# Opposition Brief — John J. Casale, Inc. v. Skidmore

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1947
- **Citation:** 331 U.S. 812

## Text

ae Not FF £224
APR 17 1947
CHARLES CLAORE one
' & OLER
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1946.
No. 1225.
JOHN J. CASALE, INC.,
Petitioner,
AGAINST
LOREN SKIDMORE, et al., .
Respondents.
JOHN J. CASALE, INC.,
Petitioner,
AGAINST
JOSEPH MOONEY, e¢ al.,
Respondents.

Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition
For Writ of Certiorari.

i Harotp R. Korey,
] Attorney for Respondents.

EMANUEL TACKER,
Of Coumsel on the Brief.

Lopge AppgaL Press, Ino., 65-67 Duane St., N. Y. O., Tel. WOrth-2-0689

INDEX.

Statement of Matter Involved ...............++5+
Summary of Basic Proved Facts ..............--
Comment on Questions Raised by Petitioner ......

Port I.—It is well settled that it is enough if an
employee, to be covered under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, shows that his work activity is
so closely tied to interstate commerce as to be
in contemplation of law a part of it ..........

Pornt I1.—Plaintiffs working directly upon the ve-
hicles that were used in interstate commerce
regularly and recurrently—are engaged in com-
SD nun cence cccncennececeas eeneseebaseueus

Pornt I1I.—The record contains overwhelming proof
that each of the employees worked in interstate
commerce each and every week regularly and
FOGUTTOMEY 2.0. cc cccccccccccccccccccccccccce

13

15

16

i

INDEX.

CASES CITED.
PAGE
Boutell v. Walling, 327 U. S. 463 ................ 15
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 ............ 13, 14

Lewis v. Florida Power and Light Co., 154 F. 2d 751 14
Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. 8. 178 14
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 325 U. S.

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. 8. 491 ............... 15
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125... 13,15
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 128 F. 2d 450 ... 14
Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Co., 318 U. S. 740 ... 13,14
Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 ... 13
Schwartz v. Witwer Grocer Co., 49 F. Supp. 1003.. 17
Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F.2d 90 17
Warren Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S.88 13
a» ES RR DB Perret

Supreme Court of the United States

Omoser Term, 1946.

Joun J. Casaz, Ino.,
Petitioner,
AGAINST

Loren Sxipmore, et al.,
Respondenis.

No. 1225.
Joun J. Casarz, Ino.,
Petitioner,
AGAINST

JosrrH Mooney, et al.,
Respondents.

Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition
Por Writ of Certiorari.

Statement of Matter Involved.

The petition for certiorari outlines the facts in a frag-
mentary manner, and in certain respects distorts the con-
tents of the appeal record. We believe a more compre-
hensive, yet succinct, presentation will assist materially
in the consideration of the application.

Summary of the Basic Facts Proved on the Trial.

(1) John J. Casale Inc. owned a number of trucks,
each housed every night after its run, in one of several

2

garages maintained by the Casale Company in New York
City, three in Manhattan, two in Brooklyn, one in Long
Island City.

(2) Each of the trucks, so returned to the garage
each night was, each night—inspected, washed, gassed,
greased, oiled, tested for tire, clutch, transmission, en-
gine and electrical ignition trouble, had minor repairs
done, was placed for easy egress in the morning—and
supervised for proper starting in the morning—which was
all done during the night time and the early morning
hours by

(a) Washers,—who washed the trucks, inside and out
(R. 299-301),

(b) Floormen,—who gassed the trucks, checked them
in, shifted and placed them, cleaned the wind-
shields and door windows, and made them ready
for easy despatch in the morning (R. 293-299),

(ec) Greasers,—who checked water and oil and tires,
greased the trucks, oiled the generators (R. 307),

(d) Night Mechanics——who inspected the trucks as
they came in, tuned motors, fixed brakes and
clutches and lights, straightened bumpers, and
did other minor repairs, and inspected trucks that
were going out of the state on long trips; their
duties included standing by in the morning to su-
pervise their going out and to help them get
started in case starting trouble developed (R. 216,
222-223, 281-283, 288-289, 292, 424).

(3) At the 21st St. (Manhattan) garage, the Casale
company housed many of its trucks; also it maintained
there an overhaul shop, to which each truck (from all
garages) was sent after it had gone 14,000 miles (R. 26,

—

<a

215). Here were employed mechanics and mechanics’
helpers (referred to hereafter as ‘‘daytime mechanics”’
as distinguished from the nighttime mechanics). These
daytime mechanics did overhaul work. In addition, they
performed the following duties:

3

(a) They did ‘‘road work’’—that is, they were sent
out on the road to repair trucks that had broken
down. Included were repair jobs on trucks that
had

(1) Broken down outside of New York State,—
mostly in New Jersey

(2) Broken down at steamship piers or railroad
yards, while delivering goods for out-of-State
transshipment, or receiving goods originating
out-of-State

(3) Come in from the Hoboken (N. J.) garage
of the Casale company, for minor adjust-
ments, made necessary because there was no
mechanic at that garage.

(b) Two of the plaintiffs, speaking for the daytime
mechanics, testified: one, that he went out on road
calls to New Jersey at least once a week and as
often as four times a day while at the same time
he went out on road calls to steamship piers and
freight yards at least once a week (R. 275): the
other, that he went out on road calls to steamship
piers and freight yards constantly, at least once
a week, and sometimes four times a day, and on
road calls to New Jersey, as often as four times

a, day (R. 217, 218): that the trucks on which
they worked thus came from all of the Casale
garages, not merely those that were housed at the
21st St. garage (R. 275).

(ec)

(d)

(4)

4

The daytime mechanics also did minor repairs
on the Bethlehem Steel Co. trucks that came in
from the Hoboken (N. J.) garage—sometimes two
or three a day, sometimes five or six during the
day (R. 219, 226, 228).

Four times during the year, for a period of one
month, these daytime mechanics were required
to come in at 6 a.m. instead of 8 a.m., to super-
vise the starting out of the trucks from the 21st
St. garage, of the trucks housed there, and to do
any minor repairs required to get them started
(R. 216, 217)—made necessary because ‘‘there
were no night mechanics on from six to nine, and
in case anything developed, you had to be there
in order to take care of it’’ (R. 216).

The work of the employees was performed on or

directed to the trucks hauling goods in interstate com-
merce during the course of each week and in fact, during
the course of each day:

(a)

(b)

(c)

The washers did their work in pairs and they
washed each truck each and every night (includ-
ing all the trucks that during that day hauled
goods in interstate commerce)—(R. 300).

The floorman performed his work on each and
every one of the trucks each night, (including all
the trucks that during the day had hauled goods
in interstate commerce )—(R. 294).

The greaser did his work ‘‘with respect to each
vehicle’? and his task was a ‘‘continuous day-to-
day maintenance of the vehicles’’—(including all
the trucks that during the day had hauled goods
in interstate commerce)—(R. 421).

5

(d) The nighttime mechanic ‘‘did work on all the
trucks’? (R. 424) and he imspected each truck as
it came in (R. 424): his duties required him to be
present in the early morning hours to supervise
the going out of the trucks, and to help get them
started in case of difficulty (including the trucks
that during the day had hauled goods in inter-
state commerce)—(R. 216).

(e) The daytime mechanics, in addition to their over-
haul work, worked each and every week and
sometimes each and every day, on trucks that at
the time of repair was in actual haulage of goods
for interstate commerce (see Paragraph 3-b su-

pra).

(5) Of the plaintiffs concerned, two of each work
category testified on the trial—and it was stipulated that
the testimony of those who testified apply to all of the
plaintiffs in the same categories (R. 219, 303-305, 310-312).

(6) The Casale company carried on its business with
full knowledge that its trucks were being used for haulage
of goods interstate, and derived its income and profits
from a business that contemplated such interstate haul-
age of goods in its trucks:

(a) The contract between the Casale company and its
customers provided (Plffs.’ Ex. 2, See. 8):

‘‘VIII.—That the Lessor (Casale) shall at all
times, and at its own cost and expense, have
each vehicle registered, licensed and maintained
in operating condition to comply with all traf-
fic and highway laws and/or regulations of the
States of New York, New Jersey and Connectt-
cut.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

aa

(b) All gas used by the trucks was furnished by the
Casale company at the garages: if a truck ran
out of gas—which happened when the truck trav-
elled long distances—the chauffeur would buy
gas and pay for it, and Casale company would
reimburse the chauffeur. Casale company kept a
record of such reimbursements, and the records
show that Casale made such reimbursements regu-
larly and often for gas so purchased in New Jer-
sey and Connecticut (R. 32-35, Plffs.’ Exhibits
7 and 8).

(c) It maintained a regular day-by-day practice of
sending its mechanics on ‘‘road calls’’ to New
Jersey and Connecticut and to steamship piers
and railroad yards, to repair trucks then engaged
in haulage of goods in interstate commerce (see
3b, supra).

6

(d) The Casale company sent out a questionnaire to
its customers to determine the extent to which
the customers hauled their goods in the Casale
trucks in interstate commerce, and as a result
of the replies, ascertained that their trucks were
being used in interstate commerce to the extent
of 23% (R. 42, 43).

(e) The Casale company admitted to definite knowl-
edge that at least 34 of its 70 customers were
using the Casale trucks in haulage of goods inter-
state (R. 157-161).

(f) In a previous case in which the Casale company
was involved, the Casale company admitted that
the use of its trucks by its customers im inter-
state haulage of goods was approximately 30%

(R. 155).

7

(7) The value, in dollars, of the goods that were
hauled each week by customers of the Casale company in
the Casale trucks, was considerable; and annually it ran
into the millions:

(a) R. C. Williams Co., wholesale grocers, whose
Casale trucks were housed at 21st St., Manhattan,
sent each week, thirty truckloads of goods to its
New Jersey customers in Casale trucks: weekly,
this amounted to $50,000—and annually it
amounted to $2,600,000.00 (R. 263).

(b) Hoffman & Mayer, dealers in poultry, whose
trucks were housed at the 21st St., Manhattan
garage, sent its Casale trucks to deliver to its
New Jersey customers several times a week,
amounting annually to $600,000.00 in value: In
fact, it brought in its iced poultry from Delaware
each morning, and instantly the poultry was
transferred to the Casale trucks, thus constitut-
ing continuous interstate shipment, even to its
New York City customers: accordingly, the Casale
trucks were used 100% of the time in interstate
commerce, and the annual value of its deliveries
in the Casale trucks, inclusive of New York City,
was between $3,000,000.00 and $5,000,000.00 (R.
249).

(c) Liggett Drug Co., whose Casale trucks were
housed at 21st St., Manhattan, maintained a cen-
tral warehouse in Manhattan, from which it de-
livered its goods, in Casale trucks, to its constitu-
ent stores: it sent the Casale trucks to its New
Jersey stores four times each week, and to its
Connecticut stores twice a week: the value of the
goods hauled thus to these stores amounted an-
nually to approximately $100,000.00; however,

—e 7

(d)

(e)

8

because it maintained the warehouse for the pur-
pose of servicing its constituent stores, haulage
of their goods to their New York City stores was
haulage in interstate commerce: on this basis, it
used Casale trucks in interstate commerce 100%
of the time, and the annual value of this haul-
age wonld be figured at $470,000.00 (R. 255-262,
Plffs.’ Ex. 15).

Jacob Ruppert, brewers, whose Casale trucks
were housed at the 93rd St. garage (Manhattan)
sent at least 11 trucks each day to deliver goods
to its New Jersey customers in Casale trucks; the
annual value of goods so shipped amounted to
approximately $1,000,000.00 (R. 246).

Austin Nichols Co., importers and rectifiers of
spirits, whose trucks were housed in the Brook-
lyn garage, used the Casale trucks to pick up im-
ports at piers in New York and New Jersey,
““sometimes once a week, sometimes twice, and
sometimes every day in the week’’ (R. 91). Also
the Casale trucks were used to make deliveries
in New Jersey and Connecticut, once, twice or
three times each week. The value of one truck-
load was $15,000. The annual value of goods
merely delivered in the Casale trucks interstate
in New Jersey and Connecticut was $1,000,000.00,
not considering the value of goods picked up at
the piers (R. 91, 116).

(f) J. M. Huber Co., whose Casale trucks were housed

at the Brooklyn garage, were manufacturers of
printing inks: its trucks were used 50% of the
time, week after week, daily, making deliveries
of its products in Casale trucks to New Jersey
customers and to freight forwarders and rail-
road terminals for shipment extra-State (R. 103).

(g)

(h)

(i)

9

V. LaRosa & Sons, manufacturers of macaroni,
housed its Casale trucks at the Brooklyn gar-
age, serviced 1,000 customers in New Jersey, and
sent between five and fifteen Casale truckloads
to New Jersey each week, on the average one or
two truckloads each day: it also sent two truck-
loads to Pennsylvania each week: the annual vol-
ume of goods shipped interstate in Casale trucks
was over $1,000,000.00 (R. 48).

Dannemiller Coffee Co., coffee importers and
roasters, housed its trucks in the Brooklyn gar-
age. It used the Casale trucks to pick up green
coffee at the piers; one truck was used 90% of
the time in picking up imports deliveries to rail-
road terminals were made daily: it was testified
‘“‘There was always coffee on the piers and we
could find a job for them (the Casale trucks)’’
(R. 73).

Benjamin Dorman, wholesale grocers, housed
the Casale trucks in the Brooklyn garage: it
used the Casale trucks daily to pick up goods
consigned to them from out-of-State at the Kast-
ern District rail yards: carloads came in twice a
week, and two or three truckloads came off each
carload: the Casale trucks were also used to de-
liver to customers in New Jersey, two or three
truckloads each week: the average truckload had
a value of between $2,000.00 and $2,500.00 (R. 60).

(j) John Morrell & Son, branch house of the Na-
tional Packing Company, housed the Casale
trucks at the Brooklyn garage: 10% of its prod-
ucts processed in its Brooklyn plant was carried
in Casale trucks to its customers in New Jersey
and Connecticut: the Casale trucks were sent to
New Jersey twice each week (R. 360).

(k)

(1)

(m)

(n)

10

Pabst Sales Co., New York branch of the na-
tional brewery bearing the same name, shipped
beer to the Pullman Company for use in Pull-
mans, 95% of which went interstate: Casale
trucks were used three times each week to make
these deliveries (R. 335).

Atlantic Macaroni Co., manufacturers of maca-
roni products, housed the Casale trucks in the
Long Island City garage: each week it sent two
or three truckloads in Casale trucks to New Jer-
sey: the goods thus shipped interstate in the
Casale trucks had an annual value of $131,000.00
(R. 206).

Jones & Laughlin Steel Service Co., housed its
trucks at the Long Island City garage: Casale
trucks were sent each day to its New Jersey cus-
tomers; this company had a policy of servicing
its customers within a 30 mile radius of New
York City, which necessarily included much of
New Jersey and Connecticut; this company used
the Casale trucks to earry goods to railroad ter-
minals of goods consigned to other out-of-State
customers. It produced delivery receipts for a
representative period August 1 to August 15,
1942—which showed 47 shipments to New Jersey
customers of finished fabricated steel products,
for a total of 77,000 pounds, shipments made
in Casale trucks on 10 different days during a
fourteen-day period (R. 231).

Edw. & John Burke, Ltd., manufacturer of soft
drinks, and exclusive sales agent of E. & J. Burke
Ltd., brewers, used the Casale trucks to deliver
its products to the Pullman Company, for use
on the Pullman trains, using the Casale trucks
two or three times each and every week for such

; 11

purpose (R. 164,—Plffs.’ Ex. 11) and made sim-
ilar deliveries in the Casale trucks to the Penn-
sylvania and New York Central Railroads, once
or twice each week (R. 172).

{o) The above recitals are indicative of the general
picture disclosing the interstate haulage of goods
in the Casale trucks; the parade of Casale cus-
tomers to the witness stand was halted on the in-
sistence of defendant’s counsel,—who, in order to
bring this about,—consented to a stipulation that
the haulage of goods in interstate commerce by
the Casale trucks was substantial (R. 379, fol.
1137—Opinion of Court R. 489, fols. 1466-7).

(8) From the facts shown, it is clear that there was
overwhelming proof that the Casale trucks hauled goods
in interstate commerce regularly, each day or several
times each week, and recurrently, each and every week,
in very substantial volume.

(9) The record shows that many of the Casale com-
pany customers were engaged in production for commerce,
thus affording the basis for a contention that the Casale
employees were engaged in an occupation necessary for
production for commerce, and therefore, covered by the
Act, on the second ground of coverage,—. e., engaged
in production for commerce; but neither in the District
Court nor in the Circuit Court did plaintiffs make an
issue of this, for coverage is so clear on the principle
that the plaintiffs were engaged in commerce—that to
assert additional coverage on the theory of production
would be merely cumulative.

Questions Raised By Petitioner.

The first question propounded by Petitioner, although
differenty phrased by petitioner’s counsel, is

ee

12

If an employee shows that his work activity
is so directly tied to interstate commerce as to
be in contemplation of law a part of it—must the
employee, in addition, show, by independent evi-
dence, that, on some other theory, the employer
is engaged in commerce, in order to be covered
by the Fair Labor Standards Act?

The short answer is (a) this Court has time and again
said ‘‘No’’ to the question and (b) there is and can be
no divergence of opinion on the point in the Circuit Courts
(see Point I, post).

The second question propounded by Petitioner, al-
though differently phrased, is

Where an employer is engaged in the business
of generally maintaining and repairing vehicles used
by other concerns in interstate commerce, may its
employees working on such vehicles be deemed
engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act?

The short answer is, that this Court has said ‘‘Yes’’
definitely to the exact question propounded, and has also
answered the question in the affirmative by decisions
closely analogous (see Point II, post).

The third question propounded by the Petitioner is

May an employee recover under the Fair Labor
Standards Act without showing that ‘during any
particular workweek he did actually perform his
labor upon’ trucks which hauled goods in interstate
commerce?

The short answer to this question is (a) that there is
no principle of law involved for the proof in the case

13

overwhelmingly shows that each employee continuously
performed his work upon trucks which hauled goods in
interstate commerce regularly, each and every week, in-
deed every day during the week, and recurrently, week
after week, and (b) there is and can be no divergence of
opinion in the Cireuit Courts (see Point III, post).

POINT I.

It is well settled that it is enough if an employee, to be
covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act, shows
that his work activity is so closely tied to interstate com-
merce as to be in contemplation of law a part of it.

In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been
definitely decided that

(A) It is not necessary for an employee to show that
the employer is engaged in commerce or in pro-
duction for commerce, aliwnde a showing that the
employee himself is engaged in an activity closely
connected with commerce or production for com-
merce and

(B) Where it is shown that an employee is engaged
in commerce or in production for commerce—the
employer is thereby deemed to be engaged in
commerce or in production for commerce.

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517;

Warren Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. 8.
88;

Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125;

Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Co., 318 U. S. 740;

Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657;

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 325
U. S. 849.

14

The argument of Petitioner is the same that was used
by the employer in the Overstreet case (supra)—the
United States Cireuit Court of Appeals (C. C. A. 5) hold-
ing with the employer (128 F. 2nd 450)—but on appeal
to the Supreme Court, the argument being raised again,
it was rejected.

In the Kirschbaum case, this Court ruled (316 U. 8.
517, 524), that

‘“To the extent that his employees are ‘engaged
in commerce or in production for commerce’ the
employer is himself so engaged.”’

The same precise question was raised in the New York
State Courts in the case of Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald
Co., supra (see history recital of this case R. 558-562),
and in those courts answered favorably to the employer
—but the Supreme Court reversed the New York Court
of Appeals, adverting to the Overstreet decision.

Petitioner cites the case of Mabee v. White Plains
Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178—the case is not in point;
all that was involved in that case was the question whether
the de minimis doctrine was applicable to cases under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

On the question of conflict of decisions, the Petitioner
has cited the case of Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
154 F. 2nd 751 (C. C. A. 5) as holding that an employee
is bound to show that an employer is ‘‘engaged in com-
merce’’ regardless of other testimony that the employee’s
activity is so closely tied to commerce as to be in con-
templation of law a part of it. The case does not so hold.
The Circuit Court was merely passing on a finding of the
District Court (based not upon a trial but upon plead-
ings and a stipulation which recited the business of the
employer, but not the work activities of the employees)
that the stipulated facts did not show that the employer
was engaged in commerce; the Circuit Court reversed the

15

District Court and held that some of the facts stipulated
did in fact show the employer was engaged in commerce,
and sent the case back for proof by the plaintiffs of the
nature of their work.

The second case on the question of conflict, cited by
Petitioner is Wilson v. R. F. C., 158 F. 2nd 564—but the
case is clearly not in point. The case is the simple case
of an employee’s activities being so remote from the com-
merce involved, that there was no coverage,—(McLeod v.
Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491—cited by that Court).

Clearly, then, there is no conflict on the point,—as in-
deed there cannot be, this Court having said the last
word.

_ POINT II.

Plaintiffs working directly upon the vehicles that were
used in interstate commerce regularly and recurrently—are
engaged in commerce.

In the case of Boutell v. Walling, 327 U. S. 463, this
Court held that employees of a company maintaining and
repairing trucks used by another company to haul goods
in interstate commerce were well within the coverage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125, this
Court held that employees of a toll road company, over
which flowed vehicles, some of which later completed their
journey by means of an interstate highway, were engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act.

Applying the theory of the Overstreet case, this Court
in the Pedersen case, reversed a determination of the New
York Court of Appeals (that a laborer employed by a con-
tractor engaged in working on a right of way of a rail-
road, over which some trains ran interstate was not en-

ee ann

16

gaged in commerce) and held that the laborer was engaged
in ecommeree—although the contractor was an independ-
ent contractor, and did his work locally.

The Pedersen case is closely analogous to the instant
ease, because the employees in question performed their
work on instrumentalities of commerce. The Overstreet
ease is likewise analogous, for the same reason—even more
authoritative, because recovery there was accorded a toll
road ticket taker, whose duties were not quite as closely |
related to commerce as were those of the repairman in
the Overstreet case, and the maintenance employees in
the instant case. The Boutell case is practically on all
fours with the instant case—there is hardly a semblance
of difference between the underlying facts in the Boutell |
case and this case.

POINT III.

The record contains overwhelming proof that each of
the employees worked in interstate commerce each and
every week regularly and recurrently.

There is really no law question involved here: the
Petitioner asserts that (Petition, p. 10)

‘‘The reeord so clearly shows that * * * there
was no inherent reason why as to any particular
employee there should have been any interstate la-
bor by him during any one or another of any par-
ticular week’’

and further asserts that from the evidence adduced by the
plaintiffs

‘“‘Tt would not follow that any individual one of
these suing employees even so much as touched in

17

the course of any particular week any one or more
vehicles so used in interstate commerce by some
one or another lessee.’’

It is upon this assumption that the third question
posed to this Court is predicated. But, the evidence is
contrary to the assumed hypothesis—for the record is re-
plete with evidence that each employee, each night, each
week worked upon all the vehicles, those which that day
were engaged in haulage of goods interstate as well as
the others,—that many Casale trucks hauled goods inter-
state each day, week after week, regularly, recurrently—
in tremendous volume: that at least 34 out of the 70 cus-
tomers used Casale trucks to haul goods in interstate com-
merce: that the extent of the interstate commerce use of
the Casale trucks was generally between 23% and 30%
and in some cases 100%. The United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct in holding
that no quarrel can be had with the Trial Court in in-
ferring that the employees spent a substantial amount of
time on trucks used in interstate commerce.

Cases have been cited by Petitioner in an attempt to
build an argument of conflict on the point. In the two
eases cited, it was held merely that the suing employees
spent time on interstate work ‘‘occasionally’’, ‘‘sporadi-
eally’’, and failed to produce proof as to when precisely
they performed such work in commerce, making it impos-
sible for the Trial Court to compute the amount of re-
covery.

In those cases, Schwartz v. Witwer Grocer Co., 49 F.
Supp. 1003 and Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124
F. 2d 90—the questions decided were purely procedural.
No principle was cited that is in conflict with any prin-
ciple of law applicable to the facts in the instant case.

- —_—

18

CONCLUSION.
The Petition Should Be Denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Harotp R. Korey,
Attorney for Respondents.

EmanveEn TAOKER,
Of Counsel,
On the Brief.

(18601)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_1063%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
