# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Hygienic Products Co. v. Judson Dunaway Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1950
- **Citation:** 339 U.S. 948

## Text

SUBJECT INDEX.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........
Summary and Short Statement ....................
The Complaint and Subject Matter in Suit ........
REORS OF TIOWOE COUT oo. cease vecesccees
Petitioner’s History and Activities ..............
Defendant’s History and Activities ..............

Products of Parties Are Same and Sold for Same
ir eee en SELLS aSCMER OE PONDS ON ETT OS

CAI ee OT EL PT ee ery ee
NN IID iiss in sd eR Rah Mewes ome anee
Reasons Relied Upon for the Grant of a Writ ......

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT
er COP OURMME Mec adee enue pecs essed Kesweldas

Opinions of the Courts Below ..................
ns On GERONOE i i coss Cees dss seu Renee baheas
IE einai 4b 6a KARE ak meee Wen hh hc ORO

Point I. Petitioner’s Valuable Good Will Rights in
Its Unique and Distinctive Trade-Mark, First
Adopted and Used Exclusively by Petitioner
for Over Thirty-Five Years and Registered by
It, Should Not Be So Strictly Construed as to
Entitle Petitioner to Protection Only Against
Eee” CUE a Aha canes KehaeaE SOO NS

Typical Infringing or Confusingly Similar Pic-
we Re ree eres rer

Point II. Defendant Is Guilty of Trade-Mark In-
fringement by Use, in Connection With the Sale
of Its Product, of Pictorial Representations
Which Have the Same Essential Ensemble and
Prominent Characteristic as Petitioner’s Picture
UE ie woo 45.566 Ok asa eh Re

12

16

——

Point III. Defendant is Guilty of Unfair Competi-
TE 6 Sas Seu eke oie Sheba aeea ss Seba R ERA 24

Point IV. The Findings of the District Court as to
Defendant’s Infringement and Unfair Competi-
tion Were Correct and Not Clearly Erroneous
and Hence Under Rule 52(a) Should Not Have

Been Disturbed by the Court of Appeals ...... 27
NE RSS icin SC cuaawies nuk bn eda Knee Vn seppaNs van 29
ge ee ee re ee 31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
Cases.
Adamson v. Gilliland, 242 U. S. 350 ................ 28
Aunt Jemima v. Blair, 50 App. D. C. 28 ............ 17

Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Kirkland Distributing Co.,
48 App. D. C. 248 (1919 C. D. 162) ............ 17, 18

Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538. ..22, 2

B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Massachusetts Hair and Felt

ee Wee Se Pe COMED oda pach eed aweNwdewe 28
Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty
aE PG oi ea huh cole ki kay rane ened 28
Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 162 F. 2d 280
Me EE oe boi bond Cicn wd indeds oo wksn 24, 29
District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U. 8. 698 .......... 28
Dwinnell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Products Co.,
ae | eres Cry ray er 29
Enoch Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Ward, 152 Fed. 690 (C.
Sees ED cin. ss wh dS oe 15, 16, 17, 18, 21
Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 177 F. 2d 177 (C. C. A.
re ere rere eee 15

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403

coer eee eee ee eee er eee eee seer ereeeeeeeeeee

International Latex Corporation vs. I. B. Kleinert
pe ee Se ee ee errerr eT eros

_——_

Jansen Knitting Mills v. Herlich et al., 24 T. M. Rep.

48, D. C. E. D. Pa. 1934 ...... 66. e eee eee eee ees 18
Jansen Knitting Mills v. Spokane Knitting Mills, Inc.,

44 F. 2d 656, D. C. E. D. Wash. N. D. 1930 ........ 18
Kassman & Kessner, Inc. v. Rosenberg Co., 10 F. 2d

904 (App. D. C. 1926) ........ceeeeeeeeeeeeees 21
Lawson v. United States Mining Co., 207 U.S.1..... 28
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877) .........--- 15

Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203 (1942) 29
Mishawaka R. & W. Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rub.

Ce, 168 F. Bah OU noc os cd ce ccctvessesewesses 11
Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18

F. 98 774 (C.-C. A. J, WBBE), 2... cccvcceccencces 21
Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165

A 3 8h. | eenrerere rey err reer TTT 22
Sierra Chemical Co. v. Berettini, 33 F. 2d 397 (C. C. A.

UI 5 nibs oid Vee Rava aweansdewcke ceayee ees 22
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461

CTOGRD sia a cia da akg nKesins eines eae 15
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S.

ices eS Ge eee 28

Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U. 8S. 545 (1947) 28

Walter Baker & Co. v. Puritan Pure Food Co., 139 Fed.
fF Be ee | error rte re 16, 18

Statutes.

15 U.S. C. Sees. 85 and 96 (Trade-Mark Act of 1905). .7, 14
15 U.S. C. Sees. 1051-1127 (Trade-Mark Act of 1946) 7

28 U.S. C. Sees. 41 (1) and 41 (7) .........cceceeees 7
. £e Se hee eee er Tee Cees er 7
96'U. B. C.. Bate BERR Ge Tae oo anv s keen ec cacccites 7

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 52(a)

_—

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1949.

THE HYGIENIC PRODUCTS COMPANY,
Petitioner,

vs.
JUDSON DUNAWAY CORPORATION,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States:

Your petitioner, The Hygienic Products Company, re-
spectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review, in
part, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit entered December 15, 1949 (R. 285)
and reported in 178 F. 2d 461.

A transcript of the record of the case, including pro-
ceedings in said Cqurt of Appeals, is furnished herewith
in accordance with the Rules of this Court.

SUMMARY AND SHORT STATEMENT.

The Complaint and Subject Matter in Suit.

Petitioner, The Hygienic Products Company, through
its Complaint filed May 31, 1947 (R. 2) in the United States
District Court for the District of New Hampshire, charged
Judson Dunaway Corporation, the defendant, respondent
here, with infringement of petitioner’s trade-mark registra-

2

tions of its picture trade-mark, comprising the picture of
a maid or woman pouring from a can into a toilet bowl, and
also charged defendant with unfair competition in trade,
all by defendant’s use of certain advertising material as-
serted to display, in connection with the sale of defendant’s
like competing goods, infringing and deceptively similar
pictorial representations.'

For convenience, we have appended to the back cover
a folded-in chart upon which we have reproduced the marks
appearing in several of petitioner’s fully identified regis-
trations, defendant’s pictori-l representations complained
of, and other illustrations which will be referred to later.

Holdings of Lower Courts.

The District Court held in its opinion (R. 216 to 234,
reported in 81 F. Supp. 935) that petitioner’s picture trade-
mark and the several registrations thereof were valid, that
they had been infringed by defendant’s pictorial representa-
tions appearing on the chart and that defendant was guilty
of unfair competition by the use thereof.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion (R. 285, reported
in 178 F. 2d 461) held with the District Court as to the
issues bearing on the validity of petitioner’s picture mark
and registrations, but reversed the District Court on the
issues of infringement and unfair competition on the
ground, in substance, that defendant’s accused pictorial

10n June 13, 1947 petitioner filed an amendment. to its
Complaint (R. 31) charging defendant with infringement by rea-
son of the use of newspaper publications containing the picture
of a hand pouring from a can into a water closet bowl. The
District Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, upon petitioner’s
cross-appeal, found that this picture did not infringe upon
petitioner’s picture mark or registrations and that defendant was
not guilty of unfair competition with respect to the same (R. 234,
293). Petitioner does not. seek to have this Court review the
judgments of the lower courts with respect to defendant’s picture
of a hand pouring from a can into a water closet bowl.

—

—

3

representations differ in detailed respects from vetitioner’s
and that defendant’s advertising, viewed as a whole, does
not so closely resemble petitioner’s marks as to be likely
to confuse the defendant’s product with that of petitioner.

Petitioner’s History and Activities.

Continuously since April 1911, petitioner has been
engaged in manufacturing and selling throughout the United
States and foreign countries a powdered chemical com-
pound, also known under its ‘‘Sani-Flush’’ trade-mark, for
cleaning by chemical reaction between the compound and
water. During that entire period petitioner’s compound has
been sold for cleaning toilet bowls and since 1922 it has also
been sold for cleaning automobile radiators. Petitioner
pioneered this industry and has long been a leader in it,
notwithstanding that since 1911 it has had well over 100
competitors marketing similar compounds (R. 64, 73, 101,

, 217).

Upon entering into this business in 1911 petitioner
composed the picture of a maid or woman pouring from a
can into a water closet bowl as its trade-mark, to indicate
the origin of its pioneer product. There is no dispute that
petitioner was the very first to adopt and use this picture
as a trade-mark for a cleaning compound, or for that mat-
ter, for any goods. It is equally well established that
petitioner has continuously and exclusively for over 35
years used such trade-mark on and in connection with the
sale of its product, as well as in connection with its ad-
vertising thereof (R. 64, 70, 99, 100, 217, 221). With re-
spect to petitioner’s registered trade-marks and typical
examples of illustrations used in its advertising, ready ref-
erence may be had to the appended chart.

Petitioner has manufactured and sold over 400,000,000
cans of its product, representing a sales value to the con-
sumer in excess of $80,000,000 (R. 101,218). Its product
has been marketed by direct sales and through jobbers to

ee

retail merchants including general stores, grocery stores
and drug stores. Petitioner has also continuously exploited
its picture trade-mark in its advertising which has been of
national scope and has been largely done through the
medium of magazines, newspapers, display cards and leaf-
lets (R. 218). Petitioner spent about $8,000,000 in ad-
vertising its product, always in connection with its picture
trade-mark (R. 76, 218).

Petitioner’s business and good will are worth many
millions of dollars (R. 83).

For over 35 years since petitioner’s adoption of its
picture trade-mark, petitioner has always asserted its
right to the exclusive use of its picture trade-mark to in-
dicate origin of its products and all violations by others of
petitioner’s picture trade-mark were discontinued after
protest or action taken by petitioner. Petitioner’s picture
trade-mark has at all times been associated exclusively
with petitioner’s product and has been recognized and re-
spected by the trade. The trade-mark is of great good will
value to petitioner (R. 83, 109, 110, 112, 131, 147, 218, 230).

Defendant’s History and Activities.

The defendant, Judson Dunaway Corporation, is com-
paratively a newcomer in the field as it did not begin to
manufacture and sell its product, which is the same as pe-
titioner’s, until 1937. The label on defendant’s container
(Physical Exh. L, R. 94, 274) has continuously displayed a
stream of material flowing from the bottom of the letter ‘‘i’’
in the word ‘‘Vanish”’ into a water closet bowl. For ap-
proximately ten years defendant competed with petitioner
and built up a prosperous business by manufacturing and
selling its product under the registered trade-mark ‘‘ Van-
ish’’ without any endeavor to simulate petitioner’s picture
trade-mark of a maid pouring from a can into a toilet bowl
(R. 196, 218, 219, 231). During this first ten years of the
sale of its product, defendant published advertisements such

_—
5

as those reproduced on our chart. Defendant’s president
admitted that he thought that these were advertising de-
fendant’s products as well as defendant could (R. 195, 196).
Petitioner made no complaint with respect to the labels on
defendant’s cans or with respect to this earlier advertising.

During this ten year period defendant’s president had
full knowledge of petitioner’s picture trade-mark and
recognized that petitioner had exclusively used that mark
and that it was of great value to petitioner (R. 196, 219).
Late in 1946 or early in 1947, defendant adopted for use in
its advertising the pictorial representation of a woman
pouring from a can into a toilet bowl (R. 219).

Defendant’s accused representations are reproduced
on our chart.

The newspaper advertisement (Exh. KE, R. 253, 57) and
the display cards (Physical Exh. K, R. 93, 274) do not in
any way display defendant’s name. The back of defend-
ant’s can carries defendant’s name but when the can is
placed in the opening of the display card defendant’s name
is not visible to persons looking at the display. The leaf-
lets (Exh. C, R. 248, 249, 57) do not display defendant’s
name except in very small type on the back page, com-
pletely disassociated from the picture complained of.

Defendant’s president admitted that defendant ‘‘did
use the symbol or picture of a girl pouring the product into
a toilet bowl in connection with the sale of’’ defendant’s
‘‘nroduct in order to increase’’ defendant’s ‘‘sales of that
product’’ (R. 197, 198, 231). No attorney was consulted
(R. 199).

Products of Parties Are Same and Sold for Same Uses.
Both petitioner’s and defendant’s products are in

powdered form and are sold in cans, carrying different

labels and the trade-marks ‘‘Sani-Flush’’ and ‘‘Vanish’’

respectively. There is no dispute that the products are
substantially the same and that they are sold for the same

a
6

uses. Petitioner has not complained about defendant’s
labels nor defendant’s use of the name ‘‘ Vanish.’’

Neither petitioner’s nor defendant’s product accom-
plishes the desired cleaning result in water closet bowls or
in automobile radiators, except in the presence of water
which is essential to produce the necessary chemical clean-
ing reaction. Petitioner has always and defendant has for
years printed explicit directions on their respective con-
tainers (Physical Exh. G-1 and L, R. 71, 94, 273, 274) de-
tailing the successive steps which must be taken in order
that their products may accomplish their purpose. The
directions on defendant’s container are quite similar to
those which had long appeared on petitioner’s, and we quote
defendant’s directions with respect to cleaning toilet bowls
and radiators:

“TO CLEAN TOILET BOWLS—Flush toilet, then pour
VANISH into bowl and around sides in direct contact
with discolored parts. Allow to stand until all bubbling
stops. With brush or swab, swish off discoloration
loosened by VANISH’s chemical action. Then flush.
For a badly discolored bow] repeat, allowing the solu-
tion to remain in bow! 15 mins. or longer.’’ (R. 166.)

“TO CLEAN AUTO RADIATORS—While radiator is
warm and motor running pour in very slowly one-half
of this can. Run engine 15 minutes, then drain. For
large trucks, use entire can. THOROUGHLY FLUSH
WITH CLEAN WATER BEFORE REFILLING. Do
not allow to touch paint or finish.’’ (R. 167.)

The text of defendant’s leaflet, Exhibit C (R. 248) con-
tains the same instructions for cleaning radiators ad-
jacent the slogan ‘‘A HANDY TIP FOR HUSBANDS”’
(R. 248).

7
JURISDICTION.

The District Court had jurisdiction under what was
at the time the action commenced, Section 24 of the Judi-
cial Code (28 U. S. C. Sees. 41 (1) and 41 (7)), the sub-
stance of which is now found in U. S. Code, Title 28, Sees.
1332 and 1338.

With respect to the trade-mark registrations, the per-
tinent provisions of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 (15 U. S.
C. Sees. 85 and 96) apply rather than the Trade Mark Act
of 1946 (15 U. S. C. Sees. 1051-1127), as the latter did not
become effective until after the present action was filed.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section
1254 of Title 28—United States Code, the date of the
judgment sought to be reviewed being December 15, 1949.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Are petitioner’s valuable good will rights in its
unique and distinctive picture trade-mark, first adopted
and used exclusively by petitioner for over thirty-five years
and registered by it, to be so strictly construed as to en-
title petitioner to protection only against ‘‘Chinese’’ copy-
ing?

2. Is the defendant guilty of trade-mark infringement
by use in connection with the sale of its product, of pictorial
representations which have the same essential ensemble
and prominent characteristics as petitioner’s trade-mark,
registered by petitioner and used in its advertising?

3. Is defendant guilty of unfair competition?
4. Were the Findings of the District Court as to in-

fringement and unfair competition by defendant ‘‘clearly
erroneous’’? (Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.)

8

REASONS RELIED UPON FOR THE GRANT OF A WRIT.
1: The questions, and particularly questions 1, 2 and 3,
presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals in this

action are of great importance to trade-mark owners and
to the general public.

2. The precise questions, and particularly questions 1,
2 and 3, presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals
in this action have not been specifically passed upon by this
Court.

3. There is divergence of views expressed in the
opinions below on questions 1, 2 and 3, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals on all the questions is in conflict with
applicable decisions of this and other Federal Courts.

WHEREFORE, we submit that this Petition for Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit
should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Harry W. Linpsey, Jr.,
Harry FREAszE,
JOsEPH FREAsE,
Frank J. Suttoway,
RanpotpeH C. RIcHARDsON,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Washington, D. C.

March 14, 1950.

—

9

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

The opinion of the District Court and Court of Appeals
below are reported respectively in 81 F. Supp. 935 and 178
F, 2d 461; and the grounds on which jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked and a statement of the case appear com-
mencing respectively in pages 7 and 1 of the foregoing
Petition.

OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court, Judge Connor, will
be found at R. 216 and is reported at 81 F. Supp. 935. The
opinion was rendered after a full trial and upon briefs and
oral arguments. The opinion includes well considered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The more per-
tinent facts, set forth in our Petition, are stated even more
fully by the District Court in its opinion, and will not be
repeated here.

The District Court essentially found that petitioner
had adopted its pictorial representation of a woman pour-
ing from a can into a toilet bowl as a unique symbol or
device to indicate the origin of its manufacture, that this
picture mark and the registrations were not descriptive,
as asserted by the defendant, that the registered marks
had not been abandoned, as contended by defendant, that
there ‘‘is ample authority to the effect that leaflets, display
cards and newspaper advertising will support a claim of
infringement’’ (citing cases) (R. 228), that there was likeli-
hood of confusion in the trade and that defendant was
guilty of trade-mark infringement and unfair competition
in trade.

The District Court, after comparing plaintiff’s picture
mark and the accused picture representations of defendant,
said, in part, with respect to the matter of defendant’s in-
fringement and unfair competition:

TT

10

‘‘Thus considered, the advertising material must
be characterized as a colorable imitation of the plain-
tiff’s trade-marks. Concededly there are variations,
and this would necessarily be so if exact reproduction
was to be avoided; but the differences are minor, such
as the apparent age and attire of the respective maids.
In two of the display cards used by the defendant was
a cut-out wherein was placed for display a can of its
product, with a large part of the card given over to a
picture of a young woman in the act of pouring a can
of material into a toilet bowl. Such would readily
tend to confuse a prospective customer in the pur-
chase of this type of product.’’ (R. 228)

‘‘Having in mind the test by which the defendant’s
complained of conduct is to be measured, I am of the
opinion that the mode of advertising which the defend-
ant has adopted would likely be misleading and result
in consumer confusion, and, as such, was an infringe-
ment on the plaintiff’s right to the exclusive use of the
trade-mark.’’ (R. 229)

* * * * *

‘“‘The motive prompting the defendant to use the ob-
jected to advertisements was to increase its sales, and
hence it could be inferred that it sought to divert some
of the plaintiff’s trade profits thereby. Both forms of
advertising would probably result in consumer confu-
sion, and would differ only in degree, with the display
cards containing the insert likely to be the most effec-
tive.’’ (R. 231)

* * * * *

‘<Tt is difficult to believe that the adoption of this design,
so similar to that of the plaintiff, was solely a coin-
cidence, and this despite the defendant’s knowledge
that the plaintiff had used this symbol for many years.”’

‘*In these circumstances, intent may reasonably be
inferred.’’ (R. 231)

The opinion of the Court of Appeals will be found
at R. 285, and is reported at 178 F. 2d 461. The Court of

11

Appeals likewise found (R. 290) that petitioner’s picture
trade-mark and registrations are valid and ‘‘are not merely
descriptive but are original, arbitrary and fanciful’’, that
none of the registered marks had been abandoned and that
it was assumed that one may infringe by advertising matter,
citing Mishawaka R. € W. Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rub.
Co., 153 F. 2nd 662.

The Court of Appeals found, however, that the defend-
ant did not infringe and was not guilty of unfair competi-
tion, seemingly on the theories that petitioner’s trade-
mark protection must be strictly confined to the exact form,
dress and appearance of the women shown in petitioner’s
registrations and that defendant’s advertisements, unlike
petitioner’s trade-mark registrations, carry slogans or
words and background for its accused illustrations of a
woman pouring from a can into a toilet bowl. For con-
venience we quote here what the Court of Appeals said, in
part, on this matter (R. 291):

‘Of course, the defendant cannot represent its product
in use in such a setting, or in such a way, as to render
it likely that the purchasing public will confuse its
product with that of the plaintiff. But this does not
mean that the defendant is relegated to advertising its
product by showing it in use by an old crone in a mother
hubbard with a scowl on her face. Clearly in advertis-
ing, to quote from the current musical play ‘South
Pacific,’ ‘There is nothing like the frame of a dame,’
and we cannot see why the defendant is not as much
entitled to take commercial advantage of pulchritude
as the plaintiff.

‘‘We mention these matters at some length for it
seems to us that the District Court’s conclusion of in-
fringement, with which we feel constrained to disagree,
could only have rested upon the defendant’s use in its
advertising of the foregoing elements which we think
it was free to use, because, aside from those elements,
the defendant’s advertising bears little or no resem-
blance to the plaintiff’s marks.’’

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS.

The errors which petitioner will urge if the petition
for writ of certiorari is granted are that the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit erred:

(1) In not affirming the judgment of the District
Court that defendant infringed petitioner’s picture
trade-mark and registrations, comprising the picture
of a woman pouring from a can into a toilet bowl.

(2) In not affirming the judgment of the District
Court that defendant was guilty of unfair competition
by reason of defendant’s use of its pictorial represen-
tations of a woman pouring from a can into a toilet
bowl.

ARGUMENT.

The Argument will follow the ‘‘Questions Presented,’’
as stated on page 7 of the Petition.

POINT I.

Petitioner’s Valuable Good Will Rights in Its Unique and
Distinctive Trade-Mark, First Adopted and Used Ex-
clusively by Petitioner for Over Thirty-Five Years
and Registered by It, Should Not Be So Strictly Con-
strued as to Entitle Petitioner to Protection Only
Against ‘‘Chinese’’ Copying.

The following essential facts are not only clearly estab-
lished by the record in this case as we have shown in the
petition, but were specifically found by the District Court
and recited in large measure by the Court of Appeals in its
decision. In 1911 petitioner adopted its picture trade-
mark comprising a woman pouring from a can into a
toilet bowl. It has sold hundreds of millions of cans of its
product having a value of many millions of dollars. The
product has been sold for use for cleaning automobile
radiators and toilet bowls. Millions of dollars have been

12

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13

spent by petitioner in nationally advertising its product
through virtually all mediums. Its picture representation
was adopted with the intent of using it as a trade-mark,
and has been exclusively used by petitioner, except for de-
fendant’s asserted infringing use. All of petitioner’s ad-
vertising has displayed a picture of its can with its regis-
tered picture trade-mark prominently appearing on the
label on the can. Much of defendant’s advertising material
carried very similar pictorial representations having the
same motif, that is, the same essential ensemble of elements
and prominent characteristics.

The District Court said, in part:

**The plaintiff adopted and used a pictorial representa-
tion as a unique symbol or device to indicate the origin
of the goods of its manufacture and to distinguish
them from goods of the same general nature which
might be manufactured by others.’’ (R. 221.)

and
“‘The long, continued, and exclusive use of the
symbol has come to denote origin, and distinguishes

the goods of the plaintiff from those of others’’ * * *
(R. 222.)

The Court of Appeals did not quarrel with these findings.
In fact it stated that ‘‘plaintiff’s marks are valid’’ and are
‘‘original, arbitrary and fanciful’’ (R. 290).

Along with such picture trade-marks as the girl carry-
ing an umbrella and a pouring can for salt, the muscular
arm and hammer for baking soda, the ‘‘Gold Dust’’ twins
for cleaning powder, the Dutch Girl with a stick for clean-
ing powder, and the phonograph and dog for ‘‘Victrolas”’
and television sets, plaintiff’s picture mark is one of the
best and most universally recognized picture marks, known
by the housewife and the trade and public generally includ-
ing the automobile mechanic who uses petitioner’s products
for cleaning auto radiators.

a

14

The very fact that petitioner in its trade-mark regis-
trations and advertising pictorial representations has kept
up with current fashions and made slight and inevitable
changes in style and dress, while retaining at all times the
essential ensemble of elements and prominent characteris-
tics of its picture trade-mark, is cogent evidence that peti-
tioner has always intended to and has asserted that its
trade-mark comprises that ensemble and those prominent
characteristics. The ensemble and characteristics include
the combination of the toilet bowl, a container in position
over the bowl, material flowing from the can in a stream
into the bowl, and a woman standing beside the toilet in a
graceful poise and holding the can with one outstretched
hand.

This is petitioner’s exclusive trade-mark, recognized
in the home and automobile repair and service shops, and
by the trade and the public generally by its essential fea-
tures and characteristics, which petitioner has always and
consistently retained.

We submit that petitioner’s trade-mark should not be
restricted to every detail of the toilet, the can or the woman,
and that protection should not be limited to ‘‘Chinese’’
copying, which seems to be the basis of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Section 16 of the Trade Mark Act of 1905, as amended,
(15 U.S. C. See. 96) is quoted in part in the footnote.* It is
specifically noted that any person who shall ‘‘colorably
imitate’’ a trade-mark is guilty of infringement.

*** Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner
thereof, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such
trade mark and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the
same descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration,
or to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles in-
tended to be used upon or in connection with the sale of mer-
chandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those
set forth in such registration, . . . shall be liable to an action for
damages therefor at the suit of the owner thereof; .. .’’

EEE

15

‘Difficulty frequently arises in determining the
question of infringement; but it is clear that exact
similarity is not required, as that requirement would
always enable the wrong-doer to evade responsibility
for his wrongful acts.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) McLean
v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 255, (1877).

‘*Not only exact reproduction, but a ‘colorable imita-
tion’ is within the statute; otherwise, the trade-mark
would be of little avail as by shrewd simulation it could
be appropriated with impunity.’’ Thaddeus Davids
Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461, 469 (1914).

‘“‘The infringer rarely has the hardihood to make
a Chinese copy.’’ Enoch Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Ward,
152 Fed. 690, 693, (C. C. A. 7, 1907).

‘*A trade-mark is not to be resolved into its com-
ponent parts and each part analyzed separately in
cases of this sort.’’ Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 177
F, 2d 177, 185. (C. C. A. 1, Sept. 21, 1949; Woodbury,
C. J.)

At the top of the following page we reproduce the
picture marks for rubber panties for babies involved in
International Latex Corporation vs. I. B. Kleinert Rubber
Co., 104 F. 2d 382, 383, decided by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in June 1939. The Examiner of Inter-
ferences had found that the two marks, when placed side by
side, were easily distinguishable but the Commissioner of
Patents had reversed the Examiner. The Court affirmed
the Commissioner stating that the baby’s posture in the
two marks ‘‘is substantially the same,’’ that the side by
side ‘‘comparison is not the test to be applied in consider-
ing the question of confusing similarity of the marks,’’
that there was likelihood of confusion and that any reason-
able ‘‘doubt must be resolved against the newcomer in
the field.’’

———eaEOO rr S™t—C™——SC‘“€F8’']

aicaahcabeianeane

” —

16

TYPICAL INFRINGING OR CONFUSINGLY
SIMILAR PICTURE TRADE-MARKS

Confusingly Similar
Picture

Registered Picture
International v. Kleinert, 104 F. 2d 382

Plaintiff ’s picture infringed by Defendant’s picture
Enoch Morgan’s v. Ward, 152 F. 690

17

Registered Picture Confusingly Similar
Picture

Aunt Jemima v. Kirkland, 48 App. D. C. 248

Registered Picture Confusingly Similar
Picture

Aunt Jemima v. Blair, 50 App. D. C. 28

For convenience, we also have summarized pictorially
above, the Enoch Morgan’s Sons case, supra, and several
additional cases out of many, which are exactly in point
here. The illustrations and legends speak amply for them-

ie,

18

selves, and detailed discussion of them here is unnecessary.*
We content ourselves by quoting from three of these cases.

‘‘Despite the differences in colors and direction in
which the figures face, I have reached the conclusion
that defendant’s trade-mark adapted and used by it
is in similitude of that of complainant; that confusion
is likely to arise, and the goods of defendant be pur-
chased in the belief that they are those of complain-
ant.’’ Walter Baker & Co. v. Puritan Pure Food Co.,
139 Fed. 680, 683 (S. D. N. Y. 1905).

‘In the pictorial marks there is no difference, ex-
cept that appellee has substituted a young woman’s
face for a young man’s.’’ Enoch Morgan’s Sons case
(p. 693).

““Tt would be difficult to imagine a more flagrant
violation of the statute than the one here presented.
The red core of the watermelon with its seed spots,
held under the chin of the negro, is a good reproduc-
tion of the red bandana with its spots, tied around the
neck of the negress. A mere glance at the marks is
convincing. No evidence of confusion is necessary, nor
can any amount of fine-spun discrimination withdraw
the case from the direct operation of the statute.’’
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Kirkland Distributing Co., 48
App. D. C. 248, 249, 250 (1919 C. D. 162).

It is clear that it is well established that the test of
trade-mark infringement and unfair competition is likeli-
hood of consumer confusion, resulting from memory and not
from a side-by-side visual comparison. Chinese copying is
not necessary to find infringement.

* Jansen Knitting Mills v. Herlich et al., 24 T. M. Ren A®,
D. C. E. D. Pa. 1934, referred to by the Court of Appeals (Ree.
291) and having to do with the famous Jansen ‘‘ Diving Girl’’ reg-
istered for swimming suits, is directly in conflict with Jansen
Knitting Mills v. Spokane Knitting Mills, Inc., 44 F. 2d 656, D. C.
E. D. Wash. N. D. 1930.

19
POINT II.

Defendant Is Guilty of Trade-Mark Infringement by Use,
in Connection With the Sale of Its Product, of Pic-
torial Representations Which Have the Same Essential
Ensemble and Prominent Characteristics as Petition-
er’s Picture Trade-Mark.

The District Court (Rec. 228) found that defendant’s
accused advertisements ‘‘have definite points of similarity
with the trade-mark of plaintiff’’ and said:

‘“‘Thus considered, the advertising material must be
characterized as a colorable imitation of the plaintiff’s
trade-marks. Concededly there are variations, and this
would necessarily be so if exact reproduction was to
be avoided;.. .’’

We submit that the fact findings of the District Court
on the matter of infringement are correct as is clear from
a mere inspection of our Chart showing petitioner’s picture
trade-mark, with petitioner’s slight variations, and defend-
ant’s accused picture illustrations.

The Court of Appeals apparently failed to duly con-
sider petitioner’s picture trade-mark as a whole and the
marked similarities between the characteristics of that
mark and defendant’s accused illustrations. On the con-
trary, the Court of Appeals, by a side-by-side comparison,
dissected petitioner’s mark into individual parts and gave
undue consideration to minor details in the parts, and also
to defendant’s background, slogans and trade-mark ‘‘Van-
ish,’’ appearing on the accused advertisements; all in con-
flict with decisions of this Court as well as of lower Federal
Courts.

The Court of Appeals said (R. 291) :

‘*Clearly in advertising, to quote from the current
musical play ‘South Pacific,’ ‘There is nothing like
the frame of a dame,’ and we cannot see why the de-
fendant is not as much entitled to take commercial ad-
vantage of pulchritude as the plaintiff.’’

—

20

Petitioner is not seeking a trade-mark monopoly on
pulchritude but is seeking to protect its long exclusively
used and famous picture trade-mark with its essential en-
semble and its prominent characteristics. One portion of
defendant’s Exhibit C advertisement (p. 249) shows the
head and shoulders of a young smiling girl and petitioner
has made no complaint with respect to that pictorial rep-
resentation. The Court of Appeals refers generally (R.
292-3) to other pictures used at times in some of petitioner’s
advertising, every piece of which, however, also shows pe-
titioner’s container with the registered mark on the label
prominently displiyed. Some of these other pictures, to
which petitioner makes no exclusive claim, show women
divorced from the essential ensemble of petitioner’s regis-
tered trade-mark and in a very different pose or position
from that shown in petitioner’s mark. The Court of Ap-
peals failed to note or say that these other sporadic pic-
tures were not imitated or copied by defendant. That Court
also disregarded in its opinion the fact that the District
Court found (R. 231) that ‘‘The motive prompting the
defendant to use the objected to advertisements was to in-
crease its sales, and hence it could be inferred that it sought
to divert some of plaintiff’s trade profits thereby.’’; defend-
ant having ‘‘knowledge that the plaintiff had used this
symbol for many years.’’ Defendant deliberately imitated
petitioner’s registered trade-mark, not, for example, the
picture of the little girl, under the Caption ‘‘We don’t
talk about toilets!’’, to which the Court of Appeals specifi-
eally refers (R. 293).

Petitioner concedes that defendant may show in its
advertising as many pictures of women in various poses,
as it may desire, so long as the pictures do not ‘‘colorably
imitate’’ petitioner’s ensemble picture mark and defendant
does not seek ‘‘to divert some of the plaintiff’s trade profits
thereby’’ (R. 231).

. 21

‘¢* * * the field from which a person may select a trade-
mark is practically unlimited, and hence there is no
excuse for impinging upon or even closely approaching
the mark of a business rival.’’ Kassman & Kessner,
Inc. v. Rosenberg Co., 10 F. 2d 904, 905 (App. D. C.
1926).

‘‘One entering a field of endeavor already occupied by
another should, in the selection of a trade-name or
trade-mark, keep far enough away to avoid all possible
confusion.’’ Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cos-
metic Co., 18 F. 2d 774, 775 (C. C. A. 7, 1927).

The Court of Appeals also says (R. 291):

**In the first place the plaintiff’s marks are all on
a plain background whereas the defendant’s advertis-
ing usually showed a bathroom setting, including a
bath tub, shower curtain, tiled walls, ete. In the sec-
ond place the defendant in all its advertising promi-
nently displayed its trade-mark ‘Vanish’ which is not
at all similar to plaintiff’s name ‘Sani-Flush’.’’

The Court cites no authorities. However, it is well estab-
lished that a registered trade-mark is infringed when it
is colorably imitated, regardless of defendant’s ‘‘back-
ground’’ or the use by the defendant of additional marks.
It hardly could be contended seriously that defendant
would have the right to use petitioner’s word mark ‘‘Sani-
Flush”’ in its advertising if defendant used entirely differ-
ent backgrounds and illustrations.

“** * * Tt is insisted that because appellant adopted the
two marks in connection with one article, appellee may
lawfully use either alone. Appellant’s marks were
adopted and registered separately. They have been
used separately in the advertisements. The word mark
has always been employed for denoting the compound,
the pictorial mark for stating a characteristic. We
are of the opinion that appellant acquired and has
maintained a separate property right in each mark,
which was not dependent upon a conjoint use.’’ Enoch
Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Ward, 152 Fed. 690, 693, supra.

22

‘‘The Sapolio Case, supra [the Enoch Morgan’s
Sons case], is authority in this court to sustain the
proposition that mere differences in the package or
dress will not prevent infringement of a registered
mark, if it is in fact colorably imitated.’’ Sierra Chem-
ical Co. v. Berettini, 33 F. 2d 397, 399, C. C. A. 7
(1929).

The Court of Appeals in its decision in the instant case
(R. 291-2) next said:

‘*And in the third place the human female figures in the
defendant’s advertising are by no means strikingly
similar to the ones used by the plaintiff in any of its
marks. The plaintiff’s earlier marks showed women
dressed as housemaids, and its later ones showed a
woman dressed conservatively as a matronly middle-
aged housewife. The defendant, on the other hand,
never used a housemaid in its advertising, but showed
therein a very slim young housewife, perhaps a bride,
ultra-fashionably dressed, i.e. in a very short skirt,
wearing an elaborate apron, and standing in an exag-
geratedly graceful bending posture pouring into a
watercloset bowl with an expression of almost ecstatic
delight upon her face. This contrasts sharply with the
more conservative dress, staid posture, and expression
of restrained joy on the faces of the women in all the
plaintiff’s trade marks, to say nothing of the rather
buxom figure of the woman appearing in its later
ones.”’

This side-by-side comparison, with its minutiae of de-
tailed differences—unwittingly exaggerated we think—is
in direct conflict with the proper test reiterated by this
Court in Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S.
538, 545, 546, as follows:

‘‘The commercial impression of a trade-mark is de-
rived from it as a whole, not from its elements sepa-
rated and considered in detail.’’

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, speaking
through Circuit Judge Woodbury, in Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic
Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F. 2d 549, 552 (1948),

"one
23

stated that in determining likelihood of consumer confu-
sion it is not enough ‘‘to make merely a side by side visual
comparison’’ and then said:
‘‘Purchasers undoubtedly often compare a mark which
they see when making a purchase with their memory of
a mark which they have seen on some previous occa-
sion. That is to say, they compare their memory of a
mark which they have seen in the past with their visual
impression of a mark which they presently see.’’

The Court of Appeals’ statements are contrary to the
fact findings of the District Court, because we respectfully
submit, the Appellate Court applied an improper test and
then spelled out differences, some of which are vague and
nebulous, if not inaccurate. What is the distinction be-
tween a housemaid and a housewife? Each of defendant’s
accused representations shows a woman wearing an apron.
We think this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that
there are many slim and young and attractive housemaids.
Do petitioner’s later marks actually show a ‘‘matronly
middle-age housewife”’’ or a ‘‘buxom figure’’? We doubt
it. Why is a woman ‘‘ultra-fashionably dressed’’ simply
because she wears a short skirt and an elaborate apron?
Is petitioner’s protection to be limited to long skirts and
the plainest apron, even though petitioner’s marks show
different length skirts and aprons with some decorations?
As to the Court’s ‘‘expression of almost ecstatic delight,’’
we think, with all due respect to that Court, that this is
somewhat rhetoric. Certainly the expression on the face
of the woman in defendant’s accused advertisement, Ex-
hibit C, shows no more delight than is portrayed on the
faces of the woman in petitioner’s marks. We think it is
very clear that the postures are substantially the same in
petitioner’s marks and defendant’s accused representa-
tions. Indeed the postures are almost identical, and we
doubt if this Court can visually reconcile the Appellate
Court’s comment that the postures in defendant’s adver-

- —
24

tisements are ‘‘exaggeratedly graceful’’ and those in plain-
tiff’s marks are ‘‘staid.’’

Obviously the Court of Appeals did not apply the test
of infringement prescribed by its decisions and those of
this Court in numerous decisions including Beckwith v.
Commissioner of Patents, supra; that is to say, the Court
of Appeals instead of considering the ‘‘commercial impres-
sion of’’ plaintiff’s picture trade-mark ‘‘as a whole,’’ er-
roneously considered the purchaser’s impression as though
it was derived ‘‘from its elements separated and considered
in detail.’’ The District Court on the other hand, after
considering the ‘vial testimony and reviewing the proofs
and authorities in point applied the proper ‘‘purchaser’s
assumed memory’’ test and found as a matter of fact (R.
229) :

««* * * that the mode of advertising which the defend-
ant has adopted would likely be misleading and result
in consumer confusion, and, as such, was an infringe-

ment on the plaintiff’s right to the exclusive use of
the trade-mark.”’

We submit that in reversing the District Court’s judg-
ment the Court of Appeals committed such manifest error
in fact and in law, as to warrant a review by this Court.

POINT III.
Defendant is Guilty of Unfair Competition.

The legal test of unfair competition is the same as
that of trade-mark infringement, that is, the likelihood of
consumer confusion as to the source of the goods.

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403,
413 (1916) ;

Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 162 F. 2d
280, 283, C. C. A. 1 (1947).

We submit that the District Court properly applied
this test in finding defendant guilty of unfair competition,

a

25

and that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
District Court.

The District Court found, in substance, the following:
For thirty-five years petitioner had used continuously and
exclusively its picture mark or symbol ‘‘to indicate the
origin of’’ petitioner’s goods. Millions of units of such
goods had been sold at retail since adoption of the mark
by petitioner. Hence the mark is ‘‘of great value’’ to
petitioner and ‘‘is entitled to protection.’’ The defendant
‘‘a relatively new competitor in the field’’ had successfully
marketed its product for ten years by means of advertising
of its own design before it adopted the accused pictures
in its advertising (R. 230-1). ‘‘The defendant’s news-
paper advertisements and display cards do not in any way
display the defendant’s name, nor do the leaflets except in
very small type on the back page * * *’’ (R. 220). ‘‘The
motive. prompting the defendant to use the objected to ad-
vertisements was to increase its sales [as admitted by
defendant’s president (R. 197-8)], and hence it could be
inferred that it sought to divert some of the plaintiff’s
trade profits thereby.’’ Defendant had ‘‘knowledge that
the plaintiff had used this symbol for many years’’ and the
adoption by defendant of a similar design ‘‘solely’’ as ‘‘a
coincidence’’ was ‘‘difficult to believe,’’ and under the
‘‘cireumstances, intent may reasonably be inferred’’ (R.
231).

We invite this Court to examine again our Chart at
the back of this brief as it so plainly confirms pictorially
the findings of the District Court.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion does not refer
to the above findings of the District Court, nor to the find-
ing (R. 221) that petitioner ‘‘adopted and used a pictorial
representation as a unique symbol or device to indicate
the origin of the goods of its manufacture.’’ The Court of
Appeals for the most part merely says (R. 292) that ‘‘it
does not appear that plaintiff has developed any unique

— me ——
26

style or pattern of advertising peculiarly its own,’’ ap-
parently because plaintiff used additional pictures in some
of its advertising. Obviously the Court of Appeals over-
looked the fact that plaintiff’s trade-mark or symbol, which
the Court found to be a good and valid trade-mark, appears
on every piece of petitioner’s advertising and that some of
petitioner’s further pictures, such as the three appearing
on our Chart, plainly have the same general ‘‘distinctive
style, format and juxtaposition of elements’’—quoting
from the language of the Court of Appeals (R. 292). We
trust that this Court compares these three pictures with
defendant’s three accused illustrations which likewise are
reproduced on the Chart.

The Court of Appeals cites no case and we know of
none which holds that a picture mark or symbol, employed
for years by the owner on all of its own goods and in all
of its own advertising, may be used by any competitor in
the latter’s advertising, merely because some of the owner’s
advertising includes additional illustrations, words or back-
ground.

Again the Court of Appeals failed to apply the proper
test of unfair competition and its decision is in conflict
with the decisions of this and lower Federal Courts. Fur-
thermore, petitioner submits that the District Court’s above
decisive findings on the unfair competition issue are amply
supported by substantial evidence and that the Court of
Appeals disregarded and in effect set aside these findings
contrary to Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the cases decided by this Court and other Courts with
respect to that Rule.

27
POINT IV.

The Findings of the District Court as to Defendant’s In-
fringement and Unfair Competition Were Correct and
Not Clearly Erroneous and Hence Under Rule 52(a)
Should Not Have Been Disturbed by the Court of
Appeals.

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in part as follows:

‘*Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-

portunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.”’

At a full trial before the District Court, oral testi-

mony was given by Mr. Raymond M. Schlabach, petitioner’s -

treasurer and general manager, and a stipulation as to
what other of petitioner’s witnesses would testify to was
read in open Court and forms part of the Record here
(R. 55 to 126, 130 to 146, 203). The court also heard the
oral testimony of two witnesses for defendant, including
that of Mr. Dunaway, defendant’s president (R. 148 to
203). Many exhibits were offered in evidence.

As we already have shown, the District Court made
careful, full and explicit findings of fact. Among its ulti-
mate findings were that defendant’s accused ‘‘advertising
material must be characterized as a colorable imitation of
the plaintiff’s trade-marks,’’ that from the facts of record
and the admissions of defendant ‘‘it could be inferred’’
that defendant had deliberately ‘‘sought to divert some of
the plaintiff’s trade profits’? and that defendant’s accused
advertisement ‘‘would likely be misleading and result in
consumer confusion’”’ (R. 228 to 231).

The findings of the District Court are supported by
substantial evidence, and hence are not ‘‘clearly erro-
neous.’’ The Court of Appeals practically disregarded
them. Instead of giving due effect to these factual deter-

“ aT
28

minations of the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, in
effect, set them aside by indirection and silence, and sub-
stituted its own judgment of the facts or the application of
legal doctrines only to facts contrary to those found by the
Trial Court, in violation of Rule 52(a) and contrary to
decisions of this Court and of Appellate Federal Courts,
including the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. We
quote here from several of such decisions, which are
clearly in point.

This Court in Walling v. General Industries Co., 330
U.S. 545 (1947), after reviewing the findings and inferences
drawn by the District Court, said at page 550:

‘*At the least, we think that in drawing such in-
ferences the Court was not clearly wrong, and con-

clude that the findings should therefore have been left
undisturbed.’’

and in the footnote cited Rule 52(a) and Lawson v. United
States Mining Co., 207 U.S. 1,12; Butte &€ Superior Copper
Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 249 U. S. 12, 30; District
of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U. S. 698, 701; Adamson v. Gilli-
land, 242 U.S. 350; United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 247 U. S. 32, 37, 38, 41.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, speaking
through Judge Woodbury in each instance, expressly said:

‘‘This question of infringement [of a patent] is also
one of fact (citing cases). As such the conclusion of
the master and the court below [on that question] is
not to be disturbed by us unless clearly erroneous.”’
(Emphasis supplied.) B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Massa-
chusetts Hair and Felt Co., 122 F. 2d 900, 914, (1941) ;

and,

‘‘Thus the ultimate question of infringement [of a
trade mark] is one of the type ordinarily classified as
one of fact (citing cases), and as such it is one primarily

for the fact-finding tribunal—in this case the district

KO

_ geen

29

court—reviewable here only for clear error under
Rule 52(a).’’ Dwinnell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit
Products Co., 140 F. 2d 618, 623 (1944) ;

and also,

‘‘And we have held in this Circuit that this ultimate
question of the likelihood of consumer confusion as to
source is one of fact.’’ Coca-Cola v. Snow Crest
Beverages, 162 F. 2d 280, 283, supra.

Manifestly, the District Court was bound by the rule
stated and reiterated in the above decisions of the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit as well as in decisions
of this Court. The District Court followed that rule and
made detailed findings of fact and the ultimate findings
of fact that there was likelihood of consumer confusion as
to source. Clearly, the Court of Appeals in reversing the
judgment of the Trial Court did so in conflict, not only
with the decisions of this Court, but with its own decisions
which the Trial Court so carefully followed.

'
x

CONCLUSION.

Each of the questions presented is of prime importance
to the protection of the purchasing public generally, as
well as to trade-mark and trade-name owners. We have
shown, we believe, that the Court of Appeals in answering
each of those questions in the negative runs counter to
the decisions of this Court, its own decisions and the deci-
sions of other Federal Appellate Courts and District
Courts. Thus there is a serious conflict of decisions in the
present instance.

The general principles which are clearly applicable
here are so ably and aptly expressed in the language of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge
Co., 316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), that we quote some of the
language in part here:

‘‘The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recog-
nition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is

30

true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that

we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a mer-
chandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to |
select what he wants, or what he has been led to be-
lieve he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this
human propensity by making every effort to impreg-

nate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means
employed, the aim is the same—to convey through the

mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desir-
ability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once

this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something

of value. If another poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner

can obtain legal redress. And in this case we are

called upon to ascertain the extent of the redress af-
forded for infringement of a mark registered under

the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.

‘‘The ‘right to be protected against an unwarranted
use of the registered mark has been made a statutory
right’ by that Act. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids
Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461, 471.’

For the reasons stated in this brief and petition, peti-
tioner respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari be
issued to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, in this action.

Respectfully submitted,
Harry W. Linpsey, JR.,
Harry FReEAsE,

JOSEPH F'REASE,

Frank J. SuLtoway,

RanpotpH C. RicHarpson,
Counsel for Petitioner.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386417_0058%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
