Hibbard, 153 Ill. 102, 38 N. E. 899, 46
Am. 8S. R. 872; Crescent City Mfg. Co. v. Slattery, 132
La. 917, 61 So. 870; Covington Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 204
Ala. 192, 85 So. 726; Loy v. Storz Electric Refrigeration
Co., 122 Neb. 357, 240 N. W. 423.

An abnormal rise in the price of goods due to unusual
trade conditions, such that a producer cannot perform
his contract to fill his order without greater expense than
anticipated, is not within the provisions of the contract
relieving him from liability in case of unavoidable acci-
dents, wars, strikes, fires, labor trouble, or other delays.
See Farmers Fertilizer Co. v. Lillie, 18 F. 2d 197, 52 A. L. R.

43

552. See, also, Wickham & B. Coal Co. v. Minnesota Coal
Co., 7 F. 2d 873.

The evidence discloses that there was no dispute be-
tween the parties as to what the market price was on
any given date after the ceiling was eliminated.

Where the defendant had defaulted on its contract to
deliver equal monthly installments of merchandise and
such requirement had been waived by plaintiff’s acquies-
cence, the defendant had no right to insist that plaintiff’s
damages for breach should be measured by the market
price in the months preceding the final breach of the
contract, the market price of such merchandise having
increased after the final breach. See Brevard Tannin Co.
v. J. F. Mosser Co., 288 F. 725.

Other assignments of error need not be discussed.

For the reasons herein given, the judgment entered by
the trial court on the verdict is sustained.

Affirmed.

Chappell, J., dissents.

(4221)

| | YEAR BOOK
and
i . TRADING RULES
‘ 1945-1946

: National Soybean Processors Association

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reassess

National Soybean Processors Association

Constitution and By-Laws, Code of Ethics,
Officers, Directors, List of Standing Commit-
tees, Names of Members, Trading Rules, ete.

Official Copy

Published by the Association 50 cents per copy
3818 Board of Trade Building, Chicago 4, Illinois

Index

Page
Constitution and By-Laws and Code of Ethics.................. 3
Officers, Directors and Committees for 1945-46............0000. 13
Membership of the National Soybean Processors Association..... 18
Trading Rules on Soybean Oil Meal..... 2.20.0... 0c cccceececcee 21
Appendix to Trading Rules on Soybean Oil Meal.............. 34
Official Methods of Analysis
PN PGc AER ietieb cbs cddutbockksveubececcides 34
CES SEENON AT eA ow tobi bK6¢ 000s vivcvenvnns 34
EES eee eae RE
We Es io eid c ic cicccccsccicdecccrec 39
Appendix to Trading Rules on Soybean Oil................... 53
I 56 2s hn 5 setae dé-rack da be bcdede 53
NN ds kv a cins coda vdcda xudésd cde 55
I aaa cans idea divnas sudedbae See 55
Tentative Official Centrifugal Refining Test.......... 57
Soybean Oil Bleach Test—Refined Oils................... 58
ae re a aaa an ne Cac re w'ae bubs Kickaine 59
Tentative Method of Grading Soybean Oil for Green Color.. 59
Official Method for Oil Sampling..................0c0eeee 63
Standard Specifications for Crude Soybean Oil for Technical
EE sobs OWES Onde vhs kha cu veda pansies 6xbeesuss 64
Moisture and Volatile Matter...............cescesceccece 65
I I Be oink viv cn eciccveccandposac 65
Pe I I a Ph 65h csv checb cae cde ceesv couse at 66
PG IE I PUD oon ccc ccescccdencescavens 67
Iodine Number—Wijs Method. ..............ccccccccecce 68
I PI ne oo ca dbindadncicsidceccdbnkaas 70

CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
(As amended Sept. 22, 1944)

ARTICLE I

Title and Object
Title

Section 1. This organization shall be known as the National Soy-
bean Processors Association.

Object

Section 2-a. To strengthen the character of its members and incul-
cate in them those principles so essential in the discharge of the duties
of the individuals as members of society.

Section 2-b. To promote the welfare of its members and to foster
and encourage the exchange of such information as may be considered
lawful in order that the consuming public may profit from economies
effected.

Section 2-c. To seek to remove the attendant evils and trade cus-
toms contrary to sound business principles and highest standard of
ethics and to formulate constructive policies for the cooperation of its
members as a means of eliminating grievances by fair and equitable
adjustment.

Section 3. The Association shall not directly or indirectly restrict
free and lawful competition.

ARTICLE II
Membership

Section 1. Any individual, firm or corporation regularly engaged
in che actual processing of Soybeans or any association or group
representing firms or corporations regularly engaged in the actual
processing of Soybeans for the manufacture of Soybean’ Oil Meal
and Soybean Oil may become a regular Member of this Association,
upon the approval of the Board of Directors and by complying with the
Constitution and By-Laws of this Association, and subscribing to the

Code of Ethics.
ial Associate Members

Section 2-a. An individual who may have rendered meritorious
service in the Soybean industry may become a Special Associate Mem-
ber upon approval of the Board of Directors.

Section 2-b. A Special Associate Member shall not be entitled to a
vote, or to hold office, but may otherwise participate in the affairs of
the Association by serving on standing or special committees, when
and if appointed by the President to render such service.

Application For Membership

Section 3. Applications for Membership shall be referred to the
President who shall submit them at once to the Board of Directors
of this Association. If the vote of the Board of Directors is favorable,
the President shall notify the applicant, and applicant shall be en-
rolled in the Membership of this Association.

Section 4. The Board of Directors may terminate the Membership
of any Member whose conduct or Code of Ethics is inimical to this

tion.
3

ARTICLE III

Board of Directors

Section 1. The management of the affairs of this Association,
including the determination of the voting rights of affiliated Members,
shall be vested in a Board of Directors, the number of which is to be
specified by the By-Laws of this Association. Directors to fill vacan-
cies on the Board of Directors shall be elected by this Association at
its Annual Meeting from its regular Members, as the last order of
business. They shall take office immediately following the Annual
Meeting and shall serve for three years. In case of death or resigna-
tion of a Member of the Board of Directors, the Executive .Com-
mittee shall appoint a Director from the regular Membership to °
serve for the remainder of the unexpired term.

Section 2. Only one representative of a firm, corporation, associa-
tion or group holding Membership in this Association may serve on
the Board of Directors at the same time.

Officers

Section 3. The Officers of this Association shall be compced.of
the President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Assistant
Treasurer. The President shall preside at all meetings of the Member-
ship, Board of Directors and the Executive Committee. In the absence
of the President, the Vice President shall preside and in the absence
of both the President and the Vice President, the Secretary shall pre-
side. The Vice. President shall serve as Chairman of the Executive
Committee, and in his absence the Secretary shall serve as Chairman
of the Executive Committee. In case of death or resignation of an
Officer, the Board of Directors shall fill such office for the remainder
of the unexpired term.

Section 4. The Officers of this Association shall be selected for
one year by the Board of Directors, at a meeting immediately follow-
ing the Annual Meeting of the Association.

Section 5. Only one representative of a firm, corporation, asso-
ciation or group holding regular Membership in this Association may
hold office at the same time.

Executive Committtee

Section 6. The Executive Committee shall be composed of the
President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer and four (4)
other Directors, elected by the Board of Directors at its meeting im-
mediately following the Annual Meeting: In the case of death or
resignation of a Member of the Executive Committee, the Board of
Directors shall fill such office for the remainder of the unexpired
term. The Vice President shall serve as Chairman of the Executive
Committee and in his absence the Secretary shall so serve.

Section 7. Only one representative of a firm, corporation, associa-
tion or group holding Membership in this Association may serve on
the Executive Committee at the same time.

4

ARTICLE IV

Duties of Officers

Section 1. Duties of the President: It shall be the duty of the
President to call all meetings of this Association except the Annual
Meeting which is provided for in Section 1 of Article VII of this
Constitution. He shall appoint such committees and fill vacancies
upon such committees as are provided under the Constitution and
By-Laws of the Association. He shall be an ex-officio member of all
committees. He shall carry on the general business management of
the Association and shal! perform such other executive duties as the
Board of Directors of the Association may direct.

Section 2. Duties of the Vice President: The Vice President shall
perform all duties of the President in his absence and such other
duties as may be assigned to him by the Board of Directors or the
Executive Committee. He shall approve all expenditures as authorized
by the Board of Directors and/or the Executive Committee. He shall
preside at all meetings of the Board of Directors and Executive Com-
mittee of this Association in the absence of the President.

Section 3. Duties of the Secretary: It shall be the duty of the
Secretary to keep a record of the proceedings of all meetings of the
Association and to perform such other duties incident to his office as
may arise. He shall prepare and present a report at the annual meet-
ing covering his work for the year. His report may be combined with
or embodied in that of the President. He shall be responsible directly
to the Executive Committee. In the absence of both the President and
the Vice President, the Secretary shall perform the duties of the
President and the Vice President in their absence, and also such
duties as may be assigned to him by the Board of Directors and/or
the Executive Committee.

Section 4. Duties of the Treasurer: It shall be the duty of the
Treasurer to collect all moneys due the Association and pay out such
moneys in settlement of just debts of the Association under direction
and authority of the Vice President and Chairman of the Executive
Committee when and as provided. He shall, at the request of the
Executive Committee, provide suitable bond to insure faithful per-
formance of his duties, expense of such bond to be borne by the
Association. He shall keep a true and accurate record of all receipts
and disbursements and submit an annual report at the annual meeting
of the Association. He shall, at the request of the Executive Com-
mittee, submit the books of the Association for an audit, expense of
such audit to be borne by the Association.

Duties of the Executive Committee

Section 5. The Executive Committee shall act as the Executive
Body for the Association under the direction and authority of the
Board of Directors. It shall be the duty of the Executive Committee
to approve the expenditure of moneys available for current operating
expenses and to confer on regular or special committees authority to

5

oe

expend such funds as may have been set aside or collected for their
specific use. The Executive Committee shall direct the President in
all Association matters, acting in behalf of the Board of Directors.

=
Duties of the Board of Directors
Section 6. The Board of Directors shall act as the governing body
in all matters of administration and policy for the Association, It shall
direct the Executive Committee, which will act as Executive Body for
the Board in the interim between Board meetings.

ARTICLE V
Initiation Fee and Dues

Section 1. The initiation fee for each individual, firm, corpora-
tion, association or group Member shall be fixed by the Board of
Directors. Check for this amount should be made payable to this Associ-
ation and be attached to application for Membership.

Section 2. The Executive Committee shall make recommendation
to the Board of Directors as to annual dues. The annual dues for each
individual, firm, corporation, association or group Member shall be
determined by the Board of Directors from year to year and shall
be paid in the manner prescribed.

Section 3. A Member individual, firm, corporation, association or
group paying its initiation fee and annual dues shall be entitled to
have several Members participate in the work of this Association,
yet shall be entitled to only one vote, per Section 6 of Article VII.
Members, who in the opinion of the Board of Directors, maintain
a common affiliation shall be so designated and such group shall have
only one vote.

Section 4. Special dues and assessments for specific purposes may
be provided for at an annual meeting or a general meeting called for
that purpose when recommended by the Executive Committee.

Section 5. Any regular Member failing to pay the annual dues
as provided in Section 2 of this Article or any special assessment
shall not be entitled to vote at any meetings of this Association and
such failure to pay shall be considered equivalent to resignation.

Section 6. There shall be no initiation fee, dues or special assess-
ments of any kind for Special Associate Members.

ARTICLE VI
Fiscal Year
Section 1. The fiscal year shall run from October 1 to Septem-
ber 30.
ARTICLE VII
Meetings
Section 1. The Annual Meeting shall be held at a date selected

by the President, approved by the Board of Directors, or otherwise
as directed.

6

Section 2. The President, or the Executive Committee, shall call
all meetings of the Association (except the annual meeting as provided
for in Section 1 of this Article) as and when they are deemed advis-
able, to transact matters requiring prompt action, fixing the exact time
and place of all meetings and making all arrangements for same.

Section 3. The President cr Vice President or, in their absence,
the Secretary may call a meeting of the Board of Directors as often
as necessary. The President or Vice President or, in their absence,
the Secretary may call a meeting of the Executive Committee as often
as necessary to take care of matters in the interim between meetings
of the Board of Directors. Notice of all stated or special meetings
of this Association shall be mailed to each participating Member at
least one week prior to the date of such meeting.

Section 4. Quorum: A majority of the Directors shall constitute
a quorum at all Directors’ Meetings of this Association; a majority
shall constitute a quorum for all meetings of the Executive Committee
of this Association.

Section 5. Representation at Meetings: Any individual, firm,
corporation, association or group holding regular Membership in this
Association may be represented at Annual Meetings of this Associa-
tion by one or more representatives, but only one representative shall
be entitled to vote on the same question.

Section 6. Each individual, firm, corporation, association or group
holding regular Membership in this Association shall designate the
Member of such organization, firm, corporation, association or group
who is to vote at stated or special meetings by sending a letter to the
Central Office in advance of such meeting.

ARTICLE VIII
Voting by Mail

Section 1. Executive Committee: When necessary, the Executive
Committee shall vote by mail on questions presented by the President
or Vice President or, in their absence, by the Secretary, and a majority
of the votes received within five (5) days shall be decisive, providing
a majority of the Executive Committee Members have voted.

Board of Directors: When necessary, the Board of Directors shall
vote by mail on questions presented by the President or Vice Presi-
dent or, in their absence, by the Secretary, and the majority of the
votes received within five (5) days shall be decisive, providing a
majority of the Directors have voted.

Section 2. Members: Questions which in the judgment of the
Board of Directors or Executive Committee are of sufficient impor-
tance for the consideration of this Association, and are not im-
portant enough for a special meeting of this Association, may be
voted upon by mail, and a majority of the votes received within fifteen
(15) days from the voting Membership of this Association shall be
— if more than fifty percent of the total Membership have
voted.

7

° ARTICLE IX
Committees

Section 1. The President shall appoint annually, at as early a
date as possible after the Annual Meeting, the following Standing
Committees consisting of not less than five Members.

(a) Oil Trading Rules Committee

(b) Meal Trading Rules Committee

(c) Technical Committee

(d) Traffic and Transportation Committee

(e) Soybean Grades and Contracts Committee

(f) Trade Development Committee

(g) Soybean Research Council

(h) Crop Improvement Committee -

(i) Soy Flour Committee

(j) Research Committee

(k) Edible Soybean Committee

(1) — Rules and Standards Committee for Soybean Oil

Mea

The President may also appoint such special committees as he may

feel necessary as the occasion arises.

The President shall appoint, after receiving the approval of the
Board of Directors or the Executive Committee, at least thirty days
before the Annual Meeting, a Nominating Committee of six (6)
from the Membership. At least two of this Nominating Committee
are to be Members of the present Board of Directors and, further,
this Nominating Committee shall represent as far as possible the
varied and different interests of this Association, with consideration
given to geographical locations of the Membership.

Section 2. Function of Committees:

(a) Oil Trading Rules Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to constantly study the
Trading Rules of the Association with a view to maintaining fair and
equitable conditions for both buyex and seller and when modern com-
mercial practices warrant changes, to promptly make such recom-
mended revisions. It shall also be the function of this committee to
interpret the Trading Rules when called upon by any member to do
so. Proposed rules, initiated by the Technical Committee or other com-
mittee, bearing on transactions in soybean oil shall first be submitted
to this committee for consideration and recommendation. ;

(b) Meal Trading Rules Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to constantly study the
Trading Rules of the Association with a view to maintaining fair and
equitable conditions for both buyer and seller and when modern com-
mercial practices warrant changes, to promptly make such recom-
mended revisions. It shall also be the function of this committee to
interpret the Trading Rules when called upon by any member to do

aiidenaale _—

so. Proposed rules, initiated by the Technical Committee or other
committee, bearing on the transactions in soybean oil meal shall first
be submitted to this committee for consideration and recommendation.

(c) Technical Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to cooperate with all
government standards committees and the various official societies and
other agencies in maintaining standards for our products which will
afford commercial protection to buyer and seller. As occasion arises,
this committee shall also carry on studies with a view to making recom-
mendations to the Trading Rules Committees with respect to any rules
or amendments to the rules.

(d) Traffic and Transportation Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to maintain close con-
tact with all rate making bodies, to represent the Association at hear-
ings on proposed changes in freight rates, to keep the Association
intormed on all rate developments directly or indirectly affecting the
soybean industry, to submit briefs and verbal arguments in behalf of
the Association and generally to see to it that the interests of the
industry as a whole are properly protected.

(e) Soybean Grades and Contracts Committee

It shall be the function of this committee in protecting the inter-
ests of the industry to see that fair and just grades are established
either by the United States Department of Agriculture or for the sev-
eral primary markets, keeping in mind that equal protection must be
afforded buyer and seller. This committee shall likewise guard the
industry against improper grain exchange trading rules and contracts.
The committee shall be responsible for such other matters as fair and
equitable schedules of discounts for moisture, foreign material and
damaged soybeans in excess of maximum amounts allowed for the
standard grades.

(f) Trade Development Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to study the major aspects
of the industry as a whole, possible future developments, the creation
of new channels of consumption for soybean products, and to suggest
policies of a broad, constructive character looking to the greater future
efficiency and economy of the industry and its relationship to other
allied or competitive industries.

(g) Soybean Research Council

The Couxci! shall be made up of scientific men from the various
member firms and from whatever outside organization shall be agreed
upon by the Executive Committee. The Council shall issue from time
to time literature bearing the Council imprint which will be distributed
in accordance with instructions by the Executive Committee. The
Council shall keep in touch with all research developments in various
agricultural colleges and universities and government experiment sta-

9

tions, shall hold meetings with college groups carrying on research
work or desiring information available to the Council. The Council
shall meet regularly, shall keep the membership advised of develop-

ments and shall submit an annual report covering fully the activities
of the year.

(h) Crop Improvement Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to cooperate with the
agricultural interests to encourage the growing of soybeans in the
United States and to cooperate with the agricultural colleges and

experiment stations in developing new strains of soybzans which yield
more and better quality oil.

(i) Soy Flour Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to keep the member-
ship informed with respect to the development of the soy flour
industry and to make suggestions and recommendations with a view
to the enlargement of this branch of the industry.

(j) Research Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to study soybean prod:
ucts, new outlets for soybeans, new types and varieties, new develop
ments in governmental and other research efforts, complete coopera:
tion to be extended to this committee by the membership.

(k) Edible Soybean Committee
It shall be the function of this committee to keep the Association

fully intormed with respect to the progress made in the development
of the edible soybean field.

(1) Uniform Rules and Standards Committee for Soybean Oil
Meal
It shall be the function of this Committee to maintain close con-
tact with the Association of American Feed Control Officials. Any
proposed changes in existing soybean product definitions or definitions
of new soybean products shall be cleared to the membership after
consultation with the designated Feed Control official.

Section 3. The Chairman of each committee shall prepare and
present a report at the annual meeting covering the progress and
scope of the work done for the year, and shall make recommenda-
tions for the guidance of their successors.

10

ARTICLE X
Rules
Section 1. The proceedings of all meetings of this Association and
its Executive Committee shall be subject to parliamentary rules as
indicated in Roberts’ Rules of Order.
ARTICLE XI
Code of Ethics

We, members of the National Soybean Processors Association,
mindful that we are engaged in a vocation affording us a distinct
opportunity to serve society and to promote and maintain friendly
and truthful relations among men, do pledge ourselves:

First: To strive by sincere, intelligent and lawful cooperation to
use our best endeavors to elevate the standards of the vocation in
which we are engaged and to so conduct our affairs that others in our
vocation may find it wise, profitable and conducive to happiness to
emulate our example.

Second: To employ workers of high character and dependability,
and to provide conditions favorable to their welfare and moral devel:
opment, and to pay for an honest day's labor an adequate wage con-
sistent with standards of living and services rendered.

Third: To use only high grade materials and to seek by every
possible means to know the true value of same in order that misrepre-
sentation, unknowingly, may be avoided. To refrain from using
inferior materials or imitation products in order to meet some unusual
competitive conditions or for the purpose of returning a larger margin
of profit.

Fourth: To observe truth and honesty in all interviews with sales
men and to make no false or misleading statements to secure price
revision. To conscientiously comply with terms or payments, accord:
ing to terms of purchase and to refrain from making unjust and unrea-
sonable claims in an attempt to evade liability under a purchase
contract.

Fifth: To compete always with fairness, securing patronage on
merit and confidence, rather than by derogatory reference to a com-
petitor or his goods and to abstain at all times from making false or
disparaging statements, either written or oral or circulate harmful
rumors regarding a competitor's products, financial or personal
reputation.

Sixth: To refrain from infringing upon the equal rights of a com-
petitor and unfairly interfering with his business or misappropriating
his trade names, or formulae, or by enticing away his employees.

Seventh: To be guided by a spirit of justice, integrity and honor
in all our relations with members of the allied trades, realizing that
the standard of ethics in our own industry so vitally affects the stand-
ards maintained in associated industries. To encourage the allied trades
to adopt similar codes and to discourage unfair trade practices in those
industries even though such business methods are to our own imme-
diate advantage.

11

Eighth: To conduct our business in such a manner that we may
render a highly satisfactory and economical service to our customers.
To know accurately our costs of management, production, and dis-
tribution, in order that a fair price may be ed and a reasonable
profit assured. To represent our products truthfully at all times in our
advertising and our labeling and to adhere to specifications as care-
fully as is commercially possible. To strive to constantly improve the
quality of our products and services and to build an established con-
fidence in the hearts of our patrons.

Ninth: To conscientiously adhere to the rules of conduct herein
set forth and to inspire others in our industry to do likewise, believ-
ing sincerely that the Golden Rule in business is the only safe guide
of conduct conducive to continued sat

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_0696%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
