# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Swalley v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1947
- **Citation:** 330 U.S. 845

## Text

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ecemenerere Re

Olas ~ Suscrme Oourt, UL
FILAD

FEB 27 1947

IN THE
CRARLES CLuort

OROPLEY
OLERK

Supreme Court of the Unitec

October Term, 1946.

“No. 1072

E. E. SWALLEY,
Petitioner,

vs.

ADDRESSOGRAPH-MULTIGRAPH CORPORATION,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

\ HARRY B. COHEN,

A. BERKOWITZ.
Birmingham, Alabama,
Counsel for Petitioner.

Qos SWALLEY PRINTING CO., BIRMINGHAM 8, ALA.

—

SUBJECT INDEX
Page

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-

PEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT__.. 1
Summary Statement of Matters Involved. 2
Jurisdictional Statement 8
The Questions Presented 8
Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ... 10
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI 13
Opinions of the Courts Below 13
Jurisdiction 13
Statement of the Case 13
Specification of Errors —
Argument 16

Summary of Argument 16

Point I. The Law of Ohio, which Admittedly
Governs the Interpretation of the Written
Contract in Question, and the Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and of Other
Circuit Courts of Appeal Require Affirm-
ance of the District Court Judgment in Fav-
or of Plaintiff Swalley ie 17

Point II. The Practical Construction of the
Contract by the Parties Requires Affirmance
of the District Court Judgment in Favor of
Plaintiff Swalley 21

Point III. The Bulletin of the Defendant Com-

o pany Relied Upon by the Circuit Court of
Appeals Did Not In Fact Apply to the Trans-
actions in Question and Did Not Constitute
a Practical Construction of the Contract ro
erative in This Case ‘os 26

Point IV. The Decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals Cannot Properly Be Predicated Upon
Modification of the Written Contract, for the
Defendant Company Failed to Plead Modifi-

ee

cation in Accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Case Was Not Tried
on that Issue, and Plaintiff Swalley Did Not
Have an Opportunity to Introduce Evidence
on That Point. 28

Point V. There Was No Effectual Modifica-
tion of the Written Contract Applicable to
the Case at Bar 31

Point VI. Plaintiff Swalley Acquired Vested
Rights to the Commissions in Question Which
Could Not be Adversely Affected by a Later
Purported Modification of the Agency Con-
tract 36

Conclusion 43

aa

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Page
Abrams vs. George E. Keith Company, 30 Fed. (2d)
90 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1929) 33
Albright vs. Kalbitzer, 2 Fed. Supp. 815 (D.C. Pa.,
1945) 39
Atkinson vs. The New Britain Machine Co., 154 Fed.
(2d) 895, 901 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 39
Bach vs. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 165 Fed. (2d)
361 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 41
Berwick Hotel Co. vs. Vaughn, 300 Pa. 389, 150 Atl.
613, 616, 71 A.L.R. 1340 (1930) 33

Brown vs. Kennedy (Ohio App.) 49 N.E. (2d) 417,
418 (1942), aff'd 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E. (2d)

857, 860 (1943)____ 19
Buell vs. Indian Refining Company, 62 Ohio App. 108,
23 N.E. (2d) 329, 331... 20
Calderon vs. Atlas S. §. Co., 170 U.S. 272, 18 Sup. Ct.
588, 42 L. Ed. 1033 (1898) 19
Charles Behlen Sons’ Company vs. Ricketts, 30 Ohio
App. 167, 164 N.E. 436 18
Coe vs. Suburban Light and Power Company, 32 Ohio
App. 158, 167 N.E. 693 18
Crawford vs. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190, 98 Am. Dec.
103 36
Crowe vs. Trickey, 204 U.S. 228, 27 Sup. Ct. 275,
51 L. Ed 454 41
Cuneo Press vs. Clayborn Corporation, 90 Fed. (2d)
233 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937 32
Dibble vs. Dimick, 143 N. Y. 549, 38 N.E. 724. 39
Dildine vs. Ford Motor Company, 159 Mo. App. 410,
140 S.W. 627 (1911) 40

Emerson vs. Slater, 22 How. (U.S.) 28,16 L.Ed. 360_. 36

S.E. 706. 42
Ferguson vs. Laux, 57 Ohio App. 495, 15 N.E. (2d)

167, 169____ 18
Fichter vs. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, 382 Ill. 91,

95-99, 46 N.E. (2d) 921, 924 (1943). 42
Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Agresta, 115 Ohio

St. 426, 154 N.E. 723 18

a

TABLE OF CASES CITED—(Continued)

Grace vs. American Century Insurance Company, 109
U. S. 278, 3 Sup. Cr. 207, 27 L. Ed. 932 (1883) __

Jacquin vs. Boutard, 89 Hun. 437, 35 N.Y. Supp. 496
(1895), aff'd 167 N.Y. 686, 51 N.E. 1091 (1898)
Manhattan Life Insurance Co. vs. Buck, 93 U.S. 24,
23 L. Ed. 789
Marshall vs. Ames, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. 363, 5 Oh. Cir. Dec.
403
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New
York vs. Banks, 76 Fed. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1935)
Mount Vernon Refrigerating Company vs. Fred W.
Wolf Company, 188 Fed. 164 (C.C.A. 6th, Ohio,
1911)
Noonan vs. Bradley, 76 U.S. 394, 9 Wall. 394, 19 L. Ed.
757 (1870) :
Ohio Marble Co. vs. Byrd, 65 Fed. (2d) 98 (C.C.A.
6th, 1933)
Oil Workers’ International Union Local No. 463 vs.
Texoma Natural Gas Company, 146 Fed. (2d) 62,
64 (C.C.A. Sth, 1945), cert. den. 324 U.S. 872,
65 Sup. Ct. 1017, 89 L. Ed. 1426
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America vs.
Sevier, 121 Fed. (2d) 650 (C.C.A. 8th, 1941).
Parish vs. Haynes, 62 Fed. (2d) 105 (C.C.A. Sth).
Peoria Life Insurance Company vs. Poynor (Tex. Civ.
App.), 297 S.W. 788_.
R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Company vs. Humboldt
Fire Insurance Company, 6 Ohio App. 313, aff’d
92 Ohio St. 541, 112 N.E. 1084
Schnerb vs. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 43 Fed. (2d)
920, cert. den. 282 U.S. 898, 75 L. Ed. 791_____.
Sigman vs. Wurlitzer, 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. (2d)
878 mt
Singer Sewing Machine Co. vs. Brewer, 78 Ark 202,
8 a ae eee
Southern Railway Company vs. Coca-Cola Bottling
Company, 145 Fed. (2d) 304 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944)
Swain vs. Seamens, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 254, 19 L. Ed. 554.

Page

19

40

42

32

19

19

19

39

34

19
36

38

18

39

18

40

19

CO AN, MI EN!

NT ee ia ee ne oe eet ae

TABLE OF CASES CITED— (Continued)

Page

Tahir Erk vs. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 Fed. (2d) 855
(C.C.A. 4th, 1941) 41
Thurston vs. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 328... 32
Williams vs. Fortlage, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. N.S. 242... 32

Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company vs. Ewing,
141 U. S. 627, 637, 12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 L. Ed. 882
(1891) 40

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED

Judicial Code, Sec. 240 (a), as amended by Act of Feb-
ruary 13, 1925, Chap. 229 (28 U.S.C.A. Sec.

347 (a))_. 8
Ohio Statute of Frauds, Throckmorton’s Annotated

Code of Ohio (1930), Sec. 8621. i
Rules of Civil Procedure for Federal District Courts

Rule 8 (c) “Affirmative Defenses”... 29

Rule 12 (h) “Waiver of Defenses”... 29
Throckmorton’s Annotated Code of Ohio (1930), Sec.

8621 (Ohio Statute of Frauds) 34
28 U.S.C.A. following sec. 723 (c), note 21 and US.

C.A. 1947 Special Pamphlet, p. 172 et seq... 29

TABLE OF TEXTBOOKS AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS
; CITED

A.L.I. Restatement on Agency, Sec. 436, comment (a) 39
2 Am. Jur. “Agency”, Sec. 50

ga

‘ IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1946
No.

E. E. SWALLEY, Petitioner and Appellee below,
vs.

ADDRESSOGRAPH-MULTIGRAPH CORPORATION,
Respondent and Appellant below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your Petitioner respectfully prays for a writ of certi-
orari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit to review the judgment of that Court
(per Minton, J.) entered in this case on October 31, 1946
(R. 376), reversing the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, East-
ern Division (per Igoe, J.) in favor of the Plaintiff-Pe-
titioner E. E. Swalley in the sum of $77,328.65 and re-
manding the cause to the District Court for proceedings
in accordance with the opinion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals.

A petition for rehearing was filed by Petitioner Swalley
in the Circuit Court of Appeals, with leave of the Court,
on November 22, 1946 (R. 386), and was denied by the
Court on November 29, 1946 (R. 386).

nee —
2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

A certified transcript of the record in this case, in-
cluding the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals,
is furnished herewith in compliance with Rule 38 of this
Court.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MATTERS
INVOLVED

This is an action to recover commissions due under a
written contract between the parties hereto, effective March
6th, 1941, wherein Plaintiff-Petitioner E. E. Swalley was
appointed exclusive sales agent of the Multigraph Division
of the Defendant-Respondent Company for the entire State
of Alabama and certain Counties in the State of Florida.

The written contract is a printed form contract that
was prepared by the Defendant Company, and the Plain-
tiff Swalley did not participate in drafting it (R. 16,
par. 6).

The controlling provision of the contract is paragraph
8 (R. 248), which reads as follows:

“Commission on Sales in Other Territories:

8. Sales Agent shall not enter any territory other
than hereinabove specified, for the purpose of selling
the products of Company for use either within or out-
side of the above specified territory without first se-
curing consent in writing of Sales Agent in said other
territory, or of Company. On orders for machines or
attachments, with or without supplies, secured by Sales
Agent in the above territory for use in other than the
above specified territory, Sales Agent shall receive 25%
of the total commission to be paid on any such sales.
When under like circumstances any other authorized
Sales Agent of Company shall sell machines or attach-
ments, with or without supplies, to be used in the terri-
tory specified in this contract, Sales Agent under this
contract shall receive 75% of the authorized commis-

sciiseeisidiniiaimmasiciieaameaae

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 3

sion to be paid on any such sales. In the event that
new or used equipment is transferred from one terri-
tory to another within ninety (90) days from date of
shipment by Sales Agent or Company, the commis-
sion on such equipment, including supplies specified
on original order, shall be readjusted on a basis of 75%
of total commission to Sales Agent in whose territory
the equipment was transferred, and 25% of total com-
mission to Sales Agent who made the sale. On orders
for or sales of supplies only, total commission will be
paid to Sales Agent in whose territory the supplies are
to be used, except that this does not apply to re-ship-
ment of supplies by a customer to its subsidiaries or
branches. These commissions stated in Clause 8, are
to be subject to the same liability to be charged back
against Sales Agent’s account in case of non-payment
by the purchaser, as in other cases specified in Clause
6 of this Contract.”

The terms “use”, “for use”, and “to be used” are not
defined in the contract, nor does the contract mention the
word “storage” or seek to draw any distinction between
“use” and “storage”.

The Commission Schedule of the contract (R. 241)
provided for a commission of 35% on the sale of machines
and attachments of the types involved in this suit.

Paragraph 5 of the contract provided that commis-
sions will be credited to the agent’s commission account
on the Company’s books when shipment of goods is made.
(R. 247).

The closing paragraph of the contract (R. 253-254)
provided as follows:

“(a) This contract may be terminated at any time
at the option of either party by and upon the giving
of written notice addressed to and mailed, or delivered
to the last known address of the other party; further
that Company at any time may alter and change the

4 Petition for Writ of Certiorart

boundaries of the territory covered by this contract.

(b) This contract shall become binding upon
the signature of Addressograph-Multigraph Corpora-
tion, Multigraph Division being thereto attached at
Euciid Post Office, Cleveland, Ohio and said contract
shall be deemed and held by the parties hereto as exe-
cuted under and to be construed, governed and in-
terpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of Ohio.

(c) This contract covers and contains any and
all agreements between Sales Agent and Company, all
other contracts or promises of any kind, either written
or verbal, being hereby annulled and cancelled, and
this contract shall not be varied or added to in any man-
ner except in writing signed by the duly authorized
officer of Company.”

The Company’s Sales Agent, Gray, at Dayton, Ohio,
procured three (3) purchase orders from the Air Corps
for machines and attachments, in accordance with the Com-

pany’s formal proposal, said orders being numbered and
dated as follows:

Order No. (535) 42-15979 dated March 31, 1942

Order No. (535) 42-19531-P dated May 18, 1942

Order No. (535) 42-19532-P dated May 20, 1942
(R. 281, 289, 295)

These purchase orders were embodied in standard Gov-
ernment contract forms, designated as War Department
Air Corps Form No. 98.

The first order covered Multigraph and Multilith non-
portable, duplicating machines, and contained a monthly de-
livery schedule requiring that delivery of all items shall be-
gin on or before July 1st, 1942 and shall be completed by
June 30th, 1943 (R. 285). The other two orders covered
attachments for use with the machines listed in the first
order, and directed that they should be delivered with the
machines (R. 293-297).

sail

Petition for Writ of Certioravi $

Each of said orders contained shipping instructions spe-
cifically directing that a certain number of the machines
and attachments be consigned to Mobile Air Depot, Mobile,

| Alabama, which was included in the exclusive territory of

| Plaintiff Swalley (R. 287, 291, and 297), and each item

| was required to be labeled “Property Air Force United States
Army (R. 287, 295). The orders did not specify what use
was to be made of the machines. After the machines were
shipped the Defendant Company had no control over them
(R. 326, 22).

Prior to the purchase orders in question, the parties had
adopted a practical construction of the contract whereby
paragraph 8 was construed to mean that where machines
were sold by Agent A for shipment into Agent B’s territory,
Agent A was entitled to receive 25% of the 35% commission
and Agent B was entitled to receive 75% of the commission,
the commissions being paid or credited to the agents at the
time of shipment; that this arrangement was subject, how-
ever, to a condition subsequent, viz., that in the event that
the machines that were shipped into Agent B’s territory
were later transferred to Agent C’s territory within ninety
days from date of shipment, there would be a readjustment

of the commission which had already been paid or credited

| to Agent B and that the commission would be split between

| Agent A and Agent C on a 25-75% basis; that this condi-

| tion subsequent would not become operative to divest
Agent B of his commission unless and until the machines
were transferred out of his territory within ninety days,
and that if they remained in his territory for a period
of ninety days, even if they were merely stored and
were not actually used during that period, the condi-
tion subsequent would not become operative and
Agent B would not be divested of his split commission.
(R. 265-266,259-260).

6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Both parties acted in reliance upon this interpretation
of the contract, and this interpretation was in force and in
effect not only at the time that the purchase orders in ques-
tion were accepted by the company, but also continued to
be given force and effect after the company had already
made substantial deliveries pursuant to the purchase orders,
and until the present controversy arose.

In the present suit Defendant Company admitted (R.
24) that the agency contract entitled Plaintiff Swalley to
commissions on all machines shipped “for storage” (this is
the Company’s version) into the Mobile Air Depot, pur-
suant to the Air Corps contracts in question, which were
subsequently installed and “used,” but contended that he is
not entitled to commissions on those machines which were
not installed and “used.” The Defendant Company failed
to offer any proof, however, from the records in its posses-
sion (R. 191), that any of the machines or attachments in
suit had been re-shipped out of Plaintiff Swalley’s territory
within 90 days; that is, the Company failed to prove that
the split commissions that had accrued to Swalley at the
time of the purchase contracts had become divested by op-
eration of the condition subsequent of the 90-day clause of
Paragraph 8 (R. 248).

The case was tried without a jury. (R. 50).

The District Court found, as a matter of fact (R. 328),
that the machines and attachments shipped to the Mobile
Air Depot pursuant to the three purchase orders in question
remained in Plaintiff Swalley’s territory more than ninety
days beyond the date of delivery, and so far as the record
shows, are still there, and that the Defendant Company has
not paid any agent any commissions upon the same, except
the commission of 25% of the total 35% commission pro-
vided for in the Dayton Agent’s Contract, which was identi-
cal in terms with Swalley’s Contract, and except for the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 7

sum of $6,324.94 paid to the Plaintiff Swalley.

The District Court further found, as a matter of fact
(R. 329), that the Defendant Company had received from
the War Department the total sum of $291,899.87 under
the three purchase orders, and that the full 35% commission
amounted to the sum of $102,164.95. The Court concluded
that Plaintiff Swalley is entitled to recover 75% of the full
commission, which amounts to the sum of $77,328.65, after
allowing proper credits and adding interest.

The District Court (per Igoe, J.) pointed out that the
word “use” was not given a restricted meaning in the agen-
cy contract prepared by the Defendant Company; that there
is no mention of “storage” in the contract; that the Air
Corps purchase orders do not specify the intended use of
the machines; that when the machines were delivered to the
Air Corps, the Defendant Company divested itself com-
pletely of all ownership and control over same, and the Air
Corps became vested with legal title and could make such
use of the machines as it saw fit, and, if it so desired, could
use the machines for the purpose of maintaining a liberal in-
ventory in the Mobile Air Depot (R. 326-327).

The District Court further pointed out that any other
interpretation would be unreasonable because an agent in
Swalley’s position would thereby be deprived of his com-
missions altogether, notwithstanding the fact that the sell-
ing agent had already received his share of the split com-
mission under an identical agency contract.

On appeal by the Defendant Company, the Circuit
Court of Appeals (per Minton, J.), completely disregarding
the practical construction of the contract by the parties
themselves (Record 265-266, 259-269), held, on the basis
of certain dictionary definitions and tax cases, that the word
“use”, as employed in the contract drafted by the Defendant
Company, should be interpreted in the Company’s favor, to

ie

exclude “storage”. The Court also proceeded to find a
modification of the contract to exclude “storage” in a cer-
tain bulletin of the Company dated October 31, 1941 (Rec-
ord 309), which in fact was wholly inapplicable to the trans-
action, and which Plaintiff Swalley had never assented to
and which the record indicates he had never received (R.
111-112), and notwithstanding the absence of a new con-
sideration, the failure of Defendant Company to affirma-
tively plead modification as required by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and its invalidity under the Statute of
Frauds of Ohio. |

8 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

It is contended that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to review the judgment herein in question under and by vir-
tue of Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by
the Act of February 13, 1925, Chap. 229 (28 U.S.C.A. Sec-
tion 347 (a)).

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was entered on October 31, 1946 (Record
376), and the petition for rehearing was denied on Novem-
ber 29, 1946 (Record 386).

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly disregard
and override decisions of the United States Supreme Court
applicable to and governing the facts of this case?

2. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly deny full
faith and credit to the statutes, laws and decisions of the
State of Ohio, which admittedly control the validity and in-
terpretation of the contract in question?

3. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly fail to
accord comity to the statutes, laws and decisions of the State

_

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 9

of Ohio which admittedly control the validity and interpre-
tation of the contract in question?

4. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly disregard
the Rules of Civil Procedure for Federal District Courts,
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court?

5. May the Circuit Court of Appeals reverse a judg-
ment for the Plaintiff on certain points not raised by the
pleadings as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure for
Federal District Courts, promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court, and thereby preclude the Plaintiff from
challenging the Defendant on said issues?

6. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly disregard
the decisions of other Circuit Courts of Appeal applicable
to the facts of this case?

7. May the Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting

the written agency contract prepared by Defendant Com-

| pany, properly construe ambiguous words therein in favor

of the Company, despite established rules of judicial con-

struction, despite the practical construction of the parties,

and despite the Company’s own admission in its pleadings
in favor of Plaintiff Swalley’s interpretation?

8. May the Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting
the written agency contract prepared by Defendant Com-
pany, properly construe the word “use” therein to exclude
“storage”, despite established rules of judicial construction,
despite the practical construction of the parties, and despite
the Company’s own admission in its pleadings that “use”
includes “storage”?

9. May the Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting
a standard form government contract, properly read into
said contract the term “for storage” which does not appear
therein?

10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

10. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly con-
clude that there was a modification of a contract, in the ab-
sence of any assent thereto by Plaintiff Swalley, in the ab-
sence of a new consi“ *ration, and where it affirmatively ap-
pears that the purported modification was embodied in a
so-called bulletin of the Defendant Company which was not
signed by Plaintiff Swalley, the party to be charged, as re-
quired by the Statute of Frauds of Ohio?

11. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly deprive
Plaintiff Swalley of commissions which he had already
earned and of rights which had already accrued and become
vested?

12. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly impair
the sanctity of a written contract by rewriting a new con-
tract for the parties?

13. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly dis-
regard the controlling facts of this case and base its decision
on certain judicial principles not applicable thereto?

REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF
THE WRIT

1. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is in
conflict with decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

2. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit is in conflict with decisions of other Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal.

3. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeal fails to
give full faith and credit to the statutes, laws and decisions
of the State of Ohio, which admittedly control the validity
and interpretation of the written contract in question.

4. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals fails
to accord comity to the statutes, laws and decisions of the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 11

State of Ohio, which admittedly control the validity and in-
terpretation of the written contract in question.

§. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals over-
rides the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District
Courts, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court.

6. The Circuit Court of Appeals decided an important
question of local law in conflict with applicable local de-
cisions.

7. The Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision on
certain points not presented by the litigants and which Pe-
titioner Swalley was not given an opportunity to meet by
the production of evidence.

8. The Circuit Court of Appeals has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of
supervision.

PRAYER

Wherefore, your Petitioner, E. E. Swalley, prays that
a writ of certiorari issue under the seal of this Court, directed
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
commanding said Court to certify and send to this Court a
full and complete transcript of the record and of the pro-
ceedings of the said Circuit Court of Appeals had in the
case numbered and entitled on its docket Number 8842,
E. E. Swalley, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Addressograph-Multi-
graph Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, to the end that
this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court
as provided for by the statutes of the United States, and
that the judgment herein of said Circuit Court of Appeals
be reversed and the judgment of the District Court be af-
firmed by this Court, and your Petitioner prays for such

12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

other and further relief as to this Court may seem proper.
Dated this the 18th day of February, 1947.
Harry B. CoHEN,
A. BERKOWITZ,
Birmingham, Alabama,
Counsel for Petitioner E. E. Swalley.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

Opinions of the Courts Below

The opinion of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, written
by Judge Michael L. Igoe, appears on Pages 325-329 of the
Record. It does not yet appear in the Federal Supplement.

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit (Circuit Judges Kerner and Minton, and
District Judge Briggle), written by Judge Minton, appears
on Pages 376-381 of the Record, and is reported in 158 Fed.
(2d) 51 (Advance Sheet No. 1).

Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section
240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of
February 13, 1925 (28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 347 (a)).
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was entered on October 31, 1946 (R. 376)

and the petition for rehearing was denied on November 29,
1946 (R. 386).

Statement of the Case

To avoid unnecessary repetition, the petitioner respect-
fully directs the attention of this Court to the Summary
Statement of Matters Involved on Pages 2-8 of the Pe-
tition for Certiorari, which is annexed hereto and made a
part hereof.

Specification of Errors

It is respectfully submitted that the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in the following par-
ticulars, separately and severally:

(13)

i

14 Brief in Support of Petition

1. The Court erred in reversing the judgment of the
District Court.

2. The Court erred in so construing the term “use” in
the written contract as to exclude “storage”.

3. The Court erred in failing to give force and effect
to the practical construction of the contract by the parties
themselves (R. 265-266, 259-260).

4. The Court erred in failing to interpret the written
contract prepared by Defendant Company most strongly
against the Company and in favor of Plaintiff Swalley.

5. The Court erred in failing to give full faith and
credit to the statutes, laws and decisions of the State of Ohio,
which admittedly control the validity and interpretation
of the contract in question.

6. The Court erred in failing to accord comity to the
statutes, laws and decisions of the State of Ohio, which ad-
mittedly control the validity and interpretation of the con-
tract in question.

7. The Court erred in holding that a certain bulletin
of the Defendant Company dated October 31, 1941 (R.
309) applied to the transactions in question and constituted
a practical construction of the contract by the parties.

8. The Court erred in basing its decision on the legal
theory of modification of the written contract, where the
Defendant Company did not plead modification in accord-
ance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court, the case was not tried
on that issue, and Plaintiff Swalley had no opportunity to
introduce evidence on that point.

9. The Court erred in holding that the written contract
of the parties was modified by a certain bulletin of the De-

Brief in Support of Petition 15

fendant Company dated October 31, 1941, which in fact
did not apply to the transactions in question.

10. The Court erred in holding that Plaintiff Swalley
accepted the terms proposed in the bulletin of the Defendant
Company dated October 31, 1941.

11. The Court erred in holding that the contract was
terminable at will and could be modified at any time by
either party unilaterally as a condition of its continuance.

12. The Court erred in holding that the bulletin of
the Company dated October 31, 1941, was submitted to
Plaintiff Swalley as a condition of the continuance of the
contract.

13. The Court erred in holding, in effect, that the De-
fendant Company had the right to partially terminate
the contract.

14. The Court erred in holding that Plaintiff Swalley
is bound by a so-called “modification” of the contract em-
bodied in a certain bulletin of the Company dated October
31, 1941, which was not signed by Plaintiff Swalley, the
party to be charged, as required by the Statute of Frauds of
the State of Ohio, the controlling law of the case.

15. The Court erred in holding that the Company’s
bulletin of October 31, 1941, constituted a modification of
the written contract in the absence of any assent or approval
by Plaintiff Swalley.

16. The Court erred in holding that the Company’s
bulletin dated October 31, 1941, constituted a modification
of the written contract in the absence of a new considera-
tion moving to Plaintiff Swalley.

17. The Court erred in depriving Plaintiff Swalley of
his commissions which he had already earned under the con-
tract in question.

er

16 Brief in Support of Petition

18. The Court erred in depriving Plaintiff Swalley of
his vested and accrued rights under the contract in question.

19. The Court erred in impairing the sanctity of the
written contract between the parties.

20. The Court erred in rewriting a new and different
contract for the parties, contrary to the terms of the writ-
ten contract and contrary to the practical construction of
the contract by the parties themselves.

21. The Court erred in failing to affirm the judgment
of the District Court in favor of Plaintiff Swalley for the
sum of $77,328.65 and costs of court.

Argument
Summary of Argument

The law of Ohio, which admittedly governs the in-
terpretation of the written contract in question, and the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of other
Circuit Courts of Appeal require affirmance of the District
Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Swalley, because the
contract was drafted by the Defendant Company, and
ambiguous words therein must be construed against it.

The parties adopted a practical construction of the
contract whereby the word “use” includes “storage”.

The bulletin of the Defendant Company dated Oc-
tober 31, 1941, upon which the Circuit Court of Appeals
relied, did not, in fact, apply to the transactions in question
and did not constitute a practical construction of the con-
tract operative in this case.

The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals cannot
propetly be predicated upon the theory of modification of
the contract, for Defendant failed to plead modification in |
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
case was not tried on that issue, and Plaintiff Swalley did \

'

Brief in Support of Petition 17

not have an opportunity to introduce evidence on that point.

There was no effectual modification of the written
contract applicable to the case at bar, because the Company
bulletin in question did not, in fact, apply to the transac-
tions in suit, there was no assent by Plaintiff Swalley, there
was no new consideration moving to him, there is no factual
basis for application of the rule that a contract terminable
at will may be modified at any time by either party as a
condition of its continuance, and the purported modifica-
tion is invalid under the Ohio Statute of Frauds.

Plaintiff Swalley acquired vested rights to the com-
missions in question which could not be adversely affected
by a later purported modification of the agency contract.
His commissions accrued when the sale contracts were made,
and were payable when the machines were shipped. The fact
that the machines were delivered in instalments, and the
purchase price paid on delivery, did not defer the accrual
of his right to the commissions, and any intervening effort
by Defendant Company to modify the contract could not
deprive Plaintiff Swalley of those commissions which had
already accrued. The bad faith and unjust enrichment on
the part of Defendant Company require affirmance of the
District Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Swalley.

I. THE LAW OF OHIO, WHICH ADMITTED-
LY GOVERNS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
WRITTEN CONTRACT IN QUESTION, AND THE
DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT AND OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS OF
APPEAL REQUIRE AFFIRMANCE OF THE DIS-
TRICT COURT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFF SWALLEY.

By agreement of the parties embodied in the agency
contract, the law of Ohio is the law that governs the interpre-

18 Brief in Support of Petition

tation of the contract (R. 254). It is admitted that the
written agency contract in question was prepared by De-
fendant Company and that Plaintiff Swalley did not par-
ticipate in drafting it (R. 16, 7).

In Sigman vs. Wurlitzer, 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. (2d)
878, the law of Ohio was stated as follows.

“The inducement having been accepted by ap-
pellee, the writing of appellant must be strictly con-
strued against it for it could have restricted the exist-
ing implications by proper words of limitation. The
appellee is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable in-
ferences applicable to the words used.

“In the case of any ambiguity, the law of Ohio is,
as stated in Knight vs. New England Mutual Life In-
surance Company, 57 N.E. (2d) 131, as follows: “That
he who writes must extend his opponent the most favor-
able, reasonable interpretation of the language implied,
where ambiguity appears in what is written, is now ac-
cepted as a rule of construction of contracts.’”

This rule of construction has been reaffirmed and ap-

plied by Ohio courts in numerous cases, including the
following:

Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Agresta, 115
Ohio St. 426, 154 N.E. 723;

Ferguson vs. Laux, 57 Ohio App. 495, 15 N.E.
(2d) 167, 169;

Coe vs. Suburban Light and Power Company, 32
Ohio App. 158, 167 N.E. 693;

Charles Beblen Sons’ Company vs. Ricketts, 30
Ohio App. 167, 164 N.E. 436;

R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Company vs. Hum-
boldt Fire Insurance Company, 6 Ohio App. 313, aff’d
92 Ohio St. 541, 112 N.E. 1084.

The United States Supreme Court and the various
Circuit Courts of Appeal throughout the country have
consistently and uniformly held that ambiguities in a writ-

Brief in Support of Petition 19

ten contract must be resolved against the party who drafted
the contract and selected its terminology. See, for example:

Grace vs. American Century Insurance Company,
109 U.S. 278, 3 Sup. Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932 (1883);

Noonan vs. Bradley, 76 U.S. 394, 9 Wall. 394, 19
L.Ed. 757 (1870) ;

Calderon vs. Atlas S. §. Co., 170 U. S. 272, 18 Sup.
Ct. 588, 42 L.Ed. 1033 (1898);

Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of
New York vs. Banks, 76 Fed. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 3d,
1935);

Southern Railway Company vs. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Company, 145 Fed. (2d) 304 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) ;

Mount Vernon Refrigerating Company vs. Fred
W. Wolf Company, 188 Fed. 164 (C.C.A. 6th, Ohio,
1911);

Order of United Commercial Travelers of America
vs. Sevier, 121 Fed. (2d) 650 (C.C.A. 8th, 1941).

This is also the undisputed law throughout the United
States. 17 C.J.S. “Contracts”, Section 324, Page 751 et seq.

The Ohio Courts have had occasion to define the term
“use” and “using” and the decisions support the contention
of Plaintiff Swalley in this case.

In Brown vs. Kennedy (Ohio App.) 49 N.E. (2d) 417,
418 (1942), aff'd 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E. (2d) 857
(1943), the Ohio Court of Appeals, considering the meaning
of the words “use” and “using” in an automobile liability
insurance policy, and holding the insurance company liable
thereon, declared:

“The general rule is, that language used in a pol-
icy of insurance being selected by the insurer should be
construed most favorably to the insured, giving the
language used its fair and reasonable meaning. 5 Am.
Jur. 806, section 534; Couch on Insurance, Section
1175, Vol. 5, p. 4175; 22 Ohio Juris. 339, 340, sec-
tions 184, 185; Duncan v. John Hancock Mutual Life

ar

20 Brief in Support of Petition

Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 441, 445, 31 N.E. 2d 88.

“This rule as applied to a case where the insurer
claims a limited interpretation of the terms ‘use’ or
‘using’ would seem to mean that where the terms ‘use’
or ‘using’ are employed in the policy, and there are in-
cluded within their fair definition and interpretation
words or meanings which would attach liability or de-
feat it, the terms employed should be given the recog-
nized fair and reasonable meaning which causes liability
under the policy to attach.

“In the instant case the terms in question are ‘use’
and ‘using.’ Now a car would be used by a person,

| whether it was operated personally or through the serv-

ices of another. If the insurer meant that liability
should only attach when it was being operated or driven
by the owner or some one with his consent, and it is
claimed the word ‘used’ includes the term ‘operated’
—then the insurer should have employed the word
carrying in its meaning the narrower limitation of li-
ability.

“The word ‘use’ is defined as the ‘Purpose served
—a purpose, object or end for useful or advantageous
nature.’ (Oxford English Dictionary.) ”

On appeal the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals and stated at Page
860 of 48 N.E. (2d) as follows:

“We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
words ‘using,’ ‘used,’ and ‘actual use’ do not have the
limited meaning of ‘operating,’ ‘operated,’ or ‘actual
operation.’ The defense that Bennett White was driv-
ing does not negative the fact that Dorothy Kennedy
was using the automobile.”

In Buell vs. Indian Refining Company, 62 Ohio App.
108, 23 N.E. (2d) 329, 331, the Ohio Court of Appeals
pointed out that the word “use” is one of the most com-
prehensive words in our language and is capable of
being used in many senses.

a

Brief in Support of Petition 21

A search for definitions of the word “use” in diction-
aries, in “Words and Phrases”, and in 66 C.J. “Use”, at
p. 65 et seq., reveals that the term is suspectible of many
shades of meaning. In Webster’s New International Dic-
tionary (2nd Ed. 1935), one of the definitions of the noun
“use” is as follows:

“6. Quality of being suitable for employment,
capability of being used or of serving to promote
an end * * *.”

In view of the fact that the written contract in ques-
tion was a regular printed form contract drafted by the
Defendant Company, and in view of the fact that the word
“use” employed therein is susceptible of different meanings,
and can reasonzbly be construed in favor of Plaintiff Swalley,
it is submitted that such construction should prevail and
that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is in di-
rect conflict with the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeal throughout the
country, and also with the law of Ohio and other States.

II. THE PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION OF
THE CONTRACT BY THE PARTIES REQUIRES
AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SWAL-
LEY.

In its opinion the Circuit Court of Appeals declared
(R. 380):

“No sounder guide to the contracts’ meaning can
be found than the interpretation of the parties them-
selves.”

In applying this familiar legal principle, however, the
Court overlooked the all-important and decisive fact that
the Defendant Company itself had already actually inter-

22 Brief in Support of Petition

preted the split-commission clause of the contract in ac-
cordance with the contention of Plaintiff Swalley in the
case at bar, and that both parties had acted in reliance
thereon.

The attention of this Court is respectfully directed to
an exchange of letters between the parties, the letter from
Swalley to the Company being dated May 10, 1941 (R. 265-
266), and the letter in reply from the Company to Swalley
being dated May 26, 1941 (R. 259-260), These letters are
not even referred to in the opinion of the Circuit Court
of Appeals and were apparently not considered by the
Court in arriving at its conclusions.

It will be noted from Swalley’s letter that he claimed
commissions on certain machines and attachments (like
those involved in the present suit) which had been stored in
their original packing crates at Barksdale Air Field, Shreve-
port, Louisiana (located in the territory of another agent),
and which had later been transferred to Selma Air Field,
Selma, Alabama (located in Swalley’s territory). In its
reply, the Company expressly denied Swalley’s right to
the commissions on the ground that the machines and attach-
ments which had been shipped direct from the factory to
Barksdale Field had not been transferred to Swalley’s terri-
tory until after they had remained at Barksdale Field for
more than ninety days, and the Company made it clear
that it is wholly immaterial that the equipment had
not, in fact, been “used” but had been merely stored
while it remained at Barksdale Field.

The pertinent parts of the Company’s letter are as fol-
lows (R. 259-260):

“When that equipment was sold, the Dayton
Multigraph Agency received its split sale share for ob-
taining the order and the remaining commission was
credited to Mr. Carter who was then Multigraph Agent

Brief in Support of Petition 23

at Dallas in whose territory Shreveport is located.

“From this it will be seen that equipment was
moved from Shreveport into Selma, Alabama, consid-
erably after the 90 day period expired. By that is
meant the time limit that is placed on equipment trans-
ferred from one territory to another which are to be
considered as bonus orders or split sales. In that con-
nection, we would refer you to the Manual Section 11,
Paragraph 28, which contains the regulations on deals
of this kind.

“Although an equipment after being shipped from
the Factory into one territory and it remains in that
territory even though it may not be used, and if that
equipment is transferred to another territory after 90
days from date of sale, under the regulations there
would be no split sale or adjustment of commissions or
quota. We wish to add, too, that the vacuum frame
and whirler were sold as open market items with those
two items being shipped to the Government forces in
the San Antonio area and from there it was re-shipped
to Shreveport. This only indicates that with the Gov-
ernment, it can be expected that there will be more or
less moving of their equipment.

“Now if the reverse were true and the Class 1200
Multilith you sold for delivery to them at Selma, last
April was shipped out by them after 90 days from
date of sale, you of course would be entitled to retain
the full commission and quota credit on the deal you
received. (Boldface supplied.) (Selma was located in
Plaintiff Swalley’s territory. )

The Defendant Company and Plaintiff Swalley acted
in reliance upon that interpretation of the contract, and
continued to do so until the present controversy arose (R.
113). The main purchase order in question was placed on
March 31, 1942 (R. 281) and the other two orders were
placed pursuant to requisitions dated May 6, 1942 (R. 289
and 295). On May 7 and 8, 1942, the Defendant Company,

—

24 Brief in Support of Petition

in a spirit of elation, sent Plaintiff Swalley four congratu-
latory telegrams regarding his early election to the 1943
Hundred Club because he had already exceeded his agency
quota for the year (R. 261 and 262). The Company thereby
recognized and acknowledged that Swalley’s rights to the
commissions had already accrued for his quota credits in-
cluded the commissions claimed in this suit.

When Plaintiff Swalley was about to enter the military
service, the Defendant Company sent its special representa-
tive, T. H. White, to make certain arrangements. The Record
(125-126) shows that White inserted the following para-
graph in a letter to the Company dated March 18, 1943,
about the machines and attachments involved in this suit
(R. 257):

“The equipment mentioned was delivered to
Mobile Air Depot within the limits of the territory
described in our contract, has been fully paid for, and
has remained beyond the ninety-day period as required
by contract”.

The Company’s answer (R. 258) did not deny that
statement.

In its pleadings in the present suit (R. 24) Defendant
Company averred that Plaintiff Swalley “was entitled to
receive, and was paid, seventy-five per cent of the com-
mission on machines shipped into the Mobile Air Depot for
storage under Purchase Order No. (535) 42-15979 which
were subsequently placed in use by the Defendant in the
territory described in the contract between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant.” Hence the Company admits that the
words “to be used” in the contract include “for stor-
age.” As Swalley’s rights to the commissions in question
accrued at the time that the sale contracts were made, and
could not be divested except by operation of the condition

Brief in Support of Petition 25

subsequent of the 90-day clause, it is, of course, immaterial
whether the equipment was ultimately placed in operation.

The fact that the 90-day clause (R. 249-250) states
that in the event of the named contingency, viz, transfer of
equipment from one territory to another within 90 days,
the commission “‘shall be readjusted”, and the fact that the
Company’s letter of May 26, 1941 (R. 259-260) points out
that if this contingency does not occur the agent may
“retain” his commission clearly indicate that the 90-day
clause presupposes that the split commission has already been
paid pursuant to the preceding sentence. Thus the 90-day
clause is a condition subsequent, and it is obvious that the
parties so construed it, especially in view of the fact that
commissions were paid or credited at the time of shipment
(R. 247, 113).

Moreover, the fact that the 90-day clause contains the
words “new or used equipment’ is cogent proof that the
parties contemplated that some equipment might be trans-
ferred within 90 days while still brand-new or unused, that
is, while still in storage. As the clause applies to both new
and used equipment its only effect is to set a 90-day time
limit for operation of the condition subsequent, viz, transfer
to another territory. This is exactly the way the Company
itself construed the contract (R. 259-260).

In view of the clear, unmistakable and unequivocal in-
terpretation and practical construction of the written con-
tract by the parties inter se, it is respectfully submitted that
recourse to judicial construction or to lexicographers was un-
warranted to determine the intention of the parties in re-
gard to the transactions in suit, and the conclusion is in-
escapable that Plaintiff Swalley is entitled to recover the
commissions awarded by the District Court.

26 Brief in Support of Petition

Ill. THE BULLETIN OF THE DEFENDANT
COMPANY RELIED UPON BY THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT IN FACT APPLY
TO THE TRANSACTIONS IN QUESTION AND
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A PRACTICAL CON-
STRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT OPERATIVE
IN THIS CASE.

The Circuit Court of Appeals relied strongly on a
certain bulletin issued by Defendant Company on October
31, 1941 (R. 309). Examination of the bulletin in ques-
tion will conclusively show that it has nothing at all to do
with the facts of the instant case, that it does not even pur-
port to interpret the written contract in question as to the
particular transactions involved in this suit, and that it does
not adversely affect the right of Plaintiff Swalley to recover
his commissions earned under the contract.

(a) In the first place, it should be noted that the sub-
ject matter of the bulletin is “Mobile Army Units”. It does
not purport to cover any other subject and it is expressly re-
stricted to that one subject by the printed instructions on
the face of the bulletin: “Identify subject in space provided.
Write on one subject only and sign the letter.” The con-
tents of the bulletin repeatedly refer to “combat units”
and it is obvious that the subject “Mobile Army Units” has
no reference to the City of Mobile, Alabama, where the
Mobile Air Depot is located in the Plaintiff’s territory, but
to a certain type of Army unit of the U. S. Engineers.

(b) It should be noted further that the bulletin refers
solely to Multilith equipment for use of the U. S. Engi-
neers. As a matter of fact, most of the machines which are
involved in this suit were not Multilith equipment but
Multigraph machines, and only one particular type or model
of Multilith was ever used in mobile Army units or trailers.

aaa

Brief in Support of Petition 27

Moreover, the machines and attachments involved in this
case were not for the use of the U. S. Engineers, but for
the use of the Air Corps, an entirely different branch of
the military service.

(c) This Court’s attention is also directed to the fact
that the bulletin states: ““When equipment is shipped from
the Factory to an Army General Depot, it is considered as
‘in transit’.” Thus, the bulletin expressly restricts itself
to:shipments from the factory to Army General Depots
and has nothing at all to do with shipments to other depots,
like the Mobile Air Depot, which are not in fact Army
General Depots.

(d) It should be noted that the bulletin refers to
purchases by the War Department procured by a Wash-
ington representative of the Company, whereas the purchases
of the machines involved in this suit were made by the Air
Corps at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, and the orders were
procured by the Company’s agent, Gray, in Ohio, accord-
ing to the Company’s own admission (R. 17-21).

(e) It is apparent that the Defendant Company itself
did not regard the bulletin of October 31, 1941, as appli-
cable to or controlling in situations like that in the case at
bar, for the Company found it necessary or advisable to is-
sue a bulletin on September 21, 1942 (R. 302), which pur-
ported to cover the situation precisely, but which came too
late to affect Plaintiff Swalley’s rights to the commissions
in question. Issuance of the second bulletin was recognition
by the Defendant Company of the fact that the first bul-
letin was inapplicable and ineffectual, either as an inter-
pretation of the written contract with respect to the pur-
chase orders in question, or as a purported modification
of the written contract.

(f) Further cogent proof of the fact that the Com-
pany itself did not intend for the bulletin of October 31,

a

28 Brief in Support of Petition

1941 to apply to the transactions in question lies in the
acts and conduct of the parties subsequent thereto. See
supra, pp. 23-25.

(g) The record is devoid of any evidence that the par-
ties hereto had acted in reliance on that bulletin, or had
adopted a new construction of the contract in conflict with
their previous construction (R. 265-266, 259-260). The
Middletown transaction does not support the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals because it does not appear from
the record that the machine had remained at Middletown,
Pennsylvania for the required period of 90 days.

In view of these circumstances, therefore, the Company
bulletin of October 31, 1941, should be completely dis-
regarded in deciding this case. The bulletin amounted to
nothing more than a special arrangement for splitting com-
missions in a certain narrow and restricted situation entirely
foreign to the circumstances of this case. Since the bul-
letin was narrowly limited by its own terms and, since it
was prepared by the Defendant Company itself, it must
be strictly construed against the Company and confined
to its own narrow field of operation. In giving to this lim-
ited bulletin the effect of overriding the provisions of Para-
graph 8 of the contract (R. 248) and the practical con-
struction thereof by the parties, the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals is in conflict with rules of judicial con-
struction recognized generally by courts throughout the
country.

IV. THE DECISION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS CANNOT PROPERLY BE PREDI-
CATED UPON MODIFICATION OF THE WRIT-
TEN CONTRACT, FOR THE DEFENDANT COM-
PANY FAILED TO PLEAD MODIFICATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF

Brief in Support of Petition 29

CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE CASE WAS NOT TRIED
ON THAT ISSUE, AND PLAINTIFF SWALLEY
DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTRO-
DUCE EVIDENCE ON THAT POINT.

The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States were promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court. Rule 8 deals with “General Rules of Plead-
ings”. Subdivision (c) entitled “Affirmative Defenses”
provides:

“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbi-
tration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res
julicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver,
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or af-
firmative defense * * *”

Rule 12 (h) provides that a party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by motion
or in his answer or reply.

Numerous Federal cases have applied and enforced
these requirements. See 28 U.S.C.A. following Sec. 723 (c),
note 21, and U.S.C.A. 1947 Special Pamphlet, p. 172 et seq.

Since modification of a contract is clearly a matter
constituting “an avoidance or affirmative defense,” it must
be set forth affirmatively. This the Defendant Com-
pany failed to do, as an examination of the pleadings will
show. The only references to the bulletin of October 31,
1941, appear in Paragraphs 8 and 10 of Defendant’s Answer
(R. 18 and 21). Paragraph 8 purported to answer Para-
graph 6 of the Complaint, which alleged that Plaintiff had
sold certain machines, and the bulletin was referred to by
the Defendant to show that Plaintiff had not sold the ma-

— —

chines. Paragraph 10 purported to answer Paragraph 8
of the Complaint, which dealt only with attachments, and
not the machines (R. 9).

Nowhere in its pleadings does the Defendant Company
use the word “modification” or aver facts to show that the
original contract was modified. The Defendant was ob-
viously trying to plead practical construction of the contract
and not modification.

Paragraph 7 of the Complaint (R. 8-9) alleged that
pursuant to the agency contract and the Air Corps pur-
chase orders in question, the Defendant delivered to the
Mobile Air Depot 75 Multigraph models and 86 Multi-
lith models, for which the Defendant received $357,886.90.
Paragraph 10 of the Complaint (R. 9 and 11) claimed the
sum of $85,244.46 under the agency contract and the main
purchase order in question. It is significant that in its an-
swers thereto, the Defendant Company did not even men-
tion the bulletin in question or endeavor to show a modifi-
cation of the contract. As a matter of fact, in its answer
to Paragraph 7 of the Complaint (R. 19-20), Defendant
Company referred to the contract, marked Plaintiff’s Ex-
hibit “A,” as “being Plaintiff’s contract with the Defend-
ant”; and in its answer to Paragraph 10 of the Complaint
(R. 23-24), the Defendant set out and relied upon Para-
graph 8 of the contract.

At the trial of this case Plaintiff’s evidence was sub-
mitted by deposition as he was then on the high seas with
the U. S. Navy. Due to the fact that Defendant Company
did not plead modification of the contract and Plaintiff was
not duly apprised of such defense, and due to the fact that
the case was not tried on that issue, Plaintiff Swalley did not
have an opportunity to meet that point by introducing
evidence. Plaintiff respectfully submits, therefore, that the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, predicated upon a

iiccinsenetassiepnaounanseniaeal

30 Brief in Support of Petition

cat

EEE

Brief in Support of Petition 31

so-called “‘modification” constitutes an injustice toward
him, for he was thereby deprived of an opportunity to be
heard, which is the essence of due process. If he had been
duly apprised that the Defendant or the Circuit Court of
Appeals would rely upon a so-called “modification” of the
contract, he would have offered to prove, inter alia, that the
Company had actually paid him a commission on a June 6,
1942 invoice where the machine had been shipped pursuant
to one of the purchase orders in question and had remained
in his territory more than 90 days, even though it was not
in fact installed or used during that period; and, further,
that he had regularly twice a month submitted to the
Company, in compliance with its rules, certain “I and E”
(Income and Expense) reports in which he claimed credit
for commissions on all the machines that were required to
be shipped to Mobile Air Depot under the three purchase
orders in question, and the Company never disputed the
correctness of nor made any complaint about said reports.

V. THERE WAS NO EFFECTUAL MODIFI-
CATION OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT AP-
PLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

(a) The Defendant’s bulletin of October 31, 1941,
upon which the Circuit Court of Appeals based a so-called
modification of the contract, did not, in fact, apply to the
transactions in question for the reasons stated on pages 26-28
of this Brief.

(b) There was no evidence showing that Plaintiff
Swalley had assented to or acquiesced in the proposed terms
of the Company set forth in the bulletin, nor was there any
evidence of acts or conduct of the parties in reliance thereon
which might afford a basis for modification.

(c) There was no new consideration moving to
Plaintiff Swalley. It is well-established that since a modifi-

.

32 Brief in Support of Petition

cation of a contract is a N€W contract, a consideration is
necessary to support the new agreement, and this is the law
of Ohio, which governs the contract in question: Thurston
vs. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 328; Marshall vs.
Ames, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. 363, 5 Oh. Cir. Dec. 403; Williams
vs. Fortlage, 17 Oh. Cir. Ct. N.S. 242. This rule has also
been recognized and applied by the Federal Courts, Cuneo
Press vs. Clayborn Corporation, 90 Fed. (2d) 233 (C.C.A.
7th, 1937), and is the prevailing law throughout the coun-
try, 17 C.J.S. “Contracts”, Sec. 376, p. 861 et seq.

As no new consideration was shown, the purported
modification lacks legal validity and cannot support the de-
cision of the Circuit Court of Appeals.

(d) There is no factual basis for application by the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the rule that a contract, termin-
able at will, may be modified at any time by either party
as a condition of its continuance.

It should be noted that the contract provided that it
may be terminated at any time at the option of either party
by and upon the giving of written notice (R. 253).

As stated in 17 C.J.S. “Contracts” Sec. 402, p. 892:

“Notice of termination is essential to the ex-
ercise of an option to terminate a contract. * * *
Notice to terminate a contract, under a provision
therein must be reasonable, clear and unequivocal,

and in accordance with the terms of the contract.
* 8 #9

There was no effort by Defendant Company to termi-
nate the contract and there was no evidence that continu-
ation of the contract was conditioned upon acceptance by
Plaintiff Swalley of the terms of the bulletin. The fact
that Defendant Company finally exercised its option to
terminate the contract by written notice dated March Sth,
1943, when Plaintiff Swalley entered the military service

(R.
that
give

Brief in Support of Petition 33

255, 257) proves that the Company itself recognized
in order to terminate the contract it was necessary to
written notice to that effect.

Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1938) Sec. 1027A,

p. 2854 fn, points out the distinction between (1) a privil-
ege to terminate a contract “at will” and (2) a privilege
to terminate a contract at any time which requires a par-
ticular manifestation of its exercise, such as written notice.

In Abrams vs. George E. Keith Company, 30 Fed. (2d)

90 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1929), the Court stated:

613,

“This contract was perfectly good in law. Being
indefinite as to its terms, either party might terminate
it on reasonable notice. No such notice was given
here. The plaintiff treated the contract as wholly
invalid, arbitrarily sought to terminate it without no-
tice, and insists on its rights so to do here. The case was
clearly one for the jury to determine what the facts
were. If the facts were as the counterclaim avers, the
plaintiff was guilty of a breach of the contract, and
defendants were entitled to recover such damages in
its counterclaim as the evidence warranted.”

In Berwick Hotel Co. v. Vaughn, 300 Pa. 389, 150 Atl.
616, 71 A.L.R. 1340 (1930), the Court declared:

“To be effective, a notice for the rescision or termi-
nation of a contract must be clear and unambiguous,
conveying an unquestionable purpose to insist on the
cancellation. And where the conduct of one having
the right to rescind a contract is ambiguous and it is
not clear whether he has rescinded it or not, he will
be deemed not to have done so. Under this rule, a
mere threat to cancel the contract is not sufficient
as a notice of rescision. 3 Black on Rescision and
Cancellation, Section 574.” (Boldface supplied.)

It should be noted that the termination clause of the
contract (R. 253) provided that the Company, at any

34 Brief in Support of Petition

time, may change the boundaries of Plaintiff’s territory.
Is this not cogent proof that a modification of other terms
of the contract, such as the commission arrangement, could
not be effected by the Company unilaterally by written
notice?

The bulletin amounted to nothing more than a mere
proposal by the Company for a new commission arrange-
ment in certain special instances. To hold that it consti-
tuted notice of termination of the contract not only does
violence to the facts, but also brings the case within the op-
eration of the rule of law which precludes partial termi-
nation of a contract. 17 C.J.S. “Contracts”, Sec. 403, p.
893.

In Oil Workers International Union Local No. 463 vs.
Texoma Natural Gas Company, 146 Fed. (2d) 62, 64
(C.C.A. Sth, 1945) cert. den. 324 U.S. 872, 65 Sup. Ct.

1017, 89 L.Ed. 1426, the Court held:

“A party to an agreement may exercise his option
to cancel it, but he may not, when unauthorized by
the agreement and in the absence of consent of the other
party, cancel it in part.” (Boldface supplied.)

Thus, even considered as a notice of termination, the
bulletin is a legal anomaly and has no validity.

(e) The purported modification of the written con-
tract was invalid under the Statute of Frauds because it was
not in writing signed by Plaintiff Swalley, “the party to be
charged therewith.”

The Ohio Statute of Frauds, embodied in Sec. 8621 of
Throckmorton’s Annotated Code of Ohio (1930), provides
as follows:

“No action shall be brought whereby to charge
the defendant * * * upon an agreement that is not to
be performed within one year from the making thereof;
unless the agreement upon which such action is brought,

Brief in Support of Petition 35

or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some
other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.”

Examination of the agency contract with respect to
expenses (R. 250), insurance, (R. 250), purchase or lease
of machines (R. 251) and the two-year no-competition
clause (R. 252) leaves no room for doubt that the parties
contemplated a permanent arrangement reasonably requir-
ing more than a year for performance, and hence the con-
tract was required to be in writing under the line of cases
supporting the following text in 37 C.J.S., “Statute of
Frauds”, Sec. 52, pp. 567-568:

“ * * Where from the nature and terms of the
contract it is manifest that the parties intended to en-
ter into a permanent arrangement, or that they did not
contemplate a complete performance within a year,
the contract is within the Statute, although no time
for performance is specified, and even though there
is a mere possibility of performance within a year.
* * * The fact that one or both of the parties have
the privilege of terminating the agreement before the
expiration of the year does not take the contract out
of the Statute”.

As the original contract was required to be in writing,
the purported modification was also required to be in writ-
ing, signed by Plaintiff Swalley. In 49 Am. Jur. “Statute
of Frauds”, Sec. 301, p. 609, the rule is stated as follows:

“* * * The broad general doctrine as announced
by most authorities is that a contract required by the
statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be validly
changed or modified as to any material condition therein
by subsequent oral agreement so as to make the original
written agreement as modified by the oral one an en-
forceable obligation. To state the rule differently,
where an original agreement comes within the provisions

——

36 Brief in Support of Petition

of the statute of frauds requiring certain agreements

to be in writing, the statute of frauds renders invalid

and ineffectual a subsequent oral agreement changing
the terms of the written agreement.”

This is the law of Ohio and the Federal courts. Craw-
ford vs. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190, 98 Am. Dec. 103; Swain
vs. Seamens, 9 Wall (U. S.) 254, 19 Law Ed. 554; Emerson
vs. Slater, 22 How. (U. S$.) 28, 16 Law Ed. 360; Parish vs.
Haynes, 62 Fed. (2d) 105 (C.C.A. Sth).

Moreover, the fact that the bulletin required fulfill-
ment of the Company’s one-year guarantee from date of }
future delivery or installation (R. 311, 24), shows that the
purported modification itself was not to be performed
within one year, and hence is invalid under the Statute of
Frauds, because not executed by Plaintiff Swalley, the party
to be charged therewith.

VI. PLAINTIFF SWALLEY ACQUIRED VEST-
ED RIGHTS TO THE COMMISSIONS IN QUES-
TION WHICH COULD NOT BE ADVERSELY AF-
FECTED BY A LATER PURPORTED MODIFICA-
TION OF THE AGENCY CONTRACT.

The Circuit Court of Appeals relied solely on the bul-
letin of October 31, 1941 (R. 309) to support its theory of
modification, but for the reasons stated above, pp. 31-36,
that bulletin did not create a valid modification of the writ-
ten contract. In recognition of this fact, the Company
issued a second bulletin dated September 21, 1942 (R. 302).
As the second bulletin obviously came too late to affect
Plaintiff Swalley’s right to recover the commissions in ques-
tion, the Circuit Court of Appeals did not even refer to it.

The same grounds which vitiate the first bulletin
(supra, pp. 31-36) also vitiate the later bulletin, but there

Brief in Support of Petition 37

are additional factors which render it a legal nullity as to
the transactions in question.

In the first place, it purports to cover only one of the
three purchase orders involved in this suit (R. 302).

It is important to bear in mind that the agency contract
was entered into March 25, 1941 (R. 254), that the 90-day
clause was interpreted in Swalley’s favor by the Company
itself in the letter of May 26, 1941 (R. 259-260), that the
Air Corps contracts for the machines in question were
made on March 31, 1942, May 18, 1942, and May 20, 1942
(R. 281, 289, 295), that shipments were commenced prior
to July 1, 1942, and that Swalley’s rights to commissions on
the machines to be shipped to Mobile Air Depot had already
accrued before the bulletin of September 21, 1942, was is-
sued (R. 302).

We urge the Court to note that each of said orders
contained shipping instructions directing that a cer-
tain number of the particular type of machines de-
scribed therein be shipped to Mobile Air Depot, at the
prices stipulated, in accordance with the monthly delivery
schedule beginning on or before July 1, 1942. The Com-
pany had entered into a binding contract with the Air
Corps in regard to the machines and attachments in question
and had actually made shipments and deliveries as required.
The commissions were earned and Swalley’s rights accrued
at the time the sale contracts were made, and, in fact,
commissions were paid to Swalley at the time the machines
were Shipped from the Factory, until the present controversy
arose (R. 247). The Company did not wait for the ma-
chines to be installed or used before collecting the purchase
price from the Government, nor did the Company wait for
the machines to be installed or used before paying Swalley’s
commissions, until the controversy of this suit arose.

Therefore, Swalley had an accrued right and in-

38 Brief in Support of Petition

terest in the War Department contracts in question,
and the Company was legally impotent to modify the
agency contract in so far as those accrued rights were
concerned.

In the law of agency, it is well-established that an agency,
coupled with an interest, is not revocable by the princi-
pal, and in the field of contracts, it is equally well-estab-
lished that, although a contract terminable at will can be
modified at any time by either party as a condition of its
continuance, nevertheless, such modification must look to
the future and cannot affect the past and, consequently,
where an agent has already earned his commission or the
company is already under a legal obligation to pay him his
commission, it cannot be changed without his consent or
without a new consideration.

As stated in 3 C.J.S. “Agency”, Sec. 187, p. 88:

“The rule that the agent is entitled to recover for
services rendered before his discharge is particularly ap-
plicable where contract of agency is severable. Accord-
cordingly, an agent, selling goods on a commis-
sion is entitled to a commission on goods sold by
him during the continuation of the agency, al-
though the goods were not delivered or paid for,
or even where the orders were not received by the
principal, until after the termination of the re-
lationship—” (Boldface supplied.)

To the same effect is 2 Am. Jur., “Agency,” Sec. 50.

In Peoria Life Insurance Company vs. Poynor (Tex.
Civ. App.), 297 S.W. 788, the Court declared that irres-
pective of an agreement that the agent would abide by the
rules of the company, the principal, by changing its rules,
cannot alter the compensation fixed by the contract of
agency, for an agent’s vested rights under an express contract
cannot be changed by rules and regulations of the principal.

Brief in Support of Petition 39

This same principle was recognized in Schnerb vs. Cat-
erpillar Tractor Company, 43 Fed. (2d) 920, cert. den. 282
U. S. 898, 75 Law Ed. 791 wherein the Court stated that al-
though a manufacturing company, under an agreement giv-
ing an agent exclusive territory without fixing the term
of duration, could cancel their obligation thereunder at any

time by notice, such termination would not affect busi-
ness already in negotiation.
It is highly significant that, by its own admissions, the

Company set aside certain sums of money in a special fund
to cover the commission on the machines in question and
the money was carried on the books of the Company as a
liability (R. 157, 193). Thus the Corapany itself recog-
nized that the right to the commissions had accrued and
that it was simply a matter of disbursing the funds.

In Atkinson vs. The New Britain Machine Co., 154
Fed. (2d) 895, 901 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946), the Court said:

“We are of the view that unless there is an agree-
ment clearly providing to the contrary, a person selling
on a commission basis is entitled to a commission when
a sale is made irrespective of when shipment takes
place.”

To the same effect is Dibble vs. Dimick, 143 N. Y.
549, 38 N.E. 724, where the commissions were not payable
until the delivery of the goods. See also A.L.I. Restatement
on Agency, Sec. 436, comment (a).

In Ohio Marble Co. vs. Byrd, 65 Fed (2d) 98 (C.C.A.
6th, 1933) the Court held that an agent was entitled to
recover Commissions upon shipments made pursuant to sales
contract, even though said shipments occurred subsequent
to the termination of his agency, and the commissions did
not become due until after the agency terminated.

In Albright vs. Kalbitzer, 2 Fed. Supp. 815 (D.C. Pa.,
1945), the Court held that under a manufacturer’s contract

i

40 Brief in Support of Petition

to pay commissions to a distributor on “sales”, delivery and
passing of title were not necessary to existence of a “sale”
on which a commission would be due.

In Jacquin vs. Boutard, 89 Hun. 437, 35 N. Y. Supp.
496 (1895) affirmed in 167 N.Y. 686, 51 N.E. 1091 (1898),
it was held that the agent could recover commissions which
he would have earned up to the end of the six-month termi-
nation period, including those on sales for future de-
livery.

In Dildine vs. Ford Motor Company, 159 Mo. App. 410,
140 S.W. 627 (1911), the Court held that a dealer could |
recover his 15% commission on a car that he had ordered, |
where the manufacturer agreed to ship the car but later
returned the deposit and refused to ship the car, even though
the contract expressly gave the manufacturer the right to
change prices and the dealer the right to cancel the order in
the event of such change.

In Singer Sewing Machine Co. vs. Brewer, 78 Ark. 202,
93 S.W. 755 (1906), it was held that an agent is entitled
to commissions for sales upon which installments remained
unpaid at the time the agency contract was terminated,
where the sales were largely on an installment basis, and the
agent was not limited to commissions on installments actu-
ally paid at the time of the termination.

In Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company vs. Ew-
ing, 141 U. S. 627, 637, 12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 Law Ed. 882
(1891), the United States Supreme Court declared:

“Of course, the revocation by the principal of the
agent’s authority could not injuriously affect the con-
tracts made by the latter under the power originally
conferred upon him.”

Hence, the fact that some of the machines and attach-
ments under the three purchase orders in question were
shipped by the Company to Mobile Air Depot after issuance

irteieacteineninsemecrecomumnnitl

Brief in Support of Petition 41

of the bulletin of September 21st, 1942, and after termina-
tion of the agency contract on March 18, 1943 (R. 255,
257, 280), cannot lawfully deprive Plaintiff Swalley of
his commissions which accrued at the time of the sale.

It is ironical, indeed, that although the commissions
sued for were set aside by the Company in a special fund
and carried on the Company’s books as a liability (R. 157,
193), and the purchase price of the machines paid by the
Government undoubtedly included Plaintiff Swalley’s com-
missions, said commissions have not in fact been paid
by the Company. It is submitted that such conduct on
the part of the Company constitutes bad faith not only
toward Plaintiff Swalley and the other agents, but also
toward the United States Government, which should not
be countenanced by this Court.

In Tahir Erk vs. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 Fed. (2d)
855 (C.A.A. 4th, 1941), the Court held, in an agent’s action
for breach of a military airplane sales agency contract, that
notwithstanding a mutual revocation clause in the contract,
the complaint stated a good cause of action on the theory
that the principal cancelled the agency in bad faith for
the purpose of depriving the agent of his commissions.

In Bach vs. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 165 Fed.
(2d) 361 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946), where the manufacturer of
calculating machines required its distributors to buy an in-
ventory of obsolete machines in a bad state of repair which
the distributors did not want and could not use, and the
distributors were required to build up a business of their own
as independent purveyors of the machines in a certain terri-
tory, the Court held that the contract was not terminable
at the will of the manufacturer.

The requirement of good faith was recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Crowe vs. Trickey, 204
U. S. 228, 27 Sup. Ct. 275, 51 Law Ed. 454.

ae

42 Brief in Support of Petition

The doctrine of unjust enrichment has also been in-
voked by courts to protect an agent against the arbitrary
exercise by his principal of an option to terminate the
agency “at will”. Erskine vs. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185
N. C. 479, 117. S.E. 706, citing Manhattan Life Ins. Co. vs.
Buck, 93 U.S. 24, 23 Law Ed. 789.

The fact that the Company actually received from the
Government the sum of $291,899.87 on the machines and
attachments in question, which included the agents’ full :
35% commissions of $102,164.95, yet the Company paid
Swalley only $6,324.94 of his share (75%) of the com-
missions, and refused to pay Agent Gray of Dayton, Ohio,
any of his share (25%) until after he sued for same (R. 329,
192, 193)—these facts are devastating proof of the bad
faith and unjust enrichment on the part of the Company.
As stated in Fichter vs. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, 382 Ill.
91, at pp. 95-99, 46 N.E. (2d) 921, 924 (1943):

> ste ARR

“We have been referred to no case and we believe
none can be cited which authorizes one party to a con-
tract which is in the course of performance to create
a situation which changes the vested rights of the par-
ties and then contend that the situation thus brought
about creates the bona fide dispute which will au-
thorize the payment of a lesser sum in satisfaction of
a greater.”

In view of the facts of this case and in view of the fore-
going legal authorities, it is, therefore, clear that Plaintiff
Swalley acquired vested rights to the commissions in ques-
tion at the time of the sale of the machines and attach-
ments, and that under the agency contract he could not
thereafter be deprived of his commissions except by opera-
tion of the condition subsequent contained in the 90-day
clause of Paragraph 8 (R. 248-249). As the District Court
found, as a fact, that the machines and attachments had re-

Brief in Support of Petition 43

mained in his territory over 90 days and had been fully
paid for, and that the commissions in suit have not been paid
to anyone else, it is respectfully submitted that justice and
adherence to sound legal principles applicable to the un-
disputed facts of this case require affirmance of the District
Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Swalley.

Conclusion

As the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is
clearly erroneous and in conflict with the controlling law of
Ohio and decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
other Circuit Courts of Appeal, and as it overrides the prac-
tical construction of the contract by the parties them-
selves, disregards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
can find no legal support in the theory of contract modifica-
tion, your Petitioner E. E. Swalley humbly prays that the
grievous error of the Circuit Court of Appeals be rectified
and that the judgment of the District Court in his favor
be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Harry B. CoHEN,
A. BERKOWITZ,
Birmingham, Alabama
Counsel for Petitioner,
E. E. SwALLey.

Birmingham, Alabama,
February 18, 1947.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_1014%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
