# Opposition Brief — Joseph v. Ohio

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1951
- **Citation:** 341 U.S. 935

## Text

INDEX.

a a en |
Denes SOROMTOG 2. cw eee oe ee
(1) Trial judge ate dinner with jury at hotel rs 3
(2) Divorce decree admitted in evidence... 11
(3) Court limited argument of petitioner’s counsel 13
RI ena 2 Gore as nak Sine Ties ot ae
Text Cited.
14 Am. Jur., 891, Sec. 179.......... Ter eer ne Ge

Cases Cited.
Ayrhart v. Wilhelmy, 135 Lowa, 290

Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 Fed. (2d), 779

Baker v. Hunter, 317 U. S., 681...
Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U. S., 483...
Bridge v. Hoboken, 1 Wall., 116, 143

Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn., 67.
Brooks v. Tenn., 71 United States Sup. Ct., ae

Capinola v. United States, 61 Fed. (2d), 5
Cases v. United States, 131 Fed. (2d), 916
Cox v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky., 585

a a ee i
SFr Ore OH wh oc -)

i

Decker v. State, 113 O. S., 512, 523. re ey
Dishmaker vy. Heck, 159 Wise., 572......... eee nahin
Dodge v. United States, 258 Fed., 300... ....

Dodge v. United States, 250 U. S., 660

Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S., 71.............

Kmmert v. State, 127 O. S., 2385............

Fay v. N. Y., 332 U. S., 261
Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S., 81

Gandolfo v. State, 11 O. S., 114.

Gonzales v. Ross, 120 U. S., 605. .

Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S., 312, 316 ;
Kay v. United States, 306 U.S., 660................
Malinski v. N. Y., 324 U.S., 401 ba Sa ael: eater
Montana, ex rel. Haire, v. Rice, Treas., 204 U.S., 291. .
MeNabb v. United States, 318 U. S., 332

New York v. Kleinert, 264 U. S., 646, 650

People v. Kelly, 94 N. Y., 526

People v. Bradbury, 155 Cal., 808

People v. Reitz, 261 Pae., 526

Perkins v. Cranor, 338 U. S., 862
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt., 485, 60 Va., 485
Ray v. U.S., 114 Fed. (2d), 507

Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S., 97...

State v. Perkins, 204 P. (2d), 207 rants
State v. Brayden, 56 O. A., 19.. Ee AR
State v. Huffman, 138 O. S., 28..............

State v. Hobbs, 134 0. S., 56........ Brier iwuel gee
State v. Adams, 141 O. S., 423.................. i
State v. Parker, 12 S. W. (2d), 428, 321 Mo., 553...
Thomas v. Iowa, 209 U. S., 258, 263.

ii

United States v. Kay, 101 Fed., 270 m3 15

Velazques v. United States, 319 U.S.,770............ 16
Voorhees v. Jackson, 10 Pet., 449....... re 5
Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U. S., 361... ... 13
Wagenman v. United States, 269 Fed., 568. 15
Wagenman v. United States, 255 U. S., 572 16
Walsh v. United States, 287 U. S., 671 14
Weaver v. State, 24 O. S., 584... 14
Wood County Commissioners v. Shinnew, et al., 10 O.
C.C. (N.S.), 54 (affrm. 80 O. S., 712) 5
Statute Cited.
NEE. oa. kaw kaa dane Ps yews ~ eae

ili

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

é

No. 672.

THOMAS A. JOSEPH,

Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF OHIO,
Respondent.

BRIEF OPPOSED TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT.

The record shows that in the state courts the only time
the petitioner indicated a question was involved under the
Federal Constitution, was in the notice of appeal filed in
the Supreme Court of Ohio (R., 3) stating “This appeal is

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2

taken to this court on questions of law and is filed on the
following grounds, to-wit: (1) In a ease involving a con-—
stitutional question under the Constitution of the state of
Ohio, and under the Constitution of the United States”; |
and in the excerpts from appellant's brief in the Supreme —
Court of Ohio (R., 5) wherein it is stated: “Appellant says
there is a constitutional question involved in this ease.”

That appellant files this case as a matter of right and
avers that his conviction on Count No. 9 of the indictment
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals violates his
rights under Article 1, Seetion 10, of the Ohio Constitution, |
and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. * * *”

At no other time throughout the proceedings in the state
courts is any reference made to a question under the Con-
stitution of the United States. The prohibitions contained
in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States do not apply to proceedings in state courts, but to
the procedure in the federal courts alone. 14 Am. Jur,
page 891, See. 179; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S., 97;
State v. Perkins, 204 P. (2d), 207 (Wash.), certiorari
denied, Perkins v. Cranor, 338 U. 8., 862.

In the case of New York v. Kleinert, 264 U. S., 646, 650,
it was stated that it is well settled that this court is with-
out jurisdiction to review the judgment of a state court
by reason of a federal question which was not raised be-
low or called to the attention of or decided by the state
court.

In Montana, ex rel. Haire, v. Rice, Treas., 204 U. S., 291,
where the claim for the first time appears in the petition
for writ of error that the judgment of the state court im-
pairs the obligation of a contract, held, it comes too late to

ea

«FE Tey OVE Ow?

3

give jurisdiction over that question even though another
federal question has been properly raised and brought here,
by the same writ of error.

In Thomas v. Iowa, 209 U. S., 258, 263, it is stated that
a mere claim in the court below, that there has been a
denial of due process of law, does not of itself raise a fed-
eral question with sufficient distinctness to give us juris-
dietion to consider whether there has been a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

In Bridge, Proprietor, v. Hoboken, 1 Wall., 116, 148, it
has been stated that:

“The true and rational rule is that the court must
be able to see clearly, from the whole record, that a
certain provision of the Constitution “ * "was
relied on by the party who brings the writ of error, and
that the right thus claimed by him was denied.”

Where it does not affirmatively appear from the record
that the accused was prejudiced by the alleged error or
was prevented from having a fair trial, the claimed error
does not constitute ground for a new trial or for the re-
versal of a conviction under See. 13449-5 G. C. (R., 20).
State v. Brayden, 56 0. A., 19. This section of the General
Code has been held to be constitutional. State v. Huffman,
138 O. S., 28, and State v. Hobbs, 134 O. S., 56.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

(1) The trial judge accompanied the jury and officers
designated by him to have charge of the jury, to the
Southern Hotel and ate dinner with them after the case had
been submitted for deliberation by the jury. Counsel for
the petitioner in urging this question in his petition for a
writ of certiorari (p. 4), for the first time undertakes to

4

place this question under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States; and in his brief (p,
7) in support of the petition says:

“The petition for writ of certiorari sets out in three
separate instances denials by the highest court of Ohio,
of privileges and immunities guaranteed petitioner by
the Constitution of the United States.”

This assignment of error was not included in the motion
for a new trial and was not noted in the record until after
the motion for a new trial was overruled and the petitioner
had been sentenced. In support of that statement the
respondent calls the attention of this court to the fact that
the record on page 37 showing the entry overruling the
motion for a new trial and sentencing the defendant to the
Ohio Penitentiary, is an excerpt from the bill of exceptions
page 1194; and that the record page 35 shows excerpts
from the bill of exceptions pages 1199 and 1200, in which
this question was stipulated for the first time. In other
words, the first reference to the trial judge eating with
the jury appears on page 1200 of the state record which
is six pages after the motion for a new trial was overruled
according to the state record; and it was not until the
petitioner had been sentenced to the penitentiary that an
attempt was made to show that such conduct of the trial
judge was prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner.

Under the rule in Ohio, on motion for new trial, the
petitioner had the full right to take affidavits or testimony
of jurors, if he believed he was prejudiced by the trial
judge eating dinner with the jury and the sworn officers in
charge of the jury. In State v. Adams, 141 O. S., 423, it
was held on motion for new trial, affidavits or testimony
of jurors may be received to show that unlawful com-

4)

munications were made by the court officer to the jury dur-
ing their deliberations. To the same effect, Emmert v.
State, 127 O. S., 235.

However, the verdict of the jury cannot be assailed by
mere suspicion and surmise. Baker v. Hudspeth, Warden,
129 Fed. (2d), 779 (where jurors improperly communicated
with female deputy sheriffs), certiorari denied, Baker v.
Hunter (suecessor to Hudspeth), Warden, 317 U. S., 681.
In People v. Kelly, 94 New York, 526, the court answered
a written communication of the jury and the record did
not disclose what the communication was. The court im-
plied that the harmful nature of such communication must
be shown, saying that the presumption is that there was no
violation of duty on the part of the court. No officer, with-
out procf, will be presumed to have violated his duty.
Gonzales v. Ross, 120 U. S., 605. There is no principle of
law better settled than that every act of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly
done till the contrary appears. Voorhees v. Jackson, 10
Pet., 449.

In the ease of Wood County Commissioners v. Shinnew,
et al., 10 0. C. C. (N.S.), 54, the court had some communi-
cation with the jury. The agreed statement of counsel is
that the jury wanted further instruction and that he said
he had given them all the instructions upon the law which
he was able to give and that he had nothing more to say
in addition to the charge delivered. It was held that such
action by the judge cannot be successfully attacked in a
reviewing court on the ground that it amounted to error
or misconduct prejudicial to the rights of either party.
This holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court without
opinion in 80 O. S., 712.

=

6

In the case of Gandolfo v. State, 11 O. S., 114, the trial
judge in a murder case sent to the jury on their request, in
the absence of the prisoner, a copy of the statutes of the
state, calling their attention to the three sections relating
to homicide: held, that it was an exercise of discretion on
the part of the judge which did not prejudice the prisoner,
and furnished no ground for the reversal of the judgment.
Judge Gholson in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court places their decision on the ground that many mat-
ters must rest in the discretion of the trial court, and if
the matter complained of infringes upon no rule of law
and merely affects the mode or manner of arriving at a
determination, and not the right or merits to be decided,
it is generally considered a matter of practice within the
discretion of the court, with which it would not be proper
for a court of error to interfere. Also that it must appear
that there has been an abuse of discretion resulting in in-
justice. <A difference of opinion as to the proper course of
proceeding would not be sufficient; the appellate court must
be able to say that the course pursued was not only im-
proper, but that it operated unjustly and injuriously to
the parties.

In the case of Dishmaker v. Heck, 159 Wise., 572, the
jury after retiring, were unable to decipher a word in the
special verdict, the foreman returned into open court and
asked the meaning of the word, to which the trial judge
replied “punitive, by way of punishment”; and it was held
there was no prejudicial error. C. J. Winslow called
attention to the strictness of the Wisconsin courts on
communications between the court and jury but stated
that it was a “little less than absurd to hold because the
trial court correctly told a juryman what a given word in

.

7

the special verdict was and what it meant there should be
a new trial of the case. Such a holding would seem to be
almost an affront to good sense.”

In the case of State v. Parker, 12 S. W. (2d), 428, 321
Mo., 553, it was held in a murder case that the court had
not committed error in discussing with the jury in a hotel
dining room, where conversation relative to additional in-
structions and giving jury “raking” could not be taken
seriously by jurors as an attempt to coerce them. It was
said by P. J. White of that court:

“That conversation with the juror was plainly a
little badinage and hurt no one.”

In the case of Ayrhart v. Wilhelmy, 185 Iowa, 290, it was
held that neither misconduct of court nor jury can be
predicated on the fact that during the deliberations of a
jury the judge was called to the jury room and questioned
by a member of the panel, when the nature of the inter-
rogatories is not disclosed and it appears they were un-
answered.

In the case of Phillips v. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt., 485,
60 Va., 485, it was held that:

“The authority of a judge who presides at a criminal
trial extends over the jury not only during the day
whilst they are in court, but after the adjournment for
the day; and it is not illegal or improper for the judge
to take charge of a juror in the temporary absence of
the sheriffs to whom the jury has been committed.”

Judge Rives, in delivering the opinion of the court, says:
“If it were possible to hold a continuous session,
there would be no necessity of confiding the jury to
anyone but the judge. Tle is the high and responsible
functionary entrusted with the conduct of criminal
trials, and bound to preserve the purity of jury trial

8

and place it beyond suspicion of all improper inter-
ference. It would be well for the protection of pris-
oners and the behaviour of juries if it were possible
for the judge to keep them. Instead of its being said,
he is the last man who should have charge of a jury,
he is the first and best, and the very one to whom the
charge is confided by law * * * But it is not pos-
sible for him to discharge the functions at all times;
hence, has grown up the custom of committing the
jury on the adjournment of the court for the day, to
the sheriff sworn to ‘keep’ them, and neither speak to
them nor suffer any other person to speak to them
touching any matter relative to the trial until they
return into court. * * *. From this theory of his
office in jury trials, it can searcely be that his over-
sight and superintendence are suspended by the ad-
journment of the court. He has many legitimate
modes while in session, through instructions and
charges to influence their finding, but no semblance
of authority to approach them corruptly; so in his re-
cess, he can have his eye upon them and exert a super-
intendence over them and their custodians so as to
maintain the purity of the trial and the sanctity of
their deliberations. Far distant be the evil day, when
corruption shall have so soiled the bench and tainted
the streams of justice as that the accidental or neces-
sary presence of the judge with a juror shall not be
received as a fair presumption that no wrong was done
or permitted, but on the contrary, shall be accepted as
proof of tampering. When that state of opinion shall
prevail, all respect for the courts, all confidence in the
administration of justice, all reverence for authority
will have forsaken that department of the publie serv-
ice, usually deemed the last and best bulwark of public
virtue and morals.”

In Dodge v. United States, 258 Fed., 300, it was held the
trial court’s improper action in privately advising the jury
that they might convict under a certain count is not re- |

9

yersible error, where no information was given which was
not contained in the original charge. The court said it is
evident that no possible harm resulted or could result
therefrom. A writ of certiorari was denied in Dodge v.
United States, 250 U. S., 660.

In the case of Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S., 97,
this court held the state may regulate procedure of its
courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and
fairness unless it offends some principle of justice ranked
as fundamental; that trial by jury may be abolished con-
sistently with the Fourteenth Amendment; and that this
amendment does not assume defendant the privilege to be
present at a bare inspection by the jury, as the view by
the jury is not a “trial” nor any part of a trial in the sense
in which a trial was understood at common law. To same
effect see Perkins v. Cranor, Supt., 338 U. S., 862, where
certiorari was denied. In the case of Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, supra, this court further held that the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant charged with murder are
not impaired by the judge telling the jury that the view,
from which the defendant excluded, was a part of the
evidence; and that the presence of the defendant is a con-
dition of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted
by his absence and to that extent only.

In the ease of Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S., 81, the
petitioner had been sentenced to death for murder, he ob-
jected that he did not have a public trial; and it was held
hy this court that the Sixth Amendment (on public trial)
does not apply to a state criminal prosecution; and that
the exclusion of the public as against due process, is not
presented by a record showing only an oral announcement

10

of the trial judge that the public would be excluded which
was not carried out; and it was further held by this court
that in criminal cases brought from the state courts on
frivolous objections, the mandate will be ordered issued
forthwith on denial of certiorari.

In Ray v. U.S., 114 Fed. (2d), 507, after the defendant
had been found guilty, the jury inquired if a leniency
recommendation were proper and the judge sent word by
the deputy marshal that it would not be improper, the de-
fendant was not present, this court held, if there was any
evidence of a substantial nature that the communication
influenced the jury or in any respect was prejudicial to the
appellant, there should be a reversal, but that the record
in this ease convinees us that the incident was harmless.
Certiorari was denied in Ray v. U.S., 311 U.S., 709.

In Fay v. N. Y., 332 U. S., 261, a statute was involved
which authorized the selection of special or so-called “Blue
Ribbon Juries” in certain cases, and this court held, these
are local matters with which the local authority must and
does have considerable latitude to cope, for they affect the
administration of justice which is a loeal responsibility;
such statute does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; that the commandments ef the.
Sixth and Seventh amendments, which require jury trial
in criminal cases, are not made applicable to the states by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
that the funetion of this court under the Fourteenth
Amendment with reference to state juries is not to pre-
scribe procedures but is essentially to protect the integrity
of the trial process by whatever method the states see fit
to employ; and beyond requiring conformity to standards
of fundamental fairness that has won legal recognition,

11

this court adheres to a policy of self restraint in interpret-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment and will not use that
amendment to impose uniform procedure upon the several
states whose legal systems stem from divers sources of law
and reflect different historical influences.

In Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. 8., 71, in a criminal ease the
jury retired to consider its verdict but the bailiff in charge
was not sworn as required by statute, and objection was
first raised on the motion for a new trial, it was held by
this court, that the objection was not in time, and pre-
sented no question of a federal nature, but was an adjudi-.
cation simply of a question of criminal and local law, and
did not impair the constitutional guarantee that no state
shall deprive any person of liberty without due process
of law.

(2) The second question presented by the petitioner, is
the claim that he was denied his right to be confronted by
witnesses against him, because the divorcee decree in the
case of Wehr v. Wehr was admitted in evidence. Said
decree recited in substance that on the evidence the court
found the plaintiff at the time of filing her petition “was
a bona fide resident of Franklin county” and the petitioner
was being tried in a criminal case on a charge of subor-
nation of perjury in the Wehr divorce case. Thus for the
first time counsel for the petitioner undertakes to be more
specifie than just referring to the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. “The provision of the
Federal Constitution (Sixth Amendment on the right to
confront witnesses) does not apply to proceedings in the
state courts, but to the procedure in the federal courts
alone. Nor does due process of law as guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution

12

require that the right to confront witnesses, which is ex-
pressed in the Sixth Amendment be accorded to defendant
in a state court.” 14 Am. Jur., page 891, See. 179.
Exhibit K-2, which is in question is shown on page 39
of the record and discloses that the petitioner, Thomas A.
Joseph, was attorney for the plaintiff, Pearl Wehr, in that
divorcee case. It must therefore not be overlooked that
this divorce decree was the handy work of the defendant
himself. He not only prepared it but secured the approval
of the court and filed it as a part of the record in that case.
The usual objection raised is that the defendant on trial
for perjury was not a party to the proceeding in which the
divorce decree was entered. Certainly, this reason has no
application to the instant case where petitioner himself
prepared the entry that he now complains of as being
prejudicial to him when it was admitted in evidence. In
any event such divorcee decrees are admissible not to es-
tablish the falsity of the testimony, but as showing the
ceiving of the testimony and its materiality. People v.
Bradbury, 155 Cal., 808 and People v. Reitz, 261 Pac., 526.
In the case of Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U. S., 483, the
state offered in evidence the statement made by the de-
fendant following his arrest, over objection by the defend-
ant, and in a rehearing before the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, defendant asserted the admission of such evidence
violated Amendment V of the Constitution of the United
States, as it compelled the defendant to become a witness
against himself, and this court held, in a criminal case,
rulings of the state courts in regard to admission of evi-
dence afford no basis for holding the defendant was not
awarded due process of law; and that Article V of the
amendment to the Constitution does not operate as a re-

13

striction on the powers of the state but solely upon federal
government. See to same effect, Malinski v. N. Y., 324
U. S., 401.

Counsel for the petitioner cite the case of Waldron v.
Waldron, 156 U. S., 361; but that case is not controlling
in the instant case, as the Waldron case originated in a
Cireuit Court of the United States and the United States
Supreme Court has much more control over proceedings
from a federal court than it does over criminal cases in
tlie state courts, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S., 401. In
MeNabb v. United States, 318 U. S., 352, it was held that
the United States Supreme Court in the exercise of its
authority over the administration of justice in the federal
courts has formulated applicable rules of evidence; but it
ix recognized that the power of this court to undo convic-
tions in state courts is limited to the enforcement of those
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice,” Herbert y.
Louisiana, 272 U. S., 312, 516 and Malinski v. New York,
324 U. S., 401.

(3) The third question presented by the petitioner is
that he was prejudicial and prevented from having a fair
trial since his counsel asked for two hours for argument
and the court only granted them one hour and a half.

The record discloses that this alleged error was pre-
sented to the trial court after the motion for a new trial
had been overruled and the petitioner sentenced to the
Ohio Penitentiary, and consequently was not one of the as-
signments of error set up in the motion for a new trial.
This is borne out by the fact that the record discloses on
page 87 that the entry overruling the motion for a new
trial and sentencing the petitioner is an excerpt from the
hill of exceptions, page 1194, while page 55 of the record

14

discloses that the stipulation as to the time limitation for
argument appeared on page 1199 of the bill of exceptions,
In other words, the alleged error involving limitation of
argument is set up on page 1199 of the bill of exceptions
in the state court while the entry overruling the motion for
a new trial and the sentence of the court appears on page
1194 or six pages before the alleged error was inserted in
the record.

The record further discloses that no objection was taken

at the time the limitation on argument was made by the }

court, and the record fails to disclose that at any later
time counsel for the petitioner requested further time from
the court if they felt that more time had been found nee-
essary. The alleged error on limitation of argument hav-
ing not been made a part of the motion for a new trial,
plainly discloses that this was merely an afterthought fol-
lowing the sentence of the petitioner to the Ohio Peni-
tentiary.

Counsel may not apparently agree or acquiesce by fail-

ure to object, in the allotment of time for argument and ©

afterward complain that the time was too short, Capinola
v. United States, 61 Fed. (2d), 5, certiorari denied in Walsh
v. United States, 287 U. S., 671.

Accused is entitled to only a reasonable time for the
argument of his cause—not a reasonable time for every
attorney he might wish to defend him, Cox v. Common-
wealth, 215 Ky., 585.

In the case of Weaver v. State, 24 O. S., 584, Judge
White says:

“Full time should be allowed for the fair discussion
and presentation of the case. What might be reason-
able in one case would be unreasonable in another. In

the present case the action of the court below shows
no just ground for our interference.”

15

It is objected in the instant case that there were numer-
ous exhibits to be considered, but it can readily be seen by
Exhibit K-2 (R., 39) that these exhibits would all be pretty
much of the same pattern, such as the divorce case file,
the petition and the decree, both of the latter having been
prepared by the defendant himself; and this case involved
the testimony of the various divorce clients of the peti-
tioner, and centered around testimony as to their pre-
tended residence in Franklin county. In the case of Decker
v. State, 113 O. S., page 512, 525, Judge Allen states:

“These authorities lay down the rule that in the
absence of statute the trial court in its sound disecre-
tion may properly limit the time consumed by counsel
in argument, and that this diseretion will not be inter-
fered with by the appellate court, unless the time of
argument in trial was made so short as manifestly to
deprive counsel from presenting the case fully and
fairly.”

In the case of United States v. Kay, 101 Fed., 270, in-
volving twenty-five counts in an indictment, error was as-
signed on restricting counsel’s time in summation, and it
was held, this is always a matter to be disposed of by the
exercise of a sound discretion in the course of a trial. Cer-
tiorari was denied in Kay v. United States, 306 U.S., 660.

In Wagenman vy. United States, 269 Fed., 568, the trial
court limited argument to the jury to fifteen minutes on
each side, and when defense counsel complained this time
Was insufficient, the court observed: “You have been too
long putting it (the case) in.” Held: While it may well
he that a somewhat longer allowance would have been
better, the court was not convineed that the defendant was
prejudiced by this limitation. There is much to be said in
favor of the court’s action. We are unable to say that the

PEN AS ae Y keen ALR, IPERS VATE YEE NIL CK I 2S LENIN B A SERIF Bel a MM Aa Mane EP FT

16

court abused its diseretion. Certiorari was denied in
Wagenman v. United States, 255 U. §., 972.

In Brooks vy. State, 187 Tenn., 67, the trial court allowed
fifteen minutes on each side for argument, held by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee that it could not say record
shows abuse of discretion by trial court. Certiorari denied
in Brooks v. Tenn., 71 United States Supreme Court, 21.

In Cases v. United States, 131 Fed. (2d), 916, in-
volving a trial in Puerto Rico on violating the Federal Fire-
arms Act, and twenty minutes for oral argument was al-
lowed, held, not an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Certiorari denied in Velazques v. United States, 319 U.S,
770.

CONCLUSION.

Counsel for the respondent respectfully submits to the
court that this being a criminal case brought from the
Supreme Court of Ohio, on objections that are without
substantial merit, certiorari should be denied and the man-
date ordered issued forthwith.

Respectfully submitted, ;
RALPH J. BARTLETT,
Proseeuting Attorney, Franklin County, Ohio,
Court House, Columbus 15, Ohio,
Attorney for Respondent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_0644%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.