# Opposition Brief — Southern Pacific Co. v. Henwood

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1947
- **Citation:** 330 U.S. 836

## Text

OPY

_ IN THE

FES 12 1947

ARLES ELMORE OnPLey

Supreme Court of the United-States——

OCTOBER TERM, 1946

No. 879

SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY,
a railroad corporation, Intervener,

Petitioner,

Uv.

BERRYMAN HENWOOD, as Trustee of St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company Lines, et al.,

Respondents.
No. 909
WALTER E. MEYER, Intervener, Petiti
ctitioner,
v.

BERRYMAN HENWOOD, as Trustee of St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company Lines, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 936
ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,

Oo i n, Deb or, Tn)
a Corporatio tor, Petitioner,

v’.
BERRYMAN HENWOOD, as Trustee of St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company Lines, et al.,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR
WRITS OF CERTIORARI

DAVIS POLK WARDWELL SUNDERLAND & KIENDL.,
15 Broad Street,
New York 5, N. Y.,
Attorneys for GUARANTY Trust Com-
PANY OF New York, as Trustee
under the Debtor’s First TERMINAL
AND UNIFYING MORTGAGE,

d Respondent.
Epwtn S. S. SUNDERLAND,

Wittiam D. Tucker, JR.,
Of Counsel.

INDEX

EE ccc cktcereccccecestsbinceuseecuubausen
eG Sid ce cccacsvabendvabepasneaen ten
PE oes. 656 ka heen seebes sacdneodsesenach
Tas Paowanry INVOLVED. ......cccvscccccccseccess
eee GE WIND GAGS og ono wi osc cc cvececcnvens

Tue PLAN OF REORGANIZATION..........0eeeceeeees

a)
oe ou

Quanraons PRMMNTED . . 2.0... 00s cise ceseesesvenes

ARGUMENT:
Point I The Petitioner’s allegations re-
garding changed conditions do not warrant a

return of the plan to the Commission.......... 5

The Petitioner’s Theory of Solveney Of
ee EPO Br CI icin bb eck en sda ae 5

(a) The decrease in debt and increase in
current assets is for the benefit of the new
CHAIN SE bei cn ee eu haus Cen bSeR OD 6

(b) The Commission’s permissible total
capitalization of $75,000,000 does not afford a
basis for determining a balance sheet solvency 10

(c) No changed conditions have resulted
from the cash distributions since the plan’s
effective date warranting review by this Court 12

Petitioners Have Made No Valid Showing
Of Changed Conditions With Respect To The
Debbne’s TAS POU onic kd ic auiks obi axks 16

Pornt II The special charges of petitioner
Meyer with respect to Southern Pacifie’s illegal
control of the Debtor present no questions for
ENE SOP TS MOE 0 on 5 04 A is cane Canckwahewse

Fe PORE SOCEM PR CELE Ee eh FEA

i

TABLE OF CASES
PAGE
Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. 8S. 448, 509 6,19

Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwau-
kee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318 U. 8. 523, 539,
OD vncd cus snececccsccepcucdestncubaaieeeaeee 6, 11

Insurance Group Committee et al. v. The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad et al., 15 U. S. Law
Pk eee 12, 14,17
I.C. C. v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 518. ...... 2. eee 19

New York Central Securities Co. v. U. S., 287 U. 8S.
OD, BD inandknnncacvetscenecteebeeeasnsbantene 19

Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company, C. C. H. Bankruptcy

Service, Par. 55,813 January 13, 1947............ 6
R. F. C. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R. Co.,

90 L. Ed. 1134, 1146, 1148, 1724........... 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125... 19
St. Louis S. W. Ry. Control, 180 I. C. C. 175. ....... 20
Moody’s Railroads Service ..............0cceeeees 17

SraTures

Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S. C. See. 47(c¢)):
UN OED ck can dSebdacdccunscabenkccacans 2
EE FT cicAsunancebebeeckbabessdcuecned 2

Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February
13, 1935 (28 U. S. C. 347 (a)):
SEES HED Nc 90K Vinee scdenanacdcccakzuun

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1946

No. 879
SourHern Pacrric Company, a railroad corporation,
Intervener,
. Petitioner,

BrrkyMAN Henwoon, as Trustee of St. Louis Southwestern
Railway Company Lines, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 909

Watrer KE. Meyer, Intervener,
Petitioner,
v.
BrrryMaN Henwoop, as Trustee of St. Louis Southwestern
Railway Company Lines, e¢ al.,
Respondents.

No. 936
Sr. Louis Sournwesrern Ramway Company,
a Corporation, Debtor,

* Petitioner,

BrrryMaNn Henwoop, as Trustee of St. Louis Southwestern
Railway Company Lines, e¢ al.,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE 8TH CIRCUIT

The respondent, Guaranty Trust Company of New
York, Trustee under the Debtor’s First Terminal and Uni-
fying Mortgage, files this brief in support of its prayer

2

that this Court deny the petitions of the Debtor, Southern
Pacific Company and Walter E. Meyer requesting this
Court to review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the 8th Circuit affirming the District Court’s order
approving a plan of reorganization for the St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company.

Opinions Below

District Court—53 F. Supp. 914 (R. 5183-5213)
Circuit Court of Appeals—152 F. (2d) 337 (R. 5559-5683)

Jurisdiction
The petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by

the Act of February 13, 1925 (28 U. S. C. 347(a)), and See-
tion 24(c) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S. C. See. 47(c)).

The Property Involved

The St. Louis Southwestern Railway system lines com-
prise a group of railroads operating with main lines and
branches from St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennes-
see, to Shreveport, Louisiana, and points in Texas, the
principal termini in Texas being at Corsicana and Fort
Worth. The total road mileage operated by the system
when the reorganization proceedings commenced was 1,749
miles. The Commission has found that traffic on the
Debtor’s main line is ‘‘highly competitive’’, and that its
branch line traffic is ‘‘very light’’ (R. 3502). The Debtor
must compete for traffic in the Southwest area with the
Missouri-Pacific, St. Louis-San Francisco, Missouri-Kansas-
Texas, and Kansas City Southern Railroads (R. 5581).

Statement of *‘.e Case

This proceeding was begun on December 12, 1935, when
the Debtor filed its petition under Section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Similar petitions were filed by Debtor’s three

3

subsidiaries, St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of
Texas, Central Arkansas and Eastern Railroad Company
and Stephenville North and South Texas Railway Company.
All objections to the Debtor’s petition were overruled, and
on January 3, 1936, one Trustee was appointed for the four
Debtors.

Hearings on the plans of reorganization filed by the
Debtor and others were begun March 16, 1937, and con-
cluded April 24, 1937. The Examiner’s Proposed Report
was issued February 7, 1938, and objections thereon were
argued before the Commission on May 16, 1938.

On January 10, 1939, the Commission reopened the
proceedings for the purpose of receiving further evidence
relating to the charges made by petitioner Meyer with re-
spect to the effect upon the Debtor’s earnings and assets of
Southern Pacific’s alleged diversion of traffic and failure to
solicit traffic preferentially (R. 500-501). Thereafter, hear-
ings were held for this sole purpose from May 5, 1939,
to May 27, 1939, and from September 18, 1939, to Septem-
ber 30, 1939 (R. 529). At these hearings a vast amount of
evidence, including hundreds of exhibits, was introduced
(R. 529-2680, 2681-3055). The extensive record made at
these hearings contained exhaustive studies of the earnings
history of the Debtor upon which the Commission founded
its finding as to the Debtor’s prospective earning power.

On June 30, 1941, the Commission issued its initial
Report and Order setting forth its plan of reorganization
for the Debtor (R. 3495-3735; 249 I. C. ©. 5). 131 pages of
the Report are devoted to an elaborate consideration and
rejection of the Meyer charges (R. 3547-3678). The plan
reduced the Debtor’s total capitalization from approxi-
mately $107,000,000 to $75,000,000 and fixed charges from
approximately $3,400,000 to $1,500,000.

Petitions for modification of the plan were filed by
various interveners, and on March 9, 1942, the Commission
issued its Supplemental Report and Order, which modified
its original plan in certain relatively minor respects but
which reaffirmed the same so far as the present petitions

4

are concerned (R. 3736-3820; 252 I. C. C. 325). The modified
plan was certified by the Commission to the District Court
March 23, 1942 (R. 3494-3495).

From October 26, 1942, to November 5, 1942, hearings
were held before the late Judge Davis upon objections to
the certified plan at which additional evidence, including
data as to the vastly increased earnings of the preceding
two years, was presented (R. 4051-5136). The great bulk of
such additional evidence related to the charges made by
Walter E. Meyer against Southern Pacific (R. 4157-4199,
4202-4209, 4304-5136). Prior to the filing of briefs in sup-
port of the plan and objections thereto, Judge Davis died.
The case was then referred to Judge Moore (R. 5138) who
on April 23, 1943, entered an order directing a reargument
on May 31, 1943, upon the case as submitted before Judge
Davis, with all parties having the right to apply for leave
to present additional testimony (R. 5181-5183). On Febru-
ary 8, 1944, the District Court filed an opinion and entered
an order in which it rejected the contentions of the objectors
and approved the certified plan.

Appeals were taken in March, 1944, to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the 8th Circuit by Southern Pacific, Walter
E. Meyer, protective committees for the Stephenville and
Central Arkansas bonds, respectively, and the Debtor, but
due to the necessity of printing an inordinately voluminous
record, argument was delayed until April 6, 1945. The
Cireuit Court handed down its decision August 26, 1946.

The Plan of Reorganization

Since the primary complaint of petitioners is not as to
the terms of the Commission’s plan of reorganization, but
as to its alleged obsolete character, no elaborate discussion
of the terms of the plan is required. It will suffice to say
that the Commission’s plan of reorganization for the Debtor
calls for a capitalization of approximately $75,000,000 and
fixed charges of approximately $1,500,000. The Debtor’s

5

capitalization at the time it went into reorganization was
$107,124,950, and fixed charges were, $3 379,341. (R. 3506,
3691)
Questions Presented

Only two questions are presented by the petitions for
writs of certiorari:

First, whether changed conditions have occurred which
were unanticipated by the Commission and which warrant
review by this Court.

Second, whether the Commission has given proper con-
sideration and disposition to petitioner Meyer’s special
charges of illegal control of the Debtor by Southern Pacific.

POINT I
The Petitioner’s allegations regarding changed condi-

tions do not warrant a return of the plan to the Commission.

In final analysis, the petitions for review by this Court
of the fairness of the Commission’s plan of reorganization
for the Debtor are based primarily on the theory of changed
conditions. This theory is rested upon two basic premises:
one, that the reduction in the Debtor’s defaulted interest
obligations and other indebtedness and the increase in its
current asset position has rendered the Debtor solvent; and
two, that the Debtor has shown an earning power unantici-
pated by the Commission. Respondents believe that the
first premise is contrary to the principles laid down by this
Court and that the second can not be sustained on the
meager additions to the record offered with the petitions,
being a mere assertion by the petitioners as opposed to the
expert judgment of the Commission.

The Petitioner’s Theory Of Solvency Of The Debtor Is Unsound

All three petitioners rely heavily upon an alleged solv-
ency of the Debtor in the bankruptcy sense resulting from
eash distributions directed by the District Court and from

6

an improvement in the current asset position of the Debtor,
As petitioner Southern Pacific states it: ‘‘The case for
the present solvency of the Debtor is presented upon the
basis of reduction in debt and improvement in current liquid
assets’’ (Petition p. 8). Respondents believe that the fal-
lacies in the position of petitioners lie in their disregard of
the principles settled by this Court as to the effect of debt
reduction and increase in current assets after the effective
date of a plan, in their misconception of the significance of
the Commission’s proposed new total capitalization, and in
their failure to analyze the effect of cash distributions under
the plan.

(a) The decrease in debt and increase in current assets is for
the benefit of the new security holders.

The effective date of the plan of reorganization in these
proceedings is January 1, 1942. This Court has consistently
held that it is for the Commission alone to determine the
effective date of a plan of reorganization. R. F.C. v. Den-
ver & Rio Grande Western R. R. Co., 90 L. Ed. 1134, p. 1148;
Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. 8S. 448, 509; Group
of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific R. Co., 318 U. 8. 523, 546. The practical reason for
this ruling was well stated by the Cireuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Cireuit in Old Colony Bondholders v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, C. C. H.
Bankruptcy Service, Par. 55,813 January 13, 1947, where
the Court said (p. 58,527) :

‘<* * * As a practical matter some closing time must
be set and it cannot be progressively postponed with-
out reopening the issues and making new findings,
with resulting new appeals. By the time these are
finished conditions may again have changed, so on
ad inifinitum. See Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
Jersey City, supra, * * *”’

Starting with this premise in the Denver case, this
Court laid down the principles with respect to the effect of

7

reduction in debt and increase in current assets in a reor-
ganization proceeding subsequent to the effective date
which, respondents submit, govern the issues petitioners
now seek to raise.

Petitioners’ primary argument of changed conditions is
founded on actual and assumed reductions of debt funded
in the plan resulting from cash distributions made since the
effective date of the plan. However, this same argument
was made before this Court in the Denver case and re-
jected. There the effective date of the plan was January 1,
1943. Among the obligations of the Debtor funded in the
plan as of that date were $2,758,330 of Rio Grande Junction
Bonds. In addition, the plan provided for the assumption
by the reorganized company of. $5,758,000 of equipment
obligations. Subsequent to the effective date the District
Court authorized the Trustees to purchase the Junction
Bonds and to pay off $1,218,000 of the equipment obliga-
tions. The capitalization of the new company was de-
creased proportionately. The Trustee for the most junior
secured creditors protested that their participation should
be increased by the amount of the debt reduction. The Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit accepted this
argument and returned the plan to the District Court. This
Court granted certiorari and reversed the Circuit Court on
this point, stating (90 L. Ed. p. 1724):

* * * ‘When the reduction of senior capital takes
place after the adoption of the plan by use of antici-
pated earnings or existing cash, there can be no such
readjustment of junior participation because assets
in the balance sheet at the adoption of the plan and
subsequent earnings are, as we have pointed out, for
the benefit of the stockholders in the new company so
that through these common stock advantages these
new stockholders may be compensated for their loss
of payment in full in cash. * * *,”

So too in the instant case the reduction of debt after the
adoption of the plan is for the benefit of the new security
holders. As the table on page 9 of the petition of Southern

8

Pacific shows, precisely the same kind of debt reduction has
occurred, in part at least, in this case as in the Denver pro-
ceeding. Here guaranteed obligations, viz. the Texarkana
Union Station certificates, were purchased and a reduction
in equipment obligations effected. A secured obligation of
the Railroad Credit Corporation was also paid off, which
was contemplated and provided for in the plan. As this
Court held in the Denver case, the benefit of this action ac-
crues to the new security holders. In addition, in this pro-
ceeding funds sufficient to pay interest arrears on certain
senior securities, but not directed to be applied for that pur-
pose, were disbursed. But this does not affect the applica-
tion of the doctrine enunciated by this Court in the Denver
case to this proceeding. Under that doctrine if these pay-
ments also effected a reduction in debt after the effective
date such reduction must be for the benefit of the new se-
curity holders.

Furthermore, under an additional holding of this Court
in the Denver case, it appears plain that the cash from
which these payments were made belongs to the creditors
provided for under the plan, because it was acquired sub-
sequent to the plan’s effective date. In the Denver pro-
ceeding this Court stated (90 L. Ed. p. 1146):

‘‘There is another important factor, corollary to
stock ownership, to be noted in the Commission’s al-
location of these securities. This factor is that the
creditors who received common stock to make them
whole obtained with that common stock an interest
in all cash on hand or all cash that might be accumu-
lated. * * * Cash, material and supplies, as well as all
other assets and all liabilities of the debtor were rep-
resented by the securities. If there is more cash on
hand than needed, for taxes, expenses and proper im-
provements, it is at the disposal of the common stock-
holders. If money was used to pay indebtedness,
there would be a corresponding reduction in the capi-
tal structure. * * *’’? [Emphasis supplied].

9

The Circuit Court of Appeals in that case had said (150 F.
(2d) at p. 35) :

‘<< * & &

we cannot disregard the fact that these huge
surpluses actually exist. Their existence is an ac-
complished fact. It is also obvious that surpluses
will continue to pile up for a reasonable time yet to
come. We think any plan which fails to take this into
account and which gives the Senior Bondholders their
claims in full by substantially delivering the road to
them, and gives them the surplus cash actually on
hand and further enables them to receive in addition
the excess war profits which are reasonably sure to
come, is inherently inequitable and unfair, so long as
there are classes of creditors whose claims are not
fully satisfied.’’

As to this holding, this Court stated (90 L. Ed. p. 1148) :

‘*In our judgment this holding is erroneous.

The effective date of the plan was fixed by the
Commission as January 1, 1943. This was in its
power. The allocation of the securities took into con-
sideration the interest of the secured claims to that
date. Any gain or any loss after that time was a
benefit or an injury to the new common stockholders
and then sometimes to security holders in positions
senior to them. Assuming that the courts, as courts
with equity powers in a bankruptcy matter, might set
aside a plan, fair and equitable when adopted by the
Commission, merely on account of subsequent changes
in economic conditions of the region or the nation, it
should not be done when the changes are of the kind
that were envisaged and considered by the Commis-
sion in its deliberations upon or explanations of the
plan’’ (Emphasis supplied).

The Commission in this case, as in the Denver reorgani-
zation, did envisage the factors upon which petitioners rely
in their claim of changed conditions. At the time of its
Supplemental Report in this proceeding the Commission
had before it the Trustee’s statements (which are filed
regularly with the Commission) showing earnings avail-

10

able for fixed charges for 1940 of $2,860,221 as compared
with $1,119,158 for 1939 and $7,495,940 for 1941 as compared
with both those earlier figures. The Trustee’s reports also
showed an increase in net current assets over those existing
when the petition was filed from a deficit of $23,771,707 to
an excess of current assets over current liabilities of
$8,010,813 as of December 31, 1941 (Debtor’s petition p. 9).
The Commission was fully aware of the certainty of further
increases resulting from war earnings. In the face of these
facts the Commission said:

‘<* * * the new securities, in the amounts in which
they will be exchanged for the securities and claims
of the old company, properly compensate the holders
of the old securities for the rights given up by them,
by the rights and shares of earnings accorded them in
the new company. * * * ’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
R. 3776)

Thus, the Commission plainly contemplated in this pro-
ceeding, as in the Denver case, that a part of the compensa-
tion of creditors for their sacrifices consisted of participa-
tion in good earnings in prosperous years and an improve-
ment in the value of the securities issued them resulting
from increased assets. It follows, therefore, that the argu-
ments of the petitioners based upon an alleged increase of
assets are directed to matters which this Court has held lie
within the province of the Commission.

(b) The Commission’s permissible total capitalization of
$75,000,000 does not afford a basis for determining a
balance sheet solvency.

A fundamental error in the solvency argument of the
petitioners lies in their use of the figure of $75,000,000 as a
starting point in setting up a balance sheet of assets and
liabilities. The Commission’s valuation in the form of a
permissible capitalization was based not upon the value of
the Debtor’s various assets as of any specific date, but
rather upon an overall valuation for reorganization pur-

ee

11

poses, which was arrived at after consideration of ‘‘all the
data of record’’ including ‘‘traffie and earnings to the latest
available date’’ and ‘‘also future prospects of traffic and
earnings’’ (R. 3741, 3774-75). Thus this valuation takes
into consideration the prospect of large wartime earnings
and the increase in the current asset position of the Debtor,
which the Commission was aware would ensue. The war
earnings for rail carriers were well known to the Commis-
sion by March 9, 1942, when it filed its Supplemental Re-
port, as shown by its pertinent references thereto in its
Annual Report for 1941, pp. 1-2, and the Commission took
these factors into account in making its determination of a
permissible capitalization. The permissible capitalization
fixed by the Commission rested upon its informed judgment,
taking into consideration estimated improved current asset
position and earning power. This capitalization cannot
be considered as an exact valuation of assets at any specific
date.

This Court has recognized that earning power is the
primary criterion in determining capitalization for reor-
ganization purposes rather than a balance sheet tabulation
of assets and liabilities (Milwaukee & Western Pacific cases,
supra). Whether or not junior securities are ‘‘without
value’? must depend primarily on earning power as this
Court ruled in the Milwaukee case 318 U.S. p. 539:

““* * * it [was not] necessary for the Commission to
make a precise finding as to the value of the road
in order to eliminate the old stock from the plan. A
finding as to the’precise extent of the deficiency is not
material or germane to the finding of ‘no value’
prescribed by § 77 (e). * * * The basic question in a
valuation for reorganization purposes is how much
the enterprise in all probability can earn.’’

The entire solvency argument of petitioners is based upon
their assumption that the Commission made a finding of
“the precise extent of the deficiency’’ when it fixed the new

ces —7

12

capitalization. But the Commission only made an overall
valuation for reorganization purposes taking into considera-
tion the prospective earnings (R. 3741, 3774-75) and other
factors to which petitioners point as changed conditions
necessitating amendment of the plan. Thus it is inaccurate
to use the Commission’s permissible capitalization as a
starting point for a series of calculations intended to show
the Debtor’s present solvency through accumulation of as-
sets sufficient to make up the supposed deficiency. As this
Court stated in Insurance Group Committee et al. v. The
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company et al.
(15 U. S. Law Week, p. 4192, Feb. 3, 1947):

‘“When the Interstate Commerce Commission finds
the value of a railroad system by any means, the cor-
rectness of the result cannot be mathematically
proved or disproved. The difficulties of appraisal
are multiplied by the necessity of looking into the
future to estimate earnings. Earnings estimates are
made with allowance for changing economic con-
ditions.’’

(c) No changed conditions have resulted from the cash distri-
butions since the plan’s effective date warranting review
by this Court.

Under the terms of the plan, the District Court may
direct that cash distributions made to senior creditors after
the effective date shall be applied to the reduction in part of
their claims. Yet, even if the court so applies whatever
amount of the cash distributed since January 1, 1942, may
be necessary to reduce or eliminate the unpaid interest
claims of senior creditors and the amount of common stock
is increased as a result of payment of the Railroad Credit
Corporation loan, as provided in the plan, $1,584,709 of
creditors’ claims will receive no treatment under the plan:

13

Total permissible capitalization ............ $75,000,000
Deduct*: Equipment Trust Ob-

ligations paid off.... 216,000

Texarkana Union Sta-

tion certificates paid

MET kcccepeesahuvesis 315,000

Interest Paid prior to

effective date Funded

Under Plan ........ 400,000

931,000 931,000

74,069,000
First Mortgage 4s ............ 20,000,000
Grays Point Terminal 5s ...... 500,000
Shreveport Bridge 5s ......... 450,000
Second Mortgage ds ........... 3,042,500
First Terminal 5s ............. 8,063,000
General and Refunding 5s...... #39,557,500
eee ** 2,843,294
Central Arkansas 5s .......... ** 1,197,435

75,653,709

(d) 1,584,709

If $1,584,709 of creditor claims are still unprovided for
under the plan, there have plainly been no changed condi-
tions resulting from cash distributions which warrant review
of the plan by this Court.

*No provision is made in the plan for reallocation of these
amounts after payment of these obligations.

** Includes unpaid interest to 1/1/42 and after deducting salvage
money that has been distributed.

#Including Refunding Bonds pledged because Commission’s
plan treats such bonds as reduced to possession and accords holders
of pledged bonds same treatment as public holders of Refunding
Bonds.

(d) Deficiency. Even if securities released by payment of
Equipment Trust Certificates, Texarkana Union Station Certificates
and interest prior to January 1, 1942 are reallocated there would
still remain unsatisfied claims of over $600,000.

14

The fact that the amount by which the creditors fail of
complete satisfaction in face amount of new securities is
now comparatively small, is of no consequence. Even if
each creditor could now receive the full face amount of his
claim in an equal face amount of new securities, it by no
means follows that he has been made whole or that such a
drastic unforeseen change in conditions has occurred neces-
sitating a return of the plan to the Commission. This Court’s
recent ruling in Insurance Group Committee et al. v. The
Denver and Rio Grande Western Raitiroad et al., 15 U. 8.
Law Week 4189, p. 4191 places the burden upon the peti-
tioners to show that the new securities over-compensate the
creditors for their sacrifices in order to establish changed
conditions invalidating a plan:

‘‘The Commission made no finding that the cash
value of the securities allocated to the senior creditors
paid them in full. To justify the change of posi-
tion of creditors from fully secured to partially
secured creditors were given opportunities to partici-
pate in profits through common stock ownership with
a chance at larger earnings than the Commission’s
forecast anticipated. We held the priority rule was
satisfied by this type of allocation. This was ex-
plained by our decision on the last review. Slip
opinion, supra, p. 15. The debtor has made no allega-
tion, either in this effort for re-examination or be-
fore, that the existing cash value of the securities
allotted any creditor has ever aggregated the amount
of the creditor’s claim against the debtor. We think
the absence of such an allegation, of itself, demon-
strates that the plan is not, because of excessive in-
terest; unfair to the debtor or those for whom it is
allowed to appear. ea

Until it can be contended with some show of
reasonableness that the creditors senior to the
creditors and steckholders whom the debtor repre-
sents here have received more in value than the face
of their claims, the debtor’s insistence on a re-ex-
amination of the plan is without substantial support.
See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482;
Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 U. S.
523, 541.’’

15

These petitioners have made no allegation and offer no
proof to show that the creditors provided for under the plan
have received more in value than the face of their claims.
There is, then, no warrant for a review of the plan by this
Court or a reconsideration of the plan by the Commission.

As a matter of record, the cash distributed to the credi-
tors has not materially aided the Debtor in so far as its
need for reorganization is concerned. As shown by the
Debtor’s balance sheet as of October 31, 1946, Appendix
B to Southern Pacific’s petition, it is still unable to meet its
matured and maturing debts. The Debtor’s matured prin-
cipal obligations are $25,064,394. In addition the Debtor
is obligated in the principal sum of $17,882,250 to Southern
Pacific, which sum is now due. Its matured unpaid interest
obligations are $3,247,284, excluding $1,443,540 interest in
default on Southern Pacifice’s claim. There is the further
obligation to pay current interest on the Debtor’s first mort-
gage bonds and its equipment obligations. The Debtor has
available to meet its matured and maturing debts, cash and
temporary cash investments of $22,989,923 and total current
assets of $32,545,847. Total current liabilities amount to
$10,455,343, leaving $22,090,504 net current assets to meet
matured and maturing obligations of $28,311,678 excluding
Southern Pacific’s matured claim of $19,325,790, principal
and interest. If this sum be included, the Debtor’s matured
obligations are $47,637,468. It cannot be said, then, that
the improved cash position of the Debtor and its debt retire-
ment has placed it in any position to fully meet its matured
or maturing obligations. It is, therefore, a proper subject
for reorganization and the fundamental consideration under
such circumstances in the formulation of a reorganization
plan is the Debtor’s prospective earning power. The Com-
mission has found that the Debtor’s normal earning power
is insufficient to warrant a capitalization which permits par-
ticipation by the equity or even full compensation of the
creditors. As we point out below, petitioners have com-
pletely failed to present substantial evidence which would
justify a finding that the Commission’s conclusion in this
respect was in error.

16

Even were the Debtor able and required to repay its in-
terest arrears only and be relieved of its obligation to pay
its matured principal debts, the problem for reorganization
purposes would still remain its ability to meet its obliga-
tions.as they mature. The obligations which Debtor would
have to meet in fixed charges on its existing debt under its
present capital structure would amount to $3,008,634 annu-
ally as shown by the Debtor’s annual report for 1945. On
the basis of the property’s historical earnings record and all
other factors the Commission has found that the Debtor has
been and will be unable to meet such heavy fixed charges
apart from its maturing principal obligations. The peti-
tioners offer no reliable evidence to establish clear error in
this determination.

Petitioners Have Made No Valid Showing Of Changed Conditions
With Respect To The Debtor’s Earning Power

The petitioners’ second charge of inequity resulting
from changed conditions is founded upon an alleged error
in judgment on the part of the Commission in its determina-
tion of the prospective earning power of the Debtor. How-
ever, the only evidence cited in support of this claim is the
10 months earning statement of the Debtor for 1946, statis-
tics showing an increase of population in the southwest ter-
ritory, and a theoretical industrial expansion in that area.
On these tenuous factors alone petitioners contend that this
Court should set aside the considered judgment of the Com-
mission as to the Debtor’s normal earning power based upon
a review of all relevant data together with its vast exper-
ience and familiarity with such matters. This inadequate
record, consisting primarily of hopeful predictions by pe-
titioners, presents no valid reason for this Court to review
the determination of the Commission based upon its expert
judgment. The allegations relied upon here with respect to
the Debtor’s earnings and earning power were presented
to the Cireuit Court as recently as October 22, 1946, when
that Court denied petitions for rehearing. The Circuit

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Court, sitting in and fully familiar with the alleged indus-
trial and population expansion in the territory served by
the Debtor, found nothing in the petitioners’ allegations
warranting a change in the Commission’s plan. As recently
as June 10, 1946, this Court considered and rejected almost
identical arguments in the Denver proceeding.* On the
basis of the proof offered in this proceeding they must like-
wise be rejected.

The petitioners rely almost entirely upon the ten months
earning statement of the Debtor to contradict the Commis-
sion’s determination as to the Debtor’s prospective earning
power. However, the figures themselves, while apparently
favorable, may not be relied upon implicitly unless there
is available the underlying data from which the
result is derived. It is impossible to tell what non-recurrent
income is contained in the ten months statement or to what
extent tax carry back credits or inadequate maintenance
provisions are responsible for the favorable statement.
Furthermore from other aspects the Debtor’s earnings
picture has not been as optimistic. The Cotton Belt re-
ported gross revenues for the full year of 1946 of $46.6
million representing a decline of 28% from 1945.** This
is a substantially larger decline than that recorded by St.
Louis-San Francisco, which showed a drop of only 17%, or
by Missouri-Pacific which showed a decline of but 20%, both
of which railroads are competitors of the Debtor. Class I
railroads in general showed a decline of about 15%. The
substantial decline in the Debtor’s earnings may be attrib-
uted to the phenomenal rate at which the company’s traffic
increased during war years, since the Debtor showed one of
the greatest percentages of increase of traffic among Class

* This ruling was reaffirmed February 3, 1947. Insurance Group
Committee et al. v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
et al., 15 U. S. Law Week p. 4190.

** The source of the statistics cited herein is Moody's Railroads
Service.

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18

I railroads in the country for the war years. The peak
traffic year of 1944 was for the Debtor 386% above its
1935-39 average as compared with 281% for the Missouri-
Pacific, 270% for the St. Louis-San Francisco and 246%
for Class I railroads generally. An important factor to
bear in mind in reviewing the Debtor’s war time earnings
record is that during this period the Debtor’s traffic ‘‘re-
ceived from connecting lines’’ increased to 68% of its total
traffic as compared with approximately 52% for years just
prior to the war. There is plainly no certainty that the
Debtor will continue to receive the very substantial in-
crease in revenue from this form of traffic. Viewed in this
light it would be wholly unsound to question the expert
judgment of the Commission as to the Debter’s normal earn-
ing power merely on the strength of a ten months earning
statement for 1946. Respondents submit that the petitioners
have made no adequate showing to warrant review by this
Court of the determinations of the three tribunals which
have passed upon the question.

POINT II

The special charges of petitioner Meyer with respect to
Southern Pacific’s alleged illegal control of the Debtor
present no questions for review by this Court.

Petitioner Meyer has renewed in his application to this
Court the arguments he has made throughout this proceed-
ing before the Commission (and subsequently before the
District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals) of injurious
control of the Debtor by Southern Pacific and other rail-
roads. Principally, his contentions are that an alleged di-
version of traffic from the Debtor and failure to solicit traffic
preferentially distorted the Debtor’s earnings record and,
therefore, rendered the Commission’s judgment of its pro-
spective earning power erroneous. As a corollary to this

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19

Se

charge petitioner Meyer maintains that Southern Pacific’s
claim against the Debtor should be subordinated because of
its breach of fiduciary duty to the Debtor. Nothing would be
gained by a detailed review of the evidence before the Com-
mission (or that introduced before the District Court) upon
which the Commission rested its finding that Meyer’s
charges were without merit, which finding the District Court
and Cireuit Court have affirmed. Respondents believe it
sufficient to point out that under the applicable decisions the
charges of petitioner Meyer are not a proper subject for
consideration by this Court.

In Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. 8., 307 U. 8. 125, this
Court made the following statement of the basic rule of ad-
ministrative law:

“*So long as there is warrant in the record for the
judgment of the expert body it must stand. * * * ‘The
judicial function is exhausted when there is found to
be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by
the administrative body.’ Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282, 286-287;
Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297,
303, et seq.”’

(Quoted with approval in J. C. C. v. Jersey City,
322 U.S., page 513).

A like rule has been laid down in connection with railroad
reorganization proceedings under Section 77 where the
scope of judicial review of Commission findings upon certain
matters committed to its exclusive jurisdiction was defined
as limited to ascertaining the existence of material evidence
supporting the Commission’s ruling and the observance of
legal standards. Western Pacific case, supra, 318 U. S.
p. 473.

It is well settled that the control of one carrier by another
is a matter committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (New York Central
Securities Co. v. U. S., 287 U.S. 12, p. 26). The Commission

LOLOL LAA LEONA LEED Le POA i

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20

has given approval to the control of the Debtor by Southern
Pacific (St. Louis S. W. Ry. Control, 180 I. C. C. 175).
Under the doctrine of the foregoing cases, therefore, it
must follow that the propriety of the exercise of such con-
trol is a matter also committed to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commission. And if it is found that its determina-
tion with respect thereto rests upon a sufficient record, com-
piled after opportunity for hearing has been given, the
area of permissible judicial review has been covered.
Plainly, the Commission’s rejection of the charges of
improper control in this case is founded upon an ample
record with full opportunity to be-heard. Petitioner Meyer
introduced considerable evidence on the subject at the initial
Commission hearing in March and April, 1937 (R. 168-212).
From May 5th through May 27th and from September 18th
through 30th, 1939, the Commission held hearings solely to
hear evidence in connection with the Meyer charges. The
record compiled on this matter alone exceeded 2,500 pages
as well as hundreds of exhibits (R. 529-3055). That the
Commission painstakingly reviewed and weighed this evi-
dence is shown by its first report which, for the most part,
is devoted to a discussion of the Meyer charges (R. 3547-
3678). Meyer’s objections to the Commission’s findings
in that report were considered and again rejected by the
Commission in its supplemental report (R. 3742-3752).
When the plan was certified to the District Court Mr. Meyer
was permitted to adduce a formidable amount of additional
evidence in support of his charges (R. 4157-4199, 4202-4209,
4304-5166). Both the District Court and the Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed this vast record, found it more than
adequate and concluded that no evidence had been presented
demonstrating palpable error in the Commission’s findings.
On the basis of this ample record and opportunity to be
heard respondents believe that this Court’s settled decisions
preclude a review of the petitioner’s special charges. The
issues raised by Mr. Meyer ‘‘are matters requiring study
by experts on railroad affairs, involving as they do, expert
analysis of traffic movements, freight loadings, financial

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statements and other data peculiarly within the compre-
hension of the I. C. C. . . . ’’ (District Court opinion, 53
F. Supp. p. 927). They are clearly, therefore, not proper
matters for consideration by this Court.

CONCLUSION
The petitions for certiorari should be denied.
Dated: February 10, 1947.

Respectfully submitted,

Epwin S. S. SunpErianp,
Wuuuo D. Tucker Jr.,
Attorneys for Guaranty Trust Com-
PANY OF New York,
as Trustee under the Debtors’ First Ter-
minal and Unifying Mortgage, Respondent

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_0986%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
