# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_2386%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1949 - **Citation:** 338 U.S. 870 ## Text age ED. \ ak sack ts pac etree Wk Mika ys nana ben 1 ain ec AN Casca ech ee b hee ih 65% 0o Se 2 ID 3. a c's pie kk says BA ain’ On pai Ens ' 2 I ES ee nT mee 2 RRS eb Ruths wu iwa Ve bRk Hews Cob ameken kwh 2 Reasons for granting the writ............................ ll 1. The court below refused to follow the controlling de- Rr eee err eres ee 12 2. The so-called “impostor rule” has no application to 3 ke Wyk wh awa se Bee o8 20 SB The question is important................ 0.0. c0es, 25 RES TS Vt ar St AY eee ate ee Pat et eee 26 ha Bh PV NRA SRSA WEEE SNAG A NORE UTE SRE GRRE RIRCER 27 CITATIONS Cases: Central National Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank, 31 I Sk Se ME 5 0 kg 4 5 ee PEKKA Ra Ks Wore Rea Ne KOS Citizens’ State Bank of McLean v. Fuller, 274 S. W. 208. _ Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363...... ‘ Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399......... 20, Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261.... 20, Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459 (1878)................. + District National Bank v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., UK SEMIS bs GNC N deb ASS CACORE ECA SUA ORAS NSS oes _ Emporia National Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kans. 360... ... ’ Floyd Acceptances, The, 7 Wall. 666.................. po ee A Se, PD Ole We MOC Ck Soke sd kas cabahtase Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. United States, 110 F. 2d 823 SRSS SSKaSE — > Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436............. 10 Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers Co., 94 N. J. Di MEE in 40 on ge kORML Cale uid eh ewe RS Reka SARE TCL a 24 National Home v. Wood, 299 U.S. 211................ 21 National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U. S. RARE ER prea 4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 25 Onondaga County Savings Bank v. United States, 64 Fed. DE: seb ie kn ns Wack emda dap s Cues buna ee Waa cae 19, 25 vo ele © aay err Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231.................. 24 Simpson v. Railroad Co., 43 Utah 105.................. 20 Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 462....... 20 United States v. Chase National Bank, 252 U.S. 485... . 25 United States v. Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U. S. 25 pratewt.t wee Cases—Continued Page United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 17 F. IEE A th iecchE Coven aeetlchae nd The facts in the Metropolitan Bank case were stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as follows (142 F. 2d 474-475): “James H. Foley was a civilian clerk in the Headquarters office of the Paymaster of the United States Marine Corps in Washington City. He was assigned to prepare officers’ pay and mileage vouchers, to prepare checks in payment thereof, to present the checks for signature by the Paymaster or other disbursing officers duly authorized to draw checks on the Treasury, and to deliver the signed checks to the named payees. From time to time during a period of twenty-eight months, beginning shortly before July 13, 1936, and ending November 14, 1938, Foley forged pay and travel mileage vouchers, to- gether with the necessary supporting travel orders, and pre- pared one hundred and forty-four Treasury checks for pay- ment of the amounts of the forged vouchers and orders. In the ordinary course he presented the checks to the Paymaster, who signed them. All were payable to one or another of six- teen actually existing Marine officers stationed in Washington. None of the payees was entitled to the proceeds of the checks or had any knowledge of the fraud. The signed checks were returned to Foley for distribution to the several officers, but 14 Here, Bertha Smith, an illiterate woman, entered upon a scheme, with others, to defraud the United States. Claims were filed by her in the name of Beulah Mitchell Gibbs setting forth facts which, if true, established that Beulah Mitchell Gibbs was the unremarried widow of Ben Gibbs, Jr., a deceased veteran of World War I and thus entitled to auto- matic insurance and dependency benefits. The real Beulah Mitchell Gibbs, who had remarried, was not a party to the fraud nor was she entitled to the benefits for which claim was made. (See fn. 1, supra, pp. 5-6.) The claims were forwarded by mail to the Veterans Administration, where, after pass- ing through several channels, it was determined that Ben Gibbs had died in circumstances entitling Foley, instead of delivering the checks, forged the signatures of the payees, added his own name as second endorser, and cashed or deposited them with the Anacostia Bank of Ana- costia, District of Columbia. That bank made no investiga- tion of the genuineness of the payees’ signatures, but took the checks in reliance on Foley, stamped them with the endorse- ment—‘Pay to the order of any Bank, Banker or Trust Com- pany. Prior endorsements guaranteed,’ and transmitted them to the National Metropolitan Bank (appellant) for collection. The latter bank likewise so endorsed the checks, presented them to the Treasury and received payment. It credited the collections to the Anacostia Bank in the regular course of busi- ness and paid over the proceeds prior to the discovery of the forgeries in November, 1938, and the Government’s demand on appellant of repayment in December, 1938.” The facts in the Providence Bank case were stated by this Court as follows (214 U.S. at 303-304): “Upon receipt of pension vouchers, regular in form and purporting to be executed by the pensioners named therein— but which in fact were forgeries—the United States pension agent at Boston drew the checks in question upon the sub- treasury at Boston, aggregating $6,362.07, in favor of the pen- sioners named in the vouchers, and transmitted such checks by mail directly to the address of each pensioner as given in the 15 his unremarried widow to automatic insurance benefits and, if dependent, to death compensation benefits. On the basis of documentary evidence submitted in support of the claim, findings of fact were made that Beulah Mitchell Gibbs was his un- remarried widow and that she was a dependent. Vouchers were then prepared calling for the pay- ment of the amount which would be due to Beulah Mitchell Gibbs under the appropriate statutes and regulations, had the facts set forth in the claims been true. The vouchers were transmitted to the Treasury Department. On the basis of the vouch- ers, the disbursing officers of the Treasury Depart- ment drew the checks in question and returned them to the Veterans Administration which placed them in the mail addressed to Beulah Mitchell Gibbs at the address given in the claims. They were either delivered to or intercepted by Bertha Smith, who forged the signature of Beulah Mitchell Gibbs to the checks as she had to the claims, and the vouchers, in accordance with the provision of § 4765, Rev. Stat. Of the persons named in the checks fifteen had died, and the others were the widows of soldiers who had remarried, and whose right to a pension had ceased, all the names, however, as we have said, having been forged. With but two excep- tions the checks were either for $24 or $36. “The checks with the forged endorsements thereon of the payees were cashed by the Exchange Bank, and immediately endorsed to a national bank in Boston for collection. The checks were presented by the collecting bank at the sub-treas- ury of the United States in Boston. The collecting bank re- ceived payment of the same and accounted for such payment to the Exchange Bank. «# * * in December, 1898, Munson, who was undergoing imprisonment upon a sentence imposed June 22, 1898, for forg- ing a pension check, with which presumably this case is not concerned, admitted that he had forged the signatures of the payees on the checks in suit.” 16 checks were presented to respondent, the Continen- tal Bank and Trust Company, which received the same, placed its endorsement on the back thereof, guaranteed the genuineness of prior endorsements, forwarded the same for payment, and, in accord- ance with applicable regulations, received payment therefor through the Federal Reserve Bank. We can find no distinction of any substance be- tween the instant case and the Metropolitan and Providence Bank cases (fn. 5, supra, pp. 13-15.) All involved a scheme to defraud the United States ; all involved the filing of false claims in the names of persons who, had the facts set forth in the claims been correct, would be entitled to certain payments ; in no case was the named payee entitled to the amount claimed; in all cases the claims were for- warded to the appropriate federal authorities who issued checks in reliance upon the truth of the facts set forth therein; and in all cases the checks were either delivered to or intercepted by the person perpetrating the fraud, who forged the names of the payees and either cashed or deposited the checks at a bank which guaranteed the genuine- ness of the endorsement; and in all cases the en- dorsing banks breached their guaranty of the gen- uineness of prior endorsements. The checks were all forwarded through channels to the Treasurer of the United States, who paid them solely in re- liance upon the guaranty of the presenting banks.° ® That the court below incorrectly summarized the facts in the Exchange Bank and Metropolitan cases (R. 183-4) is made clear by the statements of facts of those cases quoted in fn. 5, supra, pp. 13-15. a . pment 17 In the Metropolitan Bank case, as well as here, payment was sought and obtained through Federal Reserve Banks in accordance with the applicable regulation (31 C.F.R. 202.32 fn. 3, supra, p. 11), which provided that checks would be paid only when the checks contained a guaranty by a respon- sible presenting bank of the genuineness of prior endorsements. That was the obligation which re- spondents breached, and on which they should have been held liable under this Court’s rulings. It is implicit in the opinions below that the court believed the loss should fall upon the United States because its officials were negligent (R. 184). But even assuming that Government officials carelessly permitted themselves to be deceived, an assumption that the record and the trial court’s findings do mot warrant (R. 158-160), the irrelevance of that fact has already been settled by this Court. As the Court remarked, in the Metropolitan Bank case (323 U. S. at 458) : This guaranty was a protection which the government sought not only as to checks which were issued in due course having val- uable consideration, but as to checks which might have been illegally issued. That the administrative officers failed fully to per- form their duty is no reason why the gov- ernment should be deprived of the advantage of a guarantee independently made by one who was not under compulsion of any kind to make it. No equitable principles require that one who, for his own reasons, guarantees a payee’s 18 signature after issuance of a check, shall be relieved of his voluntarily assumed obligation because others who owed the government obli- gations had previously defaulted in their obli- gations.’ ™ The Court of Appeals’ approach was also condemned in the Exchange Bank of Providence case where this Court stated (214 U. S. at 318-319): By §§ 4764 and 4765, Rev. Stat., it is required, before a pension check shall be issued, that vouchers shall be supplied, and the duty is cast upon the Secretary of the Interior of making rules and regulations to establish the identity of the pensioner. As shown by the record, the regulations thus promulgated require vouchers to be signed in duplicate before an officer authorized to admin- ister anoath * * *. The pensioner is required * * * to sign and make oath to a statement as to his identity, his existing right to the pension and his post office address. The officer is required to certify * * * that the pensioner was fully identified; * * * and the address of the pensioner is to be stated in the certificate. These requirements are incompatible with the assump- tion that the Government was chargeable with knowledge of the identity, continued existence, and right to pensions, or with the signatures of those entitled to receive pension moneys. The requirement by the Government of proof, for its own protection, affords no ground for the contention that as to any action taken as the result of the furnishing of such proof the Government is estopped as to third par- ties from showing that the proofs furnished were false and fraudulent and that the Government had been de- ceived thereby. To so hold would be to say that from the act of exerting a precaution against fraud there arose a presumption by which the fraud could be successfully accomplished. This would be the case if it were now held that because by forged vouchers the Government was de- ceived into acting third parties had a right to rely upon the integrity of the proof and to estop the Government as though representations as to the verity of such proof had been made by it to such third parties. The rights, there- fore, of the bank as the apparent acquirer of the pension checks are to be governed by the nature and character of the instruments and cannot be enlarged so as to relieve the bank from the obligation of warranty implied in the presentation of the checks and the collecting of the amount. The subject is aptly illustrated in the opinion 19 Thus, contrary to the holding below, the decisions of this Court make it clear that the bank, which voluntarily accepts the endorsement, owes a duty to the United States to make certain that the endorse- ment is that of the named payee and that a failure to perform that duty makes the bank liable to the United States under its guarantee of the genuine- ness of prior endorsements.* by Coxe, Judge, in United States v. Onondaga County Savings Bank, 39 Fed. Rep. 259, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 64 Fed. Rep. 703. [Emphasis supplied. ] ® The decision below is also in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Onondaga County Savings Bank v. United States, 64 Fed. 703 (mentioned approvingly in the Exchange Bank opinion, 214 U.S. at 319, fn. 7, supra, pp. 18-19). The court there stated (pp. 704-705) : The plaintiff in error contends, however, that under the facts proved in this case it should not be required to respond. It is argued that the loss was the natural and proximate result of negligence in issuing the drafts. It appears, however, that they were issued only upon the receipt of vouchers regular in form, apparently sub- scribed by Alma Wood and by two witnesses, with a certificate by a notary public that all three of them had, on August 2, 1882, appeared personally before him, and made oath to the truth of their respective statements, and that he believed them to be credible persons. With such vouchers before him, it was certainly not negligence on the part of the pension agent to send checks for the amount receipted for to the person inscribed on his roll as a pensioner, at her post-office address. The govern- ment had a right to rely upon the fact that the assistant treasurer would pay out no money on the draft except to Alma Wood personally, upon proof of her identity, or to some responsible person presenting her endorsement and guarantying its genuineness; and it is no defense to a claim that an endorsee who has, by a forged endorsement, re- ceived from the drawee money to which he is not entitled, shall refund the same, to show that the same person who deceived him into paying money on the forged endorse- ment of the draft also induced the government to issue the draft on a forged signature to the voucher. [Emphasis supplied. ] 20 2. The so-called ‘‘impostor rule’’ has no applica- tion to Government checks. The court below un- dertook to relieve respondent banks from their plain liability for breach of their guarantee of prior endorsements, as established by this Court in the Metropolitan and Exchange Bank cases, by choosing instead to accept the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. National Bank, Albuquergue, 131 F. 2d 985, certiorari denied, 318 U. S. 774, which applied the so-called ‘‘impostor rule’’ to a similar suit by the United States. That rule, unrecognized by the Negotiable Instruments Law, and with neither antiquity ° nor unanimity * to recommend it, has been adopted by a number of courts who, borrow- ing from a principle of the law of sales (5 Willis- ton, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) sec. 1517), have announced the proposition that where a person fraudulently assumes the identity of a third person, deceives the drawer of the check into believing that he is that third person, and the drawer of the check delivers a check made payable to the order of the third party to the impostor, the drawer’s dominant intent is that the check be paid to the order of the ® The impostor rule has no counterpart in the English de- cisions. The first true impostor case relying on a supposed intent which we have been able to find is Emporia National Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kans. 360 (1886). 10 District National Bank v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 65 F. 2d 831 (C.A. D.C.); Keel v. Wynne, 210 N.C. 426; Citizens’ State Bank of McLean v. Fuller (Tex. App.) 274 S.W. 208; Simpson v. Railroad Co., 43 Utah 105; Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R.I. 462; Commonweaith v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261; cf. Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, reject the impostor rule. 21 deceiving impostor rather than the third person to whose order he has made the check payable. We think it clear that this dubious rule has not been, and should not be, applied to Government checks. a. In circumstances precisely comparable to those presented here, as we have pointed out (supra, pp. 13-17), this Court has twice—as late as 1945—imposed liability upon the guaranteeing bank in ‘‘impostor”’ situations, without any sug- gestion that the normal rule of liability should not govern. b. Moreover, application of this so-called rule to Government checks is logically untenable and with- out support in the law merchant—whatever its doubtful merits in private transactions." The rule rests upon an assumed intention to make payment to the impostor, rather than to the named payee, and, accordingly, the Court of Appeals was com- pelied to hold that it was the intention of the ‘‘ Vet- erans Administration’ to deliver the checks to 11 See Abel, The Impostor Payee, 1940 Wisc. L. Rev. 161, 217-233, 362; 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 220; 18 Cal. L. Rev. 693; 34 Harv. L. Rev. 76; 37 id. 149; 22 Mich. L. Rev. 61. “In the last analysis it must be admitted that the drawer did not intend to pay money to a confidence man or other fraudulent person, and that he did intend the bank to pay over his money to the bona fide business man or donee whom he named as payee.” 8 N. Car. L. Rev. 77. “Tf it is not the intent of all persons who draw checks to give it [them] for a supposedly valid consideration, then busi- ness men must be more foolish than anyone ever suspected.” 18 B. U. L. Rev. 148, 153. 12 The Veterans Administration is of course the United States. Cf. National Home v. Wood, 299 U.S. 211, 213. 22 the very person who practiced the fraud upon it and to have the checks paid to the order of that de- frauder.* But the district court had specifically found upon uncontradicted evidence that the Gov- ernment employees and officials who drew the checks and prepared the vouchers ‘‘intended that payment be made to Beulah Mitchell Gibbs, the un- remarried widow of Ben Gibbs, Jr., the deceased veteran, and no one else’’ (R. 158). And it neces- sarily follows from the very nature of the Govern- ment’s fiscal operations that an assumed intention to make payment to the impostor can have no place. For the statutes of Congress and the regulations of the pertinent agency, which provide the only man- ner in which the intention of the United States can be expressed and the only souree from which it can be ascertained, specifically limit the payment of claims to a definite category of people and provide for safeguards in order to make certain that the 13 As a corollary, the court stated that there was no forgery involved in the signing of Mrs. Gibbs’ name to the checks (R. 183). But it seems clear that Bertha Smith’s signing of Beulah Mitchell Gibbs’ name to the checks was just as much forgery as her signing of the same name to the claims. Sec- tion 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (infra, p. 28) pro- vides that “When a signature is * * * made without the au- thority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative.” Moreover, in just such cases as this, the fraudulent claimant, who endorsed, can be and has been convicted of forgery. Cf. United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 17 F. Supp. 611, 612 (W.D. Okla.) ; Cen- tral National Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank, 31 App. D.C. 391, 394. Finally, if carried to its logical result the decision below would require the absurd holding that if Mrs. Beulah Mitchell Gibbs had gotten hold of the checks and endorsed them, her signature of her own name would be a forgery because she was not the intended payee. — 23 United States is not defrauded by persons making false claims."* The Government officers who proc- ess and pay these claims are persons with limited powers whose authority is restricted to that ex- pressly granted to them by statute or regulation. The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 677; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409; Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120. To ascribe to them an intent, which rather obviously they do not, and could not, have, is to evade this rule of strict agency by indirection. The impostor rule, aside from its basic illogic, can- not be applied to government checks without doing violence to these long accepted principles. A second ground for rejecting the ‘impostor rule’’ in Government check cases is that it presup- poses a physical meeting between the drawer and the defrauder. Under the law of sales, from which the rule is borrowed, title to goods does not pass when they are delivered to an impostor who has practiced his deception by mail. Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459 (1878). Passage of title can occur only when there is a physical confrontation be- tween the impostor and the vendor. Jbid. A ma- jority of the courts which have adopted the im- postor rule therefore apply it only where there is 14In rejecting an impostor argument in respect of a check issued by the State of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of that state (which otherwise accepts the “impostor rule”) said in Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261: the intent of the Commonwealth was that recited in the check. See also the observations of this Court in the Providence Bank case, fn. 7, supra, pp. 18-19. 24 face to face confrontation between the impostor and the drawer. See 22 Mich. L. Rev. 61; 15 N. Car. L. Rev. 186; 11 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 89; 24 Va. L. Rev. 192. These courts rely upon the proposition that, where there has been an actual meeting, a drawer may have been mistaken as to the sort of man he dealt with but not as to the man himself. ‘‘The name of a person is the verbal designation by which he is known, but the visible presence of a person affords surer means of iden- tifying him than his name.’’ Robertson v. Cole- man, 141 Mass. 231, 232. Cf. Cohen v. Lincoln Sav- ings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399; Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers Co., 94 N. J. L. 152. Here, as is the case with most Government claims, there was no physical meeting between the impostor and any government agent (R. 158). As Judge Hutcheson aptly remarked in his dissent below, dis- tinguishing such instances of personal dealing from Government transactions (R. 185) : It is a far ery, though, from this situation to the one we have here. Here the government, dealing through agents and by mail over great distances and issuing countless checks to named, but not otherwise identified, payees, in no way undertakes to identify the payee to the bank, in no way misleads the bank into paying it, and guaranteeing endorsement of the payee. ce. Even the case of United States v. First Na- tional Bank, Albuquerque, 131 F. 2d 985, certiorari —— 25 denied, 318 U. S. 774, relied on by the court below, lends the decision below only indifferent support. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit specifically held that it was the intention of the government official who drew the check to have it payable to the order of the impostor and as- sumed that there had been a face to face con- frontation between the impostor and the disbursing officer. (131 F. 2d at 989). Here, the intention of the Treasury officer drawing the check was that it should be paid to the real widow (Beulah Mitchell Gibbs) and no one else; here also there was no face to face confrontation between the im- postor and any efficer of the United States, much less the drawer of the check. 3. The question is important. The United States, which issues tens of thousands of checks each year, is the greatest payer of claims and the largest drawer of checks in the country. As the recent appellate decisions we have cited indicate, cases frequently arise, not unnaturally, in which an im- 15 For the reasons set forth in our petition in No. 695, October Term, 1942, we think that decision was incorrect. Further- more, that decision, while recognizing that its opinion was contrary to the Exchange Bank of Providence case, supra, and Onondaga Savings Bank v. United States, 64 Fed. 703, supra, fn. 8, p. 19, believed that the effect of those cases had been dissipated by the decisions of this Court in United States v. Chase National Bank, 252 U. S. 485, and United States v. Ex- change Bank of Baltimore, 270 U. S. 527. The later decision of this Court in the Metropolitan Bank case clearly distin- guished the Chase Bank case as merely involving a variation of the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (as also did the Exchange Bank of Baltimore case), and reasserted the con ory vitality of the Providence Bank case. 323 U.S .at 7-8. ~— 26 postor succeeds in defrauding the Government and having a check issued to him in another’s name as payee. A further authoritative ruling by this Court on the scope of the presenting bank’s guarantee of prior endorsements in this situation is necessary and desirable, and all the more so because the de- cision below, which fails to follow this Court’s con- trolling rulings, has no basis in principle or the law merchant. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, it is respectfully sub- mitted that the petition herein for a writ of certi- orari should be granted. Puiuie B. PERLMAN, Solicitor General. SEPTEMBER 1949. “ 27 APPENDIX 1. The Act of September 2, 1914, 38 Stat. 711, es- tablished a Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department. Section 401 was added by the Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 398, 409, as an amendment to Section 2. The pertinent parts of Section 401 as amended by the Act of Decem- ber 24, 1919, 41 Stat. 371, 374, are: * * * Any person in the active service on or after the 6th day of April, 1917, and be- fore the 11th day of November, 1918, who, while in such service, and before the expiration of one hundred and twenty days after October 15, 1917, or one hundred and twenty days after entrance into or employment in the active serv- ice, becomes or has become totally and perma- nently disabled, or dies or has died, without having applied for insurance, shall be deemed to have applied for and to have been granted insurance, payable to such person during his life in monthly installments of $25 each; and any person inducted into the service by a local draft board after the 6th day of April, 1917, and before the 11th day of November, 1918, who, while in such service, and before being accepted and enrolled for active military or naval service, becomes or has become totally and permanently disabled, or dies or has died, without having applied for insurance, shall be deemed to have applied for and to have been granted insurance, payable to such person dur- ing his life in monthly installments of $25 each. If he shall die either before he shall have re- ceived any of such monthly installments or 28 before he shall have received two hundred and forty of such monthly installments, then $25 per month shall be paid to his widow from the time of his death and during her widowhood ; * * * Provided, however, That no more than two hundred and forty of such monthly install- ments, including those received by such per- son during his total and permanent disability shall be so paid. * * * 2. Veterans’ Regulation 1(a), promulgated by Executive Order Number 6156, June 6, 1933, and appearing after 38 U.S. C. 739, states in Part 1, Paragraph IV: The surviving widow, child or children, and/or dependent mother or father of any de- ceased person who died as a result of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military or naval service as provided for in part 1, paragraph 1 hereof, shall be entitled to receive pension at the monthly rates specified next below: Widow under 50 years of age........... $30 *+* * # 3. Section 23 of the Uniform Negotiable Instru- ments Law: Foraep SIGNATURE. When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a dis- charge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired eV 29 through or under such signature, unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. VW UG. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949 e54208 30 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_2386%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.