# Opposition Brief — St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1948
- **Citation:** 335 U.S. 815

## Text

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CITATIONS

Atwater & Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 188...........
Bleck v. Hivech, 256 U. S. 135... .. .. .. 2... ee eee 6,
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503................... 6,
Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F. 2d 730, certiorari denied,
a is ibcdanccsoseudbs twas ne casaeeacanys
Gallagher’s Steak House v. Bowles, 142 F. 2a 530, cer-
tiewart denied, S83 U. GB. TO4..... .... 2... eee,
Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269.................
Gray v. Commodity Credit Corp., 63 F. Supp. 386, af-
firmed, 159 F. 2d 243, certiorari denied, 331 U. S. 842. .
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146....
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81..............
Home Bldg. ¢ L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. 8. 398... .....
International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. 8. 399..
Lichter v. United States, No. 105, Oct. T. 1947, decided
CIEE 5. Ova nek de hGan ein ceaneebesnubienscs
Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 55 C. Cis. 310, af-
BERS A eee Tree et Stee
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502...
Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. 8. 327......
Royal Holland Lloyd v. United States, 73 C. Cls. 722... .
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 ....................
Shreveport Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F. 2d 222,
certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 749... .. 2... 66. oe
Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398................ 5,7,
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. 8. 635............
United States v. Carver, 278 U.S. 294... .. 2... 2... 66...
United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256.................
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. 8. 373.... 10
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372......... 10 i
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U. 8. 138 '

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(1)

Constitution and Statutes:

Constitution of the United States:
Fifth Amendment
Second War Powers Act (54 Stat. 676, as amended by
56 Stat. 177, 50 U.S.C. App. 633, 1152) Section 2(a).. 3,5, 12

Miscellaneous:
Executive Order No. 9125 (7 Fed. Reg. 2719)

O’Brian and Fleischmann, The War Production Board
Administrative Policies and Procedures, 13 Geo. Wash-

M-251 (7 Fed. Reg. 8424)
Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) (7 Fed. Reg. 8686) . .

No. 74
Sr. Reais Paper CoMPANY, PETITIONER
v.

Tue Unitep STATES

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF CLAIMS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION sELOW
The opinion of the Court of Claims (R. 24-30)
is reported at 76 F. Supp. 831.

. JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Claims was entered
on April 5, 1948 (R. 30). The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on June 5, 1948. The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under Section 3(b)
of the Act of February 13, 1925, as amended.

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Schedule No. 1 to Paragraph (d) of
General Preference Order No. M-251, issued by

(1)

2

War Production Board pursuant to the President’s
delegation to it of the allocation power vested in
him by the Second War Powers Act, providing that
no holder of pulpwood in the Puget Sound area
**shall consume, process, or deliver any * * *
pulpwood,”’ constituted a ‘‘taking’’ of petitioner’s
pulpwood plant, located in that area, so as to en-
title petitioner to just compensation under the
Fifth Amendent. *

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Second War
Powers Act (54 Stat. 676, as amended by 56 Stat.
177, 50 U.S.C. App. 633, 1152) ; of WPB General
Preference Order No. M-251 (7 Fed. Reg. 8424) ;
and of Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) to that Order
(7 Fed. Reg. 8686) are set forth in the Appendix,
infra, pp. 12-19.

STATEMENT

By amended petition filed in the Court of Claims
on January 8, 1948, the St. Regis Paper Company,

1 Petitioner in its formulation of the question presented
attempts to insert into the case the issue whether the United
States should be required to pay just compensation for its
inventory of pulpwood logs which it asserts was also requisi-
tioned (Pet. 14). That question was not raised in the court
below, and we submit, is not presented here. In the complaint
filed below, the sole allegation relative to this inventory of logs
is that petitioner was directed to deliver logs from its inven-
tory to other mills (R. 6). The exhibits supporting this alle-
gation indicate that petitioner was to be paid by the receiving
mill “at regularly established prices and terms (subject to the
regulations of the Office of Price Administration)” (R. 14-16).
There is no allegation that petitioner complied with these
orders, that it was not paid as there directed, or that these
payments were not just compensation. Furthermore, the com-
plaint contains ne prayer for compensation for these logs.

3

the petitioner herein, sought to recover just com-
pensation for an alleged taking of its pulpwood
plant located at Tacoma, Washington (R. 1-23).
The United States demurred (R. 23). The com-
plaint alleged the following:

Petitioner owns a plant located in Tacoma,
Washington, for the manufacture from pulpwood
of approximately 300 tons of bleached and un-
bleached kraft pulp per day (R.1). On October 26,
1942, the day on which the allocation order here in-
volved was issued, and for some years prior thereto,
petitioner was engaged in the business of manu-
facturing and selling bleached and unbleached kraft
pulp, paper and other paper products (R. 1, 2).
On that day, petitioner had at its plant an inventory
of pulpwood logs, which is an essential raw material
to its manufacturing process (R. 2). It also had
a supply of these logs under contract for delivery
for the continued operation of its plant at capacity
production (R. 2).

In October 1942, the War Production Board,
acting under Executive Order 9125 (7 Fed. Reg.
9719) delegating to it the allocation power vested
in the President by Section 2(a) of Title IIT of
the Second War Powers Act, Appendix, infra,
p. 12, issued General Preference Order No. M-251,
Appendix, infra, pp. 12-16, (R. 2-4). That order
stated that the War Production Board was em-
powered to determine areas in which there existed
a shortage of pulpwood required in the national

——

4

defense; to issue orders allocating and directing
the distribution of the supply of pulpwood; and
further to direct that certain persons to be specified
might not consume, process, deliver, or accept de-
livery of such pulpwood (R. 3-4).

On October 26, 1942, the War Production Board
issued Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) of Order M-
251, determining that there then prevailed in the
Puget Sound Area in the State of Washington, the
area in which petitioner’s plant is located, a short-
age of pulpwood needed for the defense of the
United States (Appendix, infra, pp. 16-19; R. 5,
10-12). The schedule went on to provide that on
and after October 26, 1942, and until the order
should be revoked, no holder of pulpwood in that
area was to ‘‘consume, process, or deliver any such
pulpwood except upon specific authorization or di-
rection’’ of the War Production Board (R. 5, 12).
As a result, petitioner was not allowed to consume
or process pulpwood in its plant from November 1,
1942 to April 1, 1944 (R. 7). Petitioner protested
to the War Production Board against the applica-
tion of this order to it, but its protest was rejected
(R. 6-7). Petitioner accordingly had to shut
down the plant during that period, since the plant
could not be operated, or used for any purpose
other than the manufacture of kraft pulp (R. 2,
7-8).

In its complaint in the court below, petitioner
claimed this order constituted a temporary requisi-
tion of its plant for the use and benefit of the United

5

States, and contended that the Government had
become obligated under the Fifth Amendment to
pay, as just compensation for that taking, the out-
of-pocket expenses it incurred during the shut-
down period, the plant deterioration and deprecia-
tion charges, and the profits it failed to earn during
that period (R. 8-9). The court below, in sustain-
ing the demurrer of the United States (R. 30),
held that petitioner’s allegations failed to establish
that its property had been taken (R. 25-30). Ac-
cordingly, it dismissed the complaint (R. 30).

ARGUMENT

Petitioner does not question that the power to
allocate materials and facilities, which the Con-
gress by Section 2(a) (2) of Title III of the Sec-
ond War Powers Act, Appendix, infra, p. 12,
vested in the President, involves a constitutional
exercise of the war power, or that the delegation of
that power to the War Production Board, the
agency designated by the President to exercise that
phase of the power here involved, was proper. Cf.
Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U. 8. 398. Rather,
petitioner’s claim is predicated on the novel theory
that when the War Production Board (and the
various other agencies also designated to exercise
that power in specific phases of the national econ-
omy *) exercised the power to allocate materials

2The War Food Administration, the Petroleum Adminis-
tration for War, and the Office of Price Administration also
allocated scarce materials.

a |

6

in the interests of national defense and security,
these agencies were engaged in requisitioning prop-
erty from private individuals for public use, and
that, therefore, the individuals denied materials by
reason of such allocations to others are entitled to
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
The holding below rejecting that claim is, we sub-
mit, correct and in accord with established prin-
ciples.

1. Although the allocation order here involved
denying petitioner the pulpwood it needed to
operate its plant was only one of hundreds of sim-
ilar allocation orders affecting virtually all phases
of industrial activity and business issued by various
agencies of the Government during World War II,
petitioner recognizes that there are no other cases
in which the contention it advances here has been
sustained (Pet. 28). There is good reason why no
such cases are available, since the situation here in-
volved is governed by the long established rule that
when governmental power, such as the war power
of the Federal Government or the police power of
a state, is legitimately exercised for the public good,
and injury is suffered as an incident thereto, there
is no taking of property for public use compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. Block v. Hirsch, 256
U. S. 135; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503;
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U. S. 1388; Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155-158;
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
502; United States v. Carver, 278 U.S. 294; Trans-

7

portation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. 8. 635; Morrisdale
Coal Co. v. United States, 55 C. Cls. 310, 316, af-
firmed, 259 U. S. 188; Royal Holland Lloyd v.
United States, 73 C. Cls. 722.

The allocation orders issued during World War
II were designed to effectuate the distribution of
scarce materials and products of all kinds among
competing military and civilian demands and to
insure the prompt, efficient, and adequate flow of
shortage materials to the armed forces, to our allies,
and to the home front. In order to attain these ob-
jectives, it was often imperative to withdraw or
reclaim allocations granted, or to reallocate because
of a changed military situation or a change in
legitimate consumer demands. See Brief for Re-
spondents in Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, No. 793,
Oct. T., 1943, pp. 18-21; O’Brian and Fleischmann,
The War Production Board Administrative Poli-
cies and Procedures, 13 Geo. Wash. Law Rev. eh

Although these allocation orders affected normal
peacetime activities and resulted in some instances
in very substantial financial losses, such damages
were only incidental to the overall objective of so
organizing our economy as to enable the United
States to ‘‘wage war successfully.”” Home Bldg.
& L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426; H tra-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 93; see

8 Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 29), the authors of
this article did not express the view that the allocation orders
issued by the War Production Board, including the ““M” series
here involved, resulted in a taking of private property for
public use compensable under the Fifth Amendment.

8

Itchter v. United States, No. 105, Oct. T. 1947, de-
cided June 14, 1948. Any financial losses which
ensued were ‘‘damnum absque injuria * * *
private interest has merely come into collision
with a public interest, and has had to yield.’’
Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F. 2d 730, 732 (C.C.A. 5),
certiorari denied, 322 U. S. 748; cf. Gallagher’s
Steak House v. Bowles, 142 F. 2d 530 (C.C.A. 2),
certiorari denied, 322 U. S. 764; Shreveport En-
graving Co. v. United States, 143 F. 2d 222 (C.C.A.
5), certiorari denied, 323 U. S. 749; Gray v.
Commodity Credit Corp., 63 F. Supp. 386, 396
(S. D. Cal.), affirmed, 159 F. 2d 243 (C.C.A. 9),
certiorari denied, 331 U. S. 842; see also, Block v.
Hirsch, supra; Bowles v. Willingham, supra;
Woods v. Miller Co., supra. As was pointed out in
Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, supra, at 405:

Certainly we could not say that the Presi-
dent would lack the power under this Act to
take away from a wasteful factory and route to
an efficient one a precious supply of material
needed for the manufacture of articles of war.
That power of allocation or rationing might in-
deed be the only way of getting the right equip-
ment to our armed forces in time. From the
point of view of the factory owner from whom
the materials were diverted the action would
be harsh. He would be deprived of an ex-
pected profit. But in times of war the national
interest cannot wait on individual claims to
preference. The waging of war and the con-
trol of its attendant economic problems are
urgent business.

9

Or, again, as this Court said just ‘the other day in
Lichter v. United States, supra (p. 11 of slip
opinion:

In total war it is necessary that a civilian
make sacrifices of his property and profits
with at least the same fortitude as that with
which a drafted soldier makes his traditional
sacrifices of comfort, security and life itself.

9. Petitioner’s claim is also untenable for the
reason that there was no actual taking of any right
in its property. As pointed out by the court below,
there is a complete absence of “any showing that
[petitioner’s] plant did not remain at all times
within its own exclusive ownership, possession,
and control, or that the Government had any
semblance of ownership, possession, or use of the
property’? (R. 29). Accordingly, there was no
actual physical taking of any right in petitioner’s
property, and hence petitioner’s property was not
‘‘taken’’ in the Fifth Amendment sense so as to en-
title it to compensation thereunder. Transporta-
tion Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642; Gibson V.
United States, 166 U. 8. 269, 275-276; Scranton V.
Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 154-155; Hamilton v. Ken-
tucky Distilleries Co., 951 U. S. 146, 156-157; At-
water & Co. v. United States, 975 U. S. 188, 190-
191.*

4 The various cases cited by petitioner, such as United
States v. Causby, 328 U. 8. 256; Portsmouth Company Vv.
United States, 260 U. S. 327, and International Paper Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 399 (Pet. 17-23), are all distinguish-

able since in each of these cases there was an actual taking of
an interest in the plaintiff’s property.

10

Nor is there any substance to petitioner’s further
contention that since Schedule 1 forbade it to con-
sume, process, or deliver any pulpwood and it was
thus compelled to shut down its pulpwood plant,
the plant not being usable for any other purpose
except storage, there was such a destruction of its
“rights to process and consume pulpwood”’ (R. 8)
and to use and operate its plant as to amount to a
‘*taking’’ compensable under the Fifth Amendment
(Pet. 24). For the ‘‘destruction’’ rule applies, as
stated in United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U. 8. 373, 378, only when the effects of the gov-
ernmental action short of acquisition of title or
occupancy are so complete as to deprive the owner
of all or most of his interest in the subject matter.
Cf. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372.
Here all that the Government did was to forbid
petitioner to acquire or process pulpwood and this
denial merely resulted in the closing down of peti-
tioner’s plant. Neither all or any part of petition-
er’s plant was destroyed, nor was petitioner’s ex-
clusive possession or occupany thereof disturbed at
any time during the period of the alleged taking.
In these circumstances, there clearly was no such
destruction of petitioner’s plant as to amount to a
‘‘taking’’ compensable under the Fifth Amend-
ment,

11

CONCLUSION

The decision below is clearly correct, and there is
no conflict with any applicable decision of this
Court. The petition for a writ of certiorari should
therefore be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Pup B. PERLMAN,

Solicitor General.
H. G. Morison,

Assistant Attorney General.
Pau A. SWEENEY,

MELVIN RICHTER,
Attorneys.

JuLY 1948.

12

APPENDIX

1. The Second War Powers Act, 54 Stat. 676,

as amended by 56 Stat. 177, 50 U.S.C. App. 633,
1152, provided in pertinent part:

Sec. 2(a) * *# &# & &

(2) * * * Whenever the President is satis-
fied that the fulfillment of requirements for
the defense of the United States will result in
a shortage in the supply of any material or of
any facilities for defense or for private ac-
count or for export, the President may allocate
such material or facilities in such manner,
upon such conditions and to such extent as he
shall deem necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and to promote the national
defense.

2. General Preference Order No. M-251 of the

War Production Board (7 Fed. Reg. 8424) pro-
vides in pertinent part:

The fulfillment of requirements for the de-
fense of the United States has created in cer-
tain areas and is expected to create in other
areas a shortage in the supply for defense, for
export and for private account, of wood for
pulp and lumber, and has created a shortage
in the supply for defense, for export and for
private account of various materials and facil-
ities required for the production of pulpwood;
and the following order is deemed necessary
and appropriate in the public interest and to
promote national defense:

§ 3113.1 General Preference Order M-251-
(a) Applicability of priorities regulations.

13

This order and all transactions affected thereby
are subject to all applicable provisions of the
priorities regulations of the War Production
Board, as amended from time to time.

(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this
order:

(1) ‘‘Person’’ means any individual, part-
nership, association, business trust, corpora-
tion, governmental corporation or agency, or
any organized group of persons, whether in-
corporated or not.

(2) ‘*Pulpwood’’ includes wood of any
species and in any form commonly delivered to
a manufacturer of woodpulp for the manufac-
ture of woodpulp, except those species and
forms defined in and subject to the following
orders of the War Production Board: M-186,
M-228, M-229 and M-234.

(3) A “tholder of pulpwood”’ is any person
who holds or accumulates pulpwood for manu-
facture by himself into woodpulp.

(4) To “thold”’ or ‘‘accumulate’’ pulpwood
means to have or obtain control of a supply of
pulpwood whether by production or purchase
directly by the holder, by production or pur-
chase by an affiliate or subsidiary or by one
branch, division or section of a single enter-
prise or by production or purchase by any
other person for delivery to or for the account
of the holder.

=

14

(d) Control of pulpwood in areas of short-
age. Whenever the Director General for
Operations determines that there prevails in
any area a shortage in the supply of any type
or types of pulpwood required for the produc-
tion of materials needed in the public interest
and for national defense, he may issue a sched-
ule defining such area and such type or types of
pulpwood, and may thereupon, according to
the degree of the shortage and the immediacy
of the need, and as specified in such schedule,

(1) Allocate specific quantities of pulpwood
of the type or types defined held or accumu-
lated in such area from and to specific per-
SONS ;

(2) Direct holders of pulpwood in such
area to maintain in their holdings or accumu-
lations of pulpwood of the type or types de-
fined a stated quantity or percentage, either
uniform for all such holders or particular for
any, to be known as a ‘‘Reserve Supply”’,
available for disposition by the Director Gen-
eral for Operations, from which the Director
General for Operations may from time to time
authorize or direct the delivery of specific
quantities to specific persons and/or the manu-
facture of specific quantities into the specific
products, and the Director General for Opera-
tions may in addition from time to time allo-
cate specific quantities of any pulpwood of the
type or types defined held or accumulated in
such area, although not a part of such ‘‘Re-
serve Supply’’, from and to specific persons;
and provide procedures for applying for and

15

granting such authorizations, directions and
_ allocations ;

(3) Direct that no person, or no person of
a specified class, may consume, process, deliver
or accent delivery of any pulpwood of the type
or types defined held or accumulated in such
area except upon specific authorization or di-
rection by the Director General for Operations,
and provide procedures for applying for and
granting such - authorization or direction;
and/or

(4) Limit or prohibit particular uses of
pulpwood of the type or types defined held or
accumulated in such area. In any allocation,
authorization or direction issued by the Di-
rector General for Operations pursuant to
clause (1), (2) or (8) of the foregoing para-
graph, the Director General for Operations
may require the person to whom such alloca-
tion, authorization or direction is issued to
manufacture, from the pulpwood which is the
subject thereof, particular types and quanti-
ties of woodpulp or other wood product or im-
pose upon the use of such pulpwood by such
person any other conditions necessary and
appropriate in the public interest and for
national defense. Such allocations, authoriza-
tions and directions and any conditions at-
tached thereto, and any limitations or prohibi-
tions issued pursuant to clause (4) of the fore-
going paragraph, shall be made to insure the
satisfaction of requirements, direct and in-
direct, for the defense of the United States
and for essential civilian supply, may be made

16

in consideration of the possible dislocation of
labor, the effect of the local shortage on the na-
tional supply of products manufactured from
pulpwood and woodpulp, the problems of
transporting such products into and out of the
area defined, and the necessity of keeping a
plant in operation so that it may be able to
fulfill war orders and essential requirements,
and may be made in the discretion of the Di-
rector General for Operations, without regard
to preference ratings.

3. Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) of Order No.
M-251 (7 Fed. Reg. 8686) provides:

§ 3113.2 Schedule 1 to paragraph (d) of Gen-
eral Preference Order M-251. Pursuant to
paragraph (d) of General Preference Order
M-251, the Director General for Operations
hereby determines that there prevails in the
following area a shortage in the supply of the
following type(s) of pulpwood required for
the production of materials needed in the pub-
lic interest and for national defense:

Area. That portion of the State of Washing-
ton, known as the Puget Sound area, which is
described as follows: bounded on the West by
the Pacific Ocean, bounded on the north by the
Canadian Border, bounded on the east by the
erest of the Cascade Mountain Range and
bounded on the south by a line having the fol-
lowing course: east from the Pacific Ocean
along north boundary of township 11 to range
line between Townships 7 and 6 East; then
south 3 miles; then east through Range 6 to

ee ee

17

Pacific County line; then south along Pacific
County line to southern boundary of Lewis
County line; then east along southern bound-
ary of Lewis County line through Ranges 5
West and 4 West, and east 3 miles to center
of Range 3 West; then north 3 miles through
Range 3 West; then east through remainder of
Range 3 West and through Range 2 West;
then north on the range line between Range 2
West and Range 1 West to northern boundary
of Township 11; then east along northern
boundary of Township 11 through Range 1
West, Range 1 East, and Range 2 East; then
south 3 miles on range line between Range 2
East and Range 3 East; then east through the
center of townships in Ranges 3, 4 and 5 East ;
then south 3 miles to southern boundary of
Lewis County line; then east on Lewis County
line to the crest of the Cascade Mountain
Range.

Type(s) of pulpwood. All grades and sizes
of pulpwood logs of the following species (ex-
cepting cants, slabs or other sawmill waste) :

(1) True firs of the botanical species: Abies
grandis (white fir), Abies Lasiocarpa (balsam
fir), Abies amabilis (silver fir) and Abies con-
color (white fir).

(2) Sitka spruce of the botanical species:
Picea sitchensis, except those grades of logs
specified by the War Production Board under
General Preference Order M-186 as ‘Sitka
spruce logs, Grades No. 1 and 2 and cants and
flitches of such logs’. General Preference

Kot Dan Rene ee

18

Order M-186 defines ‘‘Grades No. 1 and No. 2,
Sitka spruce logs’’ as such grades as under-
stood in the particular district on August 1,
1941.

(3) Engelmann spruce of the botanical spe-
cies: Picea Engelmannii.

(4) Western Hemlock of the botanical
species, T'suga heterophylla and Tsuga mer-
tenstana, except the log grade specified by the
War Production Board under General Pref-
erence Order M-229 as ‘‘ Western Hemlock air-
craft logs’’. General Preference Order M-229
defines ‘‘Western Hemlock aircraft logs’’ as
‘*Logs of the botanical species of Tsuga mer-
tensiana or Tsuga heterophylla (including
eants and flitches of such logs), which are
produced in those parts of Oregon and Wash-
ington lying west of the crest of the Cascade
Mountain Range, or in Alaska, and which meet
the following specifications:

(i) Are from stands of timber of approxi-
mately 1,200 feet or higher elevation and are
medium to light in weight ;

(ii) Are not less than 26 inches top diameter
and not less than 12 feet long;

(iii) Are of straight grain so that the ma-
jority of the clear lumber can be produced
with a slope of grain not greater than 1 in 15;

(iv) Are free of deep bark seams or other
defects with the clear portion of the log;

gna iane mre crasorarect

19

(v) Have reasonably uniform annual rings,
not fewer than eight to the inch within the
clear portion of the log; and

(vi) Are of a character which will produce
at least 50% No. 2 Clear and Better, or B and
Better Clear lumber’’.

Pursuant to subparagraph (3) of paragraph
(d) of said order, the Director General for
Operations hereby directs that on and after the
day upon which this schedule is issued, and
until this schedule is revoked, no holder of pulp-
wood, as defined in subparagraph (3) of para-
graph (b) of M-251, shall consume, process,
or deliver any such pulpwood except upon
specific authorization or direction by the Di-
rector General for Operations. 4

Application for authorization or direction
to consume, process or transfer such pulpwood
may be submitted on Form PD-556.

TY UV. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1948 7esoes 116

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_1714%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.