# Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — California v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Respondent in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1945
- **Citation:** 325 U.S. 869

## Text

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Page
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Jurisdiction... __ then died dela et fee ee 2
Question presented...___ Mein bile tala Ae, 2
Statutes involved. ______ PERO E RR ebeia bse wid se eo 3
Statement... Re Teer hh ehtian waned eh wie ces i 3
Argument_____ sre Abts tat sin HSS eee bnde ences oy ee HY 8
Seneiuaon. SSSR OU AM ba i ibae wendy 17
pe gage Ee ON irene oem ue Pac Suk. P 18
CITATIONS
Cases:
Abbott vy. Morgenthau, 93 F. 2d 242, cert iorari denied, 303
Se cone SEREROHAER Ripe hewn poked, 1% 10, 15
Anderson vy. Abbott, 321 U. 8, 349. a ee es pas 12
Becker Co. vy, Cummings, 296 U. §. Leg EE ee Re 12
Booth v. Oakland Bank, 122 Cal. neha dao: 2. Fe ee 14
Brown v. United States, 65 F. 2d 55 ne Seg Z 12
Brownlee vy. Board of Directors of Veterans’ Home of Cali-
fornia, 133 Pac. Snag eT PPS AREEN ewe dC 16
Childers vy, Beaver, 270 U. o 655. 5... cet a eT oor ROSEN 10
Fennell v. United States, 67 F. 2d cing CO sek dik 12
Firet National Bank vy. California, 262 U. 8. 366___ 12
Haley v. United States, 46 F Supp. 4 mobs mnceneecn. 12
Interstate Commerce Commission y. Oregon-Washington R.

Co., 288 U. ght sn TE ee Pte es iets 12
In re Dumont’s Will, 257 N. Y. App. Diy. 952, affirmed,

282 N. Y. 606__. : ; whe bee aie c oe 12
Irvine y, Marshall, 20 How. 558___. : Se re 14
Lawrence y. Shaw, 300 U, 8. 245__. er ere werecarik 10
Miller y. Little, 47 Cal. 348 : tienes 10
Monsen vy. Monsen, 174 Cal. 97 - : ; 14
Nichols y, Emery, 109 Cal. 323___ a 14
Ruddy vy. Rossi, 248 U. 8. 104__ , ese bwin 10
Russell y. Lowth, 21 Minn. 167 ; <a hs sisi de Bisa 10
Russian Fleet Vv. United States, 282 U. Pe Ge ; 12
State y. Bank of Rrietal, 165 Tenn, 461.__. . Ramee 11
Tax Commiasio,, of Unio ¥. Rife, 119 Ohio St. 63..... . 10
Treadway vy, Board of Directors of Veterans’ Home of Cali-

fornia, 14 Cal. App. 75___. i Beaune 14
United States Vv. Allegheny County, 322 U. 8.174... 14

(1)
84230245.

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II
Cases—Continued. Page
United States v. Hall, 98 U. 8, 343....------------------ 10
United States v. Klein, 303 U. 8. 276....---------------- 13
United States v. Stevens, 302 U. S. 623. .---------------- ‘10, 13
Walton v. Cotton, 19 How. 355-_------------------------ 10

Statutes:

Act of July 1, 1902, ¢, 1351, 32 Stat, 552 (24 U. 8. C, 139). 12
Act of June 25, 1910, ¢. 384, 36 Stat. 703 (24 U. 8. C. 136) - 12

Act of July 3, 1930, c. 849, 46 Stat. 991.....-.---------- 5
California Probate Code:
7.) nn ee Teer 13, 20
§ 1020__.....------------------------ +2 2---- =e 20
§ 1027......--------------------------+--------- 8, 21
Maryland Code, Article 93, § 140. --.------------------- 13

World War Veterans’ Act of 1924, § 21, as amended by
the Act of August 12, 1935, c. 510, 49 Stat. 607 (38
UB COO on eck cred cid cncuccncewecndccnsivee 2, 5, 8, 18

Inthe Supreme Gourt of the Hnited States

OcroBeR Term, 1944

No. 1092

STATE OF CaLiroarnta (IN THE Marter or Estare
or Cart A, Linpquist, ALso CALLED Car Linp-
QUIST), PETITIONER

v.
Unirep States or AMERICA

No. 1093

STATE OF CALIFORNIA (IN THE Marrer or Estate

OF Patrick Wa.keEr, Atso KNown as Patrick
J. WALKER), PETITIONER

Vv.
Unirep States or AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR WRI TS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the California Supreme Court
In the Matter of the Estate of Carl A. Lindquist,
(1)

MERRION ec ie ts

2

etc. (L. R. 24-44)" is reported in 25 Adv. Cal.
693; 154 Pac. 2d 879. Its opinion Jn the Matter
of the Estate of Patrick Walker, etc. (W. R. 49-
50) is reported in 25 Adv. Cal. 714; 154 Pac. 2d
891. The opinion of the California District Court
of Appeals, First Appellate District, In the Mat-
ter of Lindquist, not contained in the record, is re-
ported in 144 Pac. 2d 438. The memorandum
opinion of the Superior Court of San Diego
County, California, In the Matter of Walker
(W. R. 21-22) is not officially reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgments of the California Supreme Court
in Nos, 1092-1093 were entered on December 30,
1944 (L. R. 46-47; W. R. 50-51). The petitions
for writs of certiorari were filed on March 30,
1945. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under Section’ 237 (b) of the Judicial Code, as
amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

QUESTION PRESENTED A
Section 21 (3) of the World War Veterans’
Act, as amended by the Act of August 12, 1935,
provides inter alia that proceeds of pension pay-
ments remaining unexpended in the estate of an

In this consolidated brief in opposition, references to the
transcript of record in No. 1092, /n the Matter of Lindquist,
are designated by the symbol L. R.; those to the transcript of
record in No. 1093, Jn the Matter of Walker, by the symbol |
W. R.

3

incompetent veteran “shall escheat’? and ‘shall
be returned’? to the United States where such
proceeds would otherwise escheat to the state of
the veteran’s last legal residence. The sole ques-
tion presented in each ease is whether the Act is
unconstitutional as contravening the Tenth
Amendment. :
STATUTES INVOLVED

The applicable provisions of the Act of August
12, 1935, e. 510, 49 Stat. 607 (38 U. S. C. 450
(3)), and of the California Probate Code are set
forth in the Appendix, infra, pp. 18-21.

STATEMENT

The facts in Nos. 1092-1093 may be viewed as
identical insofar as the question here presented is
concerned.

In No.- 1092, Lindquist, an incompetent World
War veteran of the United States Navy, residing
in San Francisco, California, died intestate and
without known heirs on October 24, 1939 (L. R. 11,
15,17). He left an estate consisting entirely of un-
expended pension moneys paid to his guardian
under a pension award by the United States Vet-
erans Administration, dated December 11, 1935
(L. R. 18). Letters of administration of Lind-
quist’s estate were issued following his death to
the Public Administrator for San Francisco
(L. R. 445), and on April 16, 1940, the guardian
rendered a final accounting and paid over the un-

4

expended balance of the estate, consisting as afore-
said entirely of unexpended pension moneys, to
the Public Administrator (L. R. 8).

On November 7, 1940, the Public Administrator
filed a petition for settlement of final account and
for final distribution of the estate in the Superior
Court of the County of San Francisco, California,
praying that an order be made ‘“‘determining who
are entitled to the estate of said deceased, and
directing that all the * * * remainder of the
estate of said deceased be distributed to the per-
sons who by law are entitled thereto’? (L. R.
11-12). Thereafter, on December 3, 1940, the
United States filed claim with the Administrator
seeking payment to the United States under the
provisions of 38 U. S.C. 450 (8) (Appendix,
infra, pp. 18-20) of all funds in the hands of the
Administrator derived from the deceased’s pen-
sion, in the event such funds would otherwise
escheat to the State of California for want of
heirs (L. R. 14-16).

On July 10, 1942, the Superior Court entered a
decree of settlement of final account and final
distribution (L. R .16-19). The court therein
found that the deceased died intestate and with-
out heirs or next of kin entitled to share in the
estate, and that the estate consisted entirely of
moneys received under the pension award by the
Veterans Administration (L. R. 17-18). The
court denied the claim of the United States for dis-

5

tribution of the estate under the provisions of
38 U. S. C. 450 (3) and instead ordered that the
estate be distributed to the State of California as
escheated property under certain provisions of the
California Probate Code (L. R. 18-19).

In No, 1093, Walker, a veteran of the Spanish
American War and a resident of California, re-
ceived pension payments from the Federal Gov-
ernment commencing June 27, 1899 (W. R. 21,
49). He was subsequently declared incompetent
on October 7, 1938, and thereafter, until his death
on December 11, 1940 (W. R. 1), the pension
payments due him were made to a guardian
(W. R. 22). Following Walker’s death, intestate,
his guardian rendered a final accounting and paid
over the unexpended balance of his estate to the
Public Administrator for the County of San
Diego, California, Walker’s last legal residence,
It is conceded that, as in the Lindquist case, the
funds so paid over consisted entirely of unex-
pended pension moneys paid after the enactment
of the present provisions of 38 U. S. C. 450 (3).

* As noted above, Walker received pension payments as a
veteran of the Spanish American War prior to the Act. of
August 12, 1935, ¢. 510, 49 Stat. 607 (38 U. S. C. 450 (3)).
Before the 1935 amendment, the applicable Section applied
solely to compensation paid to veterans of the World War,
but was otherwise substantially identical with the present
provisions. (See Act of July 3, 1930, ¢. 849, 46 Stat. 991,
993). As stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
California (W. R. 49), the petitioner conceded that Walker's
estate consisted entirely of unexpended pension payments
made after the 1935 enactment, and petitioner does not con-

—_—+

6

On October 26, 1942, the Public Administrator
filed a petition for distribution. (W. R. 9-12) in
the Superior Court of San Diego County, praying
that a decree be made “distributing the remaining
assets of said estate, less costs of closing, to the
persons entitled thereto * * *’? (W. R. 10).
Thereafter, on November 27, 1942, the ‘United
States, relying on the provisions of 38 U. S. C. 450
(3), filed a petition in the Superior Court praying
distribution to the United States of the net estate
upon the ground that the deceased did not leave
surviving him any person capable of succeeding
to the estate under the laws of California (W. R.
15-17). On the same date, the State of Cali-
fornia filed claim in the matter for distribution
of the estate to it on the ground that the estate
property had ‘“‘escheated to the State of Cali-
fornia’? (W. R, 17-19).

On January 29, 1943, in conformity with a
memorandum opinion earlier entered (W. R. 21-
22), the Superior Court entered an ‘“‘order and
decree * * * of distribution” (W. R. 22-24),
in which it was found that there were no known
heirs of the deceased and that the entire estate
subject to -distribution consisted of ‘‘accumula-.
tions from beneficial payments to deceased by the
United States Government,” but which neverthe-
less denied the claim of the United States and

tend otherwise in its petition (cf. W. Pet. 5). Consequently,
no question is involved as to the retroactive effect of the 1935
enactment.

7

instead decreed that the estate should escheat to
the State of California.

The United States appealed from this decree
and that rendered by the Superior Court in the
Lindquist case to the Supreme Court of California
(L. R. 19; W. R. 24-25). The court trans-
ferred the Lindquist case to the District Court of
Appeals for the First Appellate District which re-
versed the holding of the Superior Court and
sustained the claim of the United States for dis-
tribution of Lindquist’s estate to it under the
provisions of 38 U. 8. C. 450 (3). Thereafter, the
Lindquist case and the Walker case were consid-
ered by the Supreme Court of California en bane.
The decision of the California Supreme Court,
entered on December 30, 1944, affirmed, one judge
dissenting, that of the District Court of Appeals
for the First District In the Matter of Lindquist,
thereby sustaining the claim of the United States
for distribution of the Lindquist estate to it. On
the same date, the Supreme Court of California
reversed the decree of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, in the Walker case, adopting its
opinion Jn the Matter of Lindquist.*

‘Although these opinions sustained the constitutionality
of the federal statute involved and affirmed the right of the
United States to receive back unexpended pension moneys
left in the estates of deceased incompetent veterans dying
intestate and without heirs, the court held that the estate
moneys in both cases must be deposited in the state treasury
for a period of five years following the termination of the

642302452

8
ARGUMENT

Section 21 (3) of the World War Veterans’
Act of 1924, as amended (Appendix, infra,
pp. 18-20), provides that funds left in
the hands of guardians of deceased in-
competent veterans ‘‘derived from com-
pensation * * * or pension, payable under
said [pension and compensation] Acts, which
under the law of the State wherein the beneficiary
had his last legal residence would escheat to the
State, shall escheat to the United States and shall
be returned by * * * [the veteran’s] guar-
dian, curator, conservator, or person legally vested
with the care of the beneficiary or his estate, or by
the personal representative of the deceased bene-
ficiary, less legal expenses of any administration
necessary to determine that an escheat is in order,
to the Veterans’ Administration, and shall be de-
posited to the credit of the current appropriations
provided for payment of compensation, insurance,
or pension’’ (38 U.S. C. 450 (3)).

Relying upon the use of the word ‘‘escheat”’ to
characterize the contingent right to the return of
the pension moneys provided _an the statute, peti-

probate proceedings under the provisions of Section 1027 of
the California Probate Code. The United States is filing
conditional cross-petitions for writs of certiorari in these
cases praying a review of this aspect of the court’s opinion
and judgment in each case in the event this Court grants
the petitions here involved. Discussion of the provisions of
Section 1027 of the Probate Code and of cheir possible effect
upon the federal statute here involved is contained therein.

9

tioner contends that the statute is an invasion of
the reserved rights of the states under the Tenth
Amendment to regulate the distribution of prop-
erty in the estates of its citizens dying intestate.
To support this position, petitioner urges (1) that
“the money having been paid to the deceased
without reservation, the United States can no
longer assert control over it’’ (L. Pet. 8; W.
Pet. 8); and (2) that “a state * * *
* * * sole and exclusive pow 7)? 9
over the disposition of the property of its
residents’’ (L. Pet. 9; W. Pet. 8). The Supreme
Court of California correctly, we maintain, re-
jected these contentions in the instant context,
holding that the United States had imposed a
permissible condition on the grant of a federal
bounty and that, in any event, the payment and
acceptance of the pension money under the terms
prescribed by the statute created a valid contrac-
tual obligation to return the money upon the
occurrence of the condition.
1. As clearly appears from the Act here in-
volved, the pension payments were not, as peti-
tioner contends, “paid without reservation. ”’
Here, the United States affixed to its grant of
pension moneys the definite condition that the
wnexpended portion thereof should revert to the
United States in circumstances wherein the money
otherwise would escheat to the state. The validity
of conditions attached to federal grants has con-
sistently been upheld, notwithstanding the fact

10

that they operate in a field ordinarily reserved to
the states.“ Thus, in Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104,
a provision attached to the grant of homestead
lands that such lands should not be subject to levy
or attachment in satisfaction of debts contracted
by the grantee prior to the grant was sustained.
See also Miller v. Little, 47 Cal. 348; Russell y.
Lowth, 21 Minn. 167, 169-170. Similar provisions
with respect to pension payments were approved
in Walton v. Cotton, 19 How. 399, 358; ef. United
States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343, 354-355, and a statu-
tory exemption of such payments from local taxa-
tion was specifically upheld in Lawrence v. Shaw,
300 U. S, 245. Nor is the federal condition in-
valid because it affects state laws relating to
descent and distribution of decedents’ estates.
United States v. Stevens, 302 U. 8. 623; Childers
v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 555; Tax Commission of Ohio
v. Rife, 119 Ohio St. 83; Abbott vy. Morgenthau,
93 F. 2d 242 (App. D. C.), certiorari denied, 303
U. S. 638.° Accordingly, it is submitted that the

* The essential reasonableness of the condition was recog-
nized by the court below. It stated: “That unexpended pen-
sion money, under the conditions enumerated in the statute,
should be returned to its source and be used in further aid
of veterans, is eminently just and equitable” (L. R. 30;
W. R. 34).

°In Abbott v. Morgenthau, the court said (93 F. 2d at
p. 245):

“° © Felley * * © had no vested legal right to
& pension at all, for, as has been said time and time again,
pensions are bounties which Congress has the right to give,
to withhold, to distribute, or to recall, at its discretion.

11

United States may validly prescribe that where
the bounty granted for the relief of a veteran is
not entirely utilized for that purpose prior to
death, the unexpended residue shall revert to the
donor. This provision for reversion, conse-
quently, despite the legislative use of the word
“escheat,’’ is in no sense the technical type of
escheat which alone might lend color to peti-
tioner’s arguments. The legislative intent is
clear and a technical connotation should not be
given the word in such cireumstances.° Under
familiar canons of construction, the statute

When, therefore, it is considered that Congress could annex
whatever conditions it pleased whenever it pleased to the
grant or the gratuity, it seems to us clear that it was
competent for Congress to say, as it did say, that, if anyone
enjoyed the benefits of the home [for veterans] and was still
a member of the home at the time of his death, his accumu-
lated pension money should be distributed in a particular
manner. * * 2%»

°Cf. State v. Bank of Bristol, 165 Tenn. 461, 468-469,
Where the Tennessee Supreme Court said of this quasi-con-
tractual right of reversion or “escheat” under the provisions
of 38 U.S. C. 450 (3) as then applicable:

“It seems a mistake to us to say that the government
retained any title to or interest in this fund after it was paid
to the guardian. The government retained control of the
administration of the fund. to a limited extent, and made a
provision with reference to escheat. Such provisions are
sustained because the guardian was not bound to accept the
fund, and if he did accept, he took on the terms prescribed
by the Act of Congress.”

Compare also, the numerous cases arising under Sections
451, 512 and 514 of Title 38 of the Code, where the courts
have invariably, without discussion, assumed the validity

12

should be construed in such manner as to render
it constitutional. Becker Co. v. Cummings, 297
U. S. 74, 80; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Oregon-Washington R. Co., 288 U. S. 14, 40;
Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 492.

The contention of California that it possesses
an absolute power of escheat merely because the
funds in question were possessed by her residents
or present in her territory at the time of death
is untenable. The state may not frustrate the
purposes of national legislation by the declaration
of an escheat. First National Bank v. California,
262 U. S. 366, 369-370; ef. Anderson v. Abbott,
321 U. S. 349, 365. Nor does the fact that the
funds have been involved in state probate pro-
ceedings for a determination of the nonexistence
of heirs establish any right of escheat,’ it having

of provisions relating to war risk insurance policies that
payments not yet made shall “escheat” to the Federal Gov-
ernment. Brown vy. United States, 65 F. 2d 65, 67 (C. C. A.
9); Fennell vy. United States, 67 F. 2d 768 (C. C. A. 5);
Haley v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D. Mont.) ; /% re
Dumont’s Wil N. Y. App. Div. 952, 953, affirmed, 282
N. Y. 606.

7 While Congress could have limited the inheritance of
pension moneys to the widow, dependent children or de-
pendent mother or father as was done in the Act of July 1,
1902, c. 1351, 32 Stat. 552, 564 (24 U.S. C. 139) or could have
provided that all the decedent’s personal property would
pass to the home for veterans, subject to reclamation by the
heirs within five years (Act of June 25, 1910, c. 384, 36 Stat.
703, 736 (24 U. S. C. 136) ), it is to be observed that the fed-
eral statute here involved follows the state law in respect of

ee BRO LS Nee IEE RE _—

13

been held in United States v. Klein, 303 U. §.
276, that the custody of funds by a court does not
enable its sovereign to prevent the disposition of
the funds under the law otherwise applicable to
them. As the court below remarked (L. R. 35;
W. R. 40): ‘‘A state escheat statute is based upon
state sovereignty and is a direction for the devolu-
tion of property. It may not prevail over the
United States Constitution or over a congres-
sional act which does not deprive one of property
interests without due process of law.”’

2. The statutory provision in question also is
enforceable as a contract. In United States v.
Stevens, 302 U. 8. 623. an ex-soldier executed an
agreement in order to obtain admission into the
national veterans’ home that upon the death of
the veteran while a member of the home, all his
personal property should pass to the home sub-

descent and distribution and that it is only at the point where
the escheat to the state would otherwise occur that the federal
statute operates. This course was made necessary by the
varying laws of the states as to the degree of consanguinity
necessary to qualify next-of-kin as heirs in cases of intestacy.
Compare, e. g., the restricted right of escheat given by Sec-
tion 231 of the California Probate Code (Appendix, infra,
p. 20), that “If the decedent leaves no one to take his estate
or any portion thereof, under the laws of this state, the same
escheats to the state * * *,” with the broader right of
escheat provided by the Maryland Code, Art. 93, Sec. 140,
that “If there be no widow or relations of the intestate
Within the fifth degree, which shall be reckoned by counting
down from the common ancestor to the more remote, the
whole surplus shall belong to the State * * *”

14

ject to reclamation within five years by legatees
or persons entitled to receive the property by
inheritance. The Court held the Government
could enforce the agreement on death as a con-
tractual obligation and reversed the circuit court
of appeals which had judged the federal statute
authorizing the contract invalid as an invasion
of the rights of the state of the veteran’s domi-
cile to regulate testamentary dispositions. It
is noted (lL. Pet. 16; W. Pet. 18) that
in the course of the decision in the Stevens case,
the Court remarked that the contract there upheld
was in conformity with and enforceable under
the laws of Massachusetts, the veteran’s domicile.
It is believed that the Court pointed to this fact
for the purpose of demonstrating that it was
unnecessary to decide whether federal or state
law governed such contract. It is submitted that
here federal law is solely applicable. FZ. g., Irvine
v. Marshall, 20 How. 558; United States v. Alle-
gheny County, 322 U. 8S. 174. In any event, it
is clear that contracts to transfer such property
as a veteran may possess at death also are valid
under California law, both as to publie contracts
of the nature here involved (Treadway v. Board
of Directors of Veterans’ Home of California, 14
Cal. App. 75) and as to private contracts (Nichols
v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323; Booth v. Oakland Bank,
122 Cal. 19; Monsen v. Monsen, 174 Cal. 97).

15

It is settled, moreover, under federal and Cali-
fornia holdings alike, that formal consent by the
veteran to a statutory provision of the nature here
involved is not requisite to its enforcement. In
Abbott v. Morgenthau, 93 F. 2d 242 (App. D. C.),
certiorari denied, 303 U. S. 638, the veteran in-
volved had signed an application for admission
to the National Veterans’ Home, one proviso of
which stipulated for the distribution of certain
unexpended pension payments on deposit with the
treasurer of the home without probate proceed-
ings, in a manner prescribed by statute. The
veteran having been incompetent and under
guardianship at the time of signing, the conten-
tion was made that the statutory provision was
inoperative because the veteran lacked capacity to
contract and th’ -wardianship court had not signi-
fied its approv. of his admission. The court en-
forced the condition, stating in part (93 F. 2d
at p. 245): ;

But the inclusion of this [statutory]
language in the application form added
nothing to the effectiveness of the statute,
nor was there any necessity for an agree-
ment on Felley’s part to make it binding
upon him as a member of the home; and
this is true because there is nothing in the
statute which requires consent to its terms
on the part of the applicant for admission
to the home. It is a self-executing act—
complete in itself and requiring neither
consent or agreement to become operative.

16

It was not, therefore, Felley’s consent that
transferred the pension money to the home
fund, but his presence inthehome * * *,
Similarly, in Brownlee v. Board of Directors of
Veterans’ Home of California, 133 Pac. 1158 (Cal,
D. C. A.), hearing denied by the Supreme Court
of California, the court held enforceable the pro-
visions of a California statute enacted after the
admission of a veteran to the state veterans’ home
that ‘‘any moneys belonging to the members of
the Home”’ should, ‘‘upon their death, be held as
a trust fund, to be paid by the board, directly and
without probate,” to those entitled to the veteran's
estate, provided claim was made within five years.
The veteran died intestate. The court held, de
spite the fact that the veteran had not expressly
consented to the operation of the statute enacted
subsequent to his admission to the home, that the
veteran’s enjoyment of the benefits of the home,
and his failure to make a will otherwise disposing
of his property, resulted in an implied agreement,
It is thus plain that both federal and California
courts uphold the imposition of conditions of this
nature when incorporated into statutes providing
for the grant of benefits and gratuities, irrespec
tive of whether the consent of the veteran is
formally expressed as in the Stevens case or il
plied by the acceptance of the gratuity to which
the condition attached.

17

CONCLUSION

The decision below is correct and no conflict
exists. It is therefore respectfully submitted that
the petitions for writs of certiorar’ should be
denied.

Hueu B. Cox,
Acting Solicitor General.
Francis M. Sura,
Assistant Attorney General.
Pau A. SWEENEY,
BonNELL PHILLIPS,
WALTER J. CumMMINGS, Jr.,
Attorneys.

Aprin 1945,

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386416_0100%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.